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“BY ANY MEANS NECESSARY:”
THE LEAGUE FOR HUMAN RIGHTS AGAINST NAZISM
AND DOMESTIC FASCISM, 1933-1946
A thesis submitted to Kent State University
in partial fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Masters of Arts
in History
by
Scott D. Abrams
May, 2012
i
Thesis written by
Scott D. Abrams
B.A., The University of Akron, 2010
M.A., Kent State University, 2012
Approved by
_______________________________, Kenneth Bindas, Co-Advisor
_______________________________, Richard Steigmann-Hall, Co-Advisor
_______________________________, Kenneth Bindas, Chair, Department of History
_______________________________, Timothy Moerland, Dean, College of Arts and
Sciences
ii
TABLE OF CONTENTS
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS..................................................................................................iv
INTRODUCTION...............................................................................................................1
CHAPTER 1: Building a Nazi Community.......................................................................23
CHAPTER 2: Public Resistance and Clandestine Vigilance.............................................55
CHAPTER 3: Breaking the Bund and Legion...................................................................90
CHAPTER 4: Resistance, Vigilance, and Change: America's War, the League for Human
Rights, and the Fall of American Fascism.......................................................................123
BIBLIOGRAPHY............................................................................................................161
iii
ACKNOWLEDGMENTS:
This thesis was a product of many long nights, difficult days, and the direct (and
indirect) help of many people. I would like to start by thanking the staff and faculty in
Kent State University's Department of History. Their assistance from everything
bureaucratic to mundane made my stay at Kent State much easier. Without them, I’d still
be lost in a sea of paperwork. I would also like to thank the professors whose classes I
took or I worked in. I believe that through personal interactions with them and in-class
activities I was able to hone my interests, skills, and knowledge well past what I initially
had. Among those faculty members, three in particular stood out and made this thesis
possible. My committee members, Dr. Richard Steigmann-Gall, Dr. Kenneth Bindas, and
Dr. Clarence Wunderlin each contributed to this project by offering me their knowledge,
time, advice, and revisions. I am most certainly in debt to them for their intellectual input
into this project. My fellow masters and Ph.D. colleagues in the department deserve
thanks as well for their moral support and probing questions. I would also like to thank
the staff members of Cleveland's Western Reserve Historical Society and Case Western
Reserve University's Special Collections department. They each gave me access to
indispensable primary sources that otherwise would have this project impossible. Most
importantly, my family and loved ones deserve the greatest thanks that I can possibly
give. Their constant support, questions, and love brought me through many difficult times
and kept my mind focused on the end goal. Their enthusiasm for my project and seeing
iv
me succeed helped keep my internal drive what it was from the beginning until the end.
This entire process has been an enlightening, albeit difficult experience that I will carry
with me for the rest of my life.
v
INTRODUCTION
A Brief Prologue
By the end of 1945, Cleveland, Ohio's League for Human Rights Against Nazism
had fought a long and tiresome campaign against domestic fascism and elements of the
German-American Bund. The League led the efforts to counter Nazi propaganda in the
area and campaigned for an economic boycott of the Nazis. They printed volumes of
informational fliers, lists of businesses that sold German goods, and rallied civilians
against Nazi atrocities. For them, the end of the war meant that they could disband and
within a few months after June, 1946, the League permanently closed its doors. Before
dismantling, however, the League printed a handful of copies detailing a considerable
amount of their activities. The report explains the League's rise to local power, the fights
it conducted against religiously and politically validated anti-Semitism, and the economic
boycott it led in Cleveland. The League's report also hints at a much greater campaign of
“carefully-kept files and persistent watchfulness.... [of] hundreds upon hundreds of
individuals” and organizations. 1 These were secret, extralegal investigations against local
Nazis, German spies, suspicious individuals, the Cleveland branch of the GermanAmerican Bund and William Dudley Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion, and the local German
American community, largely gathered by paid informants and agents with coded names
1
Anonymous, Report of the League for Human Rights, 1933-1941 (Cleveland, OH.: League for Human
Rights, 1946), 24.
1
2
like P-9, X-5, and 211. Their findings included a black market for German goods, illegal
funding programs that sent money to Germany and the Nazi Party, a Hitler Youth-themed
education camp, cooperation between German bureaucrats and local officials to send
Nazi propagandists into Cleveland schools and Cleveland students to German schools,
plans to disrupt local elections, and even a plot to illegally take over Cleveland's most
prestigious German American organization. The League furthermore found that Nazi
agents and propagandists were indeed active in spreading anti-Semitism throughout
northeast Ohio and that the local Bund's membership extended from average citizens to
the social, political, and scholarly elite of Cleveland.
The key organizations in this thesis, the German-American Bund and League for
Human Rights, were products of their time and experiences felt by members over a
period of decades. While both of these groups were local entities vying for power, their
goals and political leanings were influenced by national forces. Furthermore, they are
representative of larger movements, each calling for the nation to move in opposing
directions. It should be no surprise then that these two groups fought each other over the
role of guiding political philosophies in everyday life and in political power. Most
importantly, their conflicts over ideology portrays the problem of democracy's value as
America's leading political ideology versus the potential role of fascism offered to the
world. The German-American Bund, in both it's national and local attempts to gain real
power, represented a threat to democratic principles and left many observers extremely
unsettled by their rhetoric and activities. The League for Human Rights saw themselves
as Cleveland's leading non-sectarian/Jewish-aligned anti-Nazi boycott organization and
3
the best local solution to the Bund's efforts in Cleveland. Their mission to defend
democracy, promote ethnic and religious tolerance, and defeat fascistic regimes took the
forms of public informational speeches, rallies, parades, news columns, rumor sections in
local newspapers, boycott programs, and clandestine campaigns.
The tense, increasingly public relationship between the League and Cleveland
Bund reached it's first critical point between 1936 and 1937. This conflict came about
when the Bund leaders realized that their initial efforts to reach the American community
failed. As a result, they decided to recast the group's image and public message as proAmerican, pro-German culture, and anti-Communist, while deceptively remaining Nazi
at their core. Their message changed from militarism and anti-Semitism towards more
subtle language that embraced ethnic celebration and national pride. Changing in kind,
the League's tactical shift towards vigilance, as defined by historian Christopher
Capazolla, was aimed at continuing their campaign against an enemy that tried to make
themselves look more American and less Nazi. These new methodologies, vigilance and
increased subtlety, came to define their dialogic relationship.
In all, this study grapples with several key issues about these organizations and
their places in the larger historical narrative on American Nazism and resistance
campaigns. First, the growth of American Nazism (particularly the German-American
Bund), their initial public message, how they challenged democracy, and federal
investigations against them. Additionally, I will present the development of the League
for Human Rights, a Cleveland-based non-sectarian resistance organization, and how
they confronted domestic fascism. Naturally, discussions of these groups will be
4
preempted by sections that display how both were products of larger national conflicts.
Second, I look at the League's and Bund's changing public campaigns in Cleveland and
how they each forced the other to change their dialogue and methodology in public
settings. Third, I examine various changes in the Bund and League's operations,
altercations between their ideological campaigns, and, finally, the results of the League's
covert operations against the Bund. Fourth, my analysis looks at the breakdown of formal
Nazi organizations into discrete underground cells and how the League's vigilance
campaigns embraced renewed public resistance and revised private investigations to keep
up with developments. Lastly, my review of these groups, their changing tactics, and
their activities serves as a revision of major conclusions made by previous historians,
particularly Haskel Lookstein, on the affectivity of non-sectarian anti-Nazi resistance and
the inner circle activities of the German-American Bund and other fascist-leaning groups.
Outside of this study, no major work on anti-Nazi resistance considers the effects of
vigilance campaigns and the inner circle activities of American Nazi organizations as part
of the larger narrative of the 1930s.These elements have long been absent from the
traditional narrative. They are important because they offer a new contour to the
affectivity, tactics, and range of anti-Nazi resistance movements as well present new
information on Bund activities. The latter is key because new Bund records have not
surfaced nor been present in scholarly literature since the 1970s.
Section One: A Methodological and Historiographical Review
5
Before anything meaningful can be said of Jewish and non-sectarian anti-Nazi
resistance, one is required to first review the historiographical narrative concerning the
German American ethnic experience during and between the World Wars and general
political and social pressures during this time. Some of the works that inform my
overarching ideas about these periods include Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes,
Robert E. Herzstein's Roosevelt & Hitler, William E. Leuchtenburg's Franklin D.
Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940, and Robert S. McElvaine's The Great
Depression. 2 These works all excel at covering their specific aims, but also provide
strong syntheses on the periods, issues, and information relevant to this study. Strong as
these works are, many skim over or give little more than passing thoughts to the
experience German Americas had with nation-wide harassment. At first sight this
experience may not seem all that relevant to the American Nazi movement; however,
many historians have found that rampant national “Germanophobia” and ethnic
harassment contributed greatly to galvanizing both American attitudes towards German
activities as well as the extremist seedbed from which organized American Nazism arose.
Any review of German American harassment, “100% Americanism,” and the
nativist experience during the Great War would be incomplete without the works of two
key historians, namely Frederick C. Luebke and Carl Wittke. In particular, Carl Wittke's
2
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes, (New York: Vintage Books, 1994); Robert E. Herzstein, Roosevelt
& Hitler, (New York: Paragon House, 1989); William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the
New Deal, 1932-1940, (New York, Harper & Rowe, 1963); Robert S. McElvaine, The Great Depression
(New York, Times Books, 1984).
6
“ethnic disappearance thesis” has been the most widely reproduced and long standing
version of the nativist experience. In German-Americans and the World War, Wittke
characterized the nativist campaigns as “a violent hysterical concerted movement to
eradicate everything German from American civilization.” Nativists were centered in on
using all legal, extralegal, and in some cases, illegal methods possible so as to keep
Americans of German stock from engaging in or promoting any sort of activity or group
that did not fall within “100% Americanism.” He claims that both urban and rural
communities were equally involved in anti-German hysteria, thus making the effect a
truly universal event. 3 His account unevenly evaluates pro-German activities during and
prior to the war and the nativist campaigns against them. He posits that Germans were
victims purely because they were German and nothing more.
Wittke's idea for the actual “disappearance” of America's Germans is best shown
in his later literature. For example, he explains that “the amorphous community which
had existed from 1850 to World War I, collapsed and largely disappeared in the fiery
furnace of that war” in his 1964 We Who Built America. 4 This school of thought assumes
that assimilation was not truly possible. Instead, Wittke contends that individual ethnic
communities were defined by their unique cultural indicators and stood outside of
assimilated cultural groups. Lastly, German-American ethnic affiliation fell as a result of
“halting immigration, suburbanization, and second-generation assimilation [that]
3
Carl Wittke, German-Americans and the World War (Columbus, OH: Ohio State Archaeological and
Historical Society, 1936), 163.
4
Carl Wittke, We Who Built America: The Saga of the Immigrant, (Cleveland: Western Reserve University
Press, 1964), 248.
7
weakened the bonds of the German community.” 5 He ultimately concludes that the ethnic
community ceased to exist because nativists stripped them of their culture, institutions,
and high place in American society. Germans were quickly absorbed into the general
American population. Wittke's thesis has been instrumental in scholarly literature to this
day and has been widely reproduced or slightly altered by myriad historians that analyze
German American history.
After Wittke, Frederick Luebke's Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World
War I stands as one of the most widely respected pieces on German American studies.
While they both look at similar evidence, Luebke and Wittke come to opposing
conclusions. The first major difference present is Luebke's opening eulogy given to
Robert Praeger, the only man ever hung for being German. His chapter on Praeger
heralds him as a true American patriot that happened to be a victim of undue,
Germanophobic violence. Unlike Wittke, pro-German war-time activities are given fair
consideration in this work. Most importantly, Bonds of Loyalty posits the “ethnic survival
thesis.” While Wittke contends that Americans of German extraction disappeared from
society and were forcefully assimilated through nativism, Luebke claims that the ethnic
group ultimately outlived nativism, if only as a shell of it's former self. He claims that
this is because German institutions that were shut down during the war returned
throughout the 1920s and later. While they eventually resurfaced, German Americans
never returned to the prominence they once held. Most German Americans eventually
assimilated into general American culture and no longer cared to live by the old ways or
5
Kathleen Neils Conzen, The Paradox of German-American Assimilation, (New York: Yearbook of
German-American Studies 16, 1981), 154.
8
be a part of ethnic institutions. This difference with Wittke is important because it shows
how a segment of the German American community lived on past nativism.
Unfortunately, both Wittke and Luebke fail at connecting how a segment of the
community eventually turned to extremist politics, in part as a result of their nativist
experience. This omission, however, has been reliably filled by those who have evaluated
American fascist activities and the global fascist movement.
This study's understanding of fascist movements and fascist ideology largely
comes from the literature previously reviewed and those explained later in this chapter.
Another key piece, however, is Eric Hobsbawm's The Age of Extremes. His analysis of
fascism describes the variety of movements that proliferated throughout Europe and the
rest of the world, contending that fascist movements existed in three forms. The first were
“old-fashioned authoritarians or conservatives.... [that] had no particular ideological
agenda, other than anti-communism and the prejudices traditional to their class.” The
second form he discusses describes Juan J. Linz's “organic statism.” He claims that
“conservative regimes, not so much defending a traditional order, but deliberately
recreating its principles as a way of resisting both Liberal individualism and the challenge
of labour and socialism.” 6 This movement type relied on a desire to turn back to a time
when social and economic classes existed in harmony with the established power
hierarchy. Proponents wished to have society return to a period where each social group
played their part in the mechanisms of society and participated via their contributions to
the economic welfare of the state. Liberal institutions and representation were considered
6
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991, (New York: Vintage Books,
1996), 113-14.
9
to be less valuable to the individual than what they could offer the state. This type was
headed by authoritarian, anti-liberal regimes that all but eliminated or effectively
abolished democratic institutions.7
The third form that Hobsbawm discusses are those which relied more heavily on
copying the Italian and German models. Rather than being a variant of authoritarianism
or anti-communism, this form relied much more on personal charisma, mass
mobilization, and the theater of nationalist politics. Furthermore, these kinds of fascists
were “the revolutionaries of counter-revolution: in their rhetoric, in their appeal to those
who considered themselves victims if society, in their call for a total transformation of
society” and could enforce policies that instilled order among chaos. 8 He also claims that
this type differed from the other two in that it did not want a return to the past, but rather
used traditional values to validate their policies without empowering old leadership
hierarchies. Hitler and Mussolini's governments, for example, sought to restrain
“detestable” or “unclean” elements in society, like jazz, female emancipation, and newage art, but did not give power to traditional leadership or historically conservative
institutions to ensure these or other changes. Lastly, anti-Semitism and racism are not
necessary in this form or the other two. 9 Although Hitler's regime has gone down in
history as the most violently anti-Semitic movement ever, Mussolini's was not defined by
any sort of comparable hatred. Italian Jews did not suffer nearly as badly as their German
brethren because Mussolini's regime did not consider them a threat or enemy of the state
7
Hobsbawm, 114.
Hobsbawm, 117.
9
Hobsbawm, 118-19.
8
10
or race. In all, this third form of fascism can be summarized as one that relies squarely on
charismatic, non-traditional leadership that can use both political theater and mass
mobilization to push anti-communist, anti-liberal, counter-revolutionary policies based in
traditional values that would ultimately ensure order in a society plagued by mayhem.
Sadly, Hobsbawm's examination of global fascism fails to recognize any
American fascist groups. His omission is understandable in that he largely discusses
fascist regimes that managed to attain power. Nevertheless, one must consider the role of
failed fascist groups alongside the successful to show how and why certain societies
reject fascism as a legitimate political alternative as well as the problems intrinsic to that
specific movement. This study's examination of American fascism, as embodied by the
Bund and other pro-fascist groups, thus starts where Hobsbawm and others end. I contend
that the German-American Bund, the premier and most successful American Nazi party
during it's time, tried to model itself as best they could after the German example (thus
fitting them within Hobsbawm's third type). Bund leaders like Fritz Kuhn took the form,
function, symbols, and policies of German Nazism to heart and adopted them for
themselves. The Bund's projection of these transplanted ideas and fondness for all things
Nazi cast them as suspicious, foreign entities that were aligned with anti-democratic
forces. Their failure to garner true power in the United States was a result of their own
intrinsic, organizational problems, inability to stave off counter-movements (like those
discussed at length in this study), public affiliation with and praise of Adolf Hitler and his
Reich, as well as politics that most Americans found generally disagreeable. In part, the
role of this study is to expand on the ideas synthesized by Hobsbawm as well as fill the
11
hole that he and other historians have left by not considering the Bund as part of the
global fascist movement. More specifically, this examination uses public anti-Nazi and
boycott discourse to show how the Bund was never able to gain a meaningful foothold in
American society and political culture.
The literature on the Bund and other fascist movements in the United States starts
first with the series of investigations led by the FBI, Dickstein Committee, and House
Un-American Activities Committee, and other federal bodies. All of these reports have a
section or two devoted exclusively to the historical development of the Bund and/or the
growth of American fascist politics. Their collective findings generally conclude that the
Bund was involved in unusual activities, but were not necessarily dangerous. Not
surprisingly, these investigations also did not link the problems German Americans
suffered during the Great War with the rise of fascist groups. While some of the reports
contain false information, they are generally useful and are required material for any fair
evaluation on American fascism. Other anti-Nazi literature from the period, like John Roy
Carlson's Undercover and Robert Strausz-Hupe's Axis America, were more concerned
with findings links, real or imaginary, between the Nazi Germany and fascist groups as
well as exposing their anti-American slant. Most of these works present either pseudohistorical narratives or were purely intended as propaganda. As such, these works are
used selectively and with great discretion throughout this study. 10
While there are some methodological and thematic differences between the texts,
more modern literature specific to the Bund and other American Nazi groups largely
10
John Roy Carlson, Undercover (Philadelphia, PA: The Blakiston Company, 1943).; Robert Strausz-Hupe,
Axis America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Bros., 1941).
12
agree on the time line of events and interpretation of activities. Works like Leland V.
Bell's In Hitler's Shadow, Susan Canedy's America's Nazis, and Sander A. Diamond's The
Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941, for example, all conclude that the Bund
was a product of the Great Depression, highly interested in copying the German model of
political success, and that they ultimately failed due to public and federal scrutiny. Even
more recent studies that do not focus exclusively on American fascist groups agree with
these conclusions. For instance, Klaus P. Fischer's Hitler & America, Robert A.
Rosenbaum's Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1939-1941, and
Michaela Hoenicke Moore's Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 19331945 all draw on Bell, Canedy, and Diamond's works. More recent literature, especially
Hoenicke Moore's Know Your Enemy, have expanded these arguments to include
international and domestic issues not present in prior literature. Lastly, there are a handful
of books that look exclusively at the German American ethnic experience during World
War Two. Among them,Timothy J. Holian's The German-Americans and World War II
thoroughly chronicles how segments of the German American community turned to
fascism and the efforts Nazi Germany went to to radicalize or control them. Holians and
similar literature make up the core of secondary material used in this study. 11
The study of “resistance” has grown as an analytical tool in historical literature
11
Robert A. Rosenbaum, Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941. (Santa Barabara:
Praeger, 2010).; Klaus P. Fischer, Hitler & America, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania
Press, 2011); Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States 1924-1941, (Ithaca: Cornell
University Press, 1974); Leland A. Bell, In Hitler's Shadow, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press,
1973); Susan Canedy, America's Nazis: A Democratic Dilemma, (Menlo Park, CA: Markgraf
Publications, 1990); Timothy J. Holian, The German-Americans and World War II: An Ethnic
Experience, (New York: Peter Lang, 1996); Michaela Hoenicke Moore, Know Your Enemy: The
American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945, (Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 2010).
13
and popular culture when dealing with the Nazi era over the past several decades. Those
who resist or otherwise actively oppose the status quo are often given hero-like traits or
have herculean efforts attached to them. Generally speaking, most works utilize this
format. Moshe Gottlieb's American Anti-Nazi Resistance, 1933-1941, for example,
presents how Jewish leaders in New York led one of the nation’s largest national antiNazi boycott campaign. First, two sides are established, one as an aggressor with the
other as its natural counterpoint. Literature relevant to this study often make that
aggressor figure out to be either Hitler, the Nazi regime, Nazi Germany as a whole, or
other key individuals that held considerable power in national and international politics.
Germany, however, has not always held the exclusive place as the aggressor. In some
cases, American leaders like Fritz Kuhn, leader of the German-American Bund, or other
Bund leaders have also been used. These individuals, and ones like them, may not have
been directly linked with the Nazi party in Germany nor Hitler, however they were
significantly influenced by his ideas and thus share a sort of ideological link. The
counterpoint group is varied between ethnic groups, organizations, religious figures,
prominent politicians or statesmen, and other leaders stepped who forward, to challenge
fascist or anti-Semitic forces. Three of the most well recognized groups that resisted
fascism during the 1930s include American Germans, Jews, and non-sectarian allies. 12
Patricia Kollander's "I Must Be a Part of This War": A German American's Fight
Against Hitler and Nazism follows the virtually unknown Kurt Frank Korf's actions
against key American Nazi figures like Fritz Kuhn by acting as a FBI informant. Having
12
Moshe Gottlieb, “The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the American Jewish Community, 19331941,”(Ph.D. diss., Brandeis University, 1967).
14
escaped Germany in 1937 before he would have been criminalized under the Nuremberg
Laws (he had a Jewish grandparent), Korf worked to hunt down war criminals, and was
part of the team that authenticated Joseph Goebbels personal diaries. According to
Kollander, Korf had, as a German American and as a former citizen of the Reich trying to
prove himself in a nation hostile to him and other former citizens, a self-induced
imperative to fight Nazism at home and abroad. 13 In a sense, his form of resistance was
both for ethnic and national political causes. It can mean that the active party or
individual is acting on behalf of their ethnic group, an organization, or for the
government. The ways in which one goes about resisting a malefactor also varies
considerably. In the end, it is essential that the reader understand that “resistance” is not a
one-size-fits-all category, but one determined by a variety of variables.
One of the most well received and oft cited historians of Jewish resistance in
America is Moshe Gottlieb. His 1967 doctoral dissertation, “The Anti-Nazi Boycott
Movement in the American Jewish Community, 1933-1941,” outlines how boycotting,
one of the more popular modes of resistance utilized by Jewish and non-sectarian
organizations in the United States prior to the war, was a way for them to strike at the
heart of German oppression against Jews via economic and public relations avenues. He
wrote that “Germany was powerless to retaliate” and that boycotts put pressure on
German officials to be less harsh in their treatment of German Jews or those of conquered
territories. Sadly, Gottlieb states this pressure only influenced Nazi officials during the
early years of the Reich and expired quickly after Hitler's racial policies took priority
13
Patricia Kollander, I Must Be a Part of This War": A German American's Fight Against Hitler and
Nazism, (New York: Fordham University Press, 2005), 23.
15
over all other things. Gottlieb additionally claims that boycotts effectively raised public
consciousness against Germany and the Hitler regime by exposing how it had both
invaded the United States markets with all sorts of items and goods as well as how it
ruthlessly treated hundreds of thousands of people. The boycotts were so effective that
“On a number of occasions, Hitler himself freely conceded that the boycott was greatly
harming Germany's economic interests.... Hitler's reference to 'boycotts pursued for
ideological reasons' depicts . . . the real character of the movement that sought to wring
concessions out of the monstrous tyrant, and if that were not possible, to destroy him; but,
in any event, to resist him, come what may.” 14
Understanding Jewish resistance to Nazism, however, did not stop with Gottlieb.
Over the past thirty years, the literature regarding Jewish organizations and the overall
national reaction to Nazism has grown. Yehuda Bauer's 1981 study American Jewry and
the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, 1939-1945 addresses
two problems: the group's initial reaction to Nazism and how they challenged the
Holocaust. Importantly, she points out problems organizations such as the Joint
Distribution Committee faced,especially the legal restrictions regarding the rescue of
European Jews in Germany and territories under German control. Many Jews were “sold”
to rescue organizations in the United States (much as if they were common goods) for a
hefty price. Unfortunately, these groups lacked the funds to buy all their brethren out of
Nazi oppression. 15
14
Moeshe Gottlieb, “The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the American Jewish Community, 1933-1941.”
(Ph.D. Diss., Brandeis University, 1967), 440.
15
Yehuda Bauer, American Jewry and the Holocaust: The American Jewish Joint Distribution Committee,
1939-1945. (Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1981), 458-459.
16
Haskel Lookstein's Were We Our Brother's Keepers?: The Public Response of
American Jews to the Holocaust, 1938-1944, argues that American anti-Nazi resistance
was largely ineffective. Like other historians concerned with America's Jewish
population, Lookstein focuses heavily on the American public perception of events
occurring in Hitler's Reich. While not necessarily analyzing resistance organizations, he
does show that numerous Jewish and non-sectarian organizations participated in
information campaigns and boycotts against Germany and pro-Nazi American businesses.
He concludes that “the Allies response [to Nazi atrocities on Jews] seemed minimal and
ineffective, while the American Jews public resistance was weak and sporadic. 16 Using
Jewish newspapers and public correspondence, his arguments rely on individual national
Jewish organizations, such as B'nai B'rith, and how Jewish and American audiences
reacted to Nazi persecution of European Jews. Constantly referring to leading Jewish
figures as “timid” or “fearful” of reprisal, Lookstein projects these characteristics onto
the entire Jewish American community. Furthermore, he ignores Jewish leadership in
non-sectarian organizations, such as Cleveland's League for Human Rights, and
enigmatic figures like Cleveland's Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and journalist Leon
Wiesenfeld. Although non-sectarian boycotting groups may not have been within the
scope of his initial observation, they are essential to include because they represent
unified public opposition with German Nazism. Lastly, he fails to take into account how
groups like the League could used vigilance tactics to thwart or otherwise disturb Nazi
groups such as the Bund. While Lookstein's Were We Our Brother's Keepers provides
16
Haskel Lookstein, Were We Our Brother's Keepers?: The Public Response of American Jews to the
Holocaust, 1938-1944. (New York: Hartmore House, 1985), 205.
17
readers with an intriguing history of America's reaction to the Holocaust and other
atrocities, his work is checkered with logical holes and numerous unconsidered variables
that vastly ultimately misconstrue any American resistance to Nazism.
Although only indirectly related to the study of Jewish resistance, Christopher
Capozzola's article “The Only Badge Needed is Your Patriotic Fervor: Vigilance,
Coercion, and the Law in World War I America” provides a convincing definition and
methodological model for organized vigilance. Through four examples, Capozzola shows
that a variety of American groups worked outside of the law to keep tabs on potentially
seditious elements in society. These groups believed that it was essential for them to
engage in illegal or extralegal activities prior to and during the Great War because
America could be harmed by foreign spies, sympathizers, or unwelcome support for the
enemy. These groups engaged in collecting arms, propaganda distribution and
destruction, surveillance, investigations, and other such actions. Their self-appointed
obligation, Capozzola suggests, was an overtly patriotic, politically extreme extension of
self-defense turned communal defense only achievable during a war time atmosphere. He
argues that “vigilantes operated outside the structures of law as articulated by the
legislative regime, but they typically aim to establish social order, whether defense of the
state, control of crime, or maintenance of racial, class, or gender hierarchies.” 17 It must be
stated that Capozzola's framing of vigilantism was often much more violent than its
slightly less aggressive cousin, vigilance. Although the two words are often used
interchangeably, there is a powerful distinction between the two. Violence, one of the
17
Christopher Capozzola, “The Only Badge Needed is Your Patriotic Fervor: Vigilance, Coercion, and the
Law in World War I America.” The Journal of American History. March, 2002, 1357.
18
tactics not utilized by the League for Human Rights, is directly tied to vigilantism and not
vigilance. That aside, Capozzola's framework for vigilance movements creates an
excellent template for showing how a group like the League could shift from boycotting
to extralegal activities.
Lastly, there is only one study which actually deals with the League for Human
Rights in a meaningful way. Ivan Platt's The League for Human Rights: Cleveland
Jewry's Fight Against Naziism, 1933-1946 thesis offers a handful of useful insight. Platt's
piece is most valuable at understanding the generalities of the League, Cleveland's
political and social atmosphere during the 1930s and 1940s, and details much of their
public boycotting against Detroit's Father Coughlin. While these are certainly good things
to bring out, his account lacks any serious analysis of the League and what their
campaigns against local fascist groups meant. Additionally, Platt's account of the League
does not take in consideration any aspects of resistance and makes very little out of their
vast network of investigations. His narrative of events covers the League's clandestine
investigation campaigns in short form and instead focuses on their public activism. In all,
Platt's account of the League is a useful tool for this study in that it offers a platform to
build from. 18
Section Two: A Look at Things to Come
18
Ivan Platt, The League for Human Rights: Cleveland Jewry's Fight Against Naziism, 1933-1946.
(Cleveland, OH: Cleveland State University, 1977).
