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Appeasement
The following notes are a guide to the topic of appeasement. These are not the last
words on the subject, but they will provide you with a rough outline of the main
topics and themes. To answer an exam question successfully on this topic, you will
need to do your own reading and create your own notes. This set of notes should only
be a beginning.
Contents
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What is appeasement?
The origins of appeasement
Was appeasement a traditional British foreign policy?
Disarmament and British Military Planning.
Japan and the Manchurian Incident of 1931
Italy and Mussolini
The Abyssinian Crisis of 1935
Hitler’s foreign policy – rearmament and the Rhineland Crisis 1936
The Anschluss of 1938
The Sudetenland Crisis of 1938
Poland 1939
France in the 1930s
Economic appeasement
The Hossbach Memorandum
Was Chamberlain guilty?
Latest thoughts on appeasement – Robert Pearce
Test yourself
What was appeasement?
Appeasement was the policy of giving in to some of the demands of dictators like
Hitler and Mussolini in the hope that they would be satisfied and not ask for more.
This policy has been most closely identified with British and French foreign policy in
the 1930s. The leading figure in Britain was Neville Chamberlain, but it must not be
forgotten that his predecessors Ramsay MacDonald and Stanley Baldwin were also
appeasers.
These notes will concentrate solely on the relationships between Britain and France
and the aggressor powers in the 1930s. You will need to look elsewhere for
information on the rise of the dictators.
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Revision Notes: Appeasement
Summary of sub-topics
1. The definition of Appeasement - especially in relation to Germany, Italy and Japan.
2. The reasons for Britain's adoption of the policy of Appeasement
- economic
- strategic
- military
- domestic and political factors
- diplomatic considerations
3. Opposition to Appeasement in Britain
- its extent
- its arguments
4. The collapse of Appeasement 1938-39
5. The consequences of Appeasement up until 1942.
Issues
a. Was Appeasement a mistake?
b. Was Appeasement an understandable and perhaps correct response to economic
and political realities?
c. What were the other options open to British politicians?
d. Were there any benefits to the policy of Appeasement?
e. An assessment of the character and the role of Chamberlain and his relationship
with Hitler.
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The origins of appeasement
Europe had been drawn up into two armed camps by the beginning of the second
decade of the C.20th. Each great power in Europe sought to gain pre-eminence and
this caused great tensions and jealousy. Throughout the period 1900-1914 there were
a series of crises which could have sparked a major war, but it was only when the
assassination of Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of Austria-Hungary by a Serb nationalist
in Sarajevo in 1914 occurred that a major war broke out. The countries of the two
armed camps pledged to support each other and Europe was plunged into a war.
The two armed camps were:
The Triple Alliance - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Italy
The Triple Entente - France, Russia and Great Britain.
Many other countries were involved, including Japan and the USA (after 1917). The
Empires of the Great Powers were also involved in the conflict which caused the war
to widen into a World War.
The suffering of the participants in the Great War was so appalling, that when the war
came to an end in November 1918, many hoped never to repeat such an experience
again, and a mood of pacifism grew in the 1920s.
France had suffered particularly badly in the war, so when the diplomats met at the
Paris Peace Conference in 1919, their representatives, led by Prime Minister Georges
Clemenceau, pledged to make Germany pay.
Britain, led by Prime Minister David Lloyd-George, was more sympathetic to
Germany. Lloyd-George realised that if Germany was harshly punished this would
cause great resentment amongst the Germans and could cause tensions in the future.
He also believed that a strong Germany would be a good trading partner for Britain,
and that a healthy German economy would prevent the rise of extremist parties either
Communists or Fascists. On the other hand Lloyd-George had to listen to British
public opinion which was calling for Germany to be 'squeezed until the pips squeak!'
The other great victorious power was the USA. Led by President Woodrow Wilson,
the Americans had no great desire to punish the Germans. In January 1918 Wilson
had proposed his Fourteen Points, which was a blueprint for a fair peace settlement
at the end of the war. One of its main points was the idea of a League of Nations
which would try to prevent major wars through negotiation. Wilson did not wish to
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punish the Germans, but at the Peace Conference he was overruled by Clemenceau
and Lloyd-George.
The Treaty of Versailles was the peace settlement with Germany, it was very harsh.
In effect Germany had to:
- accept blame for starting the war
- lose all of its colonies
- lose most of its army, navy and all its airforce
- lose huge territories in Europe
- pay reparations of £6.6 billion.
The Germans hated the Treaty of Versailles and throughout the 1920s and 1930s her
politicians tried to reverse the terms of the treaty. In the 1920s Hitler and the Nazis
gained support as they promised to reverse the treaty. In the 1930s when the Nazis
were in power, Hitler set about reversing these terms. Britain believed that Hitler
should be allowed to do this and this policy of letting the Germans take back their
lands and building their armed services was called Appeasement.
Britain also appeased Italy and Japan. Italy joined Britain and France in 1915 after
territorial gains were promised to the Italians if they fought against the Germans. In
1919 Italy gained very little and felt snubbed.
Japan had fought alongside Britain in the First World War but was snubbed by the
Great Powers in 1919. Both Italy and Japan faced economic problems in the 1920s
and were dominated by right-wing extreme governments. To solve their problems
both countries set about creating empires. Britain and France let them get away with
this as they were not prepared to start a major war. This was appeasement.
Was appeasement a traditional British foreign policy?
'Munich and the British Tradition' by Paul W. Schroeder
Historical Journal 1976 quoted in British appeasement and the origins of World War
II by R.J.Q. Adams.
The appeasement of Germany by Britain in the 1930s has gone down in history as a
shameful episode. Neville Chamberlain has been lampooned as the architect of
appeasement, as if he were the sole creator of it and therefore should accept the most
blame for its failure. However many historians, such as Paul Schroeder, believe that
historical memory has failed in this instance and that in fact the origins of
appeasement can be traced back to the early nineteenth century.
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Schroeder's argument is based on the thesis that appeasement was not a new policy in
the 1930s, but that it 'conformed to the standard nineteenth century British approach
to Central and East European problems.'
Essentially British policy in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was based on
the following principles:
- the maintenance of a 'balance of power' in Europe
- the prevention of European 'hegemony' by a single power
- the protection of the independence of smaller states
- the discouragement of the use of force and of reneging on treaties
Schroeder believes that the appeasers of the 1930s continued to work along the
principles listed above and that appeasement, although a new term, was in fact a
continuation of a traditional British policy.
What did the appeasers of the 1930s have in common with nineteenth century
politicians?
Both sets of policy makers wanted:
1) to try to keep aloof from dangerous foreign alliances except in the cases of the Low
Countries and France.
2) to give most attention to the Empire, Commonwealth and World trade.
3) to keep arms expenditure compatible with sound finance and a strong economy.
4) to concentrate on naval, air and commercial warfare, if war became a necessity.
5) to maintain a free hand in European and World affairs wherever possible.
How had Britain responded to Germany in the nineteenth century?
In the early Nineteenth Century Germany had been a collection of small states
generally dominated by Prussia and Austria. Under the leadership of Bismarck
Prussia forced the unification of these German states to form Germany. The new
Germany was created from a series of internal conflicts in 1848, a war with Austria in
1866 and a war with France in 1870/71.
Britain had supported this unification for a number of reasons:
- The Germans were of the same racial Saxon stock and were natural allies
- A strong Germany was good for trade and prosperity
- Germany acted as an effective block to France and Russia
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The same beliefs held in the 1930s. The appeasers accepted that a unified, nationalist
German state existed whose size, resources, geographical location and industrial
development inevitably made her the leading power in Central Europe. Britain
traditionally held the view that Eastern Europe fell under Germany's 'sphere of
influence'; Chamberlain wanted to turn Germany eastwards to act as a bulwark
against Communist Russia; Palmerston had the same policy against Imperial Russia in
the 1850s.
After 1919 the British policy towards Germany was to recognise that there were a
number of German speaking peoples outside Germany who would one day want to be
part of the Reich. Britain had no grounds for denying this wish. Appeasement aimed
to achieve German reunification peacefully. Britain would and could not effectively
defend the new countries of Eastern Europe e.g. Poland, Czechoslovakia and
therefore encouraged these states to make concessions to Germany in a peaceful way.
Essentially Britain did not care what the particular shape of Central and Eastern
Europe was, as long as its foreign policy objectives were met. Germany served
Britain's interests as it filled the 'power vacuum' of Central Europe which had existed
as a series of small, weak states. Britain had actually been pleased when Germany had
united in 1871, at last a state had been created to balance France and Russia. The
policy makers of the nineteenth century and the appeasers in the 1930s were always
prepared to revise treaties peacefully in order to maintain the balance of power.
Appeasement was a continuation of this strategy, but Chamberlain's mistake was the
failure to recognise that Britain was declining in power and prestige in comparison to
its nineteenth century position. Chamberlain also failed to recognise that Fascism and
Nazism were unappeasable.
What kept the balance of power from working in the 1930s?
Nineteenth century British foreign policy in relation to Central Europe had worked,
but its continuation under the name of appeasement failed. Why?
- there was a relative decline in the power of the West i.e. France and Britain
- Communist Russia had been alienated by the West
- the collapse of Austria-Hungary in 1918 left a power vacuum in Eastern Europe
- modern warfare was transformed; total warfare could reach any part of the world
- Hitler and the aims, power and methods of Nazi Germany were alien to the British
- the balance of power could not be maintained without containment of Germany
- Britain failed to recognise that Austria-Hungary had acted as a check on Germany
Perhaps the collapse of Austria-Hungary was one of the greatest threats to peace in
Europe. The small successor states were not a check on Germany, but were in fact an
open field for German expansionism. Britain had been largely irrelevant to the
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problems of Eastern Europe in the Nineteenth Century and was even more so in the
1930s. Under these circumstances, what other policy was open to the appeasers?
