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Trade, Diplomacy, and American Independence
Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. and the Business of Trade During the
Confederation Era
Elizabeth M. Covart
Independent Scholar, Boston, usa
[email protected]
Abstract
The economic and trade conditions of the Confederation Era of United States history
require further study. This essay follows the difficulties experienced by Albany, New
York-based firm Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to view the political and economic hurdles
American merchants faced outside of the British Empire. In part, Americans fought for
independence to conduct free trade with merchants from other countries. However, as
Cuyler and Gansevoort’s experiences reveal, being an American merchant during the
Confederation Period proved to be a liability, not an advantage. Many foreign countries demonstrated reluctance to admit American goods into their ports. Some foreign
merchants used their home legal systems to take advantage of American merchants.
All the while, American merchants sought to overcome the liquidity problems of the
United States by searching for new trade opportunities that would provide them with
the ready money they needed to pay their bills.
Keywords
economic history – diplomatic history – Early Republic – 18th century – New York
history
Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.
In 1783, Albany, New York-based merchants Jacob Cuyler and Leonard Gansevoort
became entangled in a difficult situation. Through their trading partnership
with William Van der Locht of Philadelphia and Brothers Coster of New York,
© koninklijke brill nv, leiden, 2015 | doi 10.1163/18770703-00502001
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Cuyler and Gansevoort became acquainted with Jacobus Bronkhorst, brother of
and supercargo for merchant Jan Bronkhorst of Croisie, France. Jacobus
Bronkhorst needed help. His brother’s brigantine Maria Therese had run aground
in the Hudson River just south of Albany in the Town of Coeymans. As supercargo, Jacobus Bronkhorst needed to repair his ship and secure timber for trade.
Jacobus’s friends in New York City urged him to contact Cuyler and Gansevoort
for assistance in navigating the markets of the upper Hudson River Valley.1
Cuyler and Gansevoort seemed eager to assist Bronkhorst. A good relationship with Jacobus promised to benefit their firm Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.
Bronkhorst’s brother Jan owned a mercantile business in Croisie, France,
which the Albanians wanted to use to gain direct access to French markets.2
Jan Bronkhorst also had ties to merchants throughout Europe; Cuyler and
Gansevoort hoped that Bronkhorst would introduce them to merchants in
Amsterdam.3
In the hope of forming a good connection with the Bronkhorst brothers,
Cuyler and Gansevoort helped Jacobus fix his brother’s brig. The merchants
procured lumber both to repair Bronkhorst’s ship and as saleable merchandise. They hired carpenters and laborers to repair the Maria Therese. Their firm
extended credit to Jacobus Bronkhorst and his Captain, Roeloff Roos, so they
could pay for the goods and services Cuyler and Gansevoort acquired for them.
Additionally, Cuyler and Gansevoort oversaw the repair of the brig so Jacobus
could return to Europe.4
1 Albany Institute of History and Art (hereinafter aiha), Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family
Papers, “Brothers Coster to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg1), 26 August 1783; aiha, Library,
Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, “Jacobus Bronkhorst to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”,
(mg1), 16 October 1783 (Letter in Dutch); Alice P. Kenney, The Gansevoorts of Albany, 1st ed.
(Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, 1969), p. 120.
2 The people of Albany New York called themselves Albanians. The Oxford English Dictionary
notes that the term dates back to a 1684 pamphlet by J. Bull, Relation Mohawks at Fort-Albany.
Numerous primary sources also use the term to denote the inhabitants of Albany throughout
the 18th and early 19th centuries. See: Elizabeth M. Covart, “Collision on the Hudson: Identity,
Migration, and the Improvement of Albany, New York, 1750–1830” (Dissertation, University of
California, Davis, 2011); aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort &
Co. to Phyn, Ellice & Co.” (mg2), 1 August 1784. In August 1784, Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. asked
Pruyn, Ellice & Co. to use their connections in France to assist them with their lawsuit against
Jan Bronkhorst as they “were destitute of a friend in France.”
3 aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Jan Bronkhorst”,
(mg2), 11 March 1784.
4 aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of John
Robinson”, (mg1), 1 August 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John
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Grateful for their assistance, Jacobus wrote to Cuyler and Gansevoort and
asked them to draw on his brother for the monies the Bronkhorsts owed them.
Jacobus also mentioned that he and Jan stood ready to be of service.5
Unfortunately for Cuyler and Gansevoort, the Bronkhorsts refused to pay their
debts and the merchants’ United States citizenship hindered Cuyler and
Gansevoort’s ability to obtain recourse through a French court of justice.
The records and experiences of Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. offer a lens with
which to view the political and economic experiences of American merchants
during the Confederation Era.6 Before the ink dried on the Treaty of Paris 1783,
American merchants sought to reestablish old, and institute new, trading connections with European and West Indian merchants. As in the colonial period,
American merchants used their personal connections to associate with British
merchants. Unlike in colonial days, merchants and traders of the newly independent United States sought to establish legal connections with their counterparts outside the British Empire.
Like many businessmen, Cuyler and Gansevoort had taken British protections for granted. As citizens of the United States, American merchants hoped
to trade freely with merchants from any country. However, as Cuyler and
Gansevoort’s experiences with the Bronkhorst brothers reveal, being an
American merchant during the Confederation Period proved to be a liability,
H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Peter Ball”, (mg1), 1 August 1784; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort
Papers, John H. Wendell, “Declaration of John Robison”, (mg2), 31 August 1784; aiha,
Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Joseph Cline”,
(mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John
H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Philip Van Veghten”, (mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library,
Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, “Affidavit of John Follett & William Douglass”, (mg1), 1
September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell,
“Affidavit of Jonathan Pettit”, (mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/ Ten Eyck
Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Peter Ball”, (mg1), 8 September 1784; aiha,
Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Jacob Cuyler &
Leonard Gansevoort”, (mg1), 8 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family
Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of John DePeyster Douw”, (mg1), 10 September 1784;
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Jeremiah
Spaulding”, (mg1), 10 September 1784.
5 aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, “Jacobus Bronkhorst to Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg1), 16 October 1783 (Letter in Dutch).
