Download A Foundation of Dust: Analyzing the Relationship between Famine

 A Foundation of Dust: Analyzing the Relationship between Famine and
Political Stability in Developing States
By:
Russell E. Schloemer
Submitted to the graduate degree program in Sociology and the Graduate Faculty of the
University of Kansas in partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Master of Arts.
__________________________________
Chair David Smith
__________________________________
Ebenezer Obadare
__________________________________
Elif Andac
Date Defended: April 6, 2012
i The Thesis Committee for Russell Schloemer
certifies that this is the approved version of the following thesis:
A Foundation of Dust: Analyzing the Relationship between Famine and Political
Stability in Developing States
__________________________________
Chair David Smith
Date approved: April 6, 2012
ii Contents
Introduction………………………………………………………………………………….……1
Literature Review………………………………………………………………………………….3
Historical Understandings of Famine……………………………………………………..3
Current Understanding of Famine………………………………………………………...5
Coping With Famine………………………………………………………………………6
Methods……………………………………………………………………………………………8
Findings…………………………………………………………………………………………...9
Ethiopia (1970-1974) ……………………………………………………………………..9
Ethiopia (1980-1985)…………………………………………………………………….13
Bangladesh (1974)……………………………………………………………………….18
India (1966-1967) “Bihar Famine”………………………………………………………20
India (1971-1973) “Maharashtra Drought”……………………………………………...23
Comparison of Cases…………………………………………………………………………….24
Discussion and Conclusion………………………………………………………………………29
References………………………………………………………………………………………..32
iii Abstract:
Despite a modern agricultural surplus relative to humanity’s food needs and established means of
transport, famine remains a threat for several states around the world. It would seem obvious
that famine would be a strong destabilizing force, but this has not always been the case. This
study compares several prominent famines in Ethiopia (1970-74, 1980-85), India (1966-67,
1971-1973) and Bangladesh (1974) in order to determine what factors resulting from famine
actually cause political instability by analyzing historical events through the stability criteria of
the World Bank. This research will demonstrate that while famine is economically destructive
and often results in political instability, the primary driver of stability or instability after a famine
is the relative degree of government intervention for positive or negative effect. This adds to our
understanding of government’s role in influencing the effects of food shortage upon society and
overall stability of the state.
iv A Foundation of Dust: Analyzing the Relationship between Famine and Political
Stability in Developing States
Russell Schloemer
University of Kansas
INTRODUCTION:
Famine has existed as a nearly constant haunting specter in agricultural societies around
the world and is the natural companion for an agricultural society. Subsistence farming rendered
humanity dependent upon the predictable nature of the seasons, rains, temperatures and stable
environmental circumstances in order to have reliable access to food. When these factors become
unstable, resulting in droughts, flood or other environmental disasters, famine can occur as a
result and tends to cause substantial disruptions in political order (Carlson 1982).
The population explosion which accompanied the Industrial Revolution in Europe
brought on enormous worry that agricultural production would not be able to meet the increasing
demand for food which inspired the Thomas Malthus to write his famous Essay on the Principle
of Population in 1798. His work predicted widespread warfare, spread of disease and famine
based primarily on the idea that for linear population growth to continue an exponential increase
in resources would be required. His works have inspired generations of Malthusians to discuss
the potentially devastating consequences of a planet with insufficient resources to support
humanity (Malthus 1798).
What Malthus did not anticipate were the ever-more innovative agricultural practices that
have permitted a global surplus of food and the gradual reduction in its real cost over time. This,
along with the flexible and established trade lines that have come with increased globalization,
1 has reduced the impact of natural disasters and the other original causes of famine. Yet famine
persists. Political turmoil, war and economic factors can occasionally still prevent substantial
populations from receiving food in a regular manner causing hoarding, panic and overall social
chaos. Often famine conditions present themselves in states that are still highly reliant on
subsistence agriculture and are not accustomed to importing large quantities of food. This,
according to Devereux (1993), is the new face of famine: not a creature of nature but of markets
and availability.
Famines are now generally considered to be primarily economic and social events,
exposing weakness in the economic system. If a famine affects enough of the population or
economic base, this can cause disruption in the overall political stability of the state itself. With
a collapse in overall economic conditions, wages or government order with accompanying price
shocks can lead to widespread protests, riots or even violent overthrow of governments. This is
hardly surprising when one considers the importance of bread riots in revolutions from France in
the 1790s to Russia and Germany in the late 1910s (Collier 2007).
But even in some cases where there are substantial food crises, there is not accompanying
political destabilization and in other states there are surprisingly high levels of instability that
result from the disruption of famine and drought. The primary factor that intervenes between
the two is government intervention, or the lack thereof, with either positive or negative
consequences for the society as a whole. This work investigates one of those potential
consequences of this modern famine: the effects of famine on political stability and how
governments intervene in developing states to cope with it.
For the purposes of this study political stability indicators will be roughly based on those
used by the World Bank in terms of violence; violent uprisings, civil unrest and state violence as
2 well as economic instability factors which have been widely acknowledged (World Bank 2011).
By examining the cases of famine in Ethiopia, India and Bangladesh, this work hopes to address
how famine directly interacts with these factors to affect government stability in varying ways.
Each famine is examined to determine the forces which led up to their unique situations and the
particular political, civil or economic events which took place in each country prior to, during
and after the famine. This is supplemented with analysis of information on political stability
from the World Bank to provide additional perspective on the events.
LITERATURE REVIEW:
Historical Understandings of Famine:
Traditionally famine has been understood to be due to a sudden loss of food or ability to
produce food, a situation referred to as Food Availability Decline (FAD). Pre-modern famines
would result from “natural” causes such as a population growth, drought, floods or changing
environmental conditions that outpaced society’s ability to adapt or maintain sufficient stores.
Much of this stems from Thomas Malthus’ famous Essay on the Principle of Population in 1798.
His work predicted widespread warfare, spread of disease and famine, based primarily on the
idea that, for linear population growth to continue, an exponential increase in resources would be
required (Malthus 1798).
The mentality of insufficient food being the primary problem of famines remained
prevalent in approaching famine through the 1970s which foisted off the responsibility for
famine on “uncivilized” peoples. This perspective can be demonstrated in Tawney’s description
of famine conditions in China in 1932:
3 “In the case of famine, … [in China], consists in the primitive organization, and absence
of surplus resources over daily needs, which turn the misfortune of individuals into a
general catastrophe… (pg. 77 as quoted in Rahmato 1991, pg. 99)
It is this semi-colonialist perspective that was deeply influential for researchers 1950s and 1960s
who saw the primary problem with famine to be lack of agricultural modernization which could
be used synonymously with Westernization. Consequently policy prescriptions tended to focus
on solving famine by increasing the production of food with rationalized tools of increased
agricultural yield, temporary food aid, irrigation projects and the expansion of cultivated land.
