Download CASE AND COMMENT STATUTORY DEMANDS

CASE AND COMMENT
STATUTORY DEMANDS, BANKRUPTCY NOTICES
AND THE CONSTRUCTION CONTRACTS ACT 2002
Robyn Merrett*
I. Introduction
The recent landmark decision of the Court of Appeal in Laywood v Holmes
Construction Wellington Ltd1 has done much to clarify the interrelationship
between the Construction Contracts Act 2002 on the one hand and the
Insolvency Act 2006 and the Companies Act 1993 on the other. The judgment
stated the relevant principles clearly and coherently and, in doing so, resolved
the approaches between conflicting High Court decisions with respect to the
availability of the bankruptcy notice and statutory demand procedures to
enforce payment of a debt under the Construction Contracts Act.
This note considers the Court of Appeal decision on the question. It
outlines the extensive judicial history of the case and, for completeness, its
subsequent progress. It concludes with a consideration of the impact of the
decision on liquidation and bankruptcy proceedings including its influence
on the oft debated question of the legitimate purpose of the statutory demand
and bankruptcy notice procedure. But first it provides a brief outline of the
relevant legislation.
II. Outline of Construction Contracts Act Regime and
Relevant Insolvency Act and Companies Act Provisions
The Construction Contracts Act 2002 emphasises the need for prompt
payment of contractual sums so as to address the cashflow problems which
are common in the construction industry.2 In order to do this, the Act
provides a fast track process whereby payment obligations of parties in a
construction contract are created and enforced. The Act provides three ways
in which a party to a construction contract may become entitled to recover
money from another party. Two of these are found in Part 2 of the Act and
relate to payment claims3 while the third relates to adjudication of a dispute
under Part 3 of the Act.4
First, a payee seeking payment may issue a payment claim to the payer.
The payer must respond to the payment claim within a specified time,
either by paying the claim or providing the payee with a payment schedule
which sets out the amount the payer proposes to pay. If the payer does
*
1
2
3
4
Lecturer in Law, University of Canterbury, Christchurch.
Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243 (Court of Appeal).
The purpose of the Act is described in s 3 of the Construction Contracts Act 2002. See also
the discussion in Salem Limited v Top End Homes Limited (2005) 18 PRNZ 122 (Court of
Appeal).
Construction Contracts Act 2002, ss 19-24.
Construction Contracts Act 2002, ss 25-71.
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not pay the claim or provide a payment schedule within the required time
then, pursuant to s 23, the payer becomes liable to pay the amount claimed
on the due date. Second, under s 24 a payer also becomes liable to pay
the amount claimed on the due date if the payer has provided the payee
with a payment schedule and the payer has failed to pay the scheduled
amount within the prescribed time. Where either of these situations arises,
the consequences are that the payee can recover from the payer, as a debt
due, the unpaid portion of the claimed amount in any court, plus actual
and reasonable costs of recovery.5
The third way in which a party to a construction contract may become
entitled to recover money from another party is by taking its default claim
to adjudication. Where an adjudicator makes a determination that a party
is liable to pay an amount to another, and that other party fails to pay, s 59
provides that the party to whom the debt is owed may recover the unpaid
amount together with actual and reasonable costs of recovery as a due
debt in any court or the party may apply, under s 73, for the adjudicator’s
determination to be enforced by entry as a judgment in the District Court.
Once the determination has been entered as a judgment, the creditor can
make use of any of the general debt collection procedures available to that
Court.6 The defendant may oppose entry of an adjudicator’s determination
as a judgment but the grounds of opposition are strictly limited by s 74(2).
Those grounds are: that the amount has been paid after the determination
has been made; that the contract is not a construction contract to which the
Act applies; or that a condition imposed by the adjudicator has not been
met.7
As stated above, once a ‘due debt’ arises under ss 23, 24 or 59, proceedings
may be issued for the recovery of the debt. In practice, the most common
processes used to enforce payment under the Construction Contracts Act are
by summary judgment and statutory demand or bankruptcy notice.
If a statutory demand is issued, the debtor may apply to the High Court
to have it set aside under s 290 of the Companies Act 1993. The grounds for
setting aside a statutory demand, found in s 290(4), are that the Court is
satisfied that:8
5
6
7
8
Construction Contracts Act 2002, ss 23(2)(a) and 24(2)(a). ‘Any court’ is defined in s 5 as
meaning the District Court or High Court.
Construction Contracts Act 2002, ss 77, 78. Section 77 provides that ‘[t]o avoid doubt’ the
determination may be enforced by execution in accordance with the District Court Rules
1992. Section 78 also provides an ‘avoidance of doubt’ provision in relation to the application
of a charging order issued under the Act in respect of the construction site.
The first two grounds in s 74(2) were argued unsuccessfully by Laywood and Rees in Willis
Trust Company Ltd v Green (Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV-2006-404-809 Asher
J, 25 May 2006). The Court of Appeal in Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd
[2009] NZLR 243, [39] agreed with Asher J in this regard. In Laywood v Holmes Construction
Wellington Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 493 (High Court), Asher J held that the question of whether
payment had been made before the determination could not be raised under s 74(2) of the
Construction Contracts Act 2002.
For a discussion of the grounds in s 290(4) of the Companies Act 1993 see J Farrar (ed),
Companies and Securities Law (2008) 814-822 and the cases cited therein.
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
351
(a) There is a substantial dispute whether or not the debt is owing or is due; or
(b) The company appears to have a counterclaim, set-off, or cross demand and the
amount specified in the demand less than the amount of the counterclaim, setoff or cross demand is less than $1000; or
(c) The demand ought to be set aside on other grounds.