Schroeder concludes that appeasement was inevitable, and that any other policy was
inconceivable. Quite apart from the tradition of Britain's foreign policy, there were
many other reasons why appeasement was literally the only policy that could have
been followed in the 1930s:
- fear and horror of war was widespread
- the military was unprepared for war
- fear of the damage war could bring to the economy and the British Empire
- the unprepared state of public opinion
- the isolation of the USA and the Dominions
- lack of confidence in France
- lack of interest in Central Europe
- failure to understand Nazism
- absence of an alternative policy
These ideas certainly question the widely held belief that appeasement was something
new under Chamberlain and that he should accept a large proportion of the blame for
its failure. Appeasement was a symptom of Britain's decline, not the cause of it. There
were no good foreign policy options open to Chamberlain, only evils and danger.
Even if Britain had stood up to Germany over the Anschluss with Austria and the
annexation of Czechoslovakia, these small states could not have been saved.
Ironically appeasement was the end of Britain's traditional foreign policy and in 1939
Chamberlain made the decision to take Britain to war.
Questions
1. What were Britain's foreign policy objectives in the nineteenth and the early
twentieth century in relation to:
a) Central and Eastern Europe
b) the World?
2. Britain supported a united Germany in the nineteenth century, why did Britain
continue to support a strong Germany even after the First World War?
3. What is meant by the following historical terms:
a) balance of power
b) sphere of influence
c) hegemony?
4. According to Schroeder's thesis, why did Britain's maintenance of the balance of
power fail in the 1930s?
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5. Was appeasement the only policy option available to Chamberlain?
Military Appeasement
After the appalling casualties of the First World War a view developed that the most
effective way to avoid war in the future would be to reduce weapons through a
monitored system of world disarmament. Good idea though this was, it was inherently
impractical and unachievable. Essentially no country was willing to give up its arms if
other countries were not going to follow suit. The other problem was monitoring and
enforcing disarmament. No country was going to go to war if another country refused
to disarm. In fact, none of the Great Powers disarmed although they all agreed to it in
principle.
Germany had been compelled to disarm as a clause of the Treaty of Versailles, but
France did not disarm at the same time, and this caused tensions between the two
countries. The Germans resented the French and feared military interference, with
some good reason. For instance, France was able to simply walk unopposed into the
Ruhr in 1923 to secure reparations payments.
On a voluntary basis, Britain went the furthest towards reducing its military
capability. In 1919, British defence policy was based on the hypothesis that the
British Empire would not be engaged in a great war during the next ten years. This
‘Ten Year Rule’ was urged by the then Secretary of State for War and Air, Winston
Churchill. The policy was extremely popular with subsequent governments. By 1928
it was accepted that unless specifically altered, there was a permanent assumption of
ten years’ peace. The result of the ‘Ten Year Rule’ and the downturn in the economy
meant that very little new equipment was purchased and the armaments industry
languished. When new orders started to come in during the mid-1930s, many
companies were unable to deliver the arms quickly enough.
Between 1925-32 there were moves to call a Disarmament Conference. This actually
met in 1932, but fell apart once Germany had withdrawn from it and from the League
of Nations in 1933. Hitler’s territorial ambitions necessitated the construction of an
effective military machine. In 1935 Hitler announced the existence of the Luftwaffe.
Britain’s response was to appease Germany by signing the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement. This permitted Germany to have parity with Britain in terms of the
numbers of submarines, while the overall size of the German navy was limited to 35%
of Britain’s. Baldwin’s government thought they may as well try to limit German
naval power, after all if they didn’t come to an arrangement the Germans would
probably rebuild anyway. France and Italy were not consulted over this agreement
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and felt slighted. As the 1930s drew to a close it was apparent that disarmament was a
dead duck. All the powers began to re-arm rapidly, especially after the Munich Crisis
of 1938. Indeed Chamberlain is often given credit for preventing war in 1938 and thus
buying valuable time for Britain to re-arm. (See notes in Conclusion for an alternative
view.)
According to Michael Howard (British Appeasement and the Origins of World War II
Ed. R.J.Q. Adams) British military planners faced three major problems in the
Appeasement period:
1)
2)
3)
the need to protect a World Empire,
the vulnerability of the British Isles to air attack,
the fact that there wasn’t enough money to spend on building huge armed
forces above and beyond what already existed to defend the Empire. Additional
expenditure at this time could have endangered Britain’s weakened economic
condition and could have been politically unpopular.
For much of the C.19th Britain had developed into a world power, and to some extent
ignored developments in Europe. In consequence, Britain’s military expenditure was
largely confined to the Navy, which defended Britain’s overseas territories. Britain
had a very small standing army in comparison to the large European Continental
armies.
In the 1930s Japan was considered to be the biggest threat to Britain’s Empire. Japan
was expanding into China and threatened Singapore, Hong Kong and Australia. The
Navy considered Singapore to be the fulcrum of the Navy’s defence of the Far East
i.e. if Singapore was kept safe, Britain could retain its dominant position in the region.
However, the Admiralty believed that it would not be strong enough to maintain its
Far Eastern strength against Japan and go to war against Italy in the Mediterranean at
the same time.
The British Army was spread diversely in defence of its overseas territories and did
not have a large presence in the British Isles. When Britain guaranteed the frontiers of
Western Europe at the Locarno Treaty of 1925, there was no Continental army to
back up the guarantee. The Officers that dominated the Army were old fashioned, and
were not very interested in new technology. The Army was out of favour with the
Government, which was more interested in the RAF and Navy as deterrent forces.
The Government saw the Army as an offensive rather than a defensive power. There
was a reluctance to accept a Continental commitment. By late 1936, even the Army
Chiefs of Staff actively encouraged the appeasement of Germany:
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‘Our military backwardness and the very unreliable condition of France have
placed us in a very weak condition….the present situation dictates a policy
directed towards an understanding with Germany.’
The RAF was set up after the First World War, when the potential for aerial warfare
was first realised. It concentrated mostly on protecting the Empire, but was not well
funded by the Treasury. In 1918, Britain was the world’s leading air power, but the
force was rapidly disbanded. In 1923, Britain had only 24 front-line machines
available and this fell to 16 a few months later. At the same point, the entire air force
in India was grounded through lack of spares. By the mid-1930s, funding had
improved but was confined mainly to bomber planes. Strategists at the time saw the
RAF as a deterrent to an aerial assault. Harold Macmillan recalled in his memoirs
‘We thought of air warfare in 1938 rather as people think of nuclear warfare today.’
After Stanley Baldwin pointed out that ‘The bomber will always get through’ in 1932,
other politicians became increasingly frightened of Germany’s potential capacity to
level British cities. This was proved irrevocably at Guernica in the Spanish Civil War
1936-39 when German planes aided General Franco’s defeat of the Spanish
Government. British military planners were expecting the Germans to be able to drop
at least 700 tons/day of explosives on British targets. During the Blitz the worst raid
was 1000 tons, but most were between 30-400 tons. After 1937 the RAF’s role was
stiffened with the development of anti-aircraft batteries, RADAR and effective fighter
planes such as the Hawker Hurricane (1937) and Supermarine Spitfire (1938).
To spend more might seem a fairly straight forward response to these problems and
this in turn would have allowed Chamberlain to have stood up to the aggressors in the
knowledge that he had a strong military capability to support his policies. However, it
was not that simple. In the 1930s Britain’s economy was in severe decline because of
a world-wide recession and because Britain’s industries came under increasing
competition from abroad. The Treasury simply did not have enough spare cash to
build up Britain’s armed forces; to have done so would have severely damaged the
economic recovery. Chamberlain as Chancellor of the Exchequer (1931-37) and
Prime Minister (1937-40) believed that economic stability was the cornerstone of
defence policy.
The long-term worry for the British Government was that if it ever came to war,
Britain would probably have to face Germany, Italy and Japan on three fronts
(Northern Europe, Southern Europe and the Far East). France was in political turmoil
in the 1930s and could not be relied upon as a strong ally, and there was no guarantee
that the USA would support Britain in a war in Europe. Faced with these problems in
Europe and the defence of her Empire, Britain was not financially strong enough to
support military strength which could stand up to the aggressors in the late 1930s.
When war did break out in 1939, the Treasury estimated that Britain would go
bankrupt at the end of 1941. (The entry of the USA into World War Two in late 1941
helped to alleviate this).
Britain did start to rearm in 1936, but it was not on a massive scale. Britain’s
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commitments abroad meant that most new military expenditure went on peacekeeping
in Iraq and Palestine or bolstering Egypt against Italian aggression. By 1938, the
British Expeditionary Force consisted of two infantry divisions and one mobile
division. In the same year air strength wasn’t much better either as this comparison of
front-line aircraft shows: Germany – 5000 , Britain – 1500.
Conclusion
Chamberlain and the British Government have been heavily criticised for giving in to
Hitler at Munich in 1938, but the raw military figures underline the futility of Britain
waging a war over Czechoslovakia. The Government concluded that military
unpreparedness was so serious that hostilities were to be avoided at all cost.
Chamberlain could not stand up to Hitler and Mussolini because he had no military
clout. Chamberlain had to get the best deal he could with a very weak hand. Some
critics believed Chamberlain should have stood up to Hitler over the Sudetenland
question, but Chamberlain could not have gone to war in 1938. After Munich,
Chamberlain ordered the construction of a full-scale Continental army of 32 divisions.
Chamberlain can be praised for ‘buying time’ at Munich, by delaying war with
Germany in 1938, Britain was able to catch up in 1939.
This analysis is open to criticism. Some historians do not believe that Chamberlain
was buying time at Munich and that in fact he was trying to achieve a lasting accord
with Hitler by conceding legitimate claims. Edward Ranson (British Defence Policy
and Appeasement between the wars 1919-39), believes that the combined forces of
British, French and Czech air power would have been more than a match for the
German Luftwaffe. In 1938 the Luftwaffe’s role was ground support and it did not
have the plans or the capacity to bomb London. Of course when Hitler rolled into
Czechoslovakia in 1938 he neutralised 35 divisions of one of the best trained and
equipped armies in Europe and gained all its equipment and the Skoda armaments
factory.
Japan, the Manchurian Incident of 1931 and the League of Nations
In many ways Japan was a new nation in the early Twentieth Century. For three
hundred years Japan had remained isolated and had resisted foreign intervention.
