Download Dilek Barlas FRIENDS OR FOES? DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS

Int. J. Middle East Stud. 36 (2004), 231–252. Printed in the United States of America
DOI: 10.1017.S0020743804362045
Dilek Barlas
FRIENDS OR FOES? DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS
B E T W E E N I T A L Y A N D TU R K E Y, 1 9 2 3 – 3 6
Turkey’s foreign policy and relations in the early Republican era, before and during
World War II, has been subject to systematic and scholarly research, leading to numerous
publications since the 1970s.1 Although no less significant than Britain, Germany, or the
Soviet Union in shaping Turkish inter-war foreign policy and priorities, Italy does not
seem to have received a similar degree of attention in this growing literature. Italy is
usually treated in the works on Turkish foreign relations only as a threat that Turkey’s
foreign and strategic policy aimed to counter after 1934.2
Turkish diplomatic historiography generally tends to view Italian–Turkish relations
on a continuum extending from the Tripolitanian War of 1911 to World War II. This view
suggests that the Italian policy of expansionism was an ever-present menace to the new
republic throughout the inter-war years.3 Indeed, Italian vocal claims on Turkey as well as
Rome’s bullying of its Adriatic neighbors in the early fascist era lends strong credence
to this view. Most students of Italian foreign policy interpret Mussolini’s policies as
continuous with and similar to those of the liberal period. In other words, fascist Italy’s
foreign policy is portrayed as having inherited the expansionist policies of the past.4
However, it is also widely agreed that Mussolini’s foreign policy was consistent only
in its inconsistency.5 For instance, Marco Rimanelli defines Mussolini’s diplomacy as
fluid, constantly shifting according to the circumstances.6 Elements of both continuity
and inconsistency in Italian foreign policy were also operative in Rome’s relations with
Ankara in the inter-war years. As a result, Italian–Turkish relations in this period oscillated between antagonism and friendship. Moreover, from time to time antagonism
and friendship went hand in hand, which led the French diplomats to label Italian–
Turkish relations “amiadversion” (amity-adversity).7 Turkish diplomatic historiography
conventionally focuses solely on the element of adversity and fails to account for shifts
or changes in the direction of amity in these relations. This approach inevitably overlooks, among other things, a period of “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations between
1928 and 1932.8 Gradually improving relations between the two countries during this
short period were characterized by rapprochement. The existing literature mentions this
improved climate in Italian–Turkish relations in passing, if at all, or as a tactical move
by Mussolini.
This article pursues a number of aims. The first two are related to Italian–Turkish
bilateral relations. Thus, it aims to offer an introduction to Italian–Turkish relations as
Dilek Barlas is Associate Professor in the Department of History, Koç University, 80910 Sarıiyer, Istanbul,
Turkey; e-mail: [email protected].
© 2004 Cambridge University Press 0020-7438/04 $12.00
232 Dilek Barlas
an under-studied aspect of Turkish foreign policy in the inter-war years, based on the
documents studied in Italian, British, and, to a lesser extent, French diplomatic archives.
Second, it is an attempt to depart from conventional Turkish diplomatic historiography
by evaluating these relations on the basis of shifts (or inconsistencies) rather than solely
in terms of continuity. The article will thus seek out the sources and consequences of
such shifts in the relations between the two countries. To this end, the main focus of
the present work will be on the period of “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations between
1928 and 1932 rather than the “cooling off” and “frost” between 1932 and 1936. Finally,
this article aims to address Italian–Turkish relations as an example of the contradictions
Ankara displayed in formulating its general foreign policy in the early Republican period.
Such contradictions resulted from shifts and re-orientations in foreign relations mostly
for pragmatic reasons in search of security in an external environment largely perceived
as hostile to Turkey.
Their frustration with the existing international system provided common ground for
Italy and Turkey in the late 1920s and early 1930s. Ankara was not a challenger to the
status quo. Its resentment stemmed from being excluded from the system and from lack of
recognition of Turkey as an equal and legitimate member of the international community.
This resentment did not necessarily entail a revisionist stand. Mussolini’s Italy, however,
pursued recognition of its political equality. His policy aimed at securing a greater say and
share in world affairs as a full-fledged Great Power, not as the least of great powers. While
Ankara viewed the international system as composed of horizontally ordered equal and
sovereign states, fascist Italy’s policy was premised on a Great Power–managed internal
system of hierarchically ranked states. Consequently, the common ground was not to
last long, and Italian and Turkish policies evolved in diverging directions after the mid1930s, particularly with Turkey’s admission to the League of Nations, which symbolized
the end of its exclusion from the international system.
T H E C O N S I S T E N C Y I N T H E I TA L I A N O U T L O O K : T U R K E Y A S
A P OT E N T I A L C O L O N Y
The ambiguous relationship between Italy and Turkey depended in part on Turkey’s
security concerns. These concerns were based on the fact that Turkish people witnessed
the Italian aggression in Tripoli and the Dodecanese in 1912 and, following World
War I, had to endure the Italian occupation of Anatolia. Although Italy withdrew its
occupation forces from Anatolia during the Turkish War of Independence,9 Mussolini’s
rise to power with a heavy rhetoric of change in foreign policy, dubbed tono fascista
(fascist tone), immediately revived Turkish fear of Italy.10 While history loomed largely
in shaping Turkish leaders’ view of Italy, Turkey’s approach was also influenced by two
inter-related factors: the need for foreign economic support and Turkey’s international
isolation. These two factors prompted Ankara to seek rapprochement with the great
powers of Europe to survive as a new nation-state.
Between 1922 and 1927, Mussolini’s tono fascista translated into Italy’s refusal to see
Turkey as a sovereign state. It viewed the new country as only a geographical entity—
Anatolia—with promising opportunities for Italian expansion. In case of the collapse of
the new regime in Turkey, the Italians were planning to invade the country by taking
advantage of the proximity of the Dodecanese Islands and using them as staging post. It
Friends or Foes?
233
was expected that the ongoing Mosul issue between Ankara and London would lead to
the disintegration of Turkey and would offer the opportunity for Rome to get its share of
Anatolia. Mussolini was convinced that the new Turkey was not strong enough to resist a
powerful country such as Britain. As “a frustrated potential ally of Britain,” Mussolini’s
Italy expected to be treated by Britain like “a sister rather than a waitress.”11 Mussolini
believed that, because of the Mosul crisis, Turkey would offer this chance to Rome.
The Balkans was the region where Italian and Turkish interests conflicted. This region
played a crucial role not only for understanding the development of the fascist foreign
policy in Italy in general but also specifically with regard to Turkey. The Balkans had
always been the center of attention for Rome. Italy’s main rivalry with the Ottoman
Empire and the Austrian Empire had been over the Balkans, including the Adriatic. For
the Italian leadership of the time, the acquisition of Adriatic port cities such as Fiume
and Trieste was vital for the realization of Risorgimento, the national unification of Italy.
After he came to power in Italy, Mussolini pursued an Italian version of Lebensraum
in the Balkans.12 The Balkan Peninsula, an area between the Adriatic and the Aegean,
lay on the north of the Mediterranean, the Mare Nostrum of Mussolini. Actually, the
early 1920s offered conditions conducive to Italian expansion into these territories, as
Mussolini’s rise to power followed the collapse of both the Ottoman Empire and the
Austrian Empire. Mussolini aimed to extend Italian control over the new nation-states
that came into existence in the territories of these multi-ethnic empires. The Balkans, at
the crossroads of the two collapsed empires, became a natural target and preoccupation
of the fascist regime.
For Mussolini, in the first half of the 1920s Turkey was not a country worthy of
attention in the Balkans. In fact, the fascist leader intended to keep Turkey out of Balkan
affairs through diplomacy. This goal prompted Mussolini to personally appear at the
Lausanne Conference (November 1922–July 1923). Mussolini’s policy at Lausanne was
a typical example of the persistence of Italy’s former colonial policies. Italy had a special
interest in the Dodecanese, which formed the maritime border of the two Mediterranean
and Balkan countries Turkey and Greece. He sought to contain Turkey because he feared
that victorious Turkish nationalists might assert claims over these islands. Mussolini
must have also scorned the idea of Greece controlling various strategic islands in the
eastern Mediterranean. Since Greece had already acquired the northern Aegean Islands,
it had to be deterred from demanding the Dodecanese Islands.
In the final analysis, Mussolini’s presence at Lausanne was meant to convey a clear
warning to Turkey. At the time that Turkey was recognized as a sovereign state, Mussolini
secured formal recognition of Italian possession of the Dodecanese Islands. Even though
at Lausanne the fascist leader recognized the Turkish presence in the Balkans (limited
to eastern Thrace), his insistence on the annexation of the Dodecanese by Italy made
Balkan Turkey more vulnerable to any attack on the demilitarized straits. In addition,
Mussolini was present at Lausanne to assert that Italy was an equal “partner” with other
European powers and that he would not allow Italy’s wartime allies to cheat Italy again
over the spoils of war.13
For Mussolini, international conferences such as Lausanne were not the only forums
in which Italy could assert itself. He also demonstrated that Rome could resort to violent
methods in the Balkans without regard to international organizations. While the Lausanne
Conference was drawing to an end in July 1923, Italian expansionism manifested itself
234 Dilek Barlas
over the port city of Fiume on the Adriatic coasts of the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes. Mussolini proposed the incorporation of Fiume into Italy. His plan was
to annex the city in case Belgrade refused the proposal. However, the chain of events
prompted him to shift his immediate attention to Corfu, a Greek island in the Adriatic.
