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The Aftermath of Appeasement A Legacy of British Foreign Policy MA Thesis in European Studies Graduate School for Humanities Universiteit van Amsterdam Author: Main Supervisor: Second Supervisor: Date: Carly van Beek Dr M.E. Spiering Drs L.E. Kemp August, 2011 Table of Contents Introduction 3 1. Appeasement until 1937: a policy of peace and satisfaction 1.1 Appeasement in the early history of British politics 1.2 Appeasement after the Great War: the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations 1.3 British ‘guilty conscience’ after the Treaty of Versailles 1.4 ‘Never Again’: strong anti-war sentiments in Britain 5 7 2. Appeasement as an unfavourable policy: 1937-1939 2.1 Chamberlain becomes the British Prime Minister 2.2 The Munich Agreement of 1938 2.3 Declaration of War in 1939 22 23 27 37 3. The meaning of appeasement after World War II: revisionism and appeasement in recent politics 42 Conclusion 51 Bibliography 53 9 13 17 2 Introduction Few foreign policies have, retrospectively, been as controversial as the appeasement policy that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain pursued in the 1930s. This policy was adopted to deal with genuine German grievances over the Treaty of Versailles, and to bring Germany back into the European fold. The many conflicts that arose in Europe in the 1930s had much to do with territorial disputes. At Versailles the continent had been divided among nations rather arbitrarily, which caused resentment in the affected countries. These conflicts needed to be settled; Britain opted for the policy of appeasement to do this. Opponents of Chamberlain have argued that this appeasement policy was, at the very least, to be held partially responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. Supporters of the policy have countered this statement with the argument that appeasing the Germans was instead the best way to deal with the increasingly dangerous situation in continental Europe. Although appeasement has been disregarded as a policy based on fear and expediency, it is difficult to imagine that educated statesmen would pursue such a policy. Therefore, it is probable that, somehow, the definition and reputation of appeasement had changed into a new, and definitely more negative, perspective. During Chamberlain’s premiership, support for appeasement was far more abundant than when his successor Winston Churchill came into office. Churchill, perhaps as a political tactic, was highly critical of Chamberlain’s policy, and public opinion was greatly influenced by this. It would take over two decades for this attitude toward appeasement to be revised, after government documents were released that could be examined by historians. This new approach became known as revisionism, and the traditional view that appeasement was a shameful policy employed out of fear of dictators has been supplemented by the revisionist theory that the policy was the result of difficult circumstances that drove Chamberlain to appeasement. This thesis will give an overview of the policy of appeasement in British history. It will focus on the question why appeasement came to have such a disagreeable reputation, and will defend the statement that appeasement does not deserve this reputation. The diverse literature that came into existence after, and sometimes during, the Second World War will support this thesis. Chapter one will first give an overview of appeasement in early British history, and will consider whether appeasement had a better reputation at those times. Then, 3 the chapter continues with the various motivations behind appeasement in the 1920s and early 1930s. The international situation at that time clearly called for a policy that would reconcile the European nations after the Great War. Appeasement was thought to be able to do this. Especially the British attitude towards the Treaty of Versailles of 1919 will be discussed, and why British feelings about Versailles were an integral part of the appeasement policy. Chapter two will continue in the 1930s, and will discuss the change that occurred in the interpretation of appeasement. The chapter begins with the election of Neville Chamberlain, who became British Prime Minister in 1937. Afterwards, the Munich Agreement of 1938 will be discussed. This Agreement is of vital importance in order to explain what happened to the esteemed policy of appeasement. The outbreak of war in 1939 will also briefly be mentioned, since this has sometimes been regarded as the tragic repercussion of appeasement. Chapter three will then explore the different perspectives on appeasement that were developed after the Second World War ended, and what consequences these, sometimes controversial, new perspectives have had for the reputation of appeasement. It will then briefly be considered whether it is still possible to speak of appeasement policies today, if either the term appeasement is still in use or if the fundamental principles behind appeasement can still be found today. 4 1. Appeasement until 1937: a policy of peace and satisfaction After the Second World War, appeasement has become almost synonymous with a policy of making great concessions to aggressors in return for empty pledges. Yet, another understanding of the term appeasement must have influenced the policy of British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the late 1930s. The policy can be traced back through British history and was often seen as a sensible policy with the aim to avoid conflict. The moment when appeasement changed from a benign and pragmatic policy into a cowardly and traitorous policy is thought to lie in 1938, when Britain signed the Munich Agreement and in effect sacrificed Czech territory in order to appease Nazi Germany. Prior to 1938, appeasement was a conventional political strategy, even if like other political strategies it was not favoured by all. Although writers on the subject of appeasement cannot avoid discussing the disastrous results of the policy in the late 1930s, there does seem to be a general agreement that the policy is not inherently flawed. Martin Gilbert describes in The Roots of Appeasement the policy of appeasement as ‘a policy of optimism and hope, even at times of strength […] a noble idea, rooted in Christianity, courage and common sense’.1 For Gilbert, the birth of modern appeasement can be traced back to the day the Great War broke out; [e]ducated people in all walks of life, and of all political beliefs, knew that war between Britain and Germany was a tragic thing, that many lives would be lost, trade disrupted, society disturbed, empires threatened, and the international scene poisoned by hatred and recrimination. They determined that, when peace came, it should never again be broken; that all disputes should be settled without war, and all legitimate aspirations willingly granted. 2 Although this understanding would come too late to stop World War I, Gilbert argues that before the war had even ended, the shock of the outbreak of that war would ensure that people would do whatever needed to be done to guarantee that such a conflict would never happen again. This was not a truly new realization; appeasement had been present in British history long before that moment. However, the Great War did give appeasement a new sense of urgency. 1 2 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. xi Ibid, p. 9 5 Benny Morris, in The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany, argues that prior to 1933, appeasement was seen as ‘an enlightened policy of justice for all’.3 In the two years that were to follow, this positive outlook on appeasement would gradually change; instead of a policy based on morality appeasement was regarded as a policy compelled by fear and expediency.4 This change in perception is mostly due to developments in international politics and not necessarily due to a change in the policy itself. Paul Doerr, in British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 describes British appeasement in the 1930s as ‘a realistic means of coming to grips with the country’s substantial defensive liabilities at that time’.5 Doerr also notes a more negative description of appeasement, as a policy of [g]ranting concessions to Britain’s enemies in the futile hope of gaining agreements that would prevent war but in the pursuit of which long-cherished moral principles (such as the defence of small countries) were frequently sacrificed. 6 This is exactly the association with appeasement that has persisted through the decades after the outbreak of the Second World War, and fits with the ‘guilty men’ thesis. This theory resulted from the book Guilty Men, written under the pseudonym ‘Cato’ by three journalists who strongly opposed the government of the 1930s. In this thesis, appeasement is regarded as ‘a combination of calculated deception, incompetent leadership, diplomatic bungling and poor military planning’.7 In ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, Paul Schroeder describes appeasement as ‘a normal policy of conciliation and avoidance of war based upon a traditional balance-of-power outlook’8; however, he does note that this policy was not suited for the political situation of the late 1930s. Daniel Treisman in ‘Rational Appeasement’ claims that although there are ‘certain conditions under which appeasement can be the only rational strategy’9, in the 1930s this was not necessarily the case. 3 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 3 4 Ibid 5 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 16 6 Ibid 7 ‘Cato’, Guilty Men, Faber and Faber Ltd: London (2010), from the introduction by John Stevenson, p. xxv 8 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 243 9 Treisman, Daniel, ‘Rational Appeasement’, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) p. 368 6 Many more definitions of appeasement can be found, but for now it suffices to say that appeasement was not always associated with Neville Chamberlain and his policy towards Nazi Germany. It was in fact, by many considered to be a decent political strategy. It is not entirely clear when the term appeasement was first used, though it has certainly been used as early as the thirteenth century to describe British policy. The term appeasement was not always applied to the strategy of deterring a possible enemy by political means; other terms have also been used. 1.1 Appeasement in the early history of British politics There are different accounts on when appeasement truly became a political strategy for Britain. Martin Gilbert, in The Roots of Appeasement states that the underlying principles of appeasement, ‘conciliation and reconciliation, compromise and barter, realizing one’s own faults, seeing both sides of any dispute, giving as well as taking, conceding as well as demanding’10, became widespread during the second half of the nineteenth century. But earlier examples of appeasement can be found in British political history. Although the term appeasement was not always used in these cases, it seems clear that the goal was much the same as it was during the interwar years. At the end of the thirteenth century, England was at war with France. Still, the ruling monarch of England, Edward I, was willing ‘to embark on a policy of appeasement, in which he sacrificed his Flemish allies to France on condition that Philip [VI, ruler of France] sacrificed his Scottish allies to England’.11 This policy did not succeed because Edward faced serious opposition in England. The idea that cooperation with a hostile nation could be beneficial to both countries would influence political opinion in the years that followed. Edward II continued the policy of appeasement inaugurated by Edward I, despite the fact that this policy was considered to be rather damaging to England.12 Although the results of the policy were far from ideal, the idea that foreign policy could be used to avoid conflict would become popular. The grandson of Edward I, Edward III, adopted a foreign policy that was also influenced by the strategy of 10 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 5 Barraclough, G., ‘Edward I and Adolf Nassau. A Chapter of Mediaeval Diplomatic History’, Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1940) p. 258 12 Ibid, p. 260 11 7 appeasement. Foreign policy was seen as a ‘unifying force, instead of, as in earlier generations, a cause of dissension and war’.13 Another example of British appeasement can be found in the seventeenth century, in the foreign policy of James I. According to Chester Dunning, ‘James’ foreign policy began to drift toward one of “appeasement” of Catholic Spain’.14 The policy of appeasement was not quite popular at the time. Louis Wright describes the relationship with Spain as based on a ‘stubborn and unpopular foreign policy, which sought, at any price, to conciliate Spain’.15 This is a rare example of appeasement as a negative and perhaps damaging policy in the years before the Great War and the subsequent Second World War. Daniel Treisman states in ‘Rational Appeasement’ that British foreign policy during the period 1865-1938 was also based on the principles of appeasement.16 Treisman mentions that one of the clearest examples of British appeasement involved making concessions to the United States in the late nineteenth century. In the period 1895-1902 there were several moments where Britain chose for an appeasing approach towards the United States. These cases concerned disputes over South- and North- American territory, it was already suspected that British influence in this area could not last. Moreover, Britain could not afford to engage in a war where little was to be gained and the chances of winning the war were slim to none. Another approach to the history of appeasement in British politics can be found in the work of Paul Schroeder. In ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, Schroeder argues that twentieth-century appeasement is nothing more than the continuation of the British balance of power policy of the nineteenth century.17 During the nineteenth century, British foreign policy was not necessarily in favour of the ‘independence and integrity of all smaller states and victims of aggression, especially not in Central Europe’. 