Download Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly

WP/10/146
Resolution of Banking Crises:
The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia
© 2010 International Monetary Fund
WP/10/146
IMF Working Paper
Research Department
Resolution of Banking Crises: The Good, the Bad, and the Ugly
Prepared by Luc Laeven and Fabian Valencia1
Authorized for distribution by Stijn Claessens
June 2010
Abstract
This Working Paper should not be reported as representing the views of the IMF.
The views expressed in this Working Paper are those of the author(s) and do not necessarily represent
those of the IMF or IMF policy. Working Papers describe research in progress by the author(s) and are
published to elicit comments and to further debate.
This paper presents a new database of systemic banking crises for the period 1970-2009.
While there are many commonalities between recent and past crises, both in terms of
underlying causes and policy responses, there are some important differences in terms of the
scale and scope of interventions. Direct fiscal costs to support the financial sector were
smaller this time as a consequence of swift policy action and significant indirect support from
expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, the widespread use of guarantees on liabilities, and
direct purchases of assets. While these policies have reduced the real impact of the current
crisis, they have increased the burden of public debt and the size of government contingent
liabilities, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability in some countries.
JEL Classification Numbers: E50; E60; G20
Keywords: banking crisis; government intervention; crisis resolution; macroeconomic policy
Author’s E-Mail Address: [email protected]; [email protected]
1
Luc Laeven is Deputy Division Chief in the Research Department of the International Monetary Fund and
Research Fellow at CEPR, and Fabian Valencia is Economist in the Research Department of the International
Monetary Fund. The authors thank Eugenio Cerutti, Stijn Claessens, Luis Cortavarria-Checkley, Peter Dohlman,
Mark Griffiths, Aditya Narain, David Parker, Noel Sacasa, and Johannes Wiegand, for comments and/or
discussions, and Jeanne Verrier for outstanding research assistance.
2
Contents
Page
I. Introduction ........................................................................................................................... 3 II. The 2007-2009 Global Crisis: A Synopsis ........................................................................... 4 III. Which Countries Had a Systemic Banking Crisis in 2007-2009? ...................................... 6 IV. Policy Responses in the 2007-2009 Crises: What Is New? .............................................. 12 V. How Costly Are the 2007-2009 Systemic Banking Crises? .............................................. 22 VI. Concluding Remarks ........................................................................................................ 27 Box
1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present .................................................................................. 19 Table
1. Systemic Banking Crises, 2007-2009…….………………………………………………...9
2. Banking Crisis Start and End Dates……………………………………………………....11
3. Market Capitalization of Top 30 Banks Worldwide, by Nationality……………………..21
4. Summary of the Cost of Banking Crises…..….…………………………………..............22
A.1. Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses..…………………………………………..30
A.2. Preemptive Responses in Selected G-20 Countries….....................................................32
A.3. Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees..…………….............33
A.4. Top 30 Banks in the World By Market Capitalization.………………...………………35
Figures
1. Foreign Claims by Nationality of Reporting Banks………………………………………13
2. Emergency Central Bank Liquidity Support.……………………………………………..14
3. Monetary Expansion.……………………………………………………………………....16
4. Timing of Recapitalization Policies ……………………………………………………….17
5. Bank Failures and Interventions in Selected Countries..…………………………………..18
6. U.S. Bank Failures: Fraction of Failed Banks..……………………..……………………..19
7. U.S. Bank Failures: Market Share of Failed Banks..……………..……………………….19
8. U.S. Bank Failures: Loss Rates on Assets of Failed Banks………………....…..………...20
9. Direct Fiscal Costs…………….……………………….…………………..……...............23
10. Increase in Public Debt……………………….………………………………………….24
11. Increase in Public Debt and Direct Fiscal Costs……………………………………….. 25
12. Output Losses.……………………………..…………………………………………….26
.
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I. INTRODUCTION
Since 2007, the world has experienced a period of severe financial stress, not seen since the
time of the Great Depression. This crisis started with the collapse of the subprime residential
mortgage market in the United States and spread to the rest of the world through exposure to
U.S. real estate assets, often in the form of complex financial derivatives, and a collapse in
global trade. Many countries were significantly affected by these adverse shocks, causing
systemic banking crises in a number of countries, despite extraordinary policy interventions.
Systemic banking crises are disruptive events not only to financial systems but to the
economy as a whole. Such crises are not specific to the recent past or specific countries –
almost no country has avoided the experience and some have had multiple banking crises.
While the banking crises of the past have differed in terms of underlying causes, triggers, and
economic impact, they share many commonalities. Banking crises are often preceded by
prolonged periods of high credit growth and are often associated with large imbalances in the
balance sheets of the private sector, such as maturity mismatches or exchange rate risk, that
ultimately translate into credit risk for the banking sector.
With the recovery from the latest crisis underway, some questions naturally arise: What
caused the most recent crisis? How come this crisis led to varied levels of stress in different
countries? How does the cost of this crisis compare to that of previous banking crisis
episodes? And how do current policy responses differ from those of the past?
This paper presents new and comprehensive data on the starting dates and characteristics of
systemic banking crises over the period 1970-2009, building on earlier work by Caprio et al.
(2005), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and Reinhart and Rogoff (2009). In particular, we
update the Laeven and Valencia (2008) database on systemic banking crises to include the
recent episodes following the U.S. mortgage crisis of 2007. The update makes several
improvements to the earlier database, including an improved definition of systemic banking
crisis, the inclusion of crisis ending dates, and a broader coverage of crisis management
policies. The result is the most up-to-date banking crisis database available.2
The new data show that there are many commonalities between recent and past crises, both in
terms of underlying causes and policy responses, yet there are also some striking differences
in the economic and fiscal costs associated with the new crises. The economic cost of the
new crises is on average much larger than that of past crises, both in terms of output losses
and increases in public debt. The median output loss (computed as deviations of actual output
from its trend) is 25 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a historical median of 20
percent of GDP, while the median increase in public debt (over the three year period
2
The banking crisis dataset is publicly available www.luclaeven.com/Data.htm
4
following the start of the crisis) is 24 percent of GDP in recent crises, compared to a
historical median of 16 percent of GDP. These differences in part reflect an increase in the
size of financial systems, the fact that the recent crises are concentrated in high-income
countries, and possibly differences in the size of the initial shock to the financial system.
At the same time, direct fiscal costs to support the financial sector were smaller this time at 5
percent of GDP, compared to 10 percent of GDP for past crises, as a consequence of
relatively swift policy action and the significant indirect support the financial system
received through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, the widespread use of guarantees
on liabilities, and direct purchases of assets that helped sustain asset prices.
Policy responses broadly consisted of the same type of containment and resolution tools as
used in previous crisis episodes. As in past crises, policymakers used extensive liquidity
support and guarantees. However, recapitalization policies were implemented more quickly
this time around. While in previous crises it took policymakers about one year from the time
that liquidity support became extensive before comprehensive recapitalization measures were
implemented, this time recapitalization measured were implemented around the same time
that liquidity support became extensive.
While all these extraordinary measures have contributed to reduce the real impact of the
recent crisis, they also have increased the burden of public debt and the size of fiscal
contingent liabilities, raising concerns about fiscal sustainability in a number of countries.
The paper proceeds as follows. Section II presents a brief review of the events that led to the
2007-2009 global crises. Section III defines a systemic banking crisis and presents a list of
countries that meet this definition. Section IV describes the policy responses and contrasts
them with past crises. Section V presents the cost of recent crises and a comparison with past
episodes. Section VI concludes.
II. THE 2007-2009 GLOBAL CRISIS: A SYNOPSIS
Over the decade prior to the crisis, the United States and several other advanced economies
experienced an uninterrupted upward trend in real estate prices, which was particularly
pronounced in residential property markets. What originated this boom is still a source of
debate, though there appears to be broad agreement that financial innovation in the form of
asset securitization, government policies to increase homeownership, global imbalances,
expansionary monetary policy, and weak regulatory oversight played an important role (e.g.,
Keys et al., 2010; Obstfeld and Rogoff, 2009; and Taylor, 2009).
The boom in real estate prices was exacerbated by financial institutions’ ability to exploit
loopholes in capital regulation, allowing banks to significantly increase leverage while
maintaining capital requirements. They did so by moving assets off-balance sheet into special
purpose vehicles that were subject to weaker capital standards and by funding themselves
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increasingly short-term and in wholesale markets rather than traditional deposits. These
special purpose vehicles were used to invest in risky and illiquid assets (such as mortgages
and mortgage derivatives) and were funded in wholesale markets (for example, through asset
backed commercial paper), without the backing of adequate capital. The growing importance
of this shadow banking system highly dependent on short term funding, combined with lax
regulatory oversight, was a key contributor to the asset price bubble (Gorton, 2008,
Brunnermeier, 2009, and Acharya and Richardson, 2009).
Higher asset prices led to a leverage cycle by which increases in home values led to increases
in debt. The rise in asset prices decreased measured “value at risk” at financial institutions,
creating spare capacity in their balance sheets and leading to an increase in leverage and
supply of credit (Adrian and Shin, 2008). A similar mechanism took place in the household
sector, as perceived household wealth increased on the back of rising home values. Easy
access to the equity accumulated in their homes led households to increase their leverage
substantially. Mian and Sufi (2009) estimate that the average homeowner extracted 25 to 30
cents for every dollar increase in home equity to be used in real outlays. The asset price
boom was further fueled by an explosion of subprime mortgage credit in the United States
starting in 2002 and reaching a peak around mid-2006 (Dell’Ariccia et al, 2008).
The first signs of distress came in early 2007 from losses at U.S. subprime loan originators
and institutions holding derivatives of securitized subprime mortgages. However, these first
signs were limited to problems in the subprime mortgage market. Later in 2007, these
localized signs of distress turned into a global event, with losses spreading to banks in
Europe (such as U.K. mortgage lender Northern Rock), and distress was no longer limited to
financial institutions with exposure to the U.S. subprime mortgage market.