The so-called “Green Revolution” that resulted from these policies was seen as a cure for famine
in finding low cost means of providing greater food supply security and production for
developing states, which would ideally fix the problem of famine according to the perspective of
FAD (Grada 2007). Unfortunately, famine continued to be prevalent outside of the Western
world, even in cases those exporting agricultural products which undermined the reliability of
FAD as a means of understanding famines.
Famine theory was revolutionized in the wake of Amartya Sen’s 1981 publication
Poverty and Famines: An Essay on Entitlement and Deprivation. Sen rejects the idea that
famine is due to a lack of food, noting through his example of the Great Bengal Famine of 1943
that many individuals starved to death in sight of food. He suggests that food was not the
primary issue, but that the peasantry lacked the economic means with which to obtain food,
either by having enough funds or by lacking the ability to find work with a wage. With the
proliferation of modern agricultural production after the 1950s, there has been sufficient surplus
to easily feed the world’s population, but there were still many places where the individuals
could not obtain food. Sen points to this economic or physical access to food as the primary
issue for those who suffer from famine and consequently recommends that famine will continue
4 to be a problem until the economic factors are addressed (Sen 1981, Olsson 1987).
Current Understanding of Famine:
This change in perspective ushered in a new way of understanding famine in an
increasingly industrial and globalized world. Webb and Braun provide a more appropriately
nuanced definition of modern famine:
(1) Extreme, geographically concentrated shortfalls in food consumption that result in
chronic loss of body weight and rise in excess mortality (a net increase above average
rates)
(2) Massive social disruption, including community dislocation (increased distress
migration and out-migration of entire families), and “abnormal” behavior (increased
reliance on foraged foods, conflict among neighbors, increased begging)
(3) Long-term resource depletion, including the degradation of productive material
assets, of the natural resource base, and of human capital (pg. 10-11). (1994)
This allows famine to be separated from generalized hunger, often present even in industrialized
states, and be recognized as an unusually severe social and economic situation for a substantial
population of individuals over a long enough period of time that it breaks down normal
functioning. Currey’s (1981) definition is helpful in understanding the social implications of
famine:
Famine might be more effectively defined as the community syndrome which results
when social, economic and administrative structures are already under stress and are
further triggered by one, or several discrete disruptions which accelerate the incidence of
many symptoms, or crisis adjustments, of which one is epidemic malnutrition (pg. 123,
1981)
Given the absolutely essential nature of food as a resource, famine strikes at the structural
stability of many social systems, particularly those of the state.
5 Coping With Famine:
Developed states can frequently avoid the negative conditions of famine because of the
economic resources at the disposal of both the relatively affluent citizenry and the government
itself. It has been observed that while the U.S. and other Western countries can experience long
and devastating droughts, floods or natural disasters, their extensive infrastructure system and
financial reserves permit the state and relief agencies to diminish the impact on the overall social
structure. Even outside the West, when famines can be accurately predicted, supply chains can
be set up and the worst of the situation can be avoided. Developing states frequently do not
have the concrete infrastructure or financial resources necessary to weather such a situation and
are left particularly vulnerable to wide-scale system collapse and typically bear the full brunt of a
severe famine (Olsson 1993).
Given these conditions, famine can have unfortunate and long-lasting effects on the
societies that experience it. Famine tends to hit rural areas, and, consequently subsistence-level
peasant agriculture, the hardest and have minimal effect on urban areas which have better
infrastructure and access to foreign food resources. Developing states often rely on cash crops
and a strong agricultural base as a source of revenue both for government budgets and to support
fledgling industrial growth. If a famine is sufficiently long or widespread it could potentially cut
into economic growth through inflation and loss of revenue which in turn impacts economic
growth, a key factor in the stability of states. Less stability and growth also leads to the
withdrawal of foreign investment which only further compounds the issue (Alesina et. al. 1992;
Feng 1997).
If a famine is sufficiently long or widespread it could also potentially lead to mass
migration as people move to find more plentiful food sources which can put a serious strain on
6 state resources and on the communities that have to house and support these refugees. Often, the
nature of the impending refugee crisis alone far outweighs the consequences of what would
otherwise be a localized issue. Costs to the state can get to the point where governments will
often avoid dealing with the issues of an unexpected famine in the hopes that those affected will
solve the problems on their own (Torry 1984). This may be a prudent choice in light of research
that indicates the scale of grievance does not correlate with the corresponding levels of rebellion
or insurrection, even in the cases oppression or essential resources scarcity such as food, fuel and
water (Jenkins and Schock 1992; Collier 2007).
Unfortunately, the presence of serious drought or natural disaster, particularly among
troublesome rural populations can be seen by governments as an opportunity by governments to
exacerbate the situation in order to punish rebel groups and the populations that provide them
with resources. This was horrifically demonstrated in the Soviet Union’s (USSR) use of
starvation to hamper Ukrainian nationalism in the 1930s, the People’s Republic of China (PRC)
use of the agricultural disaster following the “Great Leap Forward” to subdue the peasantry from
1958-1962 or the repeated use of engineered famine as a tool against residents of Darfur in
Sudan from 1983-2005. Developing states tend to support urban areas over rural areas to
decrease chances of organized opposition in high density population areas and focus on the tax
base of high value economic production present in cities. While it is rare for famine to be
exploited as a weapon like it was for the USSR and PRC, the consequences of its use are
devastating when it does happen. (Mishler and Rose 2001)
Famines are regularly associated with a decrease in economic performance and could be
seen as possible precipitators of both political and economic instability as a result Paul Collier’s
Bottom Billion provides extensive reading on the effects of economic conditions on relative
7 political stability. Rather than pointing to particular ideologies or grievances as the cause of
uprisings, Collier suggests that economic growth rates are the best indicators of whether or not
governments will experience violent uprising. High levels of growth tend to lead to higher rates
of employment and consequently lower rates of rebel activity. Low rates of growth tend to lead
to population growth outpacing job creation and higher rates of rebel activity. Depending on
how governments handle these conditions, this can lead to relatively high or low degrees of
political stability (Collier 2007; World Bank 2012).