Similarly, where the debtor is an individual and a bankruptcy notice has
been issued, the debtor can apply to the High Court to have the notice set
aside. The grounds for setting aside a bankruptcy notice are now found in
s 17(1)(d)(ii) and (7) of the Insolvency Act 2006, which replaced s 19(1)(d)
and (2) of the Insolvency Act 1967 from 3 December 2007,9 but without
any substantial change to its terms. The statutory grounds are that the
debtor satisfies the High Court that he or she has a counterclaim, set-off,
or cross demand equalling or exceeding the amount of the judgment debt
which could not have been used as a defence in the proceedings in which
the judgment or order was obtained. There is no equivalent ‘other grounds’
in s 17 of the Insolvency Act 2006 as there is in s 290(4)(c) of the Companies
Act but the court does have an inherent jurisdiction to set aside or stay a
bankruptcy notice to prevent an abuse of the court’s processes.10
However, where proceedings are issued for recovery of a debt due under
the Construction Contracts Act, s 79 of that Act may be important. It provides:
In any proceedings for the recovery of a debt under section 23 or section 24 or section
59, the court must not give effect to any counterclaim, set-off, or cross-demand raised by
any party to those proceedings other than a set-off of a liquidated amount if(a) judgment has been entered for that amount; or
(b) there is not in fact any dispute between the parties in relation to the claim for that amount.
Thus s 79 prohibits the court from giving effect to any counterclaim,
set off or cross demand in any proceedings for the recovery of the debt,
except in the limited circumstances set out in the section. The purpose of s
79 clearly is to enhance the policy objective of the Act for speedy payment.
It adopts a ‘pay now, argue later philosophy’,11 but this does not mean that
the debtor who is disputing the creditor’s claim has no remedy. nothing in
the Act prevents the parties to a construction contract from submitting a
dispute to another dispute resolution process such as to a court, tribunal,
mediation or arbitration.12 However, the submission of a dispute to another
9
Insolvency Act 2006, s 443(1)). Note that the Insolvency Act 1967 continues to apply, to the
exclusion of the Insolvency Act 2006, if any of the following events first occurred before
3 December 2007, or a step or proceeding is taken as a consequence of any of these events,
even if the step or proceeding is taken after 3 December 2007:
(a) issuing a bankruptcy notice;
(b) filing a petition for adjudication;
(c) filing an application for a summary judgment order;
(d) the making of a proposal;
(e) the making of a compromise;
(f) filing an application for an order for the administration of an insolvent estate.
10 Discussed further in Part IV below. See also Brookers, Insolvency Law & Practice, IN17.11.
11 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243 (Court of Appeal), 255, [52].
12 As Asher J observed in the High Court, ‘… the enforcement process [in the Act] is not
intended to transform an adjudicator’s determination into a final judgment, and it is not
intended to prevail over other dispute resolution procedures’. Res judicata does not apply to
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dispute resolution process does not bring the adjudication to an end or
otherwise affect it.13 If an adjudicator makes a determination that an
amount is due to be paid, that determination is binding on the parties
and continues to be of full effect notwithstanding the fact that a party has
applied for judicial review or that any other process relating to the dispute
have commenced.14
Clearly s 79 will apply to summary judgment proceedings15 but the
question is whether the section applies where steps are taken under the 1967
or 2006 Insolvency Acts or the Companies Act 1993. The question comes
down to the correct interpretation of s 79 of the Construction Contracts
Act, specifically, whether the steps taken under the bankruptcy processes
in the Insolvency Acts and the winding up provisions in the Companies Act
are ‘proceedings for the recovery of a debt under section 23 or section 24
or section 59 …’ of the Construction Contracts Act. If the answer to this
question is no, then there is no conflict between s 79 and the bankruptcy
and liquidation provisions of the Companies Act and the Insolvency Acts and
thus the defences in those Acts (set-off, cross-claim or counterclaim) could
be used to defeat a Construction Contracts Act demand.
III. Conflicting High Court Decisions
Until the Court of Appeal decision in Laywood, there were conflicting
decisions on the question. In Volcanic Investments Ltd v Dempsey & Wood
Civil Contractors Ltd,16 a building contractor, Dempsey & Wood, referred
a dispute under a construction contract with its employer, Volcanic
Investments, to an adjudicator under Part 3 of the Construction Contracts
Act. The adjudicator determined the matter in favour of Dempsey &
Wood who then issued a statutory demand to Volcanic under s 289 of the
Companies Act. Volcanic responded by applying for an order under s 290 of
the Companies Act setting aside the statutory demand. Volcanic claimed a
set off for losses which it said resulted from the delay of Dempsey & Wood
in carrying out the work, losses which Volcanic was seeking to recover in
District Court proceedings. The central issue was whether Dempsey &
Wood could invoke s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act to bar Volcanic
from raising any cross-claim in response to the statutory demand.
13
14
15
16
this enforcement procedure where all the parties’ rights are otherwise preserved: Laywood v
Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 493, 502.
Construction Contracts Act 2002, s 26(2).
Construction Contracts Act 2002, s 60. The court or tribunal in these other proceedings may
adjust the debt arising under the Act even where the debt is part of a court judgment as a
result of the enforcement proceedings in the Act: Construction Contracts Act 2002, s 27.
Examples of its application in the summary judgment context are Metalcraft Industries
Ltd v Christie (Unreported, High Court Whangerei, CIV-2006-488-645, Harrison J, 15
February 2007); Halls Earthworks Ltd (in liquidation) v Donovan Drainage & Earthmoving
Ltd (Unreported, High Court Whangerei, CIV-2007-488-144, Associate Judge Faire, 18
July 2007); and Invent Solutions Ltd v Chan Developments Trustee Ltd (Unreported, High
Court Wellington, CIV-2008-485-2834, Associate Judge Gendall).