18 The annexation of smaller states could be employed for maintaining the balance of power, in which smaller states did not play a very substantial role. ‘A strong and prosperous Germany could serve to curb the Soviet Union, check 13 Barraclough, G., ‘Edward I and Adolf Nassau. A Chapter of Mediaeval Diplomatic History’, Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1940) pp.260-261 14 Dunning, Chester, ‘The Fall of Sir Thomas Overbury and the Embassy to Russia in 1613’, The Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1991) p. 703 15 Wright, Louis B., ‘Propaganda against James I’s “Appeasement” of Spain’, Huntington Library Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1943) p. 149 16 Treisman, Daniel, ‘Rational Appeasement’, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) p. 347 17 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 224 18 Ibid, p. 232 8 hegemonic aspirations and dangerous initiatives on the part of France, and promote European and British prosperity’.19 It was therefore beneficial for the balance of power to help Germany recover from the First World War. Whether or not the policy of appeasement can be traced back through British history seems to depend on the definition of appeasement. When this definition means nothing more than the avoidance of conflict, it will be clear that this can easily be identified throughout past policies. But if appeasement is understood as a deliberate policy of giving in to the opposition, with little regard for the consequences, then will be more difficult to establish. The above-mentioned examples are only to illustrate the point that appeasement, both the term and the policy, can be found in British history before the 1930s. There are undoubtedly many more examples that can be found; the main argument here is that appeasement was by no means a new phenomenon introduced by the statesmen of the interwar period. 1.2 Appeasement after the Great War: the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations The Peace Treaties When the Great War was finally over in 1918, it soon became apparent that the problems were far from over. The borders of Europe were under great dispute, the Allied victors needed to decide on their plans for Germany, and many international relations had to be re-established. The ending of the war was signalled by the armistice that was signed in 1918, which included terms that were severe on the Germans. It entailed the [a]brogation of Germany’s treaties of victory, the renunciation of her each and every conquest, the immediate evacuation of Belgium and France, withdrawal from Russia, the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, the internment in British ports of the High Seas Fleet, the surrender of all submarines, aircraft and vast quantities of weaponry, the relegation beyond the Rhine of all German divisions and the entry into the Rhineland of Allied armies of occupation, with bridgeheads across the river, the continuance of the blockade[…].20 19 20 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 225 Lentin, A., Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: an essay in the pre-history of Appeasement, Leicester University Press: Leicester (1984) p. 3 9 This armistice would later be followed by the official Paris Peace Treaties of 1919. During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920, representatives of many nations were present, whom theoretically could have ensured a balanced and fair agreement. However, one of the most important countries in causing the outbreak of war was not invited to the talks. Germany was not welcome at the conference and had consequently no say in the treaties; they were simply presented with a completed treaty towards the end of the conference.21 German resentment against the Treaty was therefore virtually unavoidable. After the end of the First World War, the general opinion in Europe was that such a devastating tragedy should never occur again. Not only were the economic losses tremendous, the number of lives that were lost during the war were also beyond belief. Between 1920 and 1923 the British government shipped thousands of headstones to France every week to mark the graves of British soldiers lost in combat. […] Armistice days, cemeteries and cenotaphs were the legacy of the Great War.22 When the Peace Treaties were drafted, these devastations were fresh on the minds of policymakers and their electorate alike. The demand for vindication was especially strong in France. The French delegation, led by Georges Clemenceau, was determined to have Germany atone for its role in the Great War. The French had obvious reasons to demand this; Germany had invaded France successfully more than once and France wanted security against Germany. Besides, the French economy had suffered greatly under the strain of war and invasion. Therefore, the French had a clear objective during the Peace Treaties; Germany was to pay for the recovery of the French economy and her military force had to be restricted and controlled. The British attitude towards Germany was more lenient since the defeat of Germany had achieved Britain’s main wartime objective. The destruction of German military power and the fact that the German fleet no longer posed a threat to the British naval force put the British in a more secure position than the French. However, the British population seems to have been convinced that Germany ‘for reasons of selfish, imperialistic greed’23 had been the instigator of war. Evidently, the 21 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 34 Ibid, p. 26 23 Rodman, Barbee-Sue, ‘Britain Debates Justice: An Analysis of the Reparations Issue of 1918’, The Journal of 22 10 mood of the British people towards the defeated Germans could not be considered as particularly generous. Regardless, the British delegation in Versailles, under the guidance of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, argued that a vengeful peace settlement could only lead to future disasters.24 This did not mean that Lloyd George was against the idea of limiting German military power or having the Germans pay reparations, but there was a clear realization that overly harsh conditions on the defeated country would only make the situation worse. Even if the mood of the people was at that time greatly influenced by the events of the war, this would not be a solid foundation for a political strategy. The Treaty that was eventually agreed upon demanded German disarmament, territorial concessions and the payment of reparations to the Allied countries. Particularly hurtful for German pride was the ‘War Guilt clause’; article 231 placed all responsibility for the war with the Germans. The British attitude towards this clause was hesitant, for it would surely make international relationships more difficult.25 The issue of reparations was also considered as a problem; the financial burden was thought to be too much for the already severly weakened German economy. The territorial concessions that were demanded of Germany angered nationalists and the new borders in the area did not improve stability in the region. It is not surprising that the terms of a treaty are not agreeable to the defeated country, but the Treaty of Versailles made it near impossible for Germany to recuperate in peace. It was mentioned earlier that the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George did not completely approve of the content of the Treaty of Versailles, that he considered it to be too vindictive. The fact that the Treaty was nevertheless signed by the British delegation can be explained by Lloyd George’s belief that the Treaty would not be set in stone, it was not to be ‘the fixed rule of the new Europe’26, but a kind of preliminary agreement that would be open to negotiation and revision. The League of Nations In the discussion of the Paris Peace Treaties and specifically the Treaty of Versailles, it is necessary to mention the League of Nations. Initiated by American President British Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1968) p. 142 McDonough, (2002), Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press. p.4. 25 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 23 26 Ibid, p. 48 24 11 Woodrow Wilson, the League was to be created ‘for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike’.27 The League was seen as an integral part of peace, as a sphere in which nations could coexist peacefully and where collective safety would be key. The League of Nations was seen as ‘the only logical way by which the evil of war can be brought to an end’.28 Initially there was a firm belief in the concept of collective security; the League was thought to provide just that. Theoretically, the League had the power to ‘impose economic sanctions and to threaten an invading power with the prospect of all League members acting collectively to remove the aggressor by military force’.29 In reality however, these lofty ideals were difficult to achieve. Economic sanctions could not be enforced by military power since the nations that were part of the League were unwilling to risk another war. Also, the various members of the League all had different interests and could cooperate very well. When in November 1919 the United States’ Senate refused to ratify the Peace Treaty due to disagreement among American politicians over the exact interpretation of the Treaty, it meant that the League had lost both its most enthusiastic supporter and its most powerful member. 30 The decisions of the American politicians to withdraw into isolation was in line with their domestic political developments, but had a negative effect on the balance of power within the League of Nations. France and Britain did not always agree on which role the League should play in international politics; France initially assumed that the League would predominantly function as protection against possible German aggression, while British politicians from the start welcomed Germany into the League. 31 A supranational institution that would impose on national sovereignty did not necessarily fit into British or French tradition, but the magnitude of the Great War showed that even these countries needed allies in times of war. As mentioned before, the effectiveness of the League was seriously undermined by the fact that no nation was willing to risk another war merely to exact 27 Lentin, A., Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: an essay in the pre-history of Appeasement, Leicester University Press: Leicester (1984) p. 5 28 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 12 29 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.8 30 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 68 31 Ibid, p. 76 12 economic sanctions. When in 1935 a conflict broke out between Italy and Abyssinia (officially the Empire of Ethiopia), both members of the League, the internal weakness of the institution became clear. Italy invaded Ethiopian territory, which was a clear violation of the League’s terms. However, the League could agree upon a decisive strategy towards the aggressor and the idea of collective security proved to be a delusion. According to Thomas Nagle, July 1936 ‘witnessed the death of collective security as conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations’. 32 The disillusionment that followed after the Abyssinia Crisis and the subsequent Ethiopian defeat damaged the League’s reputation beyond repair. This was not the first incident in which the League failed to mediate. In 1931, Japanese officers destroyed a Japanese-owned railway and then claimed Chinese terrorists were responsible for the act. This allegation was used as an excuse for a full-scale invasion of Manchuria. The Chinese government, like the Ethiopian government later would, appealed to the League for help. However, the League could not realize its peacekeeping ambitions at this time, and would not be able to do so during the conflict between Italy and Ethiopia.33 The inability of the League to enforce sanctions on countries that did not adhere to the agreements of the Peace Treaties corresponded with the appeasement policy of the British. The League was unable to threaten countries with military action and therefore had to be flexible with their own rules, the limits of transgression were stretched to accommodate unwilling nations. Instead of strengthening the Allied position stronger in Europe, the League seems mainly to have increased discord between the countries. This meant that Britain was still in charge of her own foreign policy, hardly hampered by the terms of the Treaty. Because Britain did not have to stand by the economic and military demands of the League, their foreign policy could easily be based on appeasement instead of the more rigorous League terms. 1.3 ‘Never Again’: strong anti-war sentiments in Britain After the Great War it was difficult to speak of a victory. Countries on both sides of the conflict were deeply traumatised by the war, and all had suffered great losses. The 32 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 67 33 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.20 13 aftermath of the war had various effects on British policy. After 1918 policy was mainly based on the avoidance of conflict on the European continent. The consequences of the Great War were seen as proof that war was the ultimate evil; the most important understanding that came from the war was the realization that it could never happen again. It ‘must never, under any pretext, be repeated’. 