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Mali
2012
www.africaneconomicoutlook.org
Mali
Real economic growth ground down to 1.1% in 2011 following a fall in agricultural production and a series
of external shocks (the post-election crisis in Côte d’Ivoire, the Libya war, and the rise in oil, gas and food
prices). Despite the coup in March 2012, growth is expected to reach 6.9% in 2012 and 5.2% in 2013,
provided that the crop year is good, gold and cotton prices rise and trade with Côte d’Ivoire increases.
However, the strong rate of population growth combined with political instability could have a negative
impact on the country’s socio-economic indicators.
The results of the national employment policy and initiatives such as the youth-employment programme
(YEP) are below expectations. Unemployment hits young people hardest, with the rate standing at 15.4%
for 15‑39 year olds. Young job seekers represent 81.5% of all unemployed people.
Overview
Mali experienced a sharp decline in agricultural production in 2011 due to irregular rainfall and its unfavourable
distribution in time and place. This was compounded by external shocks, including the post-election crisis in
Côte d’Ivoire, the Libya war and rising oil and food prices. Real gross domestic product (GDP) growth stood at
1.1% in 2011. The poor performance was mainly due to the decline in food production (‑16%), which represents
almost a quarter of GDP, and especially in rice production (‑25%). Growth is expected to reach 6.9% in 2012
and 5.2% in 2013, provided that the crop year is good, that gold and cotton prices rise and that trade with
Côte d’Ivoire increases. But forecasts for 2012‑13 are overshadowed by uncertainty as a result of political
upheaval following the coup and the violence that broke out at the start of 2012.
In 2011, GDP growth was sustained primarily by cotton production and trade, but also by textiles, food
processing, transport, telecommunications and livestock farming. On the demand side, consumption and exports
of cotton and gold drove growth.
Youth unemployment is a critical problem in Mali. Unemployment stood at 9.6% in 2011 but was as high as
15.4% for 15‑39 year olds. There are a number of causes of this, including low economic growth, rapid
population increase (3.6% a year), the size of the young population, lack of suitable job training, the rural
exodus, and the low absorption capacity of the formal sector.
In 1998, Mali designated employment a central pillar of human development and an effective means of
combating poverty. This policy is implemented through several projects and programmes, including a youth
employment programme (PEJ) and a ten-year vocational training development programme (PRODEFPE).
Despite these initiatives, the results achieved in terms of job creation are below expectations. The
government’s long-term solution to the unemployment crisis involves addressing the structural causes of
unemployment by implementing pro-active policies aimed at markedly increasing the growth rate of the
economy, strongly reducing population growth and training young people in sectors that correspond to the
needs of the economy.
African Economic Outlook 2012
2 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Figure 1: Real GDP growth (Western)
10%
Real GDP Growth (%)
8%
6%
4%
2%
0%
2003
2004
2005
Real GDP growth (%)
2006
2007
2008
2009
Wes tern Africa - Real GDP growth (%)
2010
2011
2012
2013
Africa - Real GDP growth (%)
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org10.1787/888932619070
Table 1: Macroeconomic Indicators
2010
2011
2012
2013
Real GDP growth
5.8
2.7
3.5
5.1
Real GDP per capita growth
2.8
-0.3
0.5
2.1
CPI inflation
1.4
3
3.8
2.2
Budget balance % GDP
-2.7
-1
-3.5
-3.4
Current account % GDP
-7.5
-5.4
-3.1
-4.7
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1787/888932602445
African Economic Outlook 2012
3 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Recent Developments & Prospects
Table 2: GDP by Sector (percentage of GDP)
2006 2011
Agriculture, forestry, fishing & hunting
36.7
41.1
Mining and quarrying
8.3
7.6
of which oil
-
-
Manufacturing
9
5.4
Electricity, gas and water
2.1
2.2
Construction
5
5.7
Wholesale and retail trade, hotels and restaurants
14.5
15.6
of which hotels and restaurants
-
-
Transport, storage and communication
5.4
5.9
Finance, real estate and business services
0.4
0.3
Financial intermediation, real estate services, business and other service activities
-
-
General government services
11.2
9.2
Public administration & defence; social security, education, health & social work
-
-
Public administration, education, health
-
-
Public administration, education, health & other social & personal services
-
-
Other community, social & personal service activities
-
-
Other services
7.4
7.1
Gross domestic product at basic prices / factor cost
100
100
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org10.1787/888932621046
Real GDP growth was estimated at 1.1% in 2011, boosted mainly by secondary and tertiary sector growth of
8.3% and 3.8% respectively, while the primary sector contracted 5.8%. Forecasts predict growth of 6.9% in
2012 and 5.2% in 2013, based on good agricultural yields and rising gold and cotton prices. But these
projections could be affected by the uncertainty regarding the country's political future created by events in
early 2012.