To alleviate liquidity shortages, the U.S. Federal Reserve reduced the penalty to banks for
accessing its discount window, and later that year created the Term Auction Facility.
Similarly, a blanket guarantee was issued in the United Kingdom for Northern Rock’s
existing deposits. Problems intensified in the United States with the bailout of Bear Stearns,
and later in the year with the collapse of investment bank Lehman Brothers, and the
government bailouts of insurer AIG and mortgage lenders Freddie Mac and Fannie Mae. By
the end of 2007, many economies around the world suffered from a collapse in international
trade, reversals in capital flows, and sizable contractions in real output. But as the crisis
mounted, so did the policy responses, with many countries announcing bank recapitalization
packages and other support for the financial sector in late 2008 and early 2009.
While some aspects of this crisis appear new, such as the role of asset securitization in
spreading risks across the financial system, it broadly resembles earlier boom-bust episodes,
many of which followed a period of financial liberalization. One commonality among these
crises is a substantial rise in private sector indebtedness, with the infected sectors besides
banks being the household sector (as in the current U.S. crisis and the Nordic crises of the
nineties), the corporate sector (as in the case of the 1997-98 East Asian financial crisis), or
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both. As in earlier crisis episodes, asset prices rose sharply while banks decreased reliance on
deposits in favor of less stable sources of wholesale funding, and while non-banking
institutions (for instance, finance companies in Thailand in the nineties, and offshore
financial institutions in Latin America in the eighties and nineties) grew significantly owing
in part to laxer prudential requirements for non-banks.
When such crises erupt, they generally trigger losses that spread rapidly throughout the
financial system by way of downward pressures on asset prices and interconnectedness
among financial institutions. These broad patterns repeated themselves this time around when
losses in the U.S. real estate market triggered general runs on the U.S. shadow banking
system, which ultimately hit banks in the U.S and elsewhere.
III. WHICH COUNTRIES HAD A SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISIS IN 2007-2009?
The financial crisis that started in the United States in 2007 spread around the world,
affecting banking systems in many other countries. In this section, we define a systemic
banking crisis and identify which countries experienced one. We also identify countries that
can be considered as cases of borderline banking crises, and countries that escaped a banking
crisis (either because they evaded a crisis through successful policies or because they were
not hit by the negative shock emanating from the United States).
We consider a banking crisis to be systemic if two conditions are met:
1) Significant signs of financial distress in the banking system (as indicated by
significant bank runs, losses in the banking system, and bank liquidations); and
2) Significant banking policy intervention measures in response to significant losses
in the banking system.
We consider the first year that both criteria are met to be the starting year of the banking
crisis, and consider policy interventions in the banking sector to be significant if at least three
out of the following six measures have been used:3
1) extensive liquidity support (5 percent of deposits and liabilities to nonresidents)
2) bank restructuring costs (at least 3 percent of GDP)
3
We express, when possible, the magnitude of policy interventions and associated fiscal costs in terms of GDP
rather than banking system size to control for the ability of a country’s economy to support its banking system.
This naturally results in higher measured fiscal costs for economies with larger banking systems.
7
3) significant bank nationalizations
4) significant guarantees put in place
5) significant asset purchases (at least 5 percent of GDP), and
6) deposit freezes and bank holidays.
In implementing this definition of systemic interventions, we consider liquidity support to be
extensive when the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector to deposits and foreign
liabilities exceeds 5 percent and more than doubles relative to its pre-crisis level.4
Direct bank restructuring costs are defined as the component of gross fiscal outlays directing
to restructuring the financial sector, such as recapitalization costs. They exclude asset
purchases and direct liquidity assistance from the treasury. We define significant direct
restructuring costs as those exceeding 3 percent of GDP.
Asset purchases from financial institutions include those implemented through the treasury or
the central bank. We define significant asset purchases as those exceeding 5 percent of GDP.5
A significant guarantee on bank liabilities indicates that either a full protection of liabilities
has been issued or that guarantees have been extended to non-deposit liabilities of banks. 6
Actions that only raise the level of deposit insurance coverage are not deemed significant.
Significant nationalizations are takeovers by the government of systemically important
financial institutions and include cases where the government takes a majority stake in the
capital of such financial institutions.
In the past, some countries intervened in their financial sectors using a combination of less
than three of these measures but on a large scale (for example, by nationalizing all major
banks in the country). Therefore, we consider a sufficient condition for a crisis episode to be
4
We exclude domestic non-deposit liabilities from the denominator of this ratio because information on such
liabilities is not readily available on a gross basis. For Euro-area countries, we also consider liquidity support to
be extensive if in a given semester the increase in this ratio is at least 5 percentage points. The reason is that
data on Euro-area central bank claims are confounded by large volumes of settlements and cross-border claims
between banks in the Eurosystem. As a result, the central banks of some Euro area countries (notably Germany
and Luxembourg) had already large pre-crisis levels of claims on the financial sector.
5
Asset purchases also provide liquidity to the system. Therefore, an estimate of total liquidity injected would
include schemes such as the Special Liquidity Scheme (185 bn pounds sterling) in the United Kingdom and
Norway’s Bond Exchange Scheme (230 bn kronas), as well as liquidity provided directly by the Treasury.
6
Although we do not consider a quantitative threshold for this criteria, in all cases guarantees involved
significant financial sector commitments relative to the size of the corresponding economies.
8
deemed systemic when either (i) a country’s banking system exhibits significant losses
resulting in a share of nonperforming loans above 20 percent or bank closures of at least 20
percent of banking system assets) or (ii) fiscal restructuring costs of the banking sector are
sufficiently high exceeding 5 percent of GDP.7 For the recent wave of crises, none of these
additional criteria are needed to identify systemic events.
Quantitative thresholds to implement our definition of a systemic banking crisis are
admittedly arbitrary; therefore, we also maintain an additional list of “borderline cases” that
almost met our definition of a systemic crisis. At the same time, our more quantitative
approach is a major improvement over earlier efforts to date banking crises (such as Caprio
et al., 2005; Laeven and Valencia, 2008; and Reinhart and Rogoff, 2009) that relied on a
qualitative approach to determine banking crises as situations in which “a large fraction of
banking system capital has been depleted”.
Table 1 provides the list of countries that meet our definition during the recent episode. For
each case, we also indicate the exact criteria that are met. We do not include a separate
column on deposit freezes and bank holidays because no episode during this recent wave of
banking crises made use of banking holidays, while deposit freezes were used only for Parex
bank in Latvia. In total, we identify 13 systemic banking crises and 10 borderline cases since
the year 2007.8 Table A.1 in the Appendix presents more detailed information about the
policy interventions in these cases.
As in our previous crisis database release (Laeven and Valencia, 2008), the starting year of
the banking crises in the United Kingdom and the United States is 2007, while for all other
cases the starting date is the year 2008.9
7
One concrete historical example is Latvia’s 1995 crisis, when banks totaling 40 percent of financial system’s
assets were closed, depositors experienced losses, but few of the interventions listed above were implemented.
8
Our new definition of a systemic banking crisis is somewhat more specific than the one used in Laeven and
Valencia (2008), where systemic crises were considered to include events with “significant policy
interventions”. As a consequence, a few cases listed as systemic banking crisis in our previous release, would
under this definition be considered borderline cases: Brazil 1990, Argentina 1995, Czech Republic 1996,
Philippines 1997, and United States 1988.
9
While undoubtedly the most salient events of the UK and US financial crises took place in 2008 (such as the
bailout of Bear Stearns, the collapse of Lehman Brothers, the takeover of the GSEs, and the TARP programs in
the US; and the nationalization of the Royal Bank of Scotland in the UK), significant signs of financial sector
distress and policy actions directed to the financial sector were in both cases already observed in 2007.
9
Table 1. Systemic Banking Crises, 2007-2009
Country
Extensive
Liquidity
Support
Significant
Restructuring
Costs
Significant
Asset
Purchases
Significant
Guarantees
on Liabilities
Significant
Nationalizations
Systemic Cases
Austria
Belgium
Denmark
Germany
Iceland
Ireland
Latvia
Luxembourg
Mongolia
Netherlands
Ukraine
United Kingdom
United States
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Borderline Cases
France
Greece
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Portugal
Russia
Slovenia
Spain
Sweden
Switzerland
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Note: Systemic banking crises are defined as cases where at least three of the listed interventions took place,
whereas borderline cases are those that almost met our definition of a systemic crisis. Extensive liquidity
support is defined as a situation where central bank claims on the financial sector exceed 5 percent of deposits
and foreign liabilities and is at least twice as large as pre-crisis levels; direct bank restructuring costs are
considered significant when they exceed 3 percent of GDP and exclude liquidity and asset purchase outlays;
guarantees on liabilities are considered significant when they include actions that guarantee liabilities of
financial institutions other than just increasing deposit insurance coverage limits; nationalizations are significant
when they affect systemic financial institutions.
Source: Authors’ calculations.
10
Most policy packages announced in countries that do not meet our definition can be seen as
pre-emptive interventions. In a large subset of G-20 countries, direct policies to support the
financial sector were quite modest. For instance, Argentina, Brazil, China, India, Indonesia,
Mexico, Saudi Arabia, South Africa, and Turkey all did not announce direct financial sector
support measures that involved fiscal outlays. Some did issue or increase guarantees on bank
liabilities, creating contingent liabilities for the government. For example, Mexico announced
a guarantee on commercial paper up to a limit of 50 billion pesos. Other G-20 countries were
more seriously affected by the financial turmoil and reacted more strongly, but ultimately did
not intervene at a large enough scale to be deemed a systemic crisis. Appendix Table A.2
provides more details about these cases, including the actual usage of policy measures. The
differences between announced and actually used amounts are quite striking in a number of
cases, with the actual usage of announced packages on average being small (see also Cheasty
and Das (2009) for a comparison between announcements and used amounts).