34 The international situation during the interwar period caused many in Britain to believe that appeasement would be the antidote to the aggressive policies of the first decades of the twentieth century. Different incidents and ideas strengthened the hypothesis that appeasement would be the safest policy to adopt after the troubling times of the war. Although few countries on the European continent did not share in the horrible experiences of the Great War, the policy of appeasement has been specifically linked to Britain during the interwar period. And indeed, popular opinion supported the policy that was adopted by British politicians. Whereas France sought the solution to peace in increasing its security, Britain was looking for ways to improve ties with Germany; to make it part of Europe again, so the country would not be compelled to start another war. Thomas Nagle mentions that this lenient attitude towards Germany came from the belief that ‘nobody in his normal senses, and certainly not the responsible leader of any nation, would be such a fool as to start war again’.35 Although giving in to an aggressor’s demands was certainly not ideal, ultimately the consequences of this were considered to be less harmful than threatening with war against an aggressive state. The different attitudes towards Germany can be explained by a closer look at the history between Britain, France and Germany. The relationship between France and Germany had been troublesome long before the outbreak of the First World War. On the other hand, Britain had traditionally enjoyed a much better relationship with Germany. Although popular opinion in Britain after the war was resentful of German actions, this soon changed into a desire to make sure Germany would not unduly be punished for starting a war that other nations also had to take responsibility for. There was no traditional or historical reason why Germany and Britain should not 34 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 4 35 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 15 14 cooperate.36 As British opinion towards Germany improved, their opinion of France grew steadily worse. France had been an ally to Britain during the war, but the relationship between the two countries could still not be considered as one of mutual trust. Even while British opinion was still coming to terms with post-war Germany as a possible partner in Europe, the ties with France were becoming strained. France was increasingly considered to be most important obstacle to achieving European peace, while Germany was seen as the country whose ‘cause and interests were compatible with Britain’s’.37 Martin Gilbert even calls French ‘folly’ the ‘fertilizer which turned appeasement from a feeble offshoot into a frantic bloom’.38 France was thought to be more interested in requital than in European stability. The belief that a good relationship between Britain and Germany could be developed was thus juxtaposed by the growing suspicion that the French were not really interested in improving the international situation in Europe. An important question posed by the events of the Great War was that of security. Although the Treaty of Versailles saw to the creation of the League of Nations, it was soon realized that this institution was not adequately equipped to secure world peace. The fact that the American military was not to be part of the alliance meant that the burden of European security through the League rested in the hands of France and Britain. However, Britain had other concerns than Europe alone. The Empire had provided Britain with much needed support during the First World War, but the dominions were equally dependent on Britain during conflicts. Without American support, Britain had little chance of protecting her dominions, especially if there would be a conflict in Europe at the same time. The realization that another great war, if anyone would be foolish enough to try and start one, could not be won without American support made the appeal of appeasement even greater. Great Britain paid a high price for her continental involvement during the Great War. Not only was there devastation and were many lives lost in the battle, the economic situation in the country was also declining. The socio-economic situation in Britain called for the attention of politicians, and this is part of the reason why, in the 1930s, Britain could be considered an insular society. According to Benny Morris, the cultural insularity that followed resulted in a ‘general lack of knowledge of Germany 36 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 29 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 119 38 Ibid, p. 71 37 15 and German affairs’.39 This view holds that British politicians were insufficiently aware of developments in Germany, and thus severely underestimated Hitler and Nazism. This introvert perspective of many politicians can be explained by both the need for domestic reforms and the belief that it was highly improbable that another war would break out. Another way in which future wars could be prevented was thought to lie in disarmament. Thomas Nagle explains in A Study of British Public Opinion that successive governments for that reason reduced the British armaments to ‘a point where national defence was no longer safeguarded; they hoped other nations would follow this example’.40 Nagle argues that this policy stemmed from the fact that public opinion was against armament increases, and their belief that a safer world would be guaranteed by collective security. Other writers agree that the public was against an increase in British armament, but that security would not be found through military alliances. Benny Morris in The Roots of Appeasement states that there was ‘a dual rejection of substantial British rearmament and of British participation in military alliances, secret or otherwise’. 41 It was thought that public spending should be directed towards domestic improvements, not towards an arms race with the rest of Europe. British public opinion seems indeed to have been firmly against the issue of rearmament and in favour of collective security through the League of Nations. Between November 1934 and June 1935 a large part of the British public participated in the National Declaration on the League of Nations and Armaments, generally known as the Peace Ballot. This questionnaire showed that a large majority of the population was in favour of participating in the League, that Britons were in favour of disarmament, and that in case of aggression by a nation economic sanctions were preferred over military action.42 Although it has been argued that the formulation of the questions was biased in favour of pacifism, it does seem clear that the British population was not in favour of aggressive European policies. 39 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 5 40 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 24 41 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 4 42 Ceadel, Martin, ‘The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934-5’, The English Historical Review, Vol. 95, No. 377 (1980) p. 828 16 The determination of politicians to ensure that another war would not afflict Europe again is evident in different aspects of British policy. Appeasement in the 1920s and 1930s was part of a strong anti-war sentiment in Britain, and the abovementioned aspects seemed to have validated the case for appeasement. Optimistically it was thought that the outbreak of another war was highly unlikely, that ties with Germany could be greatly improved, and that British politicians at the meantime could easily afford to ignore developments in Germany while they focussed on domestic problems. If this would prove true, appeasement was indeed a solid policy to adopt. And, since the strategy of disarmament had severely weakened the British military, it had better be. 1.4 British ‘guilty conscience’ after the Treaty of Versailles An important factor of the British policy of appeasement can be found in the belief that Germany was not treated fairly during the Peace Treaties. But in The Roots of Appeasement Martin Gilbert argues that the British ‘guilty conscience’ can be traced back further, namely to the outbreak of the First World War. Lloyd George, Liberal Minister, stated in 1908 that Germany was arming herself because of fear of her stronger neighbours.43 This sentiment would stay with the British people, the idea that Germany did not start the war because of hegemonic ambitions but as a reaction to hostile neighbouring countries. It was not the defeat of Germany in 1918, nor the severity of peace terms in 1919, which created the first guilty consciences on which appeasement was to grow: it was the outbreak of war. 44 The idea that the Great War was the result of a series of unfortunate incidents, and that Germany should not solely be held responsible for this became more popular in the 1920s and 1930s. With this realization, there was a growing belief that Germany was treated unjustly in the years that followed after the armistice in 1918. After all, Germany had not even been represented at the Peace Treaties; they were presented with terms that were extremely damaging for a country that had just lived through 43 44 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 11 Ibid 17 four years of war, even if Germany had instigated that war. Righting the wrongs of the Treaty of Versailles would become an important aspect of British appeasement. By becoming ‘the leading advocate for appeasement, Britain could redress the balance of injustice’.45 The feeling that Germany was not only treated unfairly, but that Britain had in fact played a role in this treatment can be seen as the reason why both British politicians and the public were tolerant towards a county that repeatedly transgressed the agreements of the Treaty. This lenient attitude could clearly be seen when in March 1920 a communist revolution broke out in the Ruhr. The German government asked for permission of the Allied powers to suppress this revolution with German forces and weapons. This was technically prohibited under Treaty rules as the weapons were supposed to already have been surrendered to the Allies. Instead of arguing that Germany was not authorized to use these weapons, David Lloyd George approved of the initiative of the German government. 46 This is but one of the examples where Britain was supportive of German actions that went against Treaty directives, terms that British politicians felt needed to be revised anyway. In the 1920s, two initiatives were launched to defuse the growing tensions in Europe, and ultimately to appease Germany. The Dawes Plan of 1924 Reparations were an important part of the Treaty of Versailles. Especially in France these payments were considered to be crucial for economic recovery after the war, but Germany was unable to fulfil her financial obligation towards France. In 1923 France therefore decided to occupy the Ruhr, attempting to force the German government to finally settle the reparations to France. The British did not support this action, although technically it was in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles. The occupation did not only fail, it also made the economic situation in both France and Germany even worse. It also made the British more sympathetic towards the Germans.47 The Ruhr crisis demonstrated that the issue of reparations needed to be settled. The Dawes Plan, initiated by the United States in 1924, was designed to help Germany pay the obliged reparations. A large loan was granted to Germany by the 45 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 52 Ibid, p. 72 47 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 75 46 18 United States in order to relieve the German economy so it would be able to stabilize itself. The reparations issue was yet another reminder to the British that the Treaty of Versailles should be revised; Germany was clearly unable to adhere to the agreements that were decided on. The Locarno Treaties of 1925 The Locarno Treaties were also a response to the Franco-German conflict during the Ruhr crisis. In Germany and in other countries there was a growing realization that cooperation would be essential for the future of Europe. In October 1926, Germany, Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy signed the Locarno treaties. These signalled an important step in the relationship with Germany; the Locarno Treaty meant that Germany would officially accept the territorial borders with France and Belgium that were decided upon in the Treaty of Versailles and declare that it was committed to peace. The Rhineland would become a demilitarized zone once France removed its troops from the area. Although the Locarno Treaty was very clear about Germany’s western borders, its eastern borders remained open to future revision. The agreement of non-aggression was not only important for the protection of peace in Europe; it also marked the first time that Germany was treated as an equal partner by the Allied powers. Germany was admitted to the League of Nations and truly became part of Europe again. The ‘spirit of Locarno’ was defined by a sincere belief that war between France and Germany was no longer possible, and that the First World War was now truly a closed chapter.48 Although the perceived injustices of the Treaty of Versailles were not really addressed in the Locarno agreement, the fact remained that it put Germany on more equal footing with the other European countries. For the British conscience this was an important step towards improving the relationship with Germany. This ‘spirit of Locarno’ would endure for some years, until Adolf Hitler decided to denounce the agreement in 1936. Although Germany was a part of the League of Nations since 1926, this newly created partnership would not last for a substantial amount of time. In October 1933 Hitler decided to withdraw from the League of Nations, claiming that Germany was not treated as an equal within the organization, and that France was blocking necessary German rearmament.49 48 49 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 89 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.19 19 It has previously been mentioned that the Germans overstepped the agreements of the Treaty of Versailles in 1920. In 1935 the agreements were again violated when Hitler announced that the German troops were substantially larger than were permitted under the Treaty. This was in addition to the notification that the German naval force would greatly be strengthened in the course of the following years. This perceived naval threat made the British apprehensive, and when Hitler, in May 1935, proposed a deal to the British government that would limit Germany’s naval power, the British were inclined to listen. The offer held that Germany would limit its fleet to thirty-five percent of Britain’s sea power.50 The Naval Agreement was soon signed by Britain, an act that shocked French politicians, partly because they were not consulted in