Download David Farragut, the Hero of Mobile Bay

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Alex Wentz
Dr. Dixon
ENG 102
11/18/14
David Farragut, the Hero of Mobile Bay
David Farragut, rear admiral in the Union navy, woke early on the morning of August 5th,
1864 with an odd request; to check the wind. After hearing that there was a slight breeze
coming from the southwest, Farragut issued orders for his fleet to prepare for attack. By the
summer of 1864, the Union had created a blockade around the South. After the fall of New
Orleans in 1862, Mobile Bay had become the primary safe haven for rebel blockade running
ships. Ever since he had stormed the port of New Orleans, Farragut had wanted to capture
Mobile; however, the leaders from Washington did not agree because they thought capturing
Texas and the Mississippi River would be more important. But now Farragut finally had his
chance, he had received the orders, the fleet was ready, and the wind was on his side. So
around 3 AM, after a fitful night of restless sleep, Farragut issued orders to begin the attack he
had been hoping to begin for over two years. Farragut’s actions throughout the attack would
both seal his place in history, and help him become the first full admiral in the United States
navy.
By the time the battle of Mobile Bay took place, Farragut was sixty-three years old and
had a long history with the U.S. navy. In 1810 when he was less than ten years old, Farragut
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was appointed midshipman in the U.S. navy under the guardianship of Captain David Porter.
During the war of 1812 he served under Captain Porter on the U.S.S Essex and eventually was
given command of his first ship, the U.S.S Essex Jr., at the age of twelve. By 1821 Farragut had
been promoted to Lieutenant and twenty years later was promoted again to commander
during the Mexican-American War. After the war Farragut helped construct naval bases and
was in charge of weapons and supplies in Norfolk, Virginia. In 1855 he was promoted yet again
to the rank of Captain. When the civil war broke out, Farragut wanted to remain part of the
Union, so he left his home state of Virginia and went north. During the beginning of the war
Farragut was given unimportant jobs because the union officers were worried he was still
faithful to his home state, Virginia. It wasn’t until December of 1861 that Farragut was given an
important role in the war; he was put in charge of the Union naval blockade of the South. At
first the blockade did not work, the Union had far too few ships and the South simply
implemented smaller, faster “blockade runners” to slip past the Union blockade. Farragut
quickly realized that the only way to truly cut off the South was to capture their ports, so even if
the blockade runners made it past the blockade, they would have nowhere to go.
Farragut first set his eyes on the port of New Orleans, the biggest shipping port in the
South. In April of 1862, Farragut began the attack on New Orleans by bombarding the two
confederate forts guarding the Mississippi River with newly designed mortars that could fire
from extra-long distances. However, after 8 days of solid bombardment, the forts were not
destroyed, and Farragut’s officers advised him to call off the attack and wait for reinforcements
from the army. But Farragut knew he had to attack before the Confederate forces became
stronger, so Farragut and his fleet of seventeen ships sailed past the confederate forts at night,
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and were able to capture New Orleans after losing only three vessels. Mobile was the next port
on Farragut’s list, however the Union leaders sent him and his ships up the Mississippi to help
the Union army, and then to numerous other engagements.