Then in 1853 Japan was opened up by Commodore Perry on the behalf of the USA.
The Japanese had no desire to become a Western colony and so modernised rapidly to
catch up with the Great Powers. By the turn of the century Japan had fought
successful wars with both China and Russia and had made it plain that Japan sought a
sphere of influence in the Far East.
Japan fought with France, Britain and the USA in the First World War, but she felt
poorly rewarded by the peace settlements of 1919. During the 1920s Japan faced
considerable problems:
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1)
The Japanese population was growing at over 900,000 per year, a phenomenal
amount which the economy found difficult to support.
2)
The USA closed its doors to cheap Japanese exports and immigrants to the
USA (American Immigration Act 1924) in the 1920s in a bid to support their own
economy.
3)
Japan lacked raw materials such as coal, iron and oil. This became an acute
problem after the 1929 Wall St. Crash, when Japan had “to export or die.”
4)
There was a strong nationalist element in politics which advocated direct
action to get Japan out of its financial difficulties. They wished to conquer new
territories on behalf of the Emperor.
Japan had long had an economic interest in Manchuria, a part of Northern China.
China was a complete mess by the 1920s; it was a country torn apart by warlords and
extremist politicians. In 1931 the Japanese stage-managed an attack on the
Manchurian railway by “Chinese bandits.” The railway was owned by the Japanese
and to safeguard their interests the Japanese army took control of the whole region.
Both China and Japan appealed to the League of Nations to arbitrate.
The significance of the Manchurian Incident is that it was the first real test of the
League of Nation’s principle of collective security. Theoretically the League should
have placed economic and military sanctions upon the aggressive member state. The
problem was that the League was seriously weakened by the non-membership of the
USA and Russia. In effect the League was comprised of only two Great Powers,
Britain and France, and a host of lesser nations. Any act of collective security would
inevitably call for the leadership of Britain and France, but in the economic
circumstances of the post-Wall St. Crash period, this was virtually impossible for
these two leading nations. The result was that Japan was appeased and got away with
adding Manchuria (later Manchukuo) to her empire.
The League appeared to take action over the Manchurian Incident by sending Lord
Lytton to the region to enquire as to the real nature of the aggression. Lytton took a
year to report back to the League that Japan was the aggressive nation in this case.
The fact that Lytton took so long to report was a de facto act of appeasement by
Britain and France, the leading members of the League. As each day and week passed
the Japanese became increasingly entrenched in Manchuria. Perhaps this appeasement
is understandable under the circumstances; it is very unlikely that the general public
in Britain and France would have had the stomach for a major war with Japan in the
Far East, literally thousands of miles from Europe, a region which meant very little to
ordinary people. It is unlikely that the navies of Britain and France would have felt
comfortable with or even have afforded such a conflict. The consequences of failure
meant not only a loss of prestige, but also involved a direct threat to European
colonies in the Far East.
The consequences of the Manchurian Incident held dire warnings for the future, for
those that cared to listen:
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1)
Branded as the aggressor, Japan left the League in 1933, this weakened it in
two ways. Firstly the League had lost a powerful member state, but secondly and
more importantly its principles of standing up to aggression, especially to that of a
member state, had been openly flouted.
2)
Japan acted as a role model for other aggressive nations in the 1930s. Hitler
withdrew from the League in 1933, followed by Italy in 1937. Both countries were
encouraged to ignore the League’s principle of collective security to meet their
own foreign policy objectives. After the Manchurian Incident, the threats of Britain
and France through the League or otherwise, in relation to a whole series of crises
in the 1930s, were perceived to be hollow indeed. Britain and France had no
stomach to uphold the principles of the League. Appeasement was the only other
foreign policy option in the 1930s.
3)
China felt betrayed by the League and the European powers and turned to
Communism in the 1940s.
Mussolini and Fascism
Born the son of a village blacksmith and schoolmistress in 1883, Benito Mussolini
fled to Switzerland in 1902 to evade military service. His dramatically varied early
career included activity as manual labourer and socialist agitator, before he finally
served and was wounded in the First World War.
In 1919 he founded the ‘fascisti di combattimento’, which in 1921 became the
ItalianFascist party. Its backing and Mussolini's own tactics accounted for his rise to
power between 1919 and 1922, when King Victor Emmanuel III appointed him Prime
Minister.
Debate has raged ever since about what exactly his party stood for. To what extent
can it be identified with similar political movements in other countries - let alone
authority figures in general, like headmasters?
At the end of the twentieth century fascism remains probably the vaguest of the major
political terms. This may stem from the fact that the word itself contains no explicit
political reference, however abstract, as do 'democracy', 'liberalism', socialism' and
'communism'. To say that the Italian fascio ...... means 'bundle' or 'union' does not tell
us much. Moreover, the term has probably been used more by its opponents than by
its proponents, the former having been responsible for the generalization of the
adjective on an international level, as early as 1923. 'Fascist' has been one of the most
frequently invoked political pejoratives, normally intended to connote 'violent',
'brutal', 'repressive' or 'dictatorial'. Yet if 'fascism' means no more than that then
Communist regimes, for example, would probably have to be categorized as among
the most fascist, depriving the word of any useful specificity....... Some scholars deny
that any such general phenomenon as fascism - as distinct from Mussolini's own
Italian movement - ever existed.
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An influential line of thought contends that fascism was (and is) an entirely negative
movement which lacked any ideological content. Unlike other modern political
movements, it has no founding text to match, say, Marx's Das Kapital. And careful
analysis of Mussolini's speeches verifies the absence of serious thought. Hence the
old joke, 'Have you half a mind to become a Fascist? That's all you need!'
Everything about Fascism was a fraud... Fascist rule was corrupt, incompetent, empty;
Mussolini was without either ideas or aims......... In 1943 Fascism collapsed
overnight. Not a single Fascist attempted to defend the regime which had lasted
twenty years and had boasted itself of such power. It simply fell down like a house of
cards, which was all it really was. This is contested by Roger Eatwell in his recent
book on Fascism. He argues that the ideological content has been neglected, partly
because of its rational argument that people were largely swayed by irrational motives
- an obvious source of confusion.
‘The essence of fascist ideology can best be summed up by combining two ideas. The
first relates to the basic nature of the community fascism was primarily concerned
with building, or reviving - the nation. But there have been nationalists who accept
liberal rights, or who welcome diversity. The fascist conception of the nation was
more holistic; it sought to overcome divisive differences and to forge a strong sense
of shared purpose [community rather than individual]. The second part relates more to
socio-economic policy. Intellectual fascists were often to term themselves supporters
of a 'Third Way', neither left nor right, neither capitalist nor communist. The term is in
some ways misleading, as it could be taken to imply that fascism was a form of
centrism, or conservatism. Both would be totally false descriptions for an ideology
which sought to launch a social revolution, albeit one which owed more to the right
than left. Yet it is a useful shorthand for fascism's syncretic style of thinking
(reconciliation of opposites).’
Roger Eatwell, Fascism: a History (1996)
Other historians reserve the term 'fascism' for Italy. Gilbert Allardyce argues that no
definition can be stretched across national boundaries, since the two alleged
paradigms were utterly different (for example, the Nazi Party persecuted Jews and the
Italian Fascist Party recruited them in great numbers). From this perspective fascism
was unique to the circumstances of Italy in and after the First World War.
‘Fascism, like communism, was essentially the child of war......... Its appeal was to the
officers of the war generation, to the 'real Italy' of the trenches and Vittoria Veneto, to
men who had won the first major victories of Italian arms. Together these men had
overcome not only the Austrians but also ......the hated neutralist Establishment, the
cowardly Giolittian parliament, the treacherous Socialists, and the peace-mongering
Church; and in the post-war ferment, braving insults and violence, they had
conquered them all again. They never forgot. The regime's slogans and symbols were
always military - 'believe, obey, fight'. Mussolini's working office after 1929 was in
Palazzo Venezia, which had until 1915 been the Austrian Embassy.’
14
Wartime memories accounted for many Fascist policies. 'Intervention' in the economy
was geared mainly to national glory. So was 'industrial mobilization'. Factories had
recreation centres, like the soldiers had had in the war; the Balilla had chaplains, as
regiments had had in the war; newspapers were censored, as they had been in the war.
'War alone', proclaimed Mussolini's official Doctrine of Fascism in 1932, 'brings up to
their highest tension all human energies and puts the stamp of nobility upon the
peoples who have the courage to meet it'. When there was no war to fight, the Fascists
found surrogates; when there was, they joined in. Mussolini was always the Duce, the
military leader, the man on horseback. His regime was neither conservative nor
revolutionary: it was bellicose.
The arguments of Taylor, Eatwell and Clark cannot all be true but it will be good
practice to find evidence for each of them, apart from that already cited. Then try to
come to a conclusion about the uniqueness, or otherwise, of Mussolini's Fascist
movement.
Italy and Mussolini
‘He is a rabbit: a phenomenal rabbit: he roars. People who see him and who do not
know him mistake him for a lion.’
Serrati of Mussolini in 1919
Rabbit or not, Mussolini was an extraordinary man in an extraordinary age. The son
of a blacksmith, a prisoner on eleven occasions, a teacher, a Socialist agitator, an
army corporal and a journalist, this man was a mass of contradictions. How had he
become leader, the Duce, of Italy?
At the end of the First World War, Italy was on the victorious allied side, yet there
was a strong feeling of discontentment in Italy. Why was this?
a) Italy had initially fought on the German and Austro-Hungarian side until 1915. At
the Treaty of London, the British and French persuaded the Italians to swap sides
in return for land at the end of the war. In fact Italy did gain some lands from
Austria-Hungary in 1919, but generally the Italians felt snubbed at Versailles and
were not treated as a Great Power as they had expected.
b)
The cost of WW1 was 148 billion lire, twice the entire government
expenditure between 1861-1913. This put a heavy strain on the economy and many
ex-soldiers found difficulty in gaining employment.
c) Italy was and is markedly divided between North and South. Basically the North is
much richer than the South and this has caused a lot of resentment on both sides
since the foundation of the Kingdom of Italy in 1861.
d)
As a whole Italy was poor, there was little demand for Italian goods in the
post-war period and many businesses struggled to survive.