Negative growth in the primary sector in 2011 was the result of a fall in agricultural production (‑11.6%), and
especially in rice production (‑25%). Strong cotton sector growth (66%) helped to limit the shortfall, however.
The 2011/12 agro-pastoral season saw rainfall arrive late and end early, reducing crop production and causing a
food crisis to start in December 2011. Livestock farming, which employs around 30% of the working population,
showed 4% growth in 2011 and accounted for 9.0% of GDP. Having shown strong growth in 2011, cotton
production is expected to stabilise in 2012/13, while food production is expected to grow by 20% in 2012. As a
result, the primary sector as a whole is expected to record growth of around 12% in 2012/13, while agricultural
production alone is expected to grow by around 18%.
The secondary sector grew by 8.3% in 2011 thanks to growth in the textile (+31%) and food-processing
(+18.6%) industries. The upward trend in international gold prices combined with the opening of new gold
mines (most notably in Kodiéran and Tabakoroni) during the second half of 2011 make the outlook good for
2012/13, with growth projected at 10% for the extraction industries and 8% for the secondary sector as a
African Economic Outlook 2012
4 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
whole.
The 3.8% growth recorded in 2011 in the service sector was based mainly on trading, which is one of the
largest sub-sectors of the economy and accounted for 15% of GDP, followed by transport and
telecommunications. The vitality of these activities has been bolstered by the increase in the private
consumption of households but has been held back by social upheaval affecting the Bamako-Abidjan road
corridor. In 2012/13, growth should reach 6.5% in the trading sub-sector and 7% in transport and
telecommunications will remain at 7% thanks to an expected increase in trade with Côte d’Ivoire.
On the demand side, consumption is the main driver of growth, followed by exports. Spurred by private
consumption by households, overall consumption rose by 2.8% in 2011 thanks mainly to civil service pay rises
and recruitment in education, health, the army and security activities. However, private consumption has been
less dynamic than initially expected because of a fall in remittances from Malians abroad, which are a major
source of household income. Gross investment contracted by 6.2% in 2011 to around 21.1% of GDP. This
decrease is not related to fixed capital, which rose 7%, but to a reduction in stocks resulting from a decline in
production. Infrastructure attracted most investment in 2011, taking a 33% share of all financing. Investment
went to major road projects aimed at opening up the country internally and externally, to human resources
projects in education, health and employment, and to water and energy supply and the rural economy.
African Economic Outlook 2012
5 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Macroeconomic Policy
Fiscal Policy
In December 2011, the Malian government adopted a new growth and poverty reduction strategy framework
(GPRSF) for 2012‑17. The medium and long term goal is to “make Mali an emerging country and an agricultural
power with a good quality of life for its people, both men and women”. 1 Overall, the implementation of
macroeconomic policy in 2011 was satisfactory. In December 2011, the executive board of the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) completed its seventh review of the Mali programme and the extended credit facility
(ECF) supporting it. This resulted in the release of 6 million special drawing rights (SDRs) and the adoption of a
new three-year ECF agreement. In 2011, Mali met four of the eight criteria set out in the West African
Economic and Monetary Union (WAEMU) economic convergence programme, including three of the top-level
criteria. The four criteria met were those relating to average annual inflation, public debt as a percentage of
GDP, internalm and external payment arrears and investment financed by domestic resources as compared to
fiscal revenue.
The 2011 budget was passed in a difficult macroeconomic environment, and subsequently a series of external
shocks forced the government to pass a law adjusting the budget. Overall, the key budget goals were achieved.
The underlying primary balance, excluding expenditure on state telecommunications company SOTELMA
(Société des télécommunications du Mali), showed a deficit of 0.3% of GDP in 2011, even though the amended
budget had provided for a 1.4% deficit. The budget deficit improved in 2011 to 1.0% of GDP thanks to good tax
revenue, good control of expenditure on salaries, and underspending on other current expenditure and
internally financed capital expenditure. The deficit is expected to worsen in 2012 due to the cost of holding
elections and managing the crisis in the north of the country. The deficit is forecast to reach 3.7% of GDP in
2012 and 3.5% in 2013. At the same time, the tax burden (14.8% of GDP in 2011) has increased a mere 0.2%
and remains below the 17% WAEMU threshold. General budget support disbursed by technical and financial
partners amounted to XOF 86.9 billion (CFA Franc BCEAO) in 2011.