6 John McCusker and Russell Menard referred to the economy of “the period from 1776 to 1789
[as] among the least studied in American history.” This appears to be true even today. John
J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard, The Economy of British America, 1607–1789, Needs and
Opportunities for Study (Chapel Hill; London: Published for the Institute of Early American
History and Culture, Williamsburg, Va., by the University of North Carolina Press, 1985), p. 358.
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Covart
not an advantage. Foreign merchants took advantage of American merchants
because the Americans did not have the backing of a strong government to
protect their rights. Additionally, the Americans lacked an adequate supply of
a uniform and stable currency, which they needed to pay their debts. If
American merchants wanted to survive in the economic climate of the
Confederation Era they had to create new trade opportunities that would provide them with the ready money they needed to pay their bills.7
The Articles of Confederation
Immediately after declaring independence in 1776, the Continental Congress
organized a committee to draft a central government for the new nation.
Congress sought to display a firm union between the thirteen states because it
believed that such a demonstration would ease its ability to raise money and
support from Great Britain’s European rivals. However, forming a strong union
proved difficult. In 1776, many of the thirteen states remained unsure of
whether they wished to remain united and bound to a single nation after the
war. To overcome this weariness, the congressional committee proposed forming a union under the Articles of Confederation, a confederal government that
granted most of the governing power to the states rather than the central
government.8
Taxation stood as the greatest power the states had over the central government. The Articles of Confederation granted Congress the ability to regulate an
army and navy and to contract loans for the welfare of the union, but it did not
provide any way for Congress to raise funds to pay and equip its servicemen or
7 John E. Crowley, The Privileges of Independence: Neomercantilism and the American
Revolution (Baltimore, Md. ; London: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1993); Eliga H. Gould,
Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World
Empire, First (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 2012); McCusker and
Menard, The Economy of British America; Cathy Matson, “A Port in the Storm: Philadelphia
Commerce during the Atlantic Revolutionary Era”, in Revolution! The Atlantic World Reborn
(London: giles, 2011), 65–90; Curtis P. Nettels, The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775–
1815, vol. 2, 10 vols., The Economic History of the United States (New York: Holt, Rinehart and
Winston, 1962).
8 See Richard Henry Lee’s resolution made June 7, 1776 and congressional resolution made
June 12, 1776 in ed. Worthington Chauncey Ford, Journals of the Continental Congress, 1774–
1789, vol. 5, 34 vols. (Washington, d.c.: Government Printing Office, 1906), 425, 433; Merrill
Jensen, The Articles of Confederation: An Interpretation of the Social-Constitutional History of
the American Revolution, 1774–1781 (Madison: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1940).
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Trade, Diplomacy, And American Independence
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repay the debts it contracted. The inability of the confederal government to
raise money for the common welfare rendered the Articles of Confederation
Congress unable to solve the problems the United States faced after it achieved
independence.
Public creditors went unpaid because of the government’s inability to compel the states to contribute to its general fund. Nor could Congress force the
states to honor the debt repayment terms of the Treaty of Paris, 1783. The fact
that the confederal government could not oblige its member states to pay
national debts or honor provisions of its treaties bred international problems,
which in turn gave rise to economic difficulties.9
Great Britain refused to evacuate military posts on land the United States
claimed in part because the states refused to compel their citizens to repay
debts to British merchants. Additionally, without funds to maintain an army
and navy, Congress could not stop Great Britain from shutting its West Indian
ports to American ships, Spain from closing the Mississippi River to American
traffic, or combat France’s refusal to open its markets to American merchants,
a violation of the Treaty of Amity and Commerce (1778). These international
slights had a profound effect on the American economy and way of life.
Prior to the Revolution, most Americans had become accustomed to living
in a region that had experienced a prolonged period of economic growth and
had one of the highest standards of living in the world. The Revolution and its
war disrupted this pattern. Independence from the British Empire brought a
severe economic downturn. The confederal government could not protect its
citizenry as they settled western lands or engaged in international trade. As a
result, agricultural growth and international trade slowed. American merchants like Cuyler and Gansevoort tried to lessen the economic slowdown by
entering new markets and establishing new trade networks across the Atlantic.
However, as they and many others discovered, independence from the British
Empire transformed the once profitable and relatively safe Atlantic marketplace into a high-risk trade area.10
9
Tench Coxe, An Enquiry into the Principles of Which a Commercial System for the United
States of America Should Be Founded (Philadelphia: Printed and Sold by Robert Aitken, at
Pope’s Head, in Market Street, 1787); Max M. Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government:
Origins of the u.s. Constitution and the Making of the American State (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2003); Max M. Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle: War, Money, and the
American State, 1783–1867, American Beginnings, 1500–1900 (Chicago: University of
Chicago Press, 2014); Cathy Matson, “A Port in the Storm: Philadelphia Commerce during
the Atlantic Revolutionary Era”.
10Edling, A Revolution in Favor of Government; Edling, A Hercules in the Cradle; Matson, “A
Port in the Storm”.
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Consequences of Independence
In 1783, John Baker-Holroyd, the first Earl of Sheffield, penned Observations on
the Commerce of the American States to underscore his unhappiness with the
peace agreement between Great Britain and the United States. Before Great
Britain could make peace with France and Spain it had to agree to terms with
the United States. The Americans sought British recognition of American independence, evacuation of British soldiers from the American states, a limitation
of Quebec to its 1774 boundary, and fishing rights in British waters. Under the
authority of William Petty-FitzMaurice, the second Earl of Shelburne, the
British peace delegation conceded to all of the American demands. In
exchange, the United States agreed that American debtors would repay their
pre-war debts to British creditors in pounds sterling and that Congress would
recommend that the states either restore loyalists to their property or recompense them for it.11
Shelburne had a different view than Sheffield. He defended the Treaty of
Paris 1783 to the House of Lords by stressing the free-trade nature of many of its
articles. For Shelburne, free trade meant reciprocal trade with the United States.