15
e) The Roman Catholic Church was still quarrelling with the Italian government.
When Italy had been formed in 1861, the Pope lost the Papal States (a large
portion of Central Italy).
f) The Italians were encouraged to think of themselves as a Great Power and yet their
track record in military terms was poor. They had been defeated by native troops in
Abyssinia (Ethiopia) in 1896 and had suffered severe losses during WW1. The
Italian image of themselves did not match up to the reality.
As a consequence of these factors, Italy in 1919 was ripe for a strong leader to restore
Italian pride. This was Mussolini after 1922.
The Abyssinian Crisis of 1935
‘The Abyssinian Crisis’ by Telford Taylor from Munich: the price of peace 1979,
pp228-233, quoted in R.J.Q Adams’ British Appeasement and the origins World War
II
Mussolini had had his eye on Abyssinia (Ethiopia) for many years. He wanted to
conquer it and add it to the ‘new Roman Empire’ of which he was the glorious leader.
Mussolini wanted also to gain revenge for the embarrassing defeat the Italians had
suffered against the Ethiopians at Adowa in 1896.
Britain’s policy towards Italy at this time was one of ‘double bluff’, on the one hand
Britain adopted a ‘get tough’ policy with Italy and yet on the other hand Britain
seemed to want to let Italy get away with aggression against Ethiopia. Neither policy
was followed whole-heartedly and as a result British policy not only failed to deal
effectively with Mussolini but in fact drove him into the arms of Hitler.
The key players in this fiasco were:
Samuel Hoare Stanley Baldwin Anthony Eden Pierre Laval -
British Foreign Secretary 1935
British Prime Minister 1935-37
British Foreign Secretary 1935-38
French Prime Minister 1935-36
The crisis over Abyssinia came to a head in the Autumn of 1935. Mussolini
demanded extensive annexation of territories in Abyssinia; in response the British
Navy moved its Mediterranean Fleet from Malta to Alexandria. Hoare prepared a
speech for the League of Nations in which he gave the impression that Britain would
stand up to any Italian aggression. Hoare pledged publicly that Britain would fully
16
back the League’s ideal of isolating aggressive powers through collective security.
Privately Hoare and Laval agreed that a war with Italy was totally out of the question
in 1935 and could lead to who-knows-what in the future. Many were taken in by
Hoare’s strong stance, although Mussolini was not overawed. Italy invaded Abyssinia
and all eyes turned to the British, as a leading member of the League, to make good
their promises of punishing Italy. In a tight spot, the Cabinet sent Anthony Eden to
Geneva to co-operate with the League in establishing sanctions with Italy, although he
was told not to initiate anything.
Meanwhile the British people elected Baldwin as Prime Minister in November 1935
partly on the basis of Hoare’s pro-League speech in September 1935. Few had yet
understood that the British had no intention of going to war with Italy over Abyssinia,
despite their public posturing. In December 1935 the Cabinet met to decide what to
do. There was a split between Eden and Chamberlain on one side who wanted to
extend sanctions while on the other Hoare and others were worried that sanctions
might provoke Mussolini to something worse. Hoare decided to go to Switzerland for
a break. He was not well and wanted to get fit practising figure-skating, at which he
was expert.
Secretly Hoare met Laval in Paris en route for Switzerland. Between them the drew
up a proposal for a settlement with Italy over the Abyssinian Crisis. The Hoare-Laval
Pact or Agreement can be summarised as follows:
1)
2)
Italy was to gain extensive territories in Abyssinia
Italy was to gain extensive economic concessions.
Baldwin, Eden and the rest of the Cabinet came round to Hoare’s proposal. After all
they could hardly prevent Italy’s aggression in Abyssinia and this proposal might still
keep Mussolini roughly in line with Britain and France. Unfortunately the British
public did not see it that way; all they saw was Hoare giving in to aggression when
only a few months before he was upholding the League’s principle of collective
security against aggressors. Hoare had to resign. (To make matters even worse, he had
just broken his nose on the ice!)
The results of the fiasco can be summarised like this:
a) Britain lost respect in Geneva as a leading member of the League,
b)
The League was seriously undermined by Britain’s unwillingness to get tough,
c) Britain continued to support sanctions against Italy until July 1936, by which time
Mussolini was thoroughly annoyed by Britain and the League which Italy, left in
1937,
d)
Mussolini completed the conquest of Abyssinia despite Britain and the
League,
e) Mussolini began to lean towards an alliance with Hitler and Britain lost all
opportunity of keeping Mussolini ‘on the side of the angels’.
17
British policy in 1935 should have been either to go to war with Mussolini and to
have brought him down or to have conceded Mussolini’s claims and brought Italy into
an alliance with Britain and France. Neither policy was properly followed and disaster
was the result.
Hitler’s aims in foreign policy 1933-38
Hitler aimed to make Germany into a great power again and this he hoped to achieve
by:
•
•
•
•
destroying the hated Versailles settlement,
building up the army,
recovering lost territory such as the Saar and the Polish Corridor, and
bringing all Germans within the Reich.
This last aim would involve the annexation of Austria and the acquisition of territory
from Czechoslovakia and Poland, both of which had large German minorities as a
result of Versailles.
There is some disagreement about what, if anything, Hitler intended beyond these
aims. Most historians believe that the annexation of Austria and parts of
Czechoslovakia and Poland was only a beginning, to be followed by the seizure of the
rest of Czechoslovakia and Poland and by the conquest and permanent occupation of
Russia as far east as the Ural Mountains. This would give him what the Germans
called lebensraum (living space) which would provide food for the German people
and an area in which the excess German population could settle and colonise. An
additional advantage was that communism would be destroyed. However not all
historians agree about these further aims; A.J.P. Taylor, for example, claims that
Hitler never intended a major war and at most was prepared for only a limited war
against Poland.
18
Whatever the truth about his long-term intentions, Hitler began his foreign policy with
a series of brilliant successes (one of the main reasons for his popularity in Germany).
By the end of 1938 almost every one of the first set of aims had been achieved,
without war and with the approval of Britain. Only the Germans of Poland remained
to be brought within the Reich. Unfortunately it was when he failed to achieve this by
peaceful means that Hitler took his fateful decision to invade Poland.
1933-38
a) Given that Germany was still militarily weak in 1933, Hitler had to move
cautiously at first. He withdrew from the Disarmament Conference and the League of
Nations on the grounds that France would not agree to German equality of
armaments. At the same time he insisted that Germany was willing to disarm if other
states agreed to do the same, and that he wanted only peace. This was one of his
favourite techniques: to act boldly while soothing his opponents with the sort of
conciliatory speeches he knew they wanted to hear.
b) Next Hitler signed a ten-year non-aggression pact with the Poles (January 1934)
who were showing alarm in case the Germans tried to take back the Polish corridor.
This was something of a triumph for Hitler:
•
•
•
Britain took it as further evidence of his peaceful intentions,
it ruined the French Little Entente which depended very much on Poland, and
it guaranteed Polish neutrality whenever Germany should move against Austria
and Czechslovakia.
On the other hand it improved relations between France and Russia, who were both
worried by the apparent threat from Nazi Germany.
c) July 1934 saw Hitler suffer a setback to his ambitions of an Anschluss (union)
between Germany and Austria. The Austrian Nazis, encoraged by Hitler, staged a
revolt and murdered the Chancellor, Egelbert Dollfuss, the protege of Mussolini.
However, when Mussolini moved Italian troops to the Austrian frontier and warned
the Germans off, the revolt collapsed; Hitler, taken aback, had to accept that Germany
was not yet strong enough to force the issue and disclaimed responsibility for the
actions of the Austrian Nazis.
d) The Saar was returned to Germany (January 1935) after a plebiscite resulting in a
90% vote in favour. Though the plebiscite had been provided for at Versailles, Nazi
propaganda made the most of the success, and Hitler announced that now all causes of
grievance between France and Germany had been removed.
e) Hitler’s first successful breach of Versailles came in March 1935 when he
announced the reintroduction of conscription. His excuse was that Britain had just
announced air force increases and France had extended consription from 12 to 18
months (their justification was German rearmament). Much to their consternation,
19
Hitler told his startled generals and the rest of the world that he would build up his
peacetime army to 36 divisions (about 600,000 men). The generals need not have
worried: although the Stresa Front condmned this violation of Versailles, no action
was taken, the League was helpless, and the Front collapsed anyway as a result of
Hitler’s next success.
f) Shrewdly realising how frail the Stresa Front was, Hitler detached Britain by
offering to limit the German navy to 35% of the strength of the British navy. Britain
eagerly accepted in the resulting Anglo-German Naval Agreement (June 1935)
apparently believeing that since the Germans were already breaking Versailles by
building a fleet, it would be as well to have it limited. Without consulting her two
allies (France and Italy), Britain had condoned German rearmament; from now on it
was going to be impossible to prevent that rearmament, which proceeded with
gathering momentum. By the end of 1938 the army stood at 51 divisions (about
800,000 men) plus reserves, there were 21 large naval vessels (battleships, cruisers
and destroyers), many more under construction, and 47 U-boats. A large air force of
over 2000 aircraft had been built up.
g) Meanwhile, encouraged by his successes, Hitler took the calculated risk of sending
troops into the demilitarised zone of the Rhineland (March 1936) - a breach of both
Versailles and Locarno. Though the troops had orders to withdraw at the first sign of
French opposition, no resistance was offered beyond the usual protests. at the same
time, well aware of the mood of pacifism among his opponents, Hitler soothed them
by offering a peace treaty to last for 25 years.
h) Later in 1936 Hitler consolidated Germany’s position by reaching an understanding
with Mussolini (the Rome-Berlin Axis) and by signing the Anti-Comintern Pact with
Japan (also joined by Italy in 1937). Germans and Italians gained military experience
helping Franco to victory in the Spanish Civil War, one of the most notorious exploits
being the bombing of the defenceless Basque market town of Guernica by the German
Condor Legion.
i) The Anschluss with Austria (March 1938) was Hitler’s greatest success to date.