Volcanic Investments Ltd v Dempsey & Wood Civil Contractors Ltd (2005) 11 TCLR 256;
(2005) 18 PRNZ 97.
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
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Randerson J noted that there was no limitation on the type of proceedings
for recovery of a debt which might be relied upon for the purposes of s 79
and there was nothing in the Construction Contracts Act to suggest that the
statutory demand procedure was not a proceeding contemplated by s 79. He
reached that conclusion because the procedure for dealing with statutory
demands, and the use to which statutory demands are put, were integral steps
in the whole winding up process under part 9A of the High Court Rules.17
He considered it appropriate, therefore, that when the matter was raised in
a s 290 application to set aside a statutory demand, that was a proceeding
which fell within the definition of proceeding contemplated by s 79.
On the question of whether s 290(4) of the Companies Act was to be
interpreted as overriding s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act, Randerson J
held, applying the usual canons of interpretation, that it should not because,
inter alia:18
 … s 290(4) is a provision relating to the recovery of debts generally. In contrast, the
Construction Contracts Act is special legislation dealing with the recovery of specific types
of debt under a specific type of contract, namely construction contracts as defined in the
Act. As such, the usual rule applies and the later specific legislation should prevail over the
earlier general enactment. If it were otherwise, s 79 would be of no effect in this context.
The decision in Volcanic had been followed on numerous occasions.19
However, the High Court in Silverpoint International Ltd v Wedding
Earthmovers Ltd20 squarely challenged this position and put the use of
statutory demands and bankruptcy notices to enforce Construction Contracts
Act debts in doubt.21
The case involved the issuing of six statutory demands by WEL, an
earthmoving contractor, against a group of four property development
companies in response to unanswered payment claims under Part 2 of the
Construction Contracts Act. The companies in the group applied to have the
statutory demands set aside asserting that they had a counterclaim, crossdemand or set off which neutralised any liability they might have to WEL. As
in Volcanic, the issue was whether WEL could invoke s 79 of the Construction
Contracts Act to bar the companies from raising any cross claim in response
to the statutory demands.
17 Part 9A of the High Court Rules is now repealed and replaced by part 31 of the High Court
Rules 2008.
18 Volcanic Investments Ltd v Dempsey & Wood Civil Contractors Ltd (2005) 11 TCLR 256;
(2005) 18 PRNZ 97 [31].
19 See, for example, Brooklyn Holdings Ltd v Able Handyman Services Ltd (2005) 9 NZCLC
263,930; 10 Gilmer Ltd v Tracer Interiors and Construction Ltd HC Wellington (Unreported,
High Court Wellington, CIV-2005-485-2009, Associate Judge Gendall, 6 December
2005); SCI Development & Construction Ltd v NZ Built Ltd (Unreported, High Court,
Auckland, CIV-2005-404-3656, Associate Judge Abbott, 23 December 2005); Freemont
Design & Construction Ltd v Nature’s View Joinery Ltd (Unreported, High Court Hamilton,
CIV-2006-419-269, Associate Judge Faire, 26 July 2006); and Kizer Builders Ltd v OEC
Construction Ltd (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV- 2006-485-2287, Associate
Judge Gendall, 16 November 2006).
20 Silverpoint International Ltd v Wedding Earthmovers Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV-2007-404-104, Associate Judge Doogue, 30 May 2007).
21 See also Re Capon ex parte TUF Panel Construction Ltd (2005) 18 PRNZ 105 in relation to
bankruptcy proceedings.
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Associate Judge Doogue adopted the analysis of John Ren who has
persuasively argued that the decision in Volcanic is wrong.22 As did Ren,
Associate Judge Doogue focussed primarily on the wording of s 79 and the
nature of liquidation proceedings. He considered that, while liquidation
proceedings are de facto used to exert pressure on a company to pay its
debts, the primary object of liquidation is to collect and distribute assets.
He concluded that the three steps in liquidation proceedings (the issue of a
statutory demand, the application to set the demand aside and the application
for an order to liquidate), viewed as a whole or independently, do not fall
under ‘proceedings for recovery of a debt’ as that phrase is used in s 79 and
that there were no clear policy reasons to justify an expansive interpretation
of s 79 to extend it to liquidation proceedings. Thus, on this analysis there was
no conflict between s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act and the Companies
Act, and the counterclaims against WEL could be taken into account when
considering the application to set aside the statutory demand.
By taking a narrow approach to the issue and focusing on the application
to set aside a statutory demand and whether the winding up procedure is a
debt recovery procedure, the conclusion of the court was always going to be
that clearly it is not. Section 79 applies to any proceeding before any court for
the recovery of a debt created under the Construction Contracts Act regime.23
The issue of a statutory demand by a creditor is a ‘proceeding’ in the sense that
it is a preliminary step that usually accompanies a winding up proceeding,
but it is not a proceeding before any court for the recovery of a debt. While
an application to set aside the statutory demand is a proceeding before a
court, it is not a proceeding to recover a debt. It is, in fact, the opposite:
it is a proceeding initiated by the debtor to resist the payment of the debt.
Similarly, an application by the creditor for an order to liquidate the debtor
company is clearly a proceeding before a court but it is not, a debt recovery
proceeding. While an objective of the creditor might be to exert pressure on
the debtor company to pay its debts, the creditor is not seeking an order for
payment of a debt, rather the creditor is seeking an order that the company
be liquidated. If a company is liquidated, the creditor may ultimately receive
a payment but strictly speaking any payment received is not recovered ‘in the
proceedings’ which led to the order placing the company into liquidation.
However, while statutory demands (and bankruptcy notices for
individuals) are the first step in assessing the solvency of a debtor, the reality
is that they are used overwhelmingly as a means of debt recovery. It is this
point which seems to have been overlooked in Silverpoint and recognised in
Volcanic. While insolvency purists may have flinched, Volcanic was seen at
the time as a decision which reflected this commercial reality and it was this
practical approach that the Court of Appeal recognised in Laywood.