Great Britain conceded to narrow Canadian boundaries, American rights to
western lands, and free navigation of the Mississippi River to allow the United
States to expand. British manufacturers stood to benefit from a burgeoning
American population. The allowance of American fishermen in British waters
served as a gesture of goodwill that would encourage positive relations between
the two countries. In his speech, Shelburne expressed his belief that the British
Empire had made peace with the United States for “trade not dominion.”12
Not long after agreeing to peace, William Pitt the Younger furthered
Shelburne’s ideas by proposing a bill in Parliament, “The Provisional
Establishment and Regulation of Trade and Intercourse between the Subjects
of Great Britain and those of the United States of North America.” The proposed
11
At the outset of negotiations, the Americans also sought reparations for damages wrought
on American towns by the British Army, an official apology from Parliament for the damages, British cession of Canada to the United States, and free trade with the empire. John
Baker Holroyd, 1st Earl of Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States
(Philadelphia: Bell, 1783); P.J. Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic: The United States
and the British Empire After American Independence (New York: Oxford University Press,
2012), p. 42; Esmond Wright, “The British Objectives, 1780–1793: ‘If Not Dominion Then
Trade’”, in Peace and the Peacemakers: The Treaty of 1783 (Charlottesville, va: United States
Capitol Historical Society the University of Virginia Press, 1986), 263.
12Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic, pp. 48–49; Wright, “The British Objectives,
1780–1793: ‘If Not Dominion Then Trade’”.
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bill offered to repeal all acts prohibiting British trade with the United States and
would have allowed the Americans to freely trade their produce throughout the
empire; the bill forbade American vessels from landing non-American produce
in imperial ports without paying a substantial duty.13
Pitt’s proposal faced considerable opposition. Sheffield bristled with anger
over the prospect that Great Britain might grant the United States “most
favoured nation” status. Like many Britons, Sheffield believed that Great Britain
had already proved too magnanimous. He argued that granting “favoured
nation” status to the United States would endanger the empire’s relations with
Russia. In his tract, Sheffield analyzed the benefits and offerings of BritishAmerican trade to remonstrate Pitt’s bill. According to Sheffield, Great Britain
would derive little benefit from a free trade with the United States. With the
exception of tobacco, the United States offered Great Britain few quality agricultural products; Sheffield suggested that the empire import fish, lumber,
ashes, and wheat from Canada and naval stores from the Mediterranean and
Russia. Sheffield allayed fears that British manufacturers and merchants would
lose business to France, Spain, or the Netherlands by observing that those
nations produced only a few products that could compete with the quality of
British wares. Above all, Sheffield questioned why Great Britain would open a
free trade with the United States when the Americans would trade for British
manufactures regardless. He argued that Great Britain had the best manufactures and British merchants offered the most generous credit terms in Europe.
Neither France nor Spain would allow the Americans to trade freely with them
or with their Caribbean islands, which meant that the Americans had little reason to favor trade with those countries. Sheffield’s pamphlet aroused enough
ire among members of Parliament that Pitt’s free-trade bill failed to pass.14
Parliament’s refusal to adopt Pitt’s bill dashed the hopes of many Americans.
In part, Americans had fought for independence because they wanted to
engage in free trade; they no longer wished to conduct their trade by the dictates of Parliament. However, peace did not bring the type of free trade the
Americans had sought. United States citizens might be free to trade with any
country they wished, but other countries imposed duties and restrictions on
the kinds of goods Americans could land in their ports. The United States’
inability to engage in unrestricted free trade with Great Britain, France, Spain,
13
“A Bill As Amended in the Committee for The Provisional Establishment and Regulation of
Trade and Intercourse between the Subjects of Great Britain and Those of the United States
of North America, 1783”, National Archives, accessed 2 April 2013, http://research.archives.
gov/description/2443516; Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States, p. 2.
14Sheffield, Observations on the Commerce of the American States.
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and their West Indian colonies combined with a weak confederal government
to hamper the transition of its economy to a post-mercantilist system.
The Promise and Perils of Partnerships
The experiences of Jacob Cuyler and Leonard Gansevoort exemplify the difficulties American merchants faced as they attempted to forge an economic life
outside of the British Empire. Cuyler and Gansevoort opened their Albany,
New York-based firm Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. in 1783. The firm exported lumber, ashes, and naval stores and imported European and West Indian goods.
They sold their imports and exports wholesale. The merchants specialized in
cloth and alcohol, but they also imported tea, fine china, iron, glass, stationary,
grindstones, hats, farming implements, potash kettles, and dry goods. Although
a new firm, Cuyler and Gansevoort brought experience to their new business.
During the war, Cuyler had served as a deputy Commissary General of Purchase
for the Northern Army. In this capacity, he purchased large quantities of beef
and flour and distributed them to the Continental Army’s northern positions.
Gansevoort had a more diversified background. He had trained as a lawyer.
However, as the son of a prominent Indian trader, he had no doubt learned
many aspects of how to run a business as a child and young man. Gansevoort
furthered his business education during the war when he speculated in merchandise with his cousin John DeWandelaer.15
Cuyler and Gansevoort had two sides to their business: the foreign side,
which included exporting domestic foodstuffs, lumber, and naval stores and
importing foreign goods and manufactures and the domestic side, which comprised buying domestic foodstuffs, lumber, and naval stores and selling their
imports to country traders and shopkeepers throughout the Hudson and
Mohawk Valleys, northern New York, and western Massachusetts. Cuyler and
Gansevoort became acquainted with the Bronkhorst brothers of Croisie,
France through the domestic side of their business.
In May 1783, Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. entered into a partnership with
William Van der Locht of Philadelphia and Bohl Bohlen of Boston, a copartner
of Brothers Coster and Company, an established mercantile firm with offices in
Boston and New York City.16 The partnership agreement stipulated that either
15
16
Gansevoort also served as a representative from the City of Albany on both the local
Committee of Safety and in the provincial and state governments of New York.
Available records do not indicate the specifics of how these three merchants and their
firms became acquainted with each other.