Italy attacked the island yet had to withdraw its troops under British pressure. Intimidated
by Italy’s aggressive behavior during the Corfu incident, Belgrade eventually conceded
and recognized Italy’s full sovereignty over Fiume.14
These developments led Ankara to conclude that Turkey would be the next target of
Italian expansionism in the Balkans. However, Mussolini’s attention at that time was
directed to the Adriatic coast in the Balkans, where he found himself blocked by French
dominance.15 France remained “public enemy number two” to Italy since there was no
“public enemy number one” after the collapse of Austria-Hungary.16 The fascist leader
was obsessed with putting an end to French influence in the region. The best way to
undermine France was to weaken its ally, the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes.
Only after that could he turn to Turkey, whose viability as a new state, he believed, was
questionable.
After the mid-1920s, Mussolini was better situated to implement his strategy once he
consolidated his power domestically and took complete control of the Palazzo Chigi.
Thus, the fascist leader openly announced his dictatorship.17 The authoritarian state
was also reinforced in the foreign office by the dismissal of many officials and their
replacement with committed fascists. In fact, Mussolini was convinced that the foreign
office ought to be the most fascist of all government departments. He gave preference
for diplomatic posts to those with party membership dating before October 1922.18 With
these new civil servants, Mussolini was able to put his assertive foreign policy into
practice with tono fascista.
The new phase in Italian foreign relations had a clear impact on Italian–Turkish
relations. Italian diplomatic papers indicate growing Italian interest in Turkish defensive
measures along the western coast in 1924 and 1925.19 Specifically, two events—the
Mosul issue and the signing of the Locarno Treaties in 1925—marked the transition in
Turkish–Italian relations. On the one hand, the Locarno Treaties concerned Italian policy
in Europe and the Balkans and therefore inevitably concerned Turkey, as well. On the
other hand, Rome expected that the Mosul issue between Ankara and London would
lead to the disintegration of Turkey and provide Italy with a share of Anatolia.
The Locarno Treaties offered two significant advantages to Italy. First, these treaties,
signed by Italy, Britain, Germany, France, and Belgium, gave Italy a greater say in Europe.
The treaties gave Italy the right to protect the frontier with Germany, France, and Belgium
defined by the Treaty of Versailles. If an “unprovoked attack” were instigated by France
against Germany or by Germany against France, the victim would be helped by Italy
and Britain.20 In addition, the Locarno Treaties made Italy a guarantor of the German–
French frontier in cooperation with Britain. The Locarno Treaties in a sense legitimized
Italy’s right to intervene in Western Europe. Second, the treaties prepared the ground for
Mussolini to focus on Eastern Europe, mainly on the Balkans.21 He could now easily
challenge the status quo in Eastern Europe since the Locarno Treaties did not guarantee
the frontiers beyond the east of Germany.
After Locarno, Mussolini’s first diplomatic initiative was in the Balkans. Albania, the
smallest Balkan state, was his main political and economic preoccupation. Italian troops
Friends or Foes?
235
were withdrawn from Albania, which had been under Italian occupation since World
War I, in line with Comte Sforza’s diplomatic tactics based on “strategic retreats and
bargains.”22 However, Mussolini wanted to prove that he was willing and able to overturn
the policies of the previous Italian prime minister, Giolitti, and Foreign Minister Sforza
in the Balkans. Between 1925 and 1927, Mussolini resumed an interventionist policy in
Albania. Under Mussolini’s pressure, Tirana adopted a policy of cooperation with Rome,
resulting in Italian economic and political domination of Albania. In November 1927,
Rome signed a military pact with Tirana. Under this pact, the Italian government pledged
to Albanian King Zogu to preserve the political and territorial status quo in Albania. The
pact also provided for reciprocal obligations between the two states, allowing each other
armed assistance in the event of an attack by a third party.23
Hence, Mussolini was able to achieve the old Italian goal for Albania. His Balkan
policies were typical of change in fascist diplomacy more as a matter of style than
substance. In other words, he did not substantially differ from previous Italian leaders
concerning Rome’s aims in Albania. However, he accomplished these goals with tono
fascista instead of compromising policies like Sforza’s. Mussolini’s policy vis-à-vis
Belgrade was shaped along similar lines. In 1926, Mussolini ordered twenty divisions
to be ready at the Albanian border for a sudden attack on the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes.24
Turkey viewed Italian activities in the Balkans with apprehension. Turkish leaders
believed that Italian aggression toward other Balkan countries would inevitably affect
Turkey. Consequently, they pursued two related goals in the region: one was to devise a
Balkan Locarno; the second was to reach an agreement among the Balkan countries in line
with the motto formulated by Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras, “The Balkans
for the Balkan people.”25 In 1926, Turkish Minister Plenipotentiary in Bucharest Hüseyin
Ragıp talked to Romanian Foreign Minister I. G. Duca about the possibility of a Balkan
cooperation project. He communicated to Duca four arguments advanced by the Turkish
government: negotiations should take place at a slow speed; Belgrade should take the
initiative in organizing the pact; no state should be excluded; and the pact should not be
directed against another Balkan state.26 Concerning the first argument, Turkey apparently
did not rush to form a Balkan pact because of the unresolved problems among the Balkan
states.
Ankara’s suggestion that Belgrade take the initiative in organizing the pact was closely
related to the pending problems between the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes
and its neighbors—namely, Italy and its “ally,” Bulgaria. According to the Turkish government, Belgrade’s initiative in this project would help the kingdom solve its problems
with these neighbors. Finally, no Balkan country was to be isolated, but all of them were
to be invited to participate in a future Balkan pact. In this way Ankara planned to prevent
any attempt by a group of Balkan countries to form a bloc against the others. Forming
partial blocs would make the Balkans more vulnerable to manipulation by great powers
such as Italy and France. In sum, any kind of hegemony by a great power or by a bloc
over the Balkans had to be avoided.
The second event that affected Italian–Turkish relations was the Mosul issue between
Turkey and Britain. Unlike its policy on the Balkan region, where Rome’s policy was
marked by initiative and activism, in the Middle East Mussolini followed a strategy
dependent on Britain. In the early years of his power, as the fascist leader was directly
236 Dilek Barlas
involved in the Balkans, he intended to shape his policy in Anatolia as an ally of Britain.
The fascist leader knew that Italy could not easily compete at that stage with British
power and influence in the Middle East. For a while, Italy had to remain a “frustrated
ally” of Britain.27
Under these circumstances, the Mosul crisis offered an opportunity for Italy to carve
out a future sphere of influence in Anatolia. In this way, Mussolini would be able to realize
Italy’s colonial dream in Anatolia, as he expected the disintegration of the Republic of
Turkey during the crisis. Therefore, fascist policy was geared toward reviving the old
expansionist designs of Italy over Turkey by profiting from the conflict between Britain
and Turkey. London used all its means not to relinquish this oil-rich region to Ankara.
At Lausanne, it was decided that the Mosul issue would be settled within nine months
by direct negotiations between Turkey and Britain, or, failing that, the problem would
be referred to the Council of the League of Nations.28 Bilateral negotiations led to a
deadlock, and the Council of the League of Nations decided in December 1925 on the
attachment of Mosul to Iraq, which was placed under British Mandate for twenty-five
years. On 6 June 1926, Turkey accepted the League of Nations’ decision by signing a
treaty with Britain concerning the establishment of the Turkish–Iraqi frontier. According
to this treaty, Turkey, in return for relinquishing Mosul, was to receive 10 percent of Iraqi
oil revenues for twenty-five years.29
In January 1925, meanwhile, Italian diplomats in Turkey recommended to the governor
of the Dodecanese Islands that the Datça and Marmaris regions be inspected for possible
landing operations. The Italian consul in Antalya even complained that his location was
not suitable for obtaining information on Turkish military measures on the coastal line
across from the Dodecanese.30
Ankara was alert to the possibility that Italy might send troops to Anatolia because
of the Mosul crisis.31 Turkish press reports of the time emphasized the possibility of
Italy’s using Rhodes as a military base in case of war.32 In fact, Italian diplomatic reports included extracts from daily Turkish newspapers such as Ikdam, whose headlines
alarmingly pointed to the Italian military preparations.33 Moreover, the Turkish press
in Antalya published articles opposing the presence of the Italians in the province.
The press proposed that Italian schools and hospitals be closed. The perpetuation of
these institutions, argued the press, proved that Italy had not given up the idea of
taking over Antalya. The governor of the province had a similar opinion. He openly
stated to the Italian authorities his belief that Italy still had territorial ambitions concerning Antalya and that the existence of Italian hospitals and schools confirmed these
intentions.34
The Italian mind set, which was fixated on colonialist expansion plans, was unsurprisingly reflected in the strategies developed by some Italian diplomats in Turkey. A
telegram sent from the Italian Embassy in Turkey to the Italian Foreign Ministry focused
on the advantages to Italy of pursuing colonial goals in southeastern Turkey. The telegram identified 1927 as the critical year to pursue colonial expansion into Turkey as the
new Turkish regime began to consolidate domestically and before it acquired effective
means to defend itself. It suggested that Italy occupy the Adana region instead of Izmir
and Antalya, as an Italian presence in this region offered better economic and political
benefits.The Adana region was rich in resources that would make a great contribution to
the Italian economy.35
Friends or Foes?