Matters came to a head when the Austrian Nazis staged huge demonstrations in
Vienna, Graz and Linz, which Chancellor Schuschnigg’s government could not
control. Realising that this could be the prelude to a German invasion, Schuschnigg
announced a plebiscite about whether or not Austria should remain independent.
Hitler decided to act before this took place, in case the vote went against union;
German troops moved in and Austria became part of the Third Reich. It was a triumph
for Germany:
•
•
•
it revealed the weaknesses of Britain and France who again did no more than
protest,
it demonstrated the value of the new undertaking with Italy, and
it dealt a severe strategic blow at Czechoslovakia which could now be attacked
from the south as well as from the west and north.
20
All was ready for the beginning of Hitler’s campaign to acquire the German-speaking
Sudetenland, a campaign which ended in triumph at the Munich Conference in
September 1938.
The Anschluss of 1938
One of Hitler’s objectives was the annexation of Austria which had been forbidden by
Versailles. The Hossbach Memorandum revealed Hitler’s intentions and by 1937
Mussolini had been drawn away from the Stresa Front and was now a part of the
Rome-Berlin Axis. This suited Hitler who had been worried that Italy might oppose
the Anschluss.
The Austrian Prime Minister was rather dominated by Hitler, who demanded that
Schuschnigg reinstate the Austrian Nazi Party which had been banned in 1938.
Schuschnigg was summoned to Berchtesgaden and told that he had to:
a) reinstate the Austrian Nazi Party
b)
accept Seyss-Inquart and other Nazi’s in his cabinet.
Schuschnigg agreed and was subsequently treated with contempt by his new
colleagues. To try to get out of German domination, Schuschnigg organised a
plebiscite on 13th March 1938 which would ask the Austrians if they wanted to be
free.
Hitler prepared to mobilise.
a) he reassured Italy to respect the Austrian border with Italy (the Brenner Pass)
b)
he reassured the Czechs that he had no hostile intentions against them.
Schuschnigg agreed to cancel the plebiscite and then resigned in favour of SeyssInquart who asked for military assistance from Germany. German troops invaded
Austria on 12th March 1938. Austria became a province of Germany.
In a plebiscite 99.75% of Austrians supported the Anschluss.
Britain and France did nothing. Why?
a) appeasers believed Austria was German
b)
the Austrians appeared to want the Anschluss
c) it was not worth a war
d)
Britain and France would not get help from Italy.
21
The Sudetenland Crisis of 1938
After the Anschluss Hitler turned his attention to Czechoslovakia and the more than
three million Sudeten Germans. The region was now bordered by Germany on 3
sides. In April 1938 Chamberlain and Halifax made it clear to Daladier that they
would not guarantee France or Czechoslovakia if the latter were attacked. Britain and
France put pressure on Benes, the Czech President to give in to Germany.
Chamberlain tried to convince Hitler that he could have what he wanted without
resorting to war.
The Issues
Czechoslovakia was a new country, born out of the collapse of the Austro-Hungarian
Empire. The new state was set up as part of the Treaty of St. Germain (the treaty
which had dealt with Austria-Hungary in 1919.) Ethnically Czechoslovakia was
diverse with large numbers of Czechs, Slovaks, Poles and Hungarians. One of the
largest minority groups was the Sudeten Germans who lived in the mountainous
region of western Czechoslovakia. This region was relatively wealthy compared to
the rest of the country and contained all the major industrial complexes such as
Skoda. Hitler detested Czechoslovakia for its Slav peoples, especially as they had
control over ethnic Germans; he also disliked the fact that Czechoslovakia was a
successful democracy. In fact in 1938 it was the last democracy in eastern Europe.
Once Austria had been incorporated into the Reich,. Germany turned to the Sudeten
question.
Konrad Henlein
Hitler encouraged and supported the Sudeten Germans’ claim for self-determination.
In the middle of the 1930s Konrad Henlein had come to prominence as the leading
exponent of Sudeten German nationalism. Hitler fuelled Henlein’s political agitation
and there were a number of riots and marches led by Henlein in opposition to Czech
control of the region. Hitler provoked problems in the region by mobilising German
troops and the Czechs did the same in retaliation.
Under pressure from Britain and France, Benes, the Czech President offered Henlein
virtually everything he had been calling for, even home rule. Henlein refused; under
pressure from Hitler, Henlein did not accept Benes’ offers because Hitler wanted an
excuse for invasion. In an effort to calm things down, Chamberlain flew to meet
Hitler in a series of three meetings.
22
Chamberlain
It is at this moment that appeasement reached its most notorious point. Chamberlain
met Hitler on three occasions before a peace deal could be thrashed out:
1) Berchtesgaden – 15th September 1938
2) Godesberg – 22nd September 1938
3) Munich – 29th September 1938
At Berchtesgaden Chamberlain made it clear to Hitler that Britain would accept selfdetermination for the Sudetenland. This seemed straightforward, but Hitler upped the
ante by sending troops to the Czechoslovak borders and by encouraging the Poles and
the Hungarians to do the same.
A week later Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler at Bad Godesberg to finalise the
agreement made at Berchtesgaden. When he arrived he found that Hitler was not just
asking for the Sudetenland’s right of self-determination, but was asking for the
withdrawal of Czech troops from the Sudetenland and was also demanding territories
on behalf of Poland and Hungary. This was a clever piece of diplomacy on Hitler’s
part. By pressing Polish claims for Teschen and Hungarian claims for South Slovakia,
Hitler had won the support of two countries who might otherwise have allied with
Czechoslovakia against German aggression. Britain and France were reluctant to
agree to these demands and so Chamberlain returned to London to prepare for war.
For the next week tension built as each country began to mobilise. Then Mussolini
stepped into the arena with the proposal for a four-power conference in Munich on the
29th September.
Chamberlain flew to meet Hitler, Mussolini and Daladier at Munich. Here
Chamberlain eagerly gave into German claims for the Sudetenland: the price of peace.
Benes and the Czechs were completely ignored by this decision, as were the Russians.
(This later led the Russians to seek their own accomadation with Hitler in the 1939
Nazi-Soviet Pact which destroyed Poland, but gave Russia valuable time to help
prepare for an attack by Germany in the future.)
For a brief moment Chamberlain was triumphant. He returned to Britain with his
‘piece of paper’ which had averted war and which promised peace between Germany
and Britain in the future. On October 1 st Germany took the Sudetenland and Poland
and Hungary gained the territories they had been seeking. As the weeks passed the
gloss of Chamberlain’s success began to fade and when Hitler invaded the rest of
Czechoslovakia in March 1939, the policy of appeasement was seen to have failed.
Conclusion of the Sudeten Crisis
What are the conclusions one can draw from this episode?
23
•
•
•
•
Hitler became increasingly popular in Germany, he had achieved victory without a
war and it encouraged him to look for other foreign policy successes i.e. Poland.
Czechoslovakia was destroyed. A small, but strong democracy had been
abandoned by the Great Powers.
Russia had not been included in the Munich Agreement and Stalin felt compelled
to come his own arrangement with Germany (Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939).
It can be argued that Munich saw appeasement fail, that Hitler could not be
trusted. However it has been argued that Chamberlain bought time at Munich,
time in which Britain could rearm for conflicts in the future.
Poland 1939
The Polish Question
Like Czechoslovakia modern Poland was born out of the Paris Peace Treaties of
1919. Hitler heartely disliked Poland, especially as it drove a wedge between
Germany proper and East Prussia. This Polish Corridor gave the Polish state access
to the sea at Danzig (Gdansk). Hitler started to make moves against Poland in March
1939 just as Germany invaded the rest of Czechoslovakia. Hitler demanded the city of
Memel from Lithuania which suggested that he had territorial ambitions in the Baltic
Sea. At the same time anti-Polish propaganda was published in Germany; this
suggested that Germans living in the Polish Corridor were being mistreated by the
Poles.
Chamberlain reluctantly agreed to guarantee Polish security from German attack. At
this point Chamberlain believed that appeasement could still solve the problem of
German aggression. Hitler was furious and abandoned the Anglo-German Naval
Agreement of 1934 (see Disarmament). Mussolini invaded Albania in April 1939 and
in May Italy and Germany signed the Pact of Steel. Chamberlain knew that Britain
could never effectively secure Poland, Chamberlain hoped to appease Germany, but
things took a turn for the worse in August 1939.
The Nazi-Soviet Pact 1939
Despite their political differences both Germany and the USSR needed each other’s
cooperation in the autumn of 1939. As Hitler prepared to take back the Polish
Corridor he did not want to get embroiled in a war with Russia. Stalin was well aware
of German ambitions on Russia, but saw this pact as an opportunity to give time in
order to further prepare defences and for Russia to control an even greater buffer zone
against Germany. The Pact was totally cynical on both sides, but it paved the way for
the German invasion of Poland.
In fact Churchill had urged Britain to sign an agreement with Russia all through the
24
summer of 1939 despite his own personal antipathy towards communism. Britain did
not hurry the negotiations with Russia believing that there was still time to spare. (See
Tyke pp50-51 for more details.)
War
As Hitler prepared himself for war with Poland he began to offer Chamberlain the
hope of negotiation and appeasement. Hitler believed that Britain would withdraw its
guarantee to Poland just as it had done with Czechoslovakia. In the end however
Chamberlain was swayed by public opinion and his party to stand by Poland, so in
September 1939 Britain declared war on Germany in response to the German invasion
of Poland.
France in the 1930s
During the 1930s successive French governments generally followed Britain’s lead in
the series of crises that appeasement attempted to deal with. Although France was
fairly strong economically, and had not been too badly harmed by the Wall St. Crash,
France remained very weak politically. The French were very nervous of further
German aggression and attempted to weaken Germany as far as possible. The French
put their faith in a series of alliances with the new Eastern European states, these were
known as the Little Ententes. Militarily the French established a huge network of
military defences on the German border known as the Maginot Line.
At this time French governments were known as the Third Republic. Between 19171940 France’s democracy produced 44 governments under 20 different Prime
Ministers.