METHODS:
For the purpose of understanding the effects of famine on political stability, I have
chosen to use Mill’s method of difference with a focus on document analysis of historical
accounts of famines supplemented by World Bank data on political stability. This approach
permits broad analysis of circumstances relating to the famines discussed which is essential for
an event with such a broad impact like the famines studied here. Economic and political factors
which famine-affected states hold in common can be demonstrated to be irrelevant if they do not
correspond with government instability. Factors that vary in accordance with relative
government stability after the famine will be considered as possibly causal variables.
The primary effects I look at are the increase in rebel movements, civil unrest1, change in
economic conditions (GDP, import/export rates, government consumption and per capita GDP)
and government policy pertaining to the famine. Each of these factors address the criteria
loosely borrowed from the World Bank and economists like Collier (2007) and are generally
accepted to demonstrate the relative strengthening or weakening of the state as a result of famine.
1
That is, protests, demonstrations, sit‐ins or other forms of non‐violent political demonstration. 8 For the purposes of the study, I ruled out famines that seemed to be intentionally
engineered by governments or occupying forces2 as these states are likely to have intentionally
manipulated results that disproportionately an outcome desired by government authorities. I
have also ruled out famines where the degree of government involvement in initiating the famine
is of significant debate3 in order to avoid potential bias. Famines that occurred under colonial
occupation were also discounted because of the incentive for imperial powers to accidentally
begin a famine due to their economic policies4 and isolate themselves from potential
consequences and thus lack incentive to intervene. This leaves only states where either
economic or environmental conditions resulted in the initial cause of the famine. All states
chosen for study were independent from direct foreign control and colonization or had remained
sovereign for some time, mitigating the lingering influence of imperialist power and economic
structures which were generally far removed from the consequences of disasters and had
substantially different power relations with the populous than those maintained by independent
states.
FINDINGS:
Ethiopia (1970-1974)
Ethiopia is no stranger to famine, having suffered many over its multi-thousand year
history, going back to early Egyptian records of massive starvation in the kingdom of Axum.
According to Richard Pankhurst, between the 14th and 19th century, Ethiopia suffered through a
famine roughly once a decade. This occurs in part because the Ethiopian agricultural system is
based on regular monsoon rains, and a few years of below average rains can cause serious food
2
Examples being the Ukrainian famine of 1932‐1933 or the Netherlands in 1944. Examples being China’s Cultural Revolution from 1958‐1961 or in Sudan in 1998 4
Such as the Great Bengal Famine of 1943 or the numerous famines that took place in India throughout the 1800s 3
9 shortages across the country (Gill 2010; Rahmato 1991). Ethiopian landlords commonly
demanded peasants send them 50-75% of their crop as rent, leaving peasants with only enough
agricultural product to subsist with little surplus to save for regular drought. This practice left
the peasantry exposed in times of shortage, having little by way of stored surplus for hard times.
This often resulted in the death of tens or hundreds of thousands of civilians in times of crisis
with little emphasis on relief from the elite landowners. Despite the massive casualties resulting
from these famines, the landowners tended to take the perspective that there would always be
more peasants to work the land and that their lives were not worth preserving at the cost of
agricultural production. This devastating cycle of high rents followed by widespread famine
continued through the occupation of Ethiopia by Italy in 1936 when the Emperor at the time,
Haile Selassie, was forced into exile (Legum 1975).
In 1942, Selassie returned to Ethiopia from exile with a British expeditionary army and
forced the occupying Italian army to retreat. From there, Selassie consolidated the country into a
semi-feudal state, dividing previously public land into private tracts which were given to
aristocratic allies of the regime either for free or at far below market value. Members of the
developing middle class were also granted tracts of with the hope that this would tie the financial
and political future of the bourgeoisie to the success of the monarchy. In order to maintain this
system of privilege for the relatively wealthy, the Selassie government authorized increased
taxes on the peasantry (Hancock 1985).
Perhaps unsurprisingly, the Selassie government did not put a high emphasis on
sheltering the peasantry from the mercurial weather patterns of Ethiopia. Hancock (1985) notes
that as far back as the 9th century AD there is no mention of any widespread policy in Ethiopia to
handle recurrent famine beyond some “piecemeal attempts to feed the hungry in lean years (pg
10 71).” In keeping with this tendency, Selassie’s government failed to put a system in place to
prevent the peasantry from recurrent famine. Indeed, when famine later struck, foreign
journalists were surprised by officials’ lack of concern for the plight of the peasants. Bureaucrats
showed far more concern about possibly upsetting superiors with bad economic news and losing
their positions than the needs of the starving peasantry (Gill 2010).
When consistent rains did not fall in 1970-1971 the Selassie administration did not begin
any plan of assistance. This disregard for the well-being of the peasantry can be shown via
Ethiopian export policies. Through 1973, Ethiopia was still net exporter of agricultural goods, to
the point that the government was able to demand increases in cash crops every year, even as the
drought increased in intensity (Legum 1975).
This policy of disengagement from the suffering of the peasantry was so pervasive that
the crisis in Ethiopia was generally unknown outside of the country from 1970-1972. It was not
until 1973 with the production of a British television documentary describing the suffering on the
ground, The Unknown Famine, that international attention focused on Ethiopia. Ironically, the
program was viewed by the British long before many Ethiopians saw it and it was only when
expatriates send the film back to Ethiopia that the general public understood the devastation that
was taking place (Gill, 2010).
Under the cloak of silence, the Selassie government used the burgeoning famine as a
means of punishing rebel movements and the ethnic populations that supported them. Ethiopia
has been a multi-ethnic kingdom for decades and in the aftermath of the Italian occupation a
number of the subject ethnicities had sought independence. The regions of Eretria, Trigray,
Gondar and Ogaden all supported substantial rebel movements that had been quelled periodically
by the national government. Given that these ethnically controlled areas had been hit hard by the
11 drought and ensuing famine, they became easy targets for predatory government action. The
province of Wollo, already facing severe shortages of foodstuffs only had the situation
aggravated by government blockades of aid and military campaigns to crush weakened rebel
movements (Gill 2010). Consequently the famine was worst in Wollo killing tens of thousands,
but the government also took action which significantly aggravated the situations in Gondar and
Gojjam, Harrarghe and Bale, (Rahmato 1991).