It wasn’t until 1864 that Farragut would be allowed to finally attack Mobile, and he
began planning the invasion immediately. Unfortunately for rear-admiral Farragut, he would
have more than enough time to plan his attack as he did not receive the needed ships for an
additional six months. Farragut knew he could not attack the city itself because it was too well
fortified. Instead he planned to sail past the forts at the mouth of Mobile Bay and occupy the
Bay itself. The Bay itself is about thirty miles long and varies in width anywhere from about five
to fifteen miles. The Bay’s opening lies between an outcropping of land from the east called
Mobile Point, and Dauphin Island to the west. The main channel fit for ships narrowed to about
two thousand yards across and ran right next to Mobile Point. Fort Morgan rested at this point
and Fort Gaines was built on top of Dauphin Island, together these two forts guarded the only
entrance to Mobile Bay. Another fort, Fort Powell, did not factor into Farragut’s plans as it was
situated on the shore of the Bay about six miles north of Fort Gaines and he would not bring his
fleet within range of it. “Entering strongly into Farragut’s calculations, however, other than the
guns of Fort Morgan, was the danger planted in the channel itself and waiting in the waters
beyond” (Waugh 21). The opening to the bay was filled almost entirely by a bed of torpedoes,
floating mines anchored to the bottom. Only 225 yards of water were left clear and this
passage ran right past Fort Morgan. It was through this narrow opening that Farragut would
have to lead his fleet. To add to the difficulties, one of the South’s only naval fleets was waiting
in the Bay led by Admiral Buchanan. Buchanan’s fleet consisted of three tiny squadron boats
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and the Tennessee, Buchanan’s flagship and the most powerful ironclad built by the
confederacy. Once finally assembled, Farragut’s invasion fleet consisted of eighteen ships,
including four ironclads and his flagship, the Hartford. The plan was for the ships to travel
through the channel in pairs, lashed together so that if one was injured the other would be able
to pull it through the narrow channel near Fort Morgan. Farragut, a firm believer in leading by
example and from the front, wanted his ship, the Hartford, to lead the column but his officers
refused, saying it would be too dangerous for the admiral. So when the ships began to line up
early on the morning of August 5th , the Hartford’s sister ship, the Brooklyn, was at the front of
the column with the Hartford trailing directly behind. Farragut wanted to attack in the early
morning because it would be high tide, and he was hoping the torpedoes would be pulled tight
against their anchors and his ships may be able to safely travel over them. He was also hoping
for a westward wind, which would blow the smoke from the battle directly at Fort Morgan,
hopefully covering Farragut’s fleet.
It was 5:30 in the morning when Farragut turned to his fleet captain and said “Well,
Drayton, we might as well be under way.” With that the double column of Farragut’s fourteen
ships began churning towards the channel into Mobile Bay, and the four ironclads lined up on
their starboard side, in between the main column and the guns of Fort Morgan in order to take
the brunt of the fire. At 6 AM a lookout aboard the Tennessee noticed the Union fleet on the
move and warned Admiral Buchannan, who in turn ordered his small fleet to line up in single
file behind Fort Morgan, so that they could fire on each Union ship as it came through the
channel. The first shot from Fort Morgan came at 7:06 in the morning, and Farragut’s fleet
responded with everything they had from the channel. According to William Hutchinson
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aboard the Union fleet it was “as if hell itself had broken loose” (Waugh 24). Within minutes
smoke filled the channel but the majority of it was blown directly at Fort Morgan by the wind
which obscured the views of the gunners in the fort. Meanwhile the Confederate fleet was still,
having been ordered “not to fire until the vessels were in actual contact” by Buchannan.
For Farragut everything was going exactly as planned, the ironclads could easily
withstand the fire they were taking and soon his fleet would be passing through the channel
where they would be able to regroup and go after Buchannan’s small fleet. The only problem
was that he could not see his ships in front of him through the smoke covering the deck of the
Hartford; this is when Farragut made his first daring decision of the day. Wanting to know what
was unfolding before him the 63 year-old Farragut began climbing the rigging of his ship until
he was above the smoke and had a clear view of the battle. According to Waugh, “What
Drayton, on the Hartford’s quarterdeck, saw as he peered up through the smoke high into the
rigging made his heart flutter” (Waugh 41). Quickly the ship’s signal quartermaster was sent up
to secure Farragut to the rigging, and so Farragut was grudgingly tied to his own ship, although
he quickly became thankful for that line around his chest. What Farragut saw when he finally
peered above the smoke made his heart skip a beat. His lead ironclad, the Tecumseh was
disobeying his orders and heading directly towards the Tennessee, a path that led directly
through the minefield. Farragut’s worst nightmare came true at 7:30, when a torpedo
exploded and tore a hole through the Tecumseh that sent it and most of its crew sinking to the
bottom almost instantly. But that was not the end of Farragut’s misfortune. The entire battle
plan seemed to unravel in front of his eyes, his lead ship, the Brooklyn, which was almost
directly in front of Fort Morgan now, had stopped dead in the water!
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Aboard the Brooklyn Captain James Alden was stunned after witnessing the fate of the
Tecumseh, a ship that had seconds ago been nearly right in front of him had now vanished. The
Tecumseh had been the strongest ironclad the Union Navy had ever built, and it was now lost
forever. It was at this time that his lookouts reported a row of ominous looking buoys directly
in front of his ship in the middle of the channel. Alden knew that these were old mines, and
numerous reports had said they would not explode because of how long they had been in the
water; and besides, they were directly in the way of the only channel in and out of the bay. But
Alden’s fear got the best of him, and he immediately ordered his engines to stop. But the
Brooklyn was now sitting in front of Fort Morgan and was nothing more than target practice for
the Fort’s gunners. Fearing that they he would soon be on the bottom alongside his ship, Alden
began turning his ship around in hopes of retreating back into open water.