The facts in Laywood are different from Volcanic and Silverpoint in that
Laywood involved the setting aside of a bankruptcy notice rather than a
statutory demand. However, while the wording of s 17 of the Insolvency Act
22 John Ren, ‘Enforcing Payment Obligations Under the Construction Contracts Act 2002’
(2006) 12 NZ Business Law Quarterly 336.
23 See Construction Contracts Act 2002, s 59(2)(a).
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
355
2006 (and previously s 19 of the 1967 Act) is different from s 290 of the
Companies Act 1993, the reasoning process involved in both is the same.
Thus, the principles espoused by the Court of Appeal in Laywood will have
application to the interrelationship between Construction Contracts Act and
the statutory demand process.24 In fact, the decision of the Court of Appeal
in Laywood has recently been applied by the High Court in the context of
s 290 of the Companies Act.25
IV. Holmes Construction v Laywood
Background
The case has occupied considerable judicial time at all levels. It arose out
of a construction contract between Willis Trust Company Ltd and Holmes
Construction Ltd for the redevelopment into residential apartments of
a substantial building in Wellington. The appellants, Laywood and Rees,
were the directors of Willis Trust and had guaranteed the obligations of
the company. Difficulties arose during the project and ultimately Holmes
Construction submitted a final claim for payment in terms of the Construction
Contracts Act. When payment was not made, Holmes Construction referred
the matter to adjudication, as it was entitled to do under the Act, and the
adjudicator found Willis Trust liable to Holmes Construction for $1,324,165
and the appellant’s liable for $322,387, their maximum liability under the
guarantee. Willis Trust and the appellants brought an application in the High
Court for judicial review of the adjudicator’s determinations. Interim orders
were made prohibiting Holmes Construction from taking steps to enforce
the adjudication until the review had been determined providing Willis Trust
paid the amounts owing under the determination to a stakeholder.26 The
payments were not made and so the order in favour of Willis Trust lapsed.
Holmes Construction then applied to the District Court under s 73(2) of the
Construction Contracts Act to enforce the adjudicator’s determination against
Willis Trust by entry as a judgment. Willis Trust was subsequently placed
into liquidation by shareholders’ resolution on 28 June 2006. The interim
order in favour of the appellants remained in force to allow the application
for judicial review of the adjudicator’s determination to be determined.
Harrison J in the High Court eventually dismissed the application for
judicial review, apart from correcting a miscalculation in relation to interest
and GST, and in June 2006 Holmes Construction applied to the District
Court to enforce the adjudicator’s determination, on the recalculated amount,
against the appellants by entry as a judgment. The appellants filed a notice
24 The Court of Appeal Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [63],
noted, obiter, that the same conclusions would apply in an application by a company to set
aside a statutory demand.
25 Greys Avenue Investments Ltd v Harbour Construction Ltd (Unreported, High Court
Auckland, CIV-2009-404-2026, Wylie J, 12 June 2009); Gills Construction Company Ltd
v Butler (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV-2009-406-203, Judge Mallon, 12
November 2009).
26 Willis Trust Company Ltd v Green (Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV-2006-404-809,
Harrison J, 1 March 2006).
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of opposition under s 74(1) of the Act but on 5 July 2006 Judge Wilson
QC in the District Court granted Holmes Construction’s application on
the papers.27 On 13 July 2006, the appellants filed an appeal against Wilson
DCJ’s decision in the High Court. A week later Holmes Construction
issued bankruptcy notices against the appellants based on Wilson DCJ’s
judgment. The appellants filed an application to set aside the bankruptcy
notices on the basis that they had a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand
which equalled or exceeded the amount of the debt, that that counterclaim
could not be set up in the action in which the judgment was entered and
further that the Construction Contracts Act did not prevent them from relying
upon a counterclaim, set-off or cross demand in an application to set aside a
bankruptcy notice. The appellants also argued that the court should use its
inherent jurisdiction to set aside or stay the bankruptcy notices pending the
decisions of the High Court appeal against Wilson DCJ’s decision and of the
Court of Appeal in respect of the judicial review proceeding. In response,
Associate Judge Faire issued an interim judgment on 9 February 2007
adjourning the application to await the outcome of the appeals.28
There matters stood until December 2007, when Asher J dismissed
the appellants’ appeal against the entry of the adjudicator’s determination
as a judgment.29 However, he later granted leave to appeal to the Court of
Appeal.30 In the meantime, the application to set aside the bankruptcy notice
came again before Associate Judge Faire on 3 March 2008.31 At this hearing,
a further ground for setting aside the bankruptcy notices was argued: that
the judgment obtained by the creditors was not a final judgment as required
by s 19(1)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1967.32 Given that the Court of Appeal was
to consider the issues relating to the decision upon which the bankruptcy
notices were founded, Associate Judge Faire removed the question of whether
there was a final order or judgment to the Court of Appeal for decision at
27 Holmes Construction Ltd v Rees (Unreported, District Court North Shore CIV-2006-0441112, Judge Wilson QC 5 July 2006).
28 Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd v Rees (Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV 2006404-004219; CIV 2006-404-004220, Associate Judge Faire, 9 February 2007).
29 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2008] 2 NZLR 493 (High Court).
30 The four points on which Asher J granted leave were: (i) whether the District Court had no
jurisdiction to enter judgment under s 73 of the Construction Contracts Act 2002 because the
amount involved exceeded the jurisdictional limit of $200,000 in s 29 District Courts Act
1947; (ii) whether the District Court was required, under the principles of natural justice,
to give an oral hearing; (iii) whether the Construction Contracts Act prevents an enquiry
into whether amounts found to be payable by the adjudicator have been paid where such
payments arose prior to the adjudicator’s determination; and (iv) in holding that the District
Court failed to consider payments made before the adjudicator’s determination, whether
there was a breach of natural justice with the result that the District Court judgment was
irregularly obtained and should be set aside.