Increasing food prices from the famine led to inflation which was bolstered by the spike
in oil prices in the aftermath of the 1973 Yom Kippur War. Both of these led to serious
discontent and created conditions prime for revolt. Students, educated through Ethiopia’s
university system, and the urban population of Addis Ababa began sporadic protests in 1972
which became a regular occurrence by early 1974 after The Unknown Famine began to be
viewed in Ethiopia (Legum 1975; Gill 2010). In addition to the famine and student protests,
soldiers became discontented because they had not been receiving regular supplies. Rations
were spoiled, water was often hard to come by and the government was becoming more and
more irregular in sending soldiers their pay. In January of 1974, the Fourth Division of the army
had mutinied which inspired other units to revolt throughout the early part of the year. By April,
hundreds of thousands were marching in urban areas in protest on a regular basis. In September,
a coalition of military units that referred to themselves as the Dergue overthrew the government,
imprisoning or killing the heads of various political organs and finally by arresting Selassie
himself on September 12th, 1974 (Zewde 2001; Handcock 1985; Gill 2010; Legum 1975;
Mengisteab 1990).
By 1975, the drought conditions had subsided, and without the Selassie government’s
efforts to worsen the crisis for the peasantry, the country began to recover. The official death toll
12 of the famine, accounted for by the Dergue government after the coup, was between 40,000 and
200,000, but the actual numbers are uncertain due to poor record keeping. UNICEF pegged the
deaths in Wollo alone at 50,000-100,000 (Gill 2010). The government suggested that 800,000
were affected by the famine by 1973, but Legum suggests that number was up to 2.4 million
given that government tallies did not include that drought conditions began in 1971. Legum
estimates that roughly 100,000 people died and that while urban areas may have had conditions
return to normal by 1974, that rural areas continued to suffer until the next serious famine in
1980 (Legum 1975; Gill 2010).
Ethiopia (1980-1985)
The Ethiopian famine from 1980-1985 is one of the most intensely studied and discussed
famines of the modern era. Given its widespread international attention garnered through the
UN and organizations like BandAid, much of the literary and popular focus on modern famine is
seen through the lens of this Ethiopian crisis, to the point where the mention of famine still
brings up images of starving Ethiopian children covered in flies (Gill 2010).
After the Dergue deposed Emperor Haile Selassie, there was a belief that the various
rebellions would die away and tranquility would return to Ethiopia. Unfortunately, within three
years of the coup there were active rebel movements in 12 out of the 14 administrative districts
in Ethiopia, the worst of these being the Eritrean and Ogaden revolts. Rebellions in Tigre, Wollo
and Gondar also demanded precious government resources (Hancock 1985). Citizens in those
states expressed to journalists in 1977 that the primary reason for continued rebellions was that
the central government had not aided in relief during the 1971-1974 famine. This perception was
difficult to shake, given that these ethnicities were still being ruled by an Amharic government
13 out of the capital of Addis Ababa. While the Dergue went to great lengths to distance
themselves from the Selassie government, little changed in terms of the daily life of the
Ethiopian peasantry (Carlson 1982).
Beginning in 1979 when another drought began, the ideologically socialist Ethiopian
government used the emergency as justification to collectivize agriculture under state control and
attempt to encourage the proletarianization of the rural population. It was hoped that this would
raise agricultural production with more rationalized techniques while aiding in the fledgling
industrialization of the country. Taxes were raised to higher or “punitive” levels to discourage
subsistence farming in rural areas and drive citizens from their land. Food prices were set at
artificially low levels which only further hampered peasant’s efforts to sell any surplus they
might have. Citizen’s movement within the country was restricted, preventing peasants from
getting to alternative markets to sell cash crops. At the same time, the government mandated
increased production quotas from the peasantry to sell directly to the government at deflated
prices. Even at the height of the famine, the Amhara and Tigray regions were exporting grain
even while their citizens were starving, not unlike the 1974 famine in Wollo. At the same time,
the government was able to either sell food back to the citizenry at increased price or sell it on
the international market for a profit (Keneally 2011).
Indirectly, the Ethiopian government made the situation far worse through its
collectivized agricultural policies. Collectivized farms were put together haphazardly and did
not have the level of production which the Dergue government had expected, compounding the
food shortage. Markets were closed in response to peasants seeking to supplement their food on
the black market with the government declaring that time spent selling produce was time which
was not spent farming and therefore wasted. The Dergue opted to collect food directly from
14 farms both to enrich the government and cripple any alternative bourgeoisie economic structures.
When this did not discourage the peasants from seeking out black market foodstuffs, the Dergue
began performing systematic air strikes on markets during harvest. These government efforts
were most concentrated in the regions of Tigray and Amhara where the food shortages were the
worst, forcing much of the peasantry into starvation or self-exile (Gill 2010, Keneally 2011).
Additionally, the Dergue government took the opportunity the famine presented to
resettle large sections of ethnic groups to different parts of the country in a strategy to decrease
the resource base of the various rebel movements, force nomads into taxable agricultural
production and deal with the growing urban homeless population (Keneally 2011). Deportations
were frequently at random amongst the existing populations, taking children from parents and
separating husbands from wives. These efforts were often taken under the guise that they would
prevent future famine by moving farmers from famine-prone areas to fallow land that would be
at less risk of periodic drought. While supposedly voluntary, the resettling was often done by
force or fraud. Citizens were told they would receive food, immunizations for their cattle or other
supplies, only to be hurried onto buses or aircraft and simply dropped off in another part of the
country. People were sometimes picked up at random, simply walking down the road or while
attending the market they would be kidnapped by soldiers who had been given a quota for a total
number of refugees to take with them (Keneally 2011). Zewde estimates that only a half million
were actually successfully transported to a different part of the country, but the original
government plan called for over 2.5 million people to be resettled, a full 6% of the population at
the time (Hancock 1985: Zewde 2001).
Probably the most devastating aspect of the Dergue’s reaction to the famine was the way
in which they used starvation to suppress rebel movements, an intensified version of the Selassie
15 government’s policies. Mass deportation not only depleted the reserves of manpower which the
rebels depended upon, but as expressed by Mengistus Haile Mariam, the leader of the Dergue,
“Food is a major element in our strategy against the secessionists” (Gill 2010:45). Dawit WoldeGiorgis, who organized the relief efforts during the famine, recalled hearing Mengistu quote Mao
Zedong in suggesting that rebels were like fish in the sea, “‘Without the sea there will be no
fish,’ he said. ‘We have to drain the sea, or if we cannot completely drain it, we must bring it to
a level where they will lack room to move at will, and their movements will be easily restricted.”
(Gill 2010:46). For quite some time, Mengistu’s strategy of depriving the rebellious regions of
food aid was successful, forcing rebels to seek food instead of fighting government forces.