237
Politically, the possession of the region would be a substantial reward for Italian
expansionism. It would offer an opportunity for Italy to cooperate closely with Britain
in the Middle East. Since Italy would provide a counter-balance in the Adana region,
Britain could be at ease in Mosul. Moreover, if the opportunity arose for Italy to support
a Kurdish revolt in the region in cooperation with Britain, the door to Persia and the
Caucasus would be wide open. The telegram also claimed that such a scenario might
even help Italy to come to better terms with the Soviet Union. In other words, if Italy
could offer the Soviets economic advantages in the Mediterranean, then Moscow might
withdraw its support of Turkey.36
The handling of the Mosul issue by the Great Powers convinced the Turkish political
leaders that these powers could at any time form a coalition against Turkey. It added fuel to
the Turkish fear of Europe’s Great Powers as the main threat to Turkey’s independence
and territorial integrity.37 Between 1923 and 1927, the Turkish Foreign Ministry let
Rome know on various occasions that it was not certain about the policies of the Great
Powers vis-à-vis Turkey. Turkish Foreign Minister Tevfik Rüştü Aras openly said to the
Italian ambassador in Ankara, Felice Orsini that, in case of Italian–British collaboration,
Turkey would consider approaching other Great Powers. More specifically, Aras warned
Orsini that Turkey might even conclude an agreement on the Mediterranean with France,
although Turkey was not at all on good terms with France at the time. Ankara had in fact
signed a convention of friendship and good neighborhood with France in May 1926. The
main purpose of this convention was to secure the border between Turkey and Syria, then
a French Mandate, in case of armed confrontation with the European powers, particularly
over Mosul. However, Rome saw the signing of the 1926 convention as Turks’ courting
the French.38
Thus, the nature of Italian–Turkish relations in general had not changed when Mussolini came to power. The same Italian colonial intentions toward Turkey that had existed
at the beginning of the 20th century remained in effect. The Italian military presence in
the Dodecanese Islands was perceived as a continuous threat to Turkey’s security, which
had already been compromised by the demilitarization of the Straits at British insistence
during the Lausanne Conference.39
Almost weekly, the Turkish press carried reports on the imminence of an Italian
landing at Izmir.40 Italian involvement in Albania heightened Turkish uneasiness toward
Italy. In fact, the Turkish fear of Italy was not unjustified. Referring to a conversation
with the Italian consul-general at Mersin, a British diplomat wrote later: “[he] was at no
pains to hide his belief that at no distant date the flag of Savoy would be waving in the
fertile Cilician plain.”41
C H A N G I N G R E L AT I O N S : I TA LY W O O S T U R K E Y A S
A R E G I O NA L AC TO R
By late 1927, the Italian diplomatic papers indicate that there was constant probing on
both sides for a high-level Turkish diplomatic visit to Rome. Consequently, a high-level
Turkish visit to Rome took place in 1928. Various factors contributed to the changing
relations between Turkey and Italy. Between 1925 and 1926, the Turkish land frontiers were secured under friendship treaties concluded with the Soviet Union and Iran.
Moreover, to solve the Syrian–Turkish and Iraqi–Turkish border problems, in May 1926
238 Dilek Barlas
Turkey signed a convention with France and in June 1926 a treaty with Britain. Turkey
had already realized at that time that it could not afford to confront the Great Powers on
all fronts. In 1927, Turkey was finally able to turn its attention from its land borders to
the Mediterranean Sea.
Second, the Mosul issue did not lead to the collapse of the republic of Turkey, contrary
to Rome’s expectations. Ankara chose to make concessions to the British on the Mosul
issue for the sake of the survival of the republic. The Turkish leaders knew that they were
ill equipped militarily to confront Britain on matters such as Mosul. In a sense, they had
to compromise so as not to aggravate their international isolation. Turkey’s political
leaders did not want to give the Great Powers a pretext on the Mosul issue that could
lead to the collapse of the new republic.42 With the resolution of the Mosul problem,
Turkey would be less likely to disintegrate or fall into the Great Powers’ hands.
Above all, Rome’s image of Turkey began to change. Turkey was no longer identified
only with Anatolia but was increasingly seen as part of the Balkans. The new Italian
image of Turkey was mainly shaped around the new situation in the Balkan Peninsula.
Belgrade’s policies vis-à-vis Rome were decisive in terms of the changing Italian strategy
toward Turkey within the Balkan context. In the fall of 1927, the Kingdom of Serbs,
Croats, and Slovenes concluded an alliance with France to deter Italian aggression. The
growing French influence in Eastern Europe dated back to the formation of the Little
Entente in 1922. In addition to the Paris–Belgrade alliance of 1927, the parliament in
Belgrade refused to ratify the Conventions of Nettuno, signed with Italy on 20 July
1925.43 The Paris–Belgrade alliance prompted Rome to seek closer links with Ankara as
an extension of Mussolini’s plan to create a group of client states that looked exclusively
to Rome.44
The French influence in the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, and in Romania,
and the entente system Paris established in Eastern Europe, constituted models for the
new Italian policy toward Turkey in the Balkans. At that stage, Turkey began to appear
to Italy more as a regional actor than as only a potential colony. Mussolini’s diplomacy
then featured new aspects in relations with Ankara. Rome wanted to take advantage of
Turkey’s international isolation to turn Ankara into a pro–Italian actor. Not a member of
the League of Nations until 1932, Turkey was a suitable candidate to become part of an
Italian-led system in the eastern Mediterranean.
However, Turkey’s initial response to the changing Italian attitude was mixed. Ankara
was concerned about being dragged into any kind of conflict in the Balkans. Prime
Minister Ismet Inönü expressed to Orsini, the Italian ambassador, Turkey’s two main
concerns. The first was the possibility that Belgrade might turn its back on Ankara after
the signing of the Paris–Belgrade alliance in 1927.45 The second concern was the future
of deteriorating Rome–Belgrade relations and their likely repercussions on Turkey. He
advised Orsini that problems between Italy and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and
Slovenes were to be resolved peacefully.46
Turkish leaders were aware that Rome would not suddenly become amicable with
Ankara. Nevertheless, they thought that, for its survival, Turkey had to profit from the
rivalries between the Great Powers. In addition to the Ottoman debts, the French military
presence in Syria and its naval power in the Mediterranean gave France a stronger
hand in its dealings with Turkey.47 Well equipped diplomatically and militarily, Paris
could manipulate Belgrade against Ankara and might even gain influence over Sofia
Friends or Foes?
239
and Athens.48 For Ankara, the Paris–Belgrade collaboration could precipitate Turkey’s
complete exclusion from the Balkans.
France was a common problem for Turkey and Italy. Around that time, Rome was
offering an alternative alliance system to Ankara against the Paris–Belgrade axis in
the Balkans. Mussolini thought that the best way to undermine the Paris–Belgrade cooperation was to make overtures to other Balkan countries. Turkey and Greece formed
important pillars of the new Italian policy. Both countries had an interdependent significance in Italian strategic calculations in the eastern Mediterranean. The French entente
system in the Adriatic would be countered by forming an Aegean bloc among Italy,
Greece, and Turkey.
Indeed, Turkey seemed the best candidate to cooperate against the Paris–Belgrade
axis for a number of reasons. First, unlike Greece, which was at odds with Rome over
Corfu, Italy had not been involved in any direct conflict with Turkey since 1921. Second,
Turkey, not a Slavic country, was less inclined than other Balkan countries to cooperate
with Belgrade. Unlike Romania, another non–Slavic nation, Turkey was not a member
of the Little Entente sponsored by France. Last but not least, Turkey would be a useful
ally because of its strategic position. Geographically, it oversaw the passage from the
Mediterranean to the Black Sea and the gateway to the Middle East and Asia.
From Turkey’s perspective, a sense of insecurity was more accentuated than in most
Balkan countries because of its international isolation, marked by its “outcast” status visà-vis the League of Nations. The political and economic problems with Europe’s Great
Powers—namely, Britain and France—ruled out the normalization of Turkey’s foreign
relations with these countries. The intimate relations between Britain and Greece, on the
one hand, and France and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, on the other,
made Turkey even more isolated in the region. Improved relations with Italy were likely
to offer the first concrete step out of Turkey’s international isolation.
Rome was convinced that it would be advantageous for Italy to be in close cooperation
with Turkey in a manner similar to the cooperation between Paris and Belgrade. The
Italian Foreign Ministry invited Turkey’s political leaders to Milan.49 In April 1928,
Undersecretary of the Italian Foreign Ministry Dino Grandi (who became the Italian
foreign minister in 1929) met with Turkish Foreign Minister Aras in Milan. The meeting
was intended to allay Turkish fears of Italy. Mussolini also attended the meeting to
provide evidence of Italy’s good intentions. At the meeting, Italian officials tried to
explain to the Turks that Italy was not a potential enemy of Turkey.50
The main purpose of the meeting, however, was to find out whether Turkey would
cooperate with Italy in the Mediterranean. In Milan, Italy’s political leaders also met
with Greek Foreign Minister Michaliko Poulos. It was not a coincidence that the Italian
leaders wanted to have Turkish and Greek officials in Milan at the same time. Their aim
was to see whether Greece could be integrated into a future cooperation arrangement with
Italy and Turkey against Paris and Belgrade. To achieve this goal, Italy’s political leaders
not only sought simultaneous improvement of their relations with Turkey and Greece,
but they also tried to contribute to the reconciliation of Turkish–Greek differences. The
Milan meeting was the first step toward resolving the post–Lausanne Turkish–Greek
problems, which also stood in the way of the realization of the Italian strategy.
