Download The crisis began in the early fall of 1962. The cutter Rockaway got

The crisis began in the early fall of 1962. The cutter Rockaway got orders to proceed south out of New York. We arrived
on scene a few days later. The civilian world did not yet know.
On the evening of 22 October 1962, US Pres John F. Kennedy went on the air to announce the discovery of missiles in
Cuba. Additionally, loaded Russian ships were headed for Cuba. Hence, he announced a maritime blockade to prevent
further shipments of missiles and military equipment from arriving in that country. Kennedy also demanded that
Khrushchev dismantle and remove all missiles from Cuba.
The Rockaway was in place, in the blockade, along with numerous other ships. The American Navy, including the US
Coast Guard, in place across the Russians path creating the Cuban blockade – the “Cuban Missile Crisis.” Days passed.
The Russian ships came closer to the quarantine line. The ships stopped.
Would the Russian ships try to break the line or would they back off? For six terrifying days, the two superpowers
considered their options until on 28 October Khrushchev agreed to Kennedy's demands. The world had teetered on the
brink of war – possibly nuclear war. The Russians had blinked while we stood firm.
That’s the short story of the Cuban Missile Crisis but my story is more personal. I was an engineman stationed aboard
the Coast Guard Cutter the Rockaway (WAVP 377). My billet included operating the ship’s lifeboat at Special Sea Detail
and other shipboard emergencies.
Officially, this was not a declared conflict/war but for me this came ultra close to a combat mission. Here’s why:
Shortly after noon I got a call to meet on the mess deck. An ensign had assembled the group consisting of all the
Rockaway’s gunners mates, a boatswains mate, the ensign and myself. He advised that we were the “landing party”
should an invasion need to take place. There was silence from all assembled.
We knew some of what was happening – the blockade. I had gone up on deck, after a four hour watch as a throttleman
in “B” engineroom. You could see the line of American ships on spaced a few miles apart, on either side of us, all the
way to the horizon and beyond.
The ensign, after his silencing announcement, proceeded to provide details of what was expected of us – the landing
party - should we need to invade:
First, he told us, that the ship’s five inch guns will soften up the beach. Next we will launch the lifeboat with us as the
landing party- the ensign will lead us. We will have M-1 rifles and other small arms and plenty of ammunition. Other
details were provided.
Lastly, he asked if there were any questions. I raised my hand. I looked around and said, “Sir, if all of the gunners mates
are in the landing party, Who will operate the five inch gun?” He paused and then said, “I’ll have to get back to you.”
Now, more than fifty years later, I’m still waiting for that answer! And luckily we never had to invade Cuba – maybe the
failed Bay of Pigs fiasco an few months earlier was a lesson learned. For sure, the Russians backing off from our blockade
ended the crisis.
My story is not a negative about the Coast Guard, a little funny – Yes. It’s more of a quirk in planning. A note of humor in
an otherwise tense situation. I still laugh when I remember the look on that ensign’s face as he tried to answer my
question. Personally, I’m glad I never had to participate in any landing. The Guard has a long history of significant
combat participation.
Coast Guardsmen and their forefathers have fought in every conflict since the Constitution became the law of the land.
Coast Guardsmen operated the landing craft during invasions of WWII. One Guardsman won the Congressional Medal of
Honor. On the morning of 27 Sept., 1942, Signalman First Class Douglas a Munro organized a rescue mission that saved
500 Marines who were pinned down on the Guadalcanal beach . Munro, the first and only member of the U.S. Coast
Guard to receive the Medal of Honor, In his honor, the Coast Guard Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971.
There is a statue of Munro at the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well. Coast Guard-manned ships sank
at least 11 enemy submarines during WWII. During the Korean War (1950-53), the Coast Guard performed a variety of
tasks. The Coast Guard was asked to participate in the Vietnam War by the Army, Navy, and Air Force and performed a
variety of duties. At the outset of the military buildup in the mid-1960s, the Navy lacked shallow water craft needed for
inshore operations. To help fill this need, the Coast Guard sent 26 82-foot cutters to Vietnam.
Coast Guardsmen have also participated in the country's most recent conflicts. Three were assigned to U.S. forces in
Operation Just Cause, the liberation of Panama in 1989. With the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on 1 August 1990, the Coast
Guard was again called to perform military duties on a large scale. Currently, many are serving in Iraq patrolling the
Straits of Hormuz. Last year CWO Jack Brown received the Bronze Star Medal for his life saving efforts, while wounded,
during a rocket attack on the Iraqi embassy.
Our distinguished combat service has and will no doubt continue. I’m proud to be a Coasty.
References
•
•
•
•
•
•
Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships
Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center
United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Rockaway
United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Mackinac, 1949 WHEC-371
Gardiner, Robert. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1982, Part I: The Western Powers. Annapolis,
Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. ISBN 0-80721-418-9.
United States Coast Guard at War by Robert Scheina Historian's Office:
About the author:
Stephen Van Rensselaer served on active duty in the U.S. Coast Guard from September 1960 until September 1964.
Initial duty was at Field Testing and Development – Curtis Bay, MD. He served aboard the cutter Rockaway from April
1962 until September 1963 as an EN3 and EN2. He transferred to Group New York aboard a 65 footer. In August of 1964
watched as the 82 footer and crew from Group New York steamed up the Hudson River and was lifted aboard a freighter
to be carried to Vietnam.
Rockaway WAVP 377
USCGC Rockaway (WAVP-377, WAGO-377, WHEC-377, WOLE-377) sometime before the Coast Guard's 1967 adoption of the "racing
stripe" markings on its ships.
Construction and U.S. Navy &U.S. Coast Guard service
Name: USCGC Rockaway
Namesake: Rockaway Inlet, on Long Island, New York, at the entrance to New York Bay
Builder: Associated Shipbuilders, Inc., Seattle, Washington
Laid down: 30 June 1941
Launched: 14 February 1942
Completed: January 1943
Acquired: Loaned by U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 24 December 1948
Transferred permanently from U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 26 September 1966
Commissioned: 10 January 1949
Decommissioned: 29 January 1972[1]
Reclassified: Oceanographic vessel, WAGO-377, 1965
High endurance cutter, WHEC-377, 1 May 1966
Offshore law enforcement vessel, WOLE-377, 23 September 1971
Struck: 26 September 1966 (from Navy List)
Fate: Sold for scrapping 21 October 1972
Notes: Served as United States Navy seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29) 1943-1946
General characteristics
Class and type: Casco-class cutter
Displacement: 2,390 tons (full load) in 1967
Length: 310 ft 7.75 in (94.685 m) overall; 300 ft 0 in (91.4 m) between perpendiculars
Beam: 41 ft 2.375 in (12.5571 m) maximum
Draft: 13 ft 1 in (4.0 m) maximum aft at full load in 1967
Installed power: 6,080 horsepower (4.54 MW)
Propulsion: Fairbanks-Morse direct-reversing diesel engines, two shafts; 166,430 gallons of fuel
Speed: 18.2 knots (maximum sustained) in 1967
13.2 knots (economic) in 1967
Range: 9,902 nautical miles (18,339 kilometers) at 18.2 knots in 1967
18,289 nautical miles (33,871 kilometers) at 13.2 knots in 1967
Complement: In 1967: 151 (10 officers, 3 warrant officers, 138 enlisted personnel)
Sensors and
processing systems: Radars in 1967 (one each): SPS-23, SPS-29D
Sonar in 1967: SQS-1
Armament: In 1967: 2 x 81-millimeter Mark 2 mortars
2 x .50-caliber (12.7-millimeter) Mark 2 machine guns
2 x Mark 32 Mod 5
Note:
As per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at
http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September 1972.
OR
Construction and U.S. Navy &U.S. Coast Guard service
Rockaway began life as the United States Navy Barnegat-class seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29). She
was laid down on 30 June 1941 by Associated Shipbuilders, Inc. at Seattle, Washington, launched on 14
February 1942, and commissioned into the U.S. Navy on 6 January 1943. She operated primarily in the Atlantic
Ocean during World War II. She began conversion to a press information ship, redesignated AG-123, in July
1945 in anticipation of the invasion of Japan scheduled for 1945-1946,, but this was cancelled and she was
converted back into a seaplane tender when the war ended without the invasion being necessary. She was
decommissioned on 21 March 1946 and placed in reserve in the Atlantic Reserve Fleet at Orange, Texas.
Transferred to the United States Coast Guard
Barnegat-class ships were very reliable and seaworthy and had good habitability, and the Coast Guard viewed
them as ideal for ocean station duty, in which they would perform weather reporting and search and rescue
tasks, once they were modified by having a balloon shelter added aft and having oceanographic equipment, an
oceanographic winch, and a hydrographic winch installed.
The U.S. Navy loaned Rockaway to the Coast Guard on 24 December 1948. After undergoing conversion for
use as a weather-reporting ship, she was commissioned into the Coast Guard service as USCGC Rockaway
(WAVP-377) on 10 January 1949.
U.S. Coast Guard service
Rockaway was stationed at Staten Island in New York City, which remained her home port throughout her
Coast Guard career. Her primary duty was to serve on ocean stations in the Atlantic Ocean to gather
meteorological data. While on duty in one of these stations, she was required to patrol a 210-square-mile (544square-kilometer) area for three weeks at a time, leaving the area only when physically relieved by another
Coast Guard cutter or in the case of a dire emergency. While on station, she acted as an aircraft check point at
the point of no return, a relay point for messages from ships and aircraft, as a source of the latest weather
information for passing aircraft, as a floating oceanographic laboratory, and as a search-and-rescue ship for
downed aircraft and vessels in distress, and engaged in law enforcement operations.
She took part in a number United States Coast Guard Academy cadet cruises inincluding 1963(with the author
participating) and 1965. Rockaway was reclassified as an "oceanographic ship" and redesignated as WAGO-377
in 1965.
On 1 May 1966, Rockaway again was reclassified, this time as a high endurance cutter, and was redesignated
WHEC-377. On 26 September 1966 her period on loan to the Coast Guard ended when she was stricken from
the Navy List and transferred permanently to the Coast Guard.
On 23 September 1971, Rockaway was once again reclassified, this time as an off-shore law enforcement
vessel, and was redesignated WOLE-377. Rockaway was decommissioned on 29 January 1972[2] She was sold
for scrapping in October 1970 to BV Intershift of Rotterdam, the Netherlands.
About the author:
Stephen Van Rensselaer served on active duty in the U.S. Coast Guard from September 1960 until September 1964.
Initial duty was at Field Testing and Development – Curtis Bay, MD. He served aboard the cutter Rockaway from April
1962 until September 1963 as an EN3 and EN2. He transferred to Group New York aboard a 65 footer. In August of 1964
watched as the 82 footer and crew from Group New York steamed up the Hudson River and was lifted aboard a freighter
to be carried to Vietnam.
In September 1958, Rockaway salvaged a U.S. Navy seaplane 180 nautical miles (333 kilometers) from
Bermuda. In December 1964, she rescued four people from the merchant ship Smith Voyager.
On 24 February 1966, Rockaway stood by the British merchant ship Parthia until a commercial tug arrived to
assist Parthia.
From 20 January 1967 to 30 March 1967, Rockaway conducted an "Eastern Tropical Pacific Cruise" in the
Pacific off Mexico, where she undertook an oceanographic survey. From November 1967 through January
1968, she conducted an oceanographic survey off Norfolk, Virginia. She was involved in more oceanographic
surveys over the Mid-Atlantic Shelf from 6 May 1968 to 12 May 1968 and again from 11 July 1968 to 18 July
1968.
From 14 January 1969 to 19 January 1969, she conducted a survival craft drift project 159 nautical miles (294
kilometers) east of the Chesapeake Bay. In August 1969, she conducted extensive oceanographic work
associated with the Barbados Oceanographic and Meteorological Experiment. She then conducted more
oceanographic surveys from Nova Scotia, Canada, to Cape Hatteras, North Carolina, from 20 October 1969 to
23 November 1969, over the Mid-Atlantic Outer Continental Margin from 30 March 1970 to 5 April 1970, from
Nova Scotia to Cape Hatteras between 19 May 1970 and 14 June 1970, and near the Grand Banks of
Newfoundland between 6 October 1970 and 21 October 1970. In November 1970, she surveyed a nerve-gas
dump site.
Rockaway conducted a fisheries research cruise from Nova Scotia to Cape Hatteras between 2 March 1971 and
3 April 1971. Another research cruise took her back to the Grand Banks of Newfoundland in May 1971. From
15 July 1971 to 18 September 1971, she studied the influence of Mediterranean effluent upon the Atlantic
Ocean.
Decommissioning and disposal
Notes
1. ^ Per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at
http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September
1972.
2. ^ Per the United States Coast Guard Historian's Office (at
http://www.uscg.mil/history/webcutters/Rockaway_1948.asp). However, NavSource.org (at
http://www.navsource.org/archives/09/43/4329.htm) places her decommissioning date on 21 September
1972.
References


Dictionary of American Naval Fighting Ships..
NavSource Online: Service Ship Photo Archive AVP-29 / AG-123 Rockaway WAGO / WHEC /
WOLE-377 Rockaway
 Department of the Navy Naval Historical Center: Online Library of Selected Images: U.S. Navy Ships:
USS Rockaway (AVP-29), 1943-1948
 United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Rockaway, 1948 AVP / WAVP / WHEC / WAGO /
WOLE-377 Radio call sign: NBTM
 United States Coast Guard Historian's Office: Mackinac, 1949 WHEC-371
 Gardiner, Robert. Conway's All the World's Fighting Ships 1947-1982, Part I: The Western Powers.
Annapolis, Maryland: Naval Institute Press, 1983. ISBN 0-80721-418-9.