In Laeven and Valencia (2008), we included only the first year of the crisis but did not report
an end date for the crisis episode. We now expand our previous release by dating the end of
each episode. We define the end of a crisis as the year before two conditions hold: real GDP
growth and real credit growth are positive for at least two consecutive years. In case the first
two years record growth in real GDP and real credit, the crisis is dated to end the same year it
starts.10 Admittedly, this is an oversimplification given the many factors that come into play
in a crisis, and the different nature of crisis and recoveries across our sample. In a number of
cases this methodology results in long crisis durations, which sometimes is the consequence
of additional shocks affecting the country’s economic performance. In order to keep the rule
simple, we truncate duration at 5 years, beginning with the crisis year. As of end-2009, none
of the recent crises had ended according to the definition we use in this paper. The median
duration of a crisis for our old episodes is 2 years. Start and end dates for all episodes are
reported in Table 2, in which we also report output losses (to be defined in the next section).
10
In computing end dates, we use bank credit to the private sector (in national currency) from IFS (line 22d).
Bank credit series are deflated using CPI from WEO. GDP in constant prices (in national currency) also comes
from the WEO. When credit data is not available, the end date is determined as the first year before GDP
growth is positive for at least two years. In all cases, we truncate the duration of a crisis at 5 years, including the
first crisis year.
Table 2. Banking Crisis Start and End Dates
Country
Start End
Output loss
Country
Start End
Output loss
Country
Start End
Output loss
Country
Start
End
Outpus loss
11
Albania 4/
1994 1994
Costa Rica
1987 1991
0%
Kenya
1985 1985
24%
Russia 3/
2008
…
0%
Algeria
1990 1994 2/
41%
Costa Rica
1994 1995
0%
Kenya
1992 1994
50%
São Tomé & Príncipe
1992
1992 1/
2%
Argentina
1980 1982 1/
58%
Cote d'Ivoire
1988 1992 2/
45%
Korea
1997 1998
58%
Senegal
1988
1991
6%
Argentina
1989 1991
13%
Croatia 4/
1998 1999
Kuwait
1982 1985
143%
Sierra Leone
1990
1994 2/
34%
Argentina 3/
1995 1995
0%
Czech Republic 3/ 4/
1996 2000 2/
Kyrgyz Rep 4/
1995 1999 2/
Slovak Rep
1998 4/ 2002 2/
0%
Argentina
2001 2003
71%
Denmark
2008 …
36%
Latvia 4/
1995 1996
Slovenia 4/
1992
1992
Armenia /4
1994 1994 1/
Djibouti
1991 1995 2/
43%
Latvia
2008 …
116%
Slovenia 3/
2008
…
37%
Austria
2008 …
17%
Dominican Rep
2003 2004
Lebanon
1990 1993
102%
Spain
1977
1981 2/
59%
Azerbaijan 4/
1995 1995 1/
Ecuador
1982 1986 2/
98%
Liberia
1991 1995 2/
Spain 3/
2008
…
39%
Bangladesh
1987 1987
0%
Ecuador
1998 2002
25%
Lithuania 4/
1995 1996
Sri Lanka
1989
1991
20%
Belarus 4/
1995 1995
Egypt
1980 1980
1%
Luxembourg
2008 …
47%
Swaziland
1995
1999 2/
46%
Belgium
2008 …
23%
El Salvador
1989 1990
0%
Macedonia, FYR 4/ 1993 1995
0%
Sweden
1991
1995
33%
Benin
1988 1992 2/
15%
Equatorial Guinea
1983 1983 1/
0%
Madagascar
1988 1988
0%
Sweden 3/
2008
…
31%
Bolivia
1986 1986
49%
Eritrea
1993 1993 1/
Malaysia
1997 1999
31%
Switzerland 3/
2008
…
0%
Bolivia
1994 1994
0%
Estonia 4/
1992 1994
Mali
1987 1991 2/
0%
Tanzania
1987
1988
0%
Bosnia and Herzegovina 4/
1992 1996 2/
Finland
1991 1995
70%
Mauritania
1984 1984
8%
Thailand
1983
1983
25%
Brazil 3/
1990 1994 2/
62%
France 3/
2008 …
21%
Mexico
1981 1985 2/
27%
Thailand
1997
2000
109%
Brazil
1994 1998
0%
Georgia 4/
1991 1995 2/
Mexico
1994 1996
14%
Togo
1993
1994
39%
Bulgaria
1996 1997
60%
Germany
2008 …
19%
Mongolia
2008 …
0%
Tunisia
1991
1991
1%
Burkina Faso
1990 1994
Ghana
1982 1983
45%
Morocco
1980 1984 2/
22%
Turkey
1982
1984
35%
Burundi
1994 1998 2/
121%
Greece 3/
2008 …
29%
Mozambique
1987 1991 2/
0%
Turkey
2000
2001
37%
Cameroon
1987 1991 2/
106%
Guinea
1985 1985 1/
0%
Nepal
1988 1988
0%
Uganda
1994
1994
0%
Cameroon
1995 1997
8%
Guinea
1993 1993
0%
Netherlands
2008 …
25%
Ukraine 4/
1998
1999
0%
Cape Verde
1993 1993
0%
Guinea-Bissau
1995 1998
30%
Nicaragua
1990 1993
11%
Ukraine
2008
…
5%
Central African Rep
1976 1976
0%
Guyana
1993 1993
0%
Nicaragua
2000 2001
0%
United Kingdom
2007
…
24%
Central African Rep
1995 1996
9%
Haiti
1994 1998
38%
Niger
1983 1985
97%
United States 3/
1988
1988
0%
Chad
1983 1983
0%
Hungary 4/
1991 1995 2/
0%
Nigeria
1991 1995 2/
0%
United States
2007
…
25%
Chad
1992 1996 2/
0%
Hungary 3/
2008 …
42%
Norway
1991 1993
5%
Uruguay
1981
1985 2/
38%
Chile
1976 1976
20%
Iceland
2008 …
42%
Panama
1988 1989
85%
Uruguay
2002
2005
27%
Chile
1981 1985 2/
9%
India
1993 1993
0%
Paraguay
1995 1995
15%
Venezuela
1994
1998 2/
1%
China, Mainland
1998 1998
19%
Indonesia
1997 2001 2/
69%
Peru
1983 1983 1/
55%
Vietnam
1997
1997
0%
Colombia
1982 1982
47%
Ireland
2008 …
110%
Philippines
1983 1986
92%
Yemen
1996
1996
16%
Colombia
1998 2000
43%
Israel
1977 1977
76%
Philippines 3/
1997 2001 2/
0%
Zambia
1995
1998
31%
Congo, Dem Rep
1983 1983
1%
Jamaica
1996 1998
38%
Poland 4/
1992 1994
0%
Zimbabwe
1995
1999 2/
10%
Congo, Dem Rep
1991 1994 2/
130%
Japan
1997 2001 2/
45%
Portugal 3/
2008 …
37%
Congo, Dem Rep
1994 1998 2/
79%
Jordan
1989 1991
106%
Romania 4/
1990 1992 1/
0%
Congo, Rep
1992 1994
47%
Kazakhstan 3/
2008 …
0%
Russia 4/
1998 1998 1/
1/ Credit data missing. For these countries, end dates are based on GDP growth only.
2/ We truncate the duration of crises at 5 years, starting with the first crisis year.
3/ Borderline cases.
4/ No output losses are reported for crises in transition economies that took place during the period of transition to market economies.
Output losses computed as the cumulative difference between actual and trend real GDP, expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP for the period [T, T+3] where T is the starting year of the crisis. Trend real GDP is computed
by applying an HP filter (λ=100) to the GDP series over [T-20, T-1].
Source: World Economic Outlook (WEO), Laeven and Valencia (2008), and authors’ calculation.
12
IV. POLICY RESPONSES IN THE 2007-2009 CRISES: WHAT IS NEW?
Crisis management starts with the containment of liquidity pressures through liquidity
support, guarantees on bank liabilities, deposit freezes, or bank holidays. This containment
phase is followed by a resolution phase during which typically a broad range of measures
(such as capital injections, asset purchases, and guarantees) are taken to restructure banks and
reignite economic growth. It is intrinsically difficult to compare the success of crisis
resolution policies given differences across countries and time in the size of the initial shock
to the financial system, the size of the financial system, the quality of institutions, and the
intensity and scope of policy interventions. With this caveat we now compare policy
responses during the recent crisis episode with those of the past.
The policy responses during the 2007-2009 crises episodes were broadly similar to those
used in the past. First, liquidity pressures were contained through liquidity support and
guarantees on bank liabilities. Like the crises of the past, during which bank holidays and
deposit freezes have rarely been used as containment policies, we have no records of the use
of bank holidays during the recent wave of crises, while a deposit freeze was used only in the
case of Latvia for deposits in Parex Bank. On the resolution side, a wide array of instruments
was used this time, including asset purchases, asset guarantees, and equity injections. All
these measures have been used in the past, but this time around they seem to have been put in
place quicker (for detailed information about the frequency of policy interventions in past
crisis episodes, see Laeven and Valencia, 2008).
One commonality among the recent crises is that they mostly affected advanced economies
with large, internationally integrated financial institutions that were deemed too large and/or
interconnected to fail. The large international networks and cross-border exposures of these
financial institutions helped propagate the crisis to other countries. Failure of any of these
large financial institutions could have resulted in the failure of other systemically important
institutions, either directly by imposing large losses through counterparty exposures or
indirectly by causing a panic that could generate bank runs. This prompted large-scale
government interventions in the financial sector (including preemptive measures in some
countries).
Given that the crisis started in U.S. subprime mortgage markets, financial exposure to the
United States was as key propagation mechanism of the crisis (see Claessens et al., 2010).
Figure 1 shows foreign claims by nationality of reporting banks, from the BIS consolidated
banking statistics, expressed as percent of GDP, as of end-2006. Cross border banking
exposure to the US varied a great deal across countries, ranging from less than 1 percent for
Mexico to 300 percent for Switzerland. Eight out of ten of the most exposed economies meet
our systemic banking crisis definition or are categorized as borderline cases.