There were some dominant characters in the 1920s such as Clemenceau, Briand and
Poincare. But they had either all died or had been sidelined by 1932. They were
succeeded by lesser men who tended to follow Britain’s leadership.
In the early 1920s French politics were dominated by nationalism and antiGermanism. The right-wing Bloc National pushed for harsh treatment of Germany
and was behind the Ruhr Invasion of 1923 which was initiated by Raymond
Poincare.
After 1925, French foreign policy was under the leadership of the left-wing Aristide
Briand. He favoured a more international and conciliatory approach than his
predecessors and helped to build the Kellogg-Briand Pact of 1928.
From 1929-1936 French politics became increasingly unstable with over 20
ministerial crises. Things came to a head over the Stavisky Affair of 1934. Stavisky
25
was a financier whose ‘suicide’ was suspected as a political murder to conceal
governmental corruption.
The Stavisky Affair coincided with economic and social unrest and with acute
political weaknesses. Riots broke out and there was a call for a general strike.
Daladier’s government of January 1934 only lasted 9 days! Calls for strong
government whether fascist or communist were to be heard on the streets of Paris. A
broad coalition government held the republic together until there were new elections
in 1936.
In 1936 a Popular Front of left-wing parties formed government under Leon Blum
and later Chautemps. Edward Daladier succeeded them from 1938-40. Daladier was
very anxious to keep France out of a war and he was the one who ignored the French
alliance with Czechoslovakia in order to keep the peace. When war broke out Petain
became the leader of France. He and Pierre Laval led the Vichy government until
1942. Petain was imprisoned, Laval was shot.
The weakness of French politics and the acute internal divisions between right and
left caused the relative decline of France as a great power. This decline deprived
Britain of the one strong ally who could have helped to stand up to Germany. French
weakness was thus a determining factor in Britain’s adoption of appeasement in the
1930s.
Economic Appeasement
The Origins of the Second World War by R.J. Overy
Chapter 3 Economic and Imperial Rivalry
The recession
a) ‘No single factor more important in explaining the breakdown of the diplomatic
system in the 1930s.’
1929----recession (20%-33% of workforce unemployed in the industrial powers.)
The system of world trade collapsed because of war debts and a weak pound. Austria
and Germany were on the brink of bankruptcy in 1931.
b)
Governments sought to protect themselves through the raising of tariffs
America put up tariffs in 1930
France manipulated the value of the Franc
Britain abandoned the gold standard and free trade
26
Little or no investment came out of London or Paris after 1929. Smaller and weaker
countries were left in desperate straits which led to resentment.
c) Some countries adopted ‘autarky’ or self-sufficiency so that national economies
would not become dependent upon shifts in the world markets. Autarky was
popular in Fascist states such as Germany and Italy where economic independence
was seen as popular on nationalistic grounds. To some extent this situation was
forced upon Germany and Italy and Japan which were naturally poor in natural
resources.
d)
Mussolini described the situation as ‘have’ and ‘have-not’ states. It was
argued that ‘have’ states like Britain and France could weather financial crises by
relying on empires; ‘have-not’ states used this argument to develop their own
empires.
‘The world economic crises thus had the effect of sharpening conflicts over markets
and raw materials, undermining economic co-operation, and arousing once again
dreams of imperial conquest.’
Imperial Power
a) Imperialism did not vanish in 1918, it was just reorganised. Britain and France
ruled 33% of the world either directly or indirectly in 1918.
Empire was the source of Britain’s greatness, without Chamberlain remarked that
Britain would be only a fourth rate power. Prestige and influence was bound up with
empire, Britain would fight to defend it.
After 1929 the empires were increasingly important to shore up finances and protect
internal producers e.g.
Trade between France and her empire rose from 9% in 1914 to 33% in 1929.
Trade between Britain and empire rose from 33% in 1910 to 50% in 1938.
Empire was seen as a source of strength and political stability was said to depend
upon empire, thus the defence of the empire became a key foreign policy aim in the
1930s and helps to explain why the policy of appeasement was adopted.
b)
Some argue that the empire was a liability, helped to undermine Britain and
France’s ability to maintain their empires and contain the aggressor powers. The
empires were not united and were gripped by nationalism which was expensive to
maintain. Eg a large part of Britain’s military capacity in 1939 was in the Middle
East - Iraq, India, Palestine and Egypt.
27
India consumed more than she gave.
c) The empires were perceived to be the source of Britain and France’s strength, yet
they were wracked by insecurity and crises. Defence of the empire was very
expensive and threatened stability. Failure to defend would end Britain and
France’s status as world powers.
The have-not powers
a) The reality of empire did not deter the have-not powers in trying to build their own.
Britain and France were perceived as has-beens who were ripe for overthrow by
new and younger nations. To be great Japan, Italy and Germany imitated what
Britain and France had done before.
All three have-nots assumed that:
1)
2)
economic survival
survival of their peoples
depended upon the acquisition of large areas with raw materials, cheap labour and
land for surplus populations.
This was an illusion and become bound up with nationalism and fascism, notions of
racial destiny and delusions of imperial grandeur. There was some truth to their ideas
particularly over oil and because they have-nots felt their supplies could be easily cutoff in times of conflict.
b)
Access to markets became restricted for the have-nots
Japanese goods were excluded from British and French markets in Asia and Africa
German trade in the Balkans replaced by Britain and France after 1919
Italian emigration to USA restricted after 1919
Japanese emigration to Australia and America closed off by the 1930s.
The slowing down in economic and trade growth and the spread of protectionism by
the haves was perceived as a deliberate attempt to restrict the economies of the havenot countries. Economic hostility led to political hostility. They had to get out of this
situation somehow.
c) Japanese expansion began in Korea in 1894 and expanded into China in the 1920s.
In the 1930s the Japanese tried to set up an Asian ‘New Order’. The Co-Prosperity
Sphere was set up in the 1930s.
d)
Italy sought an empire to make the Italians wealthy, but to also give them a
sense of racial superiority. Britain and France had not interfered with Italy in
28
Ethiopia and Spain, Mussolini believed it was only a matter of time before Italy
replaced them in Africa.
e) Germany was different, she sought world power, not geographically defined. Hitler
wanted to revise Versailles, but he wanted much more too.
Hitler believed that only Germans and Jews contested for world power, therefore he
would need to destroy the Jews. German expansion was in two stages:
1)
2)
to dominate ‘Mitteleuropa’
to use these resources as a springboard to the east (Lebensraum). The
conquest of Russia would lead to the conquest of India and the Middle East.
Eventually Germany would take on America. (He ordered Speer to build victory
buildings in Berlin for 1951)
To begin with the Germans had to be circumspect, but as they became increasingly
confident, they moved from diplomacy of opportunity to diplomacy of intention.
The failure of economic appeasement
These problems were recognised in the West:
Chamberlain: ‘Might not a great improvement in Germany’s economic situation result
in her becoming quieter and less interested in political adventures?’
Britain understood and respected Japan and Germany’s claims, by conceding certain
claims, peace could be preserved.
Economic appeasement began in 1936. They tried to find terms to bring the
aggressors back into the world economy as a prelude to a general settlement.
Protection was a real barrier to terms being found.
1934 - some agreements between Britain and Germany on trade
1938 - eastern European trade rearranged
1939 - agreement on coal exports
Britain held out the prospect of returning German colonies and a loan. No agreement
could be had with Japan.
All this was too late, the aggressors tried autarky and war to get what they wanted.
Why?
a) too late
b)
unable to get agreements between the western powers
c) 1938 economic recession
d)
the aggressors were mistrustful of western motives
29
e) Chamberlain believed that economic appeasement could help to restore the
balance, yet at the same time did not hesitate to use economic power as a weapon
to contain the aggressors.
The result was a sharp increase in economic rivalry in Eastern Europe, China and
Latin America.
Conclusion
Did economic rivalry cause war? Communists always believed that Capitalism led
to war. This theory is no longer viable. Many leading industrialists were distrustful of
the nationalists and worked internationally on trade deals eg trade agreements
between German and British businessmen in the summer of 1939.
‘Economic conflict had a basic political cause, the uneven distribution of territory and
political power.’
‘The war was fought in the end as a contest for political power, the culmination of
that long and unstable period of empire-building which had begun in the middle of the
nineteenth century.’ I.e. politics was a greater factor than economics.
The Hossbach Memorandum
In 1937 Hitler called a meeting of the German War Minister Blomberg, three chiefs of
staff and the Foreign Minister Neurath. At this meeting Hitler delivered a haranguing
monologue which was recorded by a Colonel Hossbach. At the Nuremberg trials
this Hossbach Memorandum was used as evidence that Hitler had planned a major
war all along and had not just wanted small wars to achieve small aims. The meeting
can be summarised as follows:
1)
2)
3)
4)
Aim of German policy was to preserve the racial community and gain space.
Britain and France were Germany’s main opponents.
Germany must use force to secure her objectives.
Germany would peak in 1943, the problem of space had to be solved by 194345.
5)
6)
If France suffered internal strife, Germany should seize Czechoslovakia.
If France was involved in a war, Germany should seize Austria and
Czechoslovakia. Britain and Italy would not oppose Germany in Czechoslovakia.
30
Italy might still oppose annexation of Austria. France would no nothing without
Britain.
There have been two interpretations of this memorandum:
a) Hugh Trevor-Roper: Hitler’s blueprint for war
b)
A.J.P. Taylor: Hitler was just ranting and saying nothing new, he wanted to
avoid a discussion on steel shortages which is what the meeting was supposed to
be about. Dates were wrong, Russia was ignored and France did not suffer a civil
war.
Most agree that it is remarkably accurate in predicting what actually happened
Was Chamberlain guilty?
‘The memory of Neville Chamberlain and the idea of appeasement go together. Yet
he invented neither policy nor the word.’ R.A.C. Parker Chamberlain and
Appeasement
In the early 1930s appeasement was an almost universally popular and accepted part
of British foreign policy, although later it was most closely associated Chamberlain.
Chamberlain stuck with this policy and was its leading proponent in the House of
Commons long after doubts were sown about its wisdom. Chamberlain’s three visits
to Hitler in 1938 (see The Sudetenland Crisis of 1938) were of his own undertaking.