THE COAST GUARD AT WAR By Robert Scheina
THE COAST GUARD AT WAR By Robert Scheina

See also

USS Rockaway (AVP-29)
Name: USCGC Rockaway
Namesake: Rockaway Inlet, on Long Island, New York, at the entrance to New York Bay
Builder: Associated Shipbuilders, Inc., Seattle, Washington
Laid down: 30 June 1941
Launched: 14 February 1942
Completed: January 1943
Acquired: Loaned by U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 24 December 1948
Transferred permanently from U.S. Navy to U.S. Coast Guard 26 September 1966
Commissioned: 10 January 1949
Decommissioned: 29 January 1972[1]
Reclassified: Oceanographic vessel, WAGO-377, 1965
High endurance cutter, WHEC-377, 1 May 1966
Offshore law enforcement vessel, WOLE-377, 23 September 1971
Struck: 26 September 1966 (from Navy List)
Fate: Sold for scrapping 21 October 1972
Notes: Served as United States Navy seaplane tender USS Rockaway (AVP-29) 1943-1946
General characteristics
Class and type: Casco-class cutter
Displacement: 2,390 tons (full load) in 1967
Length: 310 ft 7.75 in (94.685 m) overall; 300 ft 0 in (91.4 m) between perpendiculars
Beam: 41 ft 2.375 in (12.5571 m) maximum
Draft: 13 ft 1 in (4.0 m) maximum aft at full load in 1967
Installed power: 6,080 horsepower (4.54 MW)
Propulsion: Fairbanks-Morse direct-reversing diesel engines, two shafts; 166,430 gallons of fuel
Speed: 18.2 knots (maximum sustained) in 1967
13.2 knots (economic) in 1967
Range: 9,902 nautical miles (18,339 kilometers) at 18.2 knots in 1967
18,289 nautical miles (33,871 kilometers) at 13.2 knots in 1967
Complement: In 1967: 151 (10 officers, 3 warrant officers, 138 enlisted personnel)
Sensors and
processing systems: Radars in 1967 (one each): SPS-23, SPS-29D
Sonar in 1967: SQS-1
Armament: In 1967: 2 x 81-millimeter Mark 2 mortars
2 x .50-caliber (12.7-millimeter) Mark 2 machine guns
2 x Mark 32 Mod 5
Description: Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962-One of the greatest showdowns between West and East during the
long struggle known as the Cold War was the Cuban Missile Crisis. Alarmed by the placement of nuclear armed missiles
by the Soviet Union in Cuba, Presi)
Cuban missile crisis (1962). In May 1960, Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev promised military assistance to
the beleaguered Castro regime in Cuba. Two years later, he saw that the USSR's relations with Cuba also
represented a unique opportunity to offset the threat posed to Moscow by US nuclear missiles based in Turkey.
In addition to aircraft, air defence systems, armoured vehicles, and troops, Khrushchev offered a selection of
nuclear-armed medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles. Castro accepted the offer and within months
the USA and the USSR were on the verge of all-out nuclear war. On 14 October 1962, following indications of
increased military activity on Cuba and a growing Soviet presence, an American U-2 aircraft photographed
missile sites in western Cuba. Subsequent intelligence indicated that the missiles—SS-4 and SS-5, both with 1
megaton warheads—had the ability to reach almost the entire continental USA, including every Strategic Air
Command base. On 22 October 1962, after intense debate in the Executive Committee (ExComm) of the
National Security Council, during which the possibilities of aerial bombardment or invasion of Cuba were
discussed, US Pres John Kennedy announced a maritime blockade to prevent further shipments of missiles and
military equipment. Kennedy also demanded that Khrushchev dismantle and remove all missiles from Cuba.
For six terrifying days, the two superpowers considered their options until on 28 October Khrushchev agreed to
Kennedy's demands. In return, the USA agreed never to invade Cuba and (secretly) to remove its missiles from
Turkey.
— John P. Campbell
US Military History Companion: Cuban Missile Crisis
Top
Home > Library > History, Politics & Society > US Military History Companion
(1962–63)
On 15 October, 1962, U.S. intelligence discovered Soviet strategic nuclear missile bases under construction in
Cuba, leading to the most dramatic and dangerous crisis of the nuclear age. After a week of secret deliberation
with a group of advisers (the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm), President
John F. Kennedy demanded that the missiles be withdrawn and imposed a naval ―quarantine‖ on shipments of
―offensive‖ weapons to Cuba. Kennedy ordered a massive redeployment of U.S. forces to the Caribbean and
placed the Strategic Air Command (SAC) on heightened alert.
Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev was furious at what he considered Kennedy's flagrant interference in
Soviet‐Cuban affairs and his violation of freedom of navigation. But by the time the quarantine took effect on
the morning of 24 October—after a unanimous endorsement by the Organization of American States—
Khrushchev ordered Soviet ships not to challenge the blockade. For several days a settlement proved elusive
and pressure built for more decisive action.
Neither Kennedy nor Khrushchev wanted to risk nuclear war over the issue, and both became increasingly
concerned that an accident or inadvertent military action might trigger escalation. An apparent break in the
tension came on 26 October, when, in a rambling, emotional letter, Khrushchev offered to withdraw the missiles
in return for a U.S. pledge not to invade Cuba. But in a second, tougher letter received the following morning,
Khrushchev demanded that Kennedy withdraw analogous Jupiter missiles from Turkey (deployed under the
aegis of NATO). Most of Kennedy's advisers argued strongly against this, on the ground that it would be
interpreted by the Soviets as evidence of American weakness, and by NATO as betrayal of an ally. Kennedy
decided to ignore Khrushchev's latest demand and accept his earlier offer.
As the ExComm deliberated on 27 October, word reached the White House that an American U‐2
reconnaissance plane had been shot down over Cuba, and that another had inadvertently strayed over Siberian
air space, narrowly avoiding a similar fate. Kennedy resolved to bring the crisis to an end. Ignoring the
ExComm's advice, he secretly agreed that the United States would withdraw its missiles from Turkey ―within a
few months‖ as a private quid pro quo to a UN‐verified withdrawal of Soviet missiles from Cuba. Kennedy
would also pledge publicly not to invade Cuba. Khrushchev accepted, and on 28 October the acute phase of the
crisis came to an end.
Castro, feeling betrayed by his Soviet patron, refused to allow United Nations inspectors on Cuban soil to verify
the withdrawal. But satisfied by aerial photography that the Soviets had withdrawn the weapons the United
States considered offensive, Kennedy issued a proclamation terminating the quarantine on 21 November.
The causes of the crisis have long been debated. Khrushchev conceived the deployment in the late spring of
1962, after a hasty and uncritical decision‐making process involving only a small group of advisers. His goals
appear to have been to deter a feared American invasion of Cuba; to redress the United States's massive
superiority in strategic nuclear weapons, publicly revealed by the United States in October 1961, exploding the
myth of a ―missile gap‖ favoring the Soviet Union; and less importantly, to reciprocate the Jupiter deployment
in Turkey.
The crisis provides textbook illustrations of important misperceptions and miscalculations. The U.S.
government had calculated that the Soviet Union would not deploy nuclear weapons to Cuba because such a
move would be inconsistent with past Soviet behavior, and because it seemed obvious that it would trigger a
major confrontation. The Kennedy administration also failed to appreciate the extent to which the public
demolition of the missile gap myth heightened the Soviets' sense of vulnerability; the strength of Soviet and
Cuban fears of a U.S. invasion of Cuba (heightened by the abortive Bay of Pigs invasion of the previous year);
and the strength and sincerity of the Soviet view that if the United States had the right to deploy missiles in
Turkey, the Soviet Union had the right to deploy missiles in Cuba. Consequently, Kennedy failed to deter the
move in a timely fashion, issuing stern warnings against it only in September 1962, when the secret deployment
was well underway.
Similarly, Khrushchev grossly overestimated the willingness of Kennedy and the American people to tolerate a
major disruption in the hemispheric status quo; under estimated the likelihood that American intelligence would
discover the missiles prematurely; and failed to appreciate that the secrecy and deception surrounding the
deployment would inflame American passions. Consequently, Khrushchev underestimated the risks of the
deployment.
Although scholars differ in their assessment, some consider the Cuban Missile Crisis a classic case of prudent
crisis management. Kennedy and Khrushchev prevented the conflict from escalating while they sought and
found a mutually satisfactory solution. They did so by avoiding irreversible steps, curtailing unwarranted
bluster, and avoiding backing each other into a corner. Other scholars have criticized the handling of the crisis
as being too timid or too reckless. Kennedy's critics on the right lament his unwillingness to seize the
opportunity to destroy Castro; his critics on the other side of the spectrum condemn his willingness to risk
nuclear war merely to delay the inevitable—the vulnerability of the American homeland to Soviet nuclear
weapons. Hard‐liners in the Soviet military severely criticized Khrushchev for yielding to U.S. pressure. New
information on intelligence failures, command and control breakdowns, and near accidents suggest that both
leaders' fears of uncertainty, misperception, misjudgment, accident, and unauthorized military action provided a
critical degree of caution and circumspection that prevented the crisis from escalating even further.
Paradoxically, the Cuban Missile Crisis led to an immediate improvement in U.S.‐Soviet relations. A series of
agreements intended to restrain the arms race and improve crisis stability followed, most notably the Hot‐Line
Agreement and Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963. Over the following decades, the superpowers crafted a modus
vivendi designed to prevent a similar occurrence whereby the Soviet Union refrained from deploying military
equipment with offensive capabilities to Cuba, and the United States acquiesced in a Communist‐controlled
Cuba with close ties to the USSR.
[See also Arms Control and Disarmament; Cold War: External Course; Cold War: Changing Interpretations;
U‐2 Spy Planes.]
Bibliography

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


Raymond L. Garthoff, Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1987; rev. ed. 1989.
James G. Blight, Bruce J. Allyn, and David A. Welch, Cuba on the Brink: Castro, the Missile Crisis,
and the Soviet Collapse, 1993.
James G. Blight, and David A. Welch, Risking ‗The Destruction of Nations': Lessons of the Cuban
Missile Crisis for New and Aspiring Nuclear States, Security Studies, 4 (Summer 1994), pp. 811–50.
Anatoli I. Gribkov, and William Y. Smith, Operation Anadyr: U.S. and Soviet Generals Recount the
Cuban Missile Crisis, 1994.
Richard Ned Lebow and Janice Gross Stein, We All Lost the Cold War, 1994.
Ernest R. May and Philip D. Zelikow, Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1997.
James G. Blight and David A. Welch, eds., Intelligence and the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1998
……………………………………….
The Cuban Missile Crisis of October 1962 is generally regarded as the most dangerous moment of the Cold
War, one in which the world moved perceptibly close to nuclear conflict between the superpowers.
In the period after Fidel Castro's successful revolution in Cuba, 1959, the Americans considered various plans
to restore an anti-Communist government. In April 1961 these plans culminated in the unsuccessful Bay of Pigs
invasion which the American government authorized and supported. This was followed by a build-up of Soviet
forces in Cuba. Throughout 1962 the issue of Cuba caused difficult relations between the superpowers, already
tense as a result of the Berlin Wall crisis of the previous year. The Americans publicly signalled that they would
not tolerate the Soviets placing ‗offensive‘ nuclear missiles in Cuba, which lay only about one hundred miles
from the coast of Florida. Nikita Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, appeared to understand and to comply with this
demand. President Kennedy stated on 13 September that if Cuba were to become an offensive military base then
he would take whatever steps were necessary to protect American security. During September the first missiles
and the equipment to build the launchers arrived in Cuba.
On 14 October photographs from U2 aircraft revealed that medium-range missiles were being installed and on
16 October the Executive Committee of the National Security Council (ExCom) held the first of its meetings to
resolve what the American government regarded as a direct threat to its security. President Kennedy announced
on television the detection of the missiles, demanded their removal, and the ExCom went into semi-permanent
session to consider the next American steps. A variety of strategies was considered, including doing nothing
(which was quickly dismissed), various forms of diplomatic action (which ran the risk of leading to negotiation
and hence counter-concessions by the Americans) over the missiles' removal, invasion, an air strike against the
missiles, and a blockade. Kennedy initially favoured military action of some sort and the possibility of invasion
and air strike was held in reserve throughout the crisis. However, a blockade to prevent further missiles
reaching Cuba emerged as the preferred solution. A blockade, accompanied by demands for the removal of the
existing missiles, offered various advantages. It demonstrated American resolve and willingness to use military
force, it capitalized on America's local naval superiority, it gave time for Khrushchev to back down, and it
threw back onto him the difficult next step of escalating further the crisis if he were not to comply. The
ultimatum, in short, offered the ‗last clear chance‘ to avoid an uncontrollable confrontation which might
probably end in nuclear war.
At first Khrushchev appeared reluctant to comply. He made a good deal both of the American threat to Cuba's
integrity and the deployment of American medium-range missiles in Turkey. Kennedy was reluctant to make
any deal which traded the Turkish for the Cuban missiles, though he personally had ordered the removal of the
missiles from Turkey several months earlier on the grounds that they were unnecessary to American security
and provocative to the Soviet Union. The imposition of the American blockade went ahead and the risks of
incidents between the two naval forces became apparent.
In the days after 16 October the tension increased and the two states appeared to be moving to war as the
Soviets showed no willingness to back down. On 26 October the Americans received in secret what they
interpreted as a personal letter from Khrushchev which offered the possibility of a solution. The letter, in effect,
offered to remove the missiles in return for the Americans removing the blockade and agreeing not to invade
Cuba. The following day Khrushchev sent a public letter which was both more belligerent in tone and which
demanded the removal of the missiles from Turkey in return for removal of the missiles from Cuba. The
Americans were adamant that such a deal was unacceptable, moreover the tone of the letter suggested to them
that Khrushchev might have lost control within the Presidium to more hawkish elements. The same day Soviet
surface-to-air missiles in Cuba shot down an American plane. American military action appeared imminent. At
that point Robert Kennedy, brother of the President, suggested that the Americans agree to Khrushchev's first
(secret) letter, publicize the ‗agreement‘, and in that way attempt to lure Khrushchev into acceptance—making
clear at the same time that the burden of failure and responsibility for war would fall onto Khrushchev if he
failed to accept.
The following day the crisis ended on these terms. The Americans had secured a great diplomatic victory,
though by running enormous risks, and Kennedy's prestige stood at its new peak. The Soviets got much less out
of the crisis, though they were able to share public credit for the resolution of the crisis. However, they had got
the American promise not to invade Cuba and, some time later, they saw the Americans remove their mediumrange missiles not merely from Turkey but from Europe as a whole. The Soviet withdrawal appears to have
fatally undermined Khrushchev's prestige within the Presidium and to have led to his overthrow two years later.
The Americans consolidated their leadership within NATO which had been threatened by their inability to
prevent the Soviet gains in Berlin in 1961.
The successful resolution of the crisis led to an immediate improvement in superpower relations. The ‗hot line‘
was installed to give direct communications between the leaderships in Washington and Moscow, and in 1963
the two powers, with Britain playing an important minor role, went on to conclude the Partial Test Ban Treaty
which outlawed nuclear testing in the atmosphere. Above all, the mutual realization of how close the world had
come to war led the two superpowers to give renewed attention to their doctrines of nuclear deterrence. In the
West the missile crisis was taken as a paradigm case of a new science or art of ‗crisis management‘, and the
decision-making processes within ExCom were analysed in order to learn the ‗rules‘ or conventions of the new
science. In particular the importance of manipulating risk, or brinkmanship, emerged as a key element in
coercive diplomacy—using the risk of war to push the opponent into backing down—together with the equal
importance of allowing the opponent a last clear chance to avoid uncontrollable escalation. Kennedy himself
laid great emphasis on finding terms to offer to Khrushchev that would not be so humiliating that in fact he
would decline to take them.