19
The following study is the culmination of various methodological and
historiographical traditions. The first chapter seeks to establish the national atmosphere
that American Nazism and anti-Nazi resistance came out of. The material reviewed
places my two major subjects, the Cleveland branch of the German-American Bund and
the League for Human Rights, within the maelstrom of American politics and society. I
maintain, like other historians have, that the American fascist movement rose out of a
small, radical community of Americans inspired by German revitalization under Adolf
Hitler's National Socialist regime. Their activities inside the United States were largely
orchestrated by a variety of organizations, primarily the German-American Bund. As
their activities became more and more public, American Jews and their allies rose up to
protest them and Hitler. Although anti-German boycott activities were used mostly for
economically injuring Germany, I maintain that they were also part of a much larger
ideological fight between pro- and anti-democratic forces. This movement, although
moderately successful, was unable to penetrate the secrecy of the Bund and see if they
were engaged in potentially illegal activities. The anti-Nazi movement therefore escalated
to the federal level, where assorted governmental bodies investigated the Bund and their
affiliates. Much to the boycotters dismay, the Bund was never charged with any wrongdoing. This chapter concludes that the inability to charge the Bund on the federal level
left anti-Nazi forces frustrated and willing to take matters into their own hands.
The second chapter more specifically places the Cleveland Bund and League,
within the previously constructed timeline and series of events. I start by showing how
20
the city of Cleveland, Ohio developed one of the first and most robust anti-Nazi
movements after Hitler's rise to power. I also show how the local Bund branch was part
of the politically extreme wing of the local German American community. After
explaining their initial developments, I then move to their general public activities and
programs within the northeast Ohio area. In particular, this study highlights the series of
informational talks that the Bund and League sponsored as well as German pro-Nazi
activities in Cleveland. I contend that these represent their earliest and least
confrontational ideologically motivated exchanges. This chapter also examines how the
League first turned to investigations, one of the core programs enacted during their short
tenure as Cleveland's leading anti-Nazi force. I find that this program was first used
during the famed Berlin-Cleveland student exchange program as a way for the League to
gain otherwise inaccessible information. This is particularly important because their
policy of clandestine operations rapidly accelerated after this event and would come to
define their public activism and place in the community.
The third chapter looks at how the League attacked pro-Nazi activism by German
American organizations, the Bund, and William Dudley Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion.
These large and very visible groups were quite convenient targets for the League agents
and put under almost immediate scrutiny. As time went on and the exchanges became
more and more heated, the local Bund in particular changed their form of communication
from overt anti-Semitism and militarism to a softer message, emphasizing pro-American,
anti-communism, and subtle pro-Nazi programs. From this point, I further explore the
League's investigations and show how they were used to counter the Bund and Silver
21
Shirts effectively. This chapter, besides offering hitherto unknown information on Bund
inner-circle activities and Pelley's Silver Shirts, also explores the developing dialogic
relationships between the three forces. In all, I examine two specific cases, analyze the
League's findings, and evaluate how and why the Silver Shirt Legion and Bund were
forced (or not forced in the Legion's case) to change the way they had to engage the
Cleveland public. In the first case, I look at the Bund's youth camp at the German
Central Farm and their secretive program to teach Cleveland's youth how to be good little
Nazis. In the second case, I examine the general activities by the Cleveland branch of
Pelley's organization and their use of Christianity, millennialism, and anti-communism in
the city.
The fourth chapter ends this study with a look at the League for Human Rights as
they and the nation entered into World War Two. In short, the war and the death of all
formal pro-Nazi organizations in the United States forced the League to reevaluate their
use of investigations and overall mission in the Cleveland area. This shift was marked
with a renewed public activism campaigns, including the Rumor Roundup section in the
Cleveland Plain Dealer as well as their study into Cleveland history and diversity, This is
Cleveland. The League's new mission to educate Clevelanders about the war and promote
ethnic, racial, and religious equality as well as liberal democratic principles lasted until
shortly after the war's end. The League's demise was directly caused by the end of World
War Two and other local organizations taking over where the League had excelled.
Finally, the last section serves as a comprehensive review of previous materials and
chapter conclusions as well as a look at the League's shift from defensive investigations
22
to constructive public campaigning.
In summation, this thesis looks to accomplish several key objectives. First, it
presents a synthesis of old and new materials, constructing a logical and fair narrative of
events relevant to this story. This narrative is simultaneously buttressed and challenged
by new findings exclusive to this study. In particular, it challenges the notion that Jewish
and non-sectarian anti-Nazi resistance was inherently weak, as proposed by Haskel
Lookstein and others. It also adds considerable evidence that shows how the Bund was
both an American vessel of Hitler's Reich and actively pursued illegal, or at least highly
questionable activities in order to fulfill their goals. Second, this study works to attempt
to show the development of the League's dialogic relationship with various pro-Nazi
groups as well as the public. These are examined through the examination of newspapers,
investigations, public protests, and other channels. Lastly, this work looks to examine the
League for Human Rights' shift from a defensive organization which mastered protesting
and clandestine investigations to one that embraced a new program which emphasized
multi-ethnic inclusion, celebrating diversity, and promoting liberal democratic principles.
The total findings in this study serves as a reevaluation and confirmation of information
related to anti-Nazi resistance, the Bund, and other American fascist organizations.
Moreover, it tracks the life of an organization that mirrored the changes the United States
underwent during and before the Second World War.
Chapter One: Building the Nazi Community
In order to appreciate the League's motivations to attack Nazism, one must first
understand the internal and external pressures that created the groundswell movement for
a Nazi America and the radical fringe of America's German community embodied by the
Bund. First, the German American experience with nativism during the Great War both
shocked the community and led many towards rapid assimilation. Prior to this period,
German Americans enjoyed one of the most privileged positions of all European ethnic
groups living in the United States. They were often characterized as “industrious, thrifty,
and honest – all admirable virtues in the American value system.” 1 German culture clubs,
fraternities, theater groups, and other ethnic organizations could easily be found in most
every area of the country and held considerable power in cities like Cincinnati, Chicago,
Milwaukee, Columbus, Cleveland, and New York. The German American community of
Cincinnati, Ohio, for example, flourished like few other immigrant communities could
imagine. Prior to the Great War, German organizations (vereines) were a hallmark of the
city, numbering over 100. Some of these groups included singing societies, trade unions,
religious organizations, mutual aid groups, marksmen clubs, theater troupes, cultural
organizations, and charitable societies. German language and bilingual newspapers like
Der Deutsche Pionier, Neu und Alt, Brauer-Zeitung, and Der Christliche Apologete
1
Frederick Luebke, Germans in the New World, (Urbana: University of Illinois Press, 1990), 112.
23
24
flourished alongside English newspapers without incident. 2 According to historian Don
Heinrich Tolzmann, Cincinnati's German community was an essential part of the city's
cultural flavor as well as legislative, executive, and judicial offices.
Similarly, German groups, newspapers, and other institutions in Cleveland, Ohio
were very successful and integrated into the city. Prior to the Great War, Cleveland's
Germans constituted over 40 percent of the population and were a welcomed part of the
city atmosphere. In Cleveland und sein Deutschthum (Cleveland and Its Germans),
author Jacob Mueller presents a compelling history of the city's Germans. His begins by
describing how the city was founded by Moses Cleveland, but quickly shifts towards the
contributions and axial importance of the city's German inhabitants. Among his many
claims, Mueller contends that German immigrants were “the best element America had
recruited up until then and in some senses the best among those who came from across
the ocean to the present day.” 3 Other nationalities already present and those that came to
Cleveland over time respected German culture in the city and enjoyed their festivals. The
annual German Day celebration and other cultural events were well attended by other
ethnicities and that German Day in particular was one of the most popular festivals
during any given year. 4
Mueller is keen to explain that German Americans across the country could
simultaneously embrace their culture while remaining Americans at heart. He claims that
“The German who understands that true German identity is not at odds with true
2
Don Heinrich Tolzmann, The Cincinnati Germans After the Great War, (New York: Peter Lang, 1987), 1213.
3
Jacob Mueller, Cleveland und sein Deutschthum, (Cleveland: German-American Biographical Publishing
Co., 1898), 38.
4
Mueller, 37-38.
25
Americanism will be mindful of the obligation that the heritage of the past imposes on
him, a holy bequest from his forbearers.... If the present generation takes the same role in
this cultural work it has taken in the past, then Germans need have no concerns for the
future.” 5 Mueller added that the local German element was “united in not permitting
themselves to be robbed of their language, of their customs and usages, and they are
united in wanting to be good Americans while keeping their German way of life. “
Furthermore, Mueller claims that despite some religious and organizational differences,
the Germans were always in solidarity. He said that “the fact that Germans have divided
themselves into, here as everywhere else, into a thousand association and little clubs
damages nothing,” and he wrote, “it is fortunate that they do not all belong to one and the
same party.” 6 Lastly, Mueller suggested that “Today, as 65 or 50 years ago, their
[Germans] influence remains crucial in influencing conditions in our city.” 7 This period
of national and local acceptance dissipated away war-time fears and questionable German
American loyalty.
As the Kaiser's armies were mobilizing for war in Germany, rumors spread in the
United States that German Americans were trying to destroy democracy for the Kaiser or
were otherwise involved in fifth column activities due to widespread pro-German
activism. 8 By and large, most Americans were not in support of the United States entering
in this new European war and favored neutrality. Historian Frederick Luebke says that the
Americans perceived Archduke Ferdinand's assassination and the German militant
5
Mueller, 41.
Mueller, 37.
7
Mueller, 37.
8
Francis MacDonnell, Insidious Foes: The Axis Fifth Column and the American Home Front, (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1995), 22-27.
6
26
response as a sort of “anarchy endemic in that unfortunate part of the world.... Even when
the guns of August began to boom five weeks later, most Americans saw no possibility of
American involvement.” In fact, Luebke explains that most Americans believed that
“President Woodrow Wilson was right... it [the war in Europe] was not our affair.” 9
Many German Americans and their cultural groups loudly cheered for a quick
German victory over her enemies. Unfortunately, their actions in support of Germany
only served to verify the notion that Americans of German extraction were both
unassimilated and uninterested in supporting neutrality, as many groups participated in
pro-German public rallies or parades, while others engaged in or funded public
information campaigns. It was also common for individuals to purchase German war
bonds or contribute to war relief drives at the behest of a group that the belonged to or
was in sympathetic support of the Fatherland. These actions showed observers that
German Americans were financially and morally supporting the German war effort and
more interested in pursuing aggression than neutrality. 10 Another source of perceived
treachery were newspapers. Loud support for a quick German victory in the war was
present in many German American newspapers, which also ran articles condemning
Wilson for assisting the British with goods and political support while offering almost
nothing to the Germans. It was common for newspapers to advertise German war bonds,
and some prominent national newspapers, like George Viereck's Fatherland, had a section
dedicated to giving the Kaiser's official viewpoint of the war and America's place in the
9
Frederick Luebke, Bonds of Loyalty: German Americans and World War I, (DeKalb: Northern Illinois
University Press, 1974), 83.
10
Timothy J. Holian, The German-Americans and World War II: An Ethnic Experience, (New York: Peter
Lang, 1996), 12.
27
growing conflict. Much of the general public and some leading politicians viewed
German-language newspapers as little more than propaganda rags purchased by the
Central Powers. 11 When it became public knowledge that George Viereck's Fatherland
was funded by the German government, little else was necessary to convince already
war-weary Americans that the Germans had already invaded their country and that the
war was occurring on every street corner.
German spying missions and sabotage attempts, which often turned into public
spectacles, further aggravated Americans against their German American neighbors. For
example, in October 1915, German secret service agent and sabotage ring leader Robert
Fay was apprehended by police because his team's attempts to detonate ships in New
York Harbor. Federal agents found explosives, a map of the harbor, disguises, and letters
linking him to the German secret service in his New Jersey apartment soon after his
arrest. Subsequent press coverage on the event linked Fay and his circle with the German
Army, the Kaiser, and several pro-German German American groups. 12 On another
instance, German agent Heinrich Albert had a suitcase full of documents taken from him
by an American agent while he slept on a train. The information was passed on to
Secretary of the Treasury William McAdoo and revealed German plans to purchase war
supplies and influence popular opinion on the war (particularly by funding pro-German
public lectures and purchasing newspapers). While these actions were not necessarily
11
12
MacDonnell, 22-23.
“Fay's New Tale of German Plot,” New York Times, Oct. 28, 1915; “State Department May Act, Protest to
German Government Likely if Fay's Story is True,” New York Times, Oct. 26, 1915; “Bomb Factory in
his Room,” New York Times, Oct. 25,1915; These articles were retrieved via an internet database and did
not include the original article page numbers.
28
illegal, it did suggest “improper meddling in American domestic affairs.” 13 In another
incident, German Undersecretary Arthur Zimmermann suggested to American
ambassador James Gerard that there were “five hundred thousand trained Germans in
America who would join the Irish and start a revolution.” Gerard promptly retorted that
there were more than enough street lights to hang traitors by. 14
These compounded mistakes and misplaced perceptions resulted in nothing less
than a precipitous, nationwide fall in German American social standing, the end of most
cultural organizations and newspapers, and a rise in anti-German harassment. For many
fearful Americans, the potential threat of German American treachery was real and
proven by numerous public events and loud propagandists. Some of the initial antiGerman hysteria was not necessarily violent or especially cruel. New Berlin, Ohio, for
instance, changed their name to North Canton as a part of a national impulse to change
German-sounding town names into something more American. Other examples of
renaming German-sounding things include sauerkraut being called “liberty cabbage,”
dachshunds became “wiener dogs,” and many other silly little changes. Many schools
changed their curricula to no longer offer German language courses. More seriously, wild
accusations of Germans poisoning wells and putting glass in food circulated throughout
the country. Many citizen vigilance groups, like the American Protective League,
investigated suspicious individuals and could incite mobs to attack those deemed guilty. 15
The most famous occurrence of anti-German violence during this time was the lynching
13
MacDonnell, 17.
MacDonnell, 21.
15
MacDonnell, 24-26.
14
29
of Robert Praeger. A resident of Collinsville, Illinois, Praeger was seized from his home
on April 4, 1918, and crowd of over 200 convicted him of both being a spy for the Kaiser
and for not being loyal enough to the United States, despite having recently filed for
American citizenship and attempting to enlist in the Navy. Unable to prove his innocence
and loyalty, Praeger was hanged by the mob. His last words were reported to be “All right
boys, go ahead and kill me, but wrap me in the flag when you bury me.” 16
Throughout 1914 and 1917, politicians also took up arms against German
Americans. President Woodrow Wilson said to Congress in his annual speech on
December 15, 1915:
There are citizens of the United States, I blush to admit, born under other flags but
welcomed under our generous naturalization laws to the full freedom and
opportunity of America, who have poured the poison of disloyalty into the very
arteries of our national life; who have sought to bring the authority and good name
of our Government into contempt, to destroy our industries wherever they thought
it effective for their vindictive purposes to strike at them, and to debase our
politics to the uses of foreign intrigue.... such creatures of passion, disloyalty, and
anarchy must be crushed out. They are not many but they are infinitely malignant,
and the hand of our power should close over them at once. They have formed
plots to destroy property, they have entered into conspiracies against the neutrality
of the Government, they have sought to pry into every confidential
transaction of the Government in order to serve interests of their own. 17
Wilson's damning speech pointed directly at the shamed German American community as
the source of treachery and anti-Americanism without going so far as to call them out by
name. His accusations were based on publicly available knowledge that segments of the
German community were acting outside of the nation's interests and the belief that
“hyphenated Americans” could not have equal sympathies for separate nations. Wilson
16
17
Luebke, 9-10.
MacDonnell, 23.
30
also created the Committee on Public Information (CPI), a organization that hyped antiGerman hysteria. Wilson and CPI director George Creel wielded immense power over
public opinion through news releases, informational pamphlets, posters, and cartoons.
Creel also enlisted over 75,000 “Four Minute Men” speakers that characterized Germans
abroad and in the United States as blood thirsty and assured listeners that the world
would be safe for democracy as soon as the German brute was smashed. 18 Increasingly
violent and political anti-German harassment forced many German Americans to hide
their heritage by changing their names, disavowing their “Germanness,” or otherwise
accentuate their American citizenship. Opposite these people, however, were a minority
contingency of German Americans that doggedly stuck to their German heritage. This
population was the seedbed for the American Nazi movement and would later reignite old
fears that Germans in the United States were plotting to destroy democracy at the behest
of an evil foreign power. 19
Section Two: Fascism in America
Historians have long recognized the 1920s and especially the 1930s as periods
when traditionally liberal societies were confronted with true ideological threats from the
politically far-right. In The Age of Extremes, Eric Hobsbawm posits that “The danger [to
liberal democracy] came exclusively from the Right. And that Right represented not
merely a threat to constitutional and representative government, but an ideological threat
18
19
MacDonnell, 23-24.
Susan Canedy, America's Nazis (Menlo Park, CA:Markgraf Publications, 1990), 22.
31
to liberal civilization such, as a potentially worldwide movement.” Hobsbawm explains
that the international aspect of fascist is important because other groups and charismatic
leaders looked to the Italians and Germans for methodological, financial, and political
guidance. 20 Other successful fascist regimes, like those in South America and Spain,
turned to their European counterparts because they felt as though they could assist them
as needed. In many ways, the German-American Bund in the United States followed this
global march towards fascism.
While the late 1920s and 1930s were indeed a period defined in part by “100
percent Americanism,” it was also one that suffered from a hemorrhaging national
economy and a fear that federal power and democracy were failing. By the early 1930s,
President Herbert Hoover's policies and various Congressional acts had not improved the
situation for most Americans. The myriad failures of the federal government to fix the
economic depression called into question the ruling political ideology and the effectivity
of the powers behind it. Frustrated, some sought out other legitimate options to
democracy. For example, pro-fascist/Nazi groups in the 1930s had posited that American
democracy had failed and needed to be replaced by systems that had been proven to
work. Throughout the 1920s and 1930s, American fascists and Nazis alike pointed to
Italy and Germany as examples of how nations could rise up and overcome debt and
powerlessness through extreme political measures. If Mussolini and Hitler could do it in
their countries, so they thought, then why not in America too? Luckily, President Franklin
D. Roosevelt's New Deal was able to address those most seriously affected by the
20
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991, (New York: Vintage Books,
1996), 112.
32
Depression by enacting a wide variety of public programs and economic measures. The
programs that he had established helped to ease the overbearing economic and political
concerns created by the Great Depression. 21 The New Deal helped many Americans get
back to work and feel faith in the strength of the national government. Although it did not
solve the financial crisis entirely, Roosevelt's measures reaffirmed that democracy could
meet the needs of its citizens.
Even as Roosevelt's New Deal worked to address the issues of the Depression,
many German immigrants and other disenchanted people still believed that the methods
Hitler had implemented in Germany could similarly transform a beleaguered United
States. As Fuehrer, Hitler offered the German people restored national strength, a
resuscitated economy, a robust military with the newest technology, restored pride, and a
return to global power. His administration was responsible for stimulating private
industry to assist in remaking the German economy, nearly eliminating unemployment,
and, most importantly, restoring the semblance of order to a country in disarray. Much of
the world noticed this substantial revival and some felt that National Socialism could
indeed fix other troubled nations, including the United States. 22 Some of those who
believed that National Socialism could cure America's woes had immigrated to the
United States and started a handful of decentralized, yet robust German-centric National
Socialist movements. 23 A smaller set of these immigrants went on to make pro-Nazi
21
William E. Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940, (New York: Harper &
Row Publishers, 1963), 338-339.
22
Klaus P. Fischer, Hitler & America, (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2011), 93.
23
Works that inform this section, but that are not explicitly used include: Leland V. Bell's In Hitler's Shadow
(1973), Robert A. Rosenbaum's Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (2010),
Michaela Hoenicke Moore's Know Your Enemy: The American Debate on Nazism, 1933-1945 (2010),
33
groups with that very mission in mind.
In 1924, the first American National Socialist organization to gain Germany's
overt approval was the Detroit-based Teutonia. Historian Sander Diamond explains in his
landmark study The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941 that Teutonia
mirrored the Nazi Party in form and subject content. Looking to Hitler for guidance, they
advocated German Americans to join their movement and push forward a radically
National Socialist agenda. In addition to this, they also financially contributed to German
Nazi Party's general fund and passed along Hitler's words in their newspaper. Despite
spreading to several other cities, Teutonia was unable to duplicate the Nazi Party's
success. Frustrated, in 1932 leader Fritz Gissibl attempted a coup of “Gau-USA,” another
Nazi organization with sponsorship in New York City. His failure to do so promptly sent
his followers to join Gau-USA and signaled Teutonia's fall. While the group's reign was
shortly lived, Teutonia set a precedent for basic structure and behavior. They were
quickly replaced by “Gau-USA,” New York's premier Nazi organization and was an
official division of the German Nazi Party's Foreign Section, as the nation's leading
National Socialist party. Their activities included military-style marches, regular antiSemitic speeches, passing out pro-Nazi literature, and harassing Jews. Just as quickly as
they rose however, Gau-USA fell in 1932 because of the same inorganization and
inadequate leadership that Teutonia suffered. Although it existed as an official vessel of
the NSDAP for only a few months, Gau-USA set an important precedent of German
John Hawgood's Tragedy of German America (1940), Frederick C. Luebke's Bonds of Loyalty (1974),
Thomas J. Archdeacon's Becoming American: An Ethnic History (1983), LaVern J. Rippley's The
German-Americans (1968).
34
support for American Nazi organizations. 24
The movement for German support for American Nazi groups would be aided by
Heinz Spanknoebel. In 1933, he went to Germany and met with Rudolf Hess, Hitler's
second-in-command, hoping that they would support his group with money and
propaganda materials like they had the failed Gau-USA group. Spanknoebel claimed that
he would be the “American Fuehrer” for this new group and would be supported by
thousands of loyal German American followers. He told Hess that tens of thousands of
people were clamoring for a greater Nazi presence in America and a sense of inter-group
unity that had not taken place after Hitler's ascendancy as they had expected. With Hess'
approval, Spanknoebel created the Bund der Freunde des neuen Deutschland, or Friends
of New Germany that was, according to historian Susan Canedy, a “mirror image of
Hitler's NSDAP inorganization, administration, and activity, from the leadership principle
to the formation of a uniformed continent, the O.D. (Ordungs-Dienst) [the paramilitary
wing of the Friends, and later the Bund], the counterpart to Hitler's SA.” 25
Section Three: America Reacts - The Public Anti-Nazi Movement
The Friends were very active from their inception in 1933 until 1935.
Spanknoebel, unconcerned that a majority of the American public found the Friends'
violent militarism and anti-Semitism distasteful, tried to promote his message anyway.
24
Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States 1924-1941, (Ithaca: Cornell University
Press, 1974), 91-99.
25
Canedy, 49-51.
35
According to historian Donald McKale, the German Nazi Party was highly sensitive to
the anti-Nazi press in America stemming from the Friend's misdoings and demanded that
they “refrain from any activity until further notice.” 26 Yet Spanknoebel ignored Berlin's
orders and continued his programs and violent rhetoric. After repeatedly ignoring them
and facing increased American pressure, the Germans eventually decided to end their
support of the Friends in 1935. Although their organization quickly fell into disarray, the
idea of American Nazism remained.
The next group to champion the Nazi movement in America was Fritz Kuhn's
German-American Bund in 1936. Under Kuhn, the Bund initially defined itself just as the
Friends had. In his 1936 pamphlet “Awake and Act,” Kuhn defined the Bund and their
mission in glowing terms:
Moreover, it is not a matter of presenting the world with a new organization,
under the title of German American Volksbund, but of the fact that the Friends of
New Germany have taken a new name we may still better form a protective front
against machinations; as American citizens advanced our political interests,
defend our native land against lies and slander and to a greater extent do justice to
our exalted task of making known the aims and objects of the Third Reich.... The
Bund is American in its inception and in its field of endeavor, German in its
idealism and character. To it has fallen the great task of spurring the spiritual
awakening of the German element. The German-American Volksbund is inspired
with the National Socialist world concept..... We must leave nothing undone to
gain access to the hearts and minds of our fellow German Americans. We will
foster understanding for our homeland, convert our American fellow citizens into
true friends of the present-day Germany. 27
For a short time after their inception, the Bund and Kuhn kept up the old ways of the
Friend's, however, they too would be put under increased federal investigation and public
26
27
Donald McKale, The Swastika Outside Germany, (Kent, Ohio: Kent State University Press, 1977), 71.
Federal Bureau of Investigation, “Findings on the German-American Bund,” (Washington, D.C., 1943),
43.
36
scrutiny.
The initial American response to Nazism in Germany ranged from nonchalant
curiosity to public outrage, largely depended on the religious and political slant of the
particular observer. In Waking to Danger: America and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941,
historian Robert Rosenbaum explains that the press influenced and reflected
contemporary thoughts on the new chancellor. The anti-Communist Catholic Press
“tended to view Hitler with cautious optimism.” The weekly Jesuit-leaning America said
that “Chancellor Hitler, speaking to the nation over the radio, announced a reasonable and
moderate program, declaring that Christianity would be the basis of moral standings....
He concluded by calling upon God for a special blessing.” The Protestant Christian
Century expressed some hope that Hitler would be reined in by President Hindenburg and
other cabinet members. 28 Many non-religious magazines and newspapers also expressed
concern over Hitler. According to Rosenbaum, “influential columnist Walter Lippmann
who viewed Hitler as 'the most extreme and the most impatient of all the revisionists [of
the Treaty of Versailles],' soon concluded: “The spirit of the German Nazis [has] ended
all possibility of a pacific revision of the frontiers.... For not a voice of any consequence
will be raised in any democratic country to suggest that the cause of peace can be placed
by advancing another human being under the heel of the Nazis.” Journalist Stanley High
remarked in Literary Digest that “To-day the question of war is no longer whether, but
when.” 29
28
Robert A. Rosenbaum, Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941 (Santa Barabara:
Praeger, 2010), 4-5.
29
Rosenbaum, 5.
37
Negative public opinion on Hitler's Reich and American fascists grew as popular
media began to portray them more and more cautiously. While only a handful of
relatively small pro-Nazi groups in America actually had Hitler's stamp of approval,
many more claimed that they acted in accordance with his global interests. Many people
believed that Hitler's American cronies were plotting to take over the United States and
would usurp democratic regimes by any means necessary. Popular media during the
1930s and 1940s tried to inform the public about these threats and, in some cases, played
on these widespread fears. For example, Hollywood blockbusters like Nazi Agent (1942),
Confessions of a Nazi Spy (1939), They Came to Blow Up America (1943), Espionage
Agent (1939), and Secret Enemies (1942) all featured German Americans and/or German
spies as shadowy figures bent on destroying America. 30 The majority of these
propaganda-filled movies worked hard to instill a sense of fear and immediate danger in
viewers. For example, the trailer for Confessions prompts viewers that the movie came
from actual federal investigation notes and reflects the true actions of Nazi spies and
German-American Bund agents. This “almost incredible story of foreign agents” declares
that Hitler's regime established a “brown network spreading hatred and terrorism to mask
the treacherous plots of it's leaders” while showing a room full of uniformed men giving
the Nazi salute to the American and German flags. 31 Confessions is especially important
not only for it's depiction of German Americans as part of an organized Nazi fifth
30
Confessions of a Nazi Spy. Film. Directed by Anatole Litvak. (Burbank: CA: Warner Bros. Pictures Inc.
1939); Nazi Agent. Film. Directed by Jules Dassin. (Culver City, CA: Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios.
1942); They Came to Blow Up America. Film. Directed by Edward Ludwig. (New York City, NY:
Twentieth Century-Fox Film Corp., 1943); Espionage Agent. Film. Directed by Lloyd Bacon. (Burbank:
CA: Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. 1939); Secret Enemies. Film. Directed by Benjamin Stoloff. (Burbank:
CA: Warner Bros. Pictures Inc. 1942).
31
Confessions.
38
column, but because it established the Nazi spy movie genre that persisted for decades
after the war. It is also useful in that the movie was a major box office hit and voted Best
Film by National Board of Review in 1939. Between scenes, the narrator defines fascism
as a sort of globally-minded totalitarianism in action, mind, and political philosophy
where worship of the “Aryan superman” and Hitler trump all. Whereas democratic
institutions, as handed down to humanity by the Christian God, gave men the right to life,
liberty, and the pursuit of happiness, this new German menace demanded that all march
in step, literally and figuratively. Lastly, Nazism was the natural foe and presumptuous
usurper of American democracy that would do anything to achieve total political and
social hegemony. 32
Advertisements for the movie began with the silhouette of a man speaking in a
heavy German accent claiming “I am one of thousands [of Nazi spies] stationed at every
part of the United States to steal the secrets of your national defense. There are spies
stationed at all of the navy yards in Brooklyn, Philadelphia, Newport News, there are
Nazi agents in the airplane and munition factories of Bristol, Buffalo, [and] Seattle,
Washington.” 33 Confessions' sensationalist message played to the fears that many held
about questionable German American loyalty and brought forth the ideological conflict
between National Socialism and democracy. It further played into the growing realization
amongst most Americans that Hitler was planning the next global war and that the
democratic world needed to stand against him. In particular, the movie depicts several
scenes where this war between “Hitler's barbarism” and American democracy are most
32
33
Confessions.
Confessions.
39
visible. Early in the movie, Dr. Karl Kassel, a fictitious leader in the German American
Bund and head of a spy ring, says before a mostly uniformed crowd in a room filled with
American, Nazi, and Bund flags that:
German-American patriots, since my arrival from Germany ten years ago I have
learned to love the United States. Yes, I love America and I love it all the more
because I realize that it's deepest roots are essentially German. In all it's veins we
can see flowing the German spirit, the German sense of duty.... Many people in
this country say that we of German birth or extraction are only eight million in the
United States, but they deliberately falsify. We actually constitute a total of thirty
million here. Yes, America is found on German blood and culture. 34
Kassel continues that all Germans must unite and bring the nation to be like Hitler's
Germany. All enemies that try to interfere with this destiny “must perish socially as well
as economically because of our determination to destroy our enemies completely and
without any consideration whatever!” Most strikingly, Kassel ends his rabble-rousing
speech with, “Germans must save America from the chaos that breeds in democracy and
racial equality. We Germans must make the United States unser Amerika, our America!”