Military efforts by the Dergue against these rebel groups made conditions for farming
unstable, often destroying infrastructure, raiding towns or wiping out markets where rebels were
thought to be. It has been observed that the drought from 1982-1987 provided a cover for the
devastation which active military operations were bringing to Wollo, Tigray, Gondar and Eritrea
(Keneally 2011) As markets and agricultural districts were targeted by government forces, rebel
soldiers went from obtaining food from the general population to seeking aid in neighboring
Sudan. This aid was not present for all rebel groups, and Eritreans, Tigrayans, and other rebel
groups were often starved out, decreasing their numbers and hobbling their efforts against the
Dergue (Gill 2010; Keneally 2011).
In the meantime, the Dergue purchased increasingly large amounts of weapons to fight
the rebels: $575 million in 1982, $975 million in 1983 and $1.2 billion in the famine year of
1984, the final number accounting for 60% of the total government budget for the year as well as
additional gifts to pursue the war from the Soviet Union (Gill 2010; Keneally 2011). Hancock
surmised that the sheer amount of arms purchased for the sole purpose of putting down rebel
16 movements hampered efforts toward industrialization and any movement away from cash crop
agriculture, particularly given the burden of debt and interest payments that go on long after the
initial purchases and military action (Hancock 1985). These massive arms purchases were made
with loans which demanded high interest payments. The Dergue government managed these
payments by requiring the peasants to focus production on more and more cash crops,
particularly coffee, instead of subsistence agriculture, rendering large sections of the country
even more dependent on food imports instead of sustenance agriculture. As a side benefit for the
Dergue, this made much of the rural peasantry utterly dependent upon them for food (Gill 2010).
By 1984 it was estimated that 500,000 people were directly affected by the famine in
Ethiopia (Hancock 1985). Once the famine had finished its course in 1985, Human Rights
Watch estimated the total number of dead to be around 400,000 (Gill 2010). Zewde pegs the
number of dead closer to 1 million and the number affected closer to 8 million, though the actual
number is of some debate due to differing models and incomplete records (Gill 2010; Zewde
2001). Famed Africa expert Alex De Waal specifically noted that many tens of thousands of
those deaths were likely caused by direct government action. Through a combination of
resettlement efforts, withholding food from ethnic minorities to strike at rebels or military
response in rebel sympathetic areas, which he suggested made the famine far more lethal led to
the deaths of roughly 50,000 a conclusion supported by a number of other authors who studied
the famine (Gill 2010; Hancock 1985).
While the Dergue government was not brought down by the famine itself, and may have
benefited during the crisis, once drought conditions improved the Eritrian People’s Liberation
Front, Tigrayan People’s Liberation Front and Oromo Liberation Front used the famine as a
rallying cry for government tyranny and eventually began making military progress, forcing
17 government troops to retreat from strongholds in the north around Afabet 1988. In February of
1989 government forces were also pushed out of Tigray in a decisive battle leading to victory by
the rebels in 1991with the occupation of Addis Ababa and Asmara in May (Zewde 2001).
Bangladesh (1974)
Bangladesh, like Ethiopia, has struggled for hundreds of years with regular famines,
many of the due to the circumstances of British colonial policies and the harshness of World War
II. After the 1971 Bangladesh Liberation War, the new government was attempting to
consolidate power and gain control after the withdrawal of Pakistani forces. The nationalist
upsurge that led to the expulsion of Pakistani troops had been focused under the Awami League,
a generally secular, socialist leaning party that was now tasked with leading the country under
the 1971 constitution. While they initially enjoyed significant support, Bangladesh began to
experience significant economic problems in 1973. Patronage systems began to emerge as the
Awami League exercised a high level of control over licenses and permits for building and
business creation which led to stagnation in economic development and obvious signs of
corruption as permits became increasingly hard to come by and permit holders gained substantial
wealth. Intra-party conflict led to some parties breaking away after the 1973 election which
precipitated a series of laws to increase in the powers of the central government by the Awami
League loyalists; enabling the president to declare a state of emergency and give approval for
police to arrest and search without judicial approval (Westergaard 1985).
The economic situation had been deteriorating from the start of liberation with foreign
aid becoming a larger and more essential element of the budget as years progressed. Hard line
socialists began to leave the government, distressed by the government’s unwillingness to adopt
self-sufficiency measures. By 1973-1974, prices on necessities had increased 300-400% over
18 pre-independence costs, and by the middle of 1974 they had spiked to over 800% of 1971 prices.
Economically, the country was in a shambles, hardly capable of keeping the government together
without substantial foreign aid (Westergaard 1985).
Unfortunately, due to a faster than expected flooding season during harvest in
Mymensigh and Ranpu, water levels remained high throughout the summer and prevented the
planting of winter crops in 1974. Combined with wavering economic conditions, the double
crop failure consumed what little surplus subsistence farmers had been able to accumulate, and
suddenly the country was facing a food shortage of nearly 50% of total need (Westergaard 1985).
As Stepanek starkly put it, “The price of rice went from 150 takas per maund5 in January of 1974
to between 300 and 400 takas6 per maund in places in the northwest during October and
November” (Stepanek 1979:65). Unfortunately, due to the suddenly low production of
foodstuffs in the primarily agricultural state, the spike in inflation, accompanied by high fuel
prices, a massive exchange of foreign reserves the previous year for food and continuing trouble
stabilizing the new state, there were limited funds to provide meaningful relief efforts. Wage
labor jobs, previously abundant, became difficult to come by as large landowners had neither
fields that required farming nor the spare funds to pay laborers. Citizens, now homeless either
by selling their land or by the force of rising flood water, with no opportunities for employment
either camped out in front of the Land Registry Office or disbursed in hopes of being able to find
sustenance or alms (Stepanek 1979).
This was compounded by the growing economic crisis in the country and political
instability from lack of funds and the collapsing of the Awami League. Political opposition to
the perceived failure of the ruling party’s policies coalesced around Sheikh Mujib, one of the
5
Roughly 82.3 pounds in weight. Approximately $45.80‐$61.07 for 82.3 pounds of rice, or $.56‐$.74 per pound. Incidentally, this means two or three pounds of rice often cost more than a laborer could be expected to make in a day 6
19 original ideologues of Bangladeshi socialism. Eventually, parliament agreed to elect Sheikh
Mujib as the new president, declare emergency rule by the president and then dissolve
parliament. A single National Party was formed under Sheikh Mujib, but it was functionally just
a reincarnation of the Awami League with a couple of sympathetic parties formally absorbed as
well. As the National Party government sought to enforce control with the paramilitary Rakkhi
Bahini force, the army became concerned about their potential future and instigated a coup that
met with minimal resistance. Over the next year, two more coups would take place within the
military ruling system before a civilian puppet government was finally installed that managed to
maintain power in the November 7th coup in 1975 (Westergaard 1985).