13
Figure 1. Foreign Claims by Nationality of Reporting Banks
As percentage of GDP at end of year 2006
50
300 80
45
40
35
30
25
20
15
10
Turkey
Mexico
Brazil
Chile
Greece
Italy
Portugal
Australia
Finland
Denmark
Spain
Austria
Sweden
Japan
Germany
France
Ireland
Belgium
UK
Canada
Switzerland
0
Netherlands
5
Note: Dark solid bars denote systemic banking crises and light solid bars denote borderline cases. Figures
denote foreign claims by nationality on the United States at end-2006 as percentage of home country GDP.
Source: BIS
Liquidity support was used intensively as a first line of response to this shock emanating
from the United States. Not only was liquidity provision large, as illustrated in Figure 2, but
it was also made available more broadly through a larger set of instruments and institutions
(including nonbank institutions), and under weaker collateral requirements. Examples of
unconventional liquidity measures include the Federal Reserve’s decision to grant primary
broker-dealers access to the discount window, the widening of collateral accepted by the
Federal Reserve and many other central banks, and the purchase of asset-backed securities by
the Federal Reserve. These actions were also accompanied in some cases by the introduction
of nonconventional facilities to fund non-financial companies directly, such as the Federal
Reserve’s Commercial Paper Facility and the Bank of England’s Asset Purchase Facility.
This significant liquidity provision is reflected in a large increase in central bank claims
against the financial sector. The median change from the pre-crisis level to its peak in the
ratio of central bank claims against the financial sector to deposits and foreign liabilities
amounts to 5.5 percent.11 This is about half its median in past crisis episodes. For comparison
11
For Germany and Luxembourg, while at the peak this variable reached 9.4 and 14.7 percent respectively, the
increments look small because banks in these countries already maintained high balances prior to the crisis due
to cross-border settlements. Liquidity support is computed as the ratio of Central Bank Claims on deposit
money banks (line 12 in IFS) to total deposits and liabilities to non-residents. Total deposits are computed as the
sum of demand deposits (line 24), other deposits (line 25), and liabilities to non-residents (line 26).
14
purposes, Figure 2 also reports the historical median of liquidity support among high-income
countries only, since most recent crises occurred in high-income economies (all crisis
countries except Mongolia, Latvia, and Ukraine).12
Figure 2. Emergency Central Bank Liquidity Support
Over the period 2007 to 2009
25
20
15
10
5
Liquidity Support from the Treasury
All (old)
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Russia
Portugal
Kazakhstan
Hungary
Greece
USA
France
UK
Ukraine
Netherlands
Mongolia
Luxembourg
Latvia
Ireland
Iceland
Denmark
Germany
Belgium
Austria
0
High Income (old)
Note: The shaded figures represent the change in the ratio of central bank claims on the financial sector over
total deposits and foreign liabilities between the peak of this ratio and the average for the year before the crisis.
The non-shaded figures represent the total amount of liquidity support funded directly by the Treasury (between
2007 and 2009) over total deposits and foreign liabilities. Dark-shaded bars denote systemic crisis cases, while
light-shaded bars denote non-systemic crises. For Iceland, liquidity data was available only up to March 2008.
Horizontal lines denote the medians classified by countries’ income level for historical data. All (old): all
previous countries; High income (old): high-income previous episodes.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008), IFS, and authors’ calculations.
In some cases, liquidity was also provided directly by the treasury, as indicated in Figure 2.
Slovenia shows the largest increase in liquidity funded by the treasury, amounting to close to
5 percent of deposits and foreign liabilities. Similarly, government deposits at Parex Bank in
Latvia constituted an important source of liquidity assistance for this bank.13 Liquidity
injected in countries labeled as borderline has also been significant, in particular for Greece,
Russia, and Sweden. For Greece, liquidity support increased steadily starting in September
12
It is worth clarifying that there are only 5 historical (pre-2007) crisis episodes among high-income countries
in our historical sample.
13
In the case of Latvia, the threshold used in our definition of extensive liquidity support is satisfied once
government deposits at Parex are counted as liquidity support.
15
2009. In Russia, liquidity support subsided quickly after reaching a peak of 20 percent of
deposits and foreign liabilities in 2009.
Guarantees on bank liabilities have also been widely used during recent crisis episodes to
restore confidence of bank liability holders. All crisis countries except Ukraine (and
Kazakhstan, Sweden, and Switzerland among borderline cases) extended guarantees on bank
liabilities other than raising deposit insurance limits. Coverage extended varied widely,
though (Appendix Table A.1). While guarantees on bank liabilities have not been uncommon
in past crises, asset guarantees have been used less frequently in the past. This time around,
asset guarantees were used in some cases, including Belgium and the United Kingdom. For
instance, the Bad Bank Act in Germany, passed in July 2009, provided private banks relieve
on holdings of illiquid assets by allowing them to transfer assets to a special entity and
receive government-guaranteed bonds issued by this special entity in exchange. While direct
fiscal costs for Germany amount to just above 1 percent of GDP, total guarantees (including
those associated with the Bad Bank and financial institutions debt) reached about 6 percent.14
One measure of the length of a crisis is the time it takes central banks to withdraw liquidity
support. As a measure of the time it took the withdraw liquidity support, we compute the
number of months between the peak of liquidity support and the month when liquidity
support declined to its pre-crisis level. In earlier crises, emergency liquidity support was
withdrawn within 14 months (median). However, this time around, as of end-2009 only
Denmark, Germany, Hungary, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, and Switzerland saw their
liquidity support returned to pre-crisis levels, suggesting that liquidity remained an issue for a
prolonged time in recent crises.
We also consider the overall size of monetary expansion, by computing the change in the
monetary base, and find that monetary expansion is significantly higher in recent crises
compared to past crises. Figure 3 shows the change in the monetary base between its peak
during the crisis and its level one year before the crisis, expressed in percentage points of
GDP.15 We find that the median monetary expansion of about 6 percent this time
significantly exceeded its historical median of about 1 percent, though it is not that different
from its historical median among high-income countries. Relatively larger financial systems
and credibility of monetary policy in high income economies may explain this difference.
14
Because Germany’s Bad Bank implies asset transfers, it could also be treated as asset purchases. Yet, we treat
it as guarantees, and therefore do not list Germany as also having met the significant asset purchases threshold.
15
Data on reserve money comes from IFS. For Euro-area countries, reserve money corresponds to the
aggregation of currency issued and liabilities to depository corporations, divided by Euro area GDP.
16
Figure 3. Monetary Expansion
Over the period 2007 to 2009 14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
All (old)
Switzerland
Spain
Sweden
Russia
Slovenia
Portugal
Kazakhstan
Hungary
France
Greece
UK
USA
Ukraine
Netherlands
Mongolia
Latvia
Ireland
Iceland
Germany
Belgium
Luxembourg
-4%
Denmark
-2%
Austria
0%
High Income (old)
Note: Change in monetary base in percentage points of GDP between the peak and its level one year before the
crisis. Horizontal lines denote the medians by country groups. All (old): all countries; High income (old): highincome countries.
Source: IFS, Laeven and Valencia (2008) and authors’ calculations.
About 70 percent of fiscal outlays correspond to public sector recapitalizations of financial
institutions. Bank recapitalizations, while not more common than in earlier crisis episodes,
have been implemented much faster than in the past. The median difference between the time
it took to implement public recapitalization programs and the time that liquidity support
became extensive (that is, when liquidity support exceeded 5 percent) is zero months for the
recent crises compared to 12 months for past crises (Figure 4).16 Addressing solvency
problems with public money is generally a complex and lengthy process because it requires
political consensus and legislation. Policymakers therefore often prolong the use of liquidity
support and guarantees in the hope that problems in the banking sector subside. This time
around, though, policymakers acted with relative speed, at least in some countries.17
16
For bank recapitalizations, we only consider “comprehensive” recapitalization packages in which public
funds were used, thereby excluding ad hoc interventions and biasing upwards our estimate of the response time.
In the new crises, three recapitalization programs targeted specific banks: Iceland (the three largest banks),
Luxembourg (Fortis and Dexia), and Latvia (Parex). We include the last two in our calculation because of the
size of the affected institutions. However, the median does not change if we exclude them. We do not include
Iceland because of limited data on liquidity support as to compute the date when it became extensive.
17
In many cases, banks were able to raise capital in private markets or from parent banks, and generally this
took place before public money was used. In addition, many banks have temporarily been allowed to avoid the
recognition of market losses and thereby overstate regulatory capital.
17
Figure 4. Timing of Recapitalization Policies
Over the period 2007 to 2009
in months
14
12
10
8
5
6
-1
0
-3
-1
-3
USA
0
0
UK
2
Ukraine
1
Netherlands
2
2
Luxembourg
4
5
-2
All (old)
Latvia
Ireland
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
-4
High-Income (old)
Note: Time in months between moment when liquidity support became extensive and implementation of
recapitalization plans. Horizontal line denotes the median across all and high-income past crises in which
recapitalization plans were put in place.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) and authors’ calculations.
Governments typically acquire stakes in the banking sector as part of government
recapitalization programs, and such ownership stakes often end up being held by the
government for a prolonged period of time. Although divestments (or repayments) of
government support on average start about one year from the start of the crisis, suggesting
that the early repayments from the TARP capital support program witnessed in the US are
not uncommon, government participation in banks has in many cases largely exceeded the
initially envisioned holding period.18 In many cases, the public sector retained participation
for over 10 years (in Japan, for instance, as of end-2008 over 30 percent of capital injected in
financial institutions following the crisis in 1997 remained to be sold). In some cases,
divestment took place by tender, through sales of entire institutions to foreign investors or
large domestic banks; in other cases, it took place more gradually through markets.
Bank failures—defined broadly by including institutions that received government
assistance—have also been significant during the recent wave of crises. This is striking given
that bank failures are rare events in most countries, in part due to regulatory forbearance and
too-big-to fail or close problems. Relative to the total assets in the banking system, the bank
failures in Iceland are by far the most significant, at about 90 percent of total banking assets
(Figure 5). Iceland is followed by Greece and Belgium with banks that failed or received
18
A comprehensive analysis of guidelines for exit strategies from crises can be found in Blanchard et al. (2010).