In fact, the Italian press interpreted the meeting of leading Italian figures with the
Turkish and Greek officials as a political victory for Italy. To them, the Mediterranean
240 Dilek Barlas
nations finally realized that Italy was the only Great Power that cared about their independence. The press mirrored the mind set of the Italian leadership, reporting that some
powers intended to create discord among the Mediterranean powers to establish their
supremacy in the region.51 These powers, according to Rome, were France and its “ally,”
the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes, even though their names were not spelled
out. The Italians wanted to give the impression that only Italy could preserve “stability”
in the Mediterranean and portrayed Italy as a Mediterranean country working toward
cooperation in the Mediterranean. The press reported that Rome would ensure balance
and harmony in the region.52
Unlike the Italian press, the Turkish press reflected the mixed public opinion in Turkey
toward the Milan meeting. On the negative side, it warned Turkey’s political leaders to
keep all political options open and not to rely only on Italy. The editorials constantly
pointed to Italy’s unfriendly attitude in the past. They also suggested a policy of waitand-see until the Italian ambitions over Anatolia crystallized. Reports drew attention
to the emigration policy of over-populated Italy as a factor for its special interest in
Anatolia. The Antalya region close to Rhodes seemed especially attractive for Italian
emigration.53
On the positive side, the Turkish press noted that Italy seemed to be giving up its
pursuit of military expansion into Anatolia. The fact that Italy sought Turkish–Greek
rapprochement was a sign of Rome’s intention to change the “traditional alliance system”
of the Great Powers. On balance, the Turkish press welcomed the Italian initiative in
Milan for improving Turkish–Greek relations. Moreover, it was reported on 6 April
1928 that the meeting between Mussolini and Tevfik Rüştü Aras in Milan made a major
contribution to resolving the problems between Turkey and Greece.54
Following the Milan meeting, Turkey signed the Treaty of Neutrality and Reconciliation with Italy on 30 May 1928. Both parties agreed not to engage in any political and
economic designs against each other. According to the treaty, Italy and Turkey undertook
to remain neutral in case of aggression by a third party against any party to the treaty. For
instance, if Belgrade attacked Italy with the help of the French, Turkey would remain
neutral. Above all, according to this treaty Italy was to abstain from exerting pressure
on Turkey. In fact, on 5 June 1928, a few days after the signing of the treaty, Mussolini
expressed the Italian view of Turkey in the Italian Senate: “[f]rom now on, Rome must
recognize Turkey as it is, given its strength and population.”55 Mussolini’s speech marked
the elevation of Turkey’s standing from a potential colony to a sovereign state with which
Italy had to forge close economic, political, and military links.
The brief era of improved relations between Turkey and Italy was inaugurated under
the new foreign minister, Dino Grandi, of Italy. In 1929, after Mussolini appointed Grandi
as foreign minister, Italy moved for a few years toward a less vocal fascist diplomacy.
In general, as many scholars argue, fascist diplomacy marked a change in style rather
than in substance. The fascists’ aim, like that of the Italian liberals, was not to be the
least of the Great Powers but to win “glory and power.”56 Where fascists differed from
the liberals was in their adoption of a military style in conducting policy and in their
glorification of war.
Grandi, who had the correct fascist credentials as a man of violence, was probably
the most sophisticated among the squad leaders.57 Even though he was convinced that
Italy had to retain supremacy in the Adriatic to “safeguard the Latin race against Slav
Friends or Foes?
241
expansionism,” Grandi suggested that glory be postponed until Italy had rearmed and
fascism’s enemies had been immobilized.58 Even though he was distrustful of disarmament and against the League of Nations, he wanted to show the “determining weight” of
Italy and therefore participated in the London Naval Conference of 1930 and the ongoing
efforts of the league.59
The Grandi era coincided with the 1929 world economic crisis. The move away from
aggressive rhetoric in Italian diplomacy under Grandi was not simply a coincidence;
it was the reflection of crisis diplomacy that dictated another three years of caution in
Mussolini’s diplomacy.60 Italy had to wait until the crisis was over because it lacked
the kind of economic and military muscle that would allow it to be an independent
player in international power politics.61 The era of Grandi could thus be defined as “with
everybody and against all.”62
In December 1928, Grandi made an official visit to Turkey to discuss Turkish–Greek
relations.63 A few months after the Turkish–Italian treaty, in September 1928, Rome
had signed a similar treaty with Greece. Rome expected that the Turkish–Italian and the
Greek–Italian treaties would serve as building blocks for a tripartite alliance, and Rome
was ready to work to reconcile Turkish–Greek differences. The exchange of minorities
was the major hindrance to the restoration of normal relations between Ankara and
Athens. Their disagreements on the status of the Greek patriarchate in Istanbul created
further strains.
Turkey’s very weak navy also had to face a Greek navy flexing its muscles in the
Aegean in the 1920s.64 In fact, Greek naval maneuvers prompted Ankara to propose to
Athens a treaty that would reciprocally limit the naval forces of both countries. Although
Italy’s political leaders were keen to ameliorate Turkish–Greek relations, they did not
welcome this Turkish proposal. In the Milan meeting in 1928, Mussolini asked Turkish
Foreign Minister Aras why Ankara was trying to leave Rome out of the process. He
also requested an explanation of the Turkish intention to sign a neutrality treaty with
Greece.65
At the same time, Mussolini realized that Rome needed appropriate instruments to
draw the two difficult neighbors, Turkey and Greece, into its orbit. Arms were seen as
a particularly suitable means to facilitate Italian political and economic penetration into
Turkey. In fact, the restoration of Italian–Turkish relations had a significant impact on
the Turkish armament programs. By the end of 1929, Italy appeared to be the favored
supplier for new Turkish naval arms. For the Italian government, the political significance
of the naval arm supplies to Turkey probably far exceeded its commercial significance for
the Italian shipbuilders. Rome was willing to provide a financial guarantee for Turkish
orders that no other foreign government was willing or able to match. This guarantee was
significant, as the financing of the Turkish naval arms programs was the key question.
Turkey had not recovered economically from the devastation of the wars. It was also
struggling to settle Ottoman debts. Ankara could afford to order new warships only
under long-term financial arrangements with favorable terms. Rome agreed to provide
Italian shipbuilders with a financial guarantee for up to 70 percent of the value of a
possible Turkish order.66
The change in Rome–Ankara relations following the Italian–Turkish treaty was so dramatic that London described the treaty as bringing the “lion” and the “lamb” together.67 At
the same time, the British ambassador in Turkey commented that the recent agreement
242 Dilek Barlas
had opened the door for considerable Italian economic expansion in Turkey.68 Again
according to the British, this relationship also suited Turkish interests because of unresolved problems with France and Greece.69 Moreover, by helping Turkey to modernize
its navy, Italy found an appropriate way to compete with France, its main rival in the
Mediterranean.
On the Italian–French rivalry in the Balkans and the Mediterranean in 1928–32, Turkey
stood closer to Italy than France. Turkey’s political leaders thought that the root of
uneasiness in Europe was French hegemony. For instance, even though Tevfik Rüştü
Aras denied the emergence of a bloc against France and the states in its orbit in a
conversation with British diplomats, he claimed it was French policy that made this a
possibility.70 An interesting indication of where Turkey stood in relation to the Italian–
French rivalry was a series of conversations between the under-secretary of the Turkish
navy, Captain Mehmet Ali Dalay, and the Italian naval and air attaché, LieutenantCommander Maroni, in December 1928. In response to Maroni’s inquiry about the
Turkish naval tender, Mehmet Ali confided to Maroni that the contract might be split
between the French and Italian shipbuilders, although the state of relations with France
did not warrant such a deal.71 During a later conversation, Mehmet Ali assured Maroni
that the contract would be awarded to the Italian shipyards and admitted that the present
political climate worked in Italy’s favor.72
On 24 May 1929, the conclusion of the Turkish naval tender in favor of the Italian
shipbuilders was made public.73 The next day, the Italian Foreign Ministry officially
notified the Ministry of Marine in Rome that the contract to supply warships to the
Turkish navy was finalized.74 The Turkish orders from the Italian shipyards represented
the high tide of Italian–Turkish relations in the inter-war years. The Italians were quick
to conclude that the awarding of the naval contract signaled a change in Italy’s image
in Turkish minds. The improved climate in Italian–Turkish relations had immediate
consequences with military significance. For instance, the Turkish army changed the
location of its annual large-scale military exercise from Izmir in the west to Diyarbakir,
near the Iraqi and Syrian borders in the east.75 Also in 1929, the Turkish navy began to
send its first junior officers to Italy for training.76
Italy’s supply of naval arms to Turkey worried the Greeks. In that regard, Italy faced
a dilemma. Originally, Rome had sought simultaneous improvement in its relations
with Turkey and Greece. The supply of naval arms to Turkey was meant to serve this
purpose.77 For a while it involved the risk of deepening the Turkish–Greek rift. However,
Italy was able to keep Greece happy by supplying naval arms to the Greek navy, as well.
