Download Philosophy of Science: Values in science

6.11.2012
Philosophy of Science:
Values in science
Kristina Rolin 2012
Logical empiricism
In order to serve the society at large, scientific
knowledge should be value-free.
Scientific knowledge is value-free insofar as it is
grounded on empirical evidence and logical
reasoning alone (hence, logical empiricism).
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The ideal of value-free science
What is meant by value-free science?
1. What kinds of values should science be free
from?
2. What in science should be free from these
values?
Constitutive versus contextual values
Constitutive
(or epistemic) values are
values generated from an
understanding of the goals
of scientific inquiry (e.g.,
significant truth or
empirical success).
Contextual
(or non-epistemic) values
are values generated from
other goals (e.g., value
judgments that concern a
desirable social order).
Longino, Helen. 1990. Science
as Social Knowledge.
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Discovery and application
It is uncontroversial to
suggest that contextual
values are allowed to
influence what topics
are considered
important in science
(the context of
discovery) and what
practical goals research
is expected to serve
(the context of
application).
discovery
application
Justification
It is controversial to
suggest that
contextual values are
allowed to influence
what hypotheses and
theories should be
accepted (the context
of justification).
discovery
justification
application
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The traditional ideal of value-free
science
Epistemic justification of hypotheses and
theories should be based on constitutive
values, and not on contextual values.
Is this ideal feasible?
What are constitutive values?
Theoretical virtues are desirable features of
scientific theories.
Communal values are desirable features of
scientific communities.
Intellectual virtues are desirable features of
individual scientists.
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What are theoretical virtues?
Thomas Kuhn:
Helen Longino:
accuracy,
simplicity,
internal and external
consistency,
breadth of scope,
fruitfulness.
empirical adequacy,
ontological
heterogeneity and
complexity,
novelty,
applicability to human
needs,
diffusion of power
What are communal values?
1.
2.
3.
4.
Public venues
Uptake of criticism
Public standards
Equality of intellectual authority
The four norms are epistemic values because they
facilitate transformative criticism which is part of
the epistemic justification of scientific knowledge.
Longino, Helen. 2002. The fate of knowledge.
Princeton: Princeton University Press.
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Robert Merton (1910-2003)
“The ethos of science is that affectively toned complex of
values and norms which is held to be binding on the man of
science.”
The so called CUDOS norms:
communism,
universalism,
disinterestedness, and
organized skepticism.
Merton, Robert. 1942. “Science and Technology in a
Democratic Order.” Journal of Legal and Political Sociology 1:
115-26.
What are intellectual virtues?
honesty
competence
conscientiousness
capability of epistemic self-assessment
Hardwig, John. 1991. The role of trust in
knowledge. Journal of Philosophy 88 (12),
693-708.
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Trust in science
Many beliefs scientists
accept are so called
second-hand beliefs,
that is, their epistemic
justification is based
on the assumption
that other scientists
are trustworthy
testifiers. A scientist is
a trustworthy testifier
insofar as she has the
above mentioned
virtues.
Basic and applied research
Basic research is knowledge-seeking primarily for
the sake of knowledge itself without a demand to
deliver immediate solutions to practical problems.
Applied research is knowledge-seeking that aims
to deliver solutions to practical problems.
The basic/applied distinction is not clear-cut; the
line is shifting depending on how immediately we
expect research to deliver solutions to practical
problems.
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Basic and applied research
The distinction is based on how scientists
themselves understand the goals of their research.
The actual societal impact of research can be
evaluated only with hindsight.
For an example, see ”Civilization cannot be
imported: Research Commentary on the Impact of
Cultural and Social Research.” Publications of the
Academy of Finland 3/2007.
Technical norms
“If you want A, and you believe that you are in a
situation B, then it is rational to do X.”
The claim that A is worthy of pursuit is a value
judgment.
Underlying causal hypothesis: Doing X will bring
about A in a situation B (ceteris paribus).