Kassel's audience replied with booming cries of “Seig Heil” and the Nazi salute. 35 This
speech and others delivered throughout the film almost perfectly mirrors the look and
rhetoric of real Bund rallies held throughout the nation.
On another occasion, Kassel proclaimed to a room full of uniformed Bund
members that all Germans must refuse to assimilate into their new culture. He declares
that the best way to do this and make America free would be to “destroy the chain that
ties the whole misery of American politics together,.... the United States Constitution!
And we also know that there is a wall in which a breach must be made before America's
34
35
Confessions
Confessions
40
problems can be solved and that wall is the Bill of Rights!” Frustrated that anyone would
consider destroying the Bill of Rights and Constitution, an angry American Legion
attendee counters his message by saying that thousands of Americans fought for those
documents and the liberties granted by them. After him, a non-Nazi German American
declares that the Bund did not represent all American of German extraction and that those
like him would fight for democracy. Unable to counter the two rhetorically, Kassel ends
by calling democracy a “fanatic faith” that disputes all arguments. He adds, somewhat
ominously that “Force is the only language you understand and we will speak to you in
your own language soon enough!” The discourse between these three individuals best
symbolizes some of the film's core messages. 36 First, American Nazis were working
diligently to destroy democracy and it is the responsibility of good patriotic citizens to
resist them. These good citizens were those who had fought against tyranny on the Great
War and civilians who agreed with no regard for their ethnic heritage. Second, the Bund
would be willing to resort to violence if it meant they reached their political goals of
destroying the democratic principles enshrined in the Constitution and Bill of Rights.
Lastly, the Bund's seemingly never ending discussions on the greatness of Hitler, the
Reich, and their mission to destroy democracy assures viewers that the threat they posed
was real, immediate, and everywhere.
Tabloid publications and literature with leadlines like “Nazi Propaganda in
America,” “ Star Spangled Fascists,” “American Nazis Claim 200,000 Members” and
“Nazis Hail George Washington as First Fascist,” detailed treacherous Nazi activities in
36
Confessions.
41
ways similar to those shown in Confessions. 37 In many of them, the writers explained that
thousands (and perhaps maybe even millions) of Nazis were hiding among average
citizens and were interested solely in a coup over democracy. Their leaders were
described as charismatic, often highly theatrical men with the ability to get legions of
dedicated ideological soldiers ready to fight for Hitler's cause at a moment's notice. In
Axis America: Hitler Plans our Future, Robert Strausz-Hupe explains how Nazi forces
inside and outside the country were plotting to take over the government by destroying
American institutions. Strausz-Hupe wrote that:
The problems of American democracy are being studiously investigated, but it is
the first prerequisite of the Nazi-Fascist method that there is no rational solution
within the bounds of democracy. Whatever solution is offered is revolutionary....
Hitler is invincible; democracy – no matter what the fortunes of war – is
doomed. 38
The Jewish reaction in America to Adolf Hitler and Bund, although immediate
and highly active, was split into two separate camps. The argument in the Jewish
community largely centered around the ideals of two old and highly influential
organizations. Conservative leaders in the American Jewish Committee, for example,
held that if Jews spoke out too loudly against German anti-Semitism they would be
attacked for their positions as either being un-American or Zionists. Robert Rosenbaum
explains that “Highly acculturated but concerned with the Jews' marginal place in society,
37
“Nazi Propaganda in America,” Look Magazine, December 31, 1939, 12-15; “ Star Spangled Fascists,”
The Saturday Evening Post , May 27, 1939, 5-7, 70-73; “American Nazis Claim 200,000 Members,”
Life Magazine, March 29, 1937, 20-21; “Nazis Hail George Washington as First Fascist,” Life
Magazine, March 7, 1938, 17. Others include “When Will Hitler Invade America,” Blitzkrieg Over
America,” “Germany Must Perish,” and “Beware! 5th Column in U.S.A.” These articles were retrieved
via an internet database and did not include the original article page numbers.
38
Robert Strausz-Hupe, Axis America: Hitler's Plans our Future, (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1941),
258.
42
members of the Committee believed in keeping a low profile.” For them, being Jewish
meant that they were part of a spiritual legacy and that suggesting any form of
separatism, such as Zionism, would only bring them trouble. 39 Historians that have
looked at leaders in the Committee have found that they practiced quiet diplomacy,
often influencing those in power who would sympathize with the Jewish plight. 40
The New York-based American Jewish Congress, on the other hand, advocated a
much more aggressive campaign where German products would be put under a national
boycott. Businesses that failed to cooperate with the ban on German goods would
likewise be boycotted. Leaders like Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and journalist Leon
Wiesenfeld believed that Hitler's regime needed to see that the Jews in America would
not stand by while their German brethren suffered. The essential idea of boycotting goods
was that it was the only real way at attacking Hitler without calling for or enacting a war.
Many in the Congress and elsewhere hoped that calmer heads than Hitler would prevail
and see that the campaigns against Jews were not politically or economically valuable.
One of the strongest anti-Nazi boycott leagues in the nation was Samuel
Untermyer's New York-based Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League to Champion Human
Rights. Aligned with the American Jewish Congress ideologically, Untermyer and the
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League believed that “public opinion as the force, the Boycott
39
40
Rosenbaum, 47.
Haskel Lookstein, Were We Our Brother's Keepers?: The Public Response of American Jews to the
Holocaust, (New York: Hartmore House, 1985), 60; Other literature that discusses the Committee, some
in more limited form, include Yehuda Bauer's American Jewry and the Holocaust, Moeshe Gottlieb's
“The Anti-Nazi Boycott Movement in the American Jewish Community, 1933-1941,” and Henry L.
Feingold, Bearing Witness: How America and Is Jews Responded to the Holocaust
43
as the weapon, will break the power of Hitlerism.” 41 One of the most significant methods
that the Anti-Nazi League used put pressure on large businesses to not sell German
goods. Those who refused to cooperate with the boycott effort would be added to a public
blacklist and be treated as if they sympathized with Nazism. Most businesses, not
interested in hurting their brand, decided to obey Untermyer's request. For example in
1933 the Anti-Nazi League wrote to Sears, Roebuck and Co. in New York and informed
them that they were selling German-made items. They quickly replied back that they
would stop selling German goods and only sold some merchandise from “contracts which
could not be cancelled (sic).” 42
Another method that Untermyer's League preferred to use was by defaming
Nazism in their monthly Anti-Nazi Economic Bulletin. The Bulletin regularly posted a
section devoted to businesses that sold German goods. Under the headline “Why Do
These Firms Continue to Handle German Merchandise?,” the list would detail the names
and addresses of people who did not cooperate with the boycott. Readers were prompted
to not purchase goods from these companies. Instead, they were pushed to purchase
goods from domestic (or at least non-German) businesses which sold the same items. 43
The Anti-Nazi League's Detroit office also relied on limited private investigations into
Bund activities. For example, their investigations found that “Children in the German
neighborhood were offered lessons in language during the school vacation by Germans
known to be pro-Nazis.” They also found that local Nazi activist groups had consulted
41
Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League., “Nazis Against the World: The Counter-Boycott is the Only Defensive
Weapon against Hitlerism's World-Threat to Civilization,” (New York: The Davidson Press, 1934), 1.
42
Sears, Roebuck and Co., letter to Anti-Nazi League representative, Oct. 2, 1933.
43
“Why Do These Firms Continue to Handle German Merchandise?” was a reoccurring section in the
Bulletin throughout it's run.
44
with professional German speakers to come and speak at their events. Lastly, they found
the locations and activities going on in German-American Bund youth camps throughout
the nation. 44 Their confidential reports show the first inkling of a larger network of
clandestine activities going on throughout the nation.
Sadly, the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League and most other boycott organizations
suffered from an inability to garner enough strength behind their movements. Their
victories were limited to pushing businesses away from selling German goods and raising
public consciousness. They held no legal powers and could not go after pro-Nazi
activists. In all, the struggles behind the boycotts, informational campaigns, and rallies
amounted to little, if any, real political change in Germany concerning the Jews. Although
their efforts resulted in minimal gains outside of the United States, they were
instrumental in three things. First, the Anti-Nazi League's story reveals that they were
part of a larger national trend that believed Nazis in America and in Germany should be
put under as much scrutiny as possible. Second, their influential public awareness
campaigns helped put greater pressure on American Nazi groups to change their message
as well as push the government to investigate pro-Nazi activists. Lastly, for the purposes
of this study, the Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League is especially important because they
were the organization that Rabbi Abba Hillel modeled his Cleveland-based League for
Human Rights after.
Amid all of this growing public scrutiny, the Bund transitioned their public image
and general message throughout the 1930s and 1940s from replicating German National
44
Confidential Report of Activities of the League for Human Rights, undated; The source gives little
indication as to when it was produced, however, it seems to have been made during or before 1939.
45
Socialism to “patriotic, 100% American group” that both honored American traditions
and protected the nation from communism. According to Kuhn, “so long as there's a
swastika [in America], there'll be no hammer and sickle in this country.” 45 Naturally, this
message of anti-Communism was little more than a petty attempt to hide their affiliation
with Nazism. In reality, national investigations showed the Bund was no different than it
had been before their shift towards accentuating anti-communism over their antiSemitism. At their very core, the Bund was still a highly active and secretly Nazi front
that advocated for an American form of National Socialism. Their newly adopted policy
was to hide their pro-Nazi message more and more from the public, instead only bringing
it out at Bund member-only events or in their youth instruction camps. Investigations
done by the League for Human Rights in Cleveland found that these camps were
purposefully orchestrated by the Bund hierarchy to train young German American
children in a manner similar to the Hitler Youth were in Germany.
Section Four: The Federal Crackdown on Nazi Activity
The first federal response to Bund activity came from the Dickstein Committee,
led by Congressmen John McCormack (D-MA) and Samuel Dickstein (D-NY) in 1934.
Originally named the Special Committee on Un-American Activities, the Dickstein
Committee opposed any and all pro-Nazi activity. Dickstein told reporters that he was
determined to investigate all Bund activities and subpoena “as many Bundists as time
45
Canedy, 73.
46
would permit.” 46 The majority of the Committee's investigations consisted of interviews
where Bund members and leaders were asked pointed questions by the Committee
members. Dickstein in particular took great pleasure in interrogating members, often
questioning the witnesses himself. He also took the opportunity to make sensational
claims about the Bund and Germany. Among other things, Dickstein claimed that every
German seaman was actually a spy for the Reich, “that Germany was smuggling arms
into the country, and that the Bund had a membership of over twenty thousand in the
New York metropolitan area.” 47 Some fellow Congressmen accused Dickstein of going
too far with his prosecutions, saying that he used the trials as a political springboard or
that he was violating the witnesses' constitutional rights. 48 Despite all of Dickstein's
bombastic denouncements and the Committee's interrogations, their findings largely
confirmed what Americans had been hearing from non-federal sources, namely that the
Bund and other pro-fascist groups were nearly identical to “the same ruthless efficiency
of the military set-up which characterized Hitler's machine in Germany” and that they
aimed to create a “new kind of government in the United States, one which should
incorporate the principle of Nazi religious bigotry.” Lastly, and most importantly,
Dickstein's Special Committee identified the Bund as “ideologically and organizationally
tied to Nazi Germany.” 49
Despite all of Dickstein's claims that the Bund was guilty of illegal conduct, the
Committee concluded that the German-American Bund nor it's members were guilty of
46
Diamond, 157.
Diamond, 162.
48
Diamond, 158.
49
Congress, House, Special Committee on Un-American Activities, Investigation of Un-American
Propaganda Activities in the United States, 78th Cong., 1st sess., 1944, H. Rept. 282, 60-61.
47
47
treason or any other crimes. While their activities were morally reprehensible or too
militant for some, the Bund had broken no laws. Most of the findings they had made by
1935 were already well known to many observers because the popular press and radio
networks had covered the Committee's hearings. 50 Furthermore, the Committee's findings
about the Bund had limited lasting impact on official policy towards pro-Nazi
organizations, as the report characterized pro-Nazi behavior as something limited to an
extreme German minority who lacked the ability to do much more than anger their
opponents. This kind of federal dismissal of pro-Nazi activity would be continued
throughout until the late 1930s when investigations by various other governmental bodies
were able to prove that Bundists and other pro-Nazi activists were guilty of avoiding the
Selective Service Act or other laws. After their investigations finished in 1937, the
Dickstein Committee closed all operations and left the burden of investigating Nazi
groups to others.
Future government investigations, like the House Un-American Activities
Committee (HUAC) led by Congressman Martin Dies (D-TX), portrayed Nazi groups as
bizarre and somewhat disagreeable curiosities found only in a select immigrant group and
the militant far-right. In their 1944 summary of all findings, the Dies Committee detailed
a relatively thorough history of their findings. For example, their analysis examines the
personal and professional lives of major Bund leaders like Fritz Kuhn, August Klapprott,
Gerhard Kunze, and Peter Gissibl. 51 HUAC was able to connect each of these individuals
with either known German agents or the Nazi government, suggesting that they were
50
51
Diamond, 158.
Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 62-65.
48
coordinating or funding each other. The HUAC files also detail a large, but incomplete
list of over one hundred Bund meeting places and leaders, notably all of those in Ohio,
Michigan, Montana, Texas, and most of Pennsylvania. 52 Their list of local Bund leaders,
although more thorough than previous investigations, still shows that the HUAC
investigation were not able to penetrate the Bund's most basic level of organizational
hierarchy. 53 This inability to do so ultimately stymied the Dies Committee's ability to
judge the Bund's activities. To their credit, however, HUAC was able to collect and
identify information that indicated many organizations and individuals involved in profascist activities. For groups interested in continuously pressuring and investing groups
like the Bund, like Cleveland's League for Human Rights, the Dies Committee's efforts
were valiant, but did not reach far enough until they started to prosecute members in the
late 1930s and early 1940s It is in this context, that federal investigations had failed to
adequately deal with fascists in the early and mid-1930s, that we can understand why
groups like the League acted so aggressively against their enemies.
Despite their findings, the Dies Committee's fight against American Nazism was
hurt from the very beginning due to a crucial misunderstanding on the nature of fascism.
HUAC's definition of Nazism confused and hindered their ability to properly analyze
pro-fascist activity in American and the Bund. The Dies Committee believed that any
ideology that posed a threat to the nation, no matter what it was, needed to be repelled.
These ideologies and their proponents were thus grouped together into the collective and
52
These were found by cross-comparing the findings in Scott Freeland's They Too Were Americans appendix
with the HUAC files.
53
Investigation of Un-American Propaganda Activities in the United States, 67-69.
49
loosely defined term “anti-American.” In particular, the leader of HUAC, Martin Dies
considered Nazism and communism as one and the same, differing only in their land of
origin. In his autobiography, The Martin Dies Story, Dies said that “the important task [of
HUAC], as I saw it, was to convince the American people that Fascism and Communism
are fundamentally alike, and that the real issue is between Americanism on one hand, and
all alienism on the other....” 54 He claims throughout the book that fascists and
communists were the same because they shared revolutionary tactics and a disdain for
democracy. His analysis of the two all but ignores the extreme political and ideological
differences between the two and reveal that he was utterly ignorant to their very real
differences.
Dies' misinformed beliefs about fascists are even more apparent in his 1940 book,
The Trojan Horse in America. Part conservative political tract and part early anticommunist literature, Dies' Trojan Horse created a much more elaborate, but still error
ridden examination of fascism. He argued that Nazi groups tended to follow a set of ten
criteria, including “promulgating an anti-democratic or pro-totalitarian system of
government,” use of the swastika, celebration of Hitler, and uniformed regiments. 55
Unfortunately, Dies analysis of fascism went no deeper, showing no serious consideration
for operation and import of fascism. Furthermore, his overuse of the phrase “Trojan
Horse” incorrectly groups the fascists and communists together into one anti-Americanist
threat. For Dies, all “Trojan Horses,” or any anti-American political ideology, came from
the same sort of totalitarianism, differing only in national origin and leadership. In the
54
55
Martin Dies, Martin Dies' Story, (New York: Bookmailer, 1963), 130.
Martin Dies, The Trojan Horse in America, (New York: Dood, Mead, and Company, 1940), 20-21.
50
brief section discussing the Bund and other related American fascist movements, Dies
made no attempt to differentiate them from communist groups. Instead, he provided a
rather short history of the various organizations and their anti-American activities, all the
way hyping their membership numbers and strength well out of proportion. Ultimately,
Dies' Trojan Horse and autobiography detail that under his direction the Committee failed
to identify fascist movements as serious threats separate from communism, thus
compromising their ability to better fight the Bund and their ilk.
Dies and the HUAC committee's unwillingness to investigate domestic fascism
in a meaningful way was also continued in future federal investigations. FBI
investigations led by Attorney General Homer S. Cummings were much more thorough
than any other preceding investigation. The FBI reports show that the organization had
penetrated the Bund's general membership, special Ordnungsdienst division, and
leadership and collected volumes of their most private correspondence. These reports
were so thorough that they were able to track local Bund leaders down that neither the
Dies Committee or Dickstein Committee could even find after they left the United States.
Interestingly, the FBI files and League for Human Rights collection suggest that the FBI
communicated with and shared findings with boycott organizations that engaged in
clandestine investigation tactics. Despite seemingly overwhelming proof and vast web of
informants, Cumming and the FBI also concluded that the Bund posed no real threat to
nation. In fact, on January 5, 1938, Cummings released his report on the Bund (with
considerable editing and censoring) “which cleared the organization of any federal
51
wrongdoing.” 56
Even later investigations under J. Edgar Hoover's administration found that the
Bund were not guilty of anything serious. In early 1941, the leading Special Agent in
Philadelphia, Pennsylvania wrote to Hoover with damning evidence that the Bund were
engaging in illegal, possibly treasonous, activities. He provided materials that he believed
proved the Bund was engaged in illegal activity and suggested prosecuting members that
were planning to overthrow to the government. However, Hoover disagreed. 57 In
response, Hoover said that “A careful perusal of this material fails to reflect any
information indicating the advisability of such action. Such material reflecting the
purposes and the aims of the German-American Bund is in the possession of the Bureau
and has previously been forwarded to the Department in the course of regular
investigation.” 58 Hoover's dismissal of pro-Nazi activity like the aforementioned was par
for the course under his administration. Like HUAC and Dies, Hoover's concern that
communists, not fascists, had invaded American institutions came to define his career.
Those behind government investigations simply held little interest in investigating fascist
and National Socialist activities. According to historian Susan Canedy, what remains
significant about the Dickstein Committee, HUAC, and the Cummings report is that they
set a public expectation that Nazi groups would be investigated by some form of
organized body, federal or otherwise. With the government offering only limited interest
in fighting American fascism, many people and civilian groups felt as though they had to
56
Canedy, 142.
Special Agent in Philadelphia, letter to J. Edgar Hoover, April 21, 1941.
58
J. Edgar Hoover, letter to “Special Agent in Charge,” May 5, 1941.
57
52
step in and do what the government would not.
Section Five: Chapter Conclusions
Those who made up the Bund and other related Nazi organizations were products
of German American discontent with the American political system and their bitter
treatment during the Great War. The Great Depression era challenged the notion that
democracy was truly as strong as it seemed and gave rise to groups seeking a legitimate
alternative to the established system. American Nazis considered Hitler's Germany as the
best template for the nation to copy. Since democracy had seemingly failed America, they
thought, why not turn to the system that had resurrected Germany? From this, organized
American Nazism grew through a continual cycle of ideological radicalization, German
sponsorship, and Berlin's urging to tame the message down to something more palpable
to the general American public. Their attempts at gaining true power were largely
unsuccessful because the majority of the general public disliked their rhetoric, militant
activities, anti-Semitism, and their perceived ties to Hitler.
Anti-Nazi activism and boycott efforts were a reactive response to a perceived
threat. Those who responded to fascist groups did so to protect, among other things,
American democracy. In the minds of many Americans, Hitler had command over
thousands of devoted followers who held equal disdain for liberal democratic institutions.
In reality, the Nazi regime had little to do with the German-American Bund and other
pro-Nazi groups, but the American public believed differently. Loud, pro-Nazi preaching
53
from an extremist sect of German Americans was proof enough that the nation was in
danger and could be overcome by the militant Nazi masses. Popular movies, literature,
newspapers and magazines further sensationalized the activities of the Bund and found
most any way (real or imagined) to tie them with Hitler. Movies like Confessions of a
Nazi Spy and the myriad articles that displayed fascist treachery declared that true
American citizens needed repel the Nazi threat at home for the sake of democratic
institutions and the preservation of American liberty. The necessity to wipe out American
National Socialism became a priority of many organizations, specifically those who felt
most immediately threatened by anti-Semitic forces. Jewish-led groups like the American
Jewish Congress and American Jewish Committee fought over how their community
needed to fight Hitler's American equivalents. Their attempts to combat them largely
manifested as public information campaigns, rallies, and boycott movements. These
attempts to control and combat Nazi influence in America, while valiant, had limited
success in resisting the Nazi menace. Their inability to thoroughly counter Nazi activities
forced the government to act.
The first federal investigation led by Samuel Dickstein set the pattern for future
government investigations. In the end, the Dickstein Committee found that the GermanAmerican Bund was engaged in suspicious but not necessarily illegal activities. Their
findings, though significant in content, did not elicit much governmental action against
perceived Nazi fifth column activities until the late 1930s and early 1940s. Crucial
leaders like Martin Dies blurred the lines between communism and fascism, falsely
believing that they were one and the same. His gaffe allowed contemporary and future
54
federal investigations on pro-Nazi groups to start from a mistaken understanding of Nazi
political ideology. Instead, government investigations put a much greater emphasis on
finding communist spies and sympathizers in the country and all but ignored fascist
groups. As a result, they left the sense that they had insufficiently attended to a very real
threat and that the government was truly uninterested in pursuing the issue in a
meaningful way. If anything was to be done, new, tougher measures needed to be
undertaken by non-federal forces to find out how the Nazi menace was plotting to destroy
democratic institutions. It is in this context that we properly view organizations like the
League for Human Rights. As observant members of society and already sensitive to proNazi activity, vigilance groups such as the League believed that it was their patriotic duty
to fight Nazism in American and prevent the sort of takeover that Germany had suffered.
Chapter Two: Public Resistance and Clandestine Vigilance
Section One: Cleveland During the Great Depression
The 1930s in America was an especially tumultuous time for nearly all segments
of society. In Cleveland, Ohio, the six largest city in the United States, the economic
breakdown and social strife was especially severe. In the decade prior, however,
Cleveland was on the rise, growing in population, industry, and nationally renowned as a
city that welcomed new immigrants from Eastern European countries and elsewhere.
Between 1920 and 1929, for example, Cleveland's banks grew from $675 million to $958
million. Heavy industries improved substantially, increasing production from nearly 22
million net tons of freight in 1920 to over 35 million in 1929, making Cleveland one of
the world's foremost industrial centers at that time. Despite this, wage earners were often
under-payed and underappreciated, a theme that historian Lloyd Gartner says remained
well into the Great Depression of the 1930s. Gartner further claims that a critical view of
Cleveland's industry foreshadowed the national collapse. He cites that local relief bureaus
saw an increase in assistance requests by over 50% each year from 1927 to 1929. These
organizations were strained to keep up with demand and were unable to help all of those
who asked. The demand for Cleveland business and industry fell slightly more and more
55
56
every year after 1927. 1 Once the Depression occurred, however, the city soon fell into a
horrible spiral.
The 1930 census remarks that in 1930 the city reported 10.4% unemployment, but
in 1931 that number skyrocketed to over 25%. 2 Male unemployment during those years
were even higher, reaching 14.8% in 1930 and 35.1% in 1931 -”the highest in any major
American city.” 3 These official numbers, however, counted those with temporary
positions or odd jobs. Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, one of America's most out-spoken
Zionists during and after WWII and Cleveland's most well respect Jewish leaders,
estimated that the true numbers affected by unemployment was around 60,000 families or
300,000 to 350,000 people in 1932. In dire straits, many turned to the conservative
Republican state government for assistance, but sadly, “the amounts granted were so
inadequate and the terms so onerous that the unemployed were stirred to to a resentment
that many feared (and some hoped, in those days) boded social revolution.” 4 These
disenchanted citizens formed the core of local fascist, socialist, and communist
movements. These various groups were met with different degrees of success, some
never gaining more than a handful of followers and others, like the German-American
Bund, with nearly 200 normal members and a separate paramilitary division. Cleveland,
while sporting a large amount of fascist or Nazi-leaning groups, also had a sizable
1
Lloyd Gartner, History of the Jews of Cleveland, (Cranbury, NJ: Associated University Presses, 1987),
267, 290.
2
Howard Whipple Green, Population Characteristics by Census Tracts Cleveland, Ohio 1930, (Cleveland,
OH: The Plain Dealer Punlishing Company), 42.
3
Gartner, 291.
4
Gartner, 292.
57
communist population. For example, in 1930, concerns over unemployment caused over
3,000 jobless men, excited by communist speakers, to attempt seizing City Hall. 5 These
pro-revolutionary groups posed an ideological challenge to democracy and the reigning
system due to economic constraints and a real concern that the nation was failing and
needed a new path. In Cleveland, fascists and American Nazis were especially active and
continuously posed a threat to those who wanted to sustain democratic order. These
groups came under substantial public and private scrutiny, especially by the local Jewish
community.
Known for being a city filled with many ethnicities, the history of Cleveland's
Jewish community has been especially vibrant. Their presence in the city goes back to as
early as July 1839 when a diaspora of German Jews fled Bavaria for America. Mostly
keeping to themselves in their neighborhoods and discriminated by other through a mix
of religious bigotry and unofficial “red-lining,” early Cleveland Jews resisted assimilation
and stayed in their neighborhoods in Woodland and near the center of the city. As a result,
they forged distinctive Jewish-only businesses and social centers. Both a social refuge
and religious gathering place, local synagogues became some of the most important
aspects of these Jewish areas. In particular, the Ansche Chesed, Tifereth Israel (both
founded by German Jews), Anshe Emeth (Polish), and B'nai Jeshurum (Hungarian)
temples reflected the various Jewish nationalities and ranging orthodoxy of Jews that
came to Cleveland throughout the nineteenth century. Outside of religious life, many
5
Gartner, 290.
58
prominent Jews founded a variety of service organizations such as a local chapter of B'nai
B'rith, the Hungarian Benevolent and Service Union, Excelsior, the Oakwood Club, as
well as women's and youth clubs. 6
During the early twentieth century, Cleveland Jews began to move out of their
relatively small neighborhoods towards the eastern sides of the city. Starting in 1918, for
example, the Jews fled the Woodland and other areas in waves. While it is unknown why
they left, 80,000 of Cleveland's Jews (or nearly 10% of the city's total population)
relocated to East Cleveland, Cleveland Heights, Glenville, Mount Pleasant, and the
Kinsman neighborhoods, a trend which continued until well after World War II. 7 While
the community was shifting living spaces, they still engaged in traditional social and
religious practices, as well as making their presence felt more in city-wide affairs. In
particular, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver engaged in many public and political affairs that fir
into his politically liberal view of the world. For example, Silver was one of the leading
members of various trade union advocacy groups, humanitarian guilds, orphanages, and
other non-sectarian organizations. He was also responsible for repairing the Jew's
relationship with local Catholic and Protestant leaders that had long felt the Jews were a
pest in their city. Nationally, Silver worked for a variety of groups that advocated world
peace, Jewish affairs, inter-religious temperance, birth control, and labor groups. His
liberal agenda was often reflected in his sermons. During a series of local labor struggles
6
Judah Rubinstein, Remembering: Cleveland's Jewish Voices (Kent, OH: Kent State University Press,
2011), 5-9.
7
Rubinstein, 9-10; Gartner, 268.
59
in 1919 and 1920, Silver delivered sermons like “The Coming Industrial Struggle -The
Open vs. the Closed Shop.” He believed that trade unions were a “social utility of
beneficence, from the point of view of the highest good of the common wealth, of the
people,. Of the community as a whole” and that unions deserved the rights to collective
bargaining. Silver was additionally involved in guaranteeing the unemployed received
insurance through the Ohio Commission on Unemployment Insurance. 8 While history has
largely remembered Rabbi Silver as a reform leader and most prominently as one of the
nation's most vocal Zionists and proponents for the creation of the state of Israel, his local
endeavors made him the city's most well-known and respected Jew.
Section Two: Origins of the League for Human Rights
By as early as January 1933, Rabbi Silver was sure that German Jewry was
“doomed” while under Adolf Hitler's rule. 9 While on a vacation to Berlin, he witnessed
first-hand how the Nazi regime had come to power and positioned itself against German
Jews. Silver's concern that German Jews would be attacked quickly became a reality. The
Jewish population of Germany and all of Europe would suffer for the next twelve years
from some of the greatest horrors known to mankind, moving through religious
discrimination, financial loss, property destruction, systematic starvation, and ultimately,
liquidation under the Nazi state. Leon Wiesenfeld, one of Rabbi Silver's closest personal
8
9
Gartner, 274-76.