While the government was able to organize international aid to respond to the crisis, open
over 5,000 kitchens to feed the poor and offer some “make work” jobs, government response
was highly disrupted by the political chaos, and there was never an overall plan or significant
funding for relief efforts. In the once prices stabilized and agriculture was able to return to
normal, it was estimated that 30,000 people died of starvation, and another 10,000 died of
famine-related disease like cholera and dysentery. Over 300,000 people became homeless in the
region and it is uncertain just how many of those homeless also perished. By the summer of
1975, the food shortage that had precipitated the famine had ended, and rice prices once again
stabilized at 100 taka per maund7 as food production returned to normal levels. This permitted
the traditional agricultural cycle to return to normal and for the peasantry to begin rebuilding
their lives (Stepanek 1979).
India (1966-1967) “Bihar Famine”
7
$15.27 for 82.3 pounds of rice, or roughly $.18 per pound, a much more sustainable cost. 20 India provides a unique case when it comes to its history with famine. India has been
facing periodic famine for thousands of years and has put special focus on dealing with its
consequences. The British imperial rule of India not only led to several additional devastating
famines, as well as detailed documentation of these crises (Indian Famine Commission 1976).
The Great Bengal Famine of 1943, which cost between 1.5 and 4 million lives, occurred just
prior to the British withdrawal and served as a strong impetus among the Indian National
Congress for central governments to take on famine directly to prevent a crisis from getting out
of control (Devereux 1993).
After independence in 1948, India did not face another severe famine for 18 years.
However, in 1966 the harvest season yielded less than 50% of what was expected due to
inadequate rainfall. In response to this sudden shortfall the government declared a famine. While
in the cases of Ethiopia and Bangladesh these declarations had simply been a statement of the
obvious as the governments flailed for effective policy, the government of India is
constitutionally mandated to respond to famine. Upon the declaration of a famine, needs of
citizens were identified, resources were committed to those needs and the bureaucratic abilities
of the state were brought to bear. The government began to purchase wheat en-masse from other
unaffected provinces as well as the international market to provide for the starving, ultimately
feeding 2.4 million with supplemental food and an additional 4.5 million with protein rich
foodstuffs. Kitchens were opened that explicitly were focused on feeding children less than 10
years of age, expectant and nursing mothers and the elderly. When peasants were unable to pay
rent, relief workers used funds to pay their way until regular harvesting could be restored. Work
for food programs were organized where unemployed individuals would be paid a wage in flour,
granting them enough caloric content to survive in return for their aid in building public works
21 projects, employing 9.4 million people. The “make work” projects were primarily focused on
constructions that would mitigate or prevent future drought in the affected areas, most notably
vast reservoirs and wells which continue to serve the communities they were built in through
present. All of these works were supervised by relief workers with a total 149,000 state
employees overseeing projects at the height of state employment. For the most part, the effort
was a resounding success with minimal casualties and no serious outbreaks of disease. By the
planting season in 1967, 93.4% of all arable land in Bihar was being cultivated and the famine
ended with minimal lasting disruption (Singh 1975).
All of these efforts did not come without serious cost to the government. Income from
agricultural products declined drastically from the 1966-1967, and the prevention measures
demanded enormous government expenditure to cover. It would be several years before the
Indian government recovered from the experience. Regardless of the cost, only about 2,500
Indians died from conditions relating to the famine, a remarkably low number given the tens of
millions of individuals who were directly affected by the drought (Singh 1975).
Given the enormous affect size of the famine, actual political disruption was minimal.
During the crisis, politicians hyped up the gravity of the situation even as they were solving it,
drawing attention of the masses away from other, less fruitful government plans to increase
agricultural production. Given that 1967 was a year for General Elections, it became politically
advantageous for opposition parties to use the success in warding off the famine against the
ruling Indian National Congress which led to the opposition capturing the regional government
in Bahir. Otherwise, both the government and national economy returned to normal in about a
year (Devereux1993).
22 India (1971-1973) “Maharashtra Drought”
The second significant famine that India has experienced since independence is notable
mainly in that many sources outside of the country did not recognize that the occurrence of the
famine until substantially after the drought had subsided. It is also noteworthy in that there were
no deaths attributed to the famine itself8, largely due to comprehensive implementation of
response plans by the Indian government at the time. Massive public works and food aid were
again utilized as in the 1966-1967 Bahir famine, now with the benefit of having analyzed the
effectiveness of many earlier strategies and having engaged in significant discussion and
planning on how to better deal with the next famine (Dyson and Maharanta 1992).
Maharashtra as a region was substantially more developed in terms of infrastructure and
industry than Bahir, but that did not render it safe from potential disruption of its economy due to
drought. In the summer of 1972, food production dropped to half of what had been harvested in
1967-68 which caused a sudden and serious food shortage (Dyson and Maharatna 1992). While
the drought affected Maharashtra the most, it also caused serious difficulty in Andhra Pradesh,
Gujarat, Rajasthan and parts of Mysore, Prissa and Madhya Pradesh. In addition to crop failures,
fodder for animals and clean drinking water were at a premium (Ledejinsky 1973).
By November, the Indian government responded with over 10,500 different famine relief
projects which sought to make strides towards soil conservation, irrigation works, canal building,
reservoirs and breaking up stones to open up more land for agricultural cultivation, employing
1.7 million volunteers a day in 1972 and over 4 million at its peak in 1973 in Maharashtra alone
with hundreds of thousands seeking employment in other drought affected areas. Some
protestors and opposition leaders criticized the government for not pursuing more productive
irrigation and conservation projects, but that is likely due to the lack of preparation time. The
8
At least according to the Indian Government and UNICEF. 23 Maharashtra Drought came on with particular suddenness and earlier warning signs of drought
were not headed which hampered preparation efforts. Regardless, the effort was generally a
success in that it both provided for the citizenry at a time when they were in need of sustenance
and focused the state on the idea that the detriment of famine was functionally an issue of
employment and not simply of a lack of food (Dyson and Maharanta 1992; Ladejinsky 1973).
