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The Aftermath of Appeasement
A Legacy of British Foreign Policy
MA Thesis in European Studies
Graduate School for Humanities
Universiteit van Amsterdam
Author:
Main Supervisor:
Second Supervisor:
Date:
Carly van Beek
Dr M.E. Spiering
Drs L.E. Kemp
August, 2011
Table of Contents
Introduction
3
1. Appeasement until 1937: a policy of peace and satisfaction
1.1 Appeasement in the early history of British politics
1.2 Appeasement after the Great War:
the Peace Treaties and the League of Nations
1.3 British ‘guilty conscience’ after the Treaty of Versailles
1.4 ‘Never Again’: strong anti-war sentiments in Britain
5
7
2. Appeasement as an unfavourable policy: 1937-1939
2.1 Chamberlain becomes the British Prime Minister
2.2 The Munich Agreement of 1938
2.3 Declaration of War in 1939
22
23
27
37
3. The meaning of appeasement after World War II:
revisionism and appeasement in recent politics
42
Conclusion
51
Bibliography
53
9
13
17
2
Introduction
Few foreign policies have, retrospectively, been as controversial as the appeasement
policy that British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain pursued in the 1930s. This
policy was adopted to deal with genuine German grievances over the Treaty of
Versailles, and to bring Germany back into the European fold. The many conflicts
that arose in Europe in the 1930s had much to do with territorial disputes. At
Versailles the continent had been divided among nations rather arbitrarily, which
caused resentment in the affected countries. These conflicts needed to be settled;
Britain opted for the policy of appeasement to do this. Opponents of Chamberlain
have argued that this appeasement policy was, at the very least, to be held partially
responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War. Supporters of the policy have
countered this statement with the argument that appeasing the Germans was instead
the best way to deal with the increasingly dangerous situation in continental Europe.
Although appeasement has been disregarded as a policy based on fear and
expediency, it is difficult to imagine that educated statesmen would pursue such a
policy. Therefore, it is probable that, somehow, the definition and reputation of
appeasement had changed into a new, and definitely more negative, perspective.
During Chamberlain’s premiership, support for appeasement was far more abundant
than when his successor Winston Churchill came into office. Churchill, perhaps as a
political tactic, was highly critical of Chamberlain’s policy, and public opinion was
greatly influenced by this. It would take over two decades for this attitude toward
appeasement to be revised, after government documents were released that could be
examined by historians. This new approach became known as revisionism, and the
traditional view that appeasement was a shameful policy employed out of fear of
dictators has been supplemented by the revisionist theory that the policy was the result
of difficult circumstances that drove Chamberlain to appeasement.
This thesis will give an overview of the policy of appeasement in British
history. It will focus on the question why appeasement came to have such a
disagreeable reputation, and will defend the statement that appeasement does not
deserve this reputation. The diverse literature that came into existence after, and
sometimes during, the Second World War will support this thesis.
Chapter one will first give an overview of appeasement in early British history,
and will consider whether appeasement had a better reputation at those times. Then,
3
the chapter continues with the various motivations behind appeasement in the 1920s
and early 1930s. The international situation at that time clearly called for a policy that
would reconcile the European nations after the Great War. Appeasement was thought
to be able to do this. Especially the British attitude towards the Treaty of Versailles of
1919 will be discussed, and why British feelings about Versailles were an integral part
of the appeasement policy.
Chapter two will continue in the 1930s, and will discuss the change that
occurred in the interpretation of appeasement. The chapter begins with the election of
Neville Chamberlain, who became British Prime Minister in 1937. Afterwards, the
Munich Agreement of 1938 will be discussed. This Agreement is of vital importance
in order to explain what happened to the esteemed policy of appeasement.
The
outbreak of war in 1939 will also briefly be mentioned, since this has sometimes been
regarded as the tragic repercussion of appeasement.
Chapter three will then explore the different perspectives on appeasement that
were developed after the Second World War ended, and what consequences these,
sometimes controversial, new perspectives have had for the reputation of
appeasement. It will then briefly be considered whether it is still possible to speak of
appeasement policies today, if either the term appeasement is still in use or if the
fundamental principles behind appeasement can still be found today.
4
1. Appeasement until 1937: a policy of peace and satisfaction
After the Second World War, appeasement has become almost synonymous with a
policy of making great concessions to aggressors in return for empty pledges. Yet,
another understanding of the term appeasement must have influenced the policy of
British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain in the late 1930s. The policy can be
traced back through British history and was often seen as a sensible policy with the
aim to avoid conflict. The moment when appeasement changed from a benign and
pragmatic policy into a cowardly and traitorous policy is thought to lie in 1938, when
Britain signed the Munich Agreement and in effect sacrificed Czech territory in order
to appease Nazi Germany. Prior to 1938, appeasement was a conventional political
strategy, even if like other political strategies it was not favoured by all. Although
writers on the subject of appeasement cannot avoid discussing the disastrous results of
the policy in the late 1930s, there does seem to be a general agreement that the policy
is not inherently flawed.
Martin Gilbert describes in The Roots of Appeasement the policy of
appeasement as ‘a policy of optimism and hope, even at times of strength […] a noble
idea, rooted in Christianity, courage and common sense’.1 For Gilbert, the birth of
modern appeasement can be traced back to the day the Great War broke out;
[e]ducated people in all walks of life, and of all political beliefs, knew that war between
Britain and Germany was a tragic thing, that many lives would be lost, trade disrupted,
society disturbed, empires threatened, and the international scene poisoned by hatred
and recrimination. They determined that, when peace came, it should never again be
broken; that all disputes should be settled without war, and all legitimate aspirations
willingly granted.
2
Although this understanding would come too late to stop World War I, Gilbert argues
that before the war had even ended, the shock of the outbreak of that war would
ensure that people would do whatever needed to be done to guarantee that such a
conflict would never happen again. This was not a truly new realization; appeasement
had been present in British history long before that moment. However, the Great War
did give appeasement a new sense of urgency.
1
2
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. xi
Ibid, p. 9
5
Benny Morris, in The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and
Nazi Germany, argues that prior to 1933, appeasement was seen as ‘an enlightened
policy of justice for all’.3 In the two years that were to follow, this positive outlook on
appeasement would gradually change; instead of a policy based on morality
appeasement was regarded as a policy compelled by fear and expediency.4 This
change in perception is mostly due to developments in international politics and not
necessarily due to a change in the policy itself.
Paul Doerr, in British Foreign Policy 1919-1939 describes British appeasement
in the 1930s as ‘a realistic means of coming to grips with the country’s substantial
defensive liabilities at that time’.5 Doerr also notes a more negative description of
appeasement, as a policy of
[g]ranting concessions to Britain’s enemies in the futile hope of gaining agreements that
would prevent war but in the pursuit of which long-cherished moral principles (such as
the defence of small countries) were frequently sacrificed.
6
This is exactly the association with appeasement that has persisted through the
decades after the outbreak of the Second World War, and fits with the ‘guilty men’
thesis. This theory resulted from the book Guilty Men, written under the pseudonym
‘Cato’ by three journalists who strongly opposed the government of the 1930s. In this
thesis, appeasement is regarded as ‘a combination of calculated deception,
incompetent leadership, diplomatic bungling and poor military planning’.7
In ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, Paul Schroeder describes appeasement
as ‘a normal policy of conciliation and avoidance of war based upon a traditional
balance-of-power outlook’8; however, he does note that this policy was not suited for
the political situation of the late 1930s. Daniel Treisman in ‘Rational Appeasement’
claims that although there are ‘certain conditions under which appeasement can be the
only rational strategy’9, in the 1930s this was not necessarily the case.
3
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 3
4
Ibid
5
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 16
6
Ibid
7
‘Cato’, Guilty Men, Faber and Faber Ltd: London (2010), from the introduction by John Stevenson, p. xxv
8
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 243
9
Treisman, Daniel, ‘Rational Appeasement’, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) p. 368
6
Many more definitions of appeasement can be found, but for now it suffices to
say that appeasement was not always associated with Neville Chamberlain and his
policy towards Nazi Germany. It was in fact, by many considered to be a decent
political strategy. It is not entirely clear when the term appeasement was first used,
though it has certainly been used as early as the thirteenth century to describe British
policy. The term appeasement was not always applied to the strategy of deterring a
possible enemy by political means; other terms have also been used.
1.1 Appeasement in the early history of British politics
There are different accounts on when appeasement truly became a political strategy
for Britain. Martin Gilbert, in The Roots of Appeasement states that the underlying
principles of appeasement, ‘conciliation and reconciliation, compromise and barter,
realizing one’s own faults, seeing both sides of any dispute, giving as well as taking,
conceding as well as demanding’10, became widespread during the second half of the
nineteenth century.
But earlier examples of appeasement can be found in British political history.
Although the term appeasement was not always used in these cases, it seems clear that
the goal was much the same as it was during the interwar years. At the end of the
thirteenth century, England was at war with France. Still, the ruling monarch of
England, Edward I, was willing ‘to embark on a policy of appeasement, in which he
sacrificed his Flemish allies to France on condition that Philip [VI, ruler of France]
sacrificed his Scottish allies to England’.11 This policy did not succeed because
Edward faced serious opposition in England. The idea that cooperation with a hostile
nation could be beneficial to both countries would influence political opinion in the
years that followed.
Edward II continued the policy of appeasement inaugurated by Edward I,
despite the fact that this policy was considered to be rather damaging to England.12
Although the results of the policy were far from ideal, the idea that foreign policy
could be used to avoid conflict would become popular. The grandson of Edward I,
Edward III, adopted a foreign policy that was also influenced by the strategy of
10
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 5
Barraclough, G., ‘Edward I and Adolf Nassau. A Chapter of Mediaeval Diplomatic History’,
Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1940) p. 258
12
Ibid, p. 260
11
7
appeasement. Foreign policy was seen as a ‘unifying force, instead of, as in earlier
generations, a cause of dissension and war’.13
Another example of British appeasement can be found in the seventeenth
century, in the foreign policy of James I. According to Chester Dunning, ‘James’
foreign policy began to drift toward one of “appeasement” of Catholic Spain’.14 The
policy of appeasement was not quite popular at the time. Louis Wright describes the
relationship with Spain as based on a ‘stubborn and unpopular foreign policy, which
sought, at any price, to conciliate Spain’.15 This is a rare example of appeasement as a
negative and perhaps damaging policy in the years before the Great War and the
subsequent Second World War.
Daniel Treisman states in ‘Rational Appeasement’ that British foreign policy
during the period 1865-1938 was also based on the principles of appeasement.16
Treisman mentions that one of the clearest examples of British appeasement involved
making concessions to the United States in the late nineteenth century. In the period
1895-1902 there were several moments where Britain chose for an appeasing
approach towards the United States. These cases concerned disputes over South- and
North- American territory, it was already suspected that British influence in this area
could not last. Moreover, Britain could not afford to engage in a war where little was
to be gained and the chances of winning the war were slim to none.