Leon Wiesenfeld, Jewish Life in Cleveland. (Cleveland, OH: The Jewish Voice Pictorial, 1976), 20.
60
friends, reported in his memoir Jewish Life in Cleveland that Silver was distraught when
he came back home; a man without hope. 10 Wiesenfeld offered to Silver that they work
together on making an economic boycott of the Third Reich a possibility. Weisenfeld
explained that “Being familiar with the German mentality with regards to money matters,
I entertained the the hope that German merchants and manufacturers would, as a result of
the boycott, seek to influence Hitler to stop his persecutions of the Jews.” 11 However,
Silver was reluctant to agree so quickly. Before he could make up his mind on this big
decision, events in Cleveland forced the movement forward without a leader, or a
thoroughly supportive group behind it.
In April 1933, a small conference intended to discuss the possibility of a local
boycott turned into an unexpected mass protest with over 3,000 people in attendance.
Capitalizing on this moment Wiesenfeld took to the stage and delivered a powerful
speech where, “each time I mentioned the word 'boycott,' the audience rose to its feet,
and applauded. This was the best proof that the Jewish masses wanted action, not just
speeches in condemnation of the Nazis.” 12 As Wiesenfeld explains, the Cleveland
movement to protest Hitler grew even greater when nearly 12,000 people attended a rally
that happened the following week. At that rally Wiesenfeld read the official boycott
declaration and was met “unanimously and with thunderous applause.” 13 After the rally
Wiesenfeld asked Rabbi Silver to join him and other notable Cleveland leaders to conduct
10
Wiesenfeld, 20.
Wiesenfeld, 14.
12
Wiesenfeld, 15.
13
Wiesenfeld, 25.
11
61
an economic boycott against the Nazi dictatorship. Silver's resolve, according to
Wiesenfeld, quickly solidified and he became the city's champion against anti-Semitism,
domestic fascism, and German Nazism. Their union signified the beginning of the
League for Human Rights.
Although the movement against Hitlerism in Cleveland was alive and well under
Silver and Wiesenfeld's leadership, it lacked an organization to back it. The necessity for
such a public group did not escape either of them, however, little information outside of
Wiesenfeld's memoirs and parts of the League papers discuss the actual creation of the
group. The utility of forming the League was three-fold. First, it created a public front to
organize like-minded individuals to contribute to their overall mission. Second,
sympathizers and members who financially contributed to the group could rest assured
that their donations would not be misused. Third, creating an organization legitimized the
actions that Silver, Wiesenfeld, and other pro-boycott advocates organized. In a sense,
working under a larger banner would show that the effort to recall German goods and
reveal the evil of Nazism was not the work of one or two people, but an entire body of
people. These numbers eventually became one of the greatest League's assets, and by the
time of the late April rallies, Silver, Wiesenfeld, and other local leaders created “The
League for Human Rights Against Nazism.” 14
14
While this was their full name, the League often shortened it to just “The League for Human Rights.”
They did this in much of their literature, correspondence, and news releases. After 1943, the League all
but abandoned the “Against Nazism” part of their name, despite keeping it until their dissolution in
1946. As such, I employ their shortened name, “The League for Human Rights,” more than their
original full name throughout this thesis. It is interesting to note that the League used their full name
62
After forming the organization quickly realized that they needed to establish a
public front with a private group working behind. Like many other Jewish-led anti-Nazi
organizations, the League needed to find a way to both fight their enemies while not
looking “too Jewish.” They believed that the League would not be taken seriously enough
if their public leadership was entirely or mostly consisted of Jews. Even Rabbi Silver
feared that the group would not be able to gain much needed Gentile support if their
collective complexion seemed too pro-Jewish. In order to give themselves a greater
degree of validity, the League crafted a three-tiered system. First, League by-laws
directed that the board members were to elect fellow board members. Members could
serve an unlimited amount of two-year terms. At their peak, the League had over sixty
board members from various religions, professions, and political persuasion. On the
second tier, the board would elect members to the Committee of Fifteen where all major
decisions were made. These members usually met a few times a week, but were only
mandated to be present once a week. This group was largely responsible for directing the
core policies and decisions of the group and their public works. This committee consisted
of prominent social workers George A. Bellamy, Alice Garnett, and Russell W. Jelliffe.
They even allied with local religious leaders like Bishop Warren Rogers and Reverend
Phillip Smead Bird. Lastly, the Committee elected a Director. This person and their
secretary were the only full-time paid employees. 15 Although Grace Meyette held this
15
more when corresponding with other Jewish and anti-fascist groups than they did with others.
Ivan Platt, The League for Human Rights: Cleveland Jewry's Fight Against Naziism, 1933-1946,
(Cleveland, OH: Cleveland State University, 1977), 38.
63
position for the majority of the League's existence and technically had the reins of power
to herself, she often ceded her power to Rabbi Silver or collaborated with him on major
issues, events, and investigations. Silver, more the philosophical director of the League
than anything else, led the group through a mix of personal charisma and religious
underpinnings that deeply opposed German Nazism, anti-Semitism, American pro-Nazi
activism, and any political ideology which threaten liberal democracy. It is through this
context that the League's war against all things pro-Nazi or of the far-right make sense.
Section Three: Boycotts, Rallies, and Besting the Fascists
One of the most common tactics used by Jewish anti-Nazi groups were public
boycotts of German goods and services. Innumerable Jewish heritage groups, veterans
associations, womens clubs, and other assorted organizations throughout the nation either
complied with or conducted local and national anti-German goods boycotts. 16 The
League's boycott effort was a complex, multifaceted endeavor that emphasized economic
and social tactics. As stipulated in their mission statement, the League was committed to
“a vigorous boycott of all Nazi good and services, Nazi steamship lines, and Nazi
films.” 17 The League also promoted Ohio businesses and national corporations that
discouraged German goods or had American-made alternatives to German products.
16
Haskel Lookstein, Were We Our Brothers' Keepers?: The Public Response of American Jews to the
Holocaust, (New York: Hartmore House, 1985), 76.
17
Anonymous, The League for Human Rights, (unknown publisher: Cleveland, OH, 1946), 1.
64
Businesses selling goods imported from Germany were put on a mass-produced
distribution list that prompted readers to not shop at these specified places. Common
products that were discouraged included gloves, stockings, leather-goods, cameras, and
pharmaceuticals. The League's records show that most businesses cooperated (only a few
refused and were thus added to the public blacklist) and German merchandise largely
disappeared from markets by 1935, with some items going underground. 18 The League
also formed a special boycott board made up of representatives from local businesses to
act as links between the two parties. The group assembled monthly, shared individual
business reports, and provided the latest news in all things related to the movement. This
board and the League worked together to discourage the sale and manufacturing of
German goods and those produced by firms connected to German companies in northeast
Ohio. Of course, the League's boycott on German goods, although successful in the
Cleveland area, was a fight too large for them alone. As such, the League decided to alert
federal authorities to the growing danger that businesses selling Nazi goods posed. From
1934 until their end after the war, the League remained in contact with federal
authorities. 19
Nazi activity in Cleveland was hardly limited to German-made products. Various
pro-Nazi organizations and individuals sponsored German nationals and outwardly proNazi Americans to speak at informational talks in and around Cleveland. The League
18
Various document in the League collection at WRHS show that Cleveland merchants were highly
involved in trying to keep out German products. Other show a concerted effort on the parts of local
businesses to tell citizens about what products they should or should not buy.
19
Anonymous, 4.
65
reported that “All propaganda was hidden by the assurance that Germany wanted to have
friendly relations with the United States through the medium of the Americans of German
descent, whose culture and whose labor had helped to build America.” 20 The earliest
examples of German nationals being brought in specifically to speak with Cleveland
residents include various German ambassadors, consuls, and former Wiemar government
officials that openly praised Hitler. Not all German propaganda, however, was meant to
inform, some was meant purely to entertain or show off Germany's newly gained
prowess. In December, 1934, the Bund and Stadtverband (formally known as the
“Federation of German Organizations of Cleveland”) brought in Elly Beinhorn, an
aircraft acrobat for a performance and luncheon. 21 More important than German
nationals, however, were pro-Nazi Americans that could showcase Nazisms benefits for
Americans. For example, the German Round Table, composed of German American
leaders and Cleveland's social hierarchy, were responsible for many public talks. On
March 7, 1937, the Round Table held a meeting on “Racial Origins” which included no
less than twenty uniformed O.D. members, Martin Kessler (leader of the Cleveland Bund
branch), Fritz Kuhn, Mayor Burton (he was regularly invited to Bund events by Kessler,
with whom he shared a friendly relationship, and was known to attend occasionally), as
well as Dr. Norbert Zimmer and Dr. Kapp, known traveling Nazi propagandists. All that
is known about the content of the meeting is that they discussed how Jews were inferior
to Germanic peoples. The League's investigation papers refer to the Round Table's
20
21
Anonymous, 7.
Anonymous, 8.
66
meeting as one of many racial education programs that the Bund funded that year. The
Round Table was also responsible for bring aeronautic acrobats Count Hagenburg, Emil
Krapf, and Hanna Reitsch (notable for being one of the last people to see Hitler alive and
his favorite aviator) to Cleveland to perform that same week. 22
The League's handbook and investigation files note that they were well aware of
Nazi movements in Cleveland and actively opposed their propaganda. The most
commonly used tactic was bringing in counter-speakers before, after, or during pro-Nazis
speeches, rallies, or public meetings. Speakers included American anti-Nazis, Jews that
had escaped Germany, and famous Germans that opposed Hitler's Reich. Their messages
promoted democracy, listed Hitler's crimes (or potential crimes), and described the Nazi
threat in America. For example, in February 1937, the League brought in Dr. Hans Simon
and former Wiemar Republic leader Wilhelm Sollman to counter the Round Table's talk
on “Racial Origins.” The Cleveland Plain Dealer remarked that Sollman, an “exiled
German Socialist Democrat leader, described modern Germany to more than 500 persons
in the ball room of Hotel Hollenden.” He branded Hitler as “a shameless liar and the
greatest blackguard of modern times” and that the Nazi Party was interested in a war that
would envelop Europe. He concluded that “With a man like Hitler in command of the
largest army in Europe the world has no choice but eventually to capitulate before
Fascism or meet it with a united democratic front. … the only way the world can avoid a
22
Anonymous, 14-16.
67
war before that time is to show to Hitler the patience of democracy.” 23
In April 1938, Rabbi Silver and the League sponsored exiled German writer and
radio commentator Johannes Steel of New York to speak at Silver's Temple in support of
the League's local boycott and national effort. Speaking to over 1,200, Steel proclaimed
that the “Boycott is the only weapon civilization has against Fascist gangsters who rule
most of the world today.” Steel was confident that an economic boycott would work that
“Mussolini and Japan could be 'destroyed' and Adolf Hitler 'killed' by breaking their
economic backbone.” When asked about the German-Cleveland student exchange
program, he replied that the German students were “little propagandists and had ought to
be thrown out.” 24 One of the most significant visits that the League sponsored was by the
famed writer and philosopher Thomas Mann in May of 1938. Speaking to over 3,400 at
the Public Music Hall, Mann explained that he recently choose to revoke his Swiss and
Czech citizenship in light of recent Fascist movements. Mann “paint[ed] the battle lines
drawn up today between forces which he said were bringing a 'dark age' to Europe and
the still dormant strength of democratic institutions.” He went on to say:
The chief strength, the seduction of the Fascist currents menacing democracy is
the charm of novelty.... they make great play with it, brag about their air of youth,
their revolutionism, and so calculate to decoy the youth of the world. But it is
really a snare and a delusion. Nevertheless, with its blatant propaganda of
youthfulness, Fascism has one great publicity trick: It represents democracy as
doddering, decrepit, effete, stale and insufferably boring. It calls itself lusty,
powerful, bursting with life and the future and notoriously successful..... If
democracy is to stand up against it [Fascism], there must be no mistake as to the
23
“Predicts Fall of Hitler's Regime,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 15, 1937; These articles were retrieved
via an internet database and did not include the original article page numbers.
24
“Urges Boycott to End Fascist Rule,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 6, 1938, NPN available.
68
evilness of the new thing which has entered the world. 25
Fascism, according the League, represented a truly evil threat to the free world that made
itself out to be many intriguing and possibly enticing things. However, if democracy were
to survive, then fascism in all its forms needed to be destroyed. The League's
informational campaigns represent their efforts to discredit fascist groups and any other
political ideology as a legitimate alternative to democracy. Although it is sometime
difficult to discern the actual amount of attendees at events and literature distributed, the
League's handbook says that of their 413 special speaking engagements between 1933
and 1941, there were a total of approximately 80,345 attendants. Their public meetings
also totaled nearly 70,224 attendees. Lastly, the League handbook says that “we have
distributed reprinted literature and our own publications through direct mail and through
the cooperation of various organizations. This has amounted to well over 1,230,000.” 26
Although it is not known exactly how the League came to use investigations, they
nevertheless embraced them as a key component of their fight against local and national
Nazism by as early as May 1936. Investigations that the League conducted were largely
done through a series of informants, through direct infiltration of a group, or collective
surveillance. The agents would name themselves with letters, numbers, or a mixture of
the two (for example, P-9, 211, and C-34). No information reveals their true identity nor
to how they came to be given specific missions. It is most likely that agents were told
privately what they were to do and who they were to follow since no paper trail of any
25
26
“Mann Will Cast Lot as U.S. Citizen,”Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 2, 1938, NPN available.
Anonymous, 30.
69
sort exists that directs an agent to follow a specific person or group. What can be argued,
however, is that the League had knowledge or suspicion that individuals were involved
with or in sympathy to German Nazism or its American cognate. Nearly one hundred
individuals, groups, and locations from around the northeastern Ohio area were placed
under surveillance between 1936 and 1945, so targets were chosen with great
consideration. Agents used most any means at their disposable to retrieve information.
For example, when agent P-9 was charged with learning about the questionable nature of
a youth camp at Parma's German Central Farm, he lied his way into the director's office,
tricked various camp officials, used a child informant, took pictures of the area,
eavesdropped on conversations, and trespassed onto the property to meet with the young
man he and the League had contracted to infiltrate the camp. Other common tactics
included questioning friends, family, and business connections about the political, social,
personal, and religious leanings of particular people. They also wanted to acquire willing
informants, shadowed people with multiple agents for extended periods, befriended
suspicious individuals to get close to information, and much more. 27
Investigation reports were almost always written the evening after a specific event
on a typewriter. Reports included all data relevant to the day's proceeding and
preparations. An agent might, for example, mention that they followed a specific person
on the train for a series of stops, watched them speak to others in a bar, read certain
newspapers or magazines, enter and exit particular shops, or engage in any other sort of
27
It is clear after a thorough review of the League's findings that the League acted as I have described. The
League's notes are all a part of the Western Reserve Historical Society's League collection.
70
public behavior. These reports also detailed what was going on in their surroundings or
what some people were wearing. On many occasions, they noted the presence of
swastikas, uniforms, or other Nazi regalia. While attending Cleveland's GermanAmerican Bund meetings, X-5's inner circle informant revealed that many attendees
dressed in uniforms similar to the German SA and those who were a part of the OD paramilitary wing of the Bund. There was also a cadre of individuals dressed in copied
American military uniforms that sported a swastika at the top of the cap. 28 Flags as well
were equally important. Both P-9 and X-5 often noted if the American flag, Nazi flag, or
any others were flying or being otherwise used. Both uniforms and flags are important
since they are symbols of personal and political affiliation and can tell much about a
person. One can safely assume, for instance, that an American flag with a swastika in the
middle means that those who rally around it see themselves (and the nation as they would
like it to be) as both quintessentially American and Nazi. Secondly, an individual dressed
in German Nazi regalia or American variants thereof were so serious about their personal
affiliation with a group and did not fear announcing it to the world via their body. Lastly,
individuals outside of the scope of the investigation were typically left nameless, with
few base indicators as to who they were. For example, a special report investigating a
Cleveland-area bar did not contain the names of normal patrons, only those that were
connected to the case. In this situation, well-to-do German Americans, known Nazis, and
suspicious individuals were named or described for future reports. Individuals that could
28
Special Report by X-5, Special Archival Collections, Nov. 10, 1937, Western Reserve Historical Society,
Cleveland, Ohio, 1.
71
not be named were either described in detail or linked to vehicle license plates.
Naturally, not all investigations revealed that the targets were doing anything
wrong or pro-Nazi. For example, agent X-37 was responsible for following and learning
about a local Austrian businessman's “attitude toward the Jewish race.” 29 Although it is
not stated outright, the Austrian was most likely chosen because of a complaint or
previously uncovered information that linked him to groups or persons engaged in proNazi behavior. One informant that X-37 questioned provided the Austrian's city of birth,
he was too young to have served in the Austrian or German armies during the Great War,
held politically centrist views, and married a local Irish woman. After meeting with
several acquaintances and friends familiar with the individual, X-37 concluded that the
man was not a threat and his file should be left to rest. 30 In another case, X-37 was
involved in investigating a local man suspected of spreading pro-Nazi propaganda. In a
risky move, he spoke with the man's wife concerning their trip the year prior to Germany.
She explained that they did indeed go, were of German heritage, and very familiar with
Jewish harassment, but claimed that American news sources largely inflated matters. She
also compared street violence and anti-Jewish harassment to labor and union strikes in
the United States, saying that the state would come in and justly squash any form of
resistance. After finding out that neither the man nor the wife were engaged with any
German organizations and that their feelings about the Jews and Nazi state were nothing
too extreme, X-37 concluded that although they may be sympathetic to the Nazi cause,
29
30
Special Report by X-37, April 27, 1936, 1.
Special Report by X-37, April 27, 1936, 1-2.
72
they were not spreading propaganda or were especially pro-Nazi. The report added that
their file should be closed, but the individuals kept on a list of suspicious individuals. 31
In all, the League's investigations were a tactic chosen for two key reasons. First,
they understood that formal pro-Nazi organizations and activists represented the most
present and pressing danger. They believed that these groups were grappling for power,
attempting to usurp democratic institutions by illegal ways. They believed this very real
threat was not being attended to sufficiently by federal agents. Thus, the League took it
upon themselves to act in the ways that the government was not. Second, the shift
towards using private investigations against Nazi-related groups was first introduced in
small form during the Berlin-Cleveland student exchange program and grew from there.
They moved towards this methodology because it offered them a chance to see what was
going on in the background of events. It is especially important to note that in cases
where information was at a minimum or entirely unavailable through normal channels,
the League resorted to using more and more investigations. It was simply the best option
available to them to continue their fight against Nazism and the enemies of democracy.
Lastly, it is notable that the League had been investigating other groups prior to
the Berlin-Cleveland student exchange. From March to April 1934, the League began by
investigating the Tucker School of Expression, a performing arts school promoting
William Pelley's “Liberation Movement,” a strange mix of anti-Semitism, anticommunism, and theosophy. This shortly lived and minimalist program, while technically
31
Special Report by X-37, 1936, 1-2.
73
the first use of clandestine investigations, is given minimal thought in this section
because it is not germane to either Nazi propaganda in Cleveland nor public boycotts.
Again, it is only worth mentioning because it signals that the League began using
investigations not long after they started boycotting local Nazis and fascists.
Section Four: The Berlin-Cleveland Student Exchange
From their inception on, pro-Nazi propaganda coming from Germany was one of
the League's most important targets. They considered Nazi literature, American or
foreign, as an ideological threat to liberal democracy that could potentially lead the
disaffected masses towards fascism. The situation that best represents the League's desire
to thwart the Nazi threat and their first use of clandestine investigations was the BerlinCleveland student exchange held in 1937 and 1938. The majority of their investigations
occurred during spring 1937 and looked at how the incoming students were used as
propaganda agents for the Reich, but differed both in use and function from their Bund
camp operations. Where the League truly stood out was in how they coordinated one of
Cleveland's largest anti-Nazi rallies and educational campaigns to date. Indeed, the
student exchange case, more than any other, shows how the League's secret investigations
took a backseat to their public works.
Beginning in May 1937 and continuing until the end June 1938, over one hundred
German students came to live in the Cleveland area and learn in some of the local
74
schools. Dubbed the “Berlin-Cleveland student exchange” by the Cleveland Plain Dealer,
the program was directed between the Berlin Board of Education, members of various
Cleveland school boards, and a few prominent representatives of the local German
American community. Under the auspices of friendly cultural exchange, the German
students were to spend six weeks each at any of the Cleveland schools that agreed to
accept them. Once the German students returned home, one hundred Cleveland students
were to attend German high schools. 32 In general, the Berlin-Cleveland student exchange
program was a unique plan, one without precedent in the United States. While exchanges
with other countries were certainly done before, no other American city was complicit
with a proposed trade with Nazi Germany before, or after, Cleveland. For Germany,
sending “professional students” out to other countries to learn as “national
representatives” was commonplace and an official part of the German education system.
Students who enrolled in this program competed for eligibility and were selected on an
individual basis. Nazi student exchange programs spanned the globe, going as far as the
U.S. and Brazil, and as close as France, Poland, and Italy. 33
Naturally, this program elicited a great deal of local attention. Some Clevelanders
were in complete support while others posed that it could poison young minds with
National Socialist propaganda. Those that publicly supported the program often cited that
it was either a unique learning opportunity for the students or that it was simply
32
33
“Brickner Hits at Pupil Swap With Germany,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, Feb. 26, 1937, NPN available.
Various unnamed and undated League documents call the German students “professional students” and
that they traveled from nation to nation to nation spreading pro-Nazi propaganda. It is assumed that they
made these materials during the protest period.
75
misunderstood my opponents. One supporter who wrote to the Cleveland Plain Dealer
said that she supported the program because “there is nothing more educating than
travel.... They [the students] are only young once, and they will love their own country
after that much better.” Interestingly, she made sure to mention that, despite being of
German extraction, she did not belong to any German American organization. 34 Others
that supported the exchange cited that opponents should reserve all criticism and let the
students judge their German peers. 35 One members of the American Legion said that the
United States was the most anti-Nazi country in the world and likely to convert the young
Germans. He further stated that critics should have more faith in the students who go to
Germany because they “have been taught religious and race tolerance from birth” and
would not be shaken by six weeks in Germany. 36 Lastly, Harry Blackburn, Vice President
of the Rocky River Board of Education, believed that “our high school boys and girls are
sufficiently mature and sensible enough to distinguish between the things they will see
and hear that are of cultural value, and what the Hitler regime may stage for their
consumption during the visit in Germany.” 37
Not surprisingly, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, a leader in the League, was one of the
most powerful opponents to the student exchange. On May 2, 1937, Silver addressed his
congregation about his concerns over the upcoming arrival of German students. He began
34
Letter to the Editor, “Chance of a Lifetime,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 7, 1937, NPN available.
Letter to the Editor, “Let Pupils Judge Nazis,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 7, 1937, NPN available.
36
Letter to the Editor, “Veteran Favors Plan,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 7, 1937,NPN available.
37
Letter to the Editor, “School Board Member's View,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, March 7, 1937, NPN
available.
35
76
by blasting the program by saying, “we are dealing here not at all with an innocent
enterprise of a well-intentioned government bent upon international good will. We are
dealing with a very shrewd piece of propaganda on the part of a very unscrupulous
government which in its own land has trampled underfoot those very ideals of tolerance
and good will, freedom of thought and free education which their student emissaries
presumably are to acquaint themselves with in Cleveland and in free America.” 38 German
propaganda minister Joseph Goebbles, he claimed, was personally behind sending the
“coached, trained” students over. Silver went even further and said that the exchange was
connected to Hitler's plan to brainwash the world's youth. Silver said “In Mein Kampf,
Hitler writes: 'It will be the task of the Nationalist State to see to it that an adequate
education is given to youth in order to provide for a generation prepared for the final and
greatest decisions on this earth. The nation which will take this road first will be the
victorious one'.” For Rabbi Silver, anyone who supported the plan was either gravely
misinformed of the danger it posed or in full support of Hitler's plan to sway American
youth in his direction. Silver continually attacked supporters as being as “naïve as the
Nazis would like them to be.” 39 Lastly, and most importantly, Silver announced that he
and the League for Human Rights would stage the Jewish Welfare Fund Drive when the
German students arrived. The fund would support German Jews that had been
38
Judah Rubinstein, ed. Sally Wertheim and Alan Bennett, Remembering Cleveland's Jewish Voice, (Kent,
OH, Kent State University Press, 2011), 224.
39
Rubinstein, 226-27.
77
prosecuted. 40 He believed that it was necessary to protest what the students stood for as a
part of Hiler's international mission and to give support to German Jews under Nazism's
iron fist.
The Berlin-Cleveland student exchange also generated a strong national response.
In New York City, Samuel Untermyer's Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League sent a signed
letter of protest to Cleveland Mayor Harold Burton. The letter urged Burton to dismiss
the German students upon arrival because they were “agents of the Nazi government's
system of international propaganda.” Furthermore, the letter claimed with authority that
the students and their ten adult leaders were trained by the German propaganda bureau
and were instructed to speak about the virtues of Nazism whenever they could. Burton
replied that he could not do such even if he wanted to because he did not have the power
to dismiss students.41 The Christian Century declared the program “a 'good will' venture
which promises to do more harm than good.” Although the author believed that the
people directing things from Cleveland were acting on good intentions, they declared that
the Nazi government was manipulating these children and “all sorts of social occasions
into opportunities for singing the Horst Wessel song and testifying to the glories of der
Fuehrer.” In all, the author concluded, the exchange would leave Clevelanders with a
poor taste for Hitlerism and would make future renditions of the plan a sure failure. 42
Time magazine proclaimed that the event would be the only occasion where the
40
Rubinstein, 228.
“Protests Pupils' Visit,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 15, 1937, NPN available.
42
“Controversy in Cleveland,” The Christian Century, Vol 54, 1937, 637.
41
78
German students would have to experience true democracy. The article furthermore
described the German students first few days visiting classes, being unable to identify
Benjamin Franklin, and walking around some of Cleveland's local shops and movie
theaters. Lastly, the article indicated a level of public unwillingness to accept the
students. It told how Lakewood High School student Marygold McCauley wrote to Time
that “All who welcome the German students unfortunately do not understand the grave
significance of this issue.” 43 Indeed, the German-led program even prompted a small
international response. Reportedly, famed British Laborite Baron Dudley Leigh Aman,
better known as Lord Marley, said that “every German exchange student is a Nazi
propagandist.” 44
The League's reaction very much mirrored Silver's and, in some ways, surpassed
him in intensity. Their initial attempts to derail the plan started in early February after the
Hamburg-American Steamship Line announced the plan. Although the League later
found that the Bund and German Consul were funding this program, the HamburgAmerican Steamship Line was the public face of the matter. After proposing the plan to a
dozen Cleveland school officials, the League was tipped by an insider that there were
talks of a student exchange. Furious that such a thing could even be considered, the
League wrote to the superintendents about what they believed the plan really meant. In a
letter to Superintendent Charles H. Lake, the League said that “[we are] very
apprehensive of a situation that may be created by the Nazi students in the classroom of
43
44
“Cleveland Visit, Time, Vol. 29, Issue 20, May 17, 1937, NPN available.
“Cleveland Visit.”
79
the Cleveland schools.” They added that “We are seriously offended by the actions taken
by the Cleveland School Board as we feel that this action is a direct violation of all of the
education principles of the Cleveland schools.” They ended by writing that if the plan
were to go forward, the schools needed to meet a set of demands, including prohibiting
students from wearing swastikas or their uniforms, promoting Nazism in the classroom,
singing the Horst Wessel Lied, giving the Nazi salute at any time, or otherwise push antiAmerican ideas. 45 By repeatedly and emphatically denouncing the plan, the League
pushed many local administrators to be reluctant to accept the plan. In all, less than half
of the schools that originally accepted followed through to the final stage. Those that did
faced another round of the League's resistance.
After their partial success at getting some of the school's out of the first phase of
the plan, the League developed a subgroup to plan a large rally, similar to those that they
did when they were first founded. This group was headed by Rabbi Silver and Director
Grace Meyette. Realizing that they could not fully prevent the program, Silver and
Meyette planned to actively protest the program while the students were in Cleveland.
They believed that doing so would make it less likely for any future exchanges to occur.
They conducted a nation-wide search for speakers to come to Cleveland on May 10, 1937
to denounce the plan and talk about the state of education in Germany. Before the League
was able to find any speakers for the May 10 event, they felt that they needed to continue
to assault the exchange program. Between February and May 1937, the League had
45
League for Human Rights Against Nazism, letter to Charles H. Lake, Feb. 12 1937.
80
several very prominent speakers come and talk about the ills of Nazism, including exiled
Wiemar Germany leader Wilhelm Sollman, Johannes Steele, Walter Schoenstadt, and
Erika Mann. While the League sponsored them, Meyette and Silver worked to find
leaders in education to come to the city. In a letter to Dr. Paul Douglas of Chicago
University, Silver asked him to be the lead speaker. He explained that the program was
“aimed at reaching young people, teachers, and the public” and his speech should be
“built around the prostitution of education in Germany under the Nazi regime.” 46Douglas
gladly accepted and said he would quickly prepare his speech. 47
Director Grace Meyette contacted A. L. Winir of the American Civil Liberties
Union looking for help and potential leads. She wrote to them, “We would like to have
for a speaker a 'Pure Aryan' and he should be an educator, if possible.” Her letter was met
with a quick reply , suggesting that the League contact, among many others, Dr. Peter
Odegard of Ohio State University and Dr. Henry Prat Fairchild of New York University.