By taking the decision to try to negotiate with Hitler personally Chamberlain nailed
his colours to the mast, and had to live with the consquences. He had total faith in the
policy of appeasement and believed that eventually Hitler could be controlled through
appeasement. Chamberlain did not see appeasement as a cynical ploy to buy time to
re-arm, he believed in the ultimate success of the policy to prevent another war. His
hopes deceived him as he admitted with the outbreak of hostilities:
‘Everything that I have worked for, everything that I have hoped for, everything I
have believed in during my public life, has crashed into ruins.’
Chamberlain has long been misunderstood and under-rated as a Prime Minister but he
was not a coward, a fool, ignorant or idle. Indeed, he was cultivated, highly intelligent
and hardworking. Today he is considered the strongest-willed PM of the C.20 th with
the exception of Margaret Thatcher. But his reputation is as a petty, narrow-minded,
boring provincial. (Rather as John Major was portrayed in the 1990s.) He was quite a
small man who hated public speaking. His hobbies included art, and he took pictures
from the National Gallery for 11 Downing Street when he was Chancellor of the
Exchequer. Chamberlain did not like modern art very much, but enjoyed reading
literary criticism and historical biographies. He was interested in classical music,
flowers, trees, bird watching, pheasant shooting and angling. Chamberlain was
considered rather old-fashioned even for the 1930s, he wore dark clothes and oldfashioned collars and he spoke clearly and precisely. He respected those who worked
31
hard and concentrated, he was not good at socialising and was not considered very
club-able. Chamberlain disliked criticism and opposition, but loved flattery, which
Hitler exploited to the full when they met.
Chamberlain was a tough politician with strong views that influenced his politics. He
tended to dominate the cabinets of MacDonald and Baldwin, although they were
Prime Ministers at the time. Between 1931-1937 he held the post of Chancellor of the
Exchequer, at which he had some success in coping with the problems of the
recession. With some justification Chamberlain can claim to have helped
unemployment to fall, to increase British exports and to develop trading links with
other countries.
But despite his successes in home affairs, Chamberlain was always more interested in
foreign affairs. Chamberlain was the dominant political personality in MacDonald’s
National Government 1931-35 and Baldwin’s Government 1935-37. Chamberlain
despaired of those politicians around him and came to believe that if it wasn’t for him
the whole country would have fallen apart at the seams:
‘You would be astonished if you knew how impossible it is to get any decision taken
unless I see that it is done myself and sometimes I wonder what would happen to the
Government if I were to be smashed up in a taxi collision.’
Chamberlain’s sense of self-importance was strong. When the 1935 Stresa
Conference was set up to try and woo Mussolini into a friendly understanding with
Britain and France, Chamberlain remarked: ‘I shall have to send Baldwin as well as
Eden with Simon.’ This was quite a cheek, as Chamberlain was Chancellor while
Baldwin was Prime Minister! Chamberlain finally became Prime Minister in May
1937 and immediately took control of foreign affairs.
Chamberlain’s policy of appeasement was popular until 1938, but after the Munich
crisis, doubts began to grow. Chamberlain took sides in the national debate and
continued to offer appeasement to Hitler even after the occupation of Prague in March
1939.
Where has Chamberlain’s poor reputation come from?
Chamberlain’s poor reputation for giving into Hitler comes from two main
contemporary sources: Cato ( a group of journalists/MPs led by the Labour politician
Michael Foot), and Winston Churchill. Both men survived Chamberlain and lived
through the experiences of the Second World War. Churchill, in particular, had a
profound influence on Chamberlain’s later reputation. Not only did he succeed
Chamberlain, but Churchill wrote a number of history books which basically
criticised Chamberlain’s adoption of the appeasement as the basis of Britain’s foreign
policy. Churchill resented having been excluded from office in the 1930s by leading
Conservatives such as Baldwin and Chamberlain. What must not be forgotten is that
appeasement was an extremely popular policy for most people in Britain up until the
32
German invasion of the rest of Czechoslovakia in March 1939. Even then, many
would have continued to support appeasement if it meant avoiding war with
Germany. After the war, it was common to reproach Chamberlain for his attempts at
conciliation; hindsight appeared to make a fool of Chamberlain. It was not until the
1970s and 1980s that historians began to reappraise Chamberlain’s contribution.
Many today accept that although Chamberlain may have been foolish, there was little
else he could do. Some historians believe that Chamberlain could do very little other
than appease given the weakness of France, economic problems, military weakness,
Hitler’s diplomatic genius and the effective exclusion of the USA and the USSR from
European politics.
A summary of the different views historians have had of Chamberlain:
a) The Guilty Men 1940 Michael Foot, ‘Cato’ attacked Chamberlain for:




allowing Hitler to make gains without the risk of war,
advertising the weakness of Britain and France,
sacrifice of Czechoslovakia and Poland,
encouraging Hitler to contemplate war with the West.
b) Churchill’s The Gathering Storm 1948 criticises Chamberlain as:
‘the narrowest, most ignorant, most ungenerous of men.’
Churchill’s analysis does not explain the reasons for the Second World War. Its
causes are far more complex than being simply Chamberlain’s fault.
The following articles are a basic summary of the differing interpretations by
historians of the role of Chamberlain in the appeasement years. Essentially the debate
has raged over the degree of Chamberlain’s ‘guilt’, if that is an appropriate word. The
debate began in 1940 with the publication of The Guilty Men by Cato, a collection of
political writers led by Michael Foot. Cato criticised Chamberlain severely and this
theme was followed up by Churchill in his The Gathering Storm (1948). In fact,
Churchill had been a leading opponent of Chamberlain and appeasement in the 1930s
when the great voice of public opinion was firmly behind the National Government’s
foreign policies. By the 1970s historians began to challenge this prevailing view of
Chamberlain. These writers excused Chamberlain on the grounds that there were
many factors in Chamberlain’s adoption of appeasement, i.e. given the circumstances,
Britain had no other option but to appease. In the 1980s and 1990s the pendulum
began to swing back again, with some historians beginning to point the finger of
blame at Chamberlain whilst at the same time accepting the realities of the political
climate in the 1930s. The articles below have been summarised, you need to be aware
of the arguments put forward by these historians if you are going to write a critical
33
analysis of Chamberlain. The articles have all been reprinted in British Appeasement
and the Origins of World War II by R.J.Q Adams.
Was Chamberlain guilty?
Article
Verdict
‘Chamberlain: the guiltiest Guilty
man?’ - Aster 1989
Summary
Chamberlain identified himself with
appeasement. Aster believes that
Chamberlain did not see appeasement just as
a delaying tactic that would buy time for
Britain to rearm for the coming conflict.
Aster argues that appeasement was
Chamberlain’s final aim.
‘Chamberlain attempted
the impossible’ - Douglas
1977
Douglas argues that Chamberlain had no
other option than appeasement given the
economic, military and political climate of
the times. He did the best he could.
Not
guilty
‘A triumph for all that was Not
best in British life’ –
guilty
A.J.P. Taylor (1961)
Taylor saw Chamberlain’s adoption of
appeasement as a noble attempt by a British
politician to uphold the principle of national
self-determination as encouraged by
Woodrow Wilson and the Treaty of
Versailles. Taylor admits that Chamberlain
made mistakes at Munich by indicating to
Hitler that Britain could not effectively
respond militarily to the German threat
34
towards Czechoslovakia. I.e. it was the style
in which Chamberlain appeased that was at
made mistakes at Munich by indicating to
Hitler that Britain could not effectively
respond militarily to the German threat
towards Czechoslovakia. I.e. it was the style
in which Chamberlain appeased that was at
fault, not the actual terms of appeasement
that Taylor criticises.
‘Appeasement and its
interpreters’ - Kennedy
(1986)
Mixed
(on the
fence)
‘Reckoning’ - Middlemass Guilty
Kennedy argues that it is too simplistic to
argue that Chamberlain was guilty or not
guilty. He believes that Chamberlain made
mistakes, but that he faced insurmountable
problems at the same time.
Middlemass argues that Chamberlain
inherited a series of problems that he
compounded. Britain needed to follow a
foreign policy that maintained its status as a
Great Power yet at the same time recognised
that this power was waning.
Survival Skills - ‘Appeasement’ Robert Pearce - History Review
March 1998
Robert Pearce identifies the points to discuss on issues raised by key A-level
questions.
Appeasement is one of the most controversial and hotly contested issues in modern
history. The arguments for and against are so finely balanced that it is immensely
difficult for hard-pressed students - and academics - to make up their minds. No
longer can we accept the simplistic theory that portrayed the appeasers, and especially
Neville Chamberlain, as cowardly, short-sighted and wishful-thinking Guilty Men
who encouraged Hitler's territorial appetites and whose almost criminal negligence
left Britain undefended. Nor can the anti-appeasers, pre-eminently Winston Churchill,
any longer be assigned the role of valiant heroes, struggling manfully to avoid 'the
unnecessary war'. Instead, we have the unpleasant task of thinking for ourselves. How
should we approach the topic?
35
The preliminary spade-work
The obvious starting point is a knowledge of events. Hence you must be familiar with
European history from 1918 onwards. Try drawing up a table of relevant facts. From
early in the period, you will no doubt include those provisions of the Treaty of
Versailles which aggrieved the Germans. You should also be familiar with changing
interpretations of the causes of the Great War. Initial notions of German war guilt,
enshrined in Article 231 of the Treaty of Versailles, gave way by the early-1930s to
the view that no one country had been responsible and that, in Lloyd George's phrase,
'the nations slithered over the brink into the seething cauldron of war'. Do not forget,
either, the stories of the atrocities committed by retreating German troops in 1918
which were later revealed as gross distortions and which, in consequence, led many to
doubt the veracity of Nazi atrocities. But, of course, the bulk of your attention should
go to the period when Hitler was in power. How far, by 1933, had Versailles been
peacefully revised?
In addition, you must know (which means not having to struggle to recall) a
chronology of his actions and of the responses of the appeasers. Appeasement only
has meaning in relation to Hitler's rearmament and to his territorial demands and
acquisitions.