In response to Turkish naval modernization, Greece decided to augment its navy with
light units. Greek Prime Minister Venizelos was personally more inclined toward Italy
as the supplier for new destroyers.78 In October 1929, Greece ordered two destroyers
from Italian shipyards. With the Greek order, the Italian strategy toward Turkey and
Greece was back on track. The impact of improved relations with Ankara and Athens
was evident in the Italian navy’s strategic war plans for 1929–31. In case of a war against
Yugoslavia and France, the Italian navy assumed Turkish and Greek neutrality in the
eastern Mediterranean.79
In 1930, Turkey and Greece finally worked out their differences and concluded a
friendship treaty. They also signed a protocol to end the naval arms race in the Aegean.
This treaty was partly the outcome of Italian attempts to reconcile Ankara and Athens.
Friends or Foes?
243
In the Turkish Grand National Assembly, Aras expressed his government’s gratitude to
Mussolini and Grandi for their efforts toward Turkish–Greek reconciliation.80 It should
be added that the Turkish–Greek treaty was also a result of the efforts to promote regional
collaboration in the Balkans. Indeed, it can be seen as a precursor to a wider regional
cooperation scheme in the peninsula. As the Balkan nations began to feel the effects of
the 1929 world economic crisis, their political leaders went on to revive the Turkish idea
of founding a Balkan entente. In October 1930, the first Balkan conference met in Athens.
A few weeks later, Ankara and Athens solidified their relations with the Turkish–Greek
Treaty of Friendship, Neutrality, and Conciliation.
The signing of the Turkish–Greek treaty prompted diverging political expectations in
Ankara and Rome. The latter hoped that Turkey, having reconciled with Greece, would
contribute to a similar political reconciliation between Athens and Sofia.81 Turkey had
already concluded with Bulgaria a treaty similar to the Turkish–Italian treaty in March
1929.82 Turkey’s signing of treaties with Bulgaria and then with Greece raised Italian
expectations of an even larger alliance that would include Italy, Turkey, Greece, and
Bulgaria.83 Such an alliance would also prevent a pro–Slavic rapprochement between
Bulgaria and Serbia.84
For Rome, an Italian-led alliance with Greece, Turkey, and Bulgaria would help Italy
extend its influence over the Black Sea, as well. In that case, fascist Italy would also
be able to control the eastern Black Sea coast. On the one hand, regional collaboration
with Ankara, which already had close relations with Moscow, might serve as catalyst for
improved relations between Rome and Moscow.85 On the other hand, the Italian leaders
believed that Rome had to balance Soviet influence in Turkey. The Italians were hoping
to sign a treaty that would give them a formal say in Turkey’s foreign relations, as did the
Turkish–Soviet Treaty of 1925. Under that treaty, Moscow and Ankara pledged not to
engage in any sort of alliance with other countries without informing each other first.86
Italy expected the same kind of relationship with Turkey.
T U R K E Y A N D I TA LY D R I F T A PA RT
When French Foreign Minister Aristide Briand announced a new agenda for European
countries—the founding of a European union—Rome revitalized its plan regarding
Ankara and Moscow. Briand’s idea of a European union was exclusivist in that the
Soviet Union and Turkey were not among the countries invited to discuss his plan. Rome
stood firmly against Briand’s proposed European union idea. However, the proposal also
seemed to have been perceived as an opportunity for Italy to capitalize on the increased
sense of isolation in Turkey. The Italian diplomatic papers point to Mussolini’s intention
to press on with his Italian–Soviet–Turkish alliance plan in the form of an alternative to
the exclusivist union idea of France.87 He believed that Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union
were victims of the European system established by Britain and France. By proposing a
Pan-European union, France intended only to ratify the existing European system and its
inequalities.88 In other words, Italy accused France of emphasizing again the difference
between the defeated and the victorious countries of World War I, although Italy had
been a victor, too. For the fascist leader, Italy, Turkey, and the Soviet Union, as the three
countries that had pioneered reformist movements, could and had to collaborate against
French intrigues in Europe.89
244 Dilek Barlas
Ankara was not against the idea of a European union, but it was against the French
version proposed by Briand because it excluded Turkey.90 Ankara admitted that the
reformist policies in Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union provided to a certain extent common ground for these three countries to improve their relations.91 One of the
main reasons for Turkey to be on good terms with Italy and the Soviet Union was
its distrust of French policy in the region. In fact, the French ambassador in Turkey
was suspicious of a triple arrangement involving Turkey, Italy, and the Soviet Union.
When he asked Turkish Foreign Minister Aras whether there was “the possibility of a
Russo–Turkish–Italian naval agreement,” Aras said, “Russia and Italy had more than
hinted at such a combination but he had turned it down and intended to retain that
attitude.”92
Turkey’s main priority and interest was to develop its relations with its Balkan
neighbors. Indeed, the process had started with the first Balkan conference. The world
economic crisis generated a strong impetus for Balkan states to develop new foreignpolicy strategies. For instance, Turkey was busy working on an arrangement for Greek–
Bulgarian reconciliation that would prepare the way for a wider regional “alliance” that
included Turkey, Greece, and Bulgaria but excluded Italy. Ankara was also promoting
a framework to incorporate Yugoslavia93 into this “alliance,” which, if realized, would,
against the Italian will, contribute to Yugoslav–Bulgarian reconciliation.94 On 20 October
1931, Turkey hosted the second Balkan conference in Istanbul. During this conference,
as at the first one, the Balkan delegates tried to find common solutions to the effects of
the world economic crisis in their countries. Turkey had economic problems that were
similar, if not identical, to those of the other Balkan countries.
The Italians were concerned that Turkey might pursue an independent path and form
an alliance with the other Balkan states. Turkey’s political leaders seemed to favor PanBalkan cooperation over the tripartite-alliance proposal of Italy. In his interview with the
Italian daily Popolo d’Italia, Aras stated that as three treaties of friendship already bound
Turkey, Greece, and Italy, there was no need for an additional tripartite pact.95 Aras’s
statement proved that the Italian concerns were not unjustified. Italian Foreign Minister
Grandi recommended that Italy take precautions against the independent diplomacy of
Aras in the Balkans.96
In addition to diverging Italian and Turkish ideas on the political situation, there were
serious financial limitations that undermined Italy’s pursuit of political, military, and
economic influence in Turkey. In fact, the 1929 world economic crisis seriously curbed
Italy’s ability to pursue an effective policy to this end. Italy’s thin finances slowed
down the construction of naval units for Turkey. For instance, the Zafer and Tinaztepe
destroyers, which were supposed to be delivered in 1931, were delivered only after
Turkish Prime Minister Ismet Inönü’s visit to Rome in May 1932.97
The world economic crisis presented Turkey with a dilemma vis-à-vis Italy. In the early
1930s, in addition to paying the Ottoman debts, the Republic of Turkey had launched an
ambitious program of industrialization. As a result, Turkey asked for economic aid from
Italy to build not only its navy but also its national industry. Indeed, in 1929 Turkish
diplomats were optimistic that Italian–Turkish relations would soon be solidified by a
credit agreement.98 In 1930, it was reported that the Banca Commerciale had agreed to
extend a loan of 500,000 pounds sterling to the Turkish Treasury to assist the Turkish
government.99
Friends or Foes?
245
In May 1932, Inönü made an official visit to Rome to discuss with Mussolini pending
economic and political issues. The political leaders of the two countries decided to improve their commercial relations, which had been deteriorating since the world economic
crisis.100 They also discussed the possibility of a 300 million Italian lira loan to Turkey.101
The process that was supposed to lead to the Turkish borrowing of 300 million Italian
liras, however, ran into difficulties. The protracted negotiations on the conditions for the
release of the credit frustrated both the Italians and the Turks.
The Italian diplomats in Turkey criticized the Turks for acting with a “Balkan mentality” in their dealings with the Western Europeans on economic issues.102 They claimed
that the Turks were always suspecting that the foreign states would be asking concessions
from Ankara in return for economic aid. They accused Ankara of not having confidence
in European countries. For its part, Ankara was determined not to repeat the Ottoman
experience of foreign debts, which Turkey was still paying to those same countries.
Therefore, Turkey’s political leaders had been extremely cautious about their economic
involvement with Europe. Naturally, Ankara wanted to opt for a country that would make
the best offer. In addition, it desired that such an offer not be attached to any political
conditions.103
To improve its bargaining position, Turkey had asked for a loan not only from Rome,
but also from Moscow. In April 1932, Turkey’s political leaders, including Inönü, visited
the Soviet Union and agreed to receive a credit of $8 million from Moscow. They did not
hesitate to accept the Soviet offer because Moscow gave the aid without interest. Italy
was asking 6.5 percent interest for the 300 million Italian liras that it was planning to lend
to Turkey.104 The Italians interpreted Turkey’s policy as turning its back on old friends.105
They argued that Turkey had to count on its old friends when seeking economic aid from
abroad.106 Regarding the Italian loan, Rome turned out to be unwilling or unable, or both,
to release the cash portion of the credit, most of which was to be spent on naval arms
and aircraft built in Italy for Turkey.107
Turkish–Italian commercial relations did not improve to a great extent, either. In
general, the Turkish state, which developed étatist policies after the world economic
crisis, became even more cautious in its economic relations. Protectionist measures that
Turkey had implemented in foreign trade affected its trade with Italy. Ankara increased
custom duties to curb imports from foreign countries, including Italy. In spite of political
differences and disagreements about financial issues, however, Rome and Ankara agreed
in 1932 to renew the Turkish–Italian Treaty of 1928 for five more years. They also signed
a convention to delimit territorial waters between Anatolia and an Italian-owned island,
Castellorizzo, off the Turkish mainland.108
In the summer of 1932, Italy changed the style of its foreign policy. That change
affected its relations with Turkey. Mussolini dismissed Grandi to revitalize the tono
fascista in foreign policy. The appointments of Fulvio Suvich, a native of Trieste, as
under-secretary within the Foreign Ministry, and of Baron Pompeo Aloisi, an expert
in Balkan affairs, as the chef de bureau, confirmed the growing Italian interest in the
Balkans.109 After that, Italian territorial claims over Yugoslavia were more vocal. At the
same time, Rome stressed its intention to enlist allies against Belgrade. At the first phase
of the disarmament conference in Geneva, moreover, Mussolini declared his intentions
on matters concerning international affairs. He was already known to be against the
Versailles Treaty system and seeking to revise it. He saw the League of Nations as an
246 Dilek Barlas
obstacle to Italy’s revisionist aims. For Mussolini, a stable understanding among the big
states, rather than the League, would better guarantee the peaceful development of the
smaller states.110 To put it differently, Rome did not favor the preservation of the status
quo, especially through an international organization.