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Trade, Diplomacy, And American Independence
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Van der Locht or Bohlen would relocate to New York City and Cuyler and
Gansevoort would remain in Albany. Each party agreed to invest £2,000 New
York currency into their partnership. According to the terms of their agreement, the partnership would last for two years and the partners agreed to use
their seed money to invest in trade opportunities.17 Each party contributed to
the partnership. Cuyler and Gansevoort provided easy access to lumber, naval
stores, ashes, and foodstuffs for trade; William Van der Locht allowed the partnership to use his brig to transport goods to and from coastal and West Indian
markets; Bohlen provided the name and reputation of the established firm
Brothers Coster. All partners contributed their individual markets, trading
partners, and access to credit, thereby expanding the reach of their individual
businesses.18
Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. became acquainted with the Bronkhorst brothers
through Van der Locht and Brothers Coster. In a letter, Jacobus Bronkhorst
directed Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to send his wood to New York in the name of
his brother Jan and not “Mr. William Van der Locht.” The letter does not specify
why Jacobus made this request, but it indicates that Jacobus knew of Van der
Locht and of his connection with Cuyler and Gansevoort. A second letter from
the Coster Brothers’ New York concern mentioned sending a letter with Jacobus
Bronkhorst on the Maria Theresa.19
In addition to helping Jacobus Bronkhorst acquire saleable lumber and
repairing the brig, Cuyler and Gansevoort wrote to Jan Bronkhorst in Croisie
about the possibility of trading together. On January 22, 1784, Cuyler and
Gansevoort informed Jan of the “present high prices of West India Commodities”
17
18
19
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Articles of Agreement between Jacob Cuyler
and Leonard Gansevoort and Bohl Bohlen and William Van der Locht”, (mg 2), May 1783.
David Hancock stresses that many merchants entered partnerships to pool resources,
enable them to spread out the risk involved in trading, and to take advantage of complimentary market talents. David Hancock, Citizens of the World: London Merchants and the
Integration of the British Atlantic Community, 1735–1785 (New York: Cambridge University
Press, 1995), pp. 106–107, 241–242.
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Jacob Cuyler to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”,
(mg 1), 26 July 1783; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Jacob Cuyler to Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg 1), 6 August 1783; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers,
“Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster at Boston”, (mg 2), 26 January 1784.
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Jacobus Bronkhorst to Cuyler, Gansevoort &
Co.”, (mg 2), 20 August 1783; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Jacobus
Bronkhorst to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg 1), 16 October 1783 (Letter in Dutch);
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Brothers Coster of New York to Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg 1), 26 August 1783.
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in New York. They also related that “a real Scarcity of those Articles [rum, sugar,
molasses, and rock salt] and the Want of Means in the Merchants at that place
[New York City], induce us to believe that all West India produce will command as good price in this State during the Course of the next Summer.” Like
many American merchants during the Confederation Period, those throughout
New York State, including New York City, suffered from a want of cash. Without
hard currency on hand, American merchants found themselves hard-pressed
to trade in places where they could not obtain generous extensions of credit.20
Cuyler and Gansevoort had three reasons to hope that Jan Bronkhorst would
act on their information and import those sorely wanted articles. First, Cuyler
and Gansevoort undoubtedly wished that Jan Bronkhorst would allow them to
share in the profits of their information either by allowing the firm to purchase
the imported goods on generous credit terms or by selling Bronkhorst’s goods
on commission. Second, Cuyler and Gansevoort hoped to use Bronkhorst’s
French citizenship to skirt European prohibitions against American participation in West Indian markets. Specifically, Cuyler and Gansevoort hoped that
Jan Bronkhorst would buy their lumber and flour for use in the West India
trade; the merchants followed their mercantile intelligence with information
that they had plenty of lumber and flour on hand should Bronkhorst be interested.21 After the War for Independence, United States merchants faced many
restrictions to their trade with the West India islands. As British colonists,
American merchants had an almost unimpeded trade with the British West
Indies islands. After the war, Parliament imposed trade restrictions on
American merchants, albeit lenient ones for members of an extra-imperial
dominion. Parliament banned non-British ships from entering the ports of its
West Indian possessions. However, Parliament allowed British vessels to export
West Indian goods to the United States and to import American produce, with
the exceptions of salted provisions and fish, to the islands. These restrictions
appeared generous when compared with French and Spanish limitations.
Spain prohibited all foreign ships from entering its West Indian ports. France
allowed American vessels up to 60 tons to import American produce to its
islands, but forbid the importation of American wheat and flour and subjected
island imports of American salted beef and pork to a 3 livres duty per barrel.22
20
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Culyer, Gansevoort & Co. to Jan Bronkhorst”,
(mg 2), 22 January 1784.
21Ibid.
22Crowley, The Privileges of Independence; R.C. Nash, “The Organization of Trade and
Finance in the British Atlantic Economy, 1600–1830”, in The Atlantic Economy during the
Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries: Organization, Operation, Practice, and Personnel
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As flour and wheat constituted two of New York’s major commodities, Cuyler
and Gansevoort hoped that Jan Bronkhorst would send a ship to Albany to buy
their wheat and flour and use his French vessel to legally export those products
to the French Caribbean islands.
Thirdly, Cuyler and Gansevoort hoped that Jan Bronkhorst would look favorably on their trade advice because they wanted him to help them expand their
network of European merchants. Cuyler and Gansevoort asked Bronkhorst to
introduce them to his Amsterdam factor by way of forwarding “a Memorandum
of Goods we want from there.” Although “destitute of a Connection in Holland,”
Cuyler and Gansevoort assured Bronkhorst that they stood as worthy men and
only wanted an introduction; “we do not mean that you should recommend us
in such a way as that you would by the Custom of Merchants be considered as
a Collateral Security for us.”23 Bronkhorst seems to have disappointed all of
Cuyler and Gansevoort’s desires for a reciprocal relationship. Bronkhorst did
not respond to their letters, nor did he pay the debts accumulated in the repair
of his ship, the total of which surpassed 10,349.8.16 Livres tournois.24 Instead,
Cuyler and Gansevoort’s short-lived relationship with the Bronkhorsts soured
and ruined their partnership with Van der Locht and Brothers Coster.