18
government assistance representing 80 percent or more of banking system assets in each of
these three countries. When using the more conservative definition of failure that excludes
government assistance, Iceland is followed by Belgium, Kazakhstan, and the United
Kingdom, with banks representing 53 percent, 28 percent, and 26 percent, respectively, of the
system failing. In terms of banks receiving government assistance, Greece tops the charts,
with banks holding 80 percent of total banking system assets receiving some form of
government assistance. Greece is followed by France and Ireland, with banks holding about
70 and 55 percent, respectively, of banking system assets receiving government assistance.
Figure 5. Bank Failures and Interventions in Selected Countries
Failures and interventions as a % of total banking assets over the period August 2007 to August 2009
100%
80%
60%
40%
Failed banks, fraction of total banking assets (%)
United States
United Kingdom
Ukraine
Sweden
Switzerland
Spain
Portugal
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Latvia
Kuwait
Korea, Rep. of
Kazakhstan
Japan
Italy
Ireland
Iceland
Greece
Germany
France
Denmark
China
Belgium
0%
Austria
20%
Government-assisted banks, fraction of total banking assets (%)
Note: Government-assistance implies public capital support resulting in the government holding a minority
stake in the bank. Failure implies bank closure; bank taken over by government; nationalization; or public
capital support resulting in the government becoming a majority shareholder.
Source: Authors’ calculations based on data from IMF, EU, FDIC, and JIDC.
At least for the US, for which historical data on bank failures since the 1930s is available, the
recent wave of failures including assistance is unprecedented, with banks holding about onequarter of the deposit market having failed or received some of form of government
assistance since 2007 (see Box 1 for a more detailed analysis of historical U.S. bank failures).
Excluding banks that received public assistance, the year 1989 during the U.S. savings and
loan crisis is by far the worst year on record, with banks holding over 6% of the deposit
market failing. The United States is clearly not an outlier this time around, even when using
the broader definition of bank failures that includes government assistance. Of course, the
U.S. failure list excludes such large financial institutions as Fannie, Freddie Mac, and AIG
because they are not banks, although they meet our definition of failure, and we could
therefore underestimate the magnitude of financial distress in the United States.
19
Box 1. U.S. Bank Failures: Past and Present
U.S. bank failures since the 1930s have come in three waves: the Great Depression era of the 1930s,
the savings and loans crisis of the 1980s, and the recent mortgage crisis of the late 2000s, with the
number of bank failures peaking in the years 1937, 1989, and 2009, respectively. Compared to these
earlier bank failure episodes, the current wave of bank failures appears more short-lived and, at least
compared to the savings and loans crisis, less dramatic in terms of number of failing banks (Figure 6).
Note that 2005 and 2006 were the only two years since 1934 that reported no bank failures.
Figure 6. U.S. Bank Failures: Fraction of Failed Banks
Over the period 1934 to 2010
4.5%
4.0%
3.5%
Fraction of failed banking institutions (excluding assistance)
3.0%
Fraction of failed banking institutions (including assistance)
2.5%
2.0%
1.5%
1.0%
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
0.0%
1935
0.5%
Note: The figures include all failures and assistance transactions across 50 U.S. states and Washington DC, as percent of total number of
institutions. 2010 includes data up to April. Source: FDIC.
Owing in part to consolidation following financial deregulation starting in the 1980s, the average U.S.
bank has grown substantially in size. After accounting for this development, the recent failures look a
lot worse. Failed U.S. banks during the current crisis hold about 26 percent of the deposit market—
that is, when including banks that did not fail but received government assistance, such as Citigroup
and Bank of America (Figure 7). Using this definition of failure, 2009 is by far the worst on record.
When excluding banks that received public assistance, the year 1989 is the worst year on record.
Figure 7. U.S. Bank Failures: Market Share of Failed Banks
Over the period 1934 to 2010
20%
18%
Failed banking institutions' share in total deposits (excluding assistance)
16%
14%
Failed banking institutions' share in total deposits (including assistance)
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2010
2005
2000
1995
1990
1985
1980
1975
1970
1965
1960
1955
1950
1945
1940
0%
1935
2%
Note: The figures include the fraction of system deposits held by all bank failures and assistance transactions across 50 U.S. states and
Washington DC, as percentage of total deposits. Source: FDIC.
20
Recent bank failures have generated similar losses compared to the past, with a median loss rate to
the deposit insurance fund on assets of failed banking institutions of 19 percent (Figure 8). Median
losses are relatively stable over the examined period (data on loss rates are available starting in 1986),
and roughly the same during the recent crisis as compared to the savings and loan crisis. The median
loss rate peaked in 2008 at 28 percent. In terms of losses to the deposit insurer, we do not have data
for the year 2009 yet, but losses were significantly lower in 2008, at 0.12 percent of U.S. GDP, than
the highest loss on record in 1989 of 0.97 percent of U.S. GDP. Overall, we find that, in the particular
case of the United States, the failure rate of banks and losses incurred by the government in closing
failed banks in this crisis is similar compared to the U.S. banking crisis of the 1980’s with a median
loss rate in bank failures of about 20 percent of bank assets.
Figure 8. U.S. Bank Failures: Loss Rates on Assets of Failed Banks
Over the period 1986 to 2008
30%
Estimated loss rate (fraction of assets), median
25%
Median loss rate (1986-2008)
20%
no failures
2006
5%
no failures
10%
2005
15%
2008
2007
2004
2003
2002
2001
2000
1999
1998
1997
1996
1995
1994
1993
1992
1991
1990
1989
1988
1987
1986
0%
Note: Includes all failures and assistance transactions across 50 U.S. states and Washington DC. Loss rates are expressed as a percentage of
total bank assets. Total assets are for FDIC-insured commercial banks only. We report median loss rates by year. The estimated loss is the
difference between the amount disbursed from the Deposit Insurance Fund (DIF) to cover obligations to insured depositors and the amount
estimated to be ultimately recovered from the liquidation of the receivership estate. Estimated losses reflect unpaid principal amounts
deemed unrecoverable and do not reflect interest that may be due on the DIF’s administrative or subrogated claims should its principal be
repaid in full. Source: FDIC.
A consequence of these dramatic bank failures has been a re-organization of the worlds’
financial map, with large players becoming significantly smaller, freeing up space for new
players, in particular emerging markets. Bank failures during the recent wave of crises have
been particularly dramatic for the U.S. and some of the countries in Western Europe that
before the crisis were top tier players in global banking. Before the crisis, at end-2006, the
top 30 banks worldwide had a total stock market capitalization of about US$ 3.4 trillion
dollars, of which 40 percent belonged to U.S. banks, 12 percent to U.K. banks, and 12
percent to Japanese banks (see Table 3).19 Countries with a systemic banking crisis in 20072009 dominated the banking arena in 2006 with a share of close to 60 percent of the total.
19
A complete list of global top-30 banks in 2006 and 2009 is reported in Appendix Table A.4.
21
The crisis changed the map significantly. Twelve banks dropped from the top-30 list of 2006,
with 3 banks being acquired by other institutions. The overall loss in market capitalization of
the top-30 banks between 2006 and 2009 was a staggering 52 percent, a figure that already
includes a significant stock market recovery during 2009. The largest decline in market
capitalization corresponds to Citigroup—excluding banks that were acquired by other
institutions—however, at the country-level, the Netherlands (including Fortis) experienced
the largest average decline, followed by Japan. The latter is surprising given that Japan is not
even classified as a borderline systemic banking crisis (because, although announced policy
interventions in Japan were significant, the actual usage of these resources was small).
Table 3. Market Capitalization of Top 30 Banks Worldwide, by Nationality
As of end of year 2006 and 2009
# of banks
% of market capitalization
End-2006 End-2009
End-2006
End-2009
US
10
5
39.8
20.9
UK
4
3
12.5
13.9
France
3
3
7.8
8.8
Japan
3
1
11.9
2.5
Netherlands and Belgium 1/
3
0
6.9
0.0
Spain
2
2
6.5
9.5
Switzerland
2
2
7.5
4.9
Canada
1
2
1.8
5.0
Italy
1
2
2.9
5.1
Germany
1
1
2.4
2.1
Australia
0
4
0.0
8.8
Brazil
0
2
0.0
4.4
China
0
2
0.0
12.2
Sweden
0
1
0.0
1.9
Total
30
30
100.0
100.0
1/ Includes two Dutch institutions and Fortis, a Dutch-Belgian financial conglomerate.
Source: Bankscope. Banks used in the calculation are listed in Appendix Table A.4.
How does the list of the world’s top-30 banks look like now? Interestingly, as of end-2009
there are four countries that for the first time entered this list. These include Australia, Brazil,
China, and Sweden. On the other hand, Netherlands and Belgium—listed together because of
jointly-owned Fortis—drop from the top-30 ranking in 2009. The United States has fallen to
only 5 banks in this list, together holding only 21 percent of the market capitalization of the
world’s 30 largest banks in 2009 compared to 40 percent in 2006. The United States is
clearly the country for which the change in market capitalization share is the most dramatic.
Other clear losers include the Netherlands and Japan. While in 2006 no emerging market
appeared on the list, at end-2009 banks from Brazil and China together were holding 16
percent of the total market capitalization of top-30 banks worldwide. Other clear winners are
Australia and Canada whose large banks mostly escaped the US mortgage crisis.
22
V. HOW COSTLY ARE THE 2007-2009 SYSTEMIC BANKING CRISES?
We estimate the cost of each crisis using three metrics: direct fiscal costs, output losses, and
the increase in public sector debt relative to GDP. Direct fiscal costs include fiscal outlays
committed to the financial sector from the start of the crisis up to end-2009 (see Appendix
Table A.3 for a list of items included), and capture the direct fiscal implications of
intervention in the financial sector.20 Output losses are computed as deviations of actual GDP
from its trend, and the increase in public debt is measured as the change in the public debt-toGDP ratio over the four-year period beginning with the crisis year.21 Output losses and the
increase in public debt capture the overall real and fiscal implications of the crisis.