While the number of affected Indians remained high with 1.25 million refugees moving
from famine-affected areas and 15 million dependent on government assistance, it is remarkable
to note that there was no recorded increase in rates of starvation by the Indian government,
UNICEF or the WHO. After the famine ran its course, the government petitioned to have the
famine reclassified as a drought in order to signify their success in handling it, which is how it is
known today. Unfortunately, this was likely motivated as a political move given UNICEF’s
support for Indian protections for its citizenry at the time and India’s desire to demonstrate its
competence in the crisis. Several non-government sources indicate that mortality related to
illness and infant mortality rates overall did increase significantly during the famine, but it is still
noteworthy that in a famine that affected over 15 million people that deaths from starvation were
so rare as to be considered non-existent. It is also noteworthy that while there was a substantial
increase in protests during the Maharashtra, no violent opposition movements developed and
there was no particular increase in rebel activity while the drought took place (Deveruex 1993;
Dyson and Maharanta 1992).
Comparison of Cases:
The figures below represent a portion of the World Bank data covering economic
indicators during the times in which the aforementioned famines took place. Each table includes
24 four major indicators of economic stability which directly connects to the relative political
stability of their accompanying states as indicated by Collier (2007), Olson (1993), Feng (1997)
and Alesina et. al (1992).
Ethiopia
(millions of
2005 US $s)
GDP
Gov’t
Consumption
Imports
1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
3784.14
3952.16
4251.97
4426.34
4620.99
4769.54
4849.29
4856.05
4909.58
254.93
255.13
268.68
276.43
316.47
332.14
334.38
414.51
465.40
630.57
649.00
663.78
697.63
706.85
638.36
671.57
848.76
803.62
GDP per
134.03
136.23
142.54
144.12
146.03
146.41
145.02
142.04
141.08
capita
Information from the World Bank “Global Economic Prospects” survey data, updated Jan. 17, 2012 (World Bank,
2012)
The above data represents some of the economic indicators surrounding the Ethiopian famine
1970-1974 as well as data prior to famine conditions and data after famine conditions ceased. As
noted, GDP, Government consumption and GDP per capita do not show any serious decline,
even increasing during famine years. Imports actually decrease during the famine itself which
would generally be considered to be a positive for building up reserve currency and making for a
secure position in the global financial system. Despite this lack of any real economic issues,
Haile Selassie’s regime collapsed, which would indicate that it was not likely to be a causal
factor.
Ethiopia
(millions of
2005 US $s)
GDP
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985
1986
1987
5440..53
5662.48
5669.05
5720.98
6192.11
6015.76
5345.34
5861.78
6674.20
Gov’t
Consumption
Imports
510.80
553.66
584.67
618.56
717.15
678.86
590.32
598.93
706.63
951.26
1121.76
1172.26
1279.33
1299.90
1508.33
1462.49
1611.57
1645.20
GDP per
capita
149.58
152.47
148.72
145.61
152.48
143.21
123.06
130.60
143.95
Information from the World Bank “Global Economic Prospects” survey data, updated Jan. 17, 2012 (World Bank,
2012)
25 In contrast to the 1970-1974 famine, the 1980-1985 famine in Ethiopia demonstrates
significant economic problems. A substantial decline growth of GDP as well as per capita GDP
can be seen from 1984-1986, likely due to the enormous effect of the drought and consequent
famine upon the economy as a whole, both of which would be strong indicators for economic
instability. Imports, particularly that of weapons rise substantially through the famine years as
well as after which would have put significant financial strain on the financial system given that
the GDP as a whole was decreasing. Government consumption as part of the budget increased
substantially through 1983, but level off afterward. Despite several economic factors being far
worse for the 1980-1985 Ethiopian famine, the Dergue government survived the chaos of the
drought and famine until 1990. Given the relative strength of economic indicators for the 19801985 famine not resulting in government instability, it would seem to indicate that there are other
factors influencing the stability of the government.
Bangladesh (in millions
of 2005 US $s)
GDP
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
17993.19
17035.23
18135.49
18634.56
18781.14
Gov’t Consumption
242.72
222.69
267.17
339.01
636.80
Imports
6497.50
4856.71
2726.25
2069.73
2347.11
GDP per capita
245.11
226.38
235.18
235.90
232.20
Information from the World Bank “Global Economic Prospects” survey data, updated Jan. 17, 2012 (World Bank,
2012)
The Bangladesh famine was not as long as either of the Ethiopian famines and did not
have as much of an impact on the national economy as a whole. The efforts to make the country
self-sufficient in the years prior to the famine can be seen clearly in the substantial drop in
imports from 1972-1974. The famine itself did not substantially affect the overall GDP or GDP
per capita, but did see some increase in government consumption. Overall, the economic strain
26 on Bangladesh was not particularly large despite the government overthrow. If this is the case, it
is not likely that the famine was directly responsible for any severe economic changes that would
have resulted in government instability.
India (millions
of 2005 US $s)
GDP
1964
1965
1966
1967
1968
1969
98063.21
119264.06
119221.45
128558.74
132895.58
141585.97
Gov’t
Consumption
Imports
7223.18
10267.79
10443.64
10724.78
11317.55
12381.70
5132.84
6800.99
8747.66
8402.83
7195.90
6258.06
GDP per capita
202.73
241.49
236.40
249.59
252.58
263.39
Information from the World Bank “Global Economic Prospects” survey data, updated Jan. 17, 2012 (World Bank,
2012)
The above information catalogues data from the Bihar famine in India from 1966-1967.
Given the sheer size of India, it is impressive that the drought and ensuing famine made an
observable impact in 1966 GDP and GDP per capita. It is interesting to note that government
consumption does not particularly rise given the herculean efforts to put anti-famine measures in
place. Imports, in this case, are the most telling, spiking by more than $2 billion during the
famine as the Indian government struggled to obtain enough food to feed its starving citizenry.
This put enormous financial strain on India’s financial reserves at the time, but conditions did not
seem to be particularly bad in the long run and imports returned to below 1965 levels in 1969.
India (millions of
2005 US $s)
GDP
Gov’t
Consumption
Imports
GDP per capita
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
141585.97
14884.09
151312.77
150481.91
155476.02
157317.96
12381.70
13551.13
14873.56
15015.54
14994.65
14436.61
6258.06
7379.10
8709.31
8545.13
9235.12
8056.72
263.39
271.04
269.51
262.21
264.97
262.18
Information from the World Bank “Global Economic Prospects” survey data, updated Jan. 17, 2012 (World Bank,
2012)
27 The Maharashtra Drought shows a similar increase in imports to the 1966-1967 Bihar
Famine, but it can be seen that the planning and practice of the Indian government paid off in
their handling of the Maharashtra Drought. While there is a slight decrease in GDP per capita
and overall GDP going from 1971-1972, the spike in imports is less than in 1966-1967 and
government consumption rises minimally. While there is certainly a disruption of economic
conditions, it is not nearly to the degree of the earlier Ethiopian famines.