31 Re Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd ex parte Rees (No 2) (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV 2006-404-004219; CIV 2006-404-004220, Associate Judge Faire, 3 March 2008).
32 Because the bankruptcy notices were issued before 3 December 2007, the Insolvency Act
1967 continued to govern the case (see further, above n 8). However, as said above, s 19(1)(d)
of the Insolvency Act 1967 is in similar terms to s 17 of the Insolvency Act 2006. In fact the
decision of the Court of Appeal in Laywood on the effect of s 79 of the Construction Contracts
Act on applications to set aside bankruptcy notices has subsequently been applied in the
context of s 17 of the Insolvency Act 2006: see Re Plimmerton Courtyard Ltd ex parte Franklin
(Unreported HC Wellington, CIV-2008-485-2613, Associate Judge Gendall, 2 April 2009).
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
357
the same time.33 It was in the context of determining this question that the
Court of Appeal resolved the issue on the interplay between s 79 of the
Construction Contracts Act and insolvency provisions of the Companies Act
and the Insolvency Act.
The Court of Appeal
Counsel for the appellants argued before the Court of Appeal that
the adjudicator’s determination entered as a judgment simply created ‘a
provisional judgment for the purposes of cashflow’34 and as such it was not
a final order or judgment as required by s 19(1)(d). It was argued that, for
the order or judgment to be final, there must be a final determination of the
parties’ rights and an opportunity to raise any cross claim and/or setoff in
reaching the judgment must have been available.
Arnold J, in delivering the judgment of the Court noted that, while the
adjudicator’s determination was binding on the parties, it was not final in the
sense that it does not necessarily finally resolve all issues of a dispute between
them.35 The Court recognised that it may not have been possible for a party
to have raised a counterclaim, set-off or cross claim in the course of the
adjudication and s 79 prohibits the raising of a counterclaim, set off or cross
demand in proceedings for the recovery of a debt. Such a dispute would have
to be pursued in separate proceedings.36 However, according to the Court,
even though an adjudicator’s determination for the payment of money which
is entered as a judgment is temporary and incomplete, it does not mean that
it is unenforceable.37 Section 77 provides that ‘for the avoidance of doubt’
an adjudicator’s determination maybe enforced by execution in accordance
with the District Court Rules 1992.38 There are also ‘for avoidance of doubt’
provisions for the making and enforcement of charging orders under the
Act.39 The Court considered that:40
33 The issue of whether an adjudicator’s determination under the Construction Contracts Act
is a final judgment or order for the purposes of the Insolvency Act would not arise in the
context of a statutory demand. A statutory demand can be issued provided the debt is due
and payable as at the date on which the statutory demand is served. It is not necessary for
a judgment to be obtained before service of the demand. On the other hand, where the
bankruptcy notice process is to be used the bankruptcy notice must be founded upon a ‘final
judgment or order from a Court’, thus a Construction Contracts Act creditor would either
have to first obtain summary judgment or, as in Laywood v Holmes Construction, go through
the adjudication process in the Act and then have the adjudicator’s determination entered as
a judgment of the District Court pursuant to s 73.
34 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [50].
35 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [52].
36 Sections 25 and 26 of the Construction Contracts Act recognise that other dispute resolution
processes, for example, court, tribunal, mediation or arbitration, may be used despite the
reference of the matter to adjudication.
37 Compare an adjudicator’s determination about rights and obligations under ss 48(1)(b) and
48(2) which are not enforceable in the same way as a determination for payment of money
under s 48(1)(a).
38 Section 79 of the District Courts Act 1947 identifies several enforcement possibilities, for
example garnishee proceedings.
39 See Construction Contracts Act 2002, ss 29, 49, 76, 78.
40 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [53]. In Greys Avenue
Investments Ltd v Harbour Construction Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV-2009404-2026, Wylie J, 12 June 2009) [47] Wylie J rejected the argument that Laywood applies
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[w]hile there is no similar ‘for avoidance of doubt’ provision in relation to the Insolvency
Act, we consider that the same principle applies. Accordingly we consider that a judgment
entered under s 74 is a final judgment for the purposes of s 19(1)(d).
Importantly, in deciding the question of the finality of an adjudication, the
Court of Appeal resolved the conflict in the High Court by expressly endorsing
the view of Randerson J in Volcanic. While accepting that bankruptcy and
liquidation proceedings have broader purposes in relation to liquidity and
asset worth, the Court nevertheless held ‘bankruptcy notices and statutory
demands are, in a practical sense, important enforcement mechanisms’.41
Arnold J said that to take any other view would undermine the efficacy of the
enforcement procedures in the Act.42 He acknowledged that such an approach
may produce hardship to a debtor, but he considered that there had to be
a balance between the hardship which could be caused by the prohibition
against raising a counterclaim or set off against the hardship which maybe
caused by preventing a creditor from its entitlement under the Construction
Contract Act and thus frustrate its purpose of enhancing cashflow.