Table 4. Summary of the Cost of Banking Crises
Over the period 1970-2009
Direct Fiscal Cost
Increase in Public Debt
Medians (% of GDP)
Output Losses
Old crises (1970-2006)
Advanced economies
3.7
36.2
32.9
Emerging markets
11.5
12.7
29.4
All
10.0
16.3
19.5
New crises (2007-2009)
Advanced economies
5.9
25.1
24.8
Other economies
4.8
23.9
4.7
All
4.9
23.9
24.5
Note: New crises include Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Ireland, Latvia, Luxembourg,
Mongolia, Netherlands, Ukraine, United Kingdom, and United States.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) and authors’ calculations.
The recent crises are overall more costly in terms of output losses and increases in debt, but
less so in terms of direct fiscal outlays compared to the average crisis of the past. However,
when we limit the comparison to high-income countries—given they dominate the new crises
20
It is too early to provide reliable estimates about future recoveries and losses for recent crises, but wherever
funds have been recovered, they have been included in Table A.3. Also, we do not include potential losses
arising from contingent liabilities (such as asset guarantees) and schemes funded by the central bank (such as
asset purchases), although we recognize that losses in those schemes may ultimately have fiscal consequences.
21
Output losses are computed as the cumulative sum of the differences between actual and trend real GDP over
the period [T, T+3], expressed as a percentage of trend real GDP, with T the starting year of the crisis. Trend
real GDP is computing by applying an HP filter (with λ=100) to the log of real GDP series over [T-20, T-1] (or
shorter if data is not available, though we require at least 4 pre-crisis observations). Real GDP is extrapolated
using the trend growth rate over the same period. Real GDP data are from WEO. For recent crisis episodes,
GDP projections are based on April 2010 WEO. We truncate the duration of a crisis at 5 years, including the
first year. Wherever our methodology results in a crisis duration over 5 years, or when data availability impede
us from applying our methodology, we set the end year as the fifth year from the crisis start year.
23
sample—we find that output losses are similar compared to the past, increases in public debt
somewhat lower, but direct fiscal outlays higher (Table 4).
The median direct fiscal costs associated with financial sector restructuring for the 20072009 systemic banking crises amounts to almost 5 percent of GDP, about half its historical
median of 10 percent.22 Figure 9 plots the direct fiscal costs for the recent systemic crises, as
well as for the borderline cases. Two horizontal lines indicate the median of fiscal costs in all
previous crises and that among previous high-income crisis episodes. Greece, Kazakhstan,
Russia, and Slovenia show the highest figures among the borderline cases, although for
Slovenia all of it corresponds to liquidity support from the treasury in the form of bank
deposits. For Greece and Kazakhstan, at least half of it is also liquidity assistance from the
treasury, while only for Russia the entire amount corresponds to recapitalization. As one
would expect, on average, direct fiscal costs for borderline cases are lower than those for the
systemic crises. Iceland shows up with the highest fiscal outlays, at 13 percent of GDP.23
Figure 9. Direct Fiscal Costs
In percent of GDP and over the period 2007-2009
14%
12%
10%
8%
6%
4%
2%
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Russia
Portugal
Hungary
Kazakhstan
Greece
USA
France
UK
Ukraine
Mongolia
All (old)
Netherlands
Luxembourg
Latvia
Ireland
Iceland
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
0%
High Income (old)
Note: Dark-shaded bars denote systemic banking crises episodes, and light-shaded bars borderline cases. The
horizontal lines represent the medians across crises prior to 2007. Income groups are based on the World Bank
country classification. All (old): all old episodes; High income (old): all old crises in high-income countries.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008) and Authors’ calculations
22
23
These higher fiscal costs in part reflect an increase in average banking system size.
These costs exclude the obligations (mostly to the United Kingdom and the Netherlands) arising from the
Icesave crisis, which in net present value terms IMF staff estimates to be around 16 percent of GDP.
24
We regard the lower direct fiscal outlays associated with high income countries, relative to
all past crises, a consequence of the greater flexibility these countries have in supporting their
financial system indirectly through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy and direct
purchases of assets that help sustain asset prices. Additionally, some high income countries
opted for sizable contingent liabilities to complement direct fiscal outlays (see Table A.3).
Given that countries can also indirectly support their financial sector at times of crisis
through expansionary fiscal policies that support output and employment, it is useful to also
consider the overall increase in public debt as a broader estimate of the fiscal cost of the
crisis. The median debt increase among recent crises is 24 percent of GDP, about 8
percentage points higher than its historical median of 16 percent. Thus, public debt burdens
have increased significantly as a consequence of policy measures taken during the crisis.
Figure 10. Increase in Public Debt
In percent of GDP and over the period 2007-2011 (estimated)
75%
50%
25%
All (old)
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Russia
Portugal
Hungary
Kazakhstan
France
Greece
UK
USA
Ukraine
Netherlands
Mongolia
Latvia
Luxembourg
Ireland
Iceland
Denmark
Germany
Austria
Belgium
0%
High Income (old)
Note: Dark-shaded bars denote systemic banking crises episodes, and light-shaded bars denote borderline cases.
Increase in public debt is the increase in gross general government debt (central government debt if not
available) over GDP, estimated over the 3 year period following the start of the crisis using WEO debt
forecasts. Horizontal lines denote medians across past crises, classified by income level. All (old): all past crises
in emerging and high-income countries; High income (old): all past crises in high-income countries.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008), WEO and authors’ calculations.
Figure 10 shows the increase in the public debt burden for each crisis and also reports the
historical median of the increase in public debt at crisis times. We approximate the increase
in public debt that can be attributed to the crisis by computing the difference between preand post-crisis debt projections. For the 2007-2009 crises, we use the fall WEO debt
projections from the year before the crisis year as pre-crisis debt figures (i.e., September
2006 WEO for the UK and US and October 2007 WEO for all other recent crises) and the
25
Spring WEO 2010 debt projections for the post-crisis debt figures. For past episodes, we
simply report the actual change in debt.24
Among the recent borderline cases, France, Greece, Portugal and Spain exhibit the largest
expected increases in debt. While overall fiscal stimulus packages to counteract the global
recession were significant in some of these countries, the direct interventions in the financial
sector were not sufficient—as of end-2009—to qualify as systemic banking crises. Recent
developments in Greece, since our cutoff date at end-2009, while significant, are still not
sufficient for it to qualify as a systemic banking crisis, at least as of April 2010.
Figure 11. Increase in Public Debt and Direct Fiscal Costs
Difference between increase in public debt
and direct fiscal costs, relative to GDP
In percent of GDP
80%
60%
40%
20%
0%
0
10
20
-20%
-40%
Previous crisis episodes
30
40
50
Real GDP per capita (in 2000 US$)
60
70
Thousands
2007-2009 crises
Note: Circles denote the new systemic and borderline episodes, while diamonds denote old episodes. The y-axis
corresponds to the difference between the increase in public debt and gross fiscal costs, both in percent of GDP.
The x-axis corresponds to real GDP per capita, measured in 2000 US$. Old episodes exclude countries that
experienced a sovereign debt crisis using data from Laeven and Valencia (2008).
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008), WEO, and authors’ calculations.
The previous two graphs suggest a large difference between increases in fiscal costs arising
from direct support to the financial sector and increases in overall public debt. This
difference appears to be positively correlated at about 0.4 with an economy’s level of income
(Figure 11). Given that direct fiscal outlays to support the financial sector generally increase
public debt, the difference between the increase in public debt and fiscal costs reflect in part
the outcome of measures taken to support the real sector. This difference can in part be
24
We compute the increase in debt measured in percent of GDP over [T-1, T+3], where T is the starting year of
the crisis. Our choice of sources is guided by the availability of general government debt. When it is not
available, central government debt is reported instead. Our primary data source is WEO. When WEO debt data
are not available, we resort to the OECD Analytical Database and the IMF’s Government Finance Statistics.
26
explained by discretionary fiscal policy and automatic stabilizers. One possible interpretation
of this positive correlation is that high-income economies generally face easier financing
opportunities than their low-income counterparts, and therefore may choose to complement
financial measures with expansionary fiscal measures to deal with banking crises. Clearly,
expansionary fiscal policy indirectly supports the financial sector by stimulating aggregate
demand, which in turn props up loan demand and lowers the risk of loan defaults.
The fallout from the recent crisis on the real sector was large. We estimate median output
losses for the recent crises of 25 percent of GDP, which is almost 5 percentage points higher
than its historical median of 20 percent. Output losses are estimated by computing the
difference between trend GDP and actual GDP over the four-year period beginning with the
crisis year. Therefore, our methodology does not distinguish between permanent and
transitory output losses. For the new crises, we use spring 2010 WEO projections as actual
GDP for the post-crisis years. Figure 12 shows the results.25
Figure 12. Output Losses
In percent of potential output
100%
75%
50%
25%
All (old)
Switzerland
Sweden
Spain
Slovenia
Portugal
Kazakhstan
Greece
Hungary
France
UK
USA
Ukraine
Netherlands
Mongolia
Luxembourg
Latvia
Ireland
Iceland
Germany
Denmark
Belgium
Austria
0%
High Income (old)
Note: Dark-shaded bars denote systemic banking crises episodes, and light-shaded bars denote borderline cases.
Output losses are computed as cumulative percent difference between actual and trend real GDP over the 4-year
period starting with the crisis year. Trend GDP is computed applying an HP filter to the real GDP series over
the 20-year period prior to the crisis. Horizontal lines denote the historical medians classified by countries’
income level. All (old): all past crises; High income (old): all past crises in high-income countries.
Source: Laeven and Valencia (2008), WEO, and authors’ calculations.