Ethiopia 19711974
32,300,000
Ethiopia 19801985
41,100,000
Bangladesh 1971
Pop. During
67,800,000
Famine
Total Affected
2,400,000
8,000,000
300,000+
(aprox.)
Affected as % of
7.4%
19.5%
.442%
population
Total Dead
40,000400,00040,000
(aprox.)
200,000
1,000,000
Dead as % of
.0124%-.619%
.973%-2.43%
.00059%
Pop.
Increase in # of
Yes
No
Yes
Protests?
Increased in
Yes
No
No
Violent Activity?
Violent Gov’t
Yes
No
Yes
Change
Non-Violent
N/A
No
N/A
Gov’t Change
Type of Gov’t
Negative
Strong Negative
Little/None
Intervention
Information compiled from the various sources throughout the Results section.9
India 1966-1967
India 1971
511,000,000
560,000,000
6,900,000+
15,000,000+
1.35%
2.68%
2,500
0
<.0001%
0%
No
Yes
No
No
No
No
Yes (local)
No
Positive
Strong Positive
The above table is a comparison of the various famines discussed and their relative effect
on the countries that dealt with them. As can be seen, the Ethiopian famines had the greatest
affect on the countries, topping out with the 1980-1985 Ethiopian famine that affected 19.5% of
the country and may have killed as much as a full 2.43% of the entire population. Both of the
Indian famines had smaller numbers of affected citizens proportionate to size and the famine in
9
Population numbers from “Health, Nutrition and Population” (HNP) statistics by the World Bank (World Bank 2011) 28 Bangladesh had the least overall effect on the population. Bangladesh in 1971 and Ethiopia in
1974 were both overthrown by their militaries and had significant social unrest in the process.
Ethiopia in 1985 did not face overthrow and may have actually managed to increase stability for
a brief time, though their aggressive measures against rebel movements did lead to their downfall
in 1991. Only the Indian cases resulted in limited effect on government stability despite
significant economic and political indicators.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION:
Famine, while a disruptive force, does not necessarily have to result in political
destabilization such as that which took place in Ethiopia in 1974 and 1985 or in Bangladesh in
1975 as demonstrated by India’s successful navigation of the Bahir Famine in 1967-1977 and the
Maharashtra Drought. The case of the India suggests that if famine prevention policies are put
into place, become an expectation for both the citizenry and the government and are carried out
in the case of a famine then the government itself is not necessarily in danger
Economically, each famine had a substantial impact on the economy both through GDP,
imports, government consumption and GDP per capita, but clearly this was not a reliable
indicator of outcome. Bangladesh had the least impact on their economy of the above indicators,
yet they collapsed the most quickly of the cases examined, and had the most chaotic downfall.
That said, it is important to note that there were several intervening indicators in the case of
Bangladesh and it would be irresponsible to claim that famine alone was responsible for their
political collapse. Both the Ethiopian famines were the worst in terms of economic measures,
but as noted by de Waal it is likely that government efforts to use the famine as a weapon against
rebellious minorities prolonged the famine and caused more financial damage than if they had
simply left it alone (Gill 2010). India’s famines had mixed results in terms of economic factors,
29 but both show the enormous lengths to which the central government went in order to feed the
masses.
In terms of political stability as it relates to violence, only Ethiopia exhibited a substantial
change as a result of the famines, noting a substantial decrease in political violence as the
government deprived the various rebel movements of precious resources in the 1980-1985
famine. Bangladesh’s 1974 famine, the Bihar famine the Maharashtra Drought of were all
without significant violent action by any party, and, though there was violence present, the 1974
Famine in Ethiopia did not exhibit much of a change in the overall level of violence in the state.
Admittedly, in Ethiopia and Bangladesh, violent movements did use the famine as a justifying
frame for future political violence, but this preceded the actual events of the famine by several
years. Given that only one examined case demonstrated an increase in violent activity, it seems
unlikely that famine acts as a catalyst for decreased political stability.
Non-violent political unrest was a major factor in the famine in Ethiopia in 1970-1974
and the Maharashtra Drought but was not particularly noteworthy in Ethiopia in 1985,
Bangladesh in 1974 or the Bahir famine in 1966-1967. While it could be said that Ethiopia was
functionally a military dictatorship in 1985 and Bangladesh was functionally a repressive oneparty state, thus preventing organized protest, the Bahir famine is not associated with unusually
high levels of political protest. The combined situation of the 1970-1974 Ethiopian famine
having protest and resulting in government collapse while the Maharashtra Drought’s protests
resulted in no meaningful affect on political stability does not seem to indicate that protest was a
significant factor in the relative stability or instability of the state as a result of the famine. This
finding provides some emphasis on Sen’s thesis that democracy and freedom to protest against
the government are both critical elements in protecting a citizenry from predatory government
30 behavior (Sen . 2007; Dreze 2007). That said, it does not provide clarification on what effect
famines have on political stability.
What does seem to be the clearest indicator of relative stability or instability is the degree
of intervention by the state in the situation of the famine. In the case of both Ethiopian famines,
particularly the 1980-1985 famine, the government pursued a policy of covering up the situation
while using the relative shortage as a weapon on their own people. While it may have yielded
short term benefit for Ethiopia in both cases, it ultimately led to serious destabilization that ended
in the collapse of the Selassie government in 1974 and seriously weakened the Dergue
government by 1985 and led to their downfall in 1991. Bangladesh did little to intervene in their
famine, and while they did collapse, I feel that there are too many complicating factors to suggest
that their relative lack of effort directly resulted in political instability in collapse. I do feel that
the data is sufficient to suggest that the effects of the famine did not make the situation any
better.
Both the Bihar Famine and Maharashtra drought provide clear indicators that positive
involvement in famine conditions by the government on behalf of the citizenry seemed to end in
the best results for the state. The effects on the economy were minimized and there was no
significant increase in violent action against the state or substantial change in government except
for in local elections. It is likely that the government policy of intervention saved an enormous
number of lives and possible survival, though it is difficult to say with any kind of certainty
without more data. What this existing data does suggest is that the best predictor of political
stability in the aftermath of a famine is the degree and type of government intervention in that
famine.
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33