the matter. Under the agreements of Versailles, Germany would never have been able to rebuild its fleet in the first place and the Naval Agreement had given permission to rearmament without consultation of the other Allies. In Britain, the Naval Agreement was regarded as a victory for appeasement; it was seen as an example of AngloGerman friendship, and as evidence that Germany could be negotiated with.51 Hitler denounced the Locarno Treaty in March 1936, claiming that they were ultimately directed against Germany. Additionally, Hitler moved German troops into the officially demilitarized Rhineland.52 This was a clear violation of the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Treaty, and France in particular was distressed by this development. They appealed to the League of Nations for support but found none. The incapability of the League to deal with international crises became apparent yet again, The council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution which merely registered the fact that Germany was guilty of infractions of both the Treaty of Versailles and the Locarno Agreement and did not even discuss possible penalties.53 The inability of the League to deal with the situation was partly due to the lack of commitment of the British. The British undermined the authority of the League on 50 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 44 51 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 170 52 Furnia, Arthur H., The Diplomacy of Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to World War II, 1931-1938, University Press: Washington (1960) p. 189 53 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 75 20 numerous occasions, by being more lenient towards Germany than the other associated countries. This was influenced by the British ‘guilty conscience’ over unfair treatment of the Germans after 1918, the unjust accusation that Germany was solely responsible for the war and the British signature under a treaty that was so obviously flawed. Appeasement was considered to be the best way of correcting the injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. In the words of Martin Gilbert, ‘[a]ppeasement was the balm for a guilty conscience’54 54 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 52 21 2. Appeasement as an unfavourable policy: 1937-1939 The previous chapter describes why appeasement was generally regarded as the best option for British foreign policy in the early 1930s. Currently, the term appeasement is charged with a negative connotation. It is generally perceived as an irresponsible and risky policy. Various accounts can be found on when opinion on appeasement changed, but it is generally acknowledged that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was the definite watershed in the conception of appeasement. The politician that is usually held accountable for the appeasing attitude of Britain towards Nazi Germany, even when popular opinion turned against the policy, is Neville Chamberlain, British Prime Minister from May 1937 until May 1940. This chapter will start in the year 1937 because that was the year Chamberlain was elected Prime Minster. As premier Chamberlain was responsible for British policy, and under his leadership the status of appeasement would change dramatically. Appeasement was by no means an invention of Neville Chamberlain. Yet in any discussion of the topic of appeasement as a political strategy it is almost impossible not to mention his name. Either by a sincere belief in the policy or by a tenacious optimism, appeasement far outlasted its welcome in British foreign policy under Chamberlain’s leadership. Although general opinion was turning against appeasement as the preferred British foreign policy in the late 1930s, Chamberlain optimistically continued to believe in appeasement as the best way of dealing with the international situation of that time. In the years prior to the election of Neville Chamberlain as British Prime Minister, the policy of appeasement had already been firmly established. But under Chamberlain’s predecessor, Stanley Baldwin, appeasement was not the successful policy that Chamberlain envisioned it could be. Benny Morris, in The Roots of Appeasement, describes appeasement under Baldwin as being ‘pursued ineffectively and passively’. 55 Chamberlain believed that he could restore the British faith in appeasement by employing the policy competently. The new Prime Minister trusted that the effective and efficient exercise of appeasement would improve international relations and in effect would guarantee European safety. 55 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 67 22 2.1 Chamberlain becomes the British Prime Minister Although appeasement was certainly not a policy invented by Neville Chamberlain, he has been irrevocably linked to this policy in the years long after his premiership. Chamberlain’s reputation has undoubtedly been tainted by the events of the late 1930s. It has been suggested that Chamberlain’s application of the appeasement policy was directly responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. Especially in the years following the Second World War, historians have been rather disapproving in their opinion of Chamberlain. Compared to his successor, Winston Churchill, who was seen as a charismatic, strong-willed and forceful leader, Chamberlain seemed to pale in comparison. Whereas Churchill was seen as the man that had led Britain towards victory over the Nazis, Chamberlain was often seen as the man who had brought war to the doorsteps of the British population by continually appeasing the untrustworthy Nazis. However, in later years there has been somewhat of a reappraisal of Chamberlain’s character. Most writers acknowledge that Chamberlain was an intelligent and perceptive statesman. According to some writers there might have been some flaws in his character, however, that influenced the political future of Britain. R.A.C. Parker suggests that there is a definite connection between Chamberlain’s susceptibility to flattery and Hitler’s success in starting the Second World War.56 Chamberlain was certain that he had developed a special relationship with Hitler, one of respect and trust.57 Neville Chamberlain was rather involved in foreign relations, perhaps more so than his premiership required. Chamberlain showed interest in foreign relations throughout his political career. Prior to 1937 Chamberlain was already very influential in foreign policy. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931 until he was elected Prime Minister. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, foreign policy did not necessarily fall under his job description; Chamberlain was nevertheless very involved in British relationships with the rest of the world.58 When Chamberlain was elected Prime Minister, his influence on foreign politics rapidly increased. Although Chamberlain could count on the support of his Cabinet, especially in the first years of his premiership, he still preferred to set out his own course for foreign policy, often 56 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 6 57 Ibid, p. 169 58 Ibid, p. 122 23 without discussing his plans with the institution that was responsible for international relations, the Foreign Office.59 Chamberlain repeatedly bypassed the Foreign Office, which he deemed ‘too slow-moving and stuck in its ways to serve as an effective instrument for his ideas’.60 Chamberlain was not the first British Prime Minster to deal with the Nazi Party and its leader Adolf Hitler. It was under Chamberlain’s leadership however, that Germany became an ever-increasing threat to European safety. While many politicians in Britain were certainly reluctant to entertain the possibility that Nazism could indeed lead to another war, the potential risk that Nazism brought to the European continent could not be ignored indefinitely. Chamberlain firmly believed that Hitler would ultimately prove to be a rational statesman who could be negotiated with. This opinion was not shared by all British politicians, and disagreement over whether Hitler could be appeased would remain an important topic in deciding on a policy towards Germany. The policy of appeasement throughout British history, as discussed in the first chapter, was generally seen as an astute and, perhaps more importantly, as a safe option. Under the growing threat of Nazism however, trust in appeasement as a sensible policy gradually changed. Although much of the public and most of the press believed in maintaining peace at almost any price, the perpetuation and strengthening of the Nazi regime was becoming for more and more people too high a price to pay.61 For Chamberlain there does not seem to have been a great difference between Hitler and the Nazi party and other dictators. Appeasement had proven to be a strong political strategy in the past, and Chamberlain apparently saw little reason why appeasement would be less useful while dealing with Nazi Germany. Chamberlain and his Ambassador in Berlin ‘believed that even Nazi Germany could be appeased, not in order to give Britain a breathing space in which to rearm more rapidly and prepare for war, but to avert the danger of war for all time’.62 59 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 207 Ibid 61 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 167 62 Ibid, p. 169 60 24 The assumption that Hitler was not necessarily different from European leaders that preceded him would prove important for the policies that were set out by Chamberlain and his contemporaries. According to Benny Morris in The Roots of Appeasement, the governing Conservatives based their policy of appeasement in the 1930s on a series of assumptions about Hitler and the Germans. Most importantly, they assumed that Hitler was a rational statesman who, and that he strived for the revision of the peace treaties rather than after world domination. 63 Chamberlain believed that even ‘excitable dictators’ 64 would eventually listen to reason. Furthermore, Hitler was assumed to value British friendship highly and was thought to be reluctant to risk a conflict with the Western world. The historical ties between Britain and Germany had British statesmen believe that German ambitions toward the east would not necessarily be incompatible with British interests. Above all, British politicians truly believed that Hitler could not possibly want another world war.65 In A Study of British Public Opinion, T.W. Nagle underscores this point made by Morris. Nagle mentions that a primary ‘reliance on good will was a British tradition’.66 Nagle also mentions the flawed appraisal of Hitler, British leaders were under the assumption that Hitler was not so different from the leaders before him, that there was an ‘unbreakable continuity of national character and national interests’.67 Another assumption that has been made by Chamberlain and other political leaders was the belief that Hitler and other dictators would feel obliged to honour the commitments of the different treaties they signed. There was a strong impression that agreements between national leaders were binding to all parties. When appeasement was at its strongest in the 1930s, the policy trusted ‘the assumption that the more agreements Hitler signed, the more difficult it would be for him to disregard them.’68 Economy as the ‘fourth arm of defence’ The issue of rearmament was an important one in the late 1930s. While the threat of Germany kept increasing, British armament continued to become less important in the 63 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 2 64 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 94 65 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 2 66 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 15 67 Ibid, p. 17 68 Ibid, p. 38 25 national budget. The earlier mentioned Peace Ballot of 1935 showed that British public opinion was in favour of disarmament, and it has also been mentioned in the previous chapter that Britain brought back its armament to a point where national defence was getting more difficult to guarantee. But the growing threat of Nazism and unrest in Europe made it less feasible to maintain this position. Even if Chamberlain ‘continued to believe most emphatically that war was not inevitable’69, he still recognized that rearmament of Britain would eventually be necessary. Chamberlain and his supporters thought it vital that rearmament should not be too hasty a process. More important than rearmament itself, Chamberlain believed that economic stability would crucial for the future safety of Britain. For Chamberlain the economic health of Britain was the ‘fourth arm of defence’; economic stability was envisioned to be ‘a peacetime deterrent more significant than military strength and one that would be lost if other countries detected signs of strain in Britain’.70 A balanced budget and a strong export trade would ensure a sound British economy.71 In February 1936 the government agreed on a five-year plan for rearmament, to be launched in 1937. This five-year plan was supposed to prepare Britain for a possible military action by 1942. Chamberlain continued to believe that economic stability was far more important than rearmament and, in 1936, routinely used his influence as Chancellor of the Exchequer to lower the budget for rearmament.72 Still, Chamberlain believed in the five-year plan that would gradually strengthen Britain militarily because ‘conciliation could decrease the number if Britain’s enemies and avert war with those that remained’73, ‘while preparing enough military force to deter any remaining enemies’74 after 1942. Because rearmament was against the public will, it would be even more important that military developments would not stand in the way of economic progress. 