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We see the ocean navigated and the solid land traversed by steam power, and intelligence communicated by electricity. Truly this is almost a miraculous era. What is before us no one can say, what is upon us no one can hardly realize. Daniel Webster, 1903 Welcome to Sociology 415: The Dynamics of Social Change! The purposes of Sociology 415 are to provide: 1. 2. 3. 4. an understanding of linkages among science, technology, and society, an understanding of public risk perceptions, skills for communicating about risk to professional audiences and the public, and skills in gaining adoption of complex, controversial technologies. I hope you find the course to be intellectually stimulating, useful in your life, and an enjoyable experience. Organization of This Website This website contains five sections: Home Page, Syllabus, Calendar, Reading Assignments, and Class Assignments. Reading Assignments The web pages listed under Reading Assignments provide all the reading materials needed for this course. No textbooks or other materials are required. Most of the links provided on the web pages reference non-required reading. Sociology 415 begins by presenting a sampler of readings that describe social issues related to four complex and controversial agricultural technologies: large-scale hog-confinement operations, food irradiation, genetic modification of food, caging of chickens, nanotechnology, and stem cell research. In reading about these technologies we will see they offer great promise for improving the agricultural economy and the health and well-being of people worldwide. Yet, they raise ethical issues and concerns about potential negative effects on the environment, the quality of life in rural areas, and social and economic equity. Class Assignments Class assignments include four brief quizzes, four exams, and a computer simulation exercise. The Calendar shows the due dates for these assignments. A Note Regarding the Artwork Displayed at This Website 1 In his masterpiece, Modern Times, Charlie Chaplin portrays with endearing humor the tribulations of the Tramp as he confronts the overly mechanized, dehumanized, and irrational consequences of technological advancements in modern society. The Tramp copes as best as possible with rapidly moving assembly lines, automatic feeding devices, and giant machines that devour people whole! In Sociology 415, we neither condemn nor praise new technology, but seek to understand public opinions of it and the effects of these opinions on the shaping of the technology and its adoption by society. As part of this task, we seek greater understanding of the emotions of us as the Tramp, as one who grapples with the broader consequences of technological advancement. The images portrayed here pay tribute to a great film and hopefully will brighten your day. Thank you to the Roy Export Company Establishment for their permission to use the photographs displayed on this website. 2 Instructor Dr. Stephen G. Sapp Department of Sociology Iowa State University 320 East Hall Ames, IA 50011-1070 Ph: (515) 294-1403 Cell: (515) 451-1620 FAX: (515) 294-2303 [email protected] Course Description SOC 415 addresses theoretical and applied topics in the sociology of technology and risk communication. It focuses primarily upon applied issues of technology transfer. It explores techniques of and social issues related to risk assessment, risk management, risk communication, public policy formation, and diffusion strategies. This course is conducted in accordance with the Department of Sociology Code of Ethics. Any student who needs an accommodation based upon a disability should contact Dr. Sapp privately to discuss their specific needs. Also, please contact the Disability Resources Office (Room 1076, Student Services Building, 415-294-6624, [email protected]) to coordinate disability certification and accommodation. Readings Sociology 415 Web Site All assigned readings are available at the course web site: http://www.soc.iastate.edu /sapp/soc415.html. Diffusion of Innovations, 5th Edition Written by Everett Rogers, 2003. NY: Free Press. Although not required for Sociology 415, this text is fundamental to all programs for social change. Persons pursuing careers in social change professions should purchase it and read it carefully. 3 Sociology 415 Course Packet An Acrobat Reader version of the Course Packet is available at the Sociology 415 web site: Course Packet A paper copy of the Course Packet is available at the ISU Bookstore. Related Books Adams, John, Risk. Douglas, Mary and Aaron Wildavsky, Risk and Culture. FAO/WHO Report #70, The Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters. Krimsky, Sheldon and Dominic Golding, Social Theories of Risk. Lupton, Deborah, Risk. Shrader-Frechette, Kristin S., Risk and Rationality. Slovic, Paul, The Perception of Risk. Webster, Andrew, Science, Technology, and Society. Related Articles Bell, Michael and Diane Mayerfeld, The Rationalization of Risk. Bradbury, Judith A., The Policy Implications of Differing Concepts of Risk. Freudenburg, William R., Risk and Recreancy. Kahan, Dan M., Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, and John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk. Kahan, Dan M., and Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluation of Risk: 'Values' or 'Blunders'? Sapp, Stephen G. and Peter F. Korsching, The Social Fabric and Innovation Diffusion. Sapp, Stephen G. et al., Consumer Trust in the U.S. Food System: An Examination of the Recreancy Theorem. Sapp, Stephen G. et al., Science Communication and the