— Peter Byrd
Britannica Concise Encyclopedia: Cuban missile crisis
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(1962) Major confrontation between the U.S. and the Soviet Union over the presence of Soviet nuclear missiles
in Cuba. In October 1962 a U.S. spy plane detected a ballistic missile on a launching site in Cuba. Pres. John F.
Kennedy placed a naval blockade around the island, and for several days the U.S. and the Soviet Union hovered
on the brink of war. Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev finally agreed to remove the missiles in return for a
secret commitment from the U.S. to withdraw its own missiles from Turkey and to never invade Cuba. The
incident increased tensions during the Cold War and fueled the nuclear arms race between the two countries.
See also Fidel Castro.
For more information on Cuban missile crisis, visit Britannica.com.
US Government Guide: Cuban Missile Crisis
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The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in October 1962
that threatened all-out nuclear war. The dispute involved the Soviet placement of intermediate-range ballistic
missiles in Cuba.
On October 15, 1962, President John F. Kennedy received a briefing from intelligence advisers informing him
that the Soviet Union was installing intermediate-range ballistic missiles, medium-range bombers, in Cuba and
sending more than 10,000 troops to that island nation. The Executive Committee of the National Security
Council (known as Ex Comm) gave Kennedy four options. He could do nothing, use quiet diplomacy and not
publicize the presence of the missiles, take the weapons out with an air strike, or impose a naval blockade
against Cuba.
The ―do nothing‖ option was not feasible because Congress had already passed a joint resolution backing
military action if offensive weapons were found in Cuba, and Republicans were using the possibility of the
existence of such weapons against Democrats in the upcoming midterm (1962) congressional elections. Six
members of the Ex Comm favored an air strike. Kennedy decided against it because he thought American allies
in Europe would not approve until other alternatives had been tried. Attorney General Robert Kennedy argued
against bombing, calling the tactic ―a Pearl Harbor in reverse.‖ The State Department legal adviser argued that
bombing would be a violation of international law. Moreover, there were logistical concerns. The bombing
could not be done by a single ―surgical‖ strike; 500 or more missions would be required, destroying hundreds of
targets to prevent missiles or aircraft from attacking the United States. The magnitude of the operation would
lead to high casualties (provoking international outrage) and losses among the Soviet military, which might
bring on military action by its forces against the United States.
On October 17 Kennedy decided on a blockade, or ―quarantine,‖ as his advisers called it, because a blockade is
prohibited under international law unless a nation is at war. It would begin only with further shipments of
missiles but if necessary could expand to cover civilian goods. Implementing it in stages would permit time for
diplomacy to work. The quarantine would take place near American waters, where the United States had
overwhelming naval superiority.
On October 22 Kennedy gave a televised speech to the nation in which he called the presence of the missiles ―a
change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage and our commitments are ever
to be trusted again, by friend or foe.‖ He described the threat to the United States, saying that ―the purpose of
these bases can be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western Hemisphere.‖ He
announced the quarantine and warned the Soviet Union that ―it will be the policy of the United States
Government to regard any missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the Western Hemisphere as an
attack upon the United States by the Soviet Union, requiring a full retaliatory response.‖ Soviet ships attempting
to enter Cuban waters would be subject to search in international waters, and if Soviet ships tried to run the
blockade, Kennedy would order American ships to fire on them. The following day the Council of the
Organization of American States unanimously backed Kennedy's quarantine.
For several days Soviet ships headed toward the blockade line and work on missile sites in Cuba accelerated.
Then the ships stopped dead in the water, leading the members of the Ex Comm to think that the crisis was
over. But one ship started again toward Cuba, and a Soviet air-defense missile battery shot down an American
U-2 reconnaissance plane flying over Cuba, heating the crisis up again.
The crisis was finally resolved by negotiations between President Kennedy and Soviet chairman Nikita
Khrushchev. Khrushchev offered to remove the missiles if the President would pledge that the United States
would not invade Cuba. Kennedy hinted, through Attorney General Robert Kennedy, that if the Soviets ended
the crisis, the United States would remove intermediate-range missiles from bases in Turkey. On October 28,
the Soviets agreed to withdraw their missiles (and accepted verification by United Nations observers). The
United States ended the quarantine and pledged not to invade Cuba.
The Soviets withdrew 42 missiles and 42 long-range bombers as well as 5,000 troops. They also removed
weapons that the United States did not know were on the island: 9 short-range missiles equipped with nuclear
warheads, which would have been used in case of an American invasion, and 36 nuclear warheads for use on
the medium-range Soviet missiles. The short-range missiles could have been fired by local commanders,
without authorization from Moscow, a possibility of which the American side was completely unaware. After
the crisis ended, the Soviets kept in Cuba 37,000 of the 42,000 troops already there—a number far higher than
American estimates during the crisis—as well as fighter planes and antimissile weapons. (The size of the Soviet
commitments was not revealed to the American side until Soviet and American officials who had been involved
in the crisis held a series of meetings between 1987 and 1992.)
American intermediate-range Jupiter missiles were withdrawn from Turkey and Italy. Kennedy pledged not to
invade Cuba, but on December 14, 1962, he wrote to Khrushchev that the United States would require
―adequate assurances that all offensive weapons are removed from Cuba and are not reintroduced, and that
Cuba itself commits no aggressive acts against any of the nations of the Western Hemisphere.‖ He thus left
open the possibility that the United States might invade Cuba if these assurances were not received.
See also Kennedy, John F.; National Security Council
Sources


Graham Allison, Essence of Decision: The Cuban Missile Crisis (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971).
James Bright and David Welch, On the Brink: America and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis
(New York: Hill & Wang, 1991)
US History Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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Often regarded as the most dangerous crisis of the nuclear age, the Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was a
culmination of several Cold War tensions that had been building for some time. As a result of Cuban leader
Fidel Castro's turn toward Soviet-style communism in the early 1960s and the failed U.S.-sponsored Bay of
Pigs invasion of April 1961, U.S. Cuban relations were openly hostile by 1962. In April and May 1962, the
Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev decided to deploy Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just ninety miles from
Florida. In an agreement with Castro, the weapons would be shipped and installed secretly, so that when they
were operational, the West would be presented with a fait accompli.
During August and September 1962, U.S. intelligence found evidence of increasing Soviet military aid arriving
in Cuba, including advanced surface-to-air missile installations, IL-28 Beagle nuclear-capable bombers, and
several thousand Soviet "technicians." Refugee reports also suggested that Soviet ballistic missiles were on the
island. Although U.S. intelligence could not confirm these reports, critics of President John F. Kennedy's
administration used them in political attacks during the lead-up to the November congressional elections. In
response, in September, Kennedy publicly warned that if weapons designed for offensive use were detected in
Cuba, "the gravest consequences would arise."
On 14 October, a U-2 aerial reconnaissance flight over Cuba returned photographs of long, canvas-covered
objects. As American photo analysts pored over the photos during the next twenty-four hours and compared
their findings to their catalogs of known Soviet weaponry, it became clear that the Soviets were installing
medium-range ballistic missiles (MRBMs) and launch pads in Cuba, where they would be within easy striking
distance of much of the mainland United States.
Having just dealt with the civil rights riots at the University of Mississippi, the Kennedy administration again
found itself confronted with a crisis. The president was informed of the discovery on the morning of 16 October
and immediately convened a White House meeting of his top national security advisers, a body that later
became officially known as the Executive Committee of the National Security Council, or ExComm. Kennedy
decided not to confront the Soviets until he and the ExComm could consider and prepare courses of action.
During this series of top secret meetings, several courses of action were considered, ranging from direct military
strikes on the missile sites, a full-scale invasion of Cuba, a quid pro quo removal of American Jupiter missiles
in Turkey, and a blockade of the island. Acutely aware that miscalculation by either side could spark nuclear
war, Kennedy settled upon a blockade of Cuba in tandem with an ultimatum to the Soviets to remove the
missiles, both to be announced during a special national broadcast on television during the evening of 22
October. In that broadcast, Kennedy declared that a naval quarantine of Cuba would go into effect on the
morning of 24 October and would not be lifted until all offensive weapons had been removed. He also
announced that he had ordered increased surveillance of Cuba and, ominously, that he had directed the armed
forces "to prepare for any eventualities."
On 24 October, as U.S. strategic nuclear forces were placed on DEFCON 2, the highest alert status below actual
nuclear war, the world waited anxiously for the Soviet response to the quarantine. Despite some tense moments,
the deadline ultimately passed without serious incident, as several Soviet-chartered ships either changed course
or stopped short of the quarantine line. On 25 October, the
U.S. ambassador to the United Nations, Adlai E. Stevenson, famously confronted his Soviet counterpart,
Valerian Zorin, with photographic evidence and said he would "wait until hell freezes over" for a Soviet
explanation. At U.S. insistence, the Organization of the American States officially condemned the Soviet-Cuban
action and thereby formalized Cuba's hemispheric isolation.
Over the next few days, U.S. intelligence reported that not only were the MRBMs nearing operational status,
but there were also intermediate-range ballistic missiles (IRBMs) and tactical nuclear weapons on the island.
While U.S. forces continued to mobilize, a series of letters between Kennedy and Khrushchev was
supplemented by several secret unofficial channels, the most notable of which was Attorney General Robert F.
Kennedy's secret meetings with Anatoly Dobrynin, the Soviet ambassador to the United States, and Georgi
Bolshakov, the intelligence chief at the Soviet embassy.
On Saturday, 27 October, the crisis was at its peak. During the afternoon, reports came in of an American U-2
being shot down over Cuba by a surface-to-air missile. As tension mounted, the Joint Chiefs of Staff reported
that they were ready to launch an invasion of Cuba within twenty-four hours. In communications on 27 and 28
October, Khrushchev formally capitulated by agreeing to dismantle the missiles and ship them back to the
Soviet Union. In turn, Kennedy publicly announced that he had pledged to provide a noninvasion guarantee to
Cuba conditional on the offensive weapons being removed and the implementation of effective international
verification. Secretly, he also agreed to remove the American Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Although the crisis had been largely defused peacefully, it was not over. Castro refused to allow UN inspectors
onto Cuban sovereign territory, and Khrushchev initially refused to accept that the Soviet IL-28 Beagle bombers
were offensive weapons. Intensive discussions through the United Nations finally led to Khrushchev agreeing
on 20 November to remove the bombers in exchange for a lifting of the naval quarantine.
For many, the crisis demonstrated the dangers of the nuclear age. Subsequently, a telephone hotline was
established linking the White House and the Kremlin and efforts were intensified to secure arms control
agreements and détente.
Bibliography
Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Timothy Naftali. One Hell of a Gamble: Khrushchev, Castro, and Kennedy, 1958–
1964. New York: Norton, 1997.
Garthoff, Raymond L. Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis. Rev. ed. Washington, D.C.: Brookings
Institution, 1989.
May, Ernest, and Philip Zelikow, eds. The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during the Cuban Missile
Crisis. Concise ed. New York, Norton, 2002.
—David G. Coleman
Russian History Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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The Cuban Missile Crisis was one of the most serious incidents of the Cold War. Many believed that war might
break out between the United States and the Soviet Union over the latter's basing of nuclear-armed missiles in
Cuba.
Fidel Castro came to power in Cuba promising to restore the liberal 1940 constitution but immediately took
more radical steps, including an economic agreement in 1960 with the Soviet Union. In turn, the Soviet premier,
Nikita Khrushchev, promised in June to defend Cuba with Soviet nuclear arms. In early 1961, the United States
broke relations with Havana, and in April it helped thousands of Cuban exiles stage an abortive uprising at the
Bay of Pigs.
Khrushchev was convinced that the United States would strike again, this time with American soldiers; and he
believed that Castro's defeat would be a fatal blow to his own leadership. He decided that basing Soviet missiles
in Cuba would deter the United States from a strike against the Castro regime. Moreover, so he reasoned, the
Cuba-based medium-range missiles would compensate for the USSR's marked inferiority to America's ICBM
capabilities. Finally, a successful showdown with Washington might improve Moscow's deteriorating relations
with China.
In April 1962, Khrushchev raised the possibility of basing Soviet missiles in Cuba with his defense minister,
Rodion Malinovsky. He hoped to deploy the missiles by October and then inform Kennedy after the
congressional elections in November. He apparently expected the Americans to accept the deployment of the
Soviet missiles as calmly as the Kremlin had accepted the basing of U.S. missiles in Turkey. Foreign minister
Andrei Gromyko, when finally consulted, flatly told Khrushchev that Soviet missiles in Cuba would "cause a
political explosion" (Taubman) in the United States, but the premier was unmoved. In late April, a Soviet
delegation met with Khrushchev before departing for Cuba. They were told to "explain the plan" to install
missiles "to Castro" (Taubman). In fact, their mission was more one of "telling than asking." Castro was hardly
enthusiastic, but was ready to yield to a policy that would strengthen the "entire socialist camp" (Taubman).
Later the Presidium voted unanimously to approve the move.
Perhaps most remarkably, Khrushchev believed that the deployment of sixty missiles with forty launchers, not
to mention the support personnel and equipment, could be done secretly. General Anatoly Gribkov warned that
the installation process in Cuba could not be concealed. And American U-2 spy planes flew over the sites
unhindered. The Cubans, too, doubted that the plan could be kept secret; Khrushchev responded that if the
weapons were discovered the United States would not overreact, but if trouble arose, the Soviets would "send
the Baltic Fleet."
In July 1962, the American government learned that the USSR had started missile deliveries to Cuba. By the
end of August, American intelligence reported that Soviet technicians were in Cuba, supervising new military
construction. In September, Kennedy warned that if any Soviet ground-to-ground missiles were deployed in
Cuba, "the gravest issues would arise." Rather than calling a halt to the operation, Khrushchev ordered it
accelerated, while repeatedly assuring Washington that no build-up was taking place.