25
The medians reported in the graph are based on output losses that have been recomputed for all crisis
episodes using the methodology employed in this paper rather than by relying on estimates of output losses in
Laeven and Valencia (2008). They computed the real GDP trend using all available data, implying a different
horizon for each country. The new output loss estimates are on average similar to those in Laeven and Valencia
(2008), though they differ for low-income countries and countries affected by large shocks, such as wars.
27
Output losses differ depending on the size of the initial shock, differences across countries in
how the shock was propagated through the financial system, and the intensity of policy
interventions. The output losses for Ireland and Latvia stand out at over 100 percent of
potential GDP. Losses among borderline cases are also significant, in particular for Hungary,
Portugal, and Spain. On average, countries with larger financial systems, and especially those
that experienced rapid expansion prior to the crisis (such as Iceland, Ireland, and Latvia),
were hit hardest.
VI. CONCLUDING REMARKS
This paper updates the Laeven and Valencia (2008) database on systemic banking crises
through end-2009 to include the recent wave of financial crises following the U.S. mortgage
crisis of 2007. Our update results in 13 new systemic banking crises episodes and 10
borderline cases since early 2007. The update makes several improvements to the earlier
database, including an improved definition of systemic banking crisis, the inclusion of crisis
ending dates, and a broader coverage of crisis management policies.
The new data shows that there are many commonalities between recent and past crises, both
in terms of underlying causes and policy responses. All crises share a containment phase
during which liquidity pressures are contained through liquidity support and in some cases
guarantees on bank liabilities. This phase is followed by a resolution phase during which a
broad range of measures is taken to restructure banks and encourage bank lending (including
asset purchases, guarantees, and capital injections) to reignite economic growth. These
common patterns echo earlier findings summarized in Honohan and Laeven (2005) and
Reinhart and Rogoff (2009).
However, the recent wave of crises also shows some important differences with previous
crisis episodes.

First, the recent crisis was concentrated in advanced economies, in particular those
with large and integrated financial systems, unlike many of the boom-bust cycles
observed in the past that centered on emerging market economies. Liquidity shortages
at systemically important, globally interconnected financial institutions in these
advanced economies prompted large-scale government interventions.

Second, while the intensity of policy interventions has been comparable to past crisis
episodes, the speed of intervention and implementation of resolution policies was
faster this time. This in part reflects that most of the crisis-affected countries are highincome countries with strong legal, political, and economic institutions that create an
enabling environment for an effective and speedy crisis resolution. Recapitalization
policies in particular were implemented much sooner than in the past, contributing to
lower direct fiscal outlays.
28

Third, countries used a much broader range of policy measures compared to past
episodes, including unconventional monetary policy measures, asset purchases and
guarantees, and significant fiscal stimulus packages. These large scale public
interventions were possible in part because most of the crisis-affected countries are
high-income countries with relatively greater institutional quality and credibility of
policy actions.

Fourth, preliminary estimates indicate that the overall economic costs of the recent
crises are higher in terms of output losses and increases in public debt compared to
past crises, though fiscal costs associated with financial sector interventions are lower
this time.
The lower short-run fiscal costs in part reflect the relatively swift action with which
governments announced recapitalization measures and took other actions to restore the health
of the financial system. However, they are also a consequence of the significant indirect
support the financial system received through expansionary monetary and fiscal policy, the
widespread use of guarantees on liabilities, and direct purchases of assets that helped sustain
asset prices. The significant support deployed through monetary and fiscal policies, including
coordinated international efforts to ensure adequate foreign exchange liquidity, and a timely
implementation of measures to address solvency problems in the financial system have
significantly contributed to reduce the real impact of the recent crises. Moreover, such
indirect support from macroeconomic stabilization policies has also lifted the burden on
traditional crisis management policies, ultimately keeping the direct fiscal costs associated
with bank recapitalization and other direct interventions into the financial sector lower than
they otherwise would have been.
However, over the medium term, these indirect support measures have significantly
increased the burden of public debt and the size of government contingent liabilities, raising
concerns about fiscal sustainability in a number of countries. Moreover, the crisis is still
ongoing in several countries and its ultimate impact will have to be reassessed in the future.
It may therefore be premature to hail recent crisis management efforts as being more
successful than those of the past.
29
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Monetary Policy,” Federal Reserve Bank of New York Staff Report 346.
Blanchard, Olivier J., Carlo Cottarelli, and José Viñals, 2010, “Exiting from Crisis
Intervention Policies,” IMF Policy Paper SM/10/10, Washington, DC.
Brunnermeier, Markus, 2009, “Deciphering the Liquidity and Credit Crunch 2007-2008,”
Journal of Economic Perspectives, Vol. 23, pp. 77–100.
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Crisis Database,” in Patrick Honohan and Luc Laeven (eds.), Systemic Financial
Crises: Containment and Resolution. Cambridge, U.K.: Cambridge University Press.
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Lead to Lax Screening? Evidence From Subprime Loans,” Quarterly Journal of
Economics, Vol. 125, pp. 307–62.
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Working Paper No. 08/224, Washington, DC.
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U.S. Household Leverage Crisis,” American Economic Review, forthcoming.
Obstfeld, Maurice, and Kenneth Rogoff, 2009, “Global Imbalances and the Financial Crisis:
Products of Common Causes,” Unpublished manuscript.
Taylor, John, 2009, Getting Off Track: How Government Actions and Interventions Caused,
Prolonged, and Worsened the Financial Crisis, Hoover Press.
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Financial Folly, Princeton University Press.
Table A.1. Systemic Banking Crises Policy Responses
During the years 2007 to 2009
Country
Liquidity Support
Gross Restructuring Costs
(percentage points increase in
central bank claims on
financial institutions over
deposits and foreign liabilities)
(recapitalization and other
restructuring costs, excluding
liquidity and asset purchases,
in percent of GDP)
Austria
8.2
2.1
Guarantees: 0.6
Belgium
14.0
5.0
Guarantees: 7.7
Denmark
10.5
2.8
Germany
2.8
1.2
Iceland
2.4
13.0
Ireland
13.3
7.6
Latvia
3.3
2.5
Luxembourg
4.3
7.7
DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000.
€4.5 billion guarantee on Dexia’s debt.
Fortis and Dexia’s subsidiaries
(2008)
Mongolia
9.4
3.0
Unlimited coverage to all deposits.
Zoos Bank (2009)
Netherlands
3.3
6.5
DI raised to €100,000.
Interbank loans of solvent banks.
Fortis bonds (€5 bn) and ING bonds (€10 bn).
ABN-AMRO/Fortis (2008)
Ukraine
14.6
4.8
Asset Purchases and
Guarantees
(funded by treasury
and central bank, in
percent of GDP)
Purchases: 0.2
Guarantees on Liabilities
Nationalizations
(significant guarantees on bank liabilities in
addition to increasing deposit insurance ceilings)
(state takes control over
institutions; year of
nationalization between
brackets)
Unlimited coverage to depositors.
Bank and non-bank bond issues.
DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000.
Deposit-like insurance instruments.
Interbank loans and short-term debt
Specific guarantees on Dexia
Hypo Group Alpe Adria
(2009)
Deposits and unsecured claims of PCA banks
Fionia Bank (2009)
Unlimited coverage of household deposits.
Interbank loans and bank debt (capped at €400
billion).
Hypo Real Estate (2008)
Unlimited coverage to domestic deposits.
Kaupthing, Landsbanki, Glitnir,
Straumur-Burdaras, SPRON and
Sparisjódabankinn (all 2008)
Guarantees: 3.3
DI raised from UAH 50,000 to 150,000 until
1/1/11.
Anglo Irish Bank (2009)
Parex Bank (2008)
Prominvest (2008), Nadra,
Inprom, Volodimrski, Dialog,
Rodovid, Kiev, Ukrgaz (all
2009)
30
Unlimited coverage until 9/29/10 to most liabilities
of 10 banks.
DI raised to €50,000.
Guarantee on Parex syndicated loans
Fortis (2008)
United Kingdom
United States
5.5
4.6
5.1
3.5
Purchases: 13.4
Guarantees: 14.5
Purchases: 9.0
DI raised from ￡35,000 to 50,000.
Guarantee on short- to medium-term debt (capped
at ￡250 billion).
Blanket guarantee on Northern Rock and
Bradford & Bingley wholesale deposits.
Northern Rock (2008); RBS
(2008).
DI raised from $100,000 to $250,000 (until end2009).
Money market funds (capped at 50 billion).
Full guarantee on transaction deposits.
Newly issued senior unsecured debt.
Fannie Mae, Freddie Mac, AIG
(all 2008).
Borderline Cases
DI already higher than EU new limit.
€360 billion in guarantees for refinancing credit
institutions.
€55 billions Dexia’s debt
6.4
Greece
18.3
1.7
DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000.
Funding guarantees up to €15 billion.
Hungary
1.3
0.1
Unlimited protection to depositors of small banks.
Kazakhstan
4.6
2.4
DI raised from T0.7 million to T5 million.
Portugal
5.5
Russia
22.2
DI raised from €25,000 to €100,000.
Debt securities issued by credit institutions (up to
12 percent of GDP)
DI raised from R400,000 to R700,000.
Interbank lending for qualifying banks.
1.0
Slovenia
9.3
Spain
4.1
Sweden
13.1
0.7
Switzerland
2.8
1.1
Source: IMF Staff Reports, Mayer Brown, Official websites, and IFS
Purchases: 6.7
Unlimited protection for all deposits by
individuals and small enterprises until end-2010.
New debt issued by financial institutions until
end-2010.
DI raised from €20,000 to €100,000.
Credit Institutions New Debt Issues (capped at
€200 billion).
DI raised from SEK 250,000 to SEK 500,000.
Medium-term debt of banks and mortgage
institutions (up to SEK 1.5 trillion).
DI raised from SFr 30,000 to SFr 100,000 until
12/31/11.