The letter from the ACLU expressed a clear sense that these individuals would be good
candidates because they were all leaders in their fields and against fascism. Meyette then
sent out at least eight telegrams to those suggested by the ACLU representative. While
most were unable to attend due to prior engagements, Odegard and Fairchild accepted. 48
Meyette also distributed an informational informational propaganda flier that called on
Cleveland's youth to stand up against what the German students stood for. The
46
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, letter to Paul Douglas, May 5, 1937.
Paul Douglas, telegram to Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, May 7, 1937.
48
The following is a compilation of letters and telegrams sent between Grace Meyette and several
educational professionals concerning their attendance to the May 10 anti-student exchange rally.
47
81
anonymous flier read that:
....students of all ages are asked to demonstrate for the American ideals of free
education, of the expulsion of teachers and professors from their posts by the
Brown Shirt tyranny, and the humiliation and degradation of tens of thousands of
innocent school children because of their race and religion.... The youth of
Cleveland rises in protest against this unconscionable piece of effrontery. The
appeal to youth cannot be employed as a camouflage for the motive of the Nazi
regime, which is to destroy every vestige of human freedom, and is in direct
contrast to all principles of democracy. 49
The flier ended by calling the city's youth to “not accept your democracy placidly. Fight
for its continued existence.” 50
The League's May 10 rally was a huge hit, with over 3,000 people packing the
Cleveland Music Hall and its overflow outside the building. The Cleveland Plain Dealer
featured the event on its front page the next day and an article detailing how Rabbi Silver,
one of the keynote speakers, believed that the students deserved a “cool reception.” He
was “amazed that so few Cleveland citizens, so few school teachers see behind this
seemingly innocent student exchange that they have not seized this opportunity to
unmask this miserable dictatorship and drive home to honest citizens the meaning of
machination of [the Nazi] regime. We should have done well to have laid a little less
stress on reasonableness and being charming hosts to welcome the emissaries of
dictatorship.” 51Dr. Paul Douglas' speech emphasized that the exchange in Cleveland
varied from those he had led between the United States and other democratic countries
and called the plan “a two-way export of Nazi ideas, not an exchange,” because Germany
49
League for Human Rights flier, unnamed, undated. Assumed before May 10, 1937.
Ibid.
51
“3,000 Protest Nazi Methods of Education,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 11, 1937, NPN available.
50
82
only allowed pro-Nazi students to leave the country and did not allow liberal ideas into
the Reich. The other speakers professed similar points and were likewise well received. 52
The League's handbook remembers the event in a similar way, but lays blame on Mayor
Burton and the Cleveland Plain Dealer for being so passive, even accepting, of the
program. 53 Obviously irritated by the fact they could not stop the program that year, the
League changed its strategy to examine those involved in the program.
As early as November 1937, League put agent X-5 was set on the case. His first
action on November 3, 1937 consisted of a personal interview he had with one of the
program chaperons and leaders, Mrs. Gerstenberger. X-5 found that she was quite
pessimistic that the Berlin-Cleveland plan would continue into 1938 because the public
outrage against it was so palpable. She also explained that nine other countries were
interested in working with Berlin on a similar program and that Cleveland would likely
be passed up. 54 On November 8, 1937, X-5 visited a local PTA meeting where students
(five boys and two girls) had just returned to Cleveland from Germany five days earlier.
He found that all of the students spoke highly of the program and their experiences in
Germany, but that they also experienced some uncomfortable or curious irregularities. In
particular, one of the male students remarked that German books were censored and, on
occasions, burned. The students felt out of place at times as locals would stare at them
curiously. In all, X-5 found that the student's characterization about the trip amounted to
52
Ibid.
Anonymous, 13.
54
Special Report by X-5, Nov. 3, 1937, 1.
53
83
nothing unusual or particularly pro-Nazi. 55
While the League agents were investigating the student exchange program, they
were also accelerating their program challenging the local chapter of the GermanAmerican Bund. While those investigations were almost entirely separate from BerlinCleveland affairs, League agents found connections between the Bund and student
exchange program. First, while looking into the private histories of Bund members, the
League found that one of the local Bund's most prominent members was also the
executive manager of the Hamburg-American Line. Interestingly, this individual was also
the same person who first proposed the student exchange and acted as a middle-man
between the Cleveland and Berlin school boards. League records indicate that they were
aware of this connection by as early as February 1937. League agents also found that
local Bund members both housed and monetarily supported students throughout their
stay. One undated document claims that at least half of the homes that housed German
students and sent students abroad were active Bund members or those that openly
sympathized with them. 56 In all, the record shows that local Bund members and their
leadership supported the student exchange program. It is clear that the two actively
worked together, but the League records do not address why they chose to not make this
discovery public.
55
56
Special Report by X-5, Nov. 8, 1937, 1-2.
The following was compiled from several League for Human Rights records that talk about the local
Bund organization and individual members. For privacy reasons outlined by the Western Reserve
Historical Society's collection on the League, I cannot name this individual nor is he important enough
to get a pseudonym.
84
League investigations and public activism against the student exchange program
went silent from November, 1937 until March 4, 1938. In preparation for the second trip
to Germany, X-5 visited the exchange program's main office located in the HamburgAmerican Steam Ship Line building in Cleveland. X-5 spoke with the clerk under the
auspices that his “son” was interested in going and that his family was curious about the
program. She replied that it was a great chance for a student to experience something life
changing, that the press and those influencing the press were wrong about the program,
and that a trip was already planned for spring 1938. After giving him an application for
eligibility, X-5 asked if he could speak with a parent or student who went on the trip the
previous year. The clerk promptly gave him a name and address of someone whose child
went in 1937. Upon visiting the child's mother, X-5 found that she was very much for the
program. The mother told X-5 that her child had a great experience and that the press had
“misquoted” her in an interview about the student exchange in 1937. She also believed
the reporters were spreading lies because they wanted “to poison the minds of the young
against their homeland.” 57 The League, for whatever reason, stopped pursuing the
program after these interviews.
The 1937 and 1938 trips to Germany were widely condemned by the press and
League as obvious propaganda and clear attempt to nazify Cleveland's youth. In reality,
the trip seems to have had little, if any, “nazifying” effect on the students. After they got
back, some students remarked that the German people were kind to them and that they
57
Special Report by X-5, March 4, 1938, 1-2.
85
did not feel as though they were being indoctrinated into the National Socialist fold. In
fact, the only complaint that they had upon return to the United States was that there was
no ice water and the sauerbraten were too sour. 58 In all, little is known about the actual
content of what the students were subjected to in Germany. What is known is that they
lived in Berlin for a period of six weeks in German “foster” homes and visited Munich,
Hamburg, and Heidelberg. Some students felt that the impression they left with Germans
was “dubious.” Students reported that the German people stared at them while they
walked through the streets, seemingly bewildered by “the boys' flashy collegiate clothes.”
One student laughed off the matter, claiming Clevelanders would laugh at them for
wearing such clothes. The students also seemed quite impressed with how clean many
German cities were, how the people enjoyed bath houses, and how intensively they
worked on their gardens. The chief chaperone of the trip, Mrs. H. J. Gerstenberger,
claimed that students did not converse about politics and that all observations went
undiscussed. Upon their return, many of the students wore or carried with them various
souvenirs including “a complete Bavarian costume from shorts to wool socks,” deer
antlers, and many smaller items. 59 The League records indicate that they believed the
students were not converted, but they still held considerable reservation about the
program as a whole. After a weak showing of less than fifty students for the 1938
exchange, the Cleveland public school systems ended the program, effectively ending the
58
59
“45 Pupils Return, Praise Germany” Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 14, 1937, NPN available.
“56 Pupils Home from Berlin Visit,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 2, 1937, NPN available; “45
Pupils Return, Praise Germany,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 14, 1937, NPN available.
86
exchange of students between America and Germany.
Section Five: Conclusions
The League's crusade against Nazism in Cleveland was a product of evolution.
Before the League for Human Rights Against Nazism was founded by Rabbi Silver or
Leon Wiesenfeld, the Cleveland public was already calling for public action against
Hitler's Germany and his American supporters. The founders of the League responded by
creating their own version of dual Jewish and non-sectarian anti-Nazi resistance group.
This differed from previous incarnations like Samuel Untermyer's Anti-Nazi Leagues in
New York City and Detroit in that the Cleveland League adopted the tactics and
organizational styles used by both liberal and conservative Jewish organization. For
example, the League had adopted a more conservative stance on membership by trying to
add Gentiles to their ranks so as to not look “too Jewish.” Simultaneously, the League
was also directed in a more liberal style, namely by the Committee of Fifteen of whom
most were Jews. This Jewish-led, yet Gentile-supported group also used conservative and
liberal methods of protest. In particular, the League's allocation of conservative tactics are
mostly evident in how they pressured figures through informal channels and by
investigations. This is most evident in how the League asserted pressure on school
officials during the student exchange program's initial talks. Generally speaking,
however, the League preferred to use liberal protest tactics against their enemies. This
87
choice is most apparent in their investigations. While not used as much early on, this
option would be used more frequently and with greater intensity after the BerlinCleveland student exchange. The League's preferred choice of attack at this time were
loud, public pro-democracy and anti-Nazi informational campaigns. These are most
evident in their on-going boycotts and informational rallies.
What makes the student exchange program significant is that it was the first major
affair where the League used both of their styles of resistance, namely information
campaigns and secret investigations. While there was a greater emphasis on the public
information campaigns and rallies about the student exchange, the League's selective use
of investigations aided their final conclusions on the program and their evaluation of their
own success. An undated document simply titled “German Student Exchange” revealed
that the League felt their campaign was successful in two regards. First, they believed
that they were able to convince most of the Cleveland school boards to abandon the
proposed program. Since the program was still authorized by others, this was “only a
partial success.” Second, they considered the May 10 rally and preceding anti-Nazi talks
much more effective due to the great attendance numbers and that the program fell apart
the following year. 60 Interestingly, none of the information found during their
investigations was used in any way. This is understandable because the League was
engaging multiple opponents at once and if they had revealed anything they knew, they
might have hurt their future efforts. In any case, the League's investigations into the
60
“German Student Exchange,” undated, 1.
88
student exchange program were limited in scope as well as findings. Nonetheless, this
was the first event where the League used investigations in a serious, meaningful way.
The League public boycotts, protests, and information campaigns also had a role
outside of gaining information on enemies or preventing their spread. In particular, their
efforts rallied the local Jewish community together in a way which had not been seen
before. Cleveland's Jews, led by Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver and the League, now had a
united political and philosophical front from which they could strike out at Hitler and his
American copy-cats. American Jews in the 1930s and 1940s were well aware that their
European brethren were suffering under Hitler's oppressive regime. This common issue
and the fear that American Gentiles would reciprocate this sort of violent anti-Semitism
or at the very least sympathetically side with Germany created a common cause for Jews
around the nation. The response in Cleveland and elsewhere were boycott and protest
efforts on German goods and domestic groups which supported Hitler's policies. The
external threat personified through Hitler and his destructive regime ultimately inspired
the American Jewish response to resist by any means necessary.
In all, the League's choice of tactics varied based on two specific elements. First,
more generic pro-Nazi activity, like the selling of Nazi goods or pro-German speakers,
was attacked publicly because it could garner support for the League and their mission.
This simultaneously boosted their position in the city as the leading anti-Nazi group and
countered any pro-Nazi message from proliferating. The informational rallies, boycotts,
and other public programs show that the League was interested in getting the community
89
behind them and not letting the Bund or any other threat succeed. Second, the League
initially used secret investigations as a sort of backup plan, enacted to gain extra
information against their enemies when little else could be done or conventional modes
of resistance were exhausted. This use of investigations would continue on well into the
late 1930s and until as late as 1946. The veracity and scope of these campaigns, however,
would soon become much more aggressive and focused on infiltrating the inner rings of
local and regional fascist groups.
Chapter Three: Breaking the Bund and Legion
Section One: Nazism in America in 1930s and How it Changed
The fight against Nazism in America first manifested as public boycotts against
German anti-Semitism. Organizations like Rabbi Silver's League for Human Rights and
Samuel Untermyers's Anti-Nazi League spearheaded this effort by calling for the public
to boycott Nazi goods, rallying against pro-Nazi activists speaking throughout the nation,
fighting the Bund and organized American fascism, and raising public awareness to
German propaganda. Their campaigns, while not always successful, did present a strong
resistance effort. Although it is presently unknown if any other organization used
investigations as part of their arsenal of resistance, it is clear that the League for Human
Rights in Cleveland regarded clandestine operations as integral to the platform, necessary
parts to their much larger program. While public knowledge of these clandestine
activities were limited to a very select few, most Americans were aware of on-going
events in Germany as they were reported in the press.
While conscious of the Nazi menace, observers in the press were unsure what to
make of Germany's new regime from 1933 to 1936. Some hoped that Hitler would bring
unity to Germany, although many Americans remained cautious about the actual
prospects to it. In February 1933, the Chicago Tribune remarked that it appreciated the
“just aspiration for the restoration of Germany's greatness as a world power,” and
suggested that “American's opinion shares the Fascist hostility to communism and must
90
91
sympathize with any sane determination of the German spirit.” Along the same line,
the Atlanta Constitution wrote that “if Hitler can, even though [he] resorts to ruthless
methods, bring the same stability as Mussolini has to Italy, world affairs generally will be
benefited.” 1 Other observers expressed a much more pessimistic view of German Nazism
based on the regime's attack on German Jews combined with its announced forced
conscription, rearmament programs, and its ignorance of the tenets of the Versailles
Treaty. The San Francisco Chronicle wrote “Herr Hitler, by his insane attack on Jews,
has come dangerously close to alienating American sympathy.” In similar spirit,
the Denver Post wrote that “The anti-Jewish campaign of Hitler and his Nazis is a
demonstration of their madness,” while the St. Louis Post linked Hitler's persecution of
the Jew, “belongs to the fanaticism of the Dark Ages.” 2 Although many Americans held
anti-Semitic feelings, the sacking of Jewish businesses and similar attacks aroused a
feeling that Hitler had gone too far in his racism.
By the middle of the 1930s, it became clear that another European war inspired by
Nazi aggression might soon break out. Many newspapers of the day reflected the concern
that Americans held over Hitler and the Nazi war machine, in particularly after the
annexation of Austria in 1938. While some voices posited that the annexation was either
inevitable or even desirable, they quickly reversed their position after it became clear that
the act was an aggressive one. After Kristalnacht, the Atlanta Constitution exclaimed that
the democracies of the world need to put an end to “Hitler's barbarism,” but believed that
1
Robert A. Rosenbaum, Waking to Danger: Americans and Nazi Germany, 1933-1941, (Praeger, Santa
Barbara, CA, 2010), 154.
2
Rosenbaum, 155.
92
America [had] no place in intervening in a European concern. 3 This paradoxical assertion
most eloquently described the American view of that time – German Nazism was a beast
of the worst sort that needed to be dealt with, but it must be tamed in Europe by
neighboring democratic regimes. America, simply put, needed to stay out and fix its own
problems.
Considering the rising fear of Nazism, it is not surprising that Americans
challenged those Americans who proudly waved the Nazi flag. These individuals,
convinced that Nazism would deliver the United States from the Great Depression as
Hitler had done with Germany, adjusted their public image and dialogic relationship with
the American public in an attempt to be more successful politically. In particular, the
German-American Bund, America's premier Nazi organization, shifted their appearance
throughout the mid and late 1930s to a more palatable message in an effort to appease to
an already suspicious American public and push anti-fascist criticism away from them.
As early as 1923, fascist groups had a presence in Cleveland in a variety of small
organizations. Most fascist groups, like the Friends of New Germany, Silver Shirt Legion,
and Kyffhauser Bund, never had more than one hundred members at their peak in the
mid-1930s. By spring 1934, however, the German American, pro-Nazi element in
Cleveland, Ohio, was organized primarily under the local branch of the GermanAmerican Bund (then the “League of Friends of New Germany), numbered over three
hundred, and were led by the charismatic “Regional Fuehrer” Martin E. Kessler. He
claimed, like national Bund Leader Fritz Kuhn, that they were simply another American
3
Rosenbaum, 156.
93
institution comprised of patriotic German Americans who opposed communism. On
December 15, 1937 the Bund held a public meeting where an large number of new and
potential members (reportedly over three hundred) asked Kessler what the Bund stood for.
First, Kessler responded that they were “primarily an American organization.... [whose]
membership was composed in great part of people of German blood who were in
sympathy with the present form of the German Government.” Hitler, whom they denied
following, was not a dictator in any sense, but rather an elected official with “100%”
support from true Germans and won his election with a greater majority that Roosevelt.
Hyperbole aside, Kessler said the Bund was not against “any class or race,” and that they
respected the American form of government, namely democracy. Furthermore, although
the Jews were their typical targets, Kessler said that the organization felt no antagonism
towards the Jews, except those in power. He proclaimed that the only thing they wanted
was a more equal discussion and representation in the American government between
“true Americans,” Christians, and the Jews that held political and financial power. He
said that the Jews were only a target in that they represented a disproportionate number of
people in positions of American power and would feel the same about any other creed or
race that did the same. 4 This sort of contradiction, that the Bund was not anti-Semitic but
only hated the massive amount of Jews in power, was par for the course for the Bund.
Ideally, their true public mission was to squash the menace of American and foreign
Communism, as it represented the greatest threat to freedom. Lastly, he targeted those
who spoke out against the Bund and petitions for their disintegration as violating the
4
Special Report by X-5, Special Archival Collections, December 15, 1937, Western Reserve Historical
Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 1-3.
94
constitutional protection of free speech. The Bund was, Kessler proclaimed, a part of the
American political debate that was made possible by the constitution which allows a
person speak without fear of persecution. In sum, Kessler created a public facade for the
Bund as “merely trying to awaken the German American and his American friends to the
dangers of Communism and oppression by certain classes” onto the American people. 5
Despite initial success in countering the growing Nazi influence in Cleveland, in
1937 the League noticed a change in how the Bund operated. The Nazi movement in the
city had changed their focus from using German nationals, pro-Nazi Americans, and antiSemitism to spread propaganda to using more subtle tactics. After years of public
demonstrations, relentless boycotting, and picket line campaigns outside of the Bund
meeting hall, Kessler, Kuhn, and the Bund realized that they were drawing too much
negative attention. In order to change this, the Cleveland Bund initiated a series of
programs to redefine their public message. For example, pro-Nazi German American
organizations and the Bund brought fewer German officials or citizens to speak to
Americans and toned down their anti-Semitic message. 6 They invited national leader
Fritz Kuhn to come and speak on various occasions. In 1937 alone he came to speak in
northeast Ohio at least four documented times and at least three for private meetings with
Kessler, the Cleveland Bund, or the O.D. leadership from Bund headquarters in New
York City. In 1938 he came for at least four official meetings and two unofficial
engagements. League agent X-5's November 17, 1937, report outlined the meeting's
5
Special Report by X-5, Special Archival Collections, December 15, 1937, Western Reserve Historical
Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 1-3.
6
Anonymous, The League for Human Rights, (unknown publisher: Cleveland, OH, 1946), 23.
95
proceedings and Kuhn's visit. 7 After first noting that the speech sounded “scripted for
positive newspaper feedback/reporting,” and that he “spoke particularly about the fine
citizenship of German Americans,” X-5 explained that he spoke with Kuhn privately
where he bemoaned the “position that the German Government was putting him [Kuhn]
in, as the original instructions for the organization [Bund] were to the effect they were to
be very anti-Semitic but the German Government has since asked them to soft pedal this
angle as they were finding the Jewish boycott in this country very disastrous” to their
public image. 8 Kuhn's candid admission to X-5 shows that the Bund and German
government felt endangered by the economic boycott and understood to some degree that
their anti-Semitic message was failing to gain converts.
This tactical change reveals three key things. First, by 1937 the German-American
Bund understood that it was not wise to sound overly anti-Semitic or sponsor speakers
that used racial or religiously insensitive language. Rather, they had to change their tone
to celebrate German American's contribution to the United States and show how they
were defenders of the Constitution and not a threat to it. Any kind of outwardly pro-Nazi
language would compromise their “American” veneer. Kuhn's admission to X-5 about the
orders from Germany show that not only did the Bund have a vested interest in changing
their message, but so did the homeland. Second, the change in tone was entirely
superficial. The Bund's mission had remained unchanged from the beginning: to install a
Nazi government in the United States. According to X-5's notes, Kuhn and Kessler both
7
The League agents used names such as X-5, P-9, and others to protect themselves and the anonymity of
their sources. These individuals are never revealed by name in any documents and were most likely
only known by the League's investigation board. It is suggested in several texts that some worked in a
private investigation firm, but it is not clear if this is true for all the agents.
8
Special Report by X-5, Nov. 17, 1937, 1-3.
96
publicized the Bund as a group that celebrated both parts of their German and American
heritage. In private, however, X-5 saw that both remained anti-Semitic and highly
concerned with gaining footholds in German American circles and American political
institutions for the purpose of legitimizing American-styled Nazism. Lastly, the Bund was
more adaptive to changing their tactics than other German American groups. The German
Round Table, Stadtverband, and other groups that indulged in bringing German nationals
and pro-Nazi propagandists continued this failing methodology well after the Bund had
realized it was no longer useful. What these smaller groups like the Stadtverband and
Round Table lacked was the Bund's membership size and notoriety as the leading Nazi
front. Since the Bund was so much larger, and thus a much more noticeable target, they
were the forced over time to change the way they engaged the public. Smaller groups
with less impact, membership size, and limited national connections to pro-Nazi channels
could, before World War Two, still get away with some pro-fascist activism.
Section Two: Going Undercover at the Bund Camp
By the mid-1930s the German-American Bund was trying to revamp their public
image. Initially they had defined themselves as true American Nazis (albeit less extreme
than the Friends of the New Germany were), however this had failed them. In order to
redefine their image while still remaining true to the Nazi template, they adopted a new
97
way of communicating with American through a series of public programs. One of many
new programs that they instituted were youth camps modeled after those already in
operation in Germany. In his study In Hitler's Shadow, historian Leland Bell found that
leaders in the Bund used camps such as these to create a sort of miniature Nazi Germany
for attending children. The camps taught attendees “the courage and strength to fight for
their racial existence.” Lessons emphasized the superiority of Aryan lineage and the
decadence of Jewish influences in the world. Stories and lectures celebrated German war
heroes, taught children how to read, write, and speak the German language, presented
white-washed Nazi-accepted history, and the current state of the Nazi movement in
America and Germany. Their primary goal was “the inculcation of National Socialism
into German Americans. The camps were to be centers of National Socialist politics,
breathing and propagating the spirit of the Third Reich.” 9 In all, there were twenty-five
large Bund camps in Ohio, New York, Pennsylvania, Wisconsin, and elsewhere with an
innumerable amount of smaller camps. 10 Historian Martin Miller's Wunderlich's Salute
argues that Camp Siegfried at Yaphank, Long Island was the largest and most successful
Bund camp of its kind. Here they crafted programs and presentations to the “Young
Siegfrieds” that turned them towards Nazism. Common elements included German
language education, the use of the Nazi flag in daily activities, anti-Semitic lectures,
military-style drills, meetings with local and national Bund leaders, singing German folk
or military songs, and nightly bonfires where children would hear about the bravery of
9
Leland A. Bell, In Hitler's Shadow, (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973), 28.
Susan Canedy, America's Nazis (Menlo Park, CA: Markgraf Publications, 1990), 97.
10
98
German soldiers or children in the past. 11 In early August 1937, the Cleveland branch of
the German-American Bund opened their own camp in Parma, Ohio at the German
Central Farm. This camp, while dwarfed in size by Camp Siegfried and many others, did
promote the same sort of message and programs that others did and even included staff
members from Camp Siegfried as counselors, educators, and program managers.
News coverage and investigations on Bund activity at the German Central Farm
prior to the camp starting up reveals that Kessler and his followers considered the area as
their own. In the April 15, 1937 edition of the Bund's official national
newspaper, Deutscher Weckruf und Beobachter, celebrated the Cleveland Bund's
rebuilding of many of the Farm's facilities. On March 1, 1937, Kessler's group had
instituted an American branch of the German Labor Service and began building new
facilities for future use. Members unable to do physical labor were urged to donate $10 to
the cause. Reportedly, the project was personally led by Kessler. 12 League records also
indicate that Kuhn and Kessler spoke at German Central Farm council meetings, Farmsponsored engagements, the annual German Day celebration, and used the grounds for
their personal use regularly. In November, 1937 the League found that the Cleveland OD
branch shot a propaganda film at the Farm where members paraded around the grounds
on horseback and waved swastikas through the air. 13 In May, 1937, the Berlin rifle team
had a shooting accuracy competition with Bund members at the German Central Farm via
11
Martin Miller, Wunderlich's Salute, (Smithtown, NY: Malamud-Rose Publishers, 1983), 173.
Deutscher Werkruf und Beobachter, April 15, 1937, 4, NPN available.
13
The material used here comes from a variety of League investigation records scattered throughout their
collection and mostly left unmarked. All relevant dates are indicated in the text.
12
99
cable. 14 Additionally, on July 25th, 1937 the Cleveland Plain Dealer made mention of a
Nazi youth camp in New York and Kessler's visit to their facilities. The article described:
drills 'with sticks and wooden guns' of 15,000 German-American youths at the
Long Island camp. It said the same course was provided at the German Centrale
(sic), which is on York Road, Parma. Kessler scoffed at the idea of the youths
being taught 'German military tactics, including the goosestep.' He said the Parma
camp had not yet been opened to children but would be Aug. 7. 15
Kessler went on to laugh at the rumors that his group was making a militarized youth
camp at the German Central Farm, claiming that even adult members would have had
difficulty marching. 16
On August 10, 1937 agent P-9 contacted the director of the youth camp at the
German Central Farm under the auspices that he had a nephew who might benefit from
their program. For the cost of seventy cents, a child or teenager could enjoy a day with
other children at the German Central Farm. According to the director, daily activities
generally consisted of things typical for an outdoor camp: small games, group exercises,
running, jumping, gymnastics, etc. Feigning interest, P-9 asked if he could see the
grounds. Upon observation he noticed a U.S. flag flying with another unidentifiable one
laying on the ground. P-9 also saw children and their youth leaders (estimated around
sixteen to eighteen years old) wearing the same tan uniforms. Although initially
unmentioned by the director, wearing tan uniforms sold exclusively by select local
companies were required for all children participants and staff. The director, nearly done
with the tour of the grounds asked if the “interested nephew” could read or speak German.
14
“Wins From Germany in Telegraphic Shoot,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, May 24, 1937, NPN available.
“Raps Story Bund is Military Body,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 25, 193, NPN available7.
16
Ibid.
15
100
P-9 replied that the child could not, but the director seemed undeterred by this, saying
that it was “fine” and he would learn in time as that was what all good ethnically German
children should do and that they had programs in place that could teach him quickly.
Promising to return, P-9 left the facility and promptly returned with the boy informant
and his “mother” (another League agent). 17
Upon his return, P-9 sent the boy and his “mother” to go meet with the director
and his instructors to talk about the camp while P-9 met a young group leader and asked
him about the program and a bit about himself. The young man replied that he was indeed
a youth leader assigned to the boys section and that he had been transferred to the
German Central Farm camp location by “the Society” from his former location at a camp
in Long Island, New York that was the largest of it's kind. 18 Pressing for more
information, P-9 was able to confirm that children engaged in military style marches,
drills, and more indicative of programs like that at the camp the boy had formerly worked
at. It was likely that P-9 was either unaware of or unable to think of the name of the
camp the boy was referring to as he did not directly mention it in his report. Whatever the
case, P-9 was sure of one thing: the camp was connected to the national GermanAmerican Bund's plan to train German American youth to be loyal to their cause. Camps
such as Siegfried were the pet projects of the German-American Bund's youth education
program that stressed military training in the German tradition, German language
programs, anti-Semitic lectures, nightly campfires with tales of German heroics in the
17
Special Report by P-9, Special Archival Collections, August 15, 1937, Western Reserve Historical Society,
Cleveland, Ohio, 1-2.
18
Special Report by P-9, August 15, 1937, 2-3.
101
Great War and other conflicts, and more, making it an Americanized copy of the Hitler
Youth camps operating in Germany. It is significant that this young man admitted his
connection, and therefore personal affiliation with the German-American Bund as it
showed a direct link between the German Central Farm camp's program and the Bund's
local program to Nazify Cleveland's German American youth. Lastly, it is unknown what
was said in the private meeting between the boy, the other agent, and the director's staff.
The notes and report left by P-9 do not indicate any peculiarities nor obvious Nazi
activity, so it was likely uneventful.
For the next week, the boy informant successfully infiltrated the camp. Armed
with a little book for taking down names, notes, and relevant information, he was able to
record daily events and various peculiarities that he needed to report back to P-9. The boy
informant, for example, documented the children he met during his time at the camp, as
well as the teen leaders. The leaders were almost all males, but did include a few of the
female youth leadership. On many occasions, P-9 and the boy recorded vehicle license
plates which would be included in the nightly investigation summary reports along with
the vehicle owner's name and address. How they got the details of who owned these
vehicles and their addresses is not clear, however, several individual investigation files
unrelated to the German Central Farm case hint that investigators had access to private
vehicle records. These names and addresses were logged into a top secret spread sheet of
individuals thought to be active in Nazi circles, and several of the people were later
investigated by the League for their activities. 19
19
The following is a compilation of several Special Reports by P-9 that relate to the events of the German
102
The boy informant's detailed notes on his peers and events that took place at the
camp suggest that some boys were truly enthusiastic about the program, Adolf Hitler,
Martin Kessler, and Fritz Kuhn. Many of them expressed a clear desire to go to Germany
and serve under Hitler. Others were just there to have fun and thought nothing of the Nazi
state nor Hitler. On August 15, 1937, the boy informant told P-9 that some of the other
boys present:
....spoke to him of Hitler, and seemed to think he was a great man and his actions
against the Jews was justified. Several of them said they thought Germany would
be a much better place to live in if all the Jews were driven out of the country.