On October 14, U.S. aerial reconnaissance discovered a medium-range ballistic missile mounted on a launching
site. Such a missile could hit the eastern United States in a matter of minutes. On October 16, Kennedy and his
closest advisers met to discuss the crisis and immediately agreed that the missile must be removed. On October
22, Kennedy announced a "quarantine" around Cuba, much to Khrushchev's delight. The premier thought the
word sufficiently vague to allow for negotiation and exulted, "We've saved Cuba!" Despite his apparent
satisfaction, Khrushchev fired off a letter to Kennedy accusing him of interfering in Cuban affairs and
threatening world peace. He then went to the opera.
The turning point came on October 24, when Attorney General Robert Kennedy told the Soviet ambassador that
the United States would stop the Soviet ships, strongly implying that it would do so even if it meant war.
Khrushchev reacted angrily, but a letter from President Kennedy on October 25 pushed the premier toward
compromise. Kennedy wrote that he regretted the deterioration in relations and hoped Khrushchev would take
steps to restore the "earlier situation." With this letter, Khrushchev finally realized that the crisis was not worth
the gamble and began to back down. Another war scare occurred on the twenty-seventh with the downing of a
U-2 over Cuba, but by this point both leaders were ready and even anxious to end the crisis. On October 29, the
premier informed Kennedy that the missiles and offensive weapons in Cuba would be removed. Kennedy
promised there would be no invasion and secretly agreed to remove America's Jupiter missiles from Turkey.
Khrushchev's Cuban gamble helped convince the Soviet leadership that he was unfit to lead the USSR. This
humiliation, combined with failures in domestic policies, cost him his job in 1964.
Bibliography
Fursenko, Aleksander, and Naftali, Timothy. (1997). "One Hell of a Gamble": Khrushchev, Castro and
Kennedy, 1958 - 1964. New York: Norton.
Nathan, James A. (2001). Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press.
Taubman, William. (2003). Khrushchev: The Man and His Era. New York: Norton.
Thomson, William. (1995). Khrushchev: A Political Life. Oxford, UK: Macmillan.
—HUGH PHILLIPS
Spotlight: Cuban Missile Crisis
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From our Archives: Today's Highlights, August 30, 2006
In 1962, poor communication between the United States and the Soviet Union led to the Cuban Missile Crisis,
and nearly caused a war. To help prevent further such miscommunications, a hotline was established between
the two countries on this date in 1963. Though the image of the hotline was one of a red telephone, that
particular one was a set of high-speed teleprinters. The hotline became an actual telephone in the 1970s.
Columbia Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962, major cold war confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union.
After the Bay of Pigs Invasion, the USSR increased its support of Fidel Castro's Cuban regime, and in the
summer of 1962, Nikita Khrushchev secretly decided to install ballistic missiles in Cuba. When U.S.
reconnaissance flights revealed the clandestine construction of missile launching sites, President Kennedy
publicly denounced (Oct. 22, 1962) the Soviet actions. He imposed a naval blockade on Cuba and declared that
any missile launched from Cuba would warrant a full-scale retaliatory attack by the United States against the
Soviet Union. On Oct. 24, Russian ships carrying missiles to Cuba turned back, and when Khrushchev agreed
(Oct. 28) to withdraw the missiles and dismantle the missile sites, the crisis ended as suddenly as it had begun.
The United States ended its blockade on Nov. 20, and by the end of the year the missiles and bombers were
removed from Cuba. The United States, in return, pledged not to invade Cuba, and subsequently secretly
removed ballistic missiles it had placed in Turkey.
Bibliography
See R. F. Kennedy, Thirteen Days (1969, repr. 1971); A. Chayes, The Cuban Missile Crisis (1974); R. Garthoff,
Reflections on the Cuban Missile Crisis (1989); A. Fursenko and T. Naftali, ―One Hell of a Gamble‖ (1997); E.
R. May and P. D. Zelikow, ed., The Kennedy Tapes (1997); M. Frankel, High Noon in the Cold War (2004); M.
Dobbs, One Minute to Midnight (2008).
Intelligence Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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The Cuban missile crisis of October 1962 was triggered by the Soviet deployment to Cuba of medium-range,
nucleararmed ballistic missiles. The United States demanded that the Soviet Union remove these missiles and
imposed a naval blockade on Cuba, threatening to sink any Soviet ships that approached the island without
permitting their cargoes to be inspected. Eventually, the Soviet Union (U.S.S.R.) announced that it would
remove the missiles, and the crisis ended. Most historians affirm that the world has never been closer to global
nuclear war than during the 13 days of the Cuban missile crisis (Oct. 14–Oct. 28, 1962).
The roots of the Cuban missile crisis go back, in part, to an earlier crisis—the failed Bay of Pigs invasion of
Cuba by Cuban expatriates trained, supplied, and directed by the U.S. Central Intelligence Agency. The purpose
of the failed invasion was to overthrow Fidel Castro's leftist rule of Cuba, but had two unintended effects. First,
it frightened Castro, causing him to make concessions to the U.S.S.R, which wanted to place military bases on
the island of Cuba, in exchange for protection against further U.S. invasion attempts. Second, it heightened
tensions between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. Khrushchev, the Soviet leader, read U.S. weakness in the Bay of Pigs
fiasco, and blustered publicly that he might retaliate by driving the U.S. out of West Berlin. U.S. President John
Kennedy, in return, openly boasted that the U.S. possessed many more (and more accurate and deliverable)
nuclear missiles and warheads than the U.S.S.R., and would consider striking first with them if it ever found
itself at a military disadvantage. Kennedy's claim was true; in 1962, the U.S.S.R. had at most 20 or 30—perhaps
as few as four— functional, deployed intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs); the U.S. had several hundred.
Nevertheless, Kennedy had claimed, during his presidential campaign, that the incumbent Eisenhower's
administration had allowed the Soviets to get ahead of the U.S. in missiles, causing a "missile gap." A missile
gap did exist, as Kennedy knew, but in reverse; it had always been the U.S. that was far ahead of the U.S.S.R. in
such weapons. Once in office, Kennedy dropped the old story about the "missile gap" and brandished the United
States's nuclear superiority openly against Khrushchev.
Khruschev's response was to secretly build missile bases on Cuban soil to compensate for Soviet inferiority in
ICBMs. These missiles were medium-range and intermediate-range, rather than intercontinental, but from Cuba
could reach the entire continental U.S. except its northwest corner. Similar missiles had been by stationed the
United States for years in Turkey, which borders southern Russia. Castro gave permission to the Soviets to
build Cuban missile bases in trade for a promise of protection against U.S. invasion and for cancellation of
Cuban monetary debts.
Construction of the Cuban bases proceeded throughout the summer of 1962. The U.S. was aware, from various
intelligence sources, that the Soviets were building up military forces on the island, but did not realize that
intermediate-range nuclear weapons were part of the plan. Kennedy issued warnings to Khrushchev that the
U.S. would not tolerate a major military buildup in Cuba, but would do "whatever must be done" to guarantee
U.S. security; Kennedy and his advisors believed that Khrushchev would take these grave warnings seriously,
and were also aware that the U.S.S.R. had never yet placed nuclear weapons outside Russian territory; these
factors made it seem unlikely that nuclear weapons were part of the Cuban buildup. Nevertheless, they were.
U-2 spy planes (aircraft designed to take reconnaissance photographs from very high altitudes) were making
regular flights over Cuba, observing the military buildup. On October 14, a U-2 spy plane photographed an area
near San Cristóbal, Cuba, revealing launch pads, missile erectors, and transport trucks for medium-range
missiles. Four of the launchers were already in firing position. Khrushchev had decided to deploy launchers for
at least 16 intermediate-range missiles (capable of reaching most of the continental U.S.) and 24 medium-range
missiles (capable of reaching the southeastern U.S., including Washington, D.C.).
The U-2 pictures were shown to Kennedy on the morning of October 16. Much like the Kennedy
administration's claims during the Bay of Pigs crisis that the U.S. had no illegal intentions in Cuba,
Khrushchev's claims to have no desire to base missiles in Cuba had proved to be untrue. Kennedy hastily
assembled an ad hoc executive committee of the National Security Council, which helped him come up with
two alternative plans: (1) Immediate attack on the Soviet missiles sites in Cuba, followed by a full invasion of
the island using 180,000 U.S. troops. (2) A naval blockade of Cuba, to be lifted only if the Soviets removed its
missiles. If the blockade did not work—and it was a risky plan, as such a blockade is, by international law, an
act of war—the invasion plan would be carried out.
On October 22, 1962, Kennedy addressed the American people by television. He stated: "This sudden,
clandestine decision to station strategic weapons for the first time outside of Soviet soil is a deliberately
provocative and unjustified change in the status quo which cannot be accepted by this country if our courage
and our commitments are ever to be trusted again…To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all
offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba
from whatever nation or port will, if found to contain cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back."
Over the next four days, ships carrying Russian goods were searched at sea, and several Soviet vessels carrying
missiles were turned back by U.S. naval vessels. The U.S. Strategic Air Command placed all its B-52
intercontinental bombers on 15-minute takeoff alert on October 20; on October 22, it placed them on a
revolving airborne alert, with a percentage of bombers airborne at all times, ready to head over the North Pole
toward the Soviet Union. ICBM crews were also placed on highest alert, ready to launch, and nuclear-armed
Polaris submarines moved to their pre-assigned war stations at sea. The Soviet Union already had over 45,000
of its own troops on Cuba (though the U.S. estimated only 16,000), armed with 90 shortrange nuclear warheads
that would have been used against a U.S. invasion force. (The U.S. did not know of these short-range nuclear
weapons.)
A U.S. invasion of Cuba, had it occurred, could have escalated rapidly to nuclear war, first in Cuba and then
globally. The entire world, including Kennedy and Khrushchev and their advisors, feared throughout the crisis
that global nuclear war was extremely probable. If nuclear war had occurred, it could have caused hundreds of
millions of deaths, and significantly destroyed the U.S., the U.S.S.R., and many other nations as functioning
societies.
On October 26, Khrushchev sent a private message to Kennedy indicating that he would be willing to remove
the missiles if the U.S. would promise not to invade Cuba. The following day, a more formal message said that
Soviet Union would remove its missiles only if the U.S. would remove its Jupiter-class intermediate-range
missiles from Turkey. In secret negotiations between Soviet ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin and U.S. attorney
general Robert Kennedy (brother of President Kennedy), the U.S. did promise not to invade Cuba in exchange
for withdrawal of the Soviet missiles; it did not, however, promise to remove its missiles from Turkey. These
missiles were considered largely symbolic by U.S. strategists, and were technically unreliable and obsolete.
Additionally, their threat to the U.S.S.R. could have been replaced by deployment of a Poseidon submarine
carrying nuclear missiles to the eastern Mediterranean. In secret, therefore, Kennedy seriously considered
trading the missiles in Turkey for the missiles in Cuba, although in public he refused to do. On October 28—
one day before the deadline urged by the U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff for launching a Cuban invasion—the Soviets
stated that they would remove their missiles from Cuba. The crisis abated.
Many historians have viewed Kennedy's handling of the Cuban missile crisis as a masterpiece of statesmanship.
The Soviet Union backed down; its missiles were removed; U.S. goals were fully met; American geomilitary
prestige was preserved. Other historians argue that the Kennedy administration was not as deft in reality as it
seemed publicly. Kennedy and his advisors were badly frightened; Secretary of State Dean Rusk began to weep
when told, at the height of the crisis, that a U-2 plane had been shot down over Cuba. Robert Kennedy said later
that his brother had put events in motion that he could not control.
What is certain is that Khrushchev and Kennedy were both willing to risk global nuclear war for dubious gains.
The Soviets were soon to achieve strategic nuclear parity with the U.S. simply by building more and better
ICBMs; any strategic advantage to be gained by placing missiles in Cuba would, therefore, be short-term. By
the same token, no long-term U.S. interests were at stake in the deployment of Soviet intermediate-range
missiles to Cuba, as within a few years every city in the continental U.S. would be vulnerable to Soviet ICBMs
and submarinelaunched ballistic missiles anyway. Kennedy administration officials knew that the Soviet
buildup in Cuba would, at worst, decrease the United States's massive strategic advantage, or appear to do so—
in Kennedy's words, make the Soviets "look like they're coequal with the U.S." Kennedy was thus, willing to
gamble the world's future not to save the U.S. from an imminent military threat, but because to tolerate the
Soviet buildup in Cuba would, in his words, "have politically changed the balance of power. It would have
appeared to, and appearances contribute to reality."
The U.S. emerged from the Cuban missile crisis with greatly expanded confidence in its own geopolitical skill.
Its policymakers had verified, as they believed, that "showing resolve" (threatening to use military force) was
more effective than diplomacy, the United Nations, or international law—with the proviso that the U.S. should
be more willing to commit conventional (non-nuclear) military forces in a crisis, in order to keep back from the
nuclear abyss. Today, many historians argue that U.S. willingness to invade Vietnam is directly attributable to
its success during the Cuban missile crisis.
Further Reading
Books
Nathan, James. Anatomy of the Cuban Missile Crisis. Westport, CT: Greenwood Press. 2001.
Periodicals
Frankel, Max. "Learning from the Missile Crisis." Smithsonian. October, 2002: 53–64.
Law Encyclopedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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This entry contains information applicable to United States law only.
The 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis was a dangerous moment in the cold war between the United States and the
Soviet Union. The actions taken by President John F. Kennedy's administration prevented the installation of
Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba, just ninety miles from Florida. The crisis also illustrated the limitations of
international law, as the United States relied on military actions and threats to accomplish its goal.
The crisis grew out of political changes in Cuba. In the 1950s, Fidel Castro, a young lawyer, led a guerrilla
movement against Cuban dictator Fulgencio Batista. Batista lost the confidence of the Cuban people and on
January 1, 1959, fled the country. Castro became premier of the new government.
At first, the United States supported the Castro government. This changed when Castro seized U.S.-owned
sugar estates and cattle ranches in Cuba. The United States subsequently embargoed trade with Cuba, and the
Central Intelligence Agency began covert operations to topple Castro. In 1960 Castro openly embraced
communism and signed Cuba's first trade agreement with the Soviet Union.
Many Cubans had left the island of Cuba for the United States following the Castro revolution. Aided by the
United States, a Cuban exile army was trained for an invasion. Though most of the planning took place in 1960,
when President Dwight D. Eisenhower was finishing his second term, the final decision to invade came during
the first months of the Kennedy administration. In April 1961, Cuban exiles invaded Cuba at the Bay of Pigs.
The invasion was a debacle, in part because U.S. air support that had been promised was not provided. The
exile army was captured.