Total expenditure and net lending increased by 11.1% to reach XOF 1.424 trillion in 2011. This was mainly a
result of a 1.7% increase in current spending as a percentage of GDP, itself caused by additional transfers to
energy company Énergie du Mali, spending on the repatriation and settlement of migrants from Côte d’Ivoire
and Libya, an increase in lending to agriculture and spending on preparations for the 2012 elections. Spending
on social sectors (especially education and health), which remain a priority, represented 32.4% of 2011 budget
spending and 33.5% of spending in 2012. Capital spending, 53% of which is financed from abroad, represented
7.0% of GDP in 2011 and is expected to fall to 6.8% in 2012 before curving back up to 7.2% in 2013. The
current spending structure does not sufficiently support economic growth and results suggest it is not very
effective in the social sectors.
African Economic Outlook 2012
6 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Table 3: Public Finances (percentage of GDP)
2003
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Total revenue and grants
20.2
54.4
19.5
19
21.7
20.2
22.2
19.4
19.5
Tax revenue
14.2
14.7
14.2
13.3
14.7
14.6
14.5
14
14.1
Oil revenue
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
Grants
4.6
38.9
4.6
3.4
4.6
2.9
5
2.8
2.8
Total expenditure and net lending (a)
22.5
24.0
24.7
21.2
25.9
22.9
23.1
22.9
23
Current expenditure
14.4
13.9
14.5
13.4
14.7
14.6
16.3
16.6
16.1
Excluding interest
13.7
13.4
14.1
13.1
14.3
14.2
15.8
16
15.6
Wages and salaries
4.3
4.6
4.8
4.8
5
5
5.3
5.7
5.7
Interest
0.8
0.5
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.4
0.5
0.6
0.5
Primary balance
-1.5
30.8
-4.8
-1.9
-3.9
-2.3
-0.5
-2.9
-2.9
Overall balance
-2.2
30.4
-5.2
-2.2
-4.2
-2.7
-1
-3.5
-3.4
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org10.1787/888932622034
Monetary Policy
Mali belongs to the WAEMU, and its monetary policy is conducted by the Central Bank of West African States
(CBWAS). The central bank adopts a prudent monetary policy in the region to control inflationary pressures,
stabilise the real exchange rate of the CFA franc vis-à-vis the euro and keep exports competitive. The money
supply grew by 11% in 2011 thanks to lending to the economy and to the State. In addition, the government is
continuing to reduce the use of loans from commercial banks, which amounted to 1.3% of GDP in 2011. Credit
to the private sector, meanwhile, grew to 8.5% of GDP. Lending rates have remained relatively high over the
past few years, reaching 9.58% in 2010, compared with a WAEMU regional average of 8.11%. Deposit rates,
meanwhile, have remained almost stable since 2008, falling only slightly from 5% in 2008 to 4.86% in 2010, just
below the WAEMU average of 5.12%. Inflation reached 3% in 2011 due to rising cereal prices following a drop
in production, an increase in transport costs due to the Côte d’Ivoire crisis and higher prices for petroleum
products. Inflation is forecast to stay close to 3% in 2012.
Economic Cooperation, Regional Integration & Trade
Exports rose by 19.7% in 2011 as cotton-fibre sales shot up by 113.3% and gold sales expanded by 16.5%. Gold
exports were boosted by greater production at several existing mines and the opening of new mines, as well as
higher international prices. Imports of goods increased 15.3% in 2011 because of higher prices for imported
petroleum and food products. Remittances from Malians living abroad fell back slightly in 2011 due to crises in
their countries of residence, including, notably, the developed world and Libya. The current account deficit,
including grants, was estimated at 5.2% of GDP in 2011. This deficit was financed by net capital inflows, mainly
in the form of foreign aid and foreign direct investment. The deficit is projected to fall to 4.0% in 2012 before
expanding to 5.7% in 2013.
As regards financial transactions, net capital flows fell in 2011 to XOF 198.2 billion due to the scant increase in
public capital. Inflows of net direct investment rose to XOF 232.3 billion in 2011 under the impact of planned
investments at the Diamond Cement works, the Sukala sugar plant and on Millennium Challenge Account
projects. There was a slight upturn in the balance of the capital and financial transactions account, which rose
11.53% in 2011. The balance is projected to reach XOF 467.7 billion in 2012 and XOF 492.1 billion in 2013. The
overall balance of payments showed a deficit equivalent to 1% of GDP in 2011.