They said the damned Jews were robbers, in Germany, as well as here. Said that
their mothers were robbed by the Jews most every time they made purchases of
them, used much profanity in talking about them. 20
Others believed Hitler “was making Germany a far better place to live there than it was
here. They said the training they got here, in the Ugan, or German Boy Scouts, fitting
them for the German army, and they could go back home and fight any time they wanted
to.” 21 Several boys were especially proud of their father's roles as German soldiers in the
previous war, one remarking that his father served as a part of a railroad artillery team,
while another claimed that his father fought on front line as an infantry man. Nightly
events around the large bonfire included German folk songs like “Augerstein [it should
be noted that the boy informant did not understand German, so there is the chance that
the title is incorrect], the German Stein song,” the German Boy Scouts songs, and the
Horst Wessel Lied. Stories were often told in German and included tales about heroic
boys or young men that took part in the German side of the Great War and other parts of
Central Farm and case files about specific people later investigated by the League for Human Rights.
Events occurred between August 10-15, 1937.
20
Special Report by P-9, August 15, 1937, 1.
21
Special Report by P-9, August 15, 1937, 1-2.
103
German history. The boy informant told P-9 that there were no occasions where stories
celebrated Americans or the democratic way of life.
Of particular interest to the League was flag use in the camp and during activities.
According to flag historian Byron McCandless, flags are a symbolic representation of a
state, idea, or movement. By flying a flag or otherwise displaying it, one is showing that
they are connected with the political entity or belief that the flag embodies. 22 In this case,
the use of Nazi flags and those related to the Hitler Youth or German Boy Scouts shows
that those who were in control of the Bund camp were loyal to those institutions which
the flag represented and wanted to impress that into the children there. During the day
both P-9 and the boy informant observed that the US flag flew at the grounds. As
previously mentioned, the unidentified flag noted during P-9's initial visit remained a
mystery for a few days. By August 12, 1937, it was identified as one that saw reoccurring
use. Although the boy informant could not identify it by name, P-9 had him draw it in his
black notebook. According to the August 14 report, the flag the boy drew was the “Ugans
or German Boy Scout flag.” 23 Interestingly, the American flag often flew even with the
German Youth flag, but occasionally was replaced by others that the boy could not
identify. Both were ceremoniously taken down at the end of the day and put back up the
following morning with much pageantry. The boy reported to P-9 that during the morning
and evening flag ceremonies, they would sing German songs and give the Nazi salute to
them both. The boy reported that during morning drills and miniature parades they would
use the Nazi flag alone or with others from the Hitler Youth. The child and P-9 were keen
22
23
Byron McCandless, Flags of the World, (Washington D.C.: The National Geographic Society, 1917), 1.
Special Report by P-9, August 14, 1937, 2.
104
to note that not once had they used the American flag in such a way for the entire time he
had been present there. Some boys were reported to be respectful of the American flag
while others called it “that rag” and other things the boy and P-9 felt were too
inappropriate to put into print. The Nazi flag was also the subject of a debate between two
older women that P-9 happened to overhear. One woman, he reported, was adamant that
the Nazi flag should be larger than the US flag. 24 Her feelings aside, the fact that a Nazi
flag flew and was regularly used at the German Central Farm by the Bund's youth
program speaks volumes about their affiliation with Nazism.
The League's investigation into the Bund camp at the German Central Farm was
not intended to bring the camp down, to alert the Bund, or harm the German Central
Farm organization. It was, at its core, a fact-finding mission to confirm that a Hitler
Youth-styled camp was active. The aforementioned reports revealed that the Cleveland
branch German-American Bund and other local German American organizations that
financially contributed to the camp were aware and supportive of the content. The
children that the boy informant met were clearly a part of a program that emphasized proNazi education in the Bund's tradition. These same tactics were used in camps all across
the nation in Bund youth camps, including at the German Central Farm in Parma, Ohio.
The Cleveland Bund's efforts to Nazify these youths are equally apparent in that they
used staff members from Camp Siegfried, emphasized military-style drills, regularly used
the Nazi flag in activities while downplaying the US flag (except for maintaining a good
24
The following is a compilation of several Special Reports by P-9 that relate to the events of the German
Central Farm and case files about specific people later investigated by the League for Human Rights.
Events occurred between August 10-15, 1937.
105
public image), gave lectures on the supremacy of Germans as well as the inferiority of the
Jews, sang Nazi songs, spoke highly of youths and military men that served in the
previous war, and much more. Interestingly, the boy informant found that the director
never spoke of Hitler nor his regime directly and that only some of the instructors and
youth leaders did. Chatter about the Nazi regime was mostly hidden behind purposely
veiled language and amongst the boys in their free time. Had the leadership directly
praised the Nazi regime and Hitler, it could have raised greater concern amongst the
community and have brought greater scrutiny on them. The public use of Nazi symbols
and uniforms for the children may have been a bit much for some, but generally more
tolerable. Overall, the camp's use of pro-Nazi symbols, language, and lessons show that it
was an indoctrination program run by the Bund aimed at swaying American youth to
domestic fascism. Interestingly, the file for the camp ends after P-9 and the child
informant's case and it is not included in any post-1937 Bund youth camp materials.
Although it cannot be said for certain when the camp closed it's doors, an April 5, 1938,
article in the Cleveland Plain Dealer said that, amid a federal investigation into national
Bund activities, the national headquarters for the German-American Bund denied that any
of their camps were anywhere in Ohio. 25
Section Three: Fighting the Far-Right:
The League Fights Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion
25
“Bund Denies Nazi Link,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, April 5, 1938, NPN available.
106
As shown above and in past chapters, the League was highly active in combating
German Nazism and American pro-Nazi activists in Cleveland and northeast Ohio. Their
campaigns, however, were not simply limited to forms of National Socialism. Indeed, the
League considered all far-right political ideologies to be bred from the same wellspring of
ignorance and racism no matter where it originated from or who led the movement. As
such, William Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion of America was one of these groups and was
actively pursued by the League's agents. Unfortunately, few studies have looked
adequately into Pelley's order, with the major exception being historian Scott Beekman's
2005 study William Dudley Pelley: A Life in Right Wing Extremism and the Occult. Like
other contemporary fascist organizations, Pelley's Legion followed a strange mixture of
anti-Semitism, authoritarianism, anti-communism, paramilitary activities, and its own
religion, the “Liberation Movement.” Founded in 1933 in North Carolina, the Silver
Legion was especially strong in the western United States and cities that were hit
especially hard by the Depression, like Cleveland, Ohio. A short story and script writer by
trade, Pelley's shift towards fascism was inspired by Depression era concerns. In
particular, he believed that three elements most threatened the United States and that only
he and his Silver Shirts could fix the country. First, Pelley believed that he Great
Depression had caused a “massive economic dislocation.” 26 Pelley felt that the gap
between the very poor and the super-rich needed to be fixed, suggesting that if/when he
had the authority, individual incomes would be capped at $100,000. Second, Pelley felt
26
Scott Beekman, William Dudley Pelley: A Life in Right-Wing Extremism and the Occult, (Syracuse, NY:
Syracuse University Press, 2005), xi.
107
that the two-party system was fundamentally corrupt and that there needed to be a third
party competitor. Undoubtedly, this third party would be his Silver Shirts, or at least some
other fascist ally of theirs. Lastly, the Legion's political and religious agenda was defined
by a violent hatred for Jews. Pelley believed that the Jews were a foul race of moronic
liars and schemers, behind every calamity of man. Paradoxically, these same “disease”
Jews were also smart enough to manipulate the global economic order in their own
favor. 27 That oversight withstanding, Pelley's Silver Legion believed adamantly that their
mission, like Hitler's and the Bund, was to revitalize the nation through authoritarian,
anti-democratic control. It is through this lens that Pelley's Silver Legion, and the
League's resistance to them, is best understood.
While it is essential to understand the political motivations and contemporary
concerns that created Pelley's movement, it is equally important to understand the
religious element behind the Silver Shirt Legion. A somewhat complicated mixture of
spiritualism, theosophy, Christianity, and pyramidism, Pelley's “Liberation Movement”
posited that the world needed to be rid of Jewish and communist corruption. Believers
held that the nation was about to enter a new phase with Pelley and his Legion leading
the way. Through their misguided, politically motivated millennialism, many of Pelley's
followers were able to infiltrate and convert anti-Semitic and metaphysical circles
towards Pelley's message. It is important to note that Pelley was not always the religious
type, having had little personal connection with Christianity or the occult prior to a life
changing event in 1928. In his book Seven Minutes in Eternity, Pelley described how one
27
Beekman, xii.
108
night his spirit entered into a blue fog during some nighttime distress. He claimed that
after entering the fog, angels revealed various secrets of the world to him, including the
racial hierarchy of man and his new superhuman powers of perception. Feeling as though
he had been rejuvenated from years of anxiety and frustration, Pelley took on a much
more determined, political, and anti-Semitic persona. 28 Pelley's account altered his
personal life and those who followed him. Throughout the next few years, Pelley wrote
various political and spiritual tracts, building an army of followers behind him. On
January 31, 1933, the day that Hitler seized power in Germany, Pelley created his Silver
Shirt Legion. Using his many books as the foundational texts to the Silver Shirts and
Liberation Movement, Pelley was convinced that he could reshape America in a manner
similar to Hitler.
One of Pelley's most significant religious and political tenets was that the Jews
were the enemies of God and all good Christians throughout time. The Jews, Pelley
claimed, had a long history of manipulating global events and destroying good Gentiles.
For example, he perpetuated the age-old belief that Jesus of Nazareth was not a Jew, but
those who executed him were. According to him, Jesus actually hated the Jews for
violating God's laws and that he chased them out of the Temple with a whip. Jesus,
according to Pelley, “looked Gentile, thought Gentile, acted Gentile, came from a Gentile
province, talked Gentile, died with Gentile courage for a principle, and withal was the
world's outstanding anti-Semite at the time.” Jesus' execution, his “real” history, and over
175,000 other instances in the Bible were also altered by the Jews. Jewish control and
28
Beekman, 53-54.; William Dudley Pelley, Seven Minutes in Eternity (New York: Robert Collier Inc.,
1929).
109
treachery, however, continued well into the present. Pelley believed that the Jews
controlled the global banking system and had managed to dupe all democracies and
republics, including the United States, into becoming their “personal Jewtopia.”
Communism, too, was riddled with Jews, claiming that the political philosophy was
something the Jews had practiced in ancient Egypt under Moses, “the Stalin of his day.”
Dudley also claimed that major communist leaders like Karl Marx, Leon Trotsky,
Vladimir Lenin, and Frederick Engels were also Jews. The Soviet Union, homeland for
Jewish Bolshevism, was the continuation of the Jewish tradition to keep the Gentile down
and destroy all Gentile governments. 29
Pelley's anti-Semitic works and praises for Hitler's government were frequent
throughout the Legion's relatively short existence. New Legion members, for example,
were instructed in how Pelley's Christian Commonwealth would combat global Jewry
and their control over the American financial system. Per Pelley's order, all new members
were required to read and understand the arguments in The Hidden Empire and The
Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion, two of the most well-known anti-Semitic books,
and two of Pelley's own work. Imitating Hitler's Jewish ghettos, many of his books, like
Forty-Five Questions Most Frequently Asked About the Jews and the Answers, One
Million Silver Shirts by 1939, and No More Hunger: The Compact Plan of the Christian
Commonwealth argued that if (and when) Pelley's Commonwealth came to be, the Jews
would all be corralled in to one major Jewish-only city per state called “Beth Havens.”
Commonwealth leaders from Pelley's Secretary of Jewry would then provide security
29
Beekman, 88-89.
110
within the ghettos. Any Jews who tried to escape or did not restrict themselves to the
Beth Havens would risk execution. 30 In all, Pelley's Silver Legion was clearly interested
in reshaping the political and religious landscape of the United States. If they expected to
do so, then they first needed to take command on the grassroots level and influence the
public. In many major cities in the American mideast and west Pelley's supporters came
together and formed independent branches of the Silver Shirt Legion. One of these
chapters, and one of the recurring groups in this study, was the Cleveland branch of the
Silver Legion.
The League's notes on the Silver Shirts are split into three branches, the first part
focusing on the national organization, the second on their presence in Cleveland, and the
last solely about the Cleveland leader, Mary T. East. 31 First, their characterization of the
Legion as a national entity is best reflected in the collection's summary dossier on the
group filled with information gathered from 1934 to the early 1940s. The League notes
say that the group was “an American surface adaptation of the Nazi stormtroopers.
However, they were not intended to, and never were used for violence as the
stormtroopers.” 32 The League instead felt that the presence of uniformed “guards” was
merely intended to give Pelley the appearance of being important enough to have his own
30
Beekman, 85-86; William Dudley Pelley, The Hidden Empire, (Asheville, NC: Pelley Publishers, n.d.);
Sergeie Nilus, Protocols of the Elders of Zion, (New York: New Christian Crusade Church, 1930);
William Dudley Pelley, Forty-Five Questions Most Frequently Asked About the Jews and the Answers,
(Asheville, N.C.: Pelley Publishers, 1939); William Dudley Pelley, One Million Silver Shirts by
1939,(Asheville, N.C.: Pelley Publishers, 1938); William Dudley Pelley, No More Hunger: The
Compact Plan of the Christian Commonwealth (Asheville, N.C.: Pelley Publishers, 1935).
31
Due to privacy concerns and my contractual obligations with Western Reserve Historical Society, I cannot
disclose “Mary T. East's” real name. For the duration of this thesis, I will refer to her by this pseudonym.
All information presented about her is true and has been verified by the League notes.
32
Summary of Silvershirts, Special Archival Collections, undated but assumed 1944, Western Reserve
Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 1.
111
hired protection and personal army. Instead of using the Legion as a paramilitary force,
the League found that:
A preference for the Silvershirts could be found among the Bundists who didn't
think it smart to come out openly with a Hitler controlled organization in the
United States. Pelley's Silvershirts served him as an exhibition for controlling a
real organization, around which he could spread his sphere of influence. Influence,
in order to become in the proper moment the American 'Leader.' Certainly, he is
the most brilliant and most successful of America's little Hitler's – not a stooge but
an American imitator. 33
Interestingly, the League notes reveal that other, more action-based groups like the Bund
and Ku Klux Klan were not interested in merging with the Silver Shirts because they
were perceived as “a propaganda group only.”
The second branch of the League's records describe the activities the Legion
conducted in Cleveland formally and informally throughout the 1930s and early 1940s.
The notes explain that the group had two wings that functioned separately, one more
militant and a second that almost exclusively engaged in the esoteric side of Pelley's
message. The militant side was led by former White Russian submarine officer and ardent
anti-Semite, Asimov Malikov. 34 Having fled Russia after the Bolshevik Revolution,
Malikov made his way to the United States and eventually came to Cleveland for work.
After attending several Silver Legion meetings, where he displayed strong leadership
skills and anti-Semitic feelings, Malikov was entrusted with recruiting new members,
some of whom were also former Czarist officers. After some time, he was promoted to an
unofficial position of leadership that allowed him to exercise much greater power over
33
34
Ibid. 1.
“Asimov Malikov,” like Mary T. East, is a pseudonym for a person whose name I cannot disclose. All
facts attributed to him are truthful and accurately represent his role in the Cleveland Legion.
112
Silver Legion activities. 35 The League investigation notes explain that Malikov and the
other Russians pushing the militant side were important because:
It is most likely that the White Russians and former Czarist officers such as
Malikov [and other] gained leadership in the Silvershirts because of their natural
anti-Communistic attitude and because of a certain glamor and education as
Continental noblemen. In addition they were military experts and all.... good
engineers. The Silvershirts in this respect were quite internationalistic and
dictatorial in structure without giving any lip service to Democracy. 36
Aside from the having military and leadership skills, Malikov was one of the
leaders in the one hundred person strong “Galilean” unit of the Cleveland Silver Shirt
Legion. 37 This group was “a special loyal group, similar to the O.D. [Ordnungsdienst] In
the Bund.” This group was responsible for dispersing Pelley's and other fascistic
literature, raising money for Pelley's political campaigns and the Silver Shirts, and
running anti-Semitic campaigns around the city. For example, Malikov and the other
Galileans printed materials that claimed the Jews were responsible for poisoning foods
with “health-building vitamins.” On another occasion, Malikov conducted a series of
“Buy Gentile” campaigns, telling Clevelanders to avoid Jewish products and stores.
Interestingly, this militant branch of the Legion, despite being relatively active, was
scolded by the national branch of the Silver Shirts because “Cleveland is the slowest and
35
The following was compiled from the various League special investigation files on Malikov done from
1940 to 1944.
36
Silvershirts in Cleveland, Special Archival Collections, undated but assumed 1944, Western Reserve
Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 1.
37
Interestingly, their use of the name “Galilean” predates Pelley's magazine called The Galilean. It is likely
that they picked up this term from Pelley's commentaries on his coming Christian Commonwealth and
decided to use it for themselves. The name itself remains significant because the Cleveland unit is the
only one known to use this name to describe their more militant members.
113
least successful city in the whole nation.” 38 While it is not clear if the Cleveland Silver
Legion and Galileans were truly the worst performing branch nationally, what remains
important is that the League actively investigated the groups, leaders, and membership
for slightly over a decade. The League, aware of the Silver Shirt Legion from their
inception to their demise in 1941 and fragmented individual activities through 1944,
considered the Legion to be a real threat and pro-fascist network that needed to be
investigated.
Specific investigations against the League and high ranking members went on
from 1934 to 1945. The first series of investigation in April 1934, found that the
members and potential members were meeting at the Tucker School of Expression under
the guise of spreading Christianity and enriching minds. Prior to this, the more esoteric
branch of the Cleveland Legion met at member's homes and had no more than twenty
people attending at a time. By meeting and recruiting at the Tucker School, the Legion
could utilize the large Christian constituency already there. On April 17, 1934, one of the
League's female agents, 404, met with the leadership of the womens religious subgroup
of the Legion at the Tucker School of Expression. She met with Mary T. East, the local
Legion leader and reportedly a personal friend of Pelley, and asked her what the Legion
stood for. East response reflected the group’s public persona. She claimed that “the Silver
Legion [is an] organization for 100% Americans only” and that it's mission was to
preserve “the United States Constitution, the American Flag (sic), the principles for
which Washington and our fore fathers fought for, and for the teachings of Christ.”
38
Silvershirts in Cleveland, Special Archival Collections, undated but assumed 1944, Western Reserve
Historical Society, Cleveland, Ohio, 2.
114
Furthermore, East claimed that she and Pelley knew the nation would soon be engulfed in
a “very grave crisis and that the thinking class of people should be awakened to the
existing conditions.” She said that the communists and the Jews were menacing our
country and that they were trying to undermine the foundation on which our country was
built. East lectured investigator 404 that the Jews would ruin America if given the chance
and that only Pelley's enlightened group could save the country from the coming
communist revolution. 39
In late April, 1934, agent 404 was invited to attend a public meeting at a
member's home by leader Mary T. East. The meeting started with a heartfelt welcome, a
prayer, general announcements, and introducing those in attendance. After the
pleasantries, the women were joined by a special speaker who explained that she was
privy to special information about future events. The speaker discussed how within a few
months a communist revolution would overtake the country and that members of the
Silver Shirts needed to stock up on food and other necessities. 40 Although 404 was
allowed to hear this special speech and the rest of the meeting, she was not allowed to
join. Agent 404 concluded that “it is very obvious that this organization is suspicious of
anyone seeking information or trying to become a member.” Furthermore, 404 said that
“it would seem that the Silver Legion is just now organizing in Cleveland to the extent of
being able to formulate plans for activity.” 41 East's rather unusual stance on contemporary
politics and the group's religious and political services further buttresses the fact that the
39
Special Report by 404, April 17, 1934, 1-2.
Special Report by 404, April 24, 1934, 1-2.
41
Special Report by 404, April 24, 1934, 3.
40
115
Cleveland division of the Silver Shirt Legion, which she led and served as “Chaplain” for,
was cut from a cloth similar to that of the Bund. During 1934 and the years that the
Legion formally existed East was a character of moderate importance, investigations of
her and other Legion leaders increased greatly during and after the 1942 breakdown of
the Legion's national organization.
While the League collection does not contain notes on the Legion from April 1934
until mid-1936, the League did keep surveillance over their members, leadership, and
general activities. In 1936, League agent C-34 was invited to attend a Silver Shirt Legion
informational meeting in Cleveland being held by Pelley. The event took place on April 1,
1936 and was attended by some of Cleveland's most prestigious fascists. In particular,
Bund leader Martin Kessler and the members of his O.D. came as special guests to
Pelley's informational gathering. Agent C-34 reported that Pelley's lecture to the audience
mostly concerned how the Jews were controlling the United States and the national
banking system and how this special information was given to him by angelic beings.
Pelley even claimed that in a mere three months the nation's Jews would rise up, assume
control over the country, and create a dictatorship. This Jewish authoritarian government,
Pelley believed, would rule with an iron fist and do what they could to crush any
Christian movement against them. By 1953, however, the Jews controlling the United
States would be usurped by the Christians and run for their lives. 42 Pelley's account of
future events and special information divined to him are characteristic of claims he made
in his many books and in other public speeches.
42
Special Report by C-34, April 1, 1936, 1-2.
116
After Pelley's speech, investigator C-34 was given a chance to meet with Bund
leader Martin Kessler and speak with him about Pelley's talk and organization. Interested
in C-34, Kessler invited the agent to meet with him and some friends on April 6, 1936 at
a prominent Cleveland general practitioner’s office to discuss Pelley, the local Silver
Shirts, and the Bund. Kessler told C-34 and those in attendance “that the Nazi party in
Cleveland was behind Pelley 100%. He said that... the Naziis (sic) had a meeting... here
in Cleveland and that all German Naziis present at their meeting cheered when told of the
plans of Pelley.” 43 This connection between the local Bund and Legion was unusual
because the national organizations did not try to intermingle members or collaborate in
any way. In Cleveland, however, these two organizations worked together and shared
members. League records detail that many members either belonged to both groups or
had attended their meetings in a symbolic show of sympathy. In 1940, amid growing
public and federal scrutiny, there were even talks of the two Cleveland groups joining
into one united fascist front. 44 In the end, no such union took place and both groups
suffered from contemporary pressures.
In April 1938, C-34 was again invited to a Legion informational meetings about
what they stood for and Pelley's message. Like other weekly meetings that the Legion
held, this occasion revolved around the Jews and their control over the American
government, press, banks, and more. More than just pushing their political agenda, the
Legion speaker claimed that only the Silver Shirts knew the true history of how the Great
43
44
Special Report by C-34, April 6, 1936, 1-2.
The following was compiled from various League sources related to the German-American Bund and
Silver Shirt Legion.
117
Depression occurred. According to the Legion, the Depression occurred because
influential politicians funneled American money to Jewish judges (Associate Justice Felix
Frankfurter, in particular) and moguls. These middlemen then sent the money to
European Jews, who also profited from the Great War, the global banking system, and
rich corporations. The speaker also claimed that President Roosevelt was “the greatest
tool of the Jews” and “the first Communist President.” The speaker ended by claiming
that “we are against the Jews because of the cunning and conniving ways he uses in
obtaining his wealth.” 45 In all, the findings against the Legion and their members do not
sway far from the example that Pelley had set for them. The Cleveland branch spread the
same sort of bile that Pelley mass-produced and provided him with a stage to personally
speak from. While it is essential to discuss what the Cleveland Legion did and believed, it
is equally important to understand that the League actively combated other anti-Semitic
organizations throughout the early and mid-1930s.
Section Four: Conclusions
Pro-Nazi and far-right activism in the 1930s, as this and past chapters have argued,
was a response to the Great Depression and a belief that democracy had failed and
needed to be replaced by something else. Authoritarian governments in Germany, the
Soviet Union, and Italy, so it had seemed by the early and mid-1930s, had proved that
force and order dictated from a charismatic leader could resurrect a dying nation. Of the
45
Special Report by C-34 April 8, 1938, 1-3.
118
innumerable amount of Americans that were concerned that the United States might fall
during the Great Depression, only a small percentage would advocate the United States
going fully towards fascism or communism. The simultaneous rise of communism and
fascism in the United States shows that the search for a viable alternative to liberal
democracy (and capitalism) was indeed alive and well in the 1930s. 46 Of those
revolution-bent groups, only a handful tried to create copy-cat fascist movements of their
own. American fascist copy-cats, best embodied by the German-American Bund and
Silver Shirt Legion, each desired to replicate fascist victories in the United States. The
movements behind these groups each posited similar ideas. First, rabid anti-Semitism
served as a political, social, and sometimes religious statement of purpose. Both the Bund
and Legion believed that the on-going economic blight was caused by the Jews and they
were a continuing pariah for the world. Second, by bringing authoritarianism to America,
as Hitler did to Germany, the nation could be saved by them. Realistic or not, those loyal
to the Bund and Legion believed that they could overcome democracy and reform the
country. In total, these organizations shared two of the most important requirements for of
Nazi ideology at their cores, namely far-right conservatism and anti-Semitism.
Lastly, these movements attempted to engage the public in a way that they
thought would give them more support and members. The Legion in Cleveland, for
example, took advantage of Christian circles at the Tucker School of Expression and
former-military members already aligned against communists. While small by national
standards, the Cleveland Legion boasted well over 200 registered members and even
46
Richard H. Pells, Radical Visions and American Dreams (New York: Harper & Row, 1973), 67-69.
119
more unregistered sympathizers. Many of the members they gained were through these
traditional channels as well as through Pelley's own writing. The German-American Bund,
on the other hand, had a different experience with the public. Initially, they were much
more willing to publicly pronounce their pro-Nazi stance. Through a mix of rallies,
member drives, talks, and sponsorship of Nazi speakers, the Bund had solidified
themselves as America's Nazi vanguard. This choice, however, also caused them to suffer
later on. Increased federal and private scrutiny, mixed with poor public reception to
Americans flying swastikas, made the Bund see that they had to tone down their language
and refocus their efforts on being anti-communist, more pro-American, and use less
violent anti-Semitic language. The best sum total of these changes manifested in the
Bund youth camp at the German Central Farm just outside of Cleveland in Parma, Ohio.
At this secluded location, the Cleveland division of the Bund pushed their traditional
message on children in private and seemed to have swayed some young minds towards
their their way.
Comparing these two groups and how they operated is important because it
shows how public perception of various American fascist movements caused them to
engage the community differently. By comparing the mid-1930s tactics used by the Bund
and Legion, one can see that the Bund was forced to alter their message to become proAmerican and less outwardly pro-Nazi. This image remodeling was complicated by the
fact that they still wore Nazi-like uniforms and displayed the swastika at their meeting
places and events. While they indeed adopted some policies that sought to fix this image
dilemma, the Bund did not alter the substance of their political and philosophical views
120
of the world. If anything, their message and the tactics they used to deliver that message
were forced to change by outside pressure.
The Legion, on the other hand, did not wave the Nazi flag nor praise Hitler's
government like the Bund did. Instead, Pelley's organization fronted a strange mixture of
esoteric Christianity, far-right political activism (not to be confused with fascism or
National Socialism), anti-communism, and “100% Americanism.” This sort of concoction,
while still reserved for only a small section of the American public, did not have the same
stigma attached to them that the Bund and other swastika-waving groups did. In
substance, however, the League investigation notes show that the Legion still represented
an energized, anti-democratic force that truly foresaw themselves as the inheritors of a
new America where the Jews and communists were gone and the national economic order
was restored under Pelley's flag. This non-Nazi image and their relative secrecy served
them well in Cleveland and most likely throughout the rest of the nation. The
organization did not do large public events or speeches like the Bund or League did.
Rather, they recruited from places where they already had individuals in influential places
and kept their message to themselves. In all, this group was still targeted successfully
infiltrated because of their message; however, they did not feel the same sort of pressure
that more aesthetically pro-Nazi groups suffered.
In all, the League's findings about the Cleveland branches of the GermanAmerican Bund and William Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion were significant in content.
They found, amongst other things, that the Bund had constructed a youth camp at the
German Central Farm in Parma, Ohio similar to those found in Germany, that they were
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teaching children pro-Nazism and anti-Semitism, and more. The League also found that
the Cleveland Legion taught members that the Jews and communists were plotting to take
over the nation and that only they could use Christ's power to bring order and
authoritarian justice to America. Despite all of these findings and the League's dogged
efforts, they were unable to bear any fruit from their works. In no way did the League nor
any member or investigator bring their findings to the authorities or the public in an
attempt to sink far-right activism. The League records do not reveal if they neglected to
alert the proper authorities or public for any particular reason. It is quite likely that they
did not make anyone outside of their select group aware of things so they could continue
their actions and not force their targets to go underground. The individuals targeted by the
League seemed to have been unaware that the group was pursuing them, however, by the
mid to late-1930s it was abundantly clear that the federal government was. What makes
the League's anti-Nazi investigations important was not their immediate gains, but rather
what their resistance symbolized. The League's efforts against domestic fascists was a
part of a larger national sentiment against pro-Nazi organizations and far-right ideologies.