Perched atop the rigging of the Hartford, Farragut was dumbfounded. The Brooklyn was
disobeying his direct orders of pushing through the channel by any means necessary. Farragut
knew that his fleet was too far into the attack, and a retreat would be extremely costly as his
ships were sitting right in the line of fire from Fort Morgan. The Brooklyn was now turned
almost completely sideways, and was blocking almost the entire channel. Farragut’s fleet was
stuck! About this time Farragut received a reply from the Brooklyn about why they had
stopped: “torpedoes!” Farragut took one look at his fleet and realized that they would not
survive long enough to turn around and escape back to the Gulf. His decision was almost
instant “‘Damn the torpedoes’ he shouted. ‘Four bells! Captain Drayton, go ahead! Jouett, full
speed!’” (Waugh 44). Farragut swung his ship around the Brooklyn, past the buoys and directly
into the minefield. The remainder of the fleet, watching the Hartford sail into what was sure to
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be certain destruction, had no choice but to follow their admiral, and swung into formation
behind the Hartford. Farragut knew exactly what he was doing. It was the biggest gamble of
his career but he was counting on the mines near the edge of the field being old and not
detonating, and that the Tecumseh had cleared a safe path for him:
The Hartford slipped around the Brooklyn into the bed of torpedoes. Her crew heard
the cones
and kegs knocking against her bottom, their primers snapping.
Any moment they could all be
blown into oblivion. . . . But no more torpedoes exploded.
Just before eight o’clock the Hartford slipped into the unmined waters inside the bay, the
paired ships of Farragut’s fleet following. (Waugh 45)
Farragut breathed a sigh of relief, he had safely moved his fleet past Fort Morgan and into the
bay, and -minus the Tecumseh- all of his ships were accounted for. However Farragut’s relief
did not last long, for as he surveyed the bay, he noticed the Confederate fleet, led by the
formidable Tennessee ironclad, coming directly at him.
This was what Farragut had been waiting for: his chance to finally capture the South’s
most dangerous ironclad and the infamous admiral Buchanan as well. Still perched among the
rigging, the Admiral looked back to signal his fleet to get into position for one final battle, and
his heart nearly stop for the second time that morning, the fleet he thought was directly behind
him wasn’t there! The Hartford had been able to go around the Brooklyn with ease, but for the
remainder of his fleet it had taken much longer, and now with the Tennessee bearing down on
him he was sitting almost a mile in front of his fleet. Farragut immediately cast off from the
Metacomet, the smaller ship the Harford was tied to, and ordered it to go after the three
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smaller Confederate gunboats, and gave orders for his ship to stay its course, directly towards
the oncoming Tennessee. According to David Dana, William Dana, who was aboard the
Hartford during the battle wrote in his journal that,
’The Tennessee heads for Hartford and with the three gunboats opens fire on the
Hartford exclusively. When within a third of a mile ports [turns] her helm astarboard
and runs down the fleet, which was a long way astern. Very sharp engagement of the
Hartford with the Morgan, Canes [sic] and Selma. Hartford nearly a mile ahead of
everything.’ (Dana)
However the engagement was not as dramatic as it appeared to be, the Tennessee was unable
to maintain the head-on ramming course with the quicker Hartford and after slipping by one
another, the Tennessee retreated towards Fort Morgan under the cover of the forts guns.
Aboard the Hartford Farragut was sitting safely in the middle of the bay and ordered his
troops to have breakfast while he waited for the remainder of his fleet to catch up. He knew he
would have to go after the Tennessee again soon, but his sailors had been through a long
morning and they needed a short break. As the fleet came together in the middle of the bay
Farragut had each pair separate from one another and sent the smaller ships after the three
rebel gunboats which had fled to various parts of the bay, the large ships and the ironclads
would prepare to engage the Tennessee. However Buchanan had other plans: “The crew of the
Hartford had just sat down to breakfast at about 8:45 A.M. when Farragut saw Buck coming.