Convinced that the United States would attempt another invasion, Castro asked Premier Nikita Khrushchev, of
the Soviet Union, for nuclear missiles. Khrushchev agreed to what would be the first deployment of nuclear
weapons outside the Soviet Union. President Kennedy at first did not believe the Soviets would follow through
on their promise. On October 14, 1962, however, photographs taken by reconnaissance planes showed that
missile sites were being built in Cuba.
President Kennedy convened a small group of trusted advisers, called the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council (Ex Com). Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy served on Ex Com and became the key
adviser to the president during the crisis.
Military officials advocated bombing the missile sites or invading Cuba. Others argued for a nuclear strike on
Cuba. These ideas were rejected in favor of a naval blockade of Cuba. All ships attempting to enter Cuba were
to be stopped and searched for missiles and related military material.
President Kennedy, believing that the Soviets were using the missiles to test his will, resolved to make the crisis
public. Bypassing private, diplomatic procedures, Kennedy went on national television on October 22 and
informed the United States of the missile sites, the naval blockade, and his resolve to take any action necessary
to prevent the missile deployment.
Tension built during the last days of October as the world awaited the approach of Soviet missile-bearing ships
at the blockade line. If Soviet ships refused to turn back, it was likely that U.S. ships would either stop them or
sink them. If that happened, nuclear war seemed probable.
During the crisis, the United Nations was not used as a vehicle for negotiation or mediation. The United States
and the Soviet Union ignored an appeal by Secretary General U Thant, of the United Nations, that they reduce
tensions for a few weeks. Instead, the Security Council of the United Nations became a stage for both sides to
trade accusations. Ambassador Adlai Stevenson, from the United States, presented photographs of the missile
sites to back up the U.S. claims.
On October 24, the crisis began to ease, as twelve Soviet ships on their way to Cuba were, on orders from
Moscow, diverted or halted. However, construction on the missile sites continued. On October 26, Premier
Khrushchev sent a long, emotional letter to President Kennedy, claiming that the missiles were defensive. He
implied that a pledge by the United States not to invade Cuba would allow him to remove the missiles.
President Kennedy replied, accepting the proposal to exchange withdrawal of the missiles for the promise not to
invade. He also stated that if the Soviet Union did not answer his reply in two or three days, Cuba would be
bombed. On October 28, the Soviets announced on Radio Moscow that the missile sites were being dismantled.
Some historians maintain that President Kennedy acted heroically to meet a threat to the security of the United
States. Others claim that the missiles at issue were of limited range and were purely defensive, and that
Kennedy was reckless in brandishing the threat of nuclear war. Most agree that the crisis was probably the
closest the Soviet Union and the United States ever got to nuclear war.
History Dictionary: Cuban missile crisis
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Home > Library > History, Politics & Society > History Dictionary
A confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union in 1962 over the presence of missile sites in
Cuba; one of the ―hottest‖ periods of the cold war. The Soviet premier, Nikita Khrushchev, placed Soviet
military missiles in Cuba, which had come under Soviet influence since the success of the Cuban Revolution
three years earlier. President John F. Kennedy of the United States set up a naval blockade of Cuba and insisted
that Khrushchev remove the missiles. Khrushchev did.
Wikipedia: Cuban Missile Crisis
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Home > Library > Miscellaneous > Wikipedia
For other uses, see October Crisis.
Jupiter IRBM picture
The Cuban Missile Crisis was a confrontation between the United States, the Soviet Union, and Cuba in the
early 1960s during the Cold War. In Russia, it is termed the "Caribbean Crisis" (Russian: Карибский кризис,
Karibskiy krizis), while in Cuba it is called the "October Crisis". The crisis ranks with the Berlin Blockade as
one of the major confrontations of the Cold War, and is generally regarded as the moment in which the Cold
War came closest to a nuclear war.[1]
The critical crisis phase was preceded by deployment of Jupiter and Thor medium-range ballistic missiles,
which was performed by the US Air Force at 5 sites near İzmir, Turkey, in 1961. These MRBM were able to
carry thermonuclear warheads and had operating ranges up to 1500 miles. This created an important threat to
many cities and industrial and military facilities of the Soviet Union, including Moscow.
In Havana, there was fear of military intervention by the United States in Cuba. [2] In April 1961, the threat of
invasion became real when a force of CIA-trained Cuban exiles opposed to Castro landed at the Bay of Pigs.
The invasion was quickly stopped by Cuba's military forces due to lack of support and poor management on the
part of the U.S. After the U.S.-backed Brigade 2506 failed, Castro felt that the United States would invade Cuba
to finish what it started.[3] Castro declared Cuba a socialist republic on May 1st, 1961,[4] although not a Soviet
satellite, and began to modernise Cuba's armed forces with direct Soviet funding.
The United States feared the Soviet expansion of communism or socialism, but for a Latin American country to
ally openly with the USSR was regarded as unacceptable, given the Russo-American enmity since the end of
the Second World War in 1945. Such an involvement would also directly contradict the Monroe Doctrine which
prevented European powers from getting involved in South American matters.
In late 1961, Kennedy engaged Operation Mongoose, a series of covert operations against Castro's government.
They were unsuccessful.[5] More overtly, in February 1962, the United States launched an economic embargo
against Cuba.[6]
The United States also considered covert action. Air Force General Curtis LeMay presented to Kennedy a preinvasion bombing plan in September, while spy flights and minor military harassment from the United States
Guantanamo Naval Base were the subject of continual Cuban diplomatic complaints to the U.S. government.
In September 1962, the Cuban government saw significant evidence that the U.S. would invade, including a
joint U.S. Congressional resolution authorising the use of military force in Cuba if American interests were
threatened,[7] and the announcement of a U.S. military exercise in the Caribbean planned for the following
month (Operation Ortsac).
As a consequence, Castro and Soviet premier Nikita Khrushchev agreed to secretly place strategic nuclear
missiles in Cuba. Like Castro, Khrushchev felt that a U.S. invasion of Cuba was imminent, and that to lose
Cuba would do great harm to his prestige worldwide, especially in Latin America. He said that he wanted to
confront the Americans "with more than words...the logical answer was missiles."[8]
The tensions were at their height from October 8, 1962. On October 14, United States reconnaissance saw the
missile bases being built in Cuba. The crisis ended two weeks later on October 28, 1962, when the President of
the United States John F. Kennedy and the United Nations Secretary-General U Thant reached an agreement
with the Soviets to dismantle the missiles in Cuba in exchange for a no-invasion agreement. Khrushchev's
request that the Jupiter and Thor missiles in Turkey be removed was ignored by the Kennedy administration and
not pressed by the Soviet Union.[9]
Kennedy gave a key warning in his first public speech on the crisis (October 22, 1962):
It shall be the policy of this nation to regard any nuclear missile launched from Cuba against any nation in the
Western Hemisphere as an attack on the United States, requiring a full retaliatory response upon the Soviet
Union.[10]
This speech included another key policy:
To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is
being initiated. All ships of any kind bound for Cuba from whatever nation and port will, if found to contain
cargoes of offensive weapons, be turned back. This quarantine will be extended, if needed, to other types of
cargo and carriers. We are not at this time, however, denying the necessities of life as the Soviets attempted to
do in their Berlin blockade of 1948.
Kennedy ordered intensified surveillance, and cited cooperation from the foreign ministers of the Organization
of American States (OAS). Kennedy "directed the Armed Forces to prepare for any eventualities; and I trust
that in the interest of both the Cuban people and the Soviet technicians at the sites, the hazards to all concerned
of continuing the threat will be recognised." He called for emergency meetings of the OAS and United Nations
Security Council to deal with the matter.[10]
Contents
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1 American early reports
2 U-2 flights and discovery
3 Planning an American response
4 Quarantine
5 Crisis deepens
6 Secret negotiations
7 Crisis continues
8 Drafting the response
9 Ending the crisis of 1962
10 Aftermath
11 Historical notes
12 In popular culture
13 See also
14 Notes
15 References
16 External links
American early reports
In Paris while on honeymoon, CIA director John McCone was told by French intelligence that the Soviets were
installing missiles in Cuba. He warned Kennedy that some ships were missile-laden; however, the President —
in consultation with his brother Attorney General Robert F. Kennedy, Secretary of State Dean Rusk, and
Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara — concluded that the Soviets would not do so. Kennedy's government
had received repeated Soviet diplomatic disclaimers that there were neither Soviet missiles in Cuba, nor plans to
install any, and that the USSR was not interested in provoking an international confrontation which would
affect the United States House of Representatives elections in November.[11]
In late August, a reconnaissance flight photographed a new series of SAM sites being built, but on September 4,
1962, Kennedy told Congress that there were no offensive missiles in Cuba. The same day, Robert Kennedy met
Soviet Ambassador Anatoly Dobrynin. In that meeting he stated American concern about nuclear missiles in
Cuba. The ambassador assured him that they were defensive and that the military build-up was insignificant.
Days later, another reconnaissance flight photographed the building of a submarine pen disguised as a fishing
village. On September 11, the Soviets publicly stated that they had no need to install nuclear weapons outside
the USSR, including in Cuba. That day, Khrushchev personally communicated to Kennedy that there would be
no offensive weapons installed in Cuba.[12]
U-2 flights and discovery
U-2 reconnaissance photograph of Soviet nuclear missiles in Cuba. Shown are the transports and tents for
fuelling and maintenance.
The first consignment of SS-3 MRBMs (medium range ballistic missiles) arrived on the night of September 8,
followed by a second on September 16. The Soviets were building nine sites — six for SS-4s and three for SS5s with a 4,000 kilometer-range (2,400 statute miles). The planned arsenal was forty launchers, a 70% increase
in first strike capacity. The Cuban populace readily noticed it, with over one thousand reports reaching Miami,
which U.S. intelligence considered spurious.[13]
While Brugioni concentrates deeply on the IMINT in his book, Eyeball to Eyeball,[14] Hilsman may give a
slightly broader view in his book, To Move a Nation.[15]
On October 8, Cuban President Osvaldo Dorticós (1959-1976) spoke at the U.N. General Assembly: "If ... we
are attacked, we will defend ourselves. I repeat, we have sufficient means with which to defend ourselves; we
have indeed our inevitable weapons, the weapons, which we would have preferred not to acquire, and which we
do not wish to employ". Several unrelated problems meant the missiles were not discovered by the U.S. until an
October 15 U-2 flight showed the construction of an SS-4 site at San Cristóbal, Pinar del Río Province, in
western Cuba.
Planning an American response
Kennedy saw the photographs on October 16;[16] he assembled the Executive Committee of the National
Security Council (ExComm), fourteen key officials and his brother Robert, at 9.00 a.m. The U.S. had no plan
for dealing with such a threat, because U.S. intelligence was convinced that the Soviets would not install
nuclear missiles in Cuba. The EXCOMM quickly discussed five courses of action:
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
do nothing
use diplomatic pressure to get the Soviet Union to remove the missiles
an air attack on the missiles
a full military invasion
the naval blockade of Cuba, which was redefined as a more restrictive quarantine.[17]
Unanimously, the Joint Chiefs of Staff agreed that a full-scale attack and invasion was the only solution. They
agreed that the Soviets would not act to stop the U.S. from conquering Cuba; Kennedy was skeptical, saying:
They, no more than we, can let these things go by without doing something. They can't, after all their
statements, permit us to take out their missiles, kill a lot of Russians, and then do nothing. If they don't take
action in Cuba, they certainly will in Berlin.[18]
Kennedy concluded that attacking by air would signal the Soviets to presume "a clear line" to conquer Berlin.
Adding that in taking such an action, the United States' allies would think of the U.S. as "trigger-happy
cowboys" who lost Berlin because they could not peacefully resolve the Cuban situation.[citation needed]
President Kennedy and Secretary of Defense McNamara in an ExComm meeting.
The ExComm then discussed the effect on the strategic balance. The Joint Chiefs of Staff believed that the
missiles would seriously alter the balance, but Secretary of Defence Robert McNamara disagreed. He was
convinced that the missiles would not effect the strategic balance at all. An extra forty, he reasoned, would
make little difference to the overall strategic balance. The US already had circa 5,000 strategic warheads, whilst
the Soviet Union only had 300. He concluded that the Soviets having 340 would not therefore substantially alter
the strategic balance. In 1990 he reiterated that "it made no difference...The military balance wasn't changed. I
didn't believe it then, and I don't believe it now."[19]
The ExComm did agree, however, that the missile would affect the political balance. First, Kennedy had
explicitly promised the American people less than a month before the crisis that "if Cuba should possess a
capacity to carry out offensive actions against the United States...the United states would act"[20]. Second, U.S.
credibility amongst their allies, and amongst the American people, would have been damaged if they had
allowed the Soviet Union to appear to redress the strategic balance by placing missiles in Cuba. Kennedy
explained after the crisis that "it would have politically changed the balance of power. It would have appeared
to, and appearances contribute to reality."[21]
Thus full-scale invasion was not an option, but something had to be done. Robert McNamara supported the
naval blockade as a strong but limited military action that left the U.S. in control. According to international law
a blockade is an act of war, but the Kennedy administration did not feel itself limited, thinking that the USSR
would not be provoked to attack by a mere blockade.[citation needed]
By October 19, frequent U-2 spy flights showed four operational sites. As part of the blockade, US military was
put on high alert to enforce the blockade and to be ready to invade Cuba at a moment's notice. The 1st Armored
Division was sent to Georgia, and five army divisions were alerted for maximal action. The Strategic Air
Command (SAC) distributed its shorter-ranged B-47 Stratojet medium bombers to civilian airports and sent
aloft its B-52 Stratofortress heavy bombers.
Quarantine
Address on the Buildup of Arms in Cuba
Kennedy addressing the nation on October 22, 1962 about the buildup of arms on Cuba
Problems listening to this file? See media help.
In customary international practice, a blockade stops all shipments into the blockaded area, and is considered an
act of war. Quarantines are more selective, as, in this case, being limited to offensive weapons. While the
original U.S. Navy paper did use the term "blockade,"
This initially was to involve a naval blockade against offensive weapons within the framework of the
Organization of American States and the Rio Treaty. Such a blockade might be expanded to cover all types of
goods and air transport. The action was to be backed up by surveillance of Cuba. CNO's scenario was followed
closely in later implementing the quarantine.
Kennedy made an address to the Nation in which he said "To halt this offensive buildup, a strict quarantine on
all offensive military equipment under shipment to Cuba is being initiated." "1962 Year In Review: Cuban
Missile Crisis"
Admiral Anderson's paper, by differentiating between the quarantine of offensive weapons and all materials,
indicated that a classic blockade was not the original intention. Since it would take place in international waters,
President John F. Kennedy obtained the approval of the OAS for military action under the hemispheric defence
provisions of the Inter-American Treaty of Reciprocal Assistance (i.e., the Rio Treaty).