The League's investigations and early public campaigns were but a single part of a larger
resistance effort going on by organizations like Samuel Untermyer's Non-Sectarian AntiNazi League in New York City and other cities nationwide. Furthermore, the League’s
form of resistance brought together the local Jewish and sympathetic gentile communities
under one united banner. This same sort of anti-Nazi resistance took form in period
literature and movies discussed in previous chapters.
In effect, the League's efforts and the information borne from them proved the
122
true allegiance, activities, and tactics used by the Legion and Bund in a time when they
both tried to mask themselves with patriotism, anti-communism, and appropriation of
religious tropes. Investigations and public pressure placed against these groups, in time,
forced them to alter their public image and message so that they could better appeal to the
public. The League's local campaigns, however, created something of a backlash in the
up-coming years. The League's activities caused these two groups and their members to
go even further underground, at best hindering their public activism and membership
drives. In time, the League would realize that by racketing up the pressure on the Bund
and Legion, they had made it nearly impossible for League agents to join the groups or
get close to the leaders. In order to continue their operations, the League was forced to
adopt new strategies. In particular, the League was forced to use personal contacts well
established with the Nazi underground and reclusive Bund as well as ask the public for
any rumor they might have heard. These two new tactical choices, each effective in their
own ways, are the subject of the next chapter.
Chapter Four: Resistance, Vigilance, and Change:
America's War, the League for Human Rights, and the Fall of American Fascism
Section One: Resistance Before and After 1940
American's entry into World War Two created a ripple effect throughout both the
League for Human Rights and the United States. Not only did it signal a new phase in
American foreign policy, but it also brought the nation together to fight fascism and the
militant far-right wherever it threatened democracy. While resistance organizations like
the Cleveland League for Human Rights and the New York Anti-Nazi League had been
calling for American interventionism in Europe (and in the Pacific to an extent), the war
itself forced these groups to rethink their message. The League in particular was plagued
with an unsure future. In order to remain relevant, the League was forced to change the
ways in which they interacted with Clevelanders and northeast Ohioans. Before this time,
however, domestic fascist groups and their leaders came under greater federal and public
scrutiny. The breakdown of American Nazism in the late 1930s and early 1940s was the
last time that the League could aggressively investigate their enemies as they had in years
previous.
The war on American fascism prior to 1939 was a limited conflict, amounting to
fevered public rallies, lackadaisical federal investigations, and private vigilance activities.
Conflicts, like those led by the Cleveland League for Human Rights, were aimed at the
123
124
largest and most visible pro-Nazi targets. In particular, past chapters in this study have
pained to show that the League was engaged in an on-going conflict with public and
semi-private pro-Nazi activism. Their ideological enemies and subsequent investigation
targets were all local branches of national groups that were within their immediate reach.
This study has been particularly concerned with the League's campaigns against the local
German-American Bund led by district leader Martin E. Kessler as well as branch
divisions of William Dudley Pelley's Silver Shirt Legion. While it is important to
highlight the League's investigations and findings and connect them within the larger
national context, it is equally necessary to understand what made them believe it was
their responsibility to do these things in the first place. As I have argued, the League
pursued this aggressive, hard-line tactic because they believed that government
investigations and public actions against Nazism in the early and mid-1930s were not
doing enough to attend to the domestic fascist problem. The League's activities and
records show that they believed that it was incumbent upon them to make up where
others, the government in particular, were seemingly deficient.
More broadly, the national fight against domestic fascism took it's most serious
turn in the late 1930s and was defined by government investigations through the House
Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC). Formed in 1938, Dies' Committee made
the argument that conspiratorial elements in the nation, communist and fascist alike, were
plotting any of a series of coups to take over the United States. This fear of a hostile
takeover was widespread, if over-emphasized, and concluded that it was the government's
responsibility to watch any suspicious group with the means or ways to take over the
125
government. Doing so would prevent a similar revolution that had occurred in Germany,
Italy, and elsewhere from happening in America. More to the point, the Dies Committee
began a long series of hearings in 1938, primarily against communists and suspected
communist sympathizers. Dies' hearings allowed for speakers to give long, often
unsupported claims that groups, ranging from the Boy Scouts, various Roman Catholic
groups, and many prominent members of Hollywood's elite, were involved with
supporting communist causes. The trials were considered so ridiculous at their time that
Secretary of the Interior Harold L. Ickes joked that the HUAC might raid Shirley
Temple's nursery and convict her dolls of being involved in some kind of communist plot.
Although fascists did make their way to stand before Dies and the other committee
members, their testimony and evidence weighted against them was not substantial and
showed a lack of interest in pursuing American Nazis. 1 As a result, the HUAC did not
prosecute the Bund, Pelley's Silver Shirts, or any other far-right group with any wrong
doing. The 1940s, however, would prove to be the end of the Bund and other American
fascist organizations.
By early 1940, the Bund's struggles to remain important would only mount higher
and higher as the organization, nationally and in Cleveland, were failing to remain
relevant or popular amongst far-right activists. By this time, the national organization
could hardly keep itself afloat in an America very different from which it found itself in
the early 1930s due to a series of organization, leadership-based, and public problems.
The Bund's attempts in the mid-1930s to transition their public image to something much
1
William Leuchtenburg, Franklin D. Roosevelt and the New Deal, 1932-1940 (New York, NY: Harper &
Row Publishers, 1963), 280-281.
126
less vocally Nazi had failed. In the past, the initial Nazi movement in the United States
was, as this study has labored to show, a product of a desperate search for a economically
plausible alternative to democracy and German American dissatisfaction with their
treatment during the previous war. At first, these seedlings grew well in portions of the
United States most affected by the Great Depression and anti-German hysteria of World
War One, but in time a rejuvenated economy (greatly assisted by the buildup for the war),
restored sense of order, and the ever-growing specter of a new war with Germany rallied
the nation against Hitler's American counterparts. 2 Public and federal attacks against proNazi groups through movies, literature, and public speeches decried them as traitors, warmongers, and unpatriotic. Popular discontent with Nazism, as reviewed in the first
chapter of this thesis, doomed any sort of American variant from becoming too popular in
the late 1930s and 1940s.
The German-American Bund, once the Nazi vanguard in America that sported
tens thousands of members nationwide and paraded around in many American streets,
started to fall apart at the seams from 1939 to 1941. In 1939, federal investigators under
the Dies Committee committed themselves to finding any way they could either cripple
or fundamentally destroy any pro-Nazi organization. In March and April, the New York
Grand Jury charged Kuhn with stealing $14,548 from the Bund's corporation. Claiming
that he was being railroaded, Kuhn pleaded that he was not guilty and paid his $5,000
bail. Kuhn did not help his position as public enemy number one when both he and
the Weckruf (the Bund's newspaper) ridiculed the courts for charging him. As a result,
2
Sander A. Diamond, The Nazi Movement in the United States, 1924-1941 (Ithaca: Cornell University Press,
1974), 350-353.
127
District Attorney Thomas Dewey, claiming that Kuhn may have been planning to leave
the city's jurisdiction, raised his bail to $50,000. 3
On November 9, 1939, Kuhn's legal battle against the state of New York began.
Kuhn first claimed that he could not have committed larceny because he was allowed full
privileges over Bund funds. As leader, the Bund's by-laws gave him the right to spend the
organization's money. The prosecution, however, went to great lengths to show that Kuhn
had in fact violated his rights as leader, lied about depositing money in 1938, and had
even been in an affair with a married woman. In time, it became evident to all, even the
attending Bund members and supporters, that Kuhn had exercised his power
inappropriately. Another serious charge, though not a legal one, that Kuhn fought was
that the Bund was a fifth column organization acting on behalf of the German
government. During his testimony, Kuhn loudly claimed that the Bund was not connected
to the Nazis at all and that it was actually an American group working for peace. Overall,
Kuhn's testimony revealed only a handful of unknowns about the Bund and their
operations. 4 Kuhn's defense successfully eliminated five of the original twelve charges,
showing that he had misused $1,217 of the Bund's money. After quick deliberation, the
jury found him guilty of larceny and forgery. On December 5, 1939, Kuhn was sent to
Sing Sing to serve two and a half to five years in prison. After losing their key figure and
without anyone else ready to take his position to take his place, the Bund was greatly
weakened. 5
3
Leland V. Bell, In Hitler's Shadow (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973), 93-95.
Diamond, 332-333.
5
Leland V. Bell, In Hitler's Shadow (Port Washington, NY: Kennikat Press, 1973), 93-95.
4
128
Second, the Bund nationwide was under siege from all sides. After Kuhn was sent
to jail, individual city-based cells fell under increased public scrutiny and federal
investigations. For example, on July 9, 1942, the Cleveland Plain Dealer reported that
“federal agents launched a coast-to-coast drive.... to put the German-American Bund 'out
of business'.” 6 This attack on the group was aimed at fifty-four of the highest ranking
members. Twenty-six Bund leaders were charged with conspiracy to evade the Selective
Service Act, conspiracy to counsel Bund members to resist service in the military, and
conspiracy to conceal Bund membership on alien registration papers. Three other were
only charged only with the first charge of evading the Selective Service. The other
twenty-five indicted were national and regional leaders and subject to denaturalization.
United States Attorney Mathias F. Correa was reported to say that although the Bund was
defunct after the start of the war, various splinter organizations around New York and the
rest of the nation were trying to replace the Bund. These groups, he claimed, would also
be subject to federal investigations. The article called the program “simply another phase
of the department's intensified campaign against actual; or potential saboteurs of the
American war effort.” Many of those charged came from New York, New Jersey,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Minnesota, Indiana, Washington, California, and Ohio. One of the
most important Bund leaders targeted and captured by the FBI was Wilhelm Kunze, who
was found in Mexico. 7 In Cleveland, FBI agents arrested local Bund notable Josef
Belohlavek. Charged with conspiracy to violate the Alien Registration Act of 1940 and
6
FBI Seizes 54 Highest Officers of Nazi Bund” Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 9, 1942; These articles were
retrieved via an internet database and did not include the original article page numbers.
7
FBI Seizes 54 Highest Officers of Nazi Bund
129
the Selective Service Act, Belohlavek was also a Cleveland inner-circle Bund member
that had, at one time, been a proud Nazi. 8 The war against American fascism had, by the
eve of America's entry into World War Two, concluded with the fall of the Bund and
other formal Nazi channels.
In Cleveland, however, the local Bund's slow, inward collapse happened as a
result of an inner-circle information leak in 1937 to the Cleveland Press that forced leader
Martin Kessler to flee to Germany and their subsequent failures after that. Starting in
November 1937, an inner-circle member of the Bund chapter started to work with League
agent X-5 as a paid informant. On December 14, 1937, the mole was present at a fiveperson meeting held during a private party sponsored by a Bund member. The mole
reported to investigator X-5 that evening that Kessler had developed an elaborate plan to
win the Bund a more influential place in Cleveland's elite and takeover the most well
respected German American organization in the northeast Ohio area, the German Central
Farm. League agent X-5 reported in his notes that:
He [Kessler] went on to explain that to counteract this feeling [of local irrelevance]
they must take control of the Zentrale [German Central Farm in Parma, Ohio]. He
went on to explain that most of the delegates in the Zentrale [for the German
Round Table] being from social organizations did not take much interest in its
meetings, and often did not put in an appearance. The delegates from the Bund,
however did take an interest in its activities and always showed up to its meetings
and he, therefore, suggested that the Bund show no hard feelings in public over
the lack of cooperation extended to the Zentrale, with the result that at the next
general election the Bund could turn all of its delegates out and control the
election, thereby electing Kessler president of the Zentrale and at least four other
men favorable to the Bund as directors, which would result in the Bund then
having control over the farm. He stated that this was necessary if they wanted to
8
FBI Here Arrests West Sider Wanted on Bund Indictment, Cleveland Plain Dealer, July 9, 1942, NPN
available.
130
continue their activities at the farm next summer. 9
On December 28, 1937, the Cleveland Press printed a large expose' on Kessler revealing,
among other things, that he had citizenship in four countries including the United States,
was a sergeant in the Romanian army during the Great War, influential in getting the
German Central Farm to fly the Nazi flag, and plotting to take over the presidency of the
Farm. 10 Kessler, vigilant that the informant must have been in his inner circle, started an
investigation of his own. After a short period, Kessler and the other inner-circle members
found by process of elimination that one of the top leaders within the group was actually
a mole planted and paid by the League. The mole was subsequently forced to resign his
position and “disappear.” As a result, the Cleveland Bund retreated almost completely
from the public eye and gave the League no other option but to halt investigations for
several months. 11
By May, 1938, newly assigned agent 211 heard at a public Bund meeting that
Kessler would soon be leaving for Germany. 12 His flight to the Nazi homeland makes
sense, as many other Nazi leaders throughout the nation tried to flee federal prosecution
by heading to Germany. Attending members had heard rumors that Kessler was poised to
be a Nazi bureaucrat or possibly a military contractor. Shortly before leaving, Kessler
told his group that he would be leaving the Bund to a loyal member from Toledo, Ohio,
Edmund Wax, and that he would take all the local records with him as Fritz Kuhn had
9
Special Report by X-5, December 14, 1937, 1-2.
Records Show Martin Kessler, Nazi Chief Here, is Man With 4 Countries, The Cleveland Press,
December 28, 1937, NPN available.
11
The following is evident via several unnamed League documents related to the mole, Martin Kessler, and
agent X-5.
12
Special Report by #211, May 22, 1938, 1.
10
131
told him to do. Lastly, Kessler mentioned that his trip would not have been necessary if
he had not been betrayed by “those who acted like friends to his face, and knifed him in
the back.” 13 This curious reference to League agent X-5's mole shows that Kessler's
organization was too weak to thwart the League's attacks. On June 8, 1938, Kessler sailed
to Hamburg from New York on the S.S. Hansa. 14
Over the next few years, the group struggled under Wax's leadership. On August
22, 1939, for example, the Cleveland Plain Dealer exposed that Wax had illegally
received money from a German government representative in Cleveland. He believed that
the information was leaked via an ex-member that may have been a secret service
informant. 15 On yet another occasion, the Cleveland Press found that the local Bund and
Silver Shirt Legion organizations actively cooperated together. The two were found to be
distributing each other’s anti-Semitic literature. Furthermore, rumor had it that Wax had
transferred Bund money to the Legion as a form of tribute. 16 Various League documents
also found that the general Bund membership was falling due to negative press, Kuhn's
conviction of misspending Bund money, Kessler's untimely exit, and Wax's inability to
fix on-going problems. 17 Although it is not known when the Cleveland Bund formally
collapsed in on itself, League records and newspaper articles indicate that it happened
13
Special Report by #211, June 4, 1938, 1.
Special Report by #211, June 6, 1938, 1.
15
“Denies Rumor He Took Nazi Money,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, August 22, 1939, NPN available; In
reality, the leak was caused by the initial League mole.
16
William Miller, “Shows Bund and Silver Shirts in Co-operation,” Cleveland Press, assumed 1940-1941;
This undated clipping was found in a collection set where other articles from the Cleveland Press were
present. All clippings present were between 1933 and 1944. This one is assumed to be from 1940 to
1941 based on information found in the article itself. Since this collection has yet to be digitized and
there are no physical versions left of this long defunct newspaper, it is very difficult to know it's exact
publishing date.
17
Conclusions reached via various League documents which comment on the declining size of the local
Bund's membership. All records come from the private Bund files from agent X-5 and #211.
14
132
sometime between January and May of 1940. Edmund Wax, Kessler's replacement “Bund
Fuhrer,” also fled to Germany in May 1940. 18 Sadly, no known records indicate where
Edmund Wax went or whatever became of him.
Martin Kessler, once a fiery, bombastic figure that rallied crowds with his Bund
rhetoric, returned to Cleveland in May 1940 as a defeated, deflated man. While
the Cleveland Press could say little about why he was forced to return to the United
States, Kessler claimed that it was to retain his American citizenship and at the
suggestion of the American consul in Berlin. Local rumor, however, claimed that
Kessler's wife had insulted several German officials at a party when she bemoaned that
Germany did not have the luxuries that she was accustomed to in America 19. This faux
pas, while seemingly minor, contributed to the Kessler's flight out of Germany and back
to an America that no longer tolerated pro-Nazi rhetoric as it had in the mid-1930s. In an
interview with Cleveland Press writer William Miller, Kessler acknowledge that the Bund
in Cleveland was dead. Kessler furthermore confirmed that “Both sides [pro-Nazis and
anti-Nazis] are against me. My old friends hate me.” Miller noted that Kessler's “manner
is nervous, his demeanor that of a man sure of nothing.” 20 Kessler's record as a Bund
leader haunted him for years to come. When the Cleveland Press revealed on March 11,
1944 that Kessler was working at Apex Electric Company in Cleveland as an engineer. It
was quickly revealed that he was not working on war projects, but that he was
18
Eugene Segal, “Cleveland Bund Leaders Repentant,” Cleveland Press, undated; The article featured here
came from a clippings collection at Cleveland State University. The article was bundled with several
others related to the Cleveland Bund, but was not dated. It is nearly impossible to track the date of this
article because there are no physical or digital collections of the Cleveland Press newspaper.
19
“Kessler Refuses Comment on Germany, Says 'Let me Alone', Cleveland Press, May 20, 1940, NPN
available.
20
“Kessler Refuses Comment on Germany, Says 'Let me Alone'
133
responsible for commercial work on postwar utilities like irons, washing machines, and
other household amenities. 21 By March 16, 1944, Kessler, the “onetime fuehrer of the
Cleveland German-American Bund,” was fired from Apex Electric Company after
company executives learned about his past as a Bund leader. Those who hired him
claimed that Kessler had been vouched for by other local engineers and several
businesses and that he had passed the basic background check. 22 After losing his job, it is
not clear what became of Martin Kessler.
In the end, the Cleveland Bund and the national German American Bund
organizations could not withstand the changes brought in during the early 1940s. Local
and national forces created an atmosphere where domestic fascism and pro-Nazi
affiliation would not be accepted. These organizations were unable to change this new
wave of national anti-Nazi/fascism or change the way they engaged the community like
they had before. From 1936 to 1939, the German American Bund softened their image
and tone successfully, but 1940 and 1941 spelled doom for them. Formal Nazism and
support for American fascism fell apart as the nation came closer and closer to war with
Germany. The atmosphere that had previously allowed for Nazism to exist had faded by
this time, in part due to increased federal scrutiny that actually went after fascist groups
in a meaningful way. One might imagine that a truly dogged federal crackdown earlier on
might have curtailed the early successes that American fascists had; however,
contemporary concerns were more aimed at thwarting domestic communism. This
21
“Kessler, Ex-Bund Chief Here, Now Working in War Plant,” The Cleveland Press, March 11, 1944, NPN
available; “Real One Time Bundist Not Doing War Work,” Cleveland Press, March 13, 1944, NPN
available.
22
Former Fuehrer of Cleveland Bund Loses Job at Apex,” Cleveland Press, March 16, 1944, NPN available.
134
dismissive effect gave American fascists nearly a decade to act throughout the nation with
near impunity to the law. After it became abundantly clear that domestic fascists, most
prominently Fritz Kuhn and the German-American Bund, had violated a variety of laws
and were acting as though they were Hitler's American disciples, the government was
able to bring many to justice and the American people could thoroughly reject their
message. Even those who had not violated any laws, like Martin Kessler, faced public
ridicule for his pro-Nazi activism during the 1930s. In all, the early 1940s showed that
American fascism was a failed experiment.
Section Two: “Less Defensive and More Constructive:”
The Rumor Roundup and the League's New Resistance
The early 1940s left the League for Human Rights' mission to defeat local fascism
in a rather unusual position. First, the League had to deal with the problem of having no
obvious, swastika-waving, Hitler-praising enemies. From their inception in 1933 until
the collapse of the Bund and other groups in the early 1940s, the League had the luxury
of knowing who their opponents were simply by what they wore or how they acted. The
Bund, Legion, and many other pro-fascist groups made no secret of their allegiance or
sympathy for Hitler and his regime. After these groups fell, however, the League was left
with only limited ways to discern their opponents from truly patriotic citizens. Indeed,
ex-members of these groups were mixed into the general population, indiscernible from
other, non-Nazi-leaning citizens. Second, after the somewhat successful public
information speaking campaigns, on-going economic boycott of German goods, and the
135
protest against the Berlin-Cleveland student exchange program, the League's public antifascist activism had started to wane. Their devotion to private investigations overtook the
dedication they had previously had to their public works. As a result, public speeches,
except those rarely given by leaders like Rev. Phillip Bird Smead, Grace Mayette, and
Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, were fewer and fewer throughout the late 1930s. As a result, the
League drifted out of the public eye.
As America began to bring itself together to fight fascism in Europe, the League
had something of a short respite period where they reevaluated their community and
organizational mission statement against fascism. Indeed, America's entry into the war
made anti-Nazism and anti-fascism official government policy. The war, in effect, was
the ultimate form of resistance, thus eliminating the need for groups like the League for
Human Rights to conduct hard-line investigations. In this time between the initial
outbreak of the war and late 1942, the League decided to alter their overall structure from
defensive resistance to constructive public works. This adjustment also adopted a new
stance towards defending democracy and the values of liberal democracies such as racial
tolerance, pluralism, and equal rights. 23 This move is evident by their increased reliance
on public activism and defense of liberal democratic principles. In a 1943 letter, the
League explained their new mission as such:
The purpose, to fight all kinds of Naziism in this country, has not changed.
23
Although they never produced any working definition for their group, it is evident through their actions
that the League thought that discrimination of any sort (anti-Semitism was certainly the most personal
form to many of the League's Jews) was the first step towards organized tyranny. Nazism, according to
the League, was the product of a society that no longer held pluralistic ideals, personal freedom, or
tolerance paramount to all other things. While their view adopted something of a black-or-white version
of politics, it is most likely that they used hyperbolic language during the war to show a sense of
urgency.
136
However, the emphasis and the means has been changed. We have become less
defensive and more constructive. 24
This simple declaration concerning their new mission statement changed the League's
direction until they closed all operations after the end of the Second World War. Their
new direction encouraged the active promotion of democratic ideals, dissemination of
information regarding the war effort, popular anti-fascism, and promoting ethnic diversity.
League investigations of local fascist groups and leaders suffered greatly after the
fallout of formal Nazi organizations and America's entry into World War Two. Whereas
most of the rank and file of formerly active groups like the Silver Shirt Legion and
German-American Bund were able to slip into the rest of northeast Ohio's population, a
handful of prominent individuals could not. Furthermore, since the League was unable to
penetrate small operating cells or gain any other moles like they had before, they were
left to simple surveillance efforts and creating compilation sheets full of past and present
pro-fascist activism For example, Legion leaders Asimov Malikov and Mary T. East both
had teams that followed them throughout northeast Ohio and on trips to neighboring
states. Their collective finding revealed little that was not already known about them. 25
Between 1944 and 1945, League investigations were generally less detailed on
contemporary activities of individuals and more concerned with collectivizing a total
history of what certain people had done.
By 1945, League investigation targets were few and far between. Besides Malikov
24
Ivan Platt, The League for Human Rights: Cleveland Jewry's Fight Against Naziism, 1933-1946
(Cleveland, OH: Cleveland State University, 1977), 79.
25
Material referred to comes from several case files related to “Mary T. East” and “Asimov Malikov.” As in
the previous chapter, these two names are pseudonyms for two real individuals involved in Legion
activities. Due to contractual obligations, their real names could not be used.
137
and East, only a handful of local and even fewer national figures were being continuously
investigated. One such minor national figure was Joe McWilliams, a leader within the
Nationalist Party, a vehement anti-Semite, and commonly known as “Mr. McNazi.” 26
Records indicate that League agent #115 started tracking McWilliams as early as January
1945, however, the majority of records concerning him come from McWilliams three
month long stay in Cleveland from May to July 1945. Throughout most of late May,
McWilliams was living at a large Cleveland hotel where he frequently ate with friends
and known businessmen, mostly executives representing regional and national industrial
firms. Agent 115 and others often observed these exchanges from a distance but were not
able to overhear much of the conversations. League agents suspected that the
conversations were attempts from the Nationalist Party and the American Nationalist
Committee to gain support, financial and otherwise, from large corporations. In order to
discover if this was his true intent, agents 155, CWF, and an unnamed Jewish female who
was flirtatious with McWilliams conducted a small operation. On May 30, 1945, the
female investigator asked him if he would go on a date the next day. Unbeknownst to him,
the pair would be followed by agent CMF from a distance. As this was going on, 155
would break into McWilliams room and search his belongings. While the date involved
little more than a dinner and casual conversation at a nearby restaurant, 115 found books
on communism, religion, Jews, and management guides amid his clothes and other
belongings. 27
Investigations during June and July 1945 also proved fruitful for League agents.
26
27
“Mr. McNazi,” Time, September 23, 1940, NPN available.
Material covered comes from the investigation notes of League agent #115 between May 28-31, 1945.
138
Telephone records taken in the beginning of June 1945 suggested to the investigators that
McWilliams was in regular conversation with business officials that he had previously
eaten dinner with. While it is unknown exactly how the League obtained the phone
numbers that he called, it is clear that McWilliams was in regular contact with at least
thirty manufacturers in Akron, Youngstown, Cleveland, and Kent, Ohio. Agents G.S., #3,
FBD, and 115 tracked McWilliams as he went from company to company throughout
northeast Ohio and as far as Chicago, Illinois. On June 8, 1945, McWilliams somehow
realized he was being watched and fled Cleveland in a single night. By early July, the
League found him hiding in Chicago in a small flat still trying to solicit aid from
manufacturers. Unable to actively keep him under watch, the League resigned their
efforts against McWilliams and left all of their information to the FBI stationed in
Cleveland. 28 The Joe McWilliams case was the League's last attempt at private
investigations. In a way, it is also symbolic of the League's overall legacy concerning
investigations. Like others, it involved an array of investigators watching, reporting,
following, tricking, and even conducting searches on targets. Their findings about
McWilliams and other clearly showed that those they followed were engaging in
activities to either support American fascism or earn power for themselves. Despite this,
the League lacked the teeth to persecute them in any meaningful way. As in the
McWilliams case, the other enemies the League faced (the Legion and German-American
Bund most of all) were forced out of the public light and into hiding. From here, the
League had no choice but to leave the war on fascism and far-right ideology to the federal
28
Material comes from various reports left by agents 15, G.S., #3, and FBD. All are dated between June 1
and July 19, 1945.
139
government. As a result, the League was left without a crucial part of their mission and
resigned to contemplate their role in Cleveland and northeast Ohio. It was only after the
League was forced to give up their investigations that they came to realize they had to
reestablish themselves as Cleveland's loudest public voice against fascism in America and
abroad.
As previously discussed, the League's efforts to inform Cleveland about the
dangers of fascism had been one of their defining characteristics in their early years.
Public activism against German Nazism and domestic fascist groups had worked well for
much of the early and mid-1930s, but the late 1930s and early 1940s were a different
matter. Their speeches during this time were less in number and did not involve as many
“big names” as they had before. Notable exceptions, like exiled Czech leader Eduard
Benes' and New York City Mayor Fiorello LaGuardia sponsored appearance in 1939,
occurred, but by and large the League's public life suffered from their lack of presence. In
order for the League to reach a larger audience, they contacted the Cleveland Plain Dealer
and asked if they could have a section devoted to informing Clevelanders about the war,
domestic issues, international happenings, and to answer whatever rumors concerned
citizens may have heard. 29 Between October 1942 and March 1943, the League had a
section of the Cleveland Plain Dealer devoted to them and their efforts to inform the
nation to the dangers of fascism. This new section aptly named the “Rumor Roundup”
29
While it is unknown what the Cleveland Plain Dealer received from this temporary arrangement, it is
likely they gave the piece such prominence due to the war-time atmosphere. One might also imagine
that the newspaper was interested in boosting their sales by promoting the League's rumor section and
urging readers to inform themselves on the developments going on in America, Europe, and the Pacific
theater that other articles did not cover. Whatever the reason, it is clear that the Cleveland Plain Dealer
and the League shared a similar interest in informing Clevelanders about the war, domestic, and
international issues.
140
asked Clevelanders to write in or call the League with any rumors or questions they had
regarding the war effort, contemporary political or social issues, or fascist activity in the
nation. This section, while only a part of the Cleveland Plain Dealer for six months,
covered a great deal of issues and actively engaged Clevelanders in a conversation with
the League about the nation and local concerns.
Newspapers, according to myriad historians like Carl Wittke and Don H.
Tolzmann, are a methodologically useful tool that can be used to find the pulse of a
people during a particular span of time. 30 Articles, editorials, advice sections, and letters
to the editors often reflect contemporary concerns and give voice to the people or
community that newspaper represents. In this particular case, a look at the Rumor
Roundup section from the Cleveland Plain Dealer circa 1942 and 1943 depicts the
concerns that average Clevelanders had about the war as well as what the League for
Human Rights felt they needed to tell their fellow citizens. The first issue of the Rumor
Roundup appeared in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on October 3, 1942. In it, the League
called on citizens to report circulating rumors because they “can make the difference
between victory or defeat in this war with the Axis powers of aggression.” Rumors, the
article claimed, were one of the Nazi's greatest weapons because they divided public
opinion, disrupted truth, and could injure war production. The League explained that it
was part of a good citizen's duty to report these rumors to them. In return, the League
and Cleveland Plain Dealer would reply to the most pressing letters they received with
full factual answers and the writer's signature. In many cases, this required the League to
30
Carl Wittke, The German Language Press In America (Lexington, KY: University of Kentucky Press,
1957); Don H. Tolzmann, German American Literature (Lanham, Maryland: Scarecrow Press, 1977).