Rationality of Public Opinion Formation. Slovic, Paul, Trust, Emotions, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield. Sunstein, Cass R., Misfearing: A Reply. Course Organization Following the introduction, the course is organized into four units: 1) Science, Technology, and Society, 2) Risk Assessment, 3) Risk Communication, and 4) Diffusion of Innovations. Unit one addresses relationships among science, technology, and society, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of technology, and social philosophy. The second unit presents approaches to technology evaluation. The third unit covers risk communication, risk management, linkages between public perceptions and technology policy, and the role of the media in risk assessment. The final unit addresses strategies for gaining either the adoption or rejection of complex and controversial agricultural technologies. Assignments and Grading 1. The Calendar of Events summarizes the assignments for the course. 2. Evaluations include quizzes, exams, and a computer simulation exercise. Quizzes evaluate understanding of basic concepts. Exams evaluate integration and application of course materials. The computer simulation exercise applies principles of the diffusion of innovations approach to gaining adoption of an innovation within a hypothetical village. 4 3. Class participation is an important component of this course. Four points will be deducted from the total score for each unexcused absence. 4. The Class Assignments page provides detailed descriptions of the expectations for each type of assignment. 5. The total value of all evaluations equals 250 points. The scoring procedure allows for 80 points from quizzes (4 quizzes at 20 points each), 120 points from exams (4 exams at 30 points each), and 50 points from the computer simulation exercise. Grading is based upon a standard curve: A = 90% or more, B = 80% - 89%, and so forth, with some consideration of + and - grades. 6. Grades for all assignments will be posted on ISU Blackboard. All other materials related to the course are located at this web site. 5 Date Unit One August 24 August 26 August 28 August 31 September 2 September 4 September 9 September 11 September 14 September 16 September 18 September 21 September 23 Topic Welcome to Sociology 415 The Social Problem Science and the Public Consumer Skepticism Sampler Technologies The Philosophy of Science The Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Technology Social Philosophy Social Philosophy Social Philosophy Review Exam #1 Unit Two September 25 September 28 September 30 October 2 October 5 October 7 October 9 October 12 October 14 October 16 Science, Technology, and Society Technical Risk Assessment Risk and Rationality Economic Risk Assessment Psychological Risk Assessment Sociological Risk Assessment Sociological Risk Assessment The Sociology of Trust Anthropological Risk Assessment Exam #2 Unit Three October 19 October 21 October 23 October 26 October 28 October 30 November 2 November 4 November 6 November 9 Globalization Globalization Globalization Risk and Public Policy Risk Communication Risk Communication Risk Communication Risk Communication The Media and Risk Communication Exam #3 Unit Four November 11 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Assignments Quiz #1 Quiz #2 Quiz #3 November 13 November 16 November 18 November 20 November 30 December 2 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Computer Simulation Exercise Computer Simulation Exercise December 4 December 7 December 9 December 11 Computer Simulation Exercise Diffusion of Innovations: Part 2 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 2 Summary December 15 Exam #4 (9:45 a.m. to 11:45 a.m.) Quiz #4 Description of the Quizzes The quizzes will evaluate your mastery of key concepts discussed in Sociology 415. Each quiz consists of 10 multiple-choice questions worth 2 points each (20 points total). The course contains four quizzes, for a total value of 80 points. Quiz #1: Monday, September 14th Quiz #1 will cover materials related to Consumer Skepticism, the Social Problem of societal decision making regarding complex and controversial technologies, the Philosophy of Science, and the Philosophy of Technology. Readings: The Social Problem Consumer Skepticism Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Technology Key terms: problem of deduction, problem of induction, community of scholars, scientific theory, consumer's dilemma, functional imperatives (i.e., adaptation, goal-attainment, integration, latency), dynamic equilibrium, falisification, theoretical knowledge, practical knowledge, productive knowledge. Quiz #2: Friday, October 9th Quiz #2 will cover materials related to Technical, Economic, Psychological, and Sociological Risk Assessment, and Rationality. Readings: Technical Risk Assessment Risk and Rationality Economic Risk Assessment Psychological Risk Assessment Sociological Risk Assessment Key terms: forms of technical risk assessment (i.e., actuarial, toxicological/epidemiological, probabilistic), spurious and suppressor effects, formal and substantive rationality, rational choice theory, reflective modernization, risk society, outrage factors, recreancy. Quiz #3: Wednesday, October 28th Quiz #3 will cover materials related to Globalization and Risk and Public Policy. Readings: Globalization (Web page) Globalization (PowerPoint) Risk and Public Policy Key terms: comparative advantage, types of economies (i.e, primary, secondary, tertiary), economic leakage, race to the bottom, dilemmas of risk policy (i.e., fact-value, standardization, contributors, de minimus, consent), strategies