Latin American participation in the quarantine now involved two Argentine destroyers which were to report to
the U.S. Commander South Atlantic [COMSOLANT] at Trinidad on November 9. An Argentine submarine and
a Marine battalion with lift were available if required. In addition, two Venezuelan destroyers and one
submarine had reported to COMSOLANT, ready for sea by November 2. The Government of Trinidad and
Tobago offered the use of Chaguaramas Naval Base to warships of any OAS nation for the duration of the
quarantine. The Dominican Republic had made available one escort ship. Colombia was reported ready to
furnish units and had sent military officers to the U.S. to discuss this assistance. The Argentine Air Force
informally offered three SA-16 aircraft in addition to forces already committed to the quarantine operation.[22]
President Kennedy signs the Proclamation for Interdiction of the Delivery of Offensive Weapons to Cuba at the
Oval Office on October 23, 1962.
At 7 p.m. on October 22, President Kennedy delivered a televised radio address announcing the discovery of the
missiles.
Crisis deepens
Only an hour later, at 11:24 a.m. a cable drafted by George Ball to the U.S. Ambassador in Turkey and the U.S.
Ambassador to NATO notified them that they were considering making an offer to withdraw missiles from
Turkey in exchange for a withdrawal from Cuba. Later, on the morning of October 25, journalist Walter
Lippman proposed the same thing in his syndicated column. For many years this has been interpreted as a trial
balloon floated by the Kennedy administration, although the historical record suggests this is not the case.[citation
needed]
At the time the crisis continued unabated, and that evening TASS[citation needed] reported on an exchange of
telegrams between Khrushchev and Bertrand Russell, where Khrushchev warned that the United States' "pirate
action" would lead to war. However, this was followed at 9:24 p.m. by a telegram from Khrushchev to Kennedy
which was received at 10:52 p.m., in which Khrushchev stated that "if you coolly weigh the situation which has
developed, not giving way to passions, you will understand that the Soviet Union cannot fail to reject the
arbitrary demands of the United States", and that the Soviet Union views the blockade as "an act of aggression"
and their ships will be instructed to ignore it.
On the night of October 23, the Joint Chiefs of Staff instructed Strategic Air Command to go to DEFCON 2, for
the only time in history. The message, and the response, were deliberately transmitted uncoded, unencrypted, in
order to allow Soviet intelligence to capture them.[5] Operation Falling Leaves quickly set up three radar bases
to watch for missile launches from Cuba.[clarification needed] The radars were experimental models ahead of their
time. Each base was connected with a hotline to NORAD control.
At 1:45 a.m. on October 25, Kennedy responded to Khrushchev's telegram, stating that the U.S. was forced into
action after receiving repeated assurances that no offensive missiles were being placed in Cuba, and that when
these assurances proved to be false, the deployment "required the responses I have announced... I hope that your
government will take necessary action to permit a restoration of the earlier situation."
The image is a recently declassified map used by the U.S. Navy's Atlantic Fleet showing the position of
American and Soviet ships at the height of the crisis.
At 7:15 a.m., the USS Essex and USS Gearing attempted to intercept the Bucharest but failed to do so. Fairly
certain the tanker did not contain any military material, it was allowed through the blockade. Later that day, at
5:43 p.m., the commander of the blockade effort ordered the USS Kennedy to intercept and board the Lebanese
freighter Marcula. This took place the next day, and the Marcula was cleared through the blockade after its
cargo was checked.
At 5:00 p.m. William Clements announced that the missiles in Cuba were still actively being worked on. This
report was later verified by a CIA report that suggested there had been no slow-down at all. In response,
Kennedy issued Security Action Memorandum 199, authorising the loading of nuclear weapons onto aircraft
under the command of SACEUR (which had the duty of carrying out the first air strikes on the Soviet Union).
The next morning, Kennedy informed the executive committee that he believed only an invasion would remove
the missiles from Cuba. However, he was persuaded to give the matter time and continue with both military and
diplomatic pressure. He agreed and ordered the low-level flights over the island to be increased from two per
day to once every two hours. He also ordered a crash programme to institute a new civil government in Cuba if
an invasion went ahead.
At this point the crisis was ostensibly at a stalemate. The USSR had shown no indication that they would back
down and had made several comments to the contrary. The U.S. had no reason to believe otherwise and was in
the early stages of preparing for an invasion, along with a nuclear strike on the Soviet Union in case it
responded militarily, which was assumed.[23]
Secret negotiations
At 1:00 p.m., John A. Scali of ABC News had lunch with Aleksandr Fomin at Fomin's request. Fomin noted
that "war seems about to break out" and asked Scali to use his contacts to talk to his "high-level friends" at the
State Department to see if the U.S. would be interested in a diplomatic solution. He suggested that the language
of the deal would contain an assurance from the Soviet Union to remove the weapons under UN supervision and
that Castro would publicly announce that he would not accept such weapons in the future, in exchange for a
public statement by the U.S. that it would never invade Cuba. The U.S. responded by asking the Brazilian
government to pass a message to Castro that the U.S. would be "unlikely to invade" if the missiles are removed.
At 6:00 p.m. the State Department started receiving a message that appeared to be written personally by
Khrushchev. Robert Kennedy described the letter as "very long and emotional." Khrushchev reiterated the basic
outline that had been stated to Scali earlier in the day, "I propose: we, for our part, will declare that our ships
bound for Cuba are not carrying any armaments. You will declare that the United States will not invade Cuba
with its troops and will not support any other forces which might intend to invade Cuba. Then the necessity of
the presence of our military specialists in Cuba will disappear." At 6:45pm, news of Fomin's offer to Scali was
finally heard and was interpreted as a "set up" for the arrival of Khrushchev's letter. The letter was then
considered official and accurate, although it was later learned that Fomin was almost certainly operating of his
own accord without official backing. Additional study of the letter was ordered and continued into the night.
Canada, the NORAD ally of the United States, was not consulted in these negotiations.
Crisis continues
“
Direct aggression against Cuba would mean nuclear war. The Americans speak about such
aggression as if they did not know or did not want to accept this fact. I have no doubt they would
lose such a war.
”
— Che Guevara, October 1962[24]
S-75 Dvina with V-750V 1D missile on a launcher. An installation similar to this one shot down Major
Anderson's U-2 over Cuba.
Castro, on the other hand, was convinced that an invasion was soon at hand, and he dictated a letter to
Khrushchev which appeared to call for a preemptive strike on the U.S. He also ordered all anti-aircraft weapons
in Cuba to fire on any U.S. aircraft, whereas in the past they had been ordered only to fire on groups of two or
more. At 6:00 a.m. on October 27, the CIA delivered a memo reporting that three of the four missile sites at San
Cristobal and the two sites at Sagua la Grande appeared to be fully operational. They also noted that the Cuban
military continued to organise for action, although they were under order not to initiate action unless attacked.
At 9 a.m. Moscow's Voice of Russia began broadcasting a message from Khrushchev. Contrary to the letter of
the night before, the message offered a new trade, that the missiles on Cuba would be removed in exchange for
the removal of the Jupiters from Turkey. Throughout the crisis, Turkey had repeatedly stated that it would be
upset if the Jupiter missiles were removed. At 10 a.m. the executive committee met again to discuss the
situation and came to the conclusion that the change in message was due to internal debate between Khrushchev
and other party officials in the Kremlin.[25] McNamara noted that another tanker, the Grozny, was about
600 miles (970 km) out and should be intercepted. He also noted that they had not made the USSR aware of the
quarantine line and suggested relaying this information to them via U Thant at the UN.
An Air Force U-2 "Dragon Lady" similar to this one was shot down over Cuba.
While the meeting progressed, at 11:03 a.m. a new message began to arrive from Khrushchev. The message
stated, in part, "You are disturbed over Cuba. You say that this disturbs you because it is ninety miles by sea
from the coast of the United States of America. But... you have placed destructive missile weapons, which you
call offensive, in Turkey, literally next to us... I therefore make this proposal: We are willing to remove from
Cuba the means which you regard as offensive... Your representatives will make a declaration to the effect that
the United States ... will remove its analogous means from Turkey ... and after that, persons entrusted by the
United Nations Security Council could inspect on the spot the fulfillment of the pledges made." The executive
committee continued to meet through the day.
The engine of the Lockheed U-2 shot down over Cuba on display at Museum of the Revolution in Havana.
That morning, a Lockheed U-2 piloted by Major Rudolf Anderson, USAF had departed the U-2 forward
operating location at McCoy AFB, Florida. At approximately 12:00 p.m. Eastern Standard Time, the aircraft
was shot down by an S-75 Dvina (NATO designation SA-2 Guideline) SAM emplacement in Cuba, increasing
the stress in negotiations between the USSR and the U.S. It was later learned that the decision to fire was made
locally by an undetermined Soviet commander on his own authority. Later that day, at about 3:41 p.m., several
U.S. Navy RF-8A Crusader reconnaissance aircraft on low-level photoreconnaissance missions were fired upon,
and one was hit by a 37 mm shell but managed to return to base. At 4 p.m. Kennedy recalled the executive
committee to the White House and ordered that a message immediately be sent to U Thant asking if the Soviets
would "suspend" work on the missiles while negotiations were carried out. During this meeting, Maxwell
Taylor delivered the news that the U-2 had been shot down. Kennedy had earlier claimed he would order an
attack on such sites if fired upon, but he decided to leave the matter unless another attack was made. In an
interview 40 years later, McNamara remembers[citation needed]:
We had to send a U-2 over to gain reconnaissance information on whether the Soviet missiles were becoming
operational. We believed that if the U-2 was shot down that—the Cubans didn't have capabilities to shoot it
down, the Soviets did—we believed if it was shot down, it would be shot down by a Soviet surface-to-airmissile unit, and that it would represent a decision by the Soviets to escalate the conflict. And therefore, before
we sent the U-2 out, we agreed that if it was shot down we wouldn't meet, we'd simply attack. It was shot down
on Friday [...]. Fortunately, we changed our mind, we thought "Well, it might have been an accident, we won't
attack." Later we learned that Khrushchev had reasoned just as we did: we send over the U-2, if it was shot
down, he reasoned we would believe it was an intentional escalation. And therefore, he issued orders to Pliyev,
the Soviet commander in Cuba, to instruct all of his batteries not to shoot down the U-2.
Drafting the response
Emissaries sent by both Kennedy and Nikita Khrushchev agreed to meet at the Yenching Palace Chinese
restaurant in the Cleveland Park neighbourhood of Washington D.C.[26] Kennedy suggested that they take
Khrushchev's offer to trade away the missiles. Unknown to most members of the EXCOMM, Robert Kennedy
had been meeting with the USSR Ambassador in Washington to discover whether these intentions were
genuine. The EXCOMM was generally against the proposal because it would undermine NATO, and the
Turkish government had repeatedly stated it was against any such trade.
As the meeting progressed, a new plan emerged and Kennedy was slowly persuaded. The new plan called for
the President to ignore the latest message and instead to return to Khrushchev's earlier one. Kennedy was
initially hesitant, feeling that Khrushchev would no longer accept the deal because a new one had been offered,
but Llewellyn Thompson argued that he might accept it anyway. White House Special Counsel and Advisor
Ted Sorensen and Robert Kennedy left the meeting and returned 45 minutes later with a draft letter to this
effect. The President made several changes, had it typed, and sent it.
After the EXCOMM meeting, a smaller meeting continued in the Oval Office. The group argued that the letter
should be underscored with an oral message to Ambassador Dobrynin stating that if the missiles were not
withdrawn, military action would be used to remove them. Dean Rusk added one proviso, that no part of the
language of the deal would mention Turkey, but there would be an understanding that the missiles would be
removed "voluntarily" in the immediate aftermath. The President agreed, and the message was sent.
An EXCOMM meeting during the Cuban Missile Crisis. President Kennedy, Secretary of State Rusk, and
Secretary of Defense McNamara, in the White House Cabinet Room.
At Juan Brito's request, Fomin and Scali met again. Scali asked why the two letters from Khrushchev were so
different, and Fomin claimed it was because of "poor communications". Scali replied that the claim was not
credible and shouted that he thought it was a "stinking double cross". He went on to claim that an invasion was
only hours away, at which point Fomin stated that a response to the U.S. message was expected from
Khrushchev shortly, and he urged Scali to tell the State Department that no treachery was intended. Scali said
that he did not think anyone would believe him, but he agreed to deliver the message. The two went their
separate ways, and Scali immediately typed out a memo for the EXCOMM.
Within the U.S. establishment it was well understood that ignoring the second offer and returning to the first put
Khrushchev in a terrible position. Military preparations continued, and all active duty Air Force personnel were
recalled to base for possible action. Robert Kennedy later recalled the mood, "We had not abandoned all hope,
but what hope there was now rested with Khrushchev's revising his course within the next few hours. It was a
hope, not an expectation. The expectation was military confrontation by Tuesday, and possibly tomorrow..."
At 8:05 p.m. the letter drafted earlier in the day was delivered. The message read, "As I read your letter, the key
elements of your proposals—which seem generally acceptable as I understand them—are as follows: 1) You
would agree to remove these weapons systems from Cuba under appropriate United Nations observation and
supervision; and undertake, with suitable safe-guards, to halt the further introduction of such weapon systems
into Cuba. 2) We, on our part, would agree—upon the establishment of adequate arrangements through the
United Nations, to ensure the carrying out and continuation of these commitments (a) to remove promptly the
quarantine measures now in effect and (b) to give assurances against the invasion of Cuba." The letter was also
released directly to the press to ensure it could not be "delayed."
With the letter delivered, a deal was on the table. However, as Robert Kennedy noted, there was little
expectation it would be accepted. At 9 p.m. the EXCOMM met again to review the actions for the following
day. Plans were drawn up for air strikes on the missile sites as well as other economic targets, notably
petroleum storage. McNamara stated that they had to "have two things ready: a government for Cuba, because
we're going to need one; and secondly, plans for how to respond to the Soviet Union in Europe, because sure as
hell they're going to do something there".
At 12:12 a.m. on October 27, the U.S. informed its NATO allies that "the situation is growing shorter... the
United States may find it necessary within a very short time in its interest and that of its fellow nations in the
Western Hemisphere to take whatever military action may be necessary." To add to the concern, at 6 a.m. the
CIA reported that all missiles in Cuba were ready for action.