Mali is an active participant in the regional integration initiatives led by the Economic Community of West
African States (ECOWAS) and the WAEMU. The government has signed and ratified almost all agreements and
African Economic Outlook 2012
7 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
protocols on regional organisation, integration and co‑operation. Mali is a stakeholder in the negotiations of the
World Trade Organization (WTO) as part of the Doha Development Round. Mali’s main demands in the
negotiations remain: i) the elimination of cotton subsidies by developed countries as part of the Cotton Initiative
(C4 group), ii) access to developed countries’ markets, iii) special and differential treatment for the least
developed countries, and iv) trade aid.
Negotiations for an economic partnership agreement (EPA) with the European Union are led by ECOWAS with
the support of the WAEMU. The Malian authorities support the regional position, which calls for assistance,
financial and otherwise, to offset the effects of the liberalisation which an EPA would engender before any
agreement is signed. In the public development aid (PDA) field, progress was made in 2011 on implementing
the Paris Declaration on Aid Effectiveness. However, no progress has been made in terms of co‑ordination and
harmonisation with “non-traditional” donor countries, particularly China, India and Brazil, which are
co‑operating increasingly with Mali.
Table 4: Current Account (percentage of GDP)
2003
2006
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Trade balance
-1.4
1.2
-4.1
-7.3
-2.4
-3.3
0.2
3
2.2
Exports of goods (f.o.b.)
22
25.3
21.8
24
19.8
20.8
24.7
26.7
25.8
Imports of goods (f.o.b.)
23.4
24.1
25.8
31.3
22.2
24.2
24.5
23.6
23.7
Services
-6.1
-5.9
-5.6
-6.5
-5.3
-5.3
-5.6
-5.4
-5.7
Factor income
-3.8
-4.2
-4.1
-3.6
-5.1
-3.7
-4.3
-4.9
-5.1
Current transfers
4.9
2.6
3.9
5.2
5.4
4.9
4.3
4.1
3.9
Current account balance
-6.4
-6.3
-9.8
-12.2
-7.3
-7.5
-5.4
-3.1
-4.8
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org10.1787/888932623022
Debt Policy
Public debt stock increased from 26.8% of GDP in 2010 to 27.5% in 2011, and is expected to progress to 28.1%
in 2012. External debt represented 86.5% of public debt in 2011. The ratio of external debt service to exports
of goods and services fell to 4.5% in 2011. To maintain debt sustainability, Mali is set to continue with its
prudent fiscal policy, and external financing will continue to be in the form of grants and loans with a
concessionality rate of at least 35%. However, the government intends to use the forthcoming debt
sustainability analysis to determine an envelope of non-concessional loans for infrastructure investments that
would be compatible with debt sustainability. In 2011, the government made an inventory of all the agreements
under which the government has contracted domestic debt or given a commitment to guarantee domestic debt
so that this information can be recorded in public debt data and budgets. This has already enabled the
government to identify direct and indirect commitments to the banking sector amounting to XOF 183 billion
(3.6% of GDP), including XOF 41 billion (0.8% of GDP) in amounts due and unpaid. In 2011, XOF 2.3 billion of
this was paid off and a further XOF 7.5 million allocation has been included in the 2012 budget.
African Economic Outlook 2012
8 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Figure 2: Stock of total external debt (percentage of GDP) and debt service (percentage of exports of
goods and services)
125%
Percentage
100%
75%
50%
25%
0%
2003
2004
2005
2006
2007
Debt/GDP
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
2013
Debt s ervice/Exports
Figures for 2010 are estimates; for 2011 and later are projections.
http://dx.doi.org10.1787/888932619070
African Economic Outlook 2012
9 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Economic & Political Governance
Private Sector
Most economic activity in Mali is centred around self-employment and is limited to subsistence activities. Such
activities rely on social relations and informal networks. Private companies are small, with few permanent staff
and large variations in cash flows. These companies face various obstacles, including limited access to finance,
products that do not meet international standards, restrictive taxation, corruption, lack of dialogue between
public and private stakeholders and technical and financial partners, high transaction costs and basic
infrastructure that is well below the necessary standard. The World Bank’s Doing Business 2012 report ranks
Mali 146th out of 183 economies. For labour market legislation, the World Economic Forum ranks Mali 82nd out
of 139 economies in its employment rigidity index and 100th for wage determination flexibility. These rankings
reflect the difficulties and high cost of hiring and firing in Mali. Private land ownership is permitted with few
restrictions but the relative freedom of access to land is limited by poor management of the land register and
the land registration procedure.