His urgent orders went out across the fleet: attack the Tennessee, not only with your guns, but
ram her too, run her down at full speed.” (Waugh 53). Farragut knew his guns would do little
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against the strength of the mighty ironclad, and he was going to bring her down by any means
necessary. Against everyone’s protests Farragut once again climbed into the rigging to have a
better view of what was going on. So it was from there that he watched first the Monongahela
then the Lackawanna smash their bows into the Tennessee. But while the Lackawanna’s “stem
was cut and crushed” the only effect on the ironclad was “to give her a momentary heavy list”
(Waugh 54). After seeing this Farragut ordered the Hartford to change course right before it
struck the Tennessee so that it the two would grate alongside each other instead of smashing
the bow against the impenetrable walls of the ironclad. As the ships grated past each other the
admiral ordered his men to fire pointblank into the side of the of the Tennessee, again this did
not seem to faze the ironclad and Farragut disengaged disgusted that he could do no damage to
the mighty ship. However what Farragut did not realize was that the immense shaking caused
by the point black cannon fire had jammed the cannon shudders closed, the Tennessee could
not get her canons out to fire.
Unfortunately for Farragut his fleet did not know this either and was intent of ramming
the Tennessee until the ships were crushed to the point of no return. Just as the Hartford
pulled away from the Tennessee the Lackawanna was coming in for another blow, but was off
target. Farragut watched horror-struck as the Lackawanna tore into the bow of the Hartford,
tearing a huge hole into her side just two feet above the waterline and nearly throwing Farragut
from his perch for the second time that day. Farragut was not about to tempt fate and was
immediately out of the rigging. However moments later he was hanging over the side of his
ship trying to assess the damage and fighting off his general’s attempts to get him off the ship.
Farragut would go down with his ship if it came to that, but not until the Tennessee was
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defeated. The Hartford however was barely staying afloat, with the large hole threatening to
begin taking on water and many of her forward guns destroyed by the collision, the ship was
not about to defeat the ironclad. So when Farragut deemed the ship to be in fighting condition
and ordered her to pursue the Tennessee again he must have seemed mad to his crew. It was
about at this time when the Lackawanna barely missed the Tennessee for the second time and
cut across the stern of the Hartford, missing her by a matter of feet. Farragut screamed for his
signal officer “Say to the Lackawanna, ‘For God’s sake get out of our way and anchor!’”
However the Tennessee had no fight left in her. Being bombarded by most of the Union fleet
and unable to return fire, Buchannan, who was bleeding immensely from a large wooden
splinter stuck in his leg, finally gave the ok to surrender. The remaining gunboats gave up as
soon as they saw the ironclad wave the white flag, and Farragut had control of the Bay.
The loss of Mobile Bay was a crippling blow to the South, for they now had no way of
getting much needed supplies into the country. Much of the achievement is due to Admiral
Farragut. Without his daring attack and brave decisions during the battle there would have
been no victory for the Union. It was his decision to attack with the wind and tide that gave
them advantage of surprise, and without his decision to go around the Brooklyn during the
battle much of his fleet would have been lost to the guns of Fort Morgan. His success did not
go unnoticed by the leaders in the North. After the war Farragut was promoted again to full
Admiral, and became the first in the United States Navy to bear that title.
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Works Cited:
Browning Jr., Robert M. “’Damn the Torpedoes” Naval History. Vol. 28 Issue 4, p38-42. Aug.
2014 Periodical
Dana, David T. “William Dana had a firsthand view of the Battle of Mobile Bay from Rear Adm.
David Farragut's flagship”. America’s Civil War Vol. 12 Issue 2, p. 14 May 1999 Periodical
Adelson, Bruce; Schlesinger, Jr. “David Farragut- Union Naval Hero” 2001 Biography
Waugh, John C. “Last Stand at Mobile” Abilene, Tex. : McWhiney Foundation Press, c2001.
Book
Friend, Jack. “West wind, flood tide: the Battle of Mobile Bay” Annapolis, Md. : Naval Institute
Press, c2004. Book
Benson, Amos Reid. “The Battle of Mobile Bay” University, AL : University of Alabama, 1950.
Book
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Quotes used in paper
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Sentence and Quote run together: Page 7, middle of 2nd paragraph
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Quote with a verb: last line of page 4- first line of page 5
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Quote without a verb: page 6, middle of 1st paragraph
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Block Quote: middle of page 6
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Choose only Certain Words to Quote: Page 8, 2nd and 3rd lines