On October 27, the US Navy dropped a series of "signalling depth charges" on a Soviet submarine (B-59) at the
quarantine line, unaware that it was armed with a nuclear-tipped torpedo with orders that allowed it to be used if
the submarine was "hulled" (hole in the hull from depth charges or surface fire).[27]
Ending the crisis of 1962
After much deliberation between the Soviet Union and Kennedy's cabinet, Kennedy agreed to remove all
missiles set in Turkey on the border of the Soviet Union in exchange for Khrushchev removing all missiles in
Cuba.
At 9 a.m. on October 28, a new message from Khrushchev was broadcast on Radio Moscow. Khrushchev stated
that, "the Soviet government, in addition to previously issued instructions on the cessation of further work at the
building sites for the weapons, has issued a new order on the dismantling of the weapons which you describe as
'offensive' and their crating and return to the Soviet Union."
Kennedy immediately responded, issuing a statement calling the letter "an important and constructive
contribution to peace". He continued this with a formal letter: "I consider my letter to you of October twentyseventh and your reply of today as firm undertakings on the part of both our governments which should be
promptly carried out... The U.S. will make a statement in the framework of the Security Council in reference to
Cuba as follows: it will declare that the United States of America will respect the inviolability of Cuban
borders, its sovereignty, that it take the pledge not to interfere in internal affairs, not to intrude themselves and
not to permit our territory to be used as a bridgehead for the invasion of Cuba, and will restrain those who
would plan to carry an aggression against Cuba, either from U.S. territory or from the territory of other
countries neighbouring to Cuba."[28]
The practical effect of this Kennedy-Khrushchev Pact was that it effectively strengthened Castro's position in
Cuba in that he would not be invaded by the United States. It is possible that Khrushchev only placed the
missiles in Cuba to get Kennedy to remove the missiles from Turkey and that the Soviets had no intention of
resorting to nuclear war if they were out-gunned by the Americans. However, because the withdrawals from
Turkey were not made public at the time, Khrushchev appeared to have lost the conflict and become weakened.
The perception was that Kennedy had won the contest between the superpowers and Khrushchev had been
humiliated. However, this is not entirely the case as both Kennedy and Khrushchev took every step to avoid full
conflict despite the pressures of their governments. Khrushchev held power for another two years.[28]
Aftermath
The compromise was a particularly sharp embarrassment for Khrushchev and the Soviet Union because the
withdrawal of U.S. missiles from Turkey was not made public—it was a secret deal between Kennedy and
Khrushchev. The Russians were seen as retreating from circumstances that they had started — though if played
well, it could have looked just the opposite. Khrushchev's fall from power two years later can be partially linked
to Politburo embarrassment at both Khrushchev's eventual concessions to the U.S. and his ineptitude in
precipitating the crisis in the first place. However, the Cuban Missile Crisis was not solely responsible for the
fall of Khrushchev. The main reason was that rival politicians such as Leonid Brezhnev believed that
Khrushchev did not have enough "power" to handle international crises[citation needed].
For Cuba, it was a partial betrayal by the Soviets, given that decisions on how to resolve the crisis had been
made exclusively by Kennedy and Khrushchev, and certain issues of interest to Cuba, such as the status of
Guantanamo, were not addressed. This caused deteriorated Cuban-Soviet relations for years to come.[29] On the
other hand, Cuba continued to be protected from invasion.
One U.S. military commander was not happy with the result either. General LeMay told the President that it
was "the greatest defeat in our history" and that the U.S. should invade immediately.
The Cuban Missile Crisis spurred the creation of the Moscow-Washington hot line, a direct communications
link between Moscow and Washington D.C. The purpose was to have a way that the leaders of the two Cold
War countries could communicate directly to solve such a crisis.
Various commentators (Melman, 1988; Hersh, 1997) also suggest that the Cuban Missile Crisis encouraged US
use of military means, such as in the Vietnam War.
This Russo-American confrontation was synchronous with the Sino-Indian War, dating from the U.S.'s military
quarantine of Cuba; historians speculate that the Chinese attack against India for disputed land was meant to
coincide with the Cuban Missile Crisis.[30]
Historical notes
Adlai Stevenson shows aerial photos of Cuban missiles to the United Nations in November 1962.
Arthur Schlesinger, historian and adviser to John F. Kennedy, on National Public Radio on October 16, 2002,
concluded that Castro had not wanted the missiles but that Khrushchev had forced them upon Cuba in a bit of
political arm-twisting and "socialist solidarity." However, Castro has said that although he was not completely
happy about the idea of the missiles in Cuba, the Cuban National Directorate of the Revolution accepted them
to protect Cuba against U.S. attack, and to aid its ally, the Soviet Union.[31] Schlesinger believed that, having
accepted the missiles, Castro was angrier with Khrushchev than he was with Kennedy when the missiles were
withdrawn, because Khrushchev had not consulted Castro before deciding to remove them from Cuba.[32]
In early 1992 it was confirmed that Soviet forces in Cuba had, by the time the crisis broke, received tactical
nuclear warheads for their artillery rockets and IL-28 bombers,[33] though General Anatoly Gribkov, part of the
Soviet staff responsible for the operation, stated that the local Soviet commander, General Issa Pliyev, had
predelegated authority to use them if the U.S. had mounted a full-scale invasion of Cuba. Gribkov misspoke: the
Kremlin's authorisation remained unsigned and undelivered.[citation needed] (Other accounts show that Pliyev was
given permission to use tactical nuclear warheads but only in the most extreme case of an U.S. invasion during
which contact with Moscow was lost. However, when U.S. forces seemed to be readying for an attack (after the
U-2 photos, but before Kennedy's television address), Khrushchev rescinded his earlier permission for Pliyev to
use the tactical nuclear weapons, even under the most extreme conditions.)
Castro has stated that he knew during the crisis that the warheads had indeed reached Cuba, and that he had
recommended their use, despite being sure that Cuba would be completely destroyed should nuclear war break
out.[33]
In October 1997, The John F. Kennedy Library released a set of tape recordings documenting the crisis for the
period October 18 to October 29, 1962. These recordings were made in the Oval Office. They include President
Kennedy's personal recollections of discussions, conversations with his advisors, meetings with the Joint Chiefs
of Staff and members of the president's executive committee.
Arguably the most dangerous moment in the crisis was unrecognised until the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana
conference in October 2002, attended by many of the veterans of the crisis, at which it was learned that on
October 26, 1962 the USS Beale had tracked and dropped practice depth charges on the B-39, a Soviet Foxtrotclass submarine which was armed with a nuclear torpedo. Running out of air, the Soviet submarine was
surrounded by American warships and desperately needed to surface. An argument broke out among three
officers on the B-39, including submarine captain Valentin Savitsky, political officer Ivan Semonovich
Maslennikov, and chief of staff of the submarine flotilla, Commander Vasiliy Arkhipov. An exhausted Savitsky
became furious and ordered that the nuclear torpedo on board be made combat ready. Accounts differ about
whether Commander Arkhipov convinced Savitsky not to make the attack, or whether Savitsky himself finally
concluded that the only reasonable choice left open to him was to come to the surface.[34]
At the Cuban Missile Crisis Havana conference, Robert McNamara admitted that nuclear war had come much
closer than people had thought. Thomas Blanton, director of the National Security Archive, said that "a guy
called Vasili Arkhipov saved the world."
In popular culture
The 1974 docudrama The Missiles of October is a serious portrayal of the crisis.
Joe Dante's 1993 film Matinee is set in Key West, Florida, during the Cuban Missile Crisis. It portrays a Bmovie production about a man turning into a giant ant due to exposure to radiation.
The 1999 romantic comedy Blast from the Past portrays a family who hides in a bomb shelter during the crisis,
emerging over thirty years later to the modern world of 1997.
The 1999 Brendan DuBois novel Resurrection Day is premised on an alternative history in which a fictional
United States Air Force general responded to the October 27 U-2 downing with airstrikes, triggering a chain of
events leading to a nuclear war.
The 2000 film Thirteen Days focuses on the career of John Kennedy's associate Kenny O'Donnell (played by
Kevin Costner) during the Cuban Missile Crisis.
In the video game Metal Gear Solid 3: Snake Eater, a conspiracy theory is employed in the plot. In the game,
the removal of missiles from Turkey was only used as a cover-up by the US government. The USSR agreed to
remove the missiles from Cuba in exchange for the handover of a top weapon scientist who had earlier defected
to the US.
The second season finale of Mad Men, "Meditations in an Emergency," is set during the missile crisis, much of
the episode is devoted to the panic of the characters in New York City.
The Tangent Comics imprint of DC Comics is set in an alternate timeline where the missile crisis degenerated
into nuclear war when a U.S. superhero named the Atom flew to Cuba and was mistaken by radar technicians
for an inbound nuclear missile.
See also
Cuba portal
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International crisis
Cold War
Brinkmanship
Bomber gap
Missile gap
Dino Brugioni
Cuba-United States relations
Cuban-Soviet relations
Thirteen Days (book), written by Robert F. Kennedy
The Fog of War: Eleven Lessons from the Life of Robert S. McNamara
The Missiles of October - 1974 docu-drama about the crisis.
Stanislav Petrov
Sino-Indian War, which occurred at the same time as the Crisis.
Able Archer 83, 1983 NATO training exercise seen by the USSR as start of a nuclear attack.
Norwegian rocket incident, 1995 scientific experiment initially seen as nuclear attack by Russia.
Cuban Missile Crisis: The Aftermath, a video game based on fictional outcomes of the crisis
The World Next Door, alternate history of the crisis
Notes
1. ^ B. Gregory Marfleet, ‗The Operational Code of John F. Kennedy During the Cuban Missile Crisis: A
Comparison of Public and Private Rhetoric‘, Political Psychology, 21/3, p 545.
2. ^ Castro's Cuba. 1962. LOC: 62:10759. page 13.
3. ^ "Cuban Missile Crisis Causes". http://library.thinkquest.org/11046/days/causes.html.
4. ^ Pope, Ronald R., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis (Illinois State University, 1982), p.7
5. ^ a b Franklin, Jane, [excerpts from The Cuban Missile Crisis - An In-Depth Chronology],
http://andromeda.rutgers.edu/~hbf/missile.htm
6. ^ The American Presidency Project. "Proclamation 3447—Embargo on all trade with Cuba".
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=58824.
7. ^ Cuban resolution,october U.S. Public Law 87-733, S.J. Res. 230
8. ^ quote in Weldes, J. - "Constructing National Interests: The United States and the Cuban Missile
Crisis" University of Minnesota Press, 1999 p.29
9. ^ Mark J. White, The Cuban Missile Crisis (London: Macmillan Press Ltd, 1996), p. 228
10. ^ a b Kennedy, John F. (October 22, 1962), Speech on the Cuban Missile Crisis,
http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/cold.war/episodes/10/documents/kennedy.speech/
11. ^ Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W.W. Norton & Company.
pp. 3–5. ISBN 0-393-09896-6.
12. ^ The Cuban Missile Crisis, BBC
13. ^ Interview with Sidney Graybeal - 29.1.98, George Washington University National Security Archive,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/coldwar/interviews/episode-21/graybeal3.html
14. ^ Brugioni, Dino A. (Updated edition (October 5, 1993)). Eyeball to Eyeball: The Inside Story of the
Cuban Missile Crisis. Random House. ISBN 0679748784.
15. ^ Hilsman, Roger (1967). To Move a Nation: The Politics of Foreign Policy in the Administration of
John F. Kennedy. Doubleday.
16. ^ Revelations from the Russian Archives
17. ^ Allison, Graham. Essence of Decision. Pearson Education. pp. 111–116. ISBN 0-321-01349-2.
18. ^ Kennedy, Robert. Thirteen Days: A memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis. W.W. Norton & Company.
pp. 14. ISBN 0-393-09896-6.
19. ^ Blight, J. & Welch, D. - 'On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban Missile Crisis'
Noonday Press, 1990
20. ^ Kennedy, J. - 'The President's News Conference of September 13, 1962', In 'Public Papers of the
Presidents: John F Kennedy, 1962' pp. 674-681. Washington, DC. Government Printing Office, 1963
21. ^ Kennedy, J. - 'After Two Years: A converstaion with the president' Television and radio interview,
December 17 1962. In 'Public Papers of the Presidents: John F. Kennedy, 1962' pp.889-904.
Washington, DC. Government Printing Office 1963
22. ^ Anderson, George Whelan Jr. (Chief of Naval Operations), "The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962:
Abeyance and Negotiation, 31 October -13 November", The Naval Quarantine of Cuba, 1962, U.S.
Naval Historical Center, Report on the Naval Quarantine of Cuba, Operational Archives Branch, Post 46
Command File, Box 10, Washington, DC, http://www.history.navy.mil/faqs/faq90-5c.htm
23. ^ Helms, Richard (Deputy Director for Plans, CIA) (19 January 1962), Memorandum for the Director of
Central Intelligence: Meeting with the Attorney General of the United States concerning Cuba, George
Washington University National Security Archives,
http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/620119%20Meeting%20with%20the%20Attorney%2
0Gen..pdf
24. ^ Attack us at your Peril, Cocky Cuba Warns US by Henry Brandon, The Sunday Times, October 28,
1962
25. ^ For the President's Eyes Only, pg. 300
26. ^ Frey, Jennifer (January 14, 2007). "At Yenching Palace, Five Decades of History to Go". Washington
Post. http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2007/01/13/AR2007011301272.html.
Retrieved on 2008-12-27.
27. ^ "The Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962: Press Release, 11 October 2002, 5:00 PM". George Washington
University. 2002-10-11. http://www.gwu.edu/~nsarchiv/nsa/cuba_mis_cri/press3.htm. Retrieved on
2008-10-26.
28. ^ a b Faria p. 103
29. ^ Ramonet, Ignacio, Fidel Castro: My Life. Penguin Books: 2007, p. 278. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8
30. ^ Frontier India India-China Section Note alleged connections to Cuban Missile Crisis
31. ^ Ramonet, Ignacio, ibid, p. 272
32. ^ In his biography, Castro does not compare his feelings for either leader at that moment, however he
makes it clear that he was angry with Khrushchev for lack of consultation. See Ramonet, Ignacio, Fidel
Castro: My Life. Penguin Books: 2007, pp. 284-5. ISBN 978-0-1410-2626-8
33. ^ a b Arms Control Association: Arms Control Today
34. ^ Dobbs, Michael, One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear
War, Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008; p. 303, 317. ISBN 978-1-4000-4358-3.