Niiniluoto, Ilkka. 1993. The aim and structure of
applied research. Erkenntnis 38, 1-21.
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The ideal of value-free science in
applied research?
The normative ideal of value-free science requires
that the epistemic justification of theories and
hypotheses (e.g., causal hypotheses) is based on
constitutive values, and not on contextual values.
Contextual values are allowed to play a role in
determining whether research results are useful
(value relevance).
Problem
Can applied research measure up to the
traditional ideal of value-free science
(epistemic justification of hypotheses and
theories should be based on constitutive
values, and not on contextual values)?
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Argument #1
1.
The acceptance of hypothesis is underdetermined by
evidence.
2.
Scientists have to decide how high degree of evidential
warrant is required for the hypothesis to be acceptable.
3.
This decision depends on the risks involved: (a) the “cost” of
accepting a false hypothesis, and (b) the “cost” of rejecting
a true hypothesis.
4.
The identification and assessment of risks is a matter of
moral judgment.
5.
Therefore, the acceptance of hypothesis involves moral
judgments.
Rudner, Richard. 1953. The scientist qua scientist makes
value judgments. Philosophy of Science 20 (1), 1-6.
Decision making and risks
H
Not H
I accept H
U1 x P(H)
U2 x P(not H)
I do not
accept H
U3 x P(H)
U4 x P(not H)
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Argument #2
Theoretical virtues can be interpreted in different
ways (e.g., consistency with rational choice theory
versus consistency with social psychology).
They can be weighed in different ways (e.g.,
accuracy versus broad scope and simplicity).
Therefore, theoretical virtues can be intertwined
with contextual values.
Longino, Helen. 1995. Gender, politics and theoretical
virtues. Synthese 104 (3): 383-397.
Argument #3
In order to be able to assess the evidential warrant
of a hypothesis, a scientist will have to decide what
kind of evidence is relevant for the hypothesis. In
some cases, a decision concerning relevance is
value-laden.
Longino, Helen. 1990. Science as Social
Knowledge: Values and Objectivity in Scientific
Inquiry.
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Example
Classification and diagnosis of depression: A continually
depressed mood, diminished interest in most activities, a
large increase or decrease in appetite, insomnia or
excessive sleeping, loss of energy, feelings of
worthlessness, inappropriate guilt, indecisiveness, and
recurrent suicidal thoughts.
The different symptoms that are thought to constitute
depression have one thing in common: they impair the
functions most essential to human well-being. This is a
moral value judgment.
Intemann, Kristen. 2001. Science and values: Are value
judgments always irrelevant to the justification of scientific
claims? Philosophy of Science 68: S506-S518.
Example
Case study: Research on divorce has been focused on
negative effects on children and their parents. An
alternative research design allows researchers to
discover positive outcomes.
Lesson: Moral and social values are allowed to enter into
decisions concerning the background assumptions of
scientific reasoning (Longino 1990). Yet, some uses of
values to select background assumptions are
illegitimate. The use of values is illegitimate when they
drive inquiry to a predetermined conclusion (e.g.
“divorce is a loss”).
Anderson, Elizabeth. 2004. Uses of value judgments in
science: A general argument, with lessons fro a case study
of feminist research on divorce. Hypatia 19 (1): 1-24.
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Example
Case study: The term “rape” in evolutionary psychology
is used as if it is appropriate to describe human behavior
without value judgments. The moral and legal content of
the term is ignored.
Lesson: Many terms in language are both descriptive
and evaluative. The attempt to separate the factual from
the normative is futile.
Dupré, John. 2007. Fact and value. In Kincaid, Dupré, and
Wylie (eds.), Value-free science? Ideals and illusions.
Oxford. Oxford University Press.
Conclusion
In (applied) scientific research it is not always
possible to hold onto the principle that the
acceptance of hypothesis should be based merely
on constitutive values, and not on contextual
values.
However, saying this does not mean that
contextual values are allowed to displace
constitutive values. Contextual values cannot be
eliminated from epistemic justification insofar as
they are embedded in constitutive values.