69 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 175 Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University Press: New York (1993) p. 316 71 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 166 72 McDonough, Frank, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 38 73 Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University Press: New York (1993) p. 317 74 Ibid, p. 299 70 26 2.2 The Munich Agreement of 1938 It has already been mentioned that the Munich Agreement of 1938 signalled the end of appeasement. The events that led up to the eventual agreement that essentially gave Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe resulted from the fact that British politicians were never able to truly understand Hitler’s objective in international relations. Although there was a clear policy that Hitler should be appeased, executing this policy became increasingly difficult due to the fact that Germany would not make clear what its grievances were, and what Britain could do to improve the situation.75 The Munich Agreement was the result of a never-ending series of demands from Germany, which Britain kept giving into. Britain was committed to the policy of appeasement, and the limits of concession were continually stretched in order to accommodate Hitler. The situation in Czechoslovakia during the Munich Crisis was about much more than autonomy or self-reliance for the Sudeten Germans in the area. Various agreements and treaties meant that a possible struggle between the Germans and the Czechs could not be contained to these two countries alone. In 1924 French officials had signed a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which entailed French protection of Czechoslovakia in case of German invasion. The Locarno Treaty of 1925 compelled Britain to support France in such a case. According to Scott Newton in Profits of Peace, the British could thus be ‘dragged into war as a result of the chain of events likely to unfold following conflict between the Germans and the Czechs’.76 It is clear that the stakes were high; it was crucial for European stability that this issue would be settled peacefully. Chamberlain was sympathetic to Hitler’s call for greater autonomy for the Sudeten Germans, and felt that this could be the ‘final German grievance [that] lay in the way of a permanent settlement in Europe’.77 Under the Treaty of Versailles, around three million Germans-speaking people had become part of Czechoslovakia, without being consulted in this matter. The issue was regarded as one of the many problems that the Treaty of Versailles had created, and it was thought that a solution 75 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 98 76 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 80 77 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 169 27 to this problem would greatly improve European stability.78 This might have been an argument for British reluctance to reign in German aspirations in Czechoslovakia but it has also been argued that British politicians simply cared very little about what happened to the east of Germany. As long as Hitler confined himself to reclaiming German territory and incorporating Germans within the Reich, many of the British people were not disposed to quarrel with him. 79 Moreover, Czechoslovakia was thought to be in the German sphere of influence, not in that of Britain.80 Scott Newton summarizes this in Profits of Peace: [f]or the British government, not only were there no moral issues at stake in the Czech crisis: there were no strategic ones either. 81 It indeed seems as if British politicians were predominantly interested in preventing war over Czechoslovakian territory, a war they would probably have to get involved in. Martin Gilbert calls the Munich Agreement an ‘emergency plan, intended to buy peace at the expense of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the transfer, without plebiscite, of non-Nazis to Nazi rule’82. It has already been mentioned that Britain traditionally favoured a foreign policy based on the balance of power, and that the sacrifice of smaller states could not stand in the way of this goal. Czechoslovakia was thought to stand little chance against the German aggressor, and British opinion stated that it would be better to help achieve this peacefully than to stand in the way of Hitler. Besides, British politicians were not entirely convinced that they had the means to hinder Hitler from taking the Sudetenland by force. 83 The five-year rearmament program that was earlier mentioned had not yet prepared Britain for war by this time. 78 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 83 79 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 78 80 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 229 81 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 84 82 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 179 83 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 80 28 Although appeasement was increasingly perceived as the wrong policy for the international situation of 1938, this did not necessarily mean that Britain had very many other options. Politicians were even more reluctant to risk a war because there was no strong alliance that could make sure Germany would be defeated. The United States increasingly retreated in isolationism, and Chamberlain was not eager to have the Americans meddling in what he perceived to be British affairs anyway.84 It was equally unlikely that the Dominions would support Britain if war with Germany would break out over the Sudetenland issue. During the crisis of 1938 the Prime Ministers of the Dominions made it clear that they did not regard a German attack on Czechoslovakia as an adequate reason for the Empire becoming involved in a European war. 85 Scott Newton emphasises this argument; ‘the Dominions would not go to war over Czechoslovakia’. 86 Without the support of the Dominions, British chances of successfully defeating a German aggressor became even less likely. French irresolution over a course of action did not strengthen the British belief in an easy victory, and only increased distrust of the French.87 Both the United States and France were Britain’s strongest potential allies at the time, but the countries could not come to an agreement that would ensure safety for all parties. These factors all reinforced Chamberlain’s belief that war could not be risked, or even seriously threatened. Anschluss: the annexation of Austria Hitler never concealed that he had ambitious plans for Germany. His vision for the Third Reich entailed the inclusion of all German-speaking people, and the expansion of German territory. The first country to be confronted with these ambitions was Austria. Nazi influence in the country became increasingly noticeable throughout 1937, and this would only become more apparent the following year. In February 1938, the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, was pressured by Hitler to accept prominent Nazis into the Austrian cabinet. It soon became apparent that the 84 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 199 85 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 181 86 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 81 87 Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University Press: New York (1993) p. 314 29 Austrian Nazis were not interested in supporting a democratic Austria but rather intended to destabilize the country. 88 Schuschnigg, in order to avoid the slow deterioration of the Austrian government, ordered a plebiscite which would ask the Austrian population if they wished to join Germany. This referendum was scheduled for 13 March 1938. It was not to be however, Hitler ordered his generals to invade Vienna by 12 March. The Austrian army did not resist to this invasion, and the annexation of Austria was soon completed. Although the occupation of Austria certainly did not abide by the Treaty of Versailles, there was surprisingly little protest from the international community. The British government quickly stated that it was under no obligation to fight for the independence of Austria, that there was no treaty in existence that could compel the British to do so. Although Chamberlain did not approve of Hitler’s action per se, the fact that it all happened reasonably peacefully was probably enough to justify British inaction. Also, he considered ordering the plebiscite to be Schuschnigg’s ‘folly’.89 The fact that Austrian territory could not be seen as a necessary revision of the Treaty of Versailles – since Austria was never part of a German empire – made that Anschluss no longer appeared as the innocent expansion of a much maligned and wrongly circumscribed Germany’.90 Still, with some creative thinking, ‘the German move could be rationalized as a fulfilment of German national self-determination’.91 With the successful annexation of Austria, Hitler could now turn towards Czechoslovakia for the settlement of German grievances in that area. It was briefly mentioned before, but Hitler’s problem with Czechoslovakia was that, as a consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, more than three million German-speaking people became part of Czechoslovakia. These Sudeten Germans were included in the new Czech state without being consulted in the matter, and did not feel they were sufficiently represented in the government. Their wish for better representation was understandable; their grievances were generally neglected in Prague. 92 Konrad Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Deutsche Partei, was responsible for the realization of these goals of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, with the support of 88 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 221 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 132 90 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) pp. 167-8 91 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 222 92 Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1961) p. 139 89 30 Germany. In 1938 Hitler expressed his wholehearted support and encouraged the Sudeten Germans to strive for autonomy. 93 Hitler’s ulterior motive here was undoubtedly to stir up confrontations that would eventually lead to the realization of his own ambitions. Henlein was instructed by Hitler to make sure that an agreement would never be reached, and to never accept any offer from the Czech government.94 Czechoslovakia and the Runciman Mission Tension between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government intensified during the course of 1938. As was mentioned, opinion in Britain was reasonably supportive of Sudeten autonomy, achieving this could make sure that another German grievance would be appeased. Furthermore, a true conflict between the Czech government and the Sudeten Germans, supported by Hitler, could easily get many European nations involved in another great war. As mentioned, conflict between the German and the Czech government could drag other European nations into war through various agreements. This was understandably something Chamberlain and his government wished to prevent. Because the relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia continued to deteriorate and an eventual clash between the two countries became increasingly likely, Chamberlain decided to interfere. The British government communicated to the Czech government that it would not be acceptable for them to frustrate the goals of the Sudeten Germans. The involvement of Hitler made it crucial that an agreement would be reached, and it was still believed that an agreement could in fact be reached. Hitler might have instructed Henlein never to accept any compromise, but this was not known to other politicians. Hitler continued to ensure London that he wanted nothing but a peaceful solution to the Czech problem.95 In August 1938 Lord Runciman was asked by the British government to act as a mediator between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. Runciman was officially to be an independent, neutral party that could close the gap between both conflicting parties. It was generally understood however, that Runciman was there to serve the British goal of appeasement; Runciman was to make sure that Prague would accept as 93 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 169 Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1961) p. 143 95 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 229 94 31 many of Henlein’s demands as possible.96 Runciman eventually produced a report in which he suggested that the Czech border should remain intact, but that the Sudetenland should gain autonomy within these borders. The Mission could nearly be considered a success, an agreement between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans almost became a real possibility, even if Henlein never would have agreed to it. According to Martin Gilbert, ‘the Runciman Mission was Britain’s last exercise in positive appeasement’.97 It would prove to be that last moment in time that Britain was able to take the initiative, and would not be struggling to keep up with German demands. Hitler was not very pleased by the new developments, and in a speech on 12 September 1938 he rejected autonomy and instead incited the Sudeten to demand full self-determination.98 Although the speech itself did not cause much reason for alarm in the international world, it did result in some riots in the Sudetenland. A number of Sudeten Germans were killed in this period and Henlein fled to Germany, to demand self-determination from there. The situation became more precarious; Chamberlain again felt that British interference was called for. ‘Plan Z’ was the ultimate card up the sleeve of Chamberlain, he would personally visit Hitler and convince him of the need for peace and negotiations in Europe. On 15 September Chamberlain travelled to Hitler’s retreat in Berchtesgaden and there Hitler demanded that all parts of Czechoslovakia consisting of a predominantly German-speaking population should be incorporated into the Third Reich or German troops would make this happen by force. This was characteristic for Hitler’s policy of presenting outlandish statements that could not be agreed upon. It was highly unlikely that Chamberlain would, and could, persuade the international community to accept Hitler’s demands, convincing Czechoslovakia would be especially difficult. It might be a testament of Chamberlain’s political skill that he managed to persuade his own government and both the French and the Czechs of the necessity to agree to the Berchtesgaden demands. Appeasement was still very much upon the mind of Neville Chamberlain, and giving into Hitler’s demands was thought to placate the dictator. Britain ‘threatened to end mediative efforts and the