for development (i.e., isolationist, social progress, contervailing benefits, consent, reasonable-possibility). Quiz #4: Wednesday, November 18th Quiz #4 will cover materials related to the Diffusion of Innovations, Part 1. Readings: Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Key terms: adopter categories (i.e., innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, laggards), innovation-decision process, symbolic adoption, opinion leaders, diffusion effect, choice shift. Description of the Exam Exam #1 will contain two sections of short-answer questions. In the first section students will be asked to answer two required questions worth 10 points each. In the second section students will be asked to answer one of four questions worth 10 points each. Reading Assignments Required Class Notes. The Social Problem Consumer Skepticism Philosophy of Science Philosophy of Technology Social Philosophy Recommended Familiarity with consumer issues regarding the Sampler Technologies. Discussion Questions 1. Be prepared to describe why skepticism is a rational, legitimate response by consumers to hearing about a new and controversial technology. 2. Be prepared to describe the limitations of educating the public about new and controversial technologies. 3. Be prepared to describe in detail the central tenets of the structure-function, critical, and human agency approaches to understanding relationships among science, technology, and society. You will be asked to describe the role of the sociologist in improving the quality of public decision-making regarding complex and controversial technologies. 4. Be prepared to describe the Classical Greek, Enlightenment, and Critical philosophies of technology. For each one, be prepared to discuss how it influences public opinion about complex and controversial technologies. 5. Be prepared to describe and list the advantages and disadvantages of the positivist, 10 hypothetico-deductive, and community of scholar approaches to conducting science. What is the role of the community of scholars in the enterprise of science? 6. Be prepared to describe the "scientist's dilemma" and the "consumer's dilemma." Why does negative information about a technology carry disproportionate weight in influencing consumer opinions about it? Help Session The help session for this exam is scheduled for Tuesday, September 22, from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. We will meet on the first floor of East Hall and find an open classroom to hold the help session. Dr. Sapp's Office Hours are MWF, 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., or by appointment. Students are invited to come to the office at any time to discuss the class materials. 11 Description of the Exam Exam #2 will contain two sections of short-answer questions. In the first section students will be asked to answer two required questions worth 10 points each. In the second section students will be asked to answer one of four questions worth 10 points each. Reading Assignments Required Class Notes. Science, Technology, and Society Technical Risk Assessment Economic Risk Assessment Psychological Risk Assessment Sociological Risk Assessment Science and Public Policy The Sociology of Trust Recommended Familiarity with consumer issues regarding the Sampler Technologies. Discussion Questions 1. Be prepared to describe the key characteristics and strengths and limitations of each approach to risk assessment. 2. It will be important to recognize the philosophical and applied implications of differences between the approaches to risk assessment. In comparing the economic approach with the probabilistic approach, for example, note that we shift our focus from expected value to expected utility, thereby placing emphasis upon perceptions of the usefulness of the technology. In a sense, we are shifting our focus from asking, "How safe is the technology?" to asking "Is the technology safe enough?" 3. Be prepared to describe the limitations to technical risk assessments and Adams' suggestions for evaluating technical risk assessments. 4. Be prepared to describe what is meant by "outrage factors" in public discourse about 5. 6. 7. 8. 9. 10. new technologies. Know which outrage factors are most important in influencing public opinion. Be prepared to describe Beck's argument that we live in a "risk society." Be prepared to describe Bell and Mayerfeld's argument that risk assessment is a battle over the language of risk. Be prepared to describe the elements of Paul Slovic's argument that the system destroys trust. Be prepared to describe the policy debate between Daniel Kahan and Cass Sunstein. Why does Sunstein believe that public policy should be guided by values, but not by blunders? Why does Kahan argue for approaches that seek to reconcile diverse value orientations? As part of your response, be prepared to describe bounded rationality. Be prepared to describe the recreancy theorem (see: Sociology of Trust) as an approach to risk communication. Be prepared to describe the sociological importance of the recreancy theorem in relation to social-psychological approaches to understanding public responses to complex and controversial innovations. As part of your response, be prepared to describe formal rationality and substantive rationality and the importance of these expressions for designing public policy related to complex and controversial innovations. Andrew Webster offers five policy recommendations for improving relationships between science and society. Be prepared to describe these recommendations and offer your opinion about which one can be the most