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Epistemic responsibility
A scientist has an epistemic responsibility to
defend not only constitutive values but also
contextual values.
Epistemic responsibility requires that one provides
reasons for value judgments (both constitutive and
contextual) when requested.
For example, a scientist should explain why she
chose a particular method for the study of poverty
or pollution.
Normative approaches to values
in science
What alternatives do we have for the traditional ideal
of value-free science?
Miriam Solomon’s social empiricism
Heather Douglas’s conception of scientific integrity
Helen Longino’s social account of objectivity
Janet Kourany’s ideal of socially responsible science
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Solomon on values in science
Instrumental approach to values in science: Any
scientific practice that leads to empirical success or
truth deserves to be called scientifically rational.
Given an instrumental perspective, even those
values that have traditionally been conceived as
non-epistemic can play a rational role in science.
They can play a rational role by distributing
research efforts in the community among those
theories that have some empirical successes.
Social empiricism: part I
A normative theory of values in science should not
discourage the influence of non-empirical decision
vectors at the individual level in determining a
scientist’s choice of one theory over another.
For an individual scientist, social empiricism gives
only one guideline. A scientist should work with
empirically successful theories.
We should accept such a minimally constraining
policy with respect to individual scientists’
reasoning and decision-making because nonempirical decision vectors can play a rational role
in science.
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Social empiricism: part II
A community of scientists should distribute
research efforts when different theories have
different empirical successes and none of the
theories has all available empirical successes in a
domain of inquiry.
A rational distribution of research effort requires
two things: (1) empirical decision vectors be
equitably distributed in proportion to the empirical
successes of the various theories under
consideration, and (2) non-empirical decision
vectors be equally distributed among those
theories that have some empirical successes.
Scientific integrity
Scientific integrity consists in keeping social and moral
values to their proper roles in scientific reasoning, not in
keeping them out of scientific reasoning.
Values play a direct role when they act as reasons to
accept a hypothesis or a theory and an indirect role
when they act as reasons to accept a certain level of
uncertainty.
Social and moral values are not allowed to play a direct
role in scientific reasoning but they can legitimately play
an indirect role.
Douglas, Heather. 2009. Science, Policy, and the Value-free
Ideal. Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh Press.
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Douglas’s arguments
A direct role is not acceptable because it would
undermine the value of science itself, its basic
integrity and authority.
An indirect role is acceptable because scientists are
morally responsible for the potential harm caused
by their making overly strong knowledge claims
and downplaying the risk of error.
Indirect role for values in science
Scientists should make value judgments
concerning the acceptable level of uncertainty, and
these judgments require social and moral values.
Value judgments should be made as explicit as
possible because the public has a right to
understand the social and moral values behind
scientists’ assessment of the acceptable level of
uncertainty.
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Criticism
Social and moral values can play other roles in scientific
reasoning besides direct and indirect roles. Social and
moral values can be “encoded” in background
assumptions that are necessary to establish the
relevance of evidence for a hypothesis or a theory
(Longino 1990).
Insofar as social and moral values enter into scientific
reasoning via background assumptions, their role is not
direct because they do not act as evidence in scientific
reasoning. Also, their role is not indirect because they do
not concern the question of how much evidence is
sufficient to render the risk of error acceptable.
Douglas’s normative theory of values in science does not
provide guidance for such a situation.
Longino’s account: part I
Social and moral values can legitimately play a role
in individual scientists’ choice of background
assumptions.
Objectivity cannot be realized in an individual
scientist’s reasoning and decision-making because
both the status of observation reports as empirical
evidence, as well as the plausibility of evidential
reasoning is dependent on a context of background
assumptions which may include assumptions
encoding moral and social values.
Individual scientists are not always capable of
identifying such assumptions on their own.
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Longino’s account: part II
A social account of objectivity is needed because
“there are no formal rules, guidelines, or processes
that can guarantee that social values will not
permeate evidential relations” (2002, 50).