141
reach out to the military and government and social organizations for the truth. The
article ended with an example rumor that battleships were not being armed with guns. In
fact, it was production policy that warships be outfitted with guns after they left their
ports. 31 This rumor, the League claimed, was crafted to discourage Americans and make
them feel as if their military was ill-prepared for war. The articled ended with the League
giving the public something of a mission to accomplish:
When you hear a rumor...., telephone or write to the League for Human Rights.
The league will investigate it. The Plain Dealer will print the rumor and the fact.
And you will be doing your part to keep American and it's allies united so that
victory – however hard – will be ours. 32
Many of the rumors that the League received did not end up getting published
mainly because the writer either neglected to sign their name or their letter was not
germane to larger national or local issues. Some of these unanswered letters included
complaints that neighbors (often named) were using shortwave radios, that teenagers
were skipping school to steal items from local stores, and that some Clevelanders were
worshiping in assembly halls. 33 In all, much more serious issues like national security, the
war effort, domestic policy, underground fascist activity, and race issues were often
featured in the Rumor Roundup section. For example, when asked if men drafted into the
army got to choose if they went overseas or not and if enlisted men were forced to go, the
League contacted the local army recruiting office. The leading officer stationed there was
quoted as saying “when Uncle Sam decides to send anyone across, over he goes, whether
31
“Heard any Rumors? Let Us Set You Right,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 3, 1942, NPN available.
Ibid.
33
Sources came from a small collective of letters sent to the League as part of the Rumor Roundup
campaign.
32
142
he is a drafted man or has enlisted.” 34 In another issue, a concerned writer commented
that veterans of foreign wars were not seeing increased pensions to meet the rising cost of
living. The League replied that, in fact, pensions increased from $30 to $40 a month after
a June 10, 1942 Congressional act allocated more money for veterans. 35
Above all other concerns, Rumor Roundup readers contacted the League about
information relevant to the on-going war effort, the condition of soldiers, and their
families. In December 1942, a worried citizen asked if it were true that Germany had
seized all but a few provinces of the Soviet Union. The League responded that the
Cleveland Regional Office of War Information informed them that the Germans were
being swept out of Stalingrad and pushed further westward. Furthermore, American
journalists stationed in Moscow writing about the war were proof enough that the
Germans had not taken the capital. In the same week, another Clevelander passed on the
rumor that Navy casualties were so high that no figures were being released to the public.
The article answered that the local Office of War Information issued a public statement
saying that from December 7, 1941 to November 15, 1942, 17,252 soldiers were killed,
missing, or wounded. In February 1943, another reader informed the League that some
believed that soldier families were not receiving federal money to support children. In
fact, the League reported that mothers received $50 of government money to support the
family, plus an additional $28 for the first child, $12 for the second, and $10 for each
after that. 36
34
“Fact Finders Dissect Axis-Helping Rumors in First Roundup Here,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, October 11,
1942, NPN available.
35
“Rumor Roundup,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 27, 1942, NPN available.
36
“Week's Rumor Roundup,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, February 7, 1943, NPN available.
143
Other Clevelanders were concerned that war-time production and the lend-lease
deal with Great Britain and the Soviet Union were denying Americans of certain luxury
goods. Leather, gas, and rubber, for example, were the subject of many questions
answered in the Rumor Roundup. On December 6, 1942, one rumor mentioned in the
article said that all of the nation's oil was being sent over to the Soviet Union in order to
appease Stalin. The League responded that despite the US sending a large amount of oil
to the Soviet Union, America still had plenty. Another writer asked if leather rationing
and the lend-lease deal with the Allies would mean that shoes would no longer be sold
after January 1, 1943. This rumor was summarily declared false, but was based on an
exaggerated truth. In reality, the national Office of War Information advised shoe tanners
to set aside certain types of shoe soles and leather in order to off-set lend-lease purchases.
For most of the year, tanners were required to set aside fifteen percent of their sole and
leather quantities; however during December 1942 tanners were required to keep twenty
percent open for government purchase. 37 Another rumor had it that match production
would end in March 1943, but the League reassured readers otherwise. Matches and
match rationing, in fact, were in limited quantity because they being sent over to
members of the armed forces and producers were conserving materials for producing
other items. 38 War-time material concerns and rationing preoccupied the American mind
because it was one of the elements of the war that affected their everyday lives.
Finally, many readers were preoccupied with contemporary issues of race. In
November, 1942, one rumor said that the Marines Corp did not accept African Americans
37
38
“ Rumor Roundup,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, December 6, 1942, NPN available.
“Rumor Roundup,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, December, 27, 1942, NPN available.
144
as military specialists. After asking the Cleveland Office of War Information, the League
reported correctly that the Marines had previously announced plan to recruit five hundred
more African Americans to serve as occupational specialists. These new recruits would
become clerks, truck drivers, accountants, mechanics, radio operators, machinists, and fill
an array of other necessary positions. 39 Numerous unpublished letters delivered to the
League passed rumors about the role of Jews in the military. One, for example, claimed
that prominent Jews could buy their way out of the military while another said that Jews
all across the nation were exempt from serving because of the potential for prosecution if
they were captured by the Germans. Another raised concern that Japanese American
soldiers would turn on their fellow servicemen and defect to the Imperial Japanese or
Germans. Many of these letters went unpublished because the writers did not sign their
names or leave return addresses, thus failing to meet part of the League's most base
requirements for submitted material. 40 While it is impossible to know exactly how the
League would have answered these concerns, it is most likely that they would have
consulted a local branch of a government office or social group to find out the appropriate
information.
In review, the League's use of the Rumor Roundup had two primary aims. First, it
was a part of their renewed effort to reach out to Clevelanders in a way that supported
America and the Allies during the war. By doing so, they acted as a conduit for
democracy and patriotism that simultaneously highlighted the League as one of
39
40
“Week's Rumor Roundup,” Cleveland Plain Dealer, November 8, 1942, NPN available.
Letters referred to appear throughout the League for Human Rights collection housed at the Western
Reserve Historical Society in Cleveland, Ohio.
145
Cleveland's experts on war-time rumors and public information. Second, the League used
their new position and medium to disseminate truthful information about subjects that
concerned Clevelanders and themselves. By doing this, they controlled, at least to a
certain degree, what sort of information flowed around Cleveland. This is important
because it allowed the League to exert a level of power within the city and keep citizens
dedicated to the American cause through fighting morale-weakening rumors.
Section Three: “This is Cleveland:”
The End of the League's Mission
Starting as early as February 1941 and extending all the way until its demise in
1946, the League became more and more interested in pulling together the community
behind them. This effort to bring Cleveland's various ethnicities and religious groups
together was concerned with building their influence in the city just as much as it was in
support of liberal democratic principles. In late February 1941, the League for Human
Rights received a letter from a released prisoner of war from the Alsace-Lorraine region
of France. Why this letter was specifically sent to the League for Human Rights and not
some other larger resistance organization is not clear. In any case, the letter depicted the
systematic annihilation of French Africans by German soldiers in the occupied portions
of France. The article said that:
….[the Germans] said the Negroes had hidden behind corpses or horses after the
capitulation and had used machine guns against the Germans. The Germans
boasted that they didn't waste any bullets against 'these beasts'. Each Negro was
forced to help dig the mass grave; then a pick was hammered into their brains and
146
they were thrown into the grave. Many probably did not die because they were
buried. Others were beaten to death with shovels and the handles of guns. Those
who were not killed are prosecuted in a camp in East Prussia, all kinds of diseases
have occurred. The food is pitiful and nobody can survive for very long. We have
the impression that the Germans intend to annihilate the Africans completely, and
many a man told me, 'In case you should be freed, tell the world how we were
treated'. 41
It is important to note that the contents of the letter were only ever printed in
the Cleveland Call and Post, a prominent African-American newspaper in the city. It is
conceivable that the League released this letter to Cleveland's African American
community via the Cleveland Call and Post because they believed that they could elicit a
great deal of outrage from these assaults on French Africans. The fact that this story was
not printed in any other newspapers suggests a possible disinterest on the side of
Cleveland's predominantly white newspapers. It is a curious omission mainly because the
account recreates a German atrocity in the most disturbing imagery, especially in an age
where it was incredibly popular for newspapers to carry tales of German and Japanese
war-time horrors on or behind the front. The article's use of extremely violent imagery
was aimed at evoking an emotional response by readers. One might imagine that enraged
readers would put their support behind national anti-Nazi resistance or support the
League's activities. Whatever the case, it is clear that the League was using this incident
and others like it to expand their influence to the local African American community.
More than African-Americans, the League also tried to reach out to other faiths,
particularly to Cleveland's Protestants. For example, in the May 2, 1943, edition of
the Cleveland Plain Dealer, the League sponsored a large advertisement which called for
41
“White War Prisoner Writes of German Brutality; Tells of Annihilation of Blacks,” Cleveland Call and
Post, March 1, 1941, NPN available.
147
Christians to unite in “a Day of Compassion – in which all Christian people are invited to
join in intercession for the Jewish people of Europe who are victims of racial and
religious persecution.” 42 The advertisement suggested in the text that Christians had a
moral responsibility to help other Americans no matter what religion they adhered to or
race they were, elevating the ideas that free worship and racial tolerance were part of the
American way. The advertisement came to Clevelanders bundled with a Day of
Compassion prayer approved by the local Federal Council of Churches. It asked
Christians to pray “Almighty God,.... we plead before Thee the cause of the Jewish
people, maligned and harassed, condemned to exile, and slaughtered by the thousands.
Hear the prayers that rise to Thee from their extremity, and raise up advocates who shall
secure for them justice, tranquility, and the common rights of man.” 43 In an article
praising the League's sponsorship and the advertisement, Cleveland Plain Dealer church
editor Walton Rankin said “this piece of advertising is a work of genuine patriotism [on]
the part of the League for Human Rights of Cleveland and exemplifies the high principles
for which the league has consistently stood in this community.” 44 The League's desire to
unite sympathetic Protestants and others was part of their campaign of uniting elements
of Cleveland's diverse population.
While it is important to highlight the activities of the League as a collective body,
it is also key to look at how influential individuals working within the League helped
operate other groups in the Cleveland area. By acting as proponents of the League's
42
Walton Rankin, “Day of Compassion Soldiers' Example Tolerance Pledged,” Cleveland Plain Dealer,
May 2, 1943, NPN available.
43
Ibid.
44
Ibid.
148
values outside of their immediate group, influential League members were able to extend
their personal influence and that of the group. For example, League president Grace
Meyette worked with the Cleveland Resettlement Committee to help Japanese-Americans
find homes in northeast Ohio after they were moved from “relocation centers.” 45 After
the events at Pearl Harbor in December 1941, the federal government believed that
Japanese Americans would be disloyal to the United States. This suspicion of nonpatriotism forced 120,000 Japanese Americans to vacate their homes and move into
military-controlled camps throughout the nation. 46 Between sixteen and seventeen
thousand West Coast Japanese Americans were forcibly relocated to the Cleveland area
and were kept there under strict security order. Meyette's repeated consternation of this
injustice to the Cleveland Resettlement Committee from 1942 until January 1945 resulted
in her earning a leadership position with them. After the government discontinued
interning Japanese Americans in January 1945, Meyette was crucial in helping recently
released families find homes and jobs by connecting them with local social, community,
and educational services. While it is unknown how many of the former internees stayed
in northeast Ohio after this period, Meyette's activism on behalf of the League signaled
their devotion to fair treatment under the law and interest in racial equality. 47
More prominently, Grace Meyette worked alongside Cleveland's National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People (NAACP). During her tenure as the
League's NAACP representative, she served as the first vice-president and chairman of
45
Platt, 87.
Wendy Ng, Japanese-American Interment in World War II: a history and reference guide (Westport, CT:
Greenwood Press, 2002), 12.
47
Cleveland Resettlement Committee for Japanese Americans, January 5, 1945; Letter from Grace Meyette
to F W. Ross, January 19, 1945.
46
149
the Education Committee.
Considering their new interest in intercultural and interracial
issues, the local NAACP was quite possibly the best partner the League could have
chosen to work with. Out of the many incidents that the NAACP and League
representatives cooperated on, most were minor incidents often involving name calling or
base accusations of racial discrimination. In January 1945, however, the local NAACP
and League were involved in a case where a group of Jewish students from Glenville
High School claimed that boys from East High School and Central High School assaulted
them following a basketball game. Behaving cooperatively, the League and NAACP
investigated the matter, believing that ethnic discrimination motivated the incident.
League Director Grace Mayette found that the Jewish boys were “severely beaten,”
called “dirty Jews” and “Pollacks,” and that the windows of a nearby synagogue were
broken during the fight. 48 Interestingly, neither the students nor the school officials
believed that organized anti-Semitism was behind the incident. School officials
concluded that it was a small matter and most likely resulted from intense athletic
rivalries. 49
The League and Education Committee of the NAACP believed that the true cause
of the fight was “a lack of racial understanding and intercultural appreciation” among the
students at the school. Both organizations concluded that growing racial segregation in
the city and the Cleveland Board of Education's failed administrative practices were the
true source of the problem. Compounding this issue was that certain schools were
overwhelmingly represented by certain racial groups. Central High School, for example,
48
49
Grace Mayette to the Executive Board of the League for Human Rights, January 11, 1945.
Grace Mayette to Judge U. Hertz, January 27, 1945.
150
was said to have only two white students whereas there were nearly one thousand African
American students. Cleveland's junior high schools, on the other hand, were known to be
well integrated. After a series of investigations and talks with the leadership of many of
Cleveland's high schools, the League and NAACP found that discriminatory high school
placement practices contributed to a lack of racial understanding and tolerance among
students, directly harmed the development of a superior education, and most importantly,
hurt the instillation of liberal democratic practices. 50 Racial and ethnic discrimination,
therefore, was an enemy of liberal democratic principles and, by extension, the League.
This concern over racial conflict, exclusion, and the erosion of democratic
principles were prominent players in the League's final major publication on Cleveland's
history and ethnic groups, This is Cleveland. 51 By their own definition, democracy and its
preservation were paramount to all other things. Whereas the League used to see antiNazism as their primary form of protest, by 1944 they came to see the defense of
democracy as their most important mission. This progression followed a surge of prodemocratic sentiment coming from all corners of the nation as it became clear that the
war had vastly improved America's economic standing, elevated the nation to being one
of the top powers in the world, and proved that fascism (once deemed a legitimate
alternative to democracy) in all its forms would soon be dead.
At first an irregularly published set of magazines, This is Cleveland was later
organized in 1946 into a single study. Prominent throughout the book is Cleveland's
history as a multi-ethnic city (with chapters dedicated to specific groups including
50
51
Education Committee of the Cleveland NAACP to Charles H. Lake, February 8, 1945.
Anonymous, This is Cleveland (unknown publisher, 1946).
151
Italians, African Americans, Eastern Europeans, Jews, and “others”) and discussions on
various national histories, anti-Semitism, fascism, and democracy. In many ways, This is
Cleveland was the League's version of recent history, detailing not only their actions and
that of the nations, but also their hopes for the soon-approaching future. The study's
secondary use was in promoting democracy through celebrating diversity and individual
rights as well as disparaging fascism in all it's forms. The League's study additionally
dealt with larger geopolitical issues like the spread of communism into territories
formerly ruled by Nazism or fascism. In their efforts to detail the various groups
throughout the Cleveland area, the book shows how the League recognized that their
mission to rid northeast Ohio of fascism, and further advocate it's dismissal from the
nation, was nearing it's end and the world would soon be dealing with the spread of
communism instead.
The book starts by establishing Cleveland's history as “one of the country's most
liberal cities” because of its natural inclination towards equality, liberty, racial tolerance,
and justice. 52 From there, the book sharply turns toward America's German population,
equating them and their patriotism with other good, pro-democratic nationalities in
Cleveland and elsewhere. It deduces that the German inclination towards fascism and
violent order was not something hereditary or cultural, but rather bred from unique
circumstances in German history. As such, patriotic German Americans are painted in a
sympathetic tone, including those who were tricked or “slipped into Nazi control.” The
German Central Farm (the location of a Bund youth camp and other activities) and other
52
Anonymous, 4-7.
152
German language groups, for example, are cleared of all guilt for affiliating with
“German agents” and Americans that pledged loyalty to Hitler's Germany. 53 German
Americans, the League concludes, were not all Nazis, so they did not deserve to be
lumped in with those who truly were. This differentiation between patriotic Americans of
German stock and those who praised Hitler is stark throughout the book. Furthermore,
this shift shows a clear change from how Americans treated German Americans during
and after the Great War to how the League thought of them after World War Two. Instead
of being an enemy collective, determined by ethnicity before anything else, German
Americans were to be treated according to their personal political and patriotic activism.
In the section on Italians, This is Cleveland takes a significant turn from the
previous chapter on German fascism. Rather than looking back extensively on the
Mussolini regime or talking of local Italian American resistance to fascism in Cleveland,
this chapter examines the potential that Italy might turn to communism and how Italians
and local Italian Americans grapple with that issue. The book extols that the Italian
Republic be allowed to pick its own government free from outside influence, American,
British, and Soviet alike. This sense of Wilsonian self-determinism was buttressed by the
League's call for American troops and influence to leave Italy and instead allow a new,
post-Mussolini government to develop as the Italian people wanted it. Despite calling for
the people to choose their new government, the League disparaged any thought of
communism saying “we [the United States] will oppose the salesmen of Communism
here [in Italy] because they violate the principles of Democracy in the name of their
53
Ibid, 9-13.
153
Marxian principles of Historical Materialism.” 54 In reality, the United States created a
virtual single-party system by disallowing opposition to the Catholic-leaning Christian
Democrats. This anti-communist stance that the League adopted additionally mirrored
American foreign policy and nation building hopes in the early Cold War period. 55
The section on Jews in Cleveland most tellingly reveals the League's position on
the development of democracy after the fall of Nazism. This section on Jews starts by
likening anti-Semitism to a disease that “festers” and “threatens the free development of
our Democracy” because it destroys the moral base and very freedom from which
democracy comes from. 56 Interestingly, the League claims that anti-Semitism was
originally found in Eastern Europe and only imported when Eastern European
immigrants settled in the United States in the late 1800s. In Cleveland, for example, Jews
were generally accepted, allowed to live and work equally along Gentiles, and not
restricted to live only in certain neighborhoods. In other nations where anti-Semitism ran
rampant, however, personal liberty was limited and fascism reigned. 57 While not
completely true, the larger point the League wished to project was that any form of
discrimination is but the first indicator of a failing democracy. 58 The process of
destroying democracy through discrimination against Jews was “modernized” through
Hitler, but also a part of American history too. The book says that American Jews were
54
Ibid., 27-29.
Eric Hobsbawm, The Age of Extremes: A History of the World, 1914-1991 (New York: Vintage Books,
1996), 238-39.
56
Anonymous, 37.
57
Ibid. 40.
58
Lloyd Gartner's History of the Jews of Cleveland details a long history of anti-Semitism in Cleveland that
started well before Eastern Europeans arrived. The League's mistake on this issue, either intentional or
not, is meant to help their claim that the introduction of anti-Semitism or any other form of
discrimination erodes the moral base of a democracy.
55
154
blamed by various sections of the populace for all sorts of perceived ills in society
ranging from communism to the New Deal and capitalism to the Republican Party. The
word “Jew” even came to be redefined as:
….the anathema, the cabalistic Mumbo Jumbo that exorcises fierce emotions of
hate. The word Jew relieves the anti-Semite of the troublesome task of finding and
correcting individual and organized wrongs. Because the word magically stirs
irrational antagonism which destroys judgment, neither plain facts nor the
principles of equality and liberty, nor appeal to fairness are able to counteract this
terrible superstition against Jews. Though this attitude is the absolute antithesis
of Americanism, it is imposed in the name of Americanism; though it is
thoroughly irreconcilable with Christianity, it is promoted by some priests and
ministers. 59
While the League recognized that anti-Semitism, and discrimination on-the-whole,
was a serious problem, they also believed that it could be solved. Education programs and
learned tolerance could correct the prevailing thought that Jews or “others” were
somehow inferior. Intercultural instruction would, in theory, help fix anti-Semitism and
ultimately aid in creating a more perfect democracy. 60 Laws, too, could rectify certain
wrongs committed by society on discriminated people. In the chapter concerning African
Americans, for instance, the League concluded that discrimination could be ameliorated
by laws that enforced equal liberties, availability of resources, an end to segregation in
schools, workplaces, and living spaces, and more. 61 In all, these points are important
because they show yet another part of the League's renewed effort to influence
Cleveland's various ethnic communities and promote their ideas of post-WWII
Americanism and democracy. Furthermore, their analysis and conclusions on period
59
Ibid, 45.
Anonymous, 45-47.
61
Ibid, 59-61.
60
155
societal problems resemble much of what civil rights historians like Mary Dudziak call
part of America's growing Cold War realization on the enormity of racial and ethnic
discrimination. 62
While the League's activism may have initially indicated that they were going to
continue working well into the Cold War as a civil rights activist group or as part of
Cleveland's Jewish community, the League for Human Rights died a silent death in mid1946, not long after the final production of This is Cleveland. While there are no direct
indications as to why the League members decided to fold the 13 year old organization, it
is likely that they suffered from one severe post-war malady. First, the League's primary
mission to protest local fascist groups and German Nazism was a dead cause after the fall
of Hitler's Reich. Whereas in the 1930s and the first few years of the 1940s many
Americans were concerned with the specter of fascism all around the world challenging
democracy, the post-war era, on the other hand, was defined by the fear that communism
would envelope the world. Their inability to restyle themselves in a meaningful way in
the new post-war world led to their inevitable collapse. The League's interest in thwarting
fascism overshadowed their handful of anti-communist statements and, in part, led to the
irrelevancy after the war. Little else is known on why the League, formerly Cleveland's
leading anti-Nazi group turned civil rights advocate, failed to adjust to the changing
national and international atmosphere.
While it is not entirely clear what happened to all of the foundational members of
the organization after their dissolution, Rabbi Abba Hillel Silver, the League's former
62
Mary Dudziak, Cold War Civil Rights: Race and the Image of American Democracy (Princeton, NY:
Princeton University Press, 2000), 11-15.
156
philosophical and religious guide, established himself as one of the nation's leading
Zionists and pro-Israel activists. Though he had long been an advocate for the creation of
a Jewish state in Palestine, the 1940s offered Silver his greatest chance to alter global
political order. Starting in early 1943, Silver was appointed by President Roosevelt to
lead the American Zionist Emergency Council, an organization known as one of the
leading proponents for the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine. 63 Throughout
Roosevelt's and Truman's terms in office, Silver worked with over 400 affiliated groups
and branches of the Council. Soon thereafter in August 1943, Silver was handed the
stage at the American Jewish Conference where he announced that the United States and
American Jews would lead the world in making a “Jewish commonwealth.” 64
On October 2, 1947, among a few other leading Jews from around the world,
Silver spoke to the delegates of the United Nations urging that they create a homeland for
the Jews. He argued that statehood was the greatest thing they could achieve and that
Arab and international opposition was an orchestrated effort to strain the will of the
international community. 65 His heartfelt plea that the world's Jews be given a home in
Palestine was not met without resistance from Americans, Europeans, and others alike,
but in little time it was clear that the nation he had always wanted would be made.
Despite his short time in the national and international limelight, Silver made something
of a strong impression on Washington's elite. In particular, President Truman and Rabbi
63
Leon I. Feuer, Abba Hillel Silver: A Personal Memoir (publisher unknown), 117.
Milton Plesur, Jewish Life in Twentieth Century America (Chicago: Nelson-Hall, 1982), 110.
65
Bruce J. Evensen, “The Limites of Presidential Leadership: Truman at War with Zionistsm the Press,
Public Opinion and His Own State Department over Palestine,” Presidential Studies Quarterly 23
(1993), 272.
64
157
Silver often sparred over the issue of Jewish statehood. 66 In one case, rumor had it that
Silver pounded on President Truman's desk while meeting with him about America's
support for a Jewish state in the Middle East. True or not, Rabbi Silver left his mark in
Washington, the floor of the United Nations, and most prominently, in Cleveland, Ohio.
Silver lived the rest of his day as one of the nation's most notable and well respected Jews.
His mission to battle domestic fascism and later to create a Jewish homeland ruled much
of his life and remains two of his greatest contributions to modern American history.
Section Four: The League's Legacy:
Final Conclusions
An analysis of Cleveland's League for Human Rights activities reveals many
things and leaves others open to question. First, their efforts to thwart local-level fascist
movements were instrumental and their methods of doing so spanned the proverbial
gamut. So large was the span of the League's activities over their short 13 year lifespan, it
is almost necessary to view the group as two entities separated by what they advocated
during certain periods of time. In its first incarnation between 1933 and 1941, the League
was focused on loud, public anti-Nazi campaigns and private investigations. The
League's activism during this time followed the general feeling in the United States
which opposed Hitler's advances in Europe and his ideological followers in the United
66
Evensen, 276.
158
States. Like Samuel Untermyer's Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League in New York City and
numerous other like-minded groups scattered throughout the nation, the Cleveland
League actively fought domestic fascists. Through 1941 to 1946, however, the League
took on another shape and mission by advocating greater civil rights and equality for all
and informing Clevelanders about the war effort. This shift in tactics and mission was
necessitated by America's entry into the war. By bringing war to Hitler's Germany, antiNazism became federal policy and a way for citizens to show their patriotism to the
nation. By the war's end, however, anti-fascism became a moot point. The burgeoning
Cold War and threat of communism replaced the fear of fascism. As a result, the League
and other such groups that were unable to adapt to the new atmosphere lost their place in
society and faded away.
Considering all of their actions, the League's efforts against fascism in Cleveland
and northeast Ohio constitute a paradoxical mixture of very strong, almost reactionary,
resistance and peaceful boycotting and public awareness campaigns. As previously stated,
this was an example of a most unusual mixture of Jewish protest organization methods,
namely those used by conservative and liberal Jews in New York City anti-Nazi groups. 67
This differentiation also coincides with the major shift the League underwent after the
nation entered World War Two. One of the other background questions that this thesis
attempts to grapple with concerns the notion of success. Indeed, the League's campaigns
gathered a great deal of information about individuals, organizations, and foreign
entanglements in Cleveland's public and political scenes. Their findings, when amassed,
67
Haskel Lookstein, Were We Our Brother's Keepers?: The Public Response of American Jews to the
Holocaust (New York: Hartmore House, 1985), 60.
159
reveal that the League was deeply interested in combating local fascist and pro-Nazi
activity and that those they fought were indeed involved in pro-Nazism. That being said,
the League never revealed anything they found. What makes the League's investigative
efforts to repel local fascist groups and leaders important; however, was not what they
broadcast to Cleveland or the world. Rather, it was in what their program and resistance
symbolized for the local Jewish community and Gentile sympathizers. The League, as a
unified front of these two forces, symbolized Cleveland's early resistance to fascism.
Moreover, they were a part of a much larger national resistance effort by concerned
Americans against forces which seemingly challenged democracy and civil order.
The League's pro-democracy, anti-Nazi campaigns and clandestine operations
present one of the strongest narratives for how non-sectarian anti-Nazi activity was much
stronger than previously theorized by other historians. The key failure in past literature,
particularly those like Lookstein's which ignore the value of private investigations, is that
they focused primarily on public boycotts and other programs and completely ignore or
otherwise diminish the significance of clandestine resistance. One can plainly see the
League's public boycott were almost carbon copies of other national boycott groups like
Samuel Untermyer's Non-Sectarian Anti-Nazi League. They each engaged in similar
operations with the same cause in mind: to defeat domestic fascism and boycott German
Nazism in America. Where the League differs from these groups was in how they
expanded upon their mission by adding a thirteen-year long program of clandestine
vigilance and covert investigations. League records indicate that there were other groups
like the League that ran clandestine anti-Nazi operations and that they were somehow in
160
contact with them, but neither these groups nor their secretive activities have been a part
of the American anti-Nazi resistance narrative. To this date, no other literature covers any
non-sectarian anti-Nazi resistance groups that operated like the League for Human Rights
in Cleveland did, but their record hints that others most certainly did. This introduction of
clandestine operations to the standing narrative would benefit historians in two key ways.
First, a more open analysis of organizations that used clandestine investigations during
the 1930s and 1940s recharacterizes the essence of anti-Nazi resistance during that period.
Instead of being weak or ineffective, the suggestion that anti-Nazi groups operated with
secret spy and intelligence networks bent on infiltrating and/or injuring domestic fascists
paints a much more multifaceted picture of such organizations. Secondly, this addition to
the grand narrative on American anti-Nazi resistance efforts would reveal a side of the
story reserved only to a handful of individuals. While there is certainly a level of flair
behind these stories, they also offer keen insights into resistance studies, the functions of
fascist organizations, Nazi Germany's interest in and involvement with American fascist
groups, and much more. In all, the League for Human Rights' story serves as the opening
for a new chapter in how Americans challenged the Nazi menace in the United States and
reopens an often overlooked angle into resistance studies.
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