Nevertheless, improvements were made in 2011. The Doing Business report classifies Mali as the WAEMU
member countrywith the best record for business climate reform. As regards commercial and industrial law,
Mali’s ranking has improved greatly, according to the report. It has climbed, notably, from 152nd to 126th
place in the rankings for ease of obtainment of credit. Mali has also improved by making it easier to start up a
business. The process now requires four procedures and takes eight days, although both these figures remain
high compared to those of Senegal, where setting up a company involves three procedures and takes just five
days.
In 2011, the government adopted a new investment code that should make the private sector more viable and
better able to contribute to economic growth. The technical and financial partners who are providing support
for the Malian financial sector, who are being headed in 2012 by the African Development Bank (AfDB), also
plan to carry out a study profiling the country's private sector with the aim of remedying the current deficit of
information about it.
Financial Sector
Financial stability is underpinned by the prudential surveillance of the WAEMU Banking Commission, which
conducts regular, on-the-spot checks of the country’s financial institutions. Mali shares an exchange-rate
mechanism with the other WAEMU member states that imposes no restrictions on payments and transfers
connected with current international transactions. Malian banks comply with WAEMU directives on increasing
the minimum capital requirement for banks and other financial institutions, which stood at XOF 10 billion on
31 December 2012. The financial system has sufficient liquidity but most local banks only have short-term
resources, which is not conducive to long-term financing for major projects. Credits to the economy stand at
around 13% of GDP, while deposits stand at around 21%. Lending rates have fallen in recent years but are
slightly above the WAEMU average of 8%. The quality of banks’ portfolios has improved but remains
unsatisfactory. Bad debt makes up 10% of outstanding loans but is only 52% covered by provisions.
Access to financial services remains limited, with only 10% of Malian companies having obtained credit to
finance their activities. This limited access to credit is generally justified by the incapacity of companies to offer
the banks adequate guarantees, the complexity of the loan process, the absence of a real need for financing
among businesses and the high cost of credit. In May 2011, however, the government responded by approving
the feasibility studies carried out into the creation of a private-sector guarantee fund (FGSP) and a capital-stock
investment company (SICR). The FGSP aims to provide banks with guarantees for medium and long term loans
(2‑7 years) contracted by small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), while the SICR aims to take shareholdings
in companies. In addition, the African Development Bank (AfDB) approved a credit line for the Malian Solidarity
Bank (BMS) to contribute to promoting SMEs and small and medium-sized industries (SMIs). Finally, in 2011 the
government issued a tender call for an investment bank and a law firm to advise it on the privatisation of the
Malian housing bank BHM, which is to be carried out in 2012.
Public Sector Management, Institutions & Reform
Mali continued to implement its reform policies to modernise the public administration, decentralise government
and modernise the management of public finances. In particular it has created an institutional development
programme (PDI), a national decentralisation policy, and an action plan to improve and modernise public
finances (PAGAM/GFP).
The PDI programme has gradually made public services more effective by using modern management methods
and procedures and strengthening communication and relations between users and the administration.
However, the process of preparing and validating the results-based national management policy fell behind
African Economic Outlook 2012
10 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
schedule in 2011. With regard to competition and privatisation, the BHM, national railway company CTF and
national textiles company CMDT have all been restructured. A third mobile-phone licence has also been
awarded.
On the railways, the percentage of freight carried by rail in the Bamako-Dakar corridoor fell to less than 20% in
2011. The receivership plan devised by the Malian and Senegalese governments after operator Transrail filed
for bankruptcy in 2009 was approved in December 2011. The plan envisages a lease arrangement and the
creation of a joint-assets company between the two countries. The rapid implementation of this plan in 2012
will enable rail traffic to continue uninterrupted and open up funding for rail infrastructure. In the cotton sector,
there was no significant progress in 2011 in the restructuring of state cotton company CMDT and the
government appears to be reconsidering its earlier plans to privatise the company. In the mobile telephony
sector, a consortium formed by Planor and Monaco Telecom won the third licence with an EUR 84 million bid.