References
The short time span of the Cuban Missile Crisis and the extensive documentation of the decision-making
processes on both sides makes it an excellent case study for analysis of state decision-making. In the Essence of
Decision, Graham T. Allison and Philip D. Zelikow use the crisis to illustrate multiple approaches to analysing
the actions of the state.
It was also a substantial focus of the 2003 documentary The Fog of War, which won an Oscar.
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Allison, Graham and Zelikow, P. Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis; New York:
Longman, 1999.
Blight, James G., and David A. Welch. On the Brink: Americans and Soviets Reexamine the Cuban
Missile Crisis; New York: Hill and Wang, 1989.
Chayes, Abram. The Cuban Missile Crisis, International Crisis and the Role of Law; Oxford University
Press, 1974; 2nd ed., 1987.
Diez Acosta, Tomás, October 1962: The 'Missile' Crisis As Seen From Cuba; Pathfinder Press, New
York, 2002.
Divine, Robert A. The Cuban Missile Crisis; New York: M. Wiener Pub.,1988.
Dobbs, Michael. One Minute to Midnight: Kennedy, Khrushchev, and Castro on the Brink of Nuclear
War; Alfred A. Knopf, New York, 2008; ISBN 978-1-4000-4358-3.
Faria, Miguel, Cuba in Revolution—Escape from a Lost Paradise(2002); Hacienda Publishing, Macon,
Georgia, ISBN 0-9641077-3-2. http://www.haciendapub.com
Frankel, Max, High Noon in the Cold War; Ballantine Books, 2004; Presidio Press (reprint), 2005; ISBN
0-345-46671-3.
Fursenko, Aleksandr, and Naftali, Timothy; One Hell of a Gamble - Khrushchev, Castro and Kennedy
1958-1964; W.W. Norton (New York 1998)
Fursenko, Aleksandr; Night Session of the Presidium of the Central Committee, 22-23 October; Naval
War College Review, vol. 59, no. 3 (Summer 2006).
George, Alice L. (2006). Awaiting Armageddon: How Americans Faced the Cuban Missile Crisis.
University of North Carolina Press. ISBN 0807828289.
Gonzalez, Servando The Nuclear Deception: Nikita Khrushchev and the Cuban Missile Crisis;
IntelliBooks, 2002; ISBN 0-
9711391-5-6.
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Kennedy, Robert F. Thirteen Days: A Memoir of the Cuban Missile Crisis; ISBN 0-393-31834-6.
Khrushchev, Sergei, How my father and President Kennedy saved the world; American Heritage
magazine, October 2002 issue.
May, Ernest R. (editor); Zelikow, Philip D. (editor), The Kennedy Tapes: Inside the White House during
the Cuban Missile Crisis; Belknap Press, 1997; ISBN 0-674-17926-9.
Polmar, Norman and Gresham, John D. (foreword by Clancy, Tom) DEFCON – 2: Standing on the
Brink of Nuclear War During the Cuban Missile Crisis; Wiley, 2006; ISBN 0-471-67022-7.
Pope, Ronald R., Soviet Views on the Cuban Missile Crisis: Myth and Reality in Foreign Policy
Analysis; University Press of America, 1982.
Stern, Sheldon M., Averting the Final Failure: John F. Kennedy and the Secret Cuban Missile Crisis
Meetings; Stanford University Press, 2003; ISBN 0804748462
Stern, Sheldon M. (2005). The Week The World Stood Still: Inside The Secret Cuban Missile Crisis
(Stanford Nuclear Age Series). Stanford University Press. ISBN 0804750777.
The Cuban Missile Crisis: Declassified (Television Program)
External links
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IV. Chronology of Submarine. Contact During the Cuban Missile Crisis. October 1, 1962 - November
14, 1962. Prepared by Jeremy Robinson-Leon and William Burr.
CIA Documents on the Cuban Missile Crisis, 1962(.pdf, 354 pgs.) U.S. Central Intelligence Agency,
McAuliffe, M. ed., CIA History Staff, 1992.
Cuban Missile Crisis and Aftermath, 1961 - 1963, Volume XI of the Kennedy Administration in the
Foreign Relations of the United States series, U.S. Department of State, Office of the Historian, Keefer,
E., Sampson, C., & Smith, L., Eds., U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington, D.C., 1996. The
official U.S. documentary historical record.
Declassified Documents, etc. - Provided by the National Security Archive at The George Washington
University.
Declassified "Memorandum for the Secretary of Defense" on "Justification for U.S. Military
Intervention in Cuba," from the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Washington, D.C., March 13, 1962, html text from
Cryptome .pdf from National Security Archive, at The George Washington University.
Transcripts and Audio of EXCOMM meetings - Provided by the Miller Center's Presidential Recordings
Program, University of Virginia.
Tapes of debates between JFK and his advisors during the crisis
President Kennedy's Address to the Nation on the Soviet Arms Buildup in Cuba
The World On the Brink: John F. Kennedy and the Cuban Missile Crisis
14 Days in October: The Cuban Missile Crisis - a site geared toward high-school students
Nuclear Files.org Introduction, timeline and articles regarding the Cuban Missile Crisis
Cuba Havana Documentary Bye Bye Havana is a documentary revealing what Cubans are thinking
about today
Annotated bibliography on the Cuban Missile Crisis from the Alsos Digital Library.
October, 1962: DEFCON 4, DEFCON 3
Spartacus Educational(UK): Cuban Missile Crisis
Latin American Task Force
What the President didn't know
Document - Britain's Cuban
The Cuban Missile War: an alternate history timeline
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On the morning of 27 Sept., 1942, Signalman First Class Douglas a Munro organized a rescue mission that
saved 500 Marines who were pinned down on the Guadalcanal, beach ...
It was 27 Sept., 1942. Signalman First Class Douglas A. Munro wouldn't see the 28th.
Munro, the first and only member of the U.S. Coast Guard to receive the Medal of Honor, In his honor, the Coast Guard
Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971. There is a statue of Munro at
the Coast Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well
had been aboard the the seaplane tender Ballard.
Anchored just off Guadalcanal, the ship received word that 500 men from the 1st Battalion, 7th Marines, had met
fierce resistance from the Japanese and were pinned down on the beach, their backs to the sea. So bad was it
that the Marines had begun to stack dead bodies - like sandbags - for cover.
Munro immediately volunteered to lead five Higgins boats in to get them out.
The signalman and his crew stayed low in the small boats as lead whistled and screamed overhead. As they neared
the island the anguished cries and moans of wounded Marines grew louder, until a gentle bump followed by a
scraping sound told the rescue team they had arrived in hell.
The gray-helmeted Munro and his crew swung into action. The evacuation had begun.
The Higgins boats, too small to remove all of the Marines at one time, made several trips from the island to ships.
Near the end of the mission, when only a few Marines remained on the beach, enemy fire intensified, pinning them once
again.
Munro recognized immediately that the Marines were in an untenable position, and their deaths were imminent. He
quickly placed his vessel between the beachhead and the enemy, thus drawing the fire to himself.
When the last Marine was huddled safely behind the boat, Munro grabbed one of the Higgin's two guns and released a
murderous burst of return fire, trying desperately to hold the enemy off until Marines could be taken aboard. Moments
later he was mortally wounded. His crew, injured themselves, carried on until the last boat arrived and cleared the beach.
Munro maintained consiousness long enough to utter these last four words: "Did they get off?" Assured that they had, he
slowly closed his eyes and entered eternity. He died knowing he had sucessfully completed his last mission.
Eight months later, on 27 May, 1943, President Franklin D. Roosevelt presented the Medal of Honor to Munro's mother,
Mrs. James Munro.
In his honor, the Coast Guard Cutter Munro was commissioned 7 Sept., 1971. There is a statue of Munro at the Coast
Guard Training Center in Cape May, NJ, as well
The U. S. Coast Guard, long one of the nation's armed forces, has seen combat in virtually every conflict
fought by the United States since
From CDR Glenn Grahl, CO, TACLET South at the press conference announcing the death of PO Bruckenthal:
Let me start by extending my deepest sympathies to the family and friends of Petty Officers Bruckenthal, Pernaselli and Watts who lost
their lives this weekend while serving their country on the frontlines of the war on terror. The Coast Guard is extremely saddened by the
loss of Petty Officer Bruckenthal who was killed by terrorists Saturday while bravely serving his country in Iraq. We sincerely hope that
his family and friends can find a little comfort knowing that he and his Navy shipmates died as heroes.
We also want the family and friends of those wounded to know that our thoughts are with them and that the contribution and sacrifices
of these brave Coast Guardsmen and Sailors will not be forgotten. PO Ruggiero spoke to his father today and it is reported that he is
doing fine.
The Coast Guard has been serving in the Middle East in a small, quiet, but important fashion since the beginning. More significantly,
the Coast Guard has been a critical element of the U.S. military throughout our nation’s history. Securing the homeland and fighting and
winning the global war on terror remains our priority.
It is true that this is the Coast Guard’s first combat death since Viet Nam. Coast Guardsmen deploy as part of the military with the full
understanding that they may be thrust in harms way, but until Saturday that was only a considered possibility, now it is a known reality,
but it is a reality that we are prepared to deal with because it is a mission that matters.
PO Bruckenthal was an outstanding performer and a great shipmate. Upon his return he was to be rewarded for his performance by
being selected for the TACLET South training team.
The U. S. Coast Guard, long one of the nation's armed forces, has seen combat in virtually every
conflict fought by the United States since 1790. World War II saw the Coast Guard come to grips with
the empire of Japan as well as the armed might of Nazi Germany. This included going into action
against Adolf Hitler's vaunted submarine fleet, nicknamed "hearses" by the Coast Guardsmen who
fought them to the death on the open seas. During the war the U.S. Navy credited Coast Guard
forces with sinking or assisting in the sinking of thirteen of Hitler's U-boats, although the number was
probably only eleven. In the Pacific Theatre the Navy credited Coast Guard warships with sinking
one Japanese submarine but they probably sank two. Coast Guardsmen also captured two Nazi
surface vessels and they can take pride in knowing that they were the only United States' service to
do so during World War II. Additionally two U-boats surrendered to Coast Guard-manned warships at
the end of hostilities, including one, U-234, that was bound for Japan transporting a cargo of uranium
and the latest German rocket and jet technology.
Although the Coast Guard is one of the nation's armed forces, they entered the war as novices in
anti-submarine warfare. Nevertheless Coast Guardsmen learned their trade quickly and adapted to
combat on the seas in an efficient and deadly manner. During the long campaign across the open
waters of the North Atlantic, battling fierce storms as well as the highly trained and well equipped
German U-boat fleet, the famous Treasury Class and other cutters earned the respect of both allies
and enemies. Later, Coast Guard-manned Navy warships joined the battle and continued escorting
convoys and sailing in hunter-killer groups through the end of the war.
Smaller cutters made history by fighting and sinking U-boats right off the
coast of the United States. One of these cutters, the U.S.S. Icarus, C.G.,
sank the U-352 and then rescued the surviving crewman off North Carolina
(left) in 1942. The crewman of the Icarus have the distinction of being the
first U.S. servicemen to capture German prisoners of war in World War II.
Cutters and their crews gained international recognition during a number of
combat actions in the North Atlantic and in the waters off Greenland and
Iceland. The U.S.S. Spencer, C.G., one of the 327-foot Treasury Class
cutters, attacked and sank the U-175 in the open Atlantic (right) after the
hearse attempted to attack the convoy that Spencer was guarding. This
action was unique in that two combat photographers caught the battle on
film, providing an unmatched visual record for posterity of the destruction of one of Hitler's vaunted Uboats and the rescue of its crew. Some of the Spencer's crew actually boarded the stricken
submarine, becoming the first U.S. servicemen to board an enemy warship that was under way at sea
since the War of 1812.
The campaign was not all one-sided as a number of cutters and Coast Guard-manned Navy warships
were damaged or sunk by the enemy in both theatres of operation. Some of the losses were heavy,
including all hands of the weather ship U.S.S. Muskeget, all but two of the crew of U.S.S. Escanaba,
C.G., and 158 out of 186 of the crew of U.S.S. Leopold. The U.S.S. Alexander Hamilton, C.G.,
torpedoed and sunk in January, 1942, was the first U.S. naval vessel lost in combat after the tragic
day at Pearl Harbor. Other vessels were damaged in combat with U-boats, including the U.S.S.
Campbell, C.G., and the U.S.S. Menges, but were salvaged and returned to duty.
Since the end of the war divers have discovered submarines where none had been documented as
being sunk while the sea floor remains empty where it was thought a "hearse" was positively
destroyed. Due to the nature of anti-submarine warfare at sea many of the officially credited sinkings
were in fact incorrect. Enemy submarines that the Allies were sure had been sunk at a particular time
and place were in fact only damaged and did make it back to port. When no prisoners were taken or
wreckage found it was at best an inexact science to determine if a submarine had indeed been
sunk. So, keeping that fact in mind, here is a revised listing of the enemy craft credited by the U.S.
Navy to the Coast Guard as combat victories during World War II.
In what wars and conflicts did personnel from the Coast Guard
(or its predecessors) serve and what were the Coast Guard’s
casualties in each?
War
Quasi-War with
France
War of 1812
Mexican War
Civil War
SpanishAmerican War
World War I
World War II
Korean War
Vietnam War
Mayaguez
Incident
Grenada:
Operation
Urgent Fury
Panama:
Operation Just
Cause
Operations
Desert Shield /
Storm
Kosovo
Operation Iraqi
Freedom
*
Number Served
Deaths in Action
Wounded Total Casualties
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
100 (?)
71 officers
219 officers
unknown
unknown
1
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
unknown
660
0
unknown
unknown
8,835
241,093
8,500 ***
8,000
111 *
574 **
0
7
unknown
unknown
0
60
unknown
1,917
0
67
7 ****
0
0
0
162
0
0
0
9*****
0
0
0
400
0
0
0
100
0
0
0
1,250 ******
1
1
2
= 81 Coast Guard deaths from other causes, i.e. crashes, accidents, disease or drowning.
** = 1,343 Coast Guard deaths from other causes, i.e. crashes, accidents, disease or drowning.
*** = Approximate number of Coast Guardsmen who were eligible for the Korean Service Medal.
**** = Crewmen on board HC-130B CG-1339.
***** = There were 6 personnel from Group Miami LEDET who were stationed aboard the USS
Vreeland (FF-1068) which was conducting CN operations when the ship was diverted for Operation
Just Cause. Three others were assigned permanently to Panama and were also involved in the
conflict. No casualties were incurred.
****** = As of 3 June 2004