Again in 1932 Italy opposed Turkey’s entry into the League of Nations. Italy’s firm
stand against Turkey’s membership in the League adversely affected Turkish–Italian
relations. The issue also clearly showed the Italian bias toward minor powers. Rome tried
to foster the impression that peace could survive only with the Great Powers’ initiatives.
The Italian approach to the League and to Turkey’s membership was closely linked to
the Four-Power Pact proposal that Mussolini made. In March 1933, Mussolini presented
his ideas for a Four-Power Pact to British Prime Minister Ramsay MacDonald. For
him, the four Western powers—France, Germany, Britain, and Italy—should cooperate
to preserve peace. The proposal implied cooperation among only the Great Powers.
Moreover, the four powers would have the power to revise the treaties that might lead to
conflict among states.111 In a sense, Mussolini declared his view that the existing treaties
could lead to conflicts among the European powers and needed to be revised.
The declaration of the Four-Power Pact proposal set Turkey and Italy apart. The issue
also reflected the divergence of interests between the Great Powers and the minor powers.
The world economic crisis had already sharpened the contrast between the industrialized
and non-industrialized worlds. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact definitely widened the gap
between the great and minor powers. Turkish reaction to the Four-Power Pact was,
needless to say, less than positive. Ankara did not consider the pact a step toward peace.
On the contrary, it saw it as contributing to the policies of the Great Powers to intervene
in other parts of the world. Mussolini’s Four-Power Pact proposal prompted Turkey’s
political leaders to recall the political bargaining at Lausanne, where they had struggled
to make Italy, France, and Britain accept Turkey’s vested rights. At the same time, they
could not help but emphasize Italy’s position and power in the international hierarchy.
In Aras’s words, “Italy was ‘masquerading’ as a great power. . . . She was putting her
potentialities for influencing the course of events in Europe to a strain disproportionate
to their capacity. It was an absurdity for her to pretend she could exercise the same
influence as such powers as Great Britain, France or Germany.”112 In fact, Mussolini’s
Four-Power Pact could never materialize because of British and French reluctance to
involve Hitler’s Germany in such an arrangement.
The growing Italian threat led Ankara to revitalize regional cooperation efforts that
culminated in the conclusion of the Balkan entente in February 1934 among Turkey,
Greece, Romania, and Yugoslavia. The entente was officially aimed at guaranteeing
Balkan borders against revision from within. It also had the broader objective of preventing collaboration between Bulgaria and Italy in the Balkans. Atatürk wrote to Inönü
that Italy was against this entente and that Bulgaria, as an Italian proxy, could attempt
to undermine it with Rome’s encouragement.113
Italian policy led Aras to conclude that “Italy under Signor Mussolini was apparently
following the same policy as the pre-fascist Italian liberals, keeping waters troubled on
the chance of being able to fish in them, and hoping that circumstances, and principally the misfortunes of others, would play into their hands.”114 The inconsistent and
unpredictable policy of Mussolini, expressed elegantly by Aras, was perfectly reflected
in Italy’s relations with Turkey in this period. After the signing of the Balkan entente,
Friends or Foes?
247
Turkish–Italian relations spiraled into a deteriorating pattern. Lojacono, the Italian ambassador in Turkey, was pretty sure that the entente would encourage Turkey to adopt
a stronger anti–Italian stand.115 However, Italian foreign policy incorporated a more
aggressive tune. Mussolini’s notorious speech on the future lines of Italian expansion
in Africa and Asia in 1934 heralded the transition in Italian–Turkish relations from
“cooling-off” to “frost.” The “frost,” which was marked by renewed fear of Italy, led to
a major shift in Turkish foreign policy. This shift would eventually result in Ankara’s
alliance with Britain and France on the eve of World War II.116
The Turks, however, remained alone—at least, for a while—in their uneasiness regarding Italian policy in the Mediterranean. In February 1935, the British ambassador
in Turkey was still convinced that Ankara exaggerated the Italian threat.117 It was not
surprising that Ankara had willingly endorsed the Mediterranean pact proposal of French
Foreign Minister Barthou to preserve the peace and status quo.118 However, the proposal
could not find a lease on life because Pierre Laval replaced Barthou in October 1934.
The new French foreign minister favored bilateral agreements over regional schemes.
In 1935, he pursued agreement with Italy under which France and Britain relinquished
their economic rights in Abyssinia to Italy. At the time, London still viewed Italy as a
power that could be useful in checking Germany in Europe.119 In October 1935, Italy was
satisfied by French and British conciliatory policies and went on to invade Abyssinia.
The Italian invasion inevitably narrowed the gulf between Turkish and British assessments of the Italian aims in the Mediterranean. When the League of Nations imposed
sanctions on Italy, Greece, Turkey, and Yugoslavia agreed to implement them. In return,
Britain furnished guarantees to these three countries against the Italian threat during the
implementation of the sanctions.
CONCLUSION
The Italian invasion of Abyssinia sealed the fate of Turkish–Italian relations until the end
of World War II. During the Abyssinian crisis, the Turkish political leadership realized
the limits of collective security in preventing Italian aggression from eventually turning
on Turkey. Italian efforts to increase its fortifications and naval power in the Dodecanese
Islands aggravated the Turkish fears. As a result, Ankara notified the League of Nations
and the signatories of the Lausanne Treaty of its intention to revise the demilitarized
status of the Straits, which, Ankara argued, exposed Turkey to external aggression. In
July 1936, the Turkish delegation at Montreux was able to convince other signatories—
except Italy—to give Turkey control over the Straits, and it allowed its remilitarization.
Around the same time, Hitler and Mussolini were busy laying the foundations of the
Axis Powers in Berlin. With Italian objections to the revision of the status of the Straits
in 1936, Italian–Turkish relations came almost full circle. Ankara then had to face a
more potent Italy.
Rome took advantage of the political uncertainties of the inter-war years to strengthen
its military. Indeed, fascist foreign policy was no less aggressive, ambitious, or potentially
revisionist in the 1920s than in the 1930s. However, Italy lacked the means and allies
to pursue its goals. The inter-war experiment with collective security was meant to end
Great Power rivalries and the consequent balance-of-power policies. Rome attempted to
make up for its lack of Great Power allies by recruiting allies of lesser stature. Italy’s
248 Dilek Barlas
changing image of Turkey was the direct result of such acts of balancing—particularly
against France. The “warmth” in Italian–Turkish relations, however, represented a clear
case of an alignment of convenience. At the time, collective security did not have much
appeal to Italy, and Turkey was excluded from the League of Nations. Thus, albeit for
different reasons, Italy and Turkey shared a disdain for the League in the late 1920s and
the early 1930s.
Rome and Ankara seemed to share interests at other levels too. For instance, as Italy
also sought great-naval-power status, its infant shipbuilding industry needed a steady
flow of foreign orders to survive. Turkey became an important market for Italy’s shipbuilding industry. The Turkish navy was rebuilt with Italian credit lines for Turkish naval
contracts during the period of warmth. However, the limits of this pragmatic approach
were evident by the mid-1930s. Fundamental differences in the Italian and Turkish views
of the international order eventually set them apart on the eve of World War II. Turkish
membership in the League in 1932 affirmed Turkey’s place among the society of equal
and sovereign nations. In contrast, the Italians grew wary of the League, particularly
after their invasion of Abyssinia. Although Italy repeatedly tried to reassure Ankara
that it did not have any aggressive intentions toward Turkey, its geographic proximity
and unreliable political leader only added fuel to Turkish apprehensions. Hence, the
Italian threat dominated Turkish foreign and strategic policy from the 1930s. It also
accounted for Turkey’s change of heart regarding military alliances between powers of
equal strength.
The Turkish navy made its first overseas visit to the British naval base in Malta in
1936. It was an unprecedented port call that affirmed Turkey’s desire to forge a link with
Britain against the Italian menace in the Mediterranean. Ironically, the visiting Turkish
fleet was composed mostly of naval units built in Italy; at the time of the visit, Turkey was
still paying its outstanding debts on the ships to the Italian government. These reminders
of the brief era of cooperation between Italy and Turkey became the primary means
of Turkish defense against Italy’s emerging naval power in the Mediterranean. If the
short-lived Italian–Turkish cooperation in the inter-war period was a tactical move by
fascist Italy, diplomatic records provide sufficient evidence to suggest that cooperation
with Italy also served Turkish political, economic, and military interests at a time that
the country was seeking a way out of its international isolation.