Another approach to the history of appeasement in British politics can be
found in the work of Paul Schroeder. In ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, Schroeder
argues that twentieth-century appeasement is nothing more than the continuation of
the British balance of power policy of the nineteenth century.17 During the nineteenth
century, British foreign policy was not necessarily in favour of the ‘independence and
integrity of all smaller states and victims of aggression, especially not in Central
Europe’. 18 The annexation of smaller states could be employed for maintaining the
balance of power, in which smaller states did not play a very substantial role. ‘A
strong and prosperous Germany could serve to curb the Soviet Union, check
13
Barraclough, G., ‘Edward I and Adolf Nassau. A Chapter of Mediaeval Diplomatic History’,
Cambridge Historical Journal, Vol. 6, No. 3 (1940) pp.260-261
14
Dunning, Chester, ‘The Fall of Sir Thomas Overbury and the Embassy to Russia in 1613’, The
Sixteenth Century Journal, Vol. 22, No. 4 (1991) p. 703
15
Wright, Louis B., ‘Propaganda against James I’s “Appeasement” of Spain’, Huntington Library
Quarterly, Vol. 6, No. 2 (1943) p. 149
16
Treisman, Daniel, ‘Rational Appeasement’, International Organization, Vol. 58, No. 2 (2004) p. 347
17
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 224
18
Ibid, p. 232
8
hegemonic aspirations and dangerous initiatives on the part of France, and promote
European and British prosperity’.19 It was therefore beneficial for the balance of
power to help Germany recover from the First World War.
Whether or not the policy of appeasement can be traced back through British
history seems to depend on the definition of appeasement. When this definition means
nothing more than the avoidance of conflict, it will be clear that this can easily be
identified throughout past policies. But if appeasement is understood as a deliberate
policy of giving in to the opposition, with little regard for the consequences, then will
be more difficult to establish. The above-mentioned examples are only to illustrate the
point that appeasement, both the term and the policy, can be found in British history
before the 1930s. There are undoubtedly many more examples that can be found; the
main argument here is that appeasement was by no means a new phenomenon
introduced by the statesmen of the interwar period.
1.2 Appeasement after the Great War: the Peace Treaties and the League of
Nations
The Peace Treaties
When the Great War was finally over in 1918, it soon became apparent that the
problems were far from over. The borders of Europe were under great dispute, the
Allied victors needed to decide on their plans for Germany, and many international
relations had to be re-established. The ending of the war was signalled by the
armistice that was signed in 1918, which included terms that were severe on the
Germans. It entailed the
[a]brogation of Germany’s treaties of victory, the renunciation of her each and every
conquest, the immediate evacuation of Belgium and France, withdrawal from Russia,
the cession of Alsace-Lorraine, the internment in British ports of the High Seas Fleet,
the surrender of all submarines, aircraft and vast quantities of weaponry, the relegation
beyond the Rhine of all German divisions and the entry into the Rhineland of Allied
armies of occupation, with bridgeheads across the river, the continuance of the
blockade[…].20
19
20
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 225
Lentin, A., Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: an essay in the pre-history of
Appeasement, Leicester University Press: Leicester (1984) p. 3
9
This armistice would later be followed by the official Paris Peace Treaties of 1919.
During the Paris Peace Conference of 1919-1920, representatives of many nations
were present, whom theoretically could have ensured a balanced and fair agreement.
However, one of the most important countries in causing the outbreak of war was not
invited to the talks. Germany was not welcome at the conference and had
consequently no say in the treaties; they were simply presented with a completed
treaty towards the end of the conference.21 German resentment against the Treaty was
therefore virtually unavoidable.
After the end of the First World War, the general opinion in Europe was that
such a devastating tragedy should never occur again. Not only were the economic
losses tremendous, the number of lives that were lost during the war were also beyond
belief.
Between 1920 and 1923 the British government shipped thousands of headstones to
France every week to mark the graves of British soldiers lost in combat. […] Armistice
days, cemeteries and cenotaphs were the legacy of the Great War.22
When the Peace Treaties were drafted, these devastations were fresh on the minds of
policymakers and their electorate alike. The demand for vindication was especially
strong in France. The French delegation, led by Georges Clemenceau, was determined
to have Germany atone for its role in the Great War. The French had obvious reasons
to demand this; Germany had invaded France successfully more than once and France
wanted security against Germany. Besides, the French economy had suffered greatly
under the strain of war and invasion. Therefore, the French had a clear objective
during the Peace Treaties; Germany was to pay for the recovery of the French
economy and her military force had to be restricted and controlled.
The British attitude towards Germany was more lenient since the defeat of
Germany had achieved Britain’s main wartime objective. The destruction of German
military power and the fact that the German fleet no longer posed a threat to the
British naval force put the British in a more secure position than the French.
However, the British population seems to have been convinced that Germany ‘for
reasons of selfish, imperialistic greed’23 had been the instigator of war. Evidently, the
21
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 34
Ibid, p. 26
23
Rodman, Barbee-Sue, ‘Britain Debates Justice: An Analysis of the Reparations Issue of 1918’, The Journal of
22
10
mood of the British people towards the defeated Germans could not be considered as
particularly generous. Regardless, the British delegation in Versailles, under the
guidance of Prime Minister David Lloyd George, argued that a vengeful peace
settlement could only lead to future disasters.24 This did not mean that Lloyd George
was against the idea of limiting German military power or having the Germans pay
reparations, but there was a clear realization that overly harsh conditions on the
defeated country would only make the situation worse. Even if the mood of the people
was at that time greatly influenced by the events of the war, this would not be a solid
foundation for a political strategy.
The Treaty that was eventually agreed upon demanded German disarmament,
territorial concessions and the payment of reparations to the Allied countries.
Particularly hurtful for German pride was the ‘War Guilt clause’; article 231 placed
all responsibility for the war with the Germans. The British attitude towards this
clause was hesitant, for it would surely make international relationships more
difficult.25 The issue of reparations was also considered as a problem; the financial
burden was thought to be too much for the already severly weakened German
economy. The territorial concessions that were demanded of Germany angered
nationalists and the new borders in the area did not improve stability in the region. It
is not surprising that the terms of a treaty are not agreeable to the defeated country,
but the Treaty of Versailles made it near impossible for Germany to recuperate in
peace.
It was mentioned earlier that the British Prime Minister David Lloyd George
did not completely approve of the content of the Treaty of Versailles, that he
considered it to be too vindictive. The fact that the Treaty was nevertheless signed by
the British delegation can be explained by Lloyd George’s belief that the Treaty
would not be set in stone, it was not to be ‘the fixed rule of the new Europe’26, but a
kind of preliminary agreement that would be open to negotiation and revision.
The League of Nations
In the discussion of the Paris Peace Treaties and specifically the Treaty of Versailles,
it is necessary to mention the League of Nations. Initiated by American President
British Studies, Vol. 8, No. 1 (1968) p. 142
McDonough, (2002), Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press. p.4.
25
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 23
26
Ibid, p. 48
24
11
Woodrow Wilson, the League was to be created ‘for the purpose of affording mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states
alike’.27 The League was seen as an integral part of peace, as a sphere in which
nations could coexist peacefully and where collective safety would be key. The
League of Nations was seen as ‘the only logical way by which the evil of war can be
brought to an end’.28 Initially there was a firm belief in the concept of collective
security; the League was thought to provide just that.
Theoretically, the League had the power to ‘impose economic sanctions and to
threaten an invading power with the prospect of all League members acting
collectively to remove the aggressor by military force’.29 In reality however, these
lofty ideals were difficult to achieve. Economic sanctions could not be enforced by
military power since the nations that were part of the League were unwilling to risk
another war. Also, the various members of the League all had different interests and
could cooperate very well. When in November 1919 the United States’ Senate refused
to ratify the Peace Treaty due to disagreement among American politicians over the
exact interpretation of the Treaty, it meant that the League had lost both its most
enthusiastic supporter and its most powerful member. 30 The decisions of the
American politicians to withdraw into isolation was in line with their domestic
political developments, but had a negative effect on the balance of power within the
League of Nations.
France and Britain did not always agree on which role the League should play
in international politics; France initially assumed that the League would
predominantly function as protection against possible German aggression, while
British politicians from the start welcomed Germany into the League. 31 A
supranational institution that would impose on national sovereignty did not
necessarily fit into British or French tradition, but the magnitude of the Great War
showed that even these countries needed allies in times of war.
As mentioned before, the effectiveness of the League was seriously
undermined by the fact that no nation was willing to risk another war merely to exact
27
Lentin, A., Lloyd George, Woodrow Wilson and the Guilt of Germany: an essay in the pre-history of
Appeasement, Leicester University Press: Leicester (1984) p. 5
28
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 12
29
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.8
30
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 68
31
Ibid, p. 76
12
economic sanctions. When in 1935 a conflict broke out between Italy and Abyssinia
(officially the Empire of Ethiopia), both members of the League, the internal
weakness of the institution became clear. Italy invaded Ethiopian territory, which was
a clear violation of the League’s terms. However, the League could agree upon a
decisive strategy towards the aggressor and the idea of collective security proved to
be a delusion. According to Thomas Nagle, July 1936 ‘witnessed the death of
collective security as conceived in the spirit of the League of Nations’. 32 The
disillusionment that followed after the Abyssinia Crisis and the subsequent Ethiopian
defeat damaged the League’s reputation beyond repair. This was not the first incident
in which the League failed to mediate. In 1931, Japanese officers destroyed a
Japanese-owned railway and then claimed Chinese terrorists were responsible for the
act. This allegation was used as an excuse for a full-scale invasion of Manchuria. The
Chinese government, like the Ethiopian government later would, appealed to the
League for help. However, the League could not realize its peacekeeping ambitions at
this time, and would not be able to do so during the conflict between Italy and
Ethiopia.33
The inability of the League to enforce sanctions on countries that did not
adhere to the agreements of the Peace Treaties corresponded with the appeasement
policy of the British. The League was unable to threaten countries with military action
and therefore had to be flexible with their own rules, the limits of transgression were
stretched to accommodate unwilling nations. Instead of strengthening the Allied
position stronger in Europe, the League seems mainly to have increased discord
between the countries. This meant that Britain was still in charge of her own foreign
policy, hardly hampered by the terms of the Treaty. Because Britain did not have to
stand by the economic and military demands of the League, their foreign policy could
easily be based on appeasement instead of the more rigorous League terms.
1.3 ‘Never Again’: strong anti-war sentiments in Britain
After the Great War it was difficult to speak of a victory. Countries on both sides of
the conflict were deeply traumatised by the war, and all had suffered great losses. The
32
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 67
33
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.20
13
aftermath of the war had various effects on British policy. After 1918 policy was
mainly based on the avoidance of conflict on the European continent. The
consequences of the Great War were seen as proof that war was the ultimate evil; the
most important understanding that came from the war was the realization that it could
never happen again. It ‘must never, under any pretext, be repeated’. 34 The
international situation during the interwar period caused many in Britain to believe
that appeasement would be the antidote to the aggressive policies of the first decades
of the twentieth century. Different incidents and ideas strengthened the hypothesis
that appeasement would be the safest policy to adopt after the troubling times of the
war.
Although few countries on the European continent did not share in the horrible
experiences of the Great War, the policy of appeasement has been specifically linked
to Britain during the interwar period. And indeed, popular opinion supported the
policy that was adopted by British politicians. Whereas France sought the solution to
peace in increasing its security, Britain was looking for ways to improve ties with
Germany; to make it part of Europe again, so the country would not be compelled to
start another war. Thomas Nagle mentions that this lenient attitude towards Germany
came from the belief that ‘nobody in his normal senses, and certainly not the
responsible leader of any nation, would be such a fool as to start war again’.35
Although giving in to an aggressor’s demands was certainly not ideal, ultimately the
consequences of this were considered to be less harmful than threatening with war
against an aggressive state.