A social account of objectivity is needed to make
sure that background assumptions as well as the
social and moral values that have motivated their
choice can be articulated and criticized.
”Social” in Longino’s social
account of objectivity
Longino’s approach differs from Douglas’s approach
in that it does not assume that individual scientists
are capable of realizing the ideal of objectivity on
their own.
Longino’s approach differs from Solomon’s
approach in that it does not assume that scientific
communities are capable of realizing the ideal of
objectivity without assigning epistemic rights and
obligations to individual scientists. The four norms
imply epistemic rights and obligations for individual
scientists.
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Kourany’s ideal of socially
responsible science
“According to this approach, sound social values, as well
as sound epistemic values, must control every aspect of
the scientific research process, from the choice of
research questions to the communication and application
of results, this to be enforced by such political means as
funding requirements on research” (viii; see also 106).
Questions: What does it mean to say that social and
epistemic values “control” scientific research process?
Kourany, Janet. 2010. Philosophy of Science after
Feminism. Oxford and New York: Oxford University Press.
Sound social values?
“Like the social value management ideal of science,
on the other hand, the ideal of socially responsible
science recognizes that social values inevitably enter
into science, but unlike the social value
management ideal of science, the ideal of socially
responsible science also recognizes that we, as a
society, have a definite say—through funding
priorities and restrictions, for example—as to what
these social values will be. Indeed, given that
science is both a profound shaper of society and a
profound beneficiary of society, these social values
should be chosen so as to meet the needs of society,
including the justice-related needs of society.” (68)
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Sound social values?
“And finally, like the empiricist ideal of science, the
ideal of socially responsible science recognizes that
scientific rationality must be defined in terms of
scientific success, but unlike the empiricist ideal of
science, the ideal of socially responsible science also
recognizes that scientific success must be defined in
terms of social success—human flourishing, what
makes for a good society—as well as empirical
success.” (68)
Moral versus social values
Let us assume that there are universal moral
values (e.g., the central human capabilities as they
are defined by Martha Nussbaum 2000).
Even if we assume that there are universal moral
values, there will be a diversity of social values
(conceptions of good life) because the value of
liberty urges us to respect different individual
choices and the value of national sovereignty urges
us to respect different political choices (aiming to
realize the central human capabilities).
Question: How do scientists receive information
about the many needs of their society?
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The needs of society?
The market model:
The market is the best
place to find out about the
needs of society and a
socially responsible
scientific community
should aim to respond to
the demand in the
market.
The political model:
Politicians and policy
makers are in the best
position to articulate the
needs of society (at least
in liberal democratic
societies).
The hybrid model:
Collaboration between corporations
and publicly funded research groups
is the best way to pool information
about the needs of society.
Limitations – and a solution?
The market model:
The flaw in the market
model is in the
assumption that the
market is the best place
to find out about the
needs of society.
The political model:
Even though the political
model has advantages
over the market model, it
has its own shortcomings. Politicians and
policy makers have often
merely a partial picture of
what the needs of society
are.
Science as the third model:
Scientific research can compensate
for the shortcomings of the market
model and the political model.
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Summary
Scientists should be given the opportunity and resources
to engage themselves in an on-going debate about the
needs of society because both the market model and the
political model (and the hybrid model) have their
shortcomings.
Scientists should not be expected to take at face value
the “needs” that are expressed in the market or
articulated by politicians, policy makers, and nongovernmental organizations.
Longino’s social value management ideal of science is
capable of meeting the needs of society better than
Kourany’s ideal because it does not accept different
articulations of needs dogmatically; instead, they are
subjected to critical scrutiny.
Today’s message
The traditional ideal of value-free science: Social
and moral values are not allowed to play any role
in the reasoning and decision-making that
scientists are engaged in when they decide to
accept something as scientific knowledge, either
individually or collectively.
Whereas many philosophers of science seem to be
unanimous about the need to replace the
traditional ideal, their views diverge on the
question of what the successor to the traditional
ideal should be.
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