N OT E S
Author’s note: I gratefully acknowledge the grant provided by the Agnelli Foundation to support my
research in the Archives of Ministero degli Affari Esteri, Rome. I thank Gareth Winrow, Aysegül Baykan, and
Molly Farquharson for their comments on earlier versions of this paper.
1 See, for instance, Edward Weisband, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1943–1945: Small State Diplomacy and
Great Power Politics (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1973); Ludmila Zhivkova, Anglo-Turkish
Relations, 1933–1939 (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976); Selim Deringil, Turkish Foreign Policy during the
Second World War: An “Active” Neutrality (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989); Cemil Koçak,
Türk-Alman İlişkileri, 1923–1939 (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1991); and Dilek Barlas, Etatism
and Diplomacy in Turkey: Economic and Foreign Policy Strategies in an Uncertain World (Leiden: E. J. Brill,
1998).
2 Broke Millman, “Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy, 1934–42,” Middle Eastern Studies 31 (1995):
483–508; William Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 1774–2000 (London: Frank Cass, 2000), 61; Yücel Güçlü,
“Fascist Italy’s ‘Mare Nostrum’ Policy and Turkey,” Belleten 58, 238 (1999): 813–45.
Friends or Foes?
249
˙
Akşin, Atatürk’ün Dış Politika Ilkeleri
ve Diplomasisi (Istanbul: Inkilap ve Aka Kitabevleri,
˙ On Yılı ve Balkan Paktı (Ankara: T. C.
1966), 98–105; Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, Cumhuriyetin Ilk
Dışişleri Bakanlıǧı, 1974), 276–87; Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası, 6th ed. (Ankara: A.Ü. S.B.F. Yayınları,
1987), 81–84; Mehmet Gönlübol and Cem Sar, Atatürk ve Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası (Ankara: Milli Eǧitim
Basımevi, 1973), 76–79; Kamuran Gürün, Savaşan Dünya ve Türkiye (Istanbul: Inkilap Kitabevi, 1997),
178–81, 356–59.
4 See Ennio Di Nolfo, Mussolini e La Politica Estera Italiana (1919–1933) (Padua: Cedam, 1960), 153–59;
Alan Cassels, “Was There a Fascist Foreign Policy? Tradition and Novelty,” International History Review 2
(1983): 255–68; R. J. B. Bosworth, Italy and the Wider World 1860–1960 (London: Routledge, 1996), 36–57;
H. James Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy in the Interwar Period 1918–1940 (Westport, Conn.: Praeger, 1997);
and H. Stuart Hughes, “The Early Diplomacy of Italian Fascism, 1922–1932”, in The Diplomats, 1919–1939,
ed. Gordon A. Graig and Felix Gilbert (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1981).
5 Cassels, “Fascist Foreign Policy,” 262.
6 Marco Rimanelli, Italy between Europe and the Mediterranean: Diplomacy and Naval Strategy from
Unification to NATO, 1800s–2000 (New York: Peter Lang Publishing, 1997), 528.
7 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Levant/Turquie, vol. 616, no. 316, 27 April 1935, 49–51. “Amiadversion” defined a relationship that includes elements of both friendship and adversity.
8 A British diplomat described the evaluation of Italian–Turkish relations by 1934 in stages of “warmth,”
“cooling off,” and “frost”: Public Record Office (PRO) FO 371/19039, E 1213/1213/44, 10 February 1935.
9 Mevlüt Çelebi, Milli Mücadele Döneminde Türk-İtalyan İlişkileri (Ankara: Dışişleri Bakanlıǧı Stratejik
Araştırmalar Merkezi, 1999); Fabio L. Grassi, L’Italia e la Questione Turca (1919–1923) (Turin: Silvio
Zamaroni Editore, 1996).
10 Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 55.
11 Bosworth, Wider World, 41.
12 Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 24–27.
13 Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 219.
14 Mussolini’s seizure of Fiume was against the Rapallo Treaty that Conte Sforza had signed with the
Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes in 1920.
15 In 1922, the year Mussolini came to power, Czechoslovakia, Romania, and the Kingdom of Serbs, Croats,
and Slovenes established the Little Entente with the support of France: Eliza Campus, The Little Entente and
the Balkan Alliance (Bucharest: Academiei Republicii Socialiste Romania, 1978), 13–17.
16 Bosworth, Wider World, 44.
17 Martin Blinkhorn, Mussolini and Fascist Italy (London: Routledge, 1994), 26.
18 Denis Mack Smith, Mussolini (New York: Vintage Books, 1983), 153.
19 Archivio Storico del Ministero degli Affari Esteri (hereafter, ASMAE), Pacco 1704/7859, 29 August
1924; ibid., Pacco 1714/7889, 21 January 1925.
20 These treaties were in fact signed as a response to the occupation of the Ruhr region by France and
Belgium: William R. Keylor, The Twentieth Century World (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 123;
and Felix Gilbert, The End of the European Era, 1890 to the Present (New York: W. W. Norton, 1984),
220–21.
21 Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 35.
22 Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 221.
23 Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy, 42; Hughes, “Early Diplomacy,” 223.
24 Smith, Mussolini, 154.
25 Campus, Little Entente, 27.
26 Ibid., 23.
27 Bosworth, Wider World, 44.
28 Amid the Mosul crisis, some scholars argue, London also kept in close contact with different ethnic
groups in the region that were potential threats to the new Republic of Turkey: Mim Kemal Öke, Musul
Meselesi Kronolojisi (1918–1926) (Istanbul: Türk Dünyası Araştırmaları Vakfı, 1991), 112–40. Others say
that there is no proof to show a direct link between the rebellions and London: Ömer Kürkçüoǧlu, Türk-İngiliz
İlişkileri 1919–1926 (Ankara: A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1978), 314.
29 Soysal claims that Turkey preferred instead to receive 500,000 pounds sterling up front from Britain
instead of annual shares: İsmail Soysal, Türkiye’nin Siyasal Andlaşmaları, Vol. 1: (1920–1945) (Ankara:
Türk Tarih Kurumu, 1983), 307. Uluǧbay’s detailed study of Turkish budgets, however, reveals that Turkey
3 Abdülahat
250 Dilek Barlas
actually received a total of 3.5 million pounds sterling until 1958 in annual installments: Hikmet Uluǧbay,
İmparatorluktan Cumhuriyete Petropolitik (Ankara: Turkish Daily News, 1995), 263.
30 ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7889, 21 January 1925.
31 Rıfat Uçarol, Siyasi Tarih (Ankara: Havacılık Basın ve Neşriyat Müdürlüǧü, 1979), 426.
32 Ayın Tarihi 55 (1928): 3889.
33 ASMAE, Pacco 1714/7890, 10 April 1925.
34 Ibid., 7 April 1925.
35 Ibid., Pacco 4171/584, 9 June 1927.
36 Ibid.
37 Haluk Ülman, “Türk Dış Politikasına Yön Veren Etkenler I,” A.Ü. Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi 26,
3 (1968): 244.
38 ASMAE, Pacco 1719/7938, 19 February 1927.
39 Not until 1936 at Montreux would the Straits question be resolved to the advantage of Turkey: Feridun
Cemal Erkin, Les Relations Turco-Sovietiques et la Question des Détroits (Ankara: Başnur Matbaasi, 1968),
62–65; and Seha L. Meray, Lozan Barış Konferansı, Tutanaklar-Belgeler (Istanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları,
1993), 1:131–80.
40 See, for instance, Ayın Tarihi 48 (1928): 3336.
41 PRO FO 371/13085, E 3218/43/44, 25 June 1928.
42 According to Mango, Atatürk’s diplomatic tactic was, as ever, to split the Allies’ ranks. A compromise
in Mosul would satisfy Britain. It would then be easier to resist the economic demands of the French and the
Italians: Andrew Mango, Atatürk (London: John Murray, 1999), 378.
43 Nettuno would have guaranteed the rights of Italians living in Dalmatia: Burgwyn, Italian Foreign Policy,
42.
44 Smith, Mussolini, 151–58.
45 ASMAE, Pacco 1719, 15 November 1927. İnönü asked Orsini whether the alliance contained military
obligations.
46 Ibid., Pacco 1719/7938, 25 March 1927.
47 The Ottoman debt problem dated back to the time of the Crimean War (1854–56), during which the
Ottoman Empire had borrowed money from abroad, mainly from France. In 1881, the Administration of
the Ottoman Public Debt was instituted along with its executive committee, the council. By the signing of the
Sèvres Treaty in 1920, the council was reorganized to include only the delegates of the British, French, and
Italian bond holders and the representative of the Imperial Ottoman Bank. During the Lausanne Conference,
the council decided that the Republic of Turkey was responsible for 67 percent of the annuity of the pre-war
debt, but the question of how payment was to be made was not resolved until 1928: Emine Kıray, Osmanlı’da
Ekonomik Yapı ve Dış Borçlar (Istanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993), 23–40, 203–21.