The Court noted, obiter, that the same would apply in an application by a
company to set aside a statutory demand under the Companies Act 1993.43 It
also emphasised that the Court was only being asked to consider the position
in relation to an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice and in other
contexts a different result might be reached:44
It may be that different considerations arise at the point that the court must determine
whether it will exercise its discretion to adjudicate a judgment debtor bankrupt or order
the liquidation of a company
Thus, the Court of Appeal held that the judgment was a final determination
in respect of the payment claim to which it related despite the fact that it did
not determine the rights of the parties under the construction contract as a
whole. The Court of Appeal also declined the appeal against the judgment of
Asher J with the effect that the judgment of Judge Wilson QC, on which the
bankruptcy notice was based, remained in force.45
Supreme Court
The appellants applied to the Supreme Court for leave to appeal the decision
of the Court of Appeal. The Supreme Court dismissed the application on the
basis that while the appeal raised matters of general practical significance and
would otherwise meet the criteria for leave, the Court found the judgment
below compelling and considered that the proposed appeal had no prospect
of success on any of the grounds advanced on behalf of the applicants.46
41
42
43
44
45
46
only to the enforcement of an adjudicator’s determination as a judgment under s 73 saying
the Court of Appeal did not draw this narrow distinction and neither does the Construction
Contracts Act. See also Gills Construction Company Ltd v Butler (Unreported, High Court
Wellington, CIV-2009-406-203, Judge Mallon, 12 November 2009) [20].
Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [62].
Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [63].
Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [62].
Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [65].
See above n 30 above for the grounds of the appeal.
Laywood & Rees v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZSC 44, [2].
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
359
Back to the High Court
Inherent Jurisdiction
The application to set aside the bankruptcy notice finally came again
before Associate Judge Faire in July 2009, where the debtor conceded that
there was now no remaining challenge in respect of the judgment on which
the bankruptcy notice was based and no basis for advancing a claim that
there is or was improper conduct on the part of the creditor in seeking to
enforce the judgment by issue of the bankruptcy notice. However, the debtor
continued to argue that the Court should exercise its inherent discretion to
set aside or stay the bankruptcy notice on the basis that there are possible
claims against the creditor.47
The High Court has long accepted that it does have an inherent
jurisdiction in the context of an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice
under s 19(1)(d) of the Insolvency Act 1967 (and now under s 17 of the 2006
Act). The three possible grounds for the exercise of the jurisdiction were
laid down by Master Kennedy-Grant in Re Wise, ex p Benecke48 and have
been accepted in numerous cases since.49 The first two grounds call into
question the judgment itself by alleging either a procedural defect in the
obtaining of the judgment on which the bankruptcy notice is based and/or
the existence of arguable grounds of defence to the claim for which judgment
was given which, for example, could not have been identified at the time of
the underlying judgment or which had emerged since. The third possible
ground identified in Re Wise is that there is something in the circumstances
of the judgment on which the bankruptcy notice is based which creates a
potential injustice.
However, Associate Judge Faire in Laywood refused to exercise the Court’s
inherent jurisdiction to set aside or stay the bankruptcy notice. He said that
the ‘factual foundation on which the Court is being asked to exercise its
inherent jurisdiction is, at best, weak’.50 Moreover, even if there was proper
factual foundation for the invocation of the Court’s inherent jurisdiction,
Associate Judge Faire considered that the debtor had a major problem with
47 Re Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd ex parte Rees (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV 2006-404-004219, Associate Judge Faire 17 July 2009).
48 Re Wise, ex p Benecke (Unreported, High Court Auckland, B227/95; B228/95, Master
Kennedy-Grant, 21 June 1995).
49 See, for example, Re Stansfield; Stansfield v Gould (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
B1378/01, Master Faire 3 December 2002); Halifax Finance Ltd v McFarlane (Unreported,
High Court Wellington, CIV-2007-485-1377, Associate Judge Gendall, 12 November 2002;
Re Winther ex p Ucorp Pty Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland, B1194-im00, Master
Kennedy-Grant, 25 October 2000); Holloway v Darby (Unreported, High Court Hamilton,
CIV-2005-419-1085, Associate Judge Faire, 8 December 2005); Re Herron ex p Speirs Group
Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland, CIV-2007-404-4645, Associate Judge Doogue,
19 February 2008); Re Sadler ex parte Insite Design & Development Limited (Unreported,
High Court Auckland, CIV-2006-404-4528, Associate Judge Sargisson, 27 April 2007);
Re Solicitor-General ex p Alice (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV-2007-454-791,
Associate Judge Gendall, 14 February 2008); Re Saker ex p Blackler (Unreported, High
Court Wellington, CIV-2008-485-124, Associate Judge Faire, 26 May 2008).
50 Re Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd ex parte Rees (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV 2006-404-004219, Associate Judge Faire 17 July 2009), [23].
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pursuing his claim. The matters that the debtor was arguing were premised
on the basis that they were claims against the creditor which fall within the
definition of counter-claim, set-off or cross demand referred to in s 19(1)(d) if the
Insolvency Act 1967. As discussed above, the Court of Appeal had previously
held that s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act prevailed over s 19(1)(d) of
the Insolvency Act 1967 and thus the Court could not take into account a
counterclaim, set off or cross claim when dealing with an application to set
aside the bankruptcy notice. Thus, Associate Judge Faire said:51
The judgment debtor is therefore inviting the Court to do precisely what the Court of
Appeal has ruled cannot be done under the Insolvency Act 1967. In my view this has
nothing to do with the processes of the Court, but is an attempt by the judgment debtor
to have the Court produce a result which is expressly excluded by the current statute law
as interpreted by the Court of Appeal.
Residual Discretion
Finally, counsel for the debtor argued that the court has a residual
discretion to set aside a bankruptcy notice and it should exercise it in the
circumstances of this case. Generally the court has held that, unlike the
wide statutory discretion given to the court when considering an application
for adjudication under s 37 of the Insolvency Act 2006 (previously s 26 of
the 1967 Act), there is no residual discretion at the application to set aside
a bankruptcy notice stage.52 However, counsel argued, and Associate Judge
Faire appeared to agree, that the case of Re Taylor53 indicates there is an
exception to this general rule so that if the Court considered that it was
clear from the circumstances that a later court would not adjudicate a debtor
bankrupt, it would be appropriate to stay the proceeding at the application to
set aside the bankruptcy notice stage, rather than to wait until an application
is filed for adjudication.54
51 Re Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd ex parte Rees (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV 2006-404-004219, Associate Judge Faire 17 July 2009), [29].