effective in influencing the "active citizen" to become more involved in technology development and science policy? Help Session The help session for this exam is scheduled for Thursday, October 15, from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. We will meet on the first floor of East Hall and find an open classroom to hold the help session. Dr. Sapp's Office Hours are MWF, 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., or by appointment. Students are invited to come to the office at any time to discuss the class materials. Description of the Exam Exam #3 will contain two sections of short-answer questions. In the first section students will be asked to answer two required questions worth 10 points each. In the second section students will be asked to answer one of four questions worth 10 points each. Reading Assignments Required Class Notes. Globalization (Web page) Globalization (PowerPoint). Risk and Public Policy Risk Communication The Media and Risk Communication Recommended Familiarity with consumer issues regarding the Sampler Technologies. Discussion Questions 1. Be prepared to describe the concepts of economic leakage and dependency as they relate to primary, secondary, and tertiary economiies. 2. Be prepared to describe the dilemmas faced by risk assessors in working with the public to define technological risk (i.e., fact-value dilemma, etc.) 3. Shrader-Frechette identifies four inappropriate responses to public concerns about complex, controversial technologies. Describe each one and the counterargument to these responses offered by Shrader-Frechette. 4. Shrader-Frechette identifies five improper/unethical rationales used to disseminate usafe technologies to areas with little knowledge about the technology or power to influence its use. Describe each of these rationales and why it is improper/unethical. 5. Be prepared to describe the history of efforts at effective risk communication. 6. Be prepared to describe the elements of effective risk communication. 7. Be prepared to describe the barriers to effective risk communication. 8. Be prepared to discribe the Natural History Model, the Public Arena Model, and the Hoopla Effect. Know appropriate ways the media can present risk information to the public. 9. Be prepared to describe the concept of comparative advantage. Help Session The help session for this exam will be held on Sunday, November 8, from 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. We will meet on the first floor of East Hall and find an open classroom to hold the help session. Dr. Sapp's Office Hours are MWF, 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., or by appointment. Students are invited to come to the office at any time to discuss the class materials. Description of the Exam Exam #4 will contain two sections of short-answer questions. In the first section students will be asked to answer two required questions worth 10 points each. In the second section students will be asked to answer one of four questions worth 10 points each. Reading Assignments Required Class Notes. Diffusion of Innovations: Part 1 Diffusion of Innovations: Part 2 Recommended Familiarity with consumer issues regarding the Sampler Technologies. Discussion Questions 1. Be prepared to discuss the meaning of the "diffusion effect." What is the sociological meaning of this effect? How does it relate to the concept of normative expectations? Why is this effect important for influencing the adoption of innovations? What are the two central elements of the diffusion effect? [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 1.] 2. Be prepared to discuss the methods of identifying opinion leaders. Know an advantage and disadvantage of each approach. [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 1.] 3. Rogers discusses strategies for reducing inequalities that occur from the adoption of new technologies and presents three scenarios for reducing gaps between "ups" and "downs" that sometimes are increased as the result of innovation adoption. Be prepared to discuss each of these scenarios and Rogers' proposed solutions to them. [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 2.] 4. Be prepared to discuss the key features of each stage of the innovation-decision process. Know the diffusion strategy that is most appropriate for each of the first three stages. [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 1.] 5. Be prepared to discuss: re-invention , the "strength-of-weak-ties" , and innovation 16 characteristics. [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 1.] 6. Be prepared to discuss the contributions and criticisms of the diffusion of innovations model. [See: Diffusion of Innovations, Part 2.] Help Session Monday, December 14th, 5:00 p.m. to 6:00 p.m. We will meet on the first floor of East Hall and find an open classroom to hold the help session. Dr. Sapp's Office Hours are MWF, 9:00 a.m. to 10:00 a.m., or by appointment. Students are invited to come to the office at any time to discuss the class materials. 