French indicated that they would not fight in support of Czechoslovakia if Germany invaded 96 Ibid Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 174 98 Ibid, p. 175 97 32 it’.99 This argument won over a reluctant Czech government; it was made clear that they had little choice but to agree to Hitler’s terms. There was a general consensus – Czech population not included – that the ‘best way of solving the crisis would be for Czechoslovakia to allow the Sudetenland to be incorporated into the Third Reich’.100 Czech borders were simply not worth the risk of a grand-scale war. It was generally accepted that the Sudetenland was lost to Czechoslovakia anyway, politicians just wished for this transition to occur peacefully. An optimistic Chamberlain flew to Godesberg on 22 September to meet Hitler again. The Prime Minister was authorized to give into all the demands Hitler had spoken of in Berchtesgaden and was therefore positive that the meeting would go well. This would prove to be an illusion however; upon arrival it became clear that Hitler was in no mood to accept his own proposal. Hitler had come up with further aggressive demands and announced to Chamberlain that on 28 September, German troops would invade Czechoslovakia to solve the disagreement over the borders.101 Chamberlain obviously was not very pleased by this, and in the following days he would try to persuade Hitler that this would be a rather upsetting course of action. Chamberlain did succeed in pushing back the date for invasion, the new deadline would be 1 October. It became increasingly difficult to dismiss Hitler’s attitude towards territorial disagreements. The British government slowly realized that the only German objective seemed to be the start of a war, regardless of the cause. Chamberlain remained characteristically optimistic about his personal relationship with Hitler, even if he did not welcome the terms of Hitler’s Diktat.102 Despite Hitler’s aggressive demands, Chamberlain would not abandon the course of appeasement. The new developments were ill-received among virtually everyone else, and the new terms could not be accepted as such by the British, French or Czech government, or by British public opinion.103 War came unsettlingly close at this point and drastic steps were called for if war should be prevented. 104 Chamberlain did not mention it at the time, but Britain’s relatively weak military condition played a key factor here; Britain was not yet in a position where armament and defence was up to the task of 99 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 232 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 50 101 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 233 102 Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1961) p. 147 103 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 52 104 Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2 (1961) p. 147 100 33 confronting Germany in a war.105 The strongest potential ally, the United States had not been involved in European affairs for some time, and this was not expected to change anytime soon. The Munich Agreement Chamberlain was committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict between Germany and Czechoslovakia. Although the Peace Ballot of 1935 demonstrated that the Britons favoured a pacifist course and were overwhelmingly against the use of military force, recent developments caused for this to change. Public opinion increasingly called for a course of stronger action of the government, it was thought that the limits of concession were reached.106 Still, Chamberlain and some of his colleagues thought that the only prudent course of action was the continuation of appeasement. In Profits of Peace, Scott Newton describes that there was still a notion in Britain that ‘Nazism, however unpleasant and imperialistic, was in the end no more than the expression of frustrated nationalism’. 107 The Munich agreement was supposed to satisfy the German nationalistic call for the retrieval of territory. The underlying assumption here was still that Hitler and the Nazis could be appeased. The threat of war had not been this tangible for years. In the last days of September 1938, the British people were expecting an air raid at every moment, gas masks had been issued and the general mood was not very optimistic. 108 Chamberlain’s attitude towards war and the protection of Czechoslovakia became clear in a radio broadcast of 27 September; [h]ow horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying on gas masks here because a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we know nothing. 109 105 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 128 106 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 170 107 Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press: Oxford (1996) p. 85 108 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 177 109 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 235 34 In a last attempt to prevent the expected attack, Chamberlain called upon Italian dictator Benito Mussolini to persuade Hitler to settle the matter with Germany peacefully at a conference that would take place the same month. The conference was scheduled for 29 September, and the leaders of Britain, Germany, France and Italy were to negotiate and discuss the future of Europe. The European leaders would do their utmost to persuade Hitler that war should be prevented. Although the fate of Czechoslovakia was the main topic during the conference, no delegates from Prague were invited. The Soviet Union was also not considered to be an essential invitee, and was not asked to attend. At the conference Hitler was strongly advised to refrain from starting a war. At the same time, German generals were worried about a possible two-front war with both France and Russia and urged Hitler to come to an agreement with the other leaders.110 Apparently the pressure put upon Hitler both domestically and internationally had some effect; Hitler would accept the Munich Agreement. This was no great sacrifice from the part of Germany, the agreement entailed the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Third Reich, and the newly acquired territory for Germany was in fact larger than Hitler had demanded at Godesberg.111 The loss of territory was extremely damaging to the Czech economy and Czechoslovakia had effectively been sacrificed in order to come to an agreement with Hitler. After Munich Although Hitler had to make virtually no concessions at the Munich Agreement, he was still not pleased with the outcome. Determined to settle the issue of Czechoslovakia once and for all, Hitler intended to use his armed forces to crush the country. The Munich Agreement had made sure that this would not be a possibility in the foreseeable future. Hitler therefore could not help but to regarded Munich as a ‘defeat, since it deprived him of the opportunity to wage a glorious war of vengeance on Czechoslovakia’.112 Chamberlain had no such reservations about the agreement. He returned to London a victorious strategist, and was happy to meet with the large crowds that had 110 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 52 Ibid 112 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 237 111 35 gathered to applaud his achievement. Chamberlain told the cheering crowd that the Munich Agreement was the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.113 Even the morally questionable contents of the Munich Agreement could not dampen the British spirit, war had been averted and Chamberlain told the people that they could sleep peacefully that night.114 The need for peace was stronger than the desire to do right by small, and to many Brits, virtually unknown states. Not only was war averted for now, Britain also gained some precious time to continue its rearmament. An important change in the policy of appeasement after the Munich Agreement was the implicit objective. From 1919 onwards, appeasement was a policy directed to peace, but after September 1938 the policy evolved into one that was directed at averting war.115 Appeasement could no longer be seen as a policy of building structural peace but became instead a policy aimed at buying precious time for Britain to rearm sufficiently or until a better solution to the problem could be found. The cautious optimism that followed after the conference in Munich would not last for very long. Already in October and November 1938, leading foreign officials were describing Munich as a debacle, recognized that the balance of power was destroyed beyond repair, and resigned themselves to further German expansion eastwards and south-eastwards.116 But it was argued that there was no truly safe option for Britain to choose instead, no policy that could guarantee better results than appeasement. Although appeasement was not supported by everyone in Britain, there were little alternatives were available to Chamberlain and his Cabinet. Foreign policy had been greatly influenced by appeasement for years, and this policy ‘was massively overdetermined; any other 113 Ibid, p. 238 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 181 115 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 185 116 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 238 114 36 policy in 1938 would have been an astounding, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm’.117 Although the Munich Agreement was undertaken in the spirit of appeasement, this time it was not a policy that came from a position of strength. The term appeasement was distorted into a new definition, one that had little to do with old one. Chamberlain had the same intention as previous appeasers, but did not have the same means. Chamberlain was criticized, not because he was an appeaser, for that was a word signifying wisdom, breadth of vision, and stout common sense, but because he had failed to see that appeasement had never been designed as a policy of retreat and weakness, and that an appeaser was meant to be a midwife, not a mortician. 118 It soon would become clear if Chamberlain’s last attempt at appeasing Hitler would be a success, and if Hitler was indeed appeased. 2.3 Declaration of War in 1939 The optimism that followed the Munich Agreement would prove to be short-lived. As mentioned before, the Munich Agreement had bought some time for Britain to rearm. And indeed, the budget for British rearmament was raised considerably. In the period between the conference in Munich and the eventual outbreak of war in September 1939, the budget for rearmament increased from 8.1 per cent of gross national product to 21.4 per cent.119 But in this same period, Germany was obviously also able to raise its armaments. Despite the optimism that followed the Munich Agreement, little had changed in the nature and methods of Hitler.120 On the contrary, Hitler became increasingly difficult to deal with after signing the agreement. Frustrated by the failure of launching a war against Czechoslovakia, Hitler was looking for other outlets for his aggression. He would soon find an opportunity to unleash his wrath upon some of his adversaries. 117 Ibid, p. 242 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 185 119 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 63 120 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 177 118 37 Kristallnacht On 9 November 1938 Hitler launched a terrible attack on the Jewish community in Germany, which would become known as Kristallnacht. The Nazis used the murder of a German diplomat in Paris by a Jewish student as an excuse to burn and loot Jewish shops, homes and synagogues. Thirty thousand Jewish people were arrested, hundreds assaulted and one hundred people were murdered. As if this was not enough, Hitler also charged the Jewish community with a fine of one billion marks for the provocation of Kristallnacht.121 The international world strongly condemned this assault by the Nazis against the Jewish population, and the idea of appeasing such an ‘openly brutal dictatorship seemed the height of folly and moral bankruptcy’.122 The occupation of Prague Hitler’s contempt of the Munich Agreement became prominently clear at 15 March 1939. The German army marched into Czechoslovakia and occupied Prague, Bohemia and Moravia, thereby irrevocably ending the independence of Czechoslovakia. Although rumours about a German invasion of Czechoslovakia had been present for some time before the actual day of invasion, the rumours were steadily dismissed by Chamberlain and his associates.123 Although this was a clear violation of the Munich Agreement, Britain, France and Italy made no attempt to help the Czechs against the German aggressors. The British population condemned the attack on Czechoslovakia and appeasement became less popular than ever before.124 It became painfully clear that Hitler’s signature was worthless, and that he had no respect for international agreements. Although very little trust in the policy of appeasement remained among the British population, Chamberlain could not abandon his policy completely. Hitler might have shown that he could not be trusted to honour agreements, but this did not mean that international conflicts should not be resolved peacefully and without war.125 The time of appeasement was nearly over, it ‘was not necessarily dead by the end of March 1939, but it was certainly on life support’.126 121 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 240 Ibid, p. 63 123 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 242 124 Ibid, p. 243 125 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 64 126 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 246 122 38 The invasion of Poland After the hostile takeover of Czechoslovakia, there was little doubt over Hitler’s next target. Under the Treaty of Versailles, German land came within the borders of Poland and Hitler eagerly used this as a pretext to set his sights upon Poland. By this time Chamberlain had little choice but to acknowledge that he had little influence over Hitler, and a new plan of action had to be found. On 31 March 1939 Chamberlain proposed a guarantee to Poland, supported by the French government. This guarantee would theoretically curb Hitler’s freedom in Eastern Europe considerably, it spoke of Britain’s active intervention against Germany should these countries be attacked. 