The different attitudes towards Germany can be explained by a closer look at
the history between Britain, France and Germany. The relationship between France
and Germany had been troublesome long before the outbreak of the First World War.
On the other hand, Britain had traditionally enjoyed a much better relationship with
Germany. Although popular opinion in Britain after the war was resentful of German
actions, this soon changed into a desire to make sure Germany would not unduly be
punished for starting a war that other nations also had to take responsibility for. There
was no traditional or historical reason why Germany and Britain should not
34
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 4
35
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 15
14
cooperate.36 As British opinion towards Germany improved, their opinion of France
grew steadily worse. France had been an ally to Britain during the war, but the
relationship between the two countries could still not be considered as one of mutual
trust. Even while British opinion was still coming to terms with post-war Germany as
a possible partner in Europe, the ties with France were becoming strained. France was
increasingly considered to be most important obstacle to achieving European peace,
while Germany was seen as the country whose ‘cause and interests were compatible
with Britain’s’.37 Martin Gilbert even calls French ‘folly’ the ‘fertilizer which turned
appeasement from a feeble offshoot into a frantic bloom’.38 France was thought to be
more interested in requital than in European stability. The belief that a good
relationship between Britain and Germany could be developed was thus juxtaposed by
the growing suspicion that the French were not really interested in improving the
international situation in Europe.
An important question posed by the events of the Great War was that of
security. Although the Treaty of Versailles saw to the creation of the League of
Nations, it was soon realized that this institution was not adequately equipped to
secure world peace. The fact that the American military was not to be part of the
alliance meant that the burden of European security through the League rested in the
hands of France and Britain. However, Britain had other concerns than Europe alone.
The Empire had provided Britain with much needed support during the First World
War, but the dominions were equally dependent on Britain during conflicts. Without
American support, Britain had little chance of protecting her dominions, especially if
there would be a conflict in Europe at the same time. The realization that another
great war, if anyone would be foolish enough to try and start one, could not be won
without American support made the appeal of appeasement even greater.
Great Britain paid a high price for her continental involvement during the
Great War. Not only was there devastation and were many lives lost in the battle, the
economic situation in the country was also declining. The socio-economic situation in
Britain called for the attention of politicians, and this is part of the reason why, in the
1930s, Britain could be considered an insular society. According to Benny Morris, the
cultural insularity that followed resulted in a ‘general lack of knowledge of Germany
36
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 29
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 119
38
Ibid, p. 71
37
15
and German affairs’.39 This view holds that British politicians were insufficiently
aware of developments in Germany, and thus severely underestimated Hitler and
Nazism. This introvert perspective of many politicians can be explained by both the
need for domestic reforms and the belief that it was highly improbable that another
war would break out.
Another way in which future wars could be prevented was thought to lie in
disarmament. Thomas Nagle explains in A Study of British Public Opinion that
successive governments for that reason reduced the British armaments to ‘a point
where national defence was no longer safeguarded; they hoped other nations would
follow this example’.40 Nagle argues that this policy stemmed from the fact that
public opinion was against armament increases, and their belief that a safer world
would be guaranteed by collective security. Other writers agree that the public was
against an increase in British armament, but that security would not be found through
military alliances. Benny Morris in The Roots of Appeasement states that there was ‘a
dual rejection of substantial British rearmament and of British participation in military
alliances, secret or otherwise’. 41 It was thought that public spending should be
directed towards domestic improvements, not towards an arms race with the rest of
Europe.
British public opinion seems indeed to have been firmly against the issue of
rearmament and in favour of collective security through the League of Nations.
Between November 1934 and June 1935 a large part of the British public participated
in the National Declaration on the League of Nations and Armaments, generally
known as the Peace Ballot. This questionnaire showed that a large majority of the
population was in favour of participating in the League, that Britons were in favour of
disarmament, and that in case of aggression by a nation economic sanctions were
preferred over military action.42 Although it has been argued that the formulation of
the questions was biased in favour of pacifism, it does seem clear that the British
population was not in favour of aggressive European policies.
39
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 5
40
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 24
41
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 4
42
Ceadel, Martin, ‘The First British Referendum: The Peace Ballot, 1934-5’, The English Historical
Review, Vol. 95, No. 377 (1980) p. 828
16
The determination of politicians to ensure that another war would not afflict
Europe again is evident in different aspects of British policy. Appeasement in the
1920s and 1930s was part of a strong anti-war sentiment in Britain, and the abovementioned aspects seemed to have validated the case for appeasement. Optimistically
it was thought that the outbreak of another war was highly unlikely, that ties with
Germany could be greatly improved, and that British politicians at the meantime
could easily afford to ignore developments in Germany while they focussed on
domestic problems. If this would prove true, appeasement was indeed a solid policy to
adopt. And, since the strategy of disarmament had severely weakened the British
military, it had better be.
1.4 British ‘guilty conscience’ after the Treaty of Versailles
An important factor of the British policy of appeasement can be found in the belief
that Germany was not treated fairly during the Peace Treaties. But in The Roots of
Appeasement Martin Gilbert argues that the British ‘guilty conscience’ can be traced
back further, namely to the outbreak of the First World War. Lloyd George, Liberal
Minister, stated in 1908 that Germany was arming herself because of fear of her
stronger neighbours.43 This sentiment would stay with the British people, the idea that
Germany did not start the war because of hegemonic ambitions but as a reaction to
hostile neighbouring countries.
It was not the defeat of Germany in 1918, nor the severity of peace terms in 1919,
which created the first guilty consciences on which appeasement was to grow: it was the
outbreak of war.
44
The idea that the Great War was the result of a series of unfortunate incidents, and
that Germany should not solely be held responsible for this became more popular in
the 1920s and 1930s. With this realization, there was a growing belief that Germany
was treated unjustly in the years that followed after the armistice in 1918. After all,
Germany had not even been represented at the Peace Treaties; they were presented
with terms that were extremely damaging for a country that had just lived through
43
44
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 11
Ibid
17
four years of war, even if Germany had instigated that war. Righting the wrongs of
the Treaty of Versailles would become an important aspect of British appeasement.
By becoming ‘the leading advocate for appeasement, Britain could redress the
balance of injustice’.45
The feeling that Germany was not only treated unfairly, but that Britain had in
fact played a role in this treatment can be seen as the reason why both British
politicians and the public were tolerant towards a county that repeatedly transgressed
the agreements of the Treaty. This lenient attitude could clearly be seen when in
March 1920 a communist revolution broke out in the Ruhr. The German government
asked for permission of the Allied powers to suppress this revolution with German
forces and weapons. This was technically prohibited under Treaty rules as the
weapons were supposed to already have been surrendered to the Allies. Instead of
arguing that Germany was not authorized to use these weapons, David Lloyd George
approved of the initiative of the German government. 46 This is but one of the
examples where Britain was supportive of German actions that went against Treaty
directives, terms that British politicians felt needed to be revised anyway.
In the 1920s, two initiatives were launched to defuse the growing tensions in
Europe, and ultimately to appease Germany.
The Dawes Plan of 1924
Reparations were an important part of the Treaty of Versailles. Especially in France
these payments were considered to be crucial for economic recovery after the war, but
Germany was unable to fulfil her financial obligation towards France. In 1923 France
therefore decided to occupy the Ruhr, attempting to force the German government to
finally settle the reparations to France. The British did not support this action,
although technically it was in compliance with the Treaty of Versailles. The
occupation did not only fail, it also made the economic situation in both France and
Germany even worse. It also made the British more sympathetic towards the
Germans.47 The Ruhr crisis demonstrated that the issue of reparations needed to be
settled. The Dawes Plan, initiated by the United States in 1924, was designed to help
Germany pay the obliged reparations. A large loan was granted to Germany by the
45
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 52
Ibid, p. 72
47
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 75
46
18
United States in order to relieve the German economy so it would be able to stabilize
itself. The reparations issue was yet another reminder to the British that the Treaty of
Versailles should be revised; Germany was clearly unable to adhere to the agreements
that were decided on.
The Locarno Treaties of 1925
The Locarno Treaties were also a response to the Franco-German conflict during the
Ruhr crisis. In Germany and in other countries there was a growing realization that
cooperation would be essential for the future of Europe. In October 1926, Germany,
Great Britain, France, Belgium and Italy signed the Locarno treaties. These signalled
an important step in the relationship with Germany; the Locarno Treaty meant that
Germany would officially accept the territorial borders with France and Belgium that
were decided upon in the Treaty of Versailles and declare that it was committed to
peace. The Rhineland would become a demilitarized zone once France removed its
troops from the area. Although the Locarno Treaty was very clear about Germany’s
western borders, its eastern borders remained open to future revision.
The agreement of non-aggression was not only important for the protection of
peace in Europe; it also marked the first time that Germany was treated as an equal
partner by the Allied powers. Germany was admitted to the League of Nations and
truly became part of Europe again. The ‘spirit of Locarno’ was defined by a sincere
belief that war between France and Germany was no longer possible, and that the
First World War was now truly a closed chapter.48 Although the perceived injustices
of the Treaty of Versailles were not really addressed in the Locarno agreement, the
fact remained that it put Germany on more equal footing with the other European
countries. For the British conscience this was an important step towards improving
the relationship with Germany. This ‘spirit of Locarno’ would endure for some years,
until Adolf Hitler decided to denounce the agreement in 1936.
Although Germany was a part of the League of Nations since 1926, this newly
created partnership would not last for a substantial amount of time. In October 1933
Hitler decided to withdraw from the League of Nations, claiming that Germany was
not treated as an equal within the organization, and that France was blocking
necessary German rearmament.49
48
49
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 89
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p.19
19
It has previously been mentioned that the Germans overstepped the agreements of the
Treaty of Versailles in 1920. In 1935 the agreements were again violated when Hitler
announced that the German troops were substantially larger than were permitted
under the Treaty. This was in addition to the notification that the German naval force
would greatly be strengthened in the course of the following years. This perceived
naval threat made the British apprehensive, and when Hitler, in May 1935, proposed a
deal to the British government that would limit Germany’s naval power, the British
were inclined to listen. The offer held that Germany would limit its fleet to thirty-five
percent of Britain’s sea power.50 The Naval Agreement was soon signed by Britain,
an act that shocked French politicians, partly because they were not consulted in the
matter. Under the agreements of Versailles, Germany would never have been able to
rebuild its fleet in the first place and the Naval Agreement had given permission to
rearmament without consultation of the other Allies. In Britain, the Naval Agreement
was regarded as a victory for appeasement; it was seen as an example of AngloGerman friendship, and as evidence that Germany could be negotiated with.51
Hitler denounced the Locarno Treaty in March 1936, claiming that they were
ultimately directed against Germany. Additionally, Hitler moved German troops into
the officially demilitarized Rhineland.52 This was a clear violation of the Treaty of
Versailles and the Locarno Treaty, and France in particular was distressed by this
development. They appealed to the League of Nations for support but found none.