52 See, for example, In Re Murphy, ex p Trotter Quirke & Lewis (Unreported, High Court
Palmerston North, B118/90, Heron J, 14 February 1991; Singh v Commissioner of Inland
Revenue (2002) 20 NZTC 17,660 (HC).
53 Re Taylor (1992) 4 NZBLC 102,875 (HC).
54 In Re Taylor the debtor applied to set aside a bankruptcy notice based on summary judgment
against him for unpaid rent and outgoings which the debtor was liable for under a lease of
premises occupied by his business. Thomas J found that there was no counterclaim, set-off
or cross demand which could serve to negate or nullify the bankruptcy notice and therefore
the opposition to the notice was, according to Thomas J, ‘doomed from the outset’ and must
fail. However, Thomas J went on to say that ‘I do not regard that as the end of the matter.
The Court still has an inherent jurisdiction to stay the bankruptcy proceeding should it
be in the interests of justice to do so. It is this possibility that I must seriously consider.’
(102,878). Thomas J accepted that, on the facts before him, if an application was made
under s 26 of the Insolvency Act 1967 to adjudicate the debtor bankrupt, the Court was
likely to exercise its statutory discretion to not make an order of adjudication. In light of
this, Thomas J considered that it was appropriate to stay the proceeding now rather than
to wait until an application is filed for adjudication under s 26. Support for this ‘practical’
approach can also be found in Halifax Finance Ltd v McFarlane (Unreported, High Court
Wellington, CIV 2007-485-1377, Associate Judge Gendall, 12 November 2007); Holloway
v Darby (Unreported, High Court Hamilton, CIV-2005-419-1085, Associate Judge Faire,
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
361
However, Associate Judge Faire held that there was no foundation for
applying the Re Taylor exception because there was insufficient evidence
before the Court to enable it to predict the outcome of any application
for adjudication. He therefore dismissed the application to set aside the
bankruptcy notice.
V. Conclusions from the Decisions
The Court of Appeal and the subsequent High Court decisions resolved
important but narrow issues on the interrelationship between the Construction
Contracts Act and the Insolvency and Companies Acts. Of particular importance
is the resolution of the vexed issue of the proper interpretation of s 79 and its
reconciliation with the provisions of the Insolvency Act and Companies Act.
While it may seem unjust that a debtor who has a genuine counterclaim, set
off or cross demand may not raise it in the context of an application to set
aside a bankruptcy notice or statutory demand, the decision is likely to be
seen as both upholding the statutory intention of the Construction Contracts
Act and also reflecting the commercial reality that statutory demands and
bankruptcy notices are frequently used as a debt recovery tool.
Moreover, the debtor is not left without rights. The issuing of a statutory
demand or bankruptcy notice is only the preliminary stage in liquidation
or bankruptcy and they merely form the basis for bringing liquidation
or bankruptcy proceedings. While the Court in Volcanic suggested that
a liquidation application is also a ‘proceeding for recovery of a debt’ and
thus also affected by s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act, both the
Court of Appeal55 and the subsequent High Court decision56 emphasised
the distinction between an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice or
statutory demand on the one hand and an adjudication of bankruptcy or
order to wind up a company on the other, and that the Court was only being
asked to consider the former. The court has a wide overriding discretion as
to whether it will make an order appointing a liquidator in the event it is
satisfied that one or more of the grounds set out in s 241(4) of the Companies
Act have been established. The court has a similarly wide discretion when
faced with an application for adjudication under s 37 of the Insolvency Act
2006. Thus, at that point (or possibly even subsequently on the adjudication
of bankruptcy or the appointment of the liquidator) any counterclaim or set
off or cross demand could be dealt with.
An application to appoint a liquidator or to adjudicate a debtor bankrupt
is usually defended on the ground that the debt upon which an application is
founded is the subject of a substantial dispute. While s 79 of the Construction
Contracts Act prohibits the arguing of a counterclaim in any proceeding for
recovery of the debt, the debtor is not prevented from pursuing recovery
8 December 2005); Re Saker ex p Blackler (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV-2008485-124, Associate Judge Faire, 26 May 2008); Solicitor-General ex p Alice (Unreported,
High Court Wellington, CIV-2007-454-791, Associate Judge Gendall, 14 February 2008).
55 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243, [65].
56 Re Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd ex parte Rees (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
CIV 2006-404-004219, Associate Judge Faire 17 July 2009), [30].