The government continued with its devolution and decentralisation plans in 2011, drawing up and implementing
three-year plans to transfer resources and devolve powers and setting up support cells in several ministerial
departments to provide assistance with the decentralisation and devolution process. Also, the distribution of
income and expenditure between the state and local and regional authorities has been clearly defined. A law
passed on 15 July 2011 determines the rules for distributing tax revenue collected by each municipality,
cercle(sub-region) and region. However, the level of decentralisation of budget allocations (the share of the
state budget spent by regional authorities) remains low at about 14% in 2011, and only two ministries,
education and health, have begun to transfer resources to local and regional authorities.
The government is pursuing its three-year action plan set out in the tax-reform strategy it adopted in December
2010. The plan aims to modernise and simplify tax laws and move them into line them with WAEMU directives.
The government is not making sufficient progress in rolling out the PNTF national fiscal-transition programme.
Mali’s tax burden stood at around 14.3% of GDP in 2011 and the IMF is projecting this to increase by half a
percentage point per year. This means the country will not achieve the 17% target set by the WAEMU for 2013.
Progress has been made in connecting expenditure services at central and decentralised level, thus enabling
information to travel more easily and more reliably, reducing the time it takes to complete administrative
procedures, improving the quality, presentation and timeliness of budget documents, and providing real-time
information regarding execution of the State budget. Similarly, there have been continued efforts to extend the
medium-term expenditure frameworks (MTEFs) to all ministerial departments to translate medium-term sectoral
strategies into budgetary terms in a way that is consistent with the Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy
Paper (GPRSP). The number of MTEFs rose from 24 to 28 in 2011.
Regarding internal budget control, a-priori financial control of public spending has improved, reaching a level of
96% in 2011, while the effectiveness of services provided began being monitored at the various reception
committees in April 2011, with the support of the national financial control directorate. Furthermore, the
government devised and approved a national internal budget control strategy in 2011. As regards external
budget control, in 2011 the government passed a law validating public accounts for the period from 1960 to
1991. Work is under way to expedite approval of state accounts for the period from 1992 to 2008. Moreover,
throughout 2011, the government hired additional staff for the accounts section of the Supreme Court pending
the opening of the Court of Auditors.
Natural Resource Management & Environment
Mali still faces enormous environmental challenges: desertification, deteriorating vegetation and soil cover,
silting up of the River Niger, lack of rainfall, loss of biodiversity and deterioration of living conditions. These
challenges will be exacerbated in the coming years by climate change and the pressure of human activity from
a, population growing at a rate of 3.6% a year. In 2011, efforts were made to better manage environmental and
climate problems and the situation should improve significantly in 2012/13 thanks to international funding to
help combat climate change. With the support of technical and financial partners, especially the African
Development Bank (AfDB), the government has drawn up a large-scale renewable energies development
programme (SREP) and an investment plan based on the national renewable energies strategy.
As part of its preparations for the new 2012‑17 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy, environmental and
climate problems have been mainstreamed so they are afforded better consideration. The environment and
sanitation ministry has drawn up a national policy and strategy for climate change and an action plan. The
agency for the environment and sustainable development was created in 2011 to support implementation of
national policies and programmes. Strategic environmental assessments were also made mandatory for new
sectoral programmes. In collaboration with partners including Sweden and the World Bank, several programmes
and projects are planned in 2012 to manage and monitor the use of natural resources. Norway and Germany set
up a technical-assistance project in 2011 to support Mali in defining a portfolio of projects eligible for the Clean
Development Mechanism (CDM).
African Economic Outlook 2012
11 | © AfDB, OECD, UNDP, UNECA
Political Context
After ten years under President Amadou Toumani Touré, just a few months before the end of his final term of
office, a military junta attempted a coup on 22 March 2012. The internal situation in 2011 was marked by
preparations for the referendum on constitutional reform and the presidential and legislative elections planned
for April 2012, but now Mali has been thrust back into political instability. The stated purpose of the junta was to
end the “incompetence” of the regime in its fight against armed Islamist groups that are prevalent in the north.
The security situation in the region became particularly worrying in 2011 as a result of the return of Malians
who had been in the Libyan army and the presence of terrorist groups affiliated to the Al-Qaeda Organisation in
the Islamic Maghreb.
A resurgence of insecurity was observed in January 2012, with armed attacks against Malian army camps which
resulted in heavy casualties, the displacement of local populations and demonstrations against Tuareg peoples in
cities across the country. More than 126 000 people have taken refuge abroad. However, the army does not
seem to have the resources and capacity to cope with the size of the country and the mobility of the rebels.
Continued political stability depends on factors such as the security situation in the north of the country, political
transition and the organisation of new presidential elections.