The incapability of the League to deal with international crises became apparent yet
again,
The council of the League of Nations adopted a resolution which merely registered the
fact that Germany was guilty of infractions of both the Treaty of Versailles and the
Locarno Agreement and did not even discuss possible penalties.53
The inability of the League to deal with the situation was partly due to the lack of
commitment of the British. The British undermined the authority of the League on
50
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 44
51
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 170
52
Furnia, Arthur H., The Diplomacy of Appeasement: Anglo-French Relations and the Prelude to
World War II, 1931-1938, University Press: Washington (1960) p. 189
53
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 75
20
numerous occasions, by being more lenient towards Germany than the other
associated countries. This was influenced by the British ‘guilty conscience’ over
unfair treatment of the Germans after 1918, the unjust accusation that Germany was
solely responsible for the war and the British signature under a treaty that was so
obviously flawed. Appeasement was considered to be the best way of correcting the
injustices of the Treaty of Versailles. In the words of Martin Gilbert, ‘[a]ppeasement
was the balm for a guilty conscience’54
54
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 52
21
2. Appeasement as an unfavourable policy: 1937-1939
The previous chapter describes why appeasement was generally regarded as the best
option for British foreign policy in the early 1930s. Currently, the term appeasement
is charged with a negative connotation. It is generally perceived as an irresponsible
and risky policy. Various accounts can be found on when opinion on appeasement
changed, but it is generally acknowledged that the Munich Agreement of 1938 was
the definite watershed in the conception of appeasement. The politician that is usually
held accountable for the appeasing attitude of Britain towards Nazi Germany, even
when popular opinion turned against the policy, is Neville Chamberlain, British Prime
Minister from May 1937 until May 1940. This chapter will start in the year 1937
because that was the year Chamberlain was elected Prime Minster. As premier
Chamberlain was responsible for British policy, and under his leadership the status of
appeasement would change dramatically.
Appeasement was by no means an invention of Neville Chamberlain. Yet in
any discussion of the topic of appeasement as a political strategy it is almost
impossible not to mention his name. Either by a sincere belief in the policy or by a
tenacious optimism, appeasement far outlasted its welcome in British foreign policy
under Chamberlain’s leadership. Although general opinion was turning against
appeasement as the preferred British foreign policy in the late 1930s, Chamberlain
optimistically continued to believe in appeasement as the best way of dealing with the
international situation of that time.
In the years prior to the election of Neville Chamberlain as British Prime
Minister, the policy of appeasement had already been firmly established. But under
Chamberlain’s predecessor, Stanley Baldwin, appeasement was not the successful
policy that Chamberlain envisioned it could be. Benny Morris, in The Roots of
Appeasement, describes appeasement under Baldwin as being ‘pursued ineffectively
and passively’. 55 Chamberlain believed that he could restore the British faith in
appeasement by employing the policy competently. The new Prime Minister trusted
that the effective and efficient exercise of appeasement would improve international
relations and in effect would guarantee European safety.
55
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 67
22
2.1 Chamberlain becomes the British Prime Minister
Although appeasement was certainly not a policy invented by Neville Chamberlain,
he has been irrevocably linked to this policy in the years long after his premiership.
Chamberlain’s reputation has undoubtedly been tainted by the events of the late
1930s. It has been suggested that Chamberlain’s application of the appeasement
policy was directly responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War.
Especially in the years following the Second World War, historians have been
rather disapproving in their opinion of Chamberlain. Compared to his successor,
Winston Churchill, who was seen as a charismatic, strong-willed and forceful leader,
Chamberlain seemed to pale in comparison. Whereas Churchill was seen as the man
that had led Britain towards victory over the Nazis, Chamberlain was often seen as the
man who had brought war to the doorsteps of the British population by continually
appeasing the untrustworthy Nazis. However, in later years there has been somewhat
of a reappraisal of Chamberlain’s character. Most writers acknowledge that
Chamberlain was an intelligent and perceptive statesman. According to some writers
there might have been some flaws in his character, however, that influenced the
political future of Britain. R.A.C. Parker suggests that there is a definite connection
between Chamberlain’s susceptibility to flattery and Hitler’s success in starting the
Second World War.56 Chamberlain was certain that he had developed a special
relationship with Hitler, one of respect and trust.57
Neville Chamberlain was rather involved in foreign relations, perhaps more so
than his premiership required. Chamberlain showed interest in foreign relations
throughout his political career. Prior to 1937 Chamberlain was already very
influential in foreign policy. He was Chancellor of the Exchequer from 1931 until he
was elected Prime Minister. As Chancellor of the Exchequer, foreign policy did not
necessarily fall under his job description; Chamberlain was nevertheless very
involved in British relationships with the rest of the world.58 When Chamberlain was
elected Prime Minister, his influence on foreign politics rapidly increased. Although
Chamberlain could count on the support of his Cabinet, especially in the first years of
his premiership, he still preferred to set out his own course for foreign policy, often
56
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 6
57
Ibid, p. 169
58
Ibid, p. 122
23
without discussing his plans with the institution that was responsible for international
relations, the Foreign Office.59 Chamberlain repeatedly bypassed the Foreign Office,
which he deemed ‘too slow-moving and stuck in its ways to serve as an effective
instrument for his ideas’.60
Chamberlain was not the first British Prime Minster to deal with the Nazi
Party and its leader Adolf Hitler. It was under Chamberlain’s leadership however, that
Germany became an ever-increasing threat to European safety. While many
politicians in Britain were certainly reluctant to entertain the possibility that Nazism
could indeed lead to another war, the potential risk that Nazism brought to the
European continent could not be ignored indefinitely. Chamberlain firmly believed
that Hitler would ultimately prove to be a rational statesman who could be negotiated
with. This opinion was not shared by all British politicians, and disagreement over
whether Hitler could be appeased would remain an important topic in deciding on a
policy towards Germany.
The policy of appeasement throughout British history, as discussed in the first
chapter, was generally seen as an astute and, perhaps more importantly, as a safe
option. Under the growing threat of Nazism however, trust in appeasement as a
sensible policy gradually changed.
Although much of the public and most of the press believed in maintaining peace at
almost any price, the perpetuation and strengthening of the Nazi regime was becoming
for more and more people too high a price to pay.61
For Chamberlain there does not seem to have been a great difference between Hitler
and the Nazi party and other dictators. Appeasement had proven to be a strong
political strategy in the past, and Chamberlain apparently saw little reason why
appeasement would be less useful while dealing with Nazi Germany. Chamberlain
and his Ambassador in Berlin ‘believed that even Nazi Germany could be appeased,
not in order to give Britain a breathing space in which to rearm more rapidly and
prepare for war, but to avert the danger of war for all time’.62
59
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 207
Ibid
61
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 167
62
Ibid, p. 169
60
24
The assumption that Hitler was not necessarily different from European
leaders that preceded him would prove important for the policies that were set out by
Chamberlain and his contemporaries. According to Benny Morris in The Roots of
Appeasement, the governing Conservatives based their policy of appeasement in the
1930s on a series of assumptions about Hitler and the Germans. Most importantly,
they assumed that Hitler was a rational statesman who, and that he strived for the
revision of the peace treaties rather than after world domination. 63 Chamberlain
believed that even ‘excitable dictators’ 64 would eventually listen to reason.
Furthermore, Hitler was assumed to value British friendship highly and was thought
to be reluctant to risk a conflict with the Western world. The historical ties between
Britain and Germany had British statesmen believe that German ambitions toward the
east would not necessarily be incompatible with British interests. Above all, British
politicians truly believed that Hitler could not possibly want another world war.65 In
A Study of British Public Opinion, T.W. Nagle underscores this point made by Morris.
Nagle mentions that a primary ‘reliance on good will was a British tradition’.66 Nagle
also mentions the flawed appraisal of Hitler, British leaders were under the
assumption that Hitler was not so different from the leaders before him, that there was
an ‘unbreakable continuity of national character and national interests’.67
Another assumption that has been made by Chamberlain and other political
leaders was the belief that Hitler and other dictators would feel obliged to honour the
commitments of the different treaties they signed. There was a strong impression that
agreements between national leaders were binding to all parties. When appeasement
was at its strongest in the 1930s, the policy trusted ‘the assumption that the more
agreements Hitler signed, the more difficult it would be for him to disregard them.’68
Economy as the ‘fourth arm of defence’
The issue of rearmament was an important one in the late 1930s. While the threat of
Germany kept increasing, British armament continued to become less important in the
63
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 2
64
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 94
65
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 2
66
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 15
67
Ibid, p. 17
68
Ibid, p. 38
25
national budget. The earlier mentioned Peace Ballot of 1935 showed that British
public opinion was in favour of disarmament, and it has also been mentioned in the
previous chapter that Britain brought back its armament to a point where national
defence was getting more difficult to guarantee. But the growing threat of Nazism and
unrest in Europe made it less feasible to maintain this position. Even if Chamberlain
‘continued to believe most emphatically that war was not inevitable’69, he still
recognized that rearmament of Britain would eventually be necessary.
Chamberlain and his supporters thought it vital that rearmament should not be
too hasty a process. More important than rearmament itself, Chamberlain believed
that economic stability would crucial for the future safety of Britain. For Chamberlain
the economic health of Britain was the ‘fourth arm of defence’; economic stability
was envisioned to be ‘a peacetime deterrent more significant than military strength
and one that would be lost if other countries detected signs of strain in Britain’.70 A
balanced budget and a strong export trade would ensure a sound British economy.71
In February 1936 the government agreed on a five-year plan for rearmament, to be
launched in 1937. This five-year plan was supposed to prepare Britain for a possible
military action by 1942. Chamberlain continued to believe that economic stability was
far more important than rearmament and, in 1936, routinely used his influence as
Chancellor of the Exchequer to lower the budget for rearmament.72 Still, Chamberlain
believed in the five-year plan that would gradually strengthen Britain militarily
because ‘conciliation could decrease the number if Britain’s enemies and avert war
with those that remained’73, ‘while preparing enough military force to deter any
remaining enemies’74 after 1942. Because rearmament was against the public will, it
would be even more important that military developments would not stand in the way
of economic progress.
69
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 175
Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University
Press: New York (1993) p. 316
71
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 166
72
McDonough, Frank, Neville Chamberlain, Appeasement and the British Road to War, Manchester University
Press: Manchester (1998) p. 38
73
Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University
Press: New York (1993) p. 317
74
Ibid, p. 299
70
26
2.2 The Munich Agreement of 1938
It has already been mentioned that the Munich Agreement of 1938 signalled the end
of appeasement. The events that led up to the eventual agreement that essentially gave
Hitler a free hand in Eastern Europe resulted from the fact that British politicians
were never able to truly understand Hitler’s objective in international relations.
Although there was a clear policy that Hitler should be appeased, executing this
policy became increasingly difficult due to the fact that Germany would not make
clear what its grievances were, and what Britain could do to improve the situation.75
The Munich Agreement was the result of a never-ending series of demands from
Germany, which Britain kept giving into. Britain was committed to the policy of
appeasement, and the limits of concession were continually stretched in order to
accommodate Hitler.