127 However, the wording of the guarantee was sufficiently ambiguous that the British and French governments had some choice in their level of commitment to Poland. Unfortunately, Hitler was not thoroughly impressed by the Anglo-French guarantee. In April, he ordered his generals to prepare for an attack on Poland, to commence at the beginning of September that year.128 In April Hitler also declared that he no longer felt obligated to uphold the terms of Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, an agreement he now came to see as ‘a symbol of British obstructionism’.129 It would have been strategically prudent if Britain could come to an alliance with the Soviet Union. Especially in the case of defending Eastern European countries, Soviet assistance was virtually indispensable. Yet, Chamberlain was very reluctant to work with the Soviets. Chamberlain did not trust Stalin, he had little faith in the Soviet military apparatus and he was against Communism. But, most importantly, Chamberlain suspected that such an alliance would put a definitive end to appeasement. Chamberlain still hoped that Hitler could be persuaded to settle the German grievances peacefully. An Anglo-Soviet alliance was not to be; Stalin instead came to an agreement with Hitler. The German-Soviet pact was disclosed in August 1939 and was essentially a non-aggression pact between the two countries. It also decided on the fate of Poland, which was to be divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. Other Eastern European countries were also included in the pact, Hitler could finally regain some of 127 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 177 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 67 129 Scammell, Clare M., ‘The Royal Navy and the Strategic Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1997) p. 111 128 39 the German territory he had been after.130 Politicians in Britain, and particularly Chamberlain, thought it highly unlikely that such a pact would even come into existence; he stated ‘it would be quite impossible for Germany and Soviet Russia to come together’.131 The Nazi ideology and that of Communism were considered to be absolutely incompatible. This might have been the case, but both Stalin and Hitler were opportunists, and the potential of the pact was immense. If Hitler thought that the Nazi-Soviet pact would intimidate Britain and France enough to abandon their guarantee to Poland, he would be disappointed. On 25 August, the British government signed a formal military alliance with Poland. This came as quite a shock to Hitler, who decided this must be a negotiation tactic of Chamberlain.132 Hitler tried to come to an agreement with Britain over the Polish question, but when Chamberlain proposed this to the Polish government they refused any negotiation with Hitler. Chamberlain was perhaps not aware of the fact that the Polish government was quite prepared to undertake a suicidal war with Nazi Germany rather than simply concede territory in humiliating circumstances as the Czechs had done after Munich. 133 Hitler was not impressed by the Polish resistance and on 1 September 1939, Germany invaded Poland. The British people accepted that German action had finally required that Britain would go to war.134 The British Cabinet was determined to carry out the obligations to Poland, and insisted that war should be commenced the next day.135 After some confusion and some unnecessary delays, Chamberlain finally addressed the British nation. Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I have believed in during my public life has crashed into ruins. 136 130 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 259 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 244 132 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 71 133 Ibid 134 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 336 135 Ibid, p. 339 136 Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 264 131 40 After the German occupation of Prague, Chamberlain’s policy did not really change. It did make it much more difficult for him to put the policy into effect. 137 Chamberlain was still very much interested in keeping the peace in Europe. Although the Munich Agreement was initially seen as a great political success of Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues, it soon became clear that Munich had instead been a grave strategic error. Not only did it show Hitler that there was little resistance against his plans of European domination, but the fact that the Soviet Union was not even invited to attend the conference did little to warm Stalin to an eventual alliance between the Soviet Union and France and Britain. One possible alternative to the policy of appeasement that has been offered by historians and politicians since the 1930s has been the formation of a strong international alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Chamberlain at the time felt that this would be a terrible idea, however. According to R.A.C. Parker, even when Chamberlain seemingly accepted that Hitler could not be appeased, he still was certain war could be prevented, and this would not happen by the formation of an international resistance that would only frighten Germany. 138 137 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 203 138 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 204 41 3. The meaning of appeasement after World War II: revisionism and appeasement in recent politics The events of 1938 are generally thought to have led to the end of appeasement in modern times. The Munich Agreement would spark a debate on the merits and, more importantly, the faults of appeasement. This debate would continue in the decades that followed after 1938. The outbreak of the most destructive war the world had ever seen inevitably had negative implication for appeasement, but this does not mean appeasement could be held responsible for this war. And indeed, the accountability of appeasement has been argued. Numerous accounts on whether appeasement was a positive or negative contribution to the international problems of the late 1930s came into existence, but three general categories can be distinguished. The orthodox perspective holds that appeasement was the direct instigator of the Second World War; the irresponsible policy of the appeasers, and more specifically of Neville Chamberlain, was responsible for an atrocious British foreign strategy, and that almost any other course of action would have been better for Britain. This would prove to be the dominant perspective; at least until a cumulative body of revisionist works were released. In reaction to this perspective a different account of appeasement came into existence, which became known as revisionism. Revisionism assumed that appeasement was the result of the errors that had been made during the Treaty of Versailles, and that Chamberlain and his colleagues had few other choices but developing a policy that would try to keep the peace in Europe. Moreover, revisionism claimed that appeasement was a policy that resulted from economic and military weakness.139In other words, British politicians were not in a position to make great demands, or to stop other countries from making such demands. The third perspective is counter-revisionism. This theory about Chamberlain and appeasement combines elements of both the orthodox and the revisionist perspective. The revisionist idea that Chamberlain was a competent statesman is underscored by counter-revisionism, but the revisionist hypothesis that appeasement was the resulted from military and economic weakness was not accepted by counter- 139 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 85 42 revisionism. 140 This third school of thought will most likely provide the most balanced result. The Orthodox View The orthodox perspective on appeasement is rather straightforward; appeasement was to be held at least partially responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. This view does not disregard the role of Hitler during this time, but states that British statesmen and particularly Neville Chamberlain had a moral and political obligation to make better efforts to stop Hitler. Neville Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement have been vilified in the popular press from 1938 onwards. Especially after the outbreak of war and the presidency of his successor Churchill, little was left of Chamberlain’s good name as a reliable politician. The most important contributors to the deterioration of Chamberlain’s legacy were undoubtedly three reporters that wrote Guilty Men under the pseudonym ‘Cato’. Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen published a furious narrative in 1940, which criticized successive British Cabinets harshly. The main theme of the book has been summarized by John Stevenson, who wrote the introduction. According to Stevenson, Guilty Men stated that [a] succession of either supine or deluded leaders, MacDonald, Baldwin and, above all, Chamberlain, abetted by lesser ministers, and their cohorts of admirers and yes-men, had failed to take heed of the threats posed by the dictators or, when alerted, had failed to awaken the public to the dangers that faced them. Concession after concession had been made in order to avoid difficult and compromising decisions; appeasement, begun as a policy of legitimate remedy of Germany’s grievances over the Treaty of Versailles, became a policy of abject surrender of position after position in the face of the aggressive acts or threats from Hitler, or his lesser rival Mussolini. 141 Although Hitler and the Nazi party were obviously primarily held responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War, the orthodox view holds that appeasement and its supporters contributed to the outbreak of war, or had, at the very least, not done enough to prevent this war. 140 141 Ibid Cato’, Guilty Men, Faber and Faber Ltd: London (2010), from the introduction by John Stevenson, p. xii 43 Another orthodox point of criticism was that Chamberlain did not inform the British public adequately of the situation in Germany, and the deterioration of the Anglo-German relationship.142 Even though the press was supposed to inform the people of the political situation of the time, […] the press in fact could do nothing but help Chamberlain pursue appeasement, as the ‘free’ and ‘independent’ press of Britain is at best merely a partisan political weapon controlled by politicians for their own purposes, and at worst a mere arena at the disposal of Whitehall to play out a game of interdepartmental warfare. 143 Clearly, the orthodox view had little patience for Chamberlain and his supporters. One of the most famous opponents of appeasement – at least after appeasement had become less popular in public opinion – was Winston Churchill. He stated in his memoirs that appeasement ‘was doomed to failure’.144 Many more politicians, writers, historians and journalists would denounce the policy of appeasement, making the orthodox perspective the leading opinion for years. Revisionism The orthodox view was virtually unchallenged in the first years after the Second World War. Although Guilty Men dominated the orthodox field, it was riddled with inaccuracies and exaggerations. The book was written in response to the troubled times, but was not necessarily a well-balanced and fair narration of British policy. There were few official documents in circulation which could serve as a less prejudiced source of information, at least until 1967. In May 1967 the British parliament passed legislation that would make most state document open to public viewing after thirty years instead of the previous fifty years.145 This new Thirty Year Rule made it possible for historians to get a better perspective on the events of the 1930s, by studying primary sources from the government archives. This development of transparency gave new incentive to revisionism after 1967. New theories were 142 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 81 Cockett, R., Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press, Butler and Tanner Ltd: London (1989) p. 1 144 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 81 145 Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008) p. 452 143 44 constructed to explain the motivations behind appeasement and to examine if it might indeed have been the best policy for the time. The revisionist view argues that Chamberlain in fact carried out a policy that was based on carefully considered ideas and strategies. At the same time, he had very little alternatives but to choose for this policy. The claim that Chamberlain was incompetent was considered too much of a simplification, which did not take the difficult political situation of the 1930s into account.146 And, if nothing else, at least appeasement could buy Britain the necessary time to rearm itself and go to war as a united nation.147 One of the most prominent revisionists is A.J.P. Taylor, who wrote The Origins of the Second World War. In this book, Taylor states the opinion that Hitler was not a grand strategist, that he did not have a ‘blueprint for European domination’148 and that he instead was an opportunist; there was ‘no long-term plot; there was no seizure of power. Hitler had no idea how he would come to power; only a conviction that he would get there. 