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Social Context & Human Development
Building Human Resources
One of the major social challenges for Mali is the growing population. The current growth rate is 3.6%, and the
fertility rate is 6.6 children per woman. In addition, the population is young, with 60% aged under 25. The
contraceptive prevalence rate (6.2% in 2006) is the lowest in West Africa. This could result in unsustainable
levels of social spending in the medium and long term. Mali should begin its demographic transition by reducing
the fertility rate and addressing population issues in its development policies and programmes.
The country remains on track to achieve the Millennium Development Goal (MDG) for primary-school
enrolment by 2015. The gross enrolment rate (GER) for lower secondary education was 80.4% in 2011 (87.8%
for boys and 73.2% for girls). The gross admission rate was estimated at 69.5% in 2011 (74.9% for boys and
64.3% for girls). The gross completion rate for the first cycle of secondary school was estimated at 57.1% in
2011 (63.8% for boys and 50.4% for girls). However, there are still huge regional disparities. Literacy is much
higher in urban areas (53.2%) than in rural areas (21.6%). Education was allocated 35.61% of the 2011 budget.
Mali could also achieve the MDG in the fight against HIV/AIDS by 2015, but the other health objectives seem out
of reach despite the significant improvements recorded. Access to treatment has improved, with 31 000 patients
(87% of the goal set) receiving anti-retroviral drugs in 2010, up from just 9 750 in 2007. Regarding the MDG for
infant and child mortality, between 2001 and 2006 vaccination coverage for children aged 12 to 23 months rose
from 61.9% to 72%, infant mortality fell from 113.4 per thousand to 95.8 per thousand, and child mortality fell
from 229.1 per thousand to 190 per thousand. During the same period, the maternal mortality rate fell from
582 to 464 deaths per 100 000 births. The 2011 budget allocated 12.03% of its resources to health.
Poverty Reduction, Social Protection & Labour
The ELIM household survey conducted in 2010 improved knowledge of the poor, their socio-economic
characteristics and the access they have to services. The survey has provided useful data for defining and
monitoring progress made towards achieving the MDGs and has enabled targets to be set in national strategies
and programmes such as the PRODESS and PRODEC health and education programmes. The 2012‑17 Growth
and Poverty Reduction Strategy adopted in December 2011 envisages clearly defined action to help poor
people and vulnerable groups.
Poverty persists, especially in rural areas, despite the country’s good economic performance. The proportion
affected by income poverty, defined using a poverty threshold in real terms of XOF 165 431 in 2010, dropped
from 47.4% in 2006 to 43.6% in 2010. But income poverty remains high in rural areas at 51%. It therefore
seems unlikely that Mali will achieve the MDG of reducing poverty by half by 2015. Analysis of the incidence of
income poverty by socio-economic group shows that farmers – who make up 62% of the population – are worst
affected, with a poverty rate of 57%. The other poorest members of society are unemployed households (29%
poverty incidence), self-employed people (23%) and private-sector employees (19%).
Gender Equality
Inequality and gender discrimination still abound in Mali. Women remain grossly under-represented in decisionmaking bodies: only 10% of Malian members of parliament are women and there is only one woman among the
country’s 49 district prefects. In total, only 8.66% of people elected for office are female and only 6 of the
703 municipalities have a mayoress. The literacy rate also varies by gender and by the standard of living of the
household, and is twice as high among women (41.6%) than among men (18.8%).
Mali has spent many years producing a personal and family code. The first document was adopted by the
National Assembly in August 2009, but, following opposition from the Islamic High Council and the Association of
Young Muslims, the President of the Republic returned the document to the National Assembly for a second
reading. All sectors of society were consulted, including religious leaders, civil society organisations, women’s
groups, and representatives of the National Assembly and the government. After two years of discussions, a
new document was submitted to parliament and adopted in December 2011.
The new code paves the way for better protection of women and children by: raising the marriageable age for
girls from 15 to 16 and allowing appeals where the age requirement has been waived; improving the protection
of women in certain cases where the husband is not fulfilling his duties, in which case he may lose his status as
head of the household; enhancing the protection of women in the countryside by recognising religious marriage;
and making it illegal to violate somebody’s physical integrity, even if it is through a religious or customary act
such as female circumcision, if it is harmful to their health. However, the text adopted in late 2011 is a step
backwards from the version passed by the National Assembly in August 2009, which, although it was never
applied, gave women greater protection and abolished many gender inequalities.
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Thematic analysis: Promoting Youth Employment
Youth unemployment is a critical problem in Mali. Almost 300 000 young people join the job market every year.