The partnership between Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. and Bohl Bohlen and his
firm Brothers Coster began to dissolve in January 1784. On January 10, 1784,
Brothers Coster of New York wrote to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. and informed
them that they would not pay any bills of exchange drawn on them by Cuyler and
Gansevoort because the Albanians owed them money. Cuyler and Gansevoort
replied on January 15 “that nothing could equal our surprise and indignation…
you pretend we owe you [money].” Cuyler and Gansevoort accused the New York
branch of Brothers Coster of being “ungenteel” and “neither Merchant or
Gentlemanlike.” Cuyler and Gansevoort challenged the Costers by drawing on the
New York firm to pay a debt; “[we are] determined to see whether you will protest
their bills.” Cuyler and Gansevoort requested that the Costers send a representative to Albany so that they could “make a final settlement” as they had “Solemnly
determined to do no more Affairs with you and to make an End of every thing.”25
(Charleston, sc: University of South Carolina Press, 2005), pp. 95–151; Nettels, The
Emergence of a National Economy.
23 aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Jan Bronkhorst”,
(mg 2), 11 March 1784.
24 aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster
at Boston”, (mg 2), 26 January 1784; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co. to Phyn, Ellice & Co.”, (mg 2), 1 August 1784.
25 aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster
& Co. of New York”, (mg 2), 15 January 1784.
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Covart
Cuyler, Gansevoort, and the New York branch of Brothers Coster disagreed
over how they intended to apply the debts of Jan Bronkhorst. The custom of
merchants permitted Cuyler, Gansevoort, and the Costers to seek reimbursement from Bronkhorst by drawing bills of exchange on his firm. Cuyler,
Gansevoort and the Costers would exchange these bills to pay for goods and
services and to repay their debts.26
In a letter dated February 18, 1784, Cuyler and Gansevoort emphatically
denied the New York Costers’ assertion that they had an agreement on how to
use the bills of exchange. Brothers Coster wanted to use the bills to repay a sum
of money advanced by their Boston firm for their joint account with Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co. This application meant that the Costers canceled out a debt
they believed Cuyler and Gansevoort owed them and assumed sole ownership
of the bills on Bronkhorst. Cuyler and Gansevoort denied being in the Costers’
debt.
This disagreement prompted Brothers Coster of New York to deny a bill of
exchange that Cuyler and Gansevoort made on them for £1050. Cuyler and
Gansevoort wrote to the Costers’ Boston branch and apologized for needing to
end their relationship with all parts of Brothers Coster;
if we had been Bankrupts and really owed you the Money it would not be
worse but in the present situation of the Matter it is unpardonable it is
Such Treatment as we never before received from any Person and are
determined never to put it in the power of any one to do again, for if we
had been involv’d in Debt as Merchants frequently are, it would have
been sufficient to have stamped our Credit as irretrievable and Insolvency
ensued, but thank God…it was out of his power to injure our Credit.27
The United States’ lack of a stable and ample money supply made it imperative
that Cuyler and Gansevoort keep their good reputations for debt repayment;
few merchants in the early United States could afford to conduct business
without credit.
It took the two firms over four years to terminate their connection because
they disagreed over Jan Bronkhorst’s bills of exchange. In January 1784, Cuyler
26
27
W.T. Baxter, “Credit, Bills, and Bookkeeping in a Simple Economy”, Accounting Review xxi
(1946); W.T. Baxter, “Observations on Money, Barter and Bookkeeping”, The Accounting
Historians Journal 31, no. 1 (2004), 129–139.
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster
of Boston”, (mg 2), 26 January 1784; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler,
Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster of New York”, (mg 2), 18 February 1784.
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Trade, Diplomacy, And American Independence
149
and Gansevoort transmitted to the Costers bills of exchange on Bronkhorst
worth 10,327 livres tournois. The Costers in turn used the bills to pay their debts
in Holland. When Bronkhorst’s bills arrived in Croisie, Bronkhorst refused to
pay them.
In September 1784, the Costers wrote Cuyler and Gansevoort looking for the
Albanians to reimburse them for the non-accepted bills. Cuyler and Gansevoort
responded: “we are extremely sorry to hear that the Bills which we drew upon
Mr. Bronkhorst Merchant at Croisie… last Winter by your Constant advice &
direction are protested.” However, the merchants felt little obligation to repay
the Costers. In fact, Cuyler and Gansevoort expressed surprise at the Costers’
request; “we are not less astonished at your demanding from us a reimbursement of the amount of the said Bills with Damages & Interest[;] in this Demand
we cannot think you serious.” They informed the Costers that they could
attempt to obtain payment from them “but the Facts attending this Business,
you must be conceived, that neither Law nor Equity can or will compel us to
pay either.”28
Cuyler and Gansevoort’s disapproving letter stemmed from the fact that Jan
Bronkhorst had also cheated them and they blamed the Costers for their troubles. Cuyler and Gansevoort’s letter to the Costers reflects that they extended
credit to the Bronkhorsts because the Costers pressured them with “Constant
advice & direction.” While Cuyler and Gansevoort’s letters to Jan Bronkhorst
reflected an eagerness to form a beneficial trade with him, their letter to the
Costers indicate that they began a relationship with Bronkhorst out of an obligation to their business partners, the Costers. Cuyler and Gansevoort looked
upon the Costers’ inability to obtain payment from the Bronkhorsts as a shared
business risk. Although Cuyler, Gansevoort and the Costers would finally settle
their accounts in 1788, neither firm collected their money from Jan Bronkhorst
because their United States citizenship hindered their ability to navigate the
French legal system.
Diplomatic Consequences of Independence
Cuyler and Gansevoort turned to the international side of their business to
seek redress from Jan Bronkhorst. After several months of writing to Bronkhorst
without a reply, Cuyler and Gansevoort believed that the Bronkhorst brothers
28
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Brothers Coster & Co. to Cuyler, Gansevoort,
& Co.”, (mg 1), 17 September 1784 (letter in Dutch); aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort
Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Brothers Coster & Co.”, (mg 2), 6 October 1784.