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in other proceedings. As part of its inherent jurisdiction to prevent an
abuse of process, the court will not usually make an order adjudicating a
debtor bankrupt or appointing a liquidator if the debtor can make out this
ground, because it would be unjust for liquidation or bankruptcy to occur
while issues remained outstanding between the parties.57 A factor that may
ultimately influence a court in the overall exercise of the jurisdiction under
s 241 or s 37 is whether payment is able to be made or secured in some
way and whether a properly framed counterclaim or set-off is before a court
awaiting determination.58
Furthermore, s 79 only prohibits the arguing of a counterclaim, set off
or cross demand in any proceeding for recovery of the debt. Thus, in an
application to set aside a statutory demand, the section only affects s 290(4)(b);
it does not affect ‘other grounds’ in s 290(4)(c) nor does it prevent the exercise
of the court’s inherent jurisdiction to prevent an abuse of its processes in the
context of an application to set aside a bankruptcy notice. However, as the
High Court in Laywood made clear in the context of the now revoked s 19
of the Insolvency Act, the court cannot exercise its inherent jurisdiction on
the ground that the debtor has an arguable defence to the claim as this is
seeking a result which the Court of Appeal has ruled is expressly excluded
by s 79 of the Construction Contracts Act.59 A similar conclusion is likely
under s 290(4)(c) of the Companies Act where it is clear from the wording of
s 290(4)(c) that the ‘other grounds’ upon which an applicant may rely on are
other than those set out in s 290(4)(a) or (b).60
However, in order to prevent an abuse of process, a statutory demand or
a bankruptcy notice may be set aside under s 290(4)(c) or using the court’s
inherent jurisdiction where the demand or notice procedure is being used
for a purpose which is not contemplated by the respective Acts.61 Solvency
of the debtor company has been successfully argued in a number of cases
as one such ground and solvency as a defence is not barred by s 79 of the
Construction Contracts Act.62 It should be noted, however, that the Court of
Appeal has recently stated in AMC Construction Ltd v Frews Contracting Ltd63
that, while not discounting that solvency of the debtor may never be relevant
57 See, for example, Morph Enterprises Ltd v Marple Investments Ltd (Unreported, High Court
Wellington, CIV-2005-485-1574, Associate Judge Gendall, 30 November 2005). The court
may, at any time before a debtor is adjudicated bankrupt or a liquidator is appointed, stay or
restrain an application or proceeding (Companies Act 1993, s 247; Insolvency Act 2006, s 38).
58 See comments to this effect in Delta Roofing & Manufacturing Ltd v Kiwi Steel New Zealand
Ltd (Unreported, High Court Hamilton, CIV-2009-419-619, Associate Judge Faire,
25 August 2009).
59 Laywood v Holmes Construction Wellington Ltd [2009] NZLR 243.
60 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chester Trustee Services Ltd [2003] 1 NZLR 395 (CA);
Siteworks Ltd v IH Wedding & Sons Ltd (1998) 8 NZCLC 261,704 (High Court).
61 Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Chester Trustee Services Ltd [2003] 1 NZLR 395 (Court of
Appeal).
62 See, for example, Medisys Ltd v Getinge Castle Ltd (Unreported, High Court Auckland,
M1426-im00, Master Kennedy-Grant, 9 February 2001); Resource & Hire Ltd v Page Vivian
Motors Ltd (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV-2008-454-416, Associate Judge
Gendall, 7 November 2008).
63 AMC Construction Ltd v Frews Contracting Ltd (2009) 10 NZCLC 264,450 (CA). Applied in
Gills Construction Company Ltd v Butler (Unreported, High Court Wellington, CIV-2009406-203, Judge Mallon, 12 November 2009).
Case and Comment: Statutory Demands, Bankruptcy Notices and the
Construction Contracts Act 2002
363
at the s 290 stage, it would be extremely rare that solvency of a company
could constitute a stand alone ground for setting aside a statutory demand.
Moreover, it seems that the reasoning in those cases that support solvency as a
standalone ground was based on the view that statutory demands should not
be used as a mechanism for a creditor to obtain payment of a debt. Arguably
it is this reasoning that is the root of the conflict between Silverpoint and
Volcanic.
There has been a wide range of views taken on the issue by both courts and
academics.64 Insolvency purists uphold the principle that a statutory demand
is not to be used as a means of debt recovery but only as a precursor to
an application for liquidation or bankruptcy. Others recognise, and accept,
the reality that statutory demands are almost always used as a means of
recovering debts. However, there is a line of recent Court of Appeal decisions
that have taken the view that obtaining payment of a debt is a legitimate
purpose of the statutory demand and bankruptcy notice procedures and is
not an abuse of process.65 By adopting the view of Randerson J in Volcanic,
and therefore recognising the importance of using statutory demands and
bankruptcy notices as a means of obtaining payment of a debt, the Court of
Appeal decision in Laywood adds further weight to that view.
Thus, while the Court of Appeal resolved an important issue on the
interplay between the construction contracts legislation and insolvency
legislation, in reaching its conclusions, the decision can also be seen on a
broader level to reinforce the trend of courts to adopt a pragmatic view of
insolvency proceedings rather than the view of the insolvency purists who
flinch at the use of statutory demands and bankruptcy notices for ‘debt
collection’. This will assist those who are assessing the true purpose of a
statutory demand or bankruptcy notice and, in particular, whether using
them to claim a due debt is crossing the line of acceptable conduct.
64 See, for example, Ren, above n 21 and Brookers, Insolvency Law & Practice, CA289.07 and
the cases cited therein. Compare Andrew Beck, ‘Enforcing Construction Debts’ (2005) New
Zealand Law Journal 225.
65 In Pioneer Insurance Company Ltd v White Heron Motor Lodge Ltd [2009] NZCCLR 14;
(2008) 19 PRNZ 286 [24], the Court of Appeal considered that the purpose of a statutory
demand is to obtain payment for a debt, with the secondary purpose to provide a basis on
which the debtor’s inability to pay its debts as they fall due maybe proved in liquidation
proceedings. Similarly, in Commissioner of Inland Revenue v Central Equipment Co Ltd
(2006) 22 NZTC 19,891 [29] the Court of Appeal stated that ‘it cannot be improper for a
creditor to make a statutory demand on a debtor in order to apply pressure to realise assets to
pay a due debt. It will only be improper if some ulterior purpose that is improper and which
might amount to an abuse of the Court’s processes that the Court would be justified in
setting a statutory demand aside’. In Link Electrosystems Ltd v GPC Electronics (New Zealand)
Ltd (2007) 18 PRNZ 946 (discussed by Andrew Beck, ‘Editorial: Statutory demands and
debt collecting’ (2008) Company & Securities Law Bulletin 11) the Court of Appeal suggested
that creditors should not be criticised for using a statutory demand to collect a debt unless to
do so is ‘oppressive.’
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