The situation in Czechoslovakia during the Munich Crisis was about much
more than autonomy or self-reliance for the Sudeten Germans in the area. Various
agreements and treaties meant that a possible struggle between the Germans and the
Czechs could not be contained to these two countries alone. In 1924 French officials
had signed a Treaty of Alliance and Friendship, which entailed French protection of
Czechoslovakia in case of German invasion. The Locarno Treaty of 1925 compelled
Britain to support France in such a case. According to Scott Newton in Profits of
Peace, the British could thus be ‘dragged into war as a result of the chain of events
likely to unfold following conflict between the Germans and the Czechs’.76 It is clear
that the stakes were high; it was crucial for European stability that this issue would be
settled peacefully.
Chamberlain was sympathetic to Hitler’s call for greater autonomy for the
Sudeten Germans, and felt that this could be the ‘final German grievance [that] lay in
the way of a permanent settlement in Europe’.77 Under the Treaty of Versailles,
around three million Germans-speaking people had become part of Czechoslovakia,
without being consulted in this matter. The issue was regarded as one of the many
problems that the Treaty of Versailles had created, and it was thought that a solution
75
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 98
76
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 80
77
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 169
27
to this problem would greatly improve European stability.78 This might have been an
argument for British reluctance to reign in German aspirations in Czechoslovakia but
it has also been argued that British politicians simply cared very little about what
happened to the east of Germany.
As long as Hitler confined himself to reclaiming German territory and incorporating
Germans within the Reich, many of the British people were not disposed to quarrel with
him.
79
Moreover, Czechoslovakia was thought to be in the German sphere of influence, not
in that of Britain.80 Scott Newton summarizes this in Profits of Peace:
[f]or the British government, not only were there no moral issues at stake in the Czech
crisis: there were no strategic ones either.
81
It indeed seems as if British politicians were predominantly interested in preventing
war over Czechoslovakian territory, a war they would probably have to get involved
in. Martin Gilbert calls the Munich Agreement an ‘emergency plan, intended to buy
peace at the expense of the disintegration of Czechoslovakia and the transfer, without
plebiscite, of non-Nazis to Nazi rule’82. It has already been mentioned that Britain
traditionally favoured a foreign policy based on the balance of power, and that the
sacrifice of smaller states could not stand in the way of this goal. Czechoslovakia was
thought to stand little chance against the German aggressor, and British opinion stated
that it would be better to help achieve this peacefully than to stand in the way of
Hitler. Besides, British politicians were not entirely convinced that they had the
means to hinder Hitler from taking the Sudetenland by force. 83 The five-year
rearmament program that was earlier mentioned had not yet prepared Britain for war
by this time.
78
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 83
79
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39, Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 78
80
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 229
81
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 84
82
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 179
83
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 80
28
Although appeasement was increasingly perceived as the wrong policy for the
international situation of 1938, this did not necessarily mean that Britain had very
many other options. Politicians were even more reluctant to risk a war because there
was no strong alliance that could make sure Germany would be defeated. The United
States increasingly retreated in isolationism, and Chamberlain was not eager to have
the Americans meddling in what he perceived to be British affairs anyway.84 It was
equally unlikely that the Dominions would support Britain if war with Germany
would break out over the Sudetenland issue. During the crisis of 1938 the
Prime Ministers of the Dominions made it clear that they did not regard a German
attack on Czechoslovakia as an adequate reason for the Empire becoming involved in a
European war.
85
Scott Newton emphasises this argument; ‘the Dominions would not go to war over
Czechoslovakia’. 86 Without the support of the Dominions, British chances of
successfully defeating a German aggressor became even less likely. French
irresolution over a course of action did not strengthen the British belief in an easy
victory, and only increased distrust of the French.87 Both the United States and France
were Britain’s strongest potential allies at the time, but the countries could not come
to an agreement that would ensure safety for all parties. These factors all reinforced
Chamberlain’s belief that war could not be risked, or even seriously threatened.
Anschluss: the annexation of Austria
Hitler never concealed that he had ambitious plans for Germany. His vision for the
Third Reich entailed the inclusion of all German-speaking people, and the expansion
of German territory. The first country to be confronted with these ambitions was
Austria. Nazi influence in the country became increasingly noticeable throughout
1937, and this would only become more apparent the following year. In February
1938, the Austrian Chancellor Kurt von Schuschnigg, was pressured by Hitler to
accept prominent Nazis into the Austrian cabinet. It soon became apparent that the
84
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 199
85
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 181
86
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 81
87
Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University
Press: New York (1993) p. 314
29
Austrian Nazis were not interested in supporting a democratic Austria but rather
intended to destabilize the country. 88 Schuschnigg, in order to avoid the slow
deterioration of the Austrian government, ordered a plebiscite which would ask the
Austrian population if they wished to join Germany. This referendum was scheduled
for 13 March 1938. It was not to be however, Hitler ordered his generals to invade
Vienna by 12 March. The Austrian army did not resist to this invasion, and the
annexation of Austria was soon completed. Although the occupation of Austria
certainly did not abide by the Treaty of Versailles, there was surprisingly little protest
from the international community. The British government quickly stated that it was
under no obligation to fight for the independence of Austria, that there was no treaty
in existence that could compel the British to do so. Although Chamberlain did not
approve of Hitler’s action per se, the fact that it all happened reasonably peacefully
was probably enough to justify British inaction. Also, he considered ordering the
plebiscite to be Schuschnigg’s ‘folly’.89 The fact that Austrian territory could not be
seen as a necessary revision of the Treaty of Versailles – since Austria was never part
of a German empire – made that Anschluss no longer appeared as the innocent
expansion of a much maligned and wrongly circumscribed Germany’.90 Still, with
some creative thinking, ‘the German move could be rationalized as a fulfilment of
German national self-determination’.91
With the successful annexation of Austria, Hitler could now turn towards
Czechoslovakia for the settlement of German grievances in that area. It was briefly
mentioned before, but Hitler’s problem with Czechoslovakia was that, as a
consequence of the Treaty of Versailles, more than three million German-speaking
people became part of Czechoslovakia. These Sudeten Germans were included in the
new Czech state without being consulted in the matter, and did not feel they were
sufficiently represented in the government. Their wish for better representation was
understandable; their grievances were generally neglected in Prague. 92 Konrad
Henlein, leader of the Sudeten Deutsche Partei, was responsible for the realization of
these goals of self-determination for the Sudeten Germans, with the support of
88
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 221
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 132
90
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) pp. 167-8
91
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 222
92
Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2
(1961) p. 139
89
30
Germany. In 1938 Hitler expressed his wholehearted support and encouraged the
Sudeten Germans to strive for autonomy. 93 Hitler’s ulterior motive here was
undoubtedly to stir up confrontations that would eventually lead to the realization of
his own ambitions. Henlein was instructed by Hitler to make sure that an agreement
would never be reached, and to never accept any offer from the Czech government.94
Czechoslovakia and the Runciman Mission
Tension between the Sudeten Germans and the Czech government intensified during
the course of 1938. As was mentioned, opinion in Britain was reasonably supportive
of Sudeten autonomy, achieving this could make sure that another German grievance
would be appeased. Furthermore, a true conflict between the Czech government and
the Sudeten Germans, supported by Hitler, could easily get many European nations
involved in another great war. As mentioned, conflict between the German and the
Czech government could drag other European nations into war through various
agreements. This was understandably something Chamberlain and his government
wished to prevent. Because the relationship between Germany and Czechoslovakia
continued to deteriorate and an eventual clash between the two countries became
increasingly likely, Chamberlain decided to interfere.
The British government communicated to the Czech government that it would
not be acceptable for them to frustrate the goals of the Sudeten Germans. The
involvement of Hitler made it crucial that an agreement would be reached, and it was
still believed that an agreement could in fact be reached. Hitler might have instructed
Henlein never to accept any compromise, but this was not known to other politicians.
Hitler continued to ensure London that he wanted nothing but a peaceful solution to
the Czech problem.95
In August 1938 Lord Runciman was asked by the British government to act as
a mediator between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans. Runciman was officially to
be an independent, neutral party that could close the gap between both conflicting
parties. It was generally understood however, that Runciman was there to serve the
British goal of appeasement; Runciman was to make sure that Prague would accept as
93
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 169
Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2
(1961) p. 143
95
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 229
94
31
many of Henlein’s demands as possible.96 Runciman eventually produced a report in
which he suggested that the Czech border should remain intact, but that the
Sudetenland should gain autonomy within these borders. The Mission could nearly be
considered a success, an agreement between the Czechs and the Sudeten Germans
almost became a real possibility, even if Henlein never would have agreed to it.
According to Martin Gilbert, ‘the Runciman Mission was Britain’s last exercise in
positive appeasement’.97 It would prove to be that last moment in time that Britain
was able to take the initiative, and would not be struggling to keep up with German
demands.
Hitler was not very pleased by the new developments, and in a speech on 12
September 1938 he rejected autonomy and instead incited the Sudeten to demand full
self-determination.98 Although the speech itself did not cause much reason for alarm
in the international world, it did result in some riots in the Sudetenland. A number of
Sudeten Germans were killed in this period and Henlein fled to Germany, to demand
self-determination from there. The situation became more precarious; Chamberlain
again felt that British interference was called for.
‘Plan Z’ was the ultimate card up the sleeve of Chamberlain, he would
personally visit Hitler and convince him of the need for peace and negotiations in
Europe. On 15 September Chamberlain travelled to Hitler’s retreat in Berchtesgaden
and there Hitler demanded that all parts of Czechoslovakia consisting of a
predominantly German-speaking population should be incorporated into the Third
Reich or German troops would make this happen by force. This was characteristic for
Hitler’s policy of presenting outlandish statements that could not be agreed upon. It
was highly unlikely that Chamberlain would, and could, persuade the international
community to accept Hitler’s demands, convincing Czechoslovakia would be
especially difficult. It might be a testament of Chamberlain’s political skill that he
managed to persuade his own government and both the French and the Czechs of the
necessity to agree to the Berchtesgaden demands. Appeasement was still very much
upon the mind of Neville Chamberlain, and giving into Hitler’s demands was thought
to placate the dictator. Britain ‘threatened to end mediative efforts and the French
indicated that they would not fight in support of Czechoslovakia if Germany invaded
96
Ibid
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 174
98
Ibid, p. 175
97
32
it’.99 This argument won over a reluctant Czech government; it was made clear that
they had little choice but to agree to Hitler’s terms. There was a general consensus –
Czech population not included – that the ‘best way of solving the crisis would be for
Czechoslovakia to allow the Sudetenland to be incorporated into the Third Reich’.100
Czech borders were simply not worth the risk of a grand-scale war.
It was generally accepted that the Sudetenland was lost to Czechoslovakia
anyway, politicians just wished for this transition to occur peacefully. An optimistic
Chamberlain flew to Godesberg on 22 September to meet Hitler again. The Prime
Minister was authorized to give into all the demands Hitler had spoken of in
Berchtesgaden and was therefore positive that the meeting would go well. This would
prove to be an illusion however; upon arrival it became clear that Hitler was in no
mood to accept his own proposal. Hitler had come up with further aggressive
demands and announced to Chamberlain that on 28 September, German troops would
invade Czechoslovakia to solve the disagreement over the borders.101 Chamberlain
obviously was not very pleased by this, and in the following days he would try to
persuade Hitler that this would be a rather upsetting course of action. Chamberlain did
succeed in pushing back the date for invasion, the new deadline would be 1 October.
It became increasingly difficult to dismiss Hitler’s attitude towards territorial
disagreements. The British government slowly realized that the only German
objective seemed to be the start of a war, regardless of the cause. Chamberlain
remained characteristically optimistic about his personal relationship with Hitler, even
if he did not welcome the terms of Hitler’s Diktat.102 Despite Hitler’s aggressive
demands, Chamberlain would not abandon the course of appeasement. The new
developments were ill-received among virtually everyone else, and the new terms
could not be accepted as such by the British, French or Czech government, or by
British public opinion.103 War came unsettlingly close at this point and drastic steps
were called for if war should be prevented. 104 Chamberlain did not mention it at the
time, but Britain’s relatively weak military condition played a key factor here; Britain
was not yet in a position where armament and defence was up to the task of
99
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 232
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 50
101
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 233
102
Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2
(1961) p. 147
103
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 52
104
Webster, Charles, ‘Munich Reconsidered: A Survey of British Policy’, International Affairs, Vol. 37, No. 2
(1961) p. 147
100
33
confronting Germany in a war.105 The strongest potential ally, the United States had
not been involved in European affairs for some time, and this was not expected to
change anytime soon.
The Munich Agreement
Chamberlain was committed to a peaceful solution to the conflict between Germany
and Czechoslovakia. Although the Peace Ballot of 1935 demonstrated that the Britons
favoured a pacifist course and were overwhelmingly against the use of military force,
recent developments caused for this to change. Public opinion increasingly called for
a course of stronger action of the government, it was thought that the limits of
concession were reached.106 Still, Chamberlain and some of his colleagues thought
that the only prudent course of action was the continuation of appeasement.
In Profits of Peace, Scott Newton describes that there was still a notion in
Britain that ‘Nazism, however unpleasant and imperialistic, was in the end no more
than the expression of frustrated nationalism’. 107 The Munich agreement was
supposed to satisfy the German nationalistic call for the retrieval of territory. The
underlying assumption here was still that Hitler and the Nazis could be appeased.
The threat of war had not been this tangible for years. In the last days of
September 1938, the British people were expecting an air raid at every moment, gas
masks had been issued and the general mood was not very optimistic. 108
Chamberlain’s attitude towards war and the protection of Czechoslovakia became
clear in a radio broadcast of 27 September;
[h]ow horrible, fantastic, incredible it is that we should be digging trenches and trying
on gas masks here because a quarrel in a faraway country between people of whom we
know nothing.
109
105
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39,
Librairie Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 128
106
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 170
107
Newton, Scott, Profits of Peace: the Political Economy of Anglo-German Appeasement, Clarendon Press:
Oxford (1996) p. 85
108
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 177
109
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 235
34
In a last attempt to prevent the expected attack, Chamberlain called upon Italian
dictator Benito Mussolini to persuade Hitler to settle the matter with Germany
peacefully at a conference that would take place the same month.
The conference was scheduled for 29 September, and the leaders of Britain,
Germany, France and Italy were to negotiate and discuss the future of Europe. The
European leaders would do their utmost to persuade Hitler that war should be
prevented. Although the fate of Czechoslovakia was the main topic during the
conference, no delegates from Prague were invited. The Soviet Union was also not
considered to be an essential invitee, and was not asked to attend. At the conference
Hitler was strongly advised to refrain from starting a war. At the same time, German
generals were worried about a possible two-front war with both France and Russia
and urged Hitler to come to an agreement with the other leaders.110 Apparently the
pressure put upon Hitler both domestically and internationally had some effect; Hitler
would accept the Munich Agreement. This was no great sacrifice from the part of
Germany, the agreement entailed the incorporation of the Sudetenland into the Third
Reich, and the newly acquired territory for Germany was in fact larger than Hitler had
demanded at Godesberg.111 The loss of territory was extremely damaging to the
Czech economy and Czechoslovakia had effectively been sacrificed in order to come
to an agreement with Hitler.
After Munich
Although Hitler had to make virtually no concessions at the Munich Agreement, he
was still not pleased with the outcome. Determined to settle the issue of
Czechoslovakia once and for all, Hitler intended to use his armed forces to crush the
country. The Munich Agreement had made sure that this would not be a possibility in
the foreseeable future. Hitler therefore could not help but to regarded Munich as a
‘defeat, since it deprived him of the opportunity to wage a glorious war of vengeance
on Czechoslovakia’.112
Chamberlain had no such reservations about the agreement. He returned to
London a victorious strategist, and was happy to meet with the large crowds that had
110
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 52
Ibid
112
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 237
111
35
gathered to applaud his achievement. Chamberlain told the cheering crowd that the
Munich Agreement was
the second time in our history that there has come back from Germany to Downing Street
peace with honour. I believe it is peace for our time.113
Even the morally questionable contents of the Munich Agreement could not dampen
the British spirit, war had been averted and Chamberlain told the people that they
could sleep peacefully that night.114 The need for peace was stronger than the desire to
do right by small, and to many Brits, virtually unknown states. Not only was war
averted for now, Britain also gained some precious time to continue its rearmament.
An important change in the policy of appeasement after the Munich
Agreement was the implicit objective. From 1919 onwards, appeasement was a policy
directed to peace, but after September 1938 the policy evolved into one that was
directed at averting war.115 Appeasement could no longer be seen as a policy of
building structural peace but became instead a policy aimed at buying precious time
for Britain to rearm sufficiently or until a better solution to the problem could be
found.
The cautious optimism that followed after the conference in Munich would not
last for very long. Already in October and November 1938,
leading foreign officials were describing Munich as a debacle, recognized that the
balance of power was destroyed beyond repair, and resigned themselves to further
German expansion eastwards and south-eastwards.116
But it was argued that there was no truly safe option for Britain to choose instead, no
policy that could guarantee better results than appeasement. Although appeasement
was not supported by everyone in Britain, there were little alternatives were available
to Chamberlain and his Cabinet. Foreign policy had been greatly influenced by
appeasement for years, and this policy ‘was massively overdetermined; any other
113
Ibid, p. 238
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 181
115
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 185
116
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 238
114
36
policy in 1938 would have been an astounding, almost inexplicable divergence from
the norm’.117
Although the Munich Agreement was undertaken in the spirit of appeasement,
this time it was not a policy that came from a position of strength. The term
appeasement was distorted into a new definition, one that had little to do with old one.
Chamberlain had the same intention as previous appeasers, but did not have the same
means.
Chamberlain was criticized, not because he was an appeaser, for that was a word
signifying wisdom, breadth of vision, and stout common sense, but because he had
failed to see that appeasement had never been designed as a policy of retreat and
weakness, and that an appeaser was meant to be a midwife, not a mortician.
118
It soon would become clear if Chamberlain’s last attempt at appeasing Hitler would
be a success, and if Hitler was indeed appeased.
2.3 Declaration of War in 1939
The optimism that followed the Munich Agreement would prove to be short-lived. As
mentioned before, the Munich Agreement had bought some time for Britain to rearm.
And indeed, the budget for British rearmament was raised considerably. In the period
between the conference in Munich and the eventual outbreak of war in September
1939, the budget for rearmament increased from 8.1 per cent of gross national product
to 21.4 per cent.119 But in this same period, Germany was obviously also able to raise
its armaments.
Despite the optimism that followed the Munich Agreement, little had changed
in the nature and methods of Hitler.120 On the contrary, Hitler became increasingly
difficult to deal with after signing the agreement. Frustrated by the failure of
launching a war against Czechoslovakia, Hitler was looking for other outlets for his
aggression. He would soon find an opportunity to unleash his wrath upon some of his
adversaries.
117
Ibid, p. 242
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 185
119
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 63
120
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 177
118
37
Kristallnacht
On 9 November 1938 Hitler launched a terrible attack on the Jewish community in
Germany, which would become known as Kristallnacht. The Nazis used the murder
of a German diplomat in Paris by a Jewish student as an excuse to burn and loot
Jewish shops, homes and synagogues. Thirty thousand Jewish people were arrested,
hundreds assaulted and one hundred people were murdered. As if this was not
enough, Hitler also charged the Jewish community with a fine of one billion marks for
the provocation of Kristallnacht.121
The international world strongly condemned this assault by the Nazis against
the Jewish population, and the idea of appeasing such an ‘openly brutal dictatorship
seemed the height of folly and moral bankruptcy’.122
The occupation of Prague
Hitler’s contempt of the Munich Agreement became prominently clear at 15 March
1939. The German army marched into Czechoslovakia and occupied Prague,
Bohemia and Moravia, thereby irrevocably ending the independence of
Czechoslovakia. Although rumours about a German invasion of Czechoslovakia had
been present for some time before the actual day of invasion, the rumours were
steadily dismissed by Chamberlain and his associates.123 Although this was a clear
violation of the Munich Agreement, Britain, France and Italy made no attempt to help
the Czechs against the German aggressors. The British population condemned the
attack on Czechoslovakia and appeasement became less popular than ever before.124 It
became painfully clear that Hitler’s signature was worthless, and that he had no
respect for international agreements.
Although very little trust in the policy of appeasement remained among the
British population, Chamberlain could not abandon his policy completely. Hitler
might have shown that he could not be trusted to honour agreements, but this did not
mean that international conflicts should not be resolved peacefully and without
war.125 The time of appeasement was nearly over, it ‘was not necessarily dead by the
end of March 1939, but it was certainly on life support’.126
121
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 240
Ibid, p. 63
123
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 242
124
Ibid, p. 243
125
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 64
126
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 246
122
38
The invasion of Poland
After the hostile takeover of Czechoslovakia, there was little doubt over Hitler’s next
target. Under the Treaty of Versailles, German land came within the borders of
Poland and Hitler eagerly used this as a pretext to set his sights upon Poland. By this
time Chamberlain had little choice but to acknowledge that he had little influence
over Hitler, and a new plan of action had to be found.
On 31 March 1939 Chamberlain proposed a guarantee to Poland, supported by
the French government. This guarantee would theoretically curb Hitler’s freedom in
Eastern Europe considerably, it spoke of Britain’s active intervention against
Germany should these countries be attacked. 127 However, the wording of the
guarantee was sufficiently ambiguous that the British and French governments had
some choice in their level of commitment to Poland. Unfortunately, Hitler was not
thoroughly impressed by the Anglo-French guarantee. In April, he ordered his
generals to prepare for an attack on Poland, to commence at the beginning of
September that year.128 In April Hitler also declared that he no longer felt obligated to
uphold the terms of Anglo-German Naval Agreement of 1935, an agreement he now
came to see as ‘a symbol of British obstructionism’.129
It would have been strategically prudent if Britain could come to an alliance
with the Soviet Union. Especially in the case of defending Eastern European
countries, Soviet assistance was virtually indispensable. Yet, Chamberlain was very
reluctant to work with the Soviets. Chamberlain did not trust Stalin, he had little faith
in the Soviet military apparatus and he was against Communism. But, most
importantly, Chamberlain suspected that such an alliance would put a definitive end
to appeasement. Chamberlain still hoped that Hitler could be persuaded to settle the
German grievances peacefully. An Anglo-Soviet alliance was not to be; Stalin instead
came to an agreement with Hitler.
The German-Soviet pact was disclosed in August 1939 and was essentially a
non-aggression pact between the two countries. It also decided on the fate of Poland,
which was to be divided between Germany and the Soviet Union. Other Eastern
European countries were also included in the pact, Hitler could finally regain some of
127
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 177
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 67
129
Scammell, Clare M., ‘The Royal Navy and the Strategic Origins of the Anglo-German Naval Agreement of
1935’, Journal of Strategic Studies, Vol. 20, No. 2 (1997) p. 111
128
39
the German territory he had been after.130 Politicians in Britain, and particularly
Chamberlain, thought it highly unlikely that such a pact would even come into
existence; he stated ‘it would be quite impossible for Germany and Soviet Russia to
come together’.131 The Nazi ideology and that of Communism were considered to be
absolutely incompatible. This might have been the case, but both Stalin and Hitler
were opportunists, and the potential of the pact was immense.
If Hitler thought that the Nazi-Soviet pact would intimidate Britain and France
enough to abandon their guarantee to Poland, he would be disappointed. On 25
August, the British government signed a formal military alliance with Poland. This
came as quite a shock to Hitler, who decided this must be a negotiation tactic of
Chamberlain.132 Hitler tried to come to an agreement with Britain over the Polish
question, but when Chamberlain proposed this to the Polish government they refused
any negotiation with Hitler. Chamberlain was perhaps not aware of the fact that the
Polish government was
quite prepared to undertake a suicidal war with Nazi Germany rather than simply
concede territory in humiliating circumstances as the Czechs had done after Munich.
133
Hitler was not impressed by the Polish resistance and on 1 September 1939, Germany
invaded Poland. The British people accepted that German action had finally required
that Britain would go to war.134 The British Cabinet was determined to carry out the
obligations to Poland, and insisted that war should be commenced the next day.135
After some confusion and some unnecessary delays, Chamberlain finally addressed
the British nation.
Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything that I
have believed in during my public life has crashed into ruins.
136
130
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 259
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 244
132
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 71
133
Ibid
134
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 336
135
Ibid, p. 339
136
Doerr, Paul W., British Foreign Policy 1919-1939, Manchester University Press: Manchester (1998) p. 264
131
40
After the German occupation of Prague, Chamberlain’s policy did not really change.
It did make it much more difficult for him to put the policy into effect. 137
Chamberlain was still very much interested in keeping the peace in Europe.
Although the Munich Agreement was initially seen as a great political success of
Neville Chamberlain and his colleagues, it soon became clear that Munich had instead
been a grave strategic error. Not only did it show Hitler that there was little resistance
against his plans of European domination, but the fact that the Soviet Union was not
even invited to attend the conference did little to warm Stalin to an eventual alliance
between the Soviet Union and France and Britain.
One possible alternative to the policy of appeasement that has been offered by
historians and politicians since the 1930s has been the formation of a strong
international alliance between Britain, France and the Soviet Union. Chamberlain at
the time felt that this would be a terrible idea, however. According to R.A.C. Parker,
even when Chamberlain seemingly accepted that Hitler could not be appeased, he still
was certain war could be prevented, and this would not happen by the formation of an
international resistance that would only frighten Germany.
138
137
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 203
138
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 204
41
3. The meaning of appeasement after World War II: revisionism and
appeasement in recent politics
The events of 1938 are generally thought to have led to the end of appeasement in
modern times. The Munich Agreement would spark a debate on the merits and, more
importantly, the faults of appeasement. This debate would continue in the decades
that followed after 1938. The outbreak of the most destructive war the world had ever
seen inevitably had negative implication for appeasement, but this does not mean
appeasement could be held responsible for this war. And indeed, the accountability of
appeasement has been argued. Numerous accounts on whether appeasement was a
positive or negative contribution to the international problems of the late 1930s came
into existence, but three general categories can be distinguished.
The orthodox perspective holds that appeasement was the direct instigator of
the Second World War; the irresponsible policy of the appeasers, and more
specifically of Neville Chamberlain, was responsible for an atrocious British foreign
strategy, and that almost any other course of action would have been better for
Britain. This would prove to be the dominant perspective; at least until a cumulative
body of revisionist works were released.
In reaction to this perspective a different account of appeasement came into
existence, which became known as revisionism. Revisionism assumed that
appeasement was the result of the errors that had been made during the Treaty of
Versailles, and that Chamberlain and his colleagues had few other choices but
developing a policy that would try to keep the peace in Europe. Moreover,
revisionism claimed that appeasement was a policy that resulted from economic and
military weakness.139In other words, British politicians were not in a position to make
great demands, or to stop other countries from making such demands.
The third perspective is counter-revisionism. This theory about Chamberlain
and appeasement combines elements of both the orthodox and the revisionist
perspective. The revisionist idea that Chamberlain was a competent statesman is
underscored by counter-revisionism, but the revisionist hypothesis that appeasement
was the resulted from military and economic weakness was not accepted by counter-
139
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 85
42
revisionism. 140 This third school of thought will most likely provide the most
balanced result.
The Orthodox View
The orthodox perspective on appeasement is rather straightforward; appeasement was
to be held at least partially responsible for the outbreak of the Second World War.
This view does not disregard the role of Hitler during this time, but states that British
statesmen and particularly Neville Chamberlain had a moral and political obligation
to make better efforts to stop Hitler.
Neville Chamberlain and his policy of appeasement have been vilified in the
popular press from 1938 onwards. Especially after the outbreak of war and the
presidency of his successor Churchill, little was left of Chamberlain’s good name as a
reliable politician. The most important contributors to the deterioration of
Chamberlain’s legacy were undoubtedly three reporters that wrote Guilty Men under
the pseudonym ‘Cato’. Michael Foot, Peter Howard and Frank Owen published a
furious narrative in 1940, which criticized successive British Cabinets harshly. The
main theme of the book has been summarized by John Stevenson, who wrote the
introduction. According to Stevenson, Guilty Men stated that
[a] succession of either supine or deluded leaders, MacDonald, Baldwin and, above all,
Chamberlain, abetted by lesser ministers, and their cohorts of admirers and yes-men,
had failed to take heed of the threats posed by the dictators or, when alerted, had failed
to awaken the public to the dangers that faced them. Concession after concession had
been made in order to avoid difficult and compromising decisions; appeasement, begun
as a policy of legitimate remedy of Germany’s grievances over the Treaty of Versailles,
became a policy of abject surrender of position after position in the face of the
aggressive acts or threats from Hitler, or his lesser rival Mussolini.
141
Although Hitler and the Nazi party were obviously primarily held responsible for the
outbreak of the Second World War, the orthodox view holds that appeasement and its
supporters contributed to the outbreak of war, or had, at the very least, not done
enough to prevent this war.
140
141
Ibid
Cato’, Guilty Men, Faber and Faber Ltd: London (2010), from the introduction by John Stevenson, p. xii
43
Another orthodox point of criticism was that Chamberlain did not inform the
British public adequately of the situation in Germany, and the deterioration of the
Anglo-German relationship.142 Even though the press was supposed to inform the
people of the political situation of the time,
[…] the press in fact could do nothing but help Chamberlain pursue appeasement, as the
‘free’ and ‘independent’ press of Britain is at best merely a partisan political weapon
controlled by politicians for their own purposes, and at worst a mere arena at the
disposal of Whitehall to play out a game of interdepartmental warfare.
143
Clearly, the orthodox view had little patience for Chamberlain and his supporters.
One of the most famous opponents of appeasement – at least after appeasement had
become less popular in public opinion – was Winston Churchill. He stated in his
memoirs that appeasement ‘was doomed to failure’.144 Many more politicians, writers,
historians and journalists would denounce the policy of appeasement, making the
orthodox perspective the leading opinion for years.
Revisionism
The orthodox view was virtually unchallenged in the first years after the Second
World War. Although Guilty Men dominated the orthodox field, it was riddled with
inaccuracies and exaggerations. The book was written in response to the troubled
times, but was not necessarily a well-balanced and fair narration of British policy.
There were few official documents in circulation which could serve as a less
prejudiced source of information, at least until 1967. In May 1967 the British
parliament passed legislation that would make most state document open to public
viewing after thirty years instead of the previous fifty years.145 This new Thirty Year
Rule made it possible for historians to get a better perspective on the events of the
1930s, by studying primary sources from the government archives. This development
of transparency gave new incentive to revisionism after 1967. New theories were
142
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 81
Cockett, R., Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation of the Press,
Butler and Tanner Ltd: London (1989) p. 1
144
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 81
145
Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008)
p. 452
143
44
constructed to explain the motivations behind appeasement and to examine if it might
indeed have been the best policy for the time.
The revisionist view argues that Chamberlain in fact carried out a policy that
was based on carefully considered ideas and strategies. At the same time, he had very
little alternatives but to choose for this policy. The claim that Chamberlain was
incompetent was considered too much of a simplification, which did not take the
difficult political situation of the 1930s into account.146 And, if nothing else, at least
appeasement could buy Britain the necessary time to rearm itself and go to war as a
united nation.147
One of the most prominent revisionists is A.J.P. Taylor, who wrote The Origins
of the Second World War. In this book, Taylor states the opinion that Hitler was not a
grand strategist, that he did not have a ‘blueprint for European domination’148 and that
he instead was an opportunist;
there was ‘no long-term plot; there was no seizure of power. Hitler had no idea how he
would come to power; only a conviction that he would get there.
149
In true revisionist-style, Taylor refuted the notion that the Munich Agreement had
been a victory for Hitler, and stated instead that it was an achievement of the British.
Important here was whether the politicians could achieve a previously established
goal; only the British succeeded in doing this. According to Taylor,
[t]he settlement at Munich was a triumph for British policy, which had worked precisely
to this end; not a triumph for Hitler, who had started with no such clear intention’
150
Taylor describes the Munich Agreement as
a triumph for all that was best and most enlightened in British life; a triumph for those
who had preached equal justice between peoples; a triumph for those who had
courageously denounced the harshness and short-sightedness of Versailles.
151
146
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 82
Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008)
p. 449
148
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 78
149
Taylor, A.J.P., The Origins of the Second World War, Penguin Books Ltd: Harmondsworth (1964) p. 11
150
Ibid, pp. 234-5
151
Ibid, p. 235
147
45
The description of Munich as a triumph for Britain seems somewhat overly
enthusiastic; even if Hitler had no clear intentions during the Munich
Agreement it would be difficult to deny that German wishes were granted by
the British.
The revisionist perspective does not deny that Hitler formed a growing threat in
Europe, and does not claim that Chamberlain was not aware of this threat. Rather, it
states that there were numerous rational motivations behind the choice for
appeasement.
If one begins to tot up all the plausible motivations for appeasement – fear and horror of
another war, Britain’s state of unpreparedness, fear for the British economy and the
Empire, the unprepared state of public opinion, the isolationism of the Dominions and
the United States, lack of confidence in France, lack of interest in Central Europe,
failure to understand Hitler and Nazism, fear and distrust of the Soviet Union and
Communism, the absence of a viable alternative presented either by the Conservative
Opposition or Labour, and more – one sees that these are far more than enough to
explain it. It was massively overdetermined: any other policy in 1938 would have been
an astonishing, almost inexplicable divergence from the norm.152
Revisionism does not accept the orthodox thesis that Chamberlain was a weak and
incompetent leader who lacked diplomatic judgement. Instead they declared him to be
a sensible politician who wanted to prevent war, even though he was fully aware of
the danger posed by Hitler.153
Economic and military weakness is seen by the revisionist theory as an
important reason for the choice of appeasement. The Peace Ballot of 1935 showed
that the British population was opposed to rearmament; Britain was militarily not
prepared for war. 154 According to Sydney Aster, the revisionists’ theory of
appeasement was
acknowledged to be the result of such determining factors as economic weakness, the
paucity of resources to meet worldwide commitments, and the need to keep the
152
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 242
McDonough, Frank, Hitler, Chamberlain and Appeasement, Cambridge: University Press (2002) p. 82
154
Nagle, Thomas W., A Study of British Public Opinion and the European Appeasement Policy 1933-39,
Librairie
Chmielorz: Wiesbaden (1957) p. 128
153
46
dominions on side. Public opinion, it was alleged, while not totally pacifist was still
influenced by the ravages of the First World War and not prepared to pay the price of
standing up to Hitler.
155
According to the arguments of the revisionists, appeasement was indeed the most
appropriate policy that British leaders could embark upon, a policy that strived to deal
with possible grievances in way that would maintain peace on the continent. More
importantly, due to constraints and determinants, Chamberlain had little choice but to
choose for appeasement.
Chamberlain’s appeasement mainly focussed on revision of the Treaty of
Versailles, the Treaty that had caused for so much territorial conflict in Europe.
Revision was thought to, finally, help the European countries to move forward in a
democratic way, and to establish cordial relationships between these countries.
Counter-Revisionism
Thirdly, a counter-revisionist, or post-revisionist, approach recognizes appeasement as
a rational and sensible policy, but regards the British appeasement of the late 1930s as
being implemented inadequately. Unlike the orthodox approach, counter-revisionist
literature was based on the documents that have been made public under the Thirty
Year Rule, just like the revisionist work. But unlike revisionist literature, counterrevisionism comes to much the same conclusions as orthodox writers have; the policy
of appeasement was inadequate for the political situation at the end of the 1930s, even
if the policy was not inherently flawed.156
One of the most prominent counter-revisionists was R.A.C. Parker, who wrote
different accounts on appeasement in Britain. Especially in book Chamberlain and
Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War, elements of
both the orthodox and the revisionist perspective are present. Parker agrees with
revisionists that Chamberlain was an able and competent politician, but that
Chamberlain’s powerful, obstinate personality and his skill in debate probably stifled
serious chances of preventing the Second World War.
157
155
Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008)
p. 451
156
Schroeder, Paul W., ‘Munich and the British Tradition’, The Historical Journal, Vol. 19, No. 1 (1976) p. 238
157
Parker, R.A.C., Chamberlain and Appeasement: British Policy and the Coming of the Second World War,
Palgrave: Basingstoke (1993) p. 247
47
Although counter-revisionism is considered to be a much more balanced approach to
appeasement than the orthodox perspective, it is still very critical of Neville
Chamberlain and his supporters. Chamberlain’s personality seems to have been an
important obstacle in the way of the successful implementation of appeasement. The
Prime Minister was rather susceptible to flattery, a weakness Hitler could quite easily
turn into a German advantage. The letters Chamberlain wrote to his sisters with great
regularity revealed, according to Sydney Aster, ‘a personality hungry for flattery that
nourished his growing self-righteousness.158
The three perspectives on appeasement that have been mentioned did not
develop chronologically. Although each responded to the others, a new perspective
did not replace an older one. The orthodox theories certainly did not disappear after
revisionism became more widespread in the 1960s. With the passing of time, the
orthodox perspective has become less widespread however. The writers of Guilty Men
could hardly write a thoroughly objective book, devoid off all sentiment, when their
fellow countrymen were under attack on the beaches of Dunkirk. Likewise, defenders
of appeasement who were actually involved in Chamberlain’s administration were not
the most reliable source for an objective approach to appeasement. Today it should
theoretically be possible to consider the discourse of appeasement in a more
dispassionate and balanced manner. But, it appears that the orthodox perspective is
still very much present in the mind of politicians, appeasement is still a word that
should be avoided at all cost.
Neville Chamberlain’s reputation was unequivocally dependent on the reputation of
appeasement. When Chamberlain became Prime Minister in 1937, it was with the
support and blessing of the British population. Indeed, Chamberlain was considered to
be just the politician Britain needed after Stanley Baldwin, who was widely regarded
as a weak and inefficient leader, even though he had already adopted the policy of
appeasement.159 At that time, appeasement was considered to be the best possible
foreign policy that could be adopted to deal with the German grievances that had
resulted from the Treaty of Versailles. Both Chamberlain and the rejuvenated policy
of appeasement enjoyed great popularity in Britain. Munich is usually seen as the
158
Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008)
p. 455
159
Morris, Benny, The Roots of Appeasement: The British Weekly Press and Nazi Germany during the 1930s,
Frank Cass: London (1991) p. 67
48
point after which appeasement changed into a bad word, but in the first days after
Munich, appeasement was seen as the policy that had, yet again, kept the peace in
Europe. When it became clear that appeasement was not enough to stop Hitler in
pursuing the territorial demands of Germany, and Poland was invaded, appeasement
would never be the same. At the mean time, the reputation of Chamberlain was
damaged beyond recognition.
Appeasement in recent politics
The legacy of appeasement, and especially the Guilty Men thesis, has been firmly
imprinted upon the mind of policymakers. The lesson that was taken from the
proceedings of the late 1930s was clear; appeasing an enemy was a risky business that
had better be avoided. Although the policy of appeasement has been successful in the
years before the Munich Agreement was signed, appeasement is remembered as the
policy that led to the Second World War.
In 1990, Iraq invaded and subsequently annexed the State of Kuwait. This
military aggression was met with strong international disapproval, and an American
army was soon sent to the area. In 1991, President H.W. Bush explained why a strong
stance had to be taken against the Iraqis. He declared that
[i]f history teaches us anything, it is that we must resist aggression or it will destroy or
freedoms. Appeasement does not work. As was seen in the 1930s, we see in Saddam
Hussein an aggressive dictator threatening his neighbours.
160
The usage of the term appeasement almost conveyed the entire message; aggressors
had to be taken down immediately; no time could be wasted on trying to find a more
peaceful solution to the problem. Two months later, President Bush elaborated on his
message.
In World War II, the world paid dearly for appeasing an aggressor who could have been
stopped. Appeasement leads only to further aggression and, ultimately, to war. And we
are not going to make the mistake of appeasement again.161
160
Aster, Sidney, ‘Appeasement: Before and After Revisionism’, Diplomacy and Statecraft, Vol. 19, No. 3 (2008)
p. 443
161
Rock, Stephen R., Appeasement in International Politics, The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington (2000)
p. 3
49
The influence of the orthodox theory is clearly visible; there is a distinct assumption
that appeasement must lead to war. This is in direct contradiction to the underlying
ideals of appeasement, a policy that had peace as its ultimate goal. Although
politicians steer clear of the term appeasement, this does not mean that the policy
cannot be adopted under another name. ‘Conciliation’ and ‘engagement’ are popular
euphemisms for appeasement, and have been employed by the same Bush
administration that condemned appeasement. 162 Other examples of an appeasing
policy, while not labelled appeasement, can undoubtedly be found all over the world.
The principles of appeasement, as described by Martin Gilbert, ‘conciliation
and reconciliation, compromise and barter, realizing one’s own faults, seeing both
sides of any dispute, giving as well as taking, conceding as well as demanding’163
appear to be excellent foundations to base a policy upon. The British policy of the
1930s might have put a stigma upon the term appeasement, but again, the policy itself
will continue to live on in politics.
162
Rock, Stephen R., Appeasement in International Politics, The University Press of Kentucky: Lexington (2000)
p. 3
163
Gilbert, Martin, The Roots of Appeasement, Cox & Wyman Ltd.: London (1966) p. 5
50
Conclusion
The story of appeasement in British politics in the 1920s and 1930s has been told by
many politicians and historians. But more so than with other political discussions, the
policy of appeasement created great disagreement and discord among these writers.
The intensity of the debate can be explained by the kind of impact the conclusion of
this discussion would have on British history, and the British reputation. Supporters
of appeasement have claimed that appeasement was the best way of dealing with the
international difficulties that followed after the Treaty of Versailles in 1919. Germany
had been severely weakened by this treaty; its territorial possessions had been greatly
reduced, the military apparatus of Germany was restricted, and the Germans had to
claim full responsibility for the First World War. That this would cause some
resentment in Germany should not have come as a surprise to the international
community.
It is therefore not mere speculation to say that Hitler and the Nazi party were
symptoms of a larger ailment in Germany, ailments of a thoroughly wounded nation
with little chance of improving their lot after the Treaty of Versailles. Appeasement
seems to have been a sincere British attempt at improving Germany’s position in
Europe, even if German politicians did not perceive the endeavours as such.
As mentioned, the policy of appeasement was adopted to deal with the
aftermath of the Treaty of Versailles. In the course of the 1920s, it became
unmistakably clear to British politicians that Germany had been wronged at this
treaty, and that something had to be done. Appeasement was thought to be the remedy
for the maladies of Europe; peace was thought to be worth some concessions to
Germany. The British population supported a policy that could serve two purposes:
provide a solution to the German grievances and also prevent future wars. The Peace
Ballot of 1935 showed that the population was determinedly against rearmament and
military actions. This meant that potential hostile nations had to be dealt with in a
different way than the threats of war. Somehow, the relationships with potential
aggressors needed to be improved. It is difficult to imagine a foreign policy that
would be able to do this more efficiently than appeasement, especially if rearmament
was out of the question.
Appeasement can be very effective if there are clearly defined demands. In the
late 1930s however, this was not the case. Hitler never ceased to make greater
51
demands of the other European nations, while Chamberlain continued to believe that
appeasing Hitler would guarantee peace. Chamberlain continually had to stretch the
limits of appeasement in order to give in to the never-ending list of demands from
Hitler; the limits of concession were not easily reached.
The reputation of the Chamberlain administration and of appeasement has
been gravely damaged by the publication of Guilty Men. This orthodox perspective
would be the dominant interpretation of British policy of the late 1930s; when in 1967
official documents were made accessible through the Thirty Year Rule, revisionism
would challenge orthodox theories. Counter-revisionism intended to walk the tightrope between orthodoxy and revisionism, and was indeed the most balanced of the
interpretations. In recent politics, it is almost impossible to find examples of
appeasement. Politicians avoid all mention of the term appeasement, unless to explain
what a policy absolutely should not be. The term appeasement has become almost
synonymous with certain war; appeasement is perceived as a policy of capitulation.
Whether appeasement can be held responsible for the outbreak of the Second World
War can never truly be established. It could not have been prophesied what outcomes
other policies might have had. Chamberlain certainly had Britain’s best interest at
heart; the Prime Minister was committed to a lasting peace. Appeasement had proven
its worth in the past, and seemed to have been a rational policy to come to terms with
German grievances. The policy of the 1930s was a consequence of policy at the start
of the century; appeasement was to solve the problems of the Treaty of Versailles.
Chamberlain tirelessly endeavoured to prevent war. However, it turned out that
‘Chamberlain’s faith in preventing war was no match for Hitler’s’ will to have
one’.164
164
Post, Gaines Jr., Dilemmas of Appeasement: British Deterrence and Defence, 1934-1937, Cornell University
Press: New York (1993) p. 341
52
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