17 Copyright Information The Diffusion Game is a refinement of the Change Agent Game, a paper and pencil game developed by Everett M. Rogers (Copyright 1970 and 1972). It was modified and adapted to the computer by Charles B. Weinberg with the assistance of Roberto Mendez and David Rothschild at Stanford University. It was jointly copyrighted (1977 and 1981) by the President and Fellows of Harvard College and the Board of Trustees of the Leland Stanford Junior University (Christopher H. Lovelock, Harvard University; Charles B. Weinberg, University of British Columbia). This current version of the game (Copyright 2001) was written by Scot Hoffman and revised by Paul Murphy, with the permission of Charles B. Weinberg. It is intended for use by students taking the Dynamics of Social Change course at Iowa State University under the direction of Stephen G. Sapp. Please do not copy the program or distribute it to others. Introduction Diffusion is the process by which a tangible or intangible item spreads through a society. An area of particular interest to communication specialists, marketers, and sociologists is the diffusion of innovations, where an innovation is defined as a product, process, behavior pattern, idea, or entity that is new to a person or a society. People may be unwilling to adopt an innovation for a variety of reasons, not least because it may involve changes in present habits or beliefs. Organizations seeking to promote change are sometimes referred to as change agencies and those who work for them as change agents. The latter are professionals who try to convince others to adopt innovations. Typically, change agents work by contacting individuals or groups in person; however, they may also use forms of non-personal communication. Examples of change agents are teachers, health workers, agricultural extension agents, Peace Corps volunteers, sales people, and political precinct workers. This game asks you to assume the role of a change agent and to concentrate on two of a change agent's functions -- gathering information on the target population and, based on that information, implementing diffusion strategies to promote an innovation. How to Play the Game Scenario You are a change agent in a rural village. A map of this village, which consists of 100 farm households, is provided. These households are divided into ten cliques. Each clique has a different number of followers, headed by one opinion leader. The degree of reputational influence accorded to each opinion leader varies. In some instances, this influence may extend to villagers outside the opinion leader's immediate clique. 18 Although you know little about the village, your objective is to secure adoption of the innovation among a specified percentage of village households within one year. Information about the villagers' behavior takes time to obtain but should help you develop diffusion strategies for promoting the innovation. You will therefore find yourself engaging in two kinds of activities: (1) obtaining information about the villagers and (2) selecting appropriate diffusion strategies to motivate villagers to adopt the innovation you are advocating. Each time you initiate a diffusion strategy, the cost is subtracted from the work days available for completing your task and you are notified of the number of days that remain. At the end of your visit to the village, you will be told how many adopters you have gained. At any point in the game, you may also ask for a report on how many households have adopted the innovation so far (i.e., "Feedback"). Your visit ends when you have used all your work days. The game's scoring system rewards players who choose wisely among the different diffusion strategies. Additionally, the sequence in which you select diffusion strategies affects your score. Information Request Each time you play the game, it is assumed you are new to the village and must learn some basic information about its social structure and the people who live there. The Diffusion Game assumes it takes 45 days to collect this information. Learning about social structure and population characteristics will greatly enhance your ability to gain adoption of your innovation. During your first 45 days in the village you have learned the reputational influence of each opinion leader. Also, you have learned key communication patterns among the leaders of the 10 cliques. These communication patterns are summarized as "Links with Other Opinion Leaders" in the information window. By observing the reputational influence of each leader and contact patterns among leaders you should be able to identify the best strategy to gain maximum adoption within the remaining 320 days of your visit. Diffusion Strategies There are several ways in which you can inform villagers about the innovation. Although you can reasonably assume that each of the diffusion strategies is a feasible alternative (for example, you and the villagers speak the same language; there is a local newspaper and a radio station in the vicinity), some strategies may be more effective than others. It is important to note that you cannot implement most diffusion strategies until you have first obtained relevant information. For example, you cannot select a diffusion strategy of talking about the innovation with a specific opinion leader in the village unless you have already identified that leader. Each diffusion strategy convinces a specific number of village households to adopt the innovation. By periodically seeking feedback about your performance, you should be able to assess the relative effectiveness of different strategies. With the exception of conducting demonstrations at opinion leader's farms, there is no limit to the number of times you may select a specific strategy. However, a strategy may be more or less effective (in terms of new adopters) the more it is used. The only way to discover the effectiveness of a strategy after repeated use is by obtaining regular feedback. Suggestions for Playing the Game Develop an overall diffusion strategy each time you play the game. 19 Remember to use what you know about diffusion, especially the relative importance of different channels of communication at different stages in