According to official estimates, unemployment affects 9.6% of the overall population. However, this rate masks
disparities by age, gender and place of residence. Unemployment is higher among 15‑39 year olds (between
7.6% and 15.4%) than among 40‑64 year olds (between 1.7% and 6.9%). Unemployment affects women
(58.8%) more than men. It is also higher in Bamako (27.3%) than in smaller towns and cities (14%) and rural
areas (6.6%). The main problem in rural areas is underemployment during the dry season. On average,
unemployment lasts five years and most unemployed people (81.5%) are young people looking for their first
job.
The scale of unemployment has many causes, including:
Poor economic growth: with average growth between 2005 and 2011 of just 5%, the Malian economy
creates very few jobs per year.
Rapid population growth: the rate of population growth is among the highest in the world, resulting in an
ever-expanding workforce.
A very young population: 49% of the population are under 15 and 30% are aged 15‑35.
Training that is not adapted to the employment available: the education system churns out too
many graduates in disciplines in which jobs are limited or non-existent (office management, accounting,
management and law, for example) but not enough suitably trained graduates in sectors offering more
employment and self-employment opportunities (such agriculture and forestry, industry and agro-industry,
mining , core construction professions and information and communication technologies).
The rural exodus: many young people from rural areas move to towns and cities temporarily or
permanently, inflating the number of jobseekers.
The poor absorptive capacity of the formal sector: private companies and the public administration employ
only 5% of the workforce, so that the overwhelming majority of the workforce have precarious, poorly paid
jobs in agriculture and the informal sector, which dominate the country’s economy. The urban informal
sector offers most jobs but these are often insecure and poorly paid.
With the support of the International Labour Office, the authorities adopted a national employment policy in
1998. This policy treats employment as an essential part of human development and an effective means to
combat poverty. It prioritises jobs for young people and has as its objectives: (i) to reduce unemployment and
underemployment by development activity, notably that which is labour intensive; (ii) to improve the supply of
labour by making training more suited to market needs; (iii) to increase demand for labour in urban and rural
areas through private-sector development; and (iv) to promote employment locally by taking regional
characteristics into account.
The national employment policy adopts a holistic approach that does not limit itself to using the benefits of
economic growth to promote employment but also proposes a series of innovative measures to facilitate the
integration of young people into production. These initiatives include:
The youth-employment programme (YEP), which is financed by the government with ILO technical
assistance. The two-phase programme (2004‑08 and 2011‑16) has enabled 4 000 young graduates to
benefit from professional-qualification courses between May 2005 and October 2009.
The national employment action programme for poverty reduction (PNA/ERP), which is also funded and
supported by the International Labour Office. Launched in 2003 for a seven-year period, the programme
has trained 300 home helpers and 91 young people through 21 workshops.
The PEJHIMO programme, funded by State resources generated by Heavily Indebted Poor Countries
initiative (HIPC) and the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg with technical assistance from the International
Labour Office, aims to integrate young people into employment by investing in labour-intensive work in
rural areas. Launched in 2005, it has created around 33 000 days of work through initiatives involving small
and medium-sized companies, as well as 150 new permanent posts.
The PAPESPRIM programme to promote private-sector employment, which is a five-year programme
initiated in 2008 and funded by the State and by Denmark. This programme has funded 14 studies by
national offices and provided 50 vocational-training scholarships.
The PAJE-Nieta project, funded by the state and the United States Agency for International Development
(USAID), which supports young entrepreneurs. This five-year project aims to enable the training of
12 000 young entrepreneurs.
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The ten-year PRODEFPE programme for the development of vocational training for employment, prepared
in 2011 for 2012‑21. Costing around XOF 1.660 trillion, the programme aims to strengthen the institutional
capacity to steer and manage vocational training, create and implement a national engineering capacity,
develop training in promising sectors, train human resources in promising sectors and facilitate the socioeconomic integration of young people and women.
Despite these initiatives, the results achieved in terms of youth employment are below expectations. The
government’s long-term solution to the unemployment crisis involves addressing the structural causes of
unemployment. The government must go beyond palliative measures and implement proactive policies aimed
at accelerating economic growth, sharply reducing population growth and training young people in sectors that
meet the needs of the economy.
Notes
1 Growth and Poverty Reduction Strategy Framework, CSCRP 2012-2017, 28 December 2011. http://www.mali-
apd.org/IMG/file/pdf/DOCUMENTS_CLES/1_CSCRP/2012_MALI_CSCRP_2012_2017_VF.pdf
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