149 In true revisionist-style, Taylor refuted the notion that the Munich Agreement had been a victory for Hitler, and stated instead that it was an achievement of the British. Important here was whether the politicians could achieve a previously established goal; only the British succeeded in doing this. According to Taylor, [t]he settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had worked precisely to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with no such clear intention’ 150 Taylor describes the Munich Agreement as a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles. 151 146 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 82 Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008) p. 449 148 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 78 149 Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books Ltd: Harmondsworth (1964) p. 11 150 Ibid, pp. 234-5 151 Ibid, p. 235 147 45 The description of Munich as a triumph for Britain seems somewhat overly enthusiastic; even if Hitler had no clear intentions during the Munich Agreement it would be difficult to deny that German wishes were granted by the British. The revisionist perspective does not deny that Hitler formed a growing threat in Europe, and does not claim that Chamberlain was not aware of this threat. Rather, it states that there were numerous rational motivations behind the choice for appeasement. If one begins to tot up all the plausible motivations for appeasement – fear and horror of another war, Britain’s state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economy and the Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and the United States, lack of confidence in France, lack of interest in Central Europe, failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and Communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative Opposition or Labour, and more – one sees that these are far more than enough to explain it. It was massively overdetermined: any other policy in 1938 would have been an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm.152 Revisionism does not accept the orthodox thesis that Chamberlain was a weak and incompetent leader who lacked diplomatic judgement. Instead they declared him to be a sensible politician who wanted to prevent war, even though he was fully aware of the danger posed by Hitler.153 Economic and military weakness is seen by the revisionist theory as an important reason for the choice of appeasement. The Peace Ballot of 1935 showed that the British population was opposed to rearmament; Britain was militarily not prepared for war. 154 According to Sydney Aster, the revisionists’ theory of appeasement was acknowledged to be the result of such determining factors as economic weakness, the paucity of resources to meet worldwide commitments, and the need to keep the 152 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 242 McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 82 154 Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 128 153 46 dominions on side. Public opinion, it was alleged, while not totally pacifist was still influenced by the ravages of the First World War and not prepared to pay the price of standing up to Hitler. 155 According to the arguments of the revisionists, appeasement was indeed the most appropriate policy that British leaders could embark upon, a policy that strived to deal with possible grievances in way that would maintain peace on the continent. More importantly, due to constraints and determinants, Chamberlain had little choice but to choose for appeasement. Chamberlain’s appeasement mainly focussed on revision of the Treaty of Versailles, the Treaty that had caused for so much territorial conflict in Europe. Revision was thought to, finally, help the European countries to move forward in a democratic way, and to establish cordial relationships between these countries. Counter-Revisionism Thirdly, a counter-revisionist, or post-revisionist, approach recognizes appeasement as a rational and sensible policy, but regards the British appeasement of the late 1930s as being implemented inadequately. Unlike the orthodox approach, counter-revisionist literature was based on the documents that have been made public under the Thirty Year Rule, just like the revisionist work. But unlike revisionist literature, counterrevisionism comes to much the same conclusions as orthodox writers have; the policy of appeasement was inadequate for the political situation at the end of the 1930s, even if the policy was not inherently flawed.156 One of the most prominent counter-revisionists was R.A.C. Parker, who wrote different accounts on appeasement in Britain. Especially in book Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, elements of both the orthodox and the revisionist perspective are present. Parker agrees with revisionists that Chamberlain was an able and competent politician, but that Chamberlain’s powerful, obstinate personality and his skill in debate probably stifled serious chances of preventing the Second World War. 157 155 Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008) p. 451 156 Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 238 157 Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 247 47 Although counter-revisionism is considered to be a much more balanced approach to appeasement than the orthodox perspective, it is still very critical of Neville Chamberlain and his supporters. Chamberlain’s personality seems to have been an important obstacle in the way of the successful implementation of appeasement. The Prime Minister was rather susceptible to flattery, a weakness Hitler could quite easily turn into a German advantage. The letters Chamberlain wrote to his sisters with great regularity revealed, according to Sydney Aster, ‘a personality hungry for flattery that nourished his growing self-righteousness.158 The three perspectives on appeasement that have been mentioned did not develop chronologically. Although each responded to the others, a new perspective did not replace an older one. The orthodox theories certainly did not disappear after revisionism became more widespread in the 1960s. With the passing of time, the orthodox perspective has become less widespread however. The writers of Guilty Men could hardly write a thoroughly objective book, devoid off all sentiment, when their fellow countrymen were under attack on the beaches of Dunkirk. Likewise, defenders of appeasement who were actually involved in Chamberlain’s administration were not the most reliable source for an objective approach to appeasement. Today it should theoretically be possible to consider the discourse of appeasement in a more dispassionate and balanced manner. But, it appears that the orthodox perspective is still very much present in the mind of politicians, appeasement is still a word that should be avoided at all cost. Neville Chamberlain’s reputation was unequivocally dependent on the reputation of appeasement. When Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, it was with the support and blessing of the British population. Indeed, Chamberlain was considered to be just the politician Britain needed after Stanley Baldwin, who was widely regarded as a weak and inefficient leader, even though he had already adopted the policy of appeasement.159 At that time, appeasement was considered to be the best possible foreign policy that could be adopted to deal with the German grievances that had resulted from the Treaty of Versailles. Both Chamberlain and the rejuvenated policy of appeasement enjoyed great popularity in Britain. Munich is usually seen as the 158 Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008) p. 455 159 Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s, Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 67 48 point after which appeasement changed into a bad word, but in the first days after Munich, appeasement was seen as the policy that had, yet again, kept the peace in Europe. When it became clear that appeasement was not enough to stop Hitler in pursuing the territorial demands of Germany, and Poland was invaded, appeasement would never be the same. At the mean time, the reputation of Chamberlain was damaged beyond recognition. Appeasement in recent politics The legacy of appeasement, and especially the Guilty Men thesis, has been firmly imprinted upon the mind of policymakers. The lesson that was taken from the proceedings of the late 1930s was clear; appeasing an enemy was a risky business that had better be avoided. Although the policy of appeasement has been successful in the years before the Munich Agreement was signed, appeasement is remembered as the policy that led to the Second World War. In 1990, Iraq invaded and subsequently annexed the State of Kuwait. This military aggression was met with strong international disapproval, and an American army was soon sent to the area. In 1991, President H.W. Bush explained why a strong stance had to be taken against the Iraqis. He declared that [i]f history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy or freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was seen in the 1930s, we see in Saddam Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbours. 160 The usage of the term appeasement almost conveyed the entire message; aggressors had to be taken down immediately; no time could be wasted on trying to find a more peaceful solution to the problem. Two months later, President Bush elaborated on his message. In World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been stopped. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and, ultimately, to war. And we are not going to make the mistake of appeasement again.161 160 Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008) p. 443 161 Rock, Stephen R., Appeasement in International Politics, The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington (2000) p. 3 49 The influence of the orthodox theory is clearly visible; there is a distinct assumption that appeasement must lead to war. This is in direct contradiction to the underlying ideals of appeasement, a policy that had peace as its ultimate goal. Although politicians steer clear of the term appeasement, this does not mean that the policy cannot be adopted under another name. ‘Conciliation’ and ‘engagement’ are popular euphemisms for appeasement, and have been employed by the same Bush administration that condemned appeasement. 162 Other examples of an appeasing policy, while not labelled appeasement, can undoubtedly be found all over the world. The principles of appeasement, as described by Martin Gilbert, ‘conciliation and reconciliation, compromise and barter, realizing one’s own faults, seeing both sides of any dispute, giving as well as taking, conceding as well as demanding’163 appear to be excellent foundations to base a policy upon. The British policy of the 1930s might have put a stigma upon the term appeasement, but again, the policy itself will continue to live on in politics. 162 Rock, Stephen R., Appeasement in International Politics, The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington (2000) p. 3 163 Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 5 50 Conclusion The story of appeasement in British politics in the 1920s and 1930s has been told by many politicians and historians. But more so than with other political discussions, the policy of appeasement created great disagreement and discord among these writers. The intensity of the debate can be explained by the kind of impact the conclusion of this discussion would have on British history, and the British reputation. Supporters of appeasement have claimed that appeasement was the best way of dealing with the international difficulties that followed after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Germany had been severely weakened by this treaty; its territorial possessions had been greatly reduced, the military apparatus of Germany was restricted, and the Germans had to claim full responsibility for the First World War. That this would cause some resentment in Germany should not have come as a surprise to the international community. It is therefore not mere speculation to say that Hitler and the Nazi party were symptoms of a larger ailment in Germany, ailments of a thoroughly wounded nation with little chance of improving their lot after the Treaty of Versailles. Appeasement seems to have been a sincere British attempt at improving Germany’s position in Europe, even if German politicians did not perceive the endeavours as such. As mentioned, the policy of appeasement was adopted to deal with the aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles. In the course of the 1920s, it became unmistakably clear to British politicians that Germany had been wronged at this treaty, and that something had to be done. Appeasement was thought to be the remedy for the maladies of Europe; peace was thought to be worth some concessions to Germany. The British population supported a policy that could serve two purposes: provide a solution to the German grievances and also prevent future wars. The Peace Ballot of 1935 showed that the population was determinedly against rearmament and military actions. This meant that potential hostile nations had to be dealt with in a different way than the threats of war. Somehow, the relationships with potential aggressors needed to be improved. It is difficult to imagine a foreign policy that would be able to do this more efficiently than appeasement, especially if rearmament was out of the question. Appeasement can be very effective if there are clearly defined demands. In the late 1930s however, this was not the case. Hitler never ceased to make greater 51 demands of the other European nations, while Chamberlain continued to believe that appeasing Hitler would guarantee peace. Chamberlain continually had to stretch the limits of appeasement in order to give in to the never-ending list of demands from Hitler; the limits of concession were not easily reached. The reputation of the Chamberlain administration and of appeasement has been gravely damaged by the publication of Guilty Men. This orthodox perspective would be the dominant interpretation of British policy of the late 1930s; when in 1967 official documents were made accessible through the Thirty Year Rule, revisionism would challenge orthodox theories. Counter-revisionism intended to walk the tightrope between orthodoxy and revisionism, and was indeed the most balanced of the interpretations. In recent politics, it is almost impossible to find examples of appeasement. Politicians avoid all mention of the term appeasement, unless to explain what a policy absolutely should not be. The term appeasement has become almost synonymous with certain war; appeasement is perceived as a policy of capitulation. Whether appeasement can be held responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War can never truly be established. It could not have been prophesied what outcomes other policies might have had. Chamberlain certainly had Britain’s best interest at heart; the Prime Minister was committed to a lasting peace. 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