48 ASMAE, Pacco 1724/7965, 15 June 1928.
49 The choice of Milan over Rome can be taken as a manifestation of what tono fascista amounted to in
Italian foreign policy. Milan had a special significance for the fascists, especially for Mussolini. In March
1919, when the inaugural meeting of the Fasci di Combatti was held in Milan under Ferruccio Vecchi, the
audience cheered the speeches of Mussolini and adopted the program that Mussolini had drawn up for the new
organization. In fact, the first fascio was formed in Milan: Jasper Ridley, Mussolini (New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1997), 91. According to Morgan, early fascism’s activist style could be seen most clearly in the high
profile in the Milan fascio: Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism 1919–1945 (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995),
14. And on 20 October 1922, Mussolini came to Rome from Milan to accept the prime ministership from
Victor Emmmanuel III: Bosworth, Wider World, 34.
50 Ayın Tarihi 48 (1928): 3331.
51 Ibid., 3338.
52 Ibid., 3336.
53 Ibid., 3340.
54 The Greek newspaper Politika wrote that the Greek and Turkish foreign ministers, Poulus and Aras,
would travel together from Italy to Greece to exchange views on the Milan meeting: as quoted in Ayın Tarihi
48 (1928): 3335.
55 As quoted in Tomaso Sillani, L’Italia E İl Levante (Roma: La Rassegna Italiana, 1934), 205.
56 Smith, Mussolini, 101.
57 Ibid., 157.
Friends or Foes?
58 Burgwyn,
251
Italian Foreign Policy, 60.
Italian Fascism, 139.
60 Blinkhorn, Mussolini, 44.
61 Morgan, Italian Fascism, 132.
62 Ibid., 139.
63 ASMAE, Pacco 1729/7993, 11 February 1929; ibid., 1728/2319, 29 March 1929.
64 Afif Büyüktuǧrul, “Osmanlı (Türk)-Yunan Deniz Silahlanma Yarışı,” Belleten 39, 156, (1975): 749.
65 Tevfik Rüştü Aras, Görüşlerim (Istanbul: Tan Basımevi, 1945), 52.
66 ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7948, 21 July 1927.
67 PRO FO 371/13085, E 3218/43/44, 25 June 1928.
68 Ibid.
69 Ibid., E 6167/43/44, 31 December 1928. When the Italian–Turkish Treaty was being signed in Rome,
a Turkish delegation in Paris was trying to come to an agreement with the French on the debt issue. Finally,
in June 1928, Turkey signed a treaty with the Ottoman Debt Council and agreed to pay 67 percent of the
Ottoman debt, which amounted to 107.5 million Turkish liras in gold: Faruk Yılmaz, Devlet Borçlanması ve
Osmanlıdan Cumhuriyete Dış Borçlar (Istanbul: Birleşik Yayıncılık, 1996), 228. Again in June, the Italian
diplomats were commenting that the common economic interests had prompted the two countries (Italy and
Turkey), “bathing in the same sea,” to conclude a treaty: ASMAE, Pacco 1727/7981, 25 June 1928.
70 PRO FO 371/14351, C 9143/3519/62, 8 December 1930. In addition to the unresolved Ottoman debt
issue mainly with France, Ankara would be very much disappointed with the French foot-dragging in ratifying
the French–Turkish Treaty of Friendship, Reconciliation, and Arbitration of 1930.
71 ASMAE, Pacco 17271/7975, 9 December 1928.
72 Ibid., 17 December 1928.
73 Cumhuriyet, 24 May 1929.
74 ASMAE, Pacco 1731/8003, 25 May 1929.
75 Ibid., Pacco 1728/2319, 3 June 1929.
76 Afif Büyüktuǧrul, Cumhuriyet Donanması (1923–1960) (Istanbul: Deniz Basımevi, 1967), 53–54. In
June 1929, four Italian destroyers and a squadron of thirty-five Italian seaplanes visited Istanbul. The seaplane
squadron was led by Italy’s famous aviation hero Air Minister Italo Balbo: Cumhuriyet, 7 June 1929. Around
the same time, the Turkish ambassador in Rome, Suat Davaz, was in Turkey. In his comments to Cumhuriyet,
he stated that a large number of Turkish civil servants were in training in Italy. He also announced that a group
of Turkish scouts were to visit Italy in September: Cumhuriyet, 8 June 1929.
77 For the Italian policy of seeking political influence through supply of arms, see Dilek Barlas and Serhat
Güvenç, “To Build a Navy with the Help of an Adversary, Italian–Turkish Naval Arms Trade, 1929–1932,”
Middle Eastern Studies 38 (2002): 143–68.
78 PRO FO 371/13648, C 7796/14/19, 7 October 1929.
79 Rimanelli, Between Europe and the Mediterranean, 528.
80 TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, vol. 25, term 3, sess. 3, meeting 28, 12 February 1931, 35–37. For a different
view, see Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, “The 1930 Greek–Turkish Naval Protocol,” Diplomacy and Statecraft 9, 1
(1998): 89–111.
81 ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 3 November 1930.
82 Ibid., Pacco 1728/2319, 10 March 1929.
83 Türkiye Dış Politikasında 50 Yıl, 278.
84 ASMAE, Pacco 1719, 2 November and 16 November 1927.
85 Ibid., Pacco 1732/8021, 4 November 1930.
86 The 1925 treaty was renewed in 1929: Hale, Turkish Foreign Policy, 60.
87 ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 17 November 1930.
88 Ayın Tarihi 75–78 (1930): 6430.
89 J. Calvitt Clarke III, Russia and Italy against Hitler (New York: Greenwood Press, 1991), 11.
90 Greece was more inclined toward France’s European union idea than toward the triple alliance of Italy,
Turkey, and Greece.
91 ASMAE, Busta 6, 3 October 1932–14 December 1932.
92 Aras expressed his feelings about France to British Ambassador George R. Clerk by saying that the French
economist Charles Rist “wanted to enclave Turkey to France and leave her without a vestige of financial and
economic independence.” Even though Rist was sent to Turkey not by France but by the Ottoman Debt Council
59 Morgan,
252 Dilek Barlas
to write a report on Turkey’s economic situation, Aras said to Clerk that Rist was the Quai d’Orsay and that “he
himself had not been at all surprised, for the report set forth exactly the policy of France towards this country
as he had always thought it to be.” PRO FO 371/14585, E 4975/3476/44, 4 September 1930.
93 The Kingdom of Serbs, Croats, and Slovenes was named Yugoslavia in 1929.
94 Ministère des Affaires Etrangères, Levant/Turquie, vol. 609, no. 234, 25 August 1930; and ibid., no. 111,
26 November 1930.
95 Ibid., no. 111.
96 ASMAE, Pacco 1732/8021, 29 December 1930.
97 Cumhuriyet, 6 June 1932.
98 Ibid., 8 June 1929.
99 PRO FO 371/14568, E 863/282/44; and ibid., E 950/282/44, 19 February 1930.
100 In 1929, Turkey’s imports from Italy totaled 32 million Turkish lira whereas its exports amounted to
33 million Turkish lira. In 1932, there was a drastic decline in the volume of trade. Imports went down to
11 million Turkish lira and exports to 16 million Turkish lira: T. C. Başvekalet İstatistik Umum Müdürlüǧü,
Harici Ticaret, Aylık İstatistik, Hususi Ticaret (1940), v.
101 ASMAE, Busta 6, 30 May 1932.
102 Ibid., 3 October 1932.
103 Mustafa Aydın, “Determinants of Turkish Foreign Policy: Historical Framework and Traditional Inputs,”
Middle Eastern Studies, 35 (1999): 163.
104 ASMAE, Busta 10, 10 and 20 February 1933; ibid., 1 and 23 March 1933; Cumhuriyet, May–July 1932;
and Akşam, 26 December 1932. The Italians decided that they would keep 17 million Turkish lira out of the
30 million Turkish lira that they would give as loan. Moreover, they increased the interest to 7.5 percent.
105 ASMAE, Busta 6/8, 3 October 1932 and 14 December 1932.
106 Ibid., 13 December 1932.
107 Ibid., 5 August 1932.
108 Cumhuriyet, 28–30 May 1932; and Vakit, 30 May 1932.
109 Burgywn, Italian Foreign Policy, 71.
110 Clarke, Russia and Italy, 60.
111 R. Albrecht-Carrie, Italy from Napoleon to Mussolini (New York: Columbia University Press, 1968),
202.
112 PRO FO 371/17949, E 3652/3652/44, 4 June 1934.
113 Cumhurbaşkanlıǧı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 48–49.
114 PRO FO 371/17964, E 3073/44, 10 May 1934.
115 ASMAE, Busta 11/1, 26 April 1934.
116 On 19 October 1939, with the signing of the Tripartite Alliance with Britain and France, Turkey pledged
help to its partners if the war spread to the Mediterranean area.
117 PRO FO 371/19039, E 1213/1213/44, 10 February 1935.
118 This would be a pact of mutual assistance among France, Italy, Spain, Britain, Greece, Yugoslavia,
and Turkey, guaranteeing only naval frontiers against any naval and air attack in the Mediterranean:
Cumhurbaşkanlıǧı Arşivleri, A. IV-6, D. 54, F. 90-1.
119 Michael Simpson, “Superhighway to the World Wide Web: The Mediterranean in British Imperial Strategy,” in Naval Strategy and Policy in the Mediterranean: Past, Present and Future, ed. J. B. Hattendorf
(London: Frank Cass, 2000), 57.