31
France
Banco Portugues de Negócios
(small bank) (2008)
Table A.2. Preemptive Crisis Responses in Selected G-20 Countries
During the years 2007 to 2009
Country
Australia
Liquidity Support
Gross Restructuring Costs
(Percentage points increase in
central bank claims on
financial institutions over
deposits and foreign liabilities,
relative to pre-crisis level)
(recapitalization and other
restructuring costs, excluding
liquidity and asset purchases,
in percent of GDP)
Asset Purchases and
Guarantees
(Funded by treasury
and central bank, in
percent of GDP)
Guarantees on Liabilities
Nationalizations
(significant: in addition to increasing deposit
insurance (DI) ceilings, guarantees of other
liabilities)
(State takes control over
institutions; year of
nationalization between
brackets)
Unlimited coverage to deposits (if above 1
million, only those with maturity<5 years).
n/a
Temporary insurance on the wholesale term
borrowing of deposit-taking institutions.
Canada
1.8
Purchases: 4.4
Italy
2.5
0.8
Purchases: 1.1
Japan
1.1
<0.1
Guarantees: 2.6
(SME’s)
Purchases: <0.1
Korea
2.1
0.8
Guarantees: 1.8
(SME’s)
Source: IMF Staff Reports, Mayer Brown, Official websites, and IFS.
Payment guarantees to Korean banks'
external debt ($100 billion cap).
32
Increased deposit insurance in some
provinces.
33
Table A.3. Direct Fiscal Outlays, Recoveries to Date, and Asset Guarantees
During the years 2007 to 2009
Gross
Austria
Recapitalizations
Asset Purchases
Asset Guarantees
Belgium
Recapitalization
Other
Asset Guarantees
Denmark
Recapitalization
Other
France
Recapitalization
Asset Guarantees
Germany
Recapitalization
Asset Purchases
Asset Guarantees
Greece
Recapitalization
Other
Hungary
Recapitalization
Other
Iceland 3/
Recapitalization
Ireland
Recapitalization
Kazakhstan
Recapitalization
Other
Latvia
Recapitalization
Other
Luxembourg
Recapitalization
Netherlands
Capital Injection Program
impaired assets and liquidity
Total Fiscal Outlays
Asset guarantee program
2.1
2.0
4.1
0.6
Ethias, Fortis, KBC, and Dexia
Capital for Fortis SPV
Total Fiscal Outlays
Asset relief facility
Fortis SPV
Fortis portfolio
Total Asset Guarantees
4.7
0.2
5.0
6.0
1.3
0.4
7.7
Capital Assistance Program
Capital injection in Fionia Bank
Loan to Fionia Bank
Total Fiscal Outlays
2.7
0.1
0.3
3.1
SPPE acquisition of subordinated bonds
Second stage recapitalization (BNP, SG, Dexia)
Total Fiscal Outlays
Financial Security Assurance Inc.
0.5
0.5
1.0
0.3
Capital Injection Program
Asset purchase program
Total Fiscal Outlays
Bad Bank Act 2/
1.2
0.2
1.4
6.1
Capital injection package
Liquidity
Total Fiscal Outlays
1.7
1.9
3.6
Capital injection in FHB (mortgage lender)
FX loans to large banks
Total Fiscal Outlays
0.1
2.6
2.7
Landsbanki, Kaupthing, and Islandsbanki
Recoveries
1/
Net
4.1
5.0
7.7
3.1
1.0
1.2
1.4
3.6
1.6
1.1
13.0
13.0
Bank of Ireland, Allied Irish Bank, and Anglo Irish
7.6
7.6
BTA, Halyk, Alliance, and KKB
Liquidity through deposits of the development agency
Total Fiscal Outlays
2.4
1.3
3.8
3.8
Parex and MLBN
Liquidity
Total Fiscal Outlays
2.5
2.5
4.9
4.9
Fortis and Dexia
7.7
7.7
34
Gross
Recapitalization
Other
Asset Guarantees
Mongolia
Other
Portugal
Recapitalization
Russia
Slovenia
Liquidity
Spain
Asset purchases
Sweden
Recapitalization
Other
Switzerland
Recapitalization
Ukraine
Recapitalization
United Kingdom
Recapitalization
Other
Asset Guarantees
United States
Recapitalization
Other
Asset Purchases
Asset Guarantees
Fortis, ING, SNS, and AEGON
Loans to Icesave and Icelandic Deposit Insurance
Loan to Fortis
Total Fiscal Outlays
ABN AMRO/Fortis Mortgage portfolio
ING Alt-A RMBS portfolio
Total Asset Guarantees
Restructuring of Avod Bank
6.5
0.2
5.9
12.7
6.0
4.8
10.8
Recoveries
5.9
1/
Net
6.8
3.0
3.0
0
0
Rosagroleasing, VEB
Subordinated loans from VEB
Liquidity through government deposits in commercial banks
Total Fiscal Outlays
1.0
0.9
0.4
2.3
2.3
Public sector deposits in banks (proceed from bond issue)
2.8
2.8
Purchase of high-quality securities from credit institutions
1.8
1.8
Recapitalization package
Initial contribution to stabilization fund
Total Fiscal Outlays
0.2
0.5
0.7
0.7
Mandatory convertible notes UBS
1.1
Public Recapitalization program
4.8
State Mortgage Agency , VTB, Rosselhozbank,
RBS, Lloyds, LBG, and Northern Rock
Dunfermline Building Society takeover
Deposit compensation
Loans to Northern Rock and Bradford & Bingley
Total Fiscal Outlays
Pool of RBS assets and CoCo's
Capital Purchase Program (CPP)
AIG
Targeted Investment Program
Support to GMAC
Support to Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac
Home Affordable Modification Program
Credit Union Homeowners Affordability Relief Program
MBS purchase
Public-Private Investment Program
Total Fiscal Outlays
Citigroup asset guarantee
5.0
0.1
1.8
1.9
8.7
14.5
1.4
0.5
0.3
0.1
0.8
0.2
0.1
1.4
0.2
4.9
1.5
-0.4
4.8
1.0
7.7
0.6
4.3
1/ It includes repayments up to end-2009 of capital support as well as interest and fees generated from loans and guarantee
programs for the cases where the data was available. 2/ Includes total guarantees issued by the Stabilization Fund, which
includes items related to the Bad Bank Act as well as debt issued by financial institutions. 3/ In our baseline case we do not
include the increase in debt that would result from the Icesave crisis as part of the fiscal costs. Most disbursements took
place at end-2008 and the first half of 2009, so we use 2009 nominal GDP (from WEO) to express the figures as percentage
points of GDP.
Source: IMF staff reports, official websites, and Mayer Brown.
35
Table A.4. Top 30 Banks in the World By Market Capitalization
As of end of year 2006 and 2009
Market
Capitalization
(millions of US$)
2006
Rank
Bank name
Country
2006
2009
Market
Capitalization
(millions of US$)
2009
Rank
Bank name
Country
2009
1 Citigroup
USA
286,337
17,016
1 HSBC Holdings
UK
2 Bank of America
USA
251,872
68,660
2 China Construction Bank
China
193,240
3 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
Japan
188,034
53,052
3 JP Morgan Chase
USA
148,484
4 HSBC Holdings
UK
172,938
199,785
4 Banco Santander
Spain
136,918
5 JP Morgan Chase
USA
172,109
148,484
5 Wells Fargo & Co
USA
112,251
6 UBS
Switzerland 156,455
50,242
6 BNP Paribas
France
95,359
7 Banco Santander
Spain
127,400
136,918
7 Goldman Sachs
USA
69,454
199,785
8 Wells Fargo & Co
USA
122,056
112,251
9 Wachovia Corp
USA
114,542
Failed
10 Mizuho Financial Group
Japan
114,249
21,423
10 Bank of America
USA
68,660
11 BNP Paribas
France
110,786
95,359
11 Royal Bank of Canada
Canada
64,894
8 Ind’l & Commercial Bank of China
China
68,968
9 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria
Spain
68,733
12 ING Groep
Netherlands 106,700
38,077
12 National Australia Bank
Australia
56,732
13 Royal Bank of Scotland
UK
26,655
13 UniCredit
Italy
56,538
55,706
102,726
14 UniCredit
Italy
99,639
56,538
14 Credit Suisse Group
Switzerland
15 Sumitomo Mitsui Financial
Japan
98,384
27,429
15 Intesa Sanpaolo
Italy
53,771
16 Credit Suisse Group
Switzerland
96,203
55,706
16 Mitsubishi UFJ Financial Group
Japan
53,052
17 Banco Bilbao Vizcaya Argentaria Spain
93,333
68,733
17 Société Générale
France
52,169
18 Goldman Sachs
91,457
69,454
18 Standard Chartered
UK
51,268
50,722
USA
19 Société Générale
France
85,410
52,169
19 Itau Unibanco Holdings
Brazil
20 Merrill Lynch & Co
USA
82,235
Failed
20 American Express
USA
50,281
21 Morgan Stanley
USA
80,553
31,307
21 UBS
Switzerland
50,242
49,295
22 Deutsche Bank
Germany
80,433
44,201
22 Barclays
UK
23 Barclays
UK
76,734
49,295
23 Commonwealth Bank of Australia
Australia
48,062
24 American Express Company
USA
75,285
50,281
24 Deutsche Bank
Germany
44,201
25 HBOS
UK
69,158
6,138
25 Banco do Brasil
Brazil
43,382
26 US Bancorp
USA
68,942
39,617
26 Bank of Nova Scotia
Canada
43,190
27 Crédit Agricole.
France
68,723
41,302
27 Westpac Banking Corp
Australia
43,137
28 ABN Amro Holdings
Netherlands
64,717
Failed
28 Australia and New Zealand Banking
Australia
42,473
29 Fortis
Belgium/
Netherlands
Canada
60,674
8,886
59,686
64,894
30 Royal Bank of Canada
Total
3,377,767 1,633,871
29 Crédit Agricole
France
41,302
30 Nordea Bank
Sweden
Total
41,284
2,153,554
Note: Shaded ranking positions on left list indicate banks no longer among the top thirty in 2009, while shaded ranking positions on right
list indicate banks that entered the top 30 list in 2009.
Source: Bankscope.