Next, try formulating a working definition of appeasement. Do not give a value-laden
definition. At this stage you should avoid deciding whether appeasement was,
essentially, 'a good thing' or 'a bad thing'. Later you can return to this issue and
formulate a final judgement.
Justifications for Appeasement
• Another war would be even more destructive than the 1914-18 conflict
• Hitler presented a logical, convincing case in favour of revision; but he also
seemed a dangerous fanatic who would risk major war if his grievances were not
satisfied
• Britain was too weak economically to fight another war
• Nazi Germany was a useful barrier against the spread of Soviet Communism
• Britain's defences meant that she was ill-prepared for war
36
• Avoiding war would help the National Government to win the general election due
by 1940
• A war would leave the vast and sprawling British Empire vulnerable to attack
• Britain had too few allies: neither the French, the Americans, nor the Russians
could be relied on
• Appeasement bought time to rearm
• Versailles was based on false notions of German war guilt
• Britain had too many potential enemies and certainly could not afford to get
involved in a war against Germany, Italy and Japan
• Public opinion seemed set against war
• Events in central and eastern Europe were of no direct concern to Britain.
The rationale for appeasement
Once you are aware of what happened, you should list possible reasons why Britain's
politicians tried to satisfy Hitler's grievances and thereby avoid war. Your list will
probably include those from above.
But do not be satisfied with drawing up a list like this. Rearrange your points so that
they are in coherent order. (How would you rearrange the list above, so that groups of
related causes appear together?) You should also attempt to rank them into some sort
of order of importance. Next, you should add evidence, in order to substantiate them.
This of course is absolutely vital, since a generalisation without evidence is merely an
assertion. Try to compile enough evidence so that you can be confident of tackling
any question that comes up, and try to pick the best evidence, which often means
finding short, easily memorable quotations from contemporaries. For instance, quote
Baldwin's assertion that 'the bomber will always get through' to show the fear of
another war. Or, to show defence weakness, quote General Ironside at the time of
Munich insisting that 'Chamberlain is of course right. We have not the means of
defending ourselves and he knows it....We cannot expose ourselves now to a German
attack. We simply commit suicide if we do.' (Or, to get the highest grade, try to find
evidence which is not quoted so often in the textbooks, in order to avoid boring the
examiner with over-familiar material. Sometimes students assume that examiners are
always fair, impartial and wide awake. Would that it were so!)
Finally, try to judge when each of your points was most relevant. Guilt feelings about
Versailles, for instance, may have been important in 1933-36 but they were far less
37
important in the years that followed. Similarly there is far more evidence that the
politicians followed public opinion when the passive Baldwin was premier than in the
period after May 1937, when Chamberlain followed a more active brand of
appeasement. You must be sure to avoid giving the impression that the 1930s were a
static period.
The case for the prosecution
It is easy to draw up reasons explaining appeasement - and even easier to fall into the
trap of supposing that, because a policy can be explained, it was therefore a sensible
policy to pursue, and perhaps the best policy to pursue. Hence it is vital to consider
the case against appeasement, and especially against Chamberlain's appeasement.
What points will you make? Perhaps you might focus on Chamberlain's relative
ignorance of foreign affairs: he once insisted that it was right that the Sudetenland
should be 'returned' to Germany, whereas in fact it had never been part of the German
state. Did he, as his critics asserted, see foreign affairs 'through the wrong end of a
municipal drain-pipe'? Furthermore, did he ever really understand Hitler?
Appeasement was based on the assumption that, at some point, Hitler would be
satisfied with concessions; but every time Chamberlain was reasonable, Hitler's
contempt for the man grew. 'Our opponents', he said, 'are little worms: I saw them at
Munich.' The guarantee to Poland at the end of March 1939 owed more to Halifax's
initiative than to Chamberlain's, and the Premier continued to put pressure on Poland
to make concessions over Danzig. Moreover Chamberlain made only half-hearted
attempts to secure an alliance with the Soviet Union in the summer of 1939. He sent a
relatively low-level delegation to Moscow, headed by Admiral Drax - and they
travelled not by air by a slow boat. Nor did Chamberlain hasten to make good the
guarantee when Hitler invaded Poland on 1 September. Was Chamberlain therefore
an unconscious pacifist who, at heart, wanted peace at any price? Churchill said, after
the Munich crisis, that Chamberlain had been given a choice between 'dishonour and
war: you chose dishonour, but you will still have war'. This view was vindicated by
events. Hence it is tempting to agree with Churchill's critique and to believe that a
policy of resistance would have yielded better results.
The critics criticised
On the other hand, Churchill - an unrepentant imperialist - had a romantic, unrealistic
view of Britain's position in world affairs (and of his glorious destiny in our unfolding
history). Chamberlain considered, with good reasons, that an all-out programme of
rearmament would severely weaken the whole economy, putting Britain at a severe
disadvantage if a long war were to be fought. Nor was Churchill, in the 1930s, as
implacably opposed to appeasement as he later claimed. Indeed he was quite prepared
to turn a blind eye to Japanese and Italian aggression, and his opposition to German
appeasement was not as sharp or prolonged as he later indicated. In 1948, in The
38
Gathering Storm, he decided that the Second World War could easily have been
avoided but for the foolish policy of appeasement. But at other times in his career he
viewed attempts to avoid war differently. In The World Crisis (1923) he decided that
'a war postponed may be a war averted'; and in a speech in Washington in June 1954
he insisted that to 'jaw-jaw is better than to war-war'.
Make your mind up time
Was Chamberlain right? He said that he 'was hoping for the best (by appeasing Hitler)
while preparing for the worst (by rearming)'. Did this make sense? Aware that
declaring war on behalf of Czechoslovakia would have been an empty gesture, given
Britain's inability to help the Czechs, he chose to appease Hitler while there still
seemed to be a chance of avoiding a catastrophic war. By waiting until September
1939 he was able to enter the conflict with a united nation behind him, with the
support of the Dominions, and with the moral support of neutral nations like the USA.
A good case can be made out for Chamberlain. And if he was motivated by an
unconscious pacifism, it can still be argued that he did the right thing, even if for the
wrong reason. Some would say that his policy went awry only with the guarantee to
Poland. A fashionable argument nowadays is that Chamberlain should have persisted
with his appeasement, and thereby kept Britain out of the Second World War.
What verdict will you reach on the anti-appeasement argument? Were Britons led
astray into pursuing an unwise policy by their insularity, by their guilt feelings over
Versailles and by fear of Armageddon? Would another, firmer stance have fared
better, perhaps fuelling anti-Nazi critics in Germany and even leading to Hitler's
downfall? Some have said that Churchill was motivated by implacable anti-German
feelings. If so, perhaps it was he who did the right thing for the wrong reason.
Reaching a final verdict is anything but easy. Try rehearsing the various arguments in
your mind to see which ones makes most sense. Better still, try debating them with
other people. Put yourself in the position of someone in the 1930s - and remember not
to use hindsight. Events which, to us, are in the past were in the future - and therefore
unknowable - in the 1930s. To get best results, you will need to make a real
imaginative effort. It is no good simply dodging inconvenient facts and evidence.
Pretend that this is not merely an intellectual exercise. Pretend that you care and that
the issue is vital - and, in the end, you probably will care. Then you will be in a
position to argue a case convincingly.
Now you should return to your initial definition of appeasement, expanding it and
giving your final views. By this stage you should have the satisfaction of knowing
your own mind and of having squarely confronted the difficulties of this fiendishly
complex but endlessly intriguing topic.
Robert Pearce is Reader in History at the University College of St Martin, Lancaster.
His latest books include Attlee (Longman, 1997) and Fascism and Nazism (Hodder &
Stoughton, 1997).
39
Test yourself
Make sure you have completed your revision. You should then be able to answer the
following questions without too much trouble:
1. Which British Prime Minister is most closely associated with appeasement?
2. Name three countries that were appeased by Britain in the 1930s.
3. In which year did Japan invade Manchuria?
4. How large an army was Germany restricted to by the Treaty of Versailles?
5. What was the Stresa Front of 1935?
6. Which African state was invaded by Italy in 1935?
7. What was the Hoare-Laval Pact?
8. Why did Britain turn a blind-eye to Mussolini's aggressive foreign policy?
9. In which war did both Germany and Italy support the fascist dictator General
Franco?
10. Which clause of the Treaty of Versailles was broken by Germany in 1936?
11. Which country became part of Germany after the Anschluss of 1938?
12. What was the name of the largely German-speaking area of Czechoslovakia?
13. Who was the leader of the Sudeten Germans?
14. Essentially what was agreed to at the Munich Conference of 1938?
15. Which Polish port was claimed by Germany in 1939?
16. Which agreement between Germany and Russia prevented Russia from declaring
war on Germany in 1939?
17. What is the German word for the eastward expansion of Germany's frontiers in
the 1930s and 40s which aimed to provide new lands for the German people?
18. Which historian claims that Hitler always intended a major European war?
40
19. Which historian claims that Hitler only ever intended a small-scale war against
Poland in 1939?
20. Why was Britain reluctant to formalise a defensive alliance with Russia in the
1930s?
If you’ve got this far, well done and good luck in your exams!
Books on Appeasement
Philip Bell, 'Appeasement', in Martin Pugh (ed), A Companion to Modern European
History 1871-1945 (1997)
John Charmley, Chamberlain and the Lost Peace (1989)
Richard Cockett, Twilight of Truth: Chamberlain, Appeasement and the Manipulation
of the Press (1989)
Alan Farmer, Britain: Foreign and Imperial Affairs 1919-39 (1992)
Paul Kennedy, The Realities behind Diplomacy (1981)
R.A.C. Parker, Chamberlain and Appeasement (1993)
Keith Robbins, Appeasement (1988)
William Rock, British Appeasement in the 1930s (1977)
Note: Penguin has recently republished The Guilty Men by ‘Cato’ (a group of 4 MPs
from the 1940s under the leadership of Michael Foot.) Current price is £6.99.
Tim Johnson
June 1999
41