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Covart
had taken advantage of them to the tune of £1738.8.6 New York Currency, not
inclusive of the 10,327 livres tournois they remitted to the Costers. “Destitute of
a Friend in France,” Cuyler and Gansevoort relied on their “friendship” with
Phyn, Ellices & Co. of London “to extricate us from a difficulty into which we
have insensibly got involved.” With their August 1, 1784 letter, Cuyler and
Gansevoort sent Phyn, Ellices & Co. their “Bill of Bottom[r]y executed by Capt.
Roeloff C. Roor, Commander of the Brigatine Maria Therece,” power of attorney, and “the Papers we conceive are explanatory of the whole transaction.”29
These papers included eight affidavits attesting to the fact that Cuyler and
Gansevoort had ordered and paid for goods and services meant for the
Bronkhorsts and their damaged brig.30
Phyn, Ellices & Co. used their connections to help Cuyler and Gansevoort
with their lawsuit against Jan Bronkhorst. In mid-September 1784, M.C. Lynch
of Nantes informed Cuyler and Gansevoort that he had received their bottomry bond on the Maria Therese along with an explanatory letter of the affair
from Misters French & Park of London, which they received through Phyn,
Ellices & Co. Lynch briefed Cuyler and Gansevoort that the Maria Therese had
safely “arrived here [in France] ab[ou]t 8 Days ago from Albany or New York”
and that he had “already had a Conversation on the Subject with the
Correspondent here of Mr. Bronkhorst.” Jan Bronkhorst refused to pay Cuyler
and Gansevoort because he had insured the Maria Therese and “on the first
News of the damage she met with in the river Albany [Hudson River], he had
made on Abandon to the UnderWritiers.” Bronkhorst contended that the debt
29
30
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. to Phyn, Ellice &
Co.”, (mg 2), 1 August 1784.
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of John
Robinson”, (mg1), 1 August 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers,
John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Peter Ball”, (mg1), 30 August 1784; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/
Gansevoort Papers, John H. Wendell, “Declaration of John Robison”, (mg2), 31 August
1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of
Joseph Cline”, (mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family
Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Philip Van Veghten”, (mg1), 1 September 1784;
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, “Affidavit of John Follett & William
Douglass”, (mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers,
John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Jonathan Pettit”, (mg1), 1 September 1784; aiha, Library,
Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Peter Ball”, (mg1), 8
September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell,
“Affidavit of Jacob Cuyler & Leonard Gansevoort”, (mg1), 8 September 1784; aiha,
Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers, John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of John DePeyster
Douw”, (mg1), 10 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Family Papers,
John H. Wendell, “Affidavit of Jeremiah Spaulding”, (mg1), 10 September 1784.
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Trade, Diplomacy, And American Independence
151
for repairing his brig belonged to his insurance underwriters. Lynch advised
Cuyler and Gansevoort to seek redress from the underwriters and “if it be necessary” to try and seize the vessel. Lynch further assured Cuyler and Gansevoort
that he would keep them “duly advised of what I will do in the Affair” and that
he would “Tender [them] my best Services in these Parts.”31
Cuyler and Gansevoort’s suit against Jan Bronkhorst and the underwriters
carried on for more than two years. In October 1786, Lynch wrote that “notwithstanding my attention to the affair of your demand…nothing has been
done…that can give room to hope for the recovery of any part of your said
demand.” Lynch explained that insurance claims made in France had to go
through a referee process whereby the referees would determine “the average
to be paid by the underwriters.” Until the referees decided how much the
underwriters had to pay on Bronkhorst’s claim, “no Claim can be made to the
underwriters.”
Lynch prepared Cuyler and Gansevoort for the worst. He told them that the
affidavits and papers he had received from Phyn and Ellice would not do.
Lynch’s private attorney believed that “these papers & accounts will not suffice
in law to Compell Bronkhorst of Croisies to the paym[ent] of your demands.”
The problem: none of the papers showed Jacobus Bronkhorst, supercargo of
the Maria Therese, as having had a power of attorney from Jan “to Contract any
Engagements for his account.” Moreover, the papers in his possession contained only the Captain’s signature; the French “Court of Admiralty pronounced
that the Owners of the vessel w[ere] not accountable for any [charges made
without the power of attorney].” Lynch’s attorney speculated that Cuyler and
Gansevoort’s “recourse was by only against the Captain, who is no more to be
found, having long since quitted this Country.” Lynch concluded “all I see of this
unfortunate affair, I can only repeat with Concern that you are likely to be sufferers by it, and thereby the Victims of your too great Confidence in people.”32
Seven months later, Lynch confirmed that his lawyer had been correct. The
referees settled the amount the underwriters owed to Bronkhorst, but
Bronkhorst had “been discharged of your demand by the Court of Admiralty in
this place.” To seek redress, Cuyler and Gansevoort had only two options left:
Appeal the Admiralty Court’s decision to the French Parliament, an option
that Lynch stated “would be very costly” for an “issue very uncertain,” or apply
31
32
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “M.C. Lynch to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”,
(mg 1), 18 September 1784; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Phyn, Ellices &
Co. to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”, (mg 1), 28 September 1784.
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “M. Lynch to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”,
(mg 1), 19 October 1786.
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to the American ambassador at the French Court to “Claim Justice for you”
with the King’s Council. Lynch recommended the latter course, as Cuyler and
Gansevoort’s United States citizenship predisposed the French legal system
against them.33
It does not appear that Cuyler and Gansevoort pursued their lawsuit against
Bronkhorst after 1787. Bronkhorst did not feel an obligation to pay the
Americans because French laws protected him and the United States government had little power to seek redress on behalf of its citizens.34 Cuyler and
Gansevoort’s inability to collect Bronkhorst’s debts typifies the larger predicament of debt collection faced by many American merchants during the
Confederation Period.
Debt Collection During the Confederation Era
Aside from a weak central government incapable of protecting the interests of
its merchants in foreign markets, the United States lacked an ample and stable
supply of currency. Specie proved hard to acquire, as did reliable bills of
exchange. Mercantile firms like Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. became insolvent
because their debtors could not obtain an acceptable medium of payment.
In addition to trying to collect Bronkhorst’s debt, Cuyler and Gansevoort also
tried to collect the monies due to them by the country traders and shopkeepers
they supplied. James Roosevelt of Claverack, New York, assured the merchants
that he would pay them just as soon as he could collect his debts; “I must repeat
I have you in mind daily & the repeated disappointments from those of our
creditors have caused this tardiness in ou[r] remittance.” Collecting debts did
not prove an easy matter. Roosevelt explained that “should I introduce the Law
destruction must follow[;] the Collecting of Money in these parts is of the most
difficult neature, my exertions are daily made use of and you may depend, that
all the Cash worth forwarding shall be sent you on the receipt thereof.”35
The money shortage in the United States also complicated merchants’
efforts to collect payments of produce. Nathaniel Stewart of Lanesborough,
33
aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “M. Lynch to Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.”,
(mg 1), 8 May 1797.
34“Advertisement”, Albany Gazette, 18 October 1787.
35 aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “James Roosevelt & Co. to Cuyler, Gansevoort
& Co.”, (mg 1), 17 August 1785; John L. Brooke, Columbia Rising: Civil Life on the Upper
Hudson from the Revolution to the Age of Jackson (Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina
Press, 2010).
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Massachusetts, told Cuyler and Gansevoort that he could not collect his debts
because the farmers in his area would not part with their wheat and flax seed
for anything but “Rum tea and Salt” and that “Since i have none of the above
articles I do my Best.” Like Roosevelt, Stewart assured his creditors that “I take
Every possibel method to collect my debts I spare no pains by Day or night.” To
buy some more time, Stewart offered to pay a portion of his debt with “one
Hundred bushels mor[e] of Wheat” and that if needed he had “one hundred lb
Worth of Beef Cattle & Valuable Swine,” although he preferred to keep the latter “while my pastures is good.”36
While they waited on their suit against Bronkhorst, and tried to collect
their domestic debts, Cuyler and Gansevoort attempted to bolster their business by looking for markets where suitable currency could be obtained. In
November 1784, Leonard Gansevoort dispatched the sloop Schuyler and
Captain Thomas Hook to “Charlestown in South Carolina” and if needed to
the Dutch West India islands, where the Dutch allowed free trade. Gansevoort
hoped to sell New York lumber, naval stores, foodstuffs, and if possible, the
Albany-built sloop for hard currency or bills of exchange on reputable
European firms.
Hook never made it to the West Indies. When he arrived in Charleston he
found that “there are no markets in the westindies the N: Englanders have
Ruined this [Charleston] as well as the Rest.” Like Cuyler and Gansevoort, New
England merchants also looked to trade in markets that would take their produce, which unfortunately for Cuyler and Gansevoort mirrored the produce
from New York. An intelligent captain, Hook sold what he could, when he
could, and hired his vessel out to carry freight while he waited for prices to
improve. By the end of February, Hook netted £145.3.6 for the produce and “a
bill of Exchange for Eighteen hundred Spanish Doller[s]” from the sale of
Gansevoort’s sloop.37 Despite this modest success, Cuyler and Gansevoort
could not remain solvent. In October 1787, they dissolved their partnership “by
mutual consent.”38
36
aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort Papers, “Nathaniel Stewart to Cuyler, Gansevoort &
Co.”, (mg 2), 20 October 1785.
37 aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Agreement between Leonard Gansevoort
and Thomas Hook”, (mg 1), 22 November 1784; aiha, Library, Ten Eyck/Gansevoort
Papers, “Thomas Hook to Leonard Gansevoort”, (mg 2), 7 January 1785; aiha, Library,
Gansevoort/Ten Eyck Papers, “Sales of Sundry Merchandize from on board the Sloop
Schuyler at Charleston”, (mg 1), 28 February 1785; aiha, Library, Gansevoort/Ten Eyck
Papers, “Thomas Hook to Leonard Gansevoort”, (mg 1), March 1785.
38“Advertisement”, Albany Gazette, 18 October 1787.
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Trade with China
To avoid the fate of Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co., other Albany merchants
attempted to profit by looking beyond the markets in the Atlantic. In 1785, a
group of merchants from Albany and New York City tried their luck in China.
On November 15, 1785, eighteen merchants partnered and agreed to invest
£10,000 New York currency “to fit out the Sloop Experiment Stewart Dean
Master for Canton in China.” Unsure of what goods the Chinese market might
accept, the partners filled Dean’s Albany-built sloop with 6,000 pounds of ginseng, fifty tons of cordage, thirty tons of lead, and an assortment of wines, spirits, cloth, lumber products, and furs. The total investment in Dean’s outbound
cargo amounted to $4143; Dean sold his cargo for $7549.5.39
It took Dean two years to complete his voyage. When he returned to New
York City, he arrived with 308 chests of Hyson and 100 chests of Souchong tea,
twenty-six chests of China Tea cups and saucers, five chests of Breakfast China,
and eighty bales of Nankeens, a pale, yellow cotton fabric. When the investors
sold these goods at auction they realized about an eight percent return on their
investment. Bolstered by this news, a second group of New York investors sent
Dean and the Experiment back to China, this time with both a cargo of goods
and $18,000 silver dollars. Like the first group, the second realized a modest
return on their investment.
Direct trade with China proved uneconomical because American merchants lacked the capital to send an appropriately sized vessel, crew, and cargo
to profitably trade with China. At 85 tons, the Experiment could not create the
profits realized by the 1,000 ton European East Indiamen.40 In order to compete in the Atlantic and East Asian markets, American merchants needed to
find a way to solve their nation’s currency shortage and to imbue their national
government with the authority it needed to protect their rights abroad.
39
40
New York Public Library, Manuscripts and Special Collections, Stewart & Jones Papers,
“Letterbook”, Box 3, 1784–1786; Paul E. Fontenoy, “An ‘Experimental’ Voyage to China,
1785–1787”, The American Neptune, 1996, http://www.pem.org/sites/neptune/voyage
1.htm; Caroline Frank, Objectifying China, Imagining America: Chinese Commodities in
Early America (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press, 2011); William J. Wilgus, Life of
Captain Stewart Dean (Ascutney, Vermont, 1942).
nypl, msc, Stewart & Jones Papers, “Letterbook”, Box 3, 1784–1786; Eric Jay Dolin, When
America First Met China: An Exotic History of Tea, Drugs, and Money in the Age of Sail
(New York: W.W. Norton & Company, 2012); Fontenoy, “An ‘Experimental’ Voyage to
China”; Wilgus, Life of Captain Stewart Dean; Dane A. Morrison, True Yankees: The South
Seas and the Discovery of American Identity (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press,
2014).
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155
Historiography of the Confederation Era
Few historical works discuss the Confederation Period of United States history
in great detail. The historiography of the era portrays the intertwined nature of
the economy and politics of the new nation. Histories that center on the economy discuss the politics of the period just as those that focus on politics consider the economy of the era. Historians who discuss the Confederation Period
tend to be political historians with an interest in how and why Americans created and ratified the Constitution of 1787. If their political histories discuss the
economy of the Confederation Period, they do so because the economic conditions between 1783 and 1787 helped to create the political context that gave
birth to the Constitution.
Since Merrill Jensen published The New Nation: A History of the United States
During the Confederation, 1781–1789 in 1950, historians have debated whether
the post-war recession represented a severe economic depression or a period
of slow economic growth, which was colored by the adjustment of the United
States to a non-mercantilist economy. In his quest to inspect the New Dealers’
claims that the national sovereignty of the United States originated at the
beginning of the Revolution, Jensen portrayed the Confederation economy as
a time of painful, but slow economic growth. In 1962, Curtis P. Nettels championed the opposite viewpoint. In The Emergence of a National Economy, 1775 to
1815, Nettels interpreted the economy of the Confederation Period as a time of
severe recession. Nettels’s interpretation makes his argument that the United
States experienced a solid record of economic growth and increased standards
of living post-1789 more compelling.41
The debate over whether the Confederation Period experienced the severe
recession advocated by Nettels or the painful period of slow economic growth
championed by Jensen continues into the present day. Most recently, Jonathan
M. Chu wrote Stumbling Towards the Constitution to argue against the Federalist
view of the Articles of Confederation, which portrays the period as one of
abject economic failure. Chu believes that economic conditions influenced
the development of and debate over the Constitution of 1787. He argues that
Americans created the Constitution because the solution to their lack of
liquidity lay in the better regulation of domestic commerce and in the expansion of international trade. Chu’s view falls in line with the most recent diplomatic histories of the period. Both Eliga Gould and P.J. Marshall argue that the
41
Merrill Jensen, The New Nation: A History of the United States During the Confederation,
1781–1789, First (New York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1950); Nettels, The Emergence of a National
Economy.
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weakness of the Articles of Confederation negatively affected the ability of the
United States to negotiate commercial treaties with other nations, primarily
Great Britain.42
In 1986, John J. McCusker and Russell R. Menard marveled at the dearth of
economic histories about the Confederation Era. McCusker and Menard
acknowledged that economic historians viewed “the War of Independence,
and more broadly the entire Revolutionary era” as a “watershed in American
history” and yet ironically they neglected the period: “Indeed, apart from its
military, diplomatic, and political aspects, the period from 1776 to 1789 is
among the least studied in American history.”43 McCusker and Menard offered
two reasons why economic historians forgot to study the economic history of
the Revolutionary and Confederation periods in the concluding chapter of
their seminal work The Economy of British America. First, economic historians
felt compelled to compare these watershed periods with the late colonial and
early national eras. Second, the periods lacked good evidence for historians to
study. McCusker and Menard acknowledged that “new interest in the period”
might spell the end of economic histories “that [end] abruptly in the mid-1770s
and [begin] anew circa 1787.”44
Their hopes have yet to be realized. In The Economy of Early America:
Historical Perspectives and New Directions (2011), volume-editor Cathy Matson
reported that much work remains to be done on the Confederation Period.
Matson points out that scholars still need to study and address many areas of
the early American economy; “A rising generation of economic historians is
only beginning to understand how the destinies of a people in a broad hemispheric arena of inter-imperial commerce were intertwined.”45
Conclusion
The case study of Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co. adds to our understanding of the
intertwined “destinies” of early Americans and their fellow Atlantic citizens. It
42
43
44
45
Jonathan M. Chu, Stumbling Toward the Constitution: The Economic Consequences of
Freedom in the Atlantic World, The New Urban Atlantic (New York: Pal, 2012); Gould,
Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New World
Empire; Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic.
McCusker and Menard, The Economy of British America, p. 358.
Ibid., p. 359.
Cathy Matson, “A House of Many Mansions: Some Thoughts on the Field of Economic
History”, in The Economy of Early America: Historical Perspectives & New Directions, ed. Cathy
Matson (University Park, pa: The Pennsyvlania State University Press, 2006), 15–16.
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offers a micro-study of how some merchants conducted business during the
Confederation Era and highlights how both the economy and diplomacy of the
period affected the way merchants traded. A shortage of specie made it hard
for Cuyler and Gansevoort to collect debts. Their inability to recoup debts
affected their ability to receive and offer credit, repay their debts, and hunt for
new markets. Moreover, the weakness of the Articles of Confederation affected
their international partnerships. European court systems favored their citizens
and did so with the knowledge that the American congress could do little to
protect theirs. With a small, unpaid, and ill-clad army, no navy, and an inability
to make the states conform to the international agreements it negotiated, the
Confederation government stood powerless to protect its merchants, manufacturers, and citizens from unscrupulous international merchants.
For many Americans the answer to the nation’s economic difficulties lay in
adopting the centralized federal government proposed in the Constitution of
1787. The Constitution empowered the government to protect its merchants,
establish a liquid currency supply, and regulate import and export duties
throughout the nation. These powers buttressed the American economy by
creating a government that foreign nations such as Great Britain would form
commercial treaties with. However, the economic support offered by the
Constitution did not begin to appear until after 1796, which came too late for
firms like Cuyler, Gansevoort & Co.46
46Gould, Among the Powers of the Earth: The American Revolution and the Making of a New
World Empire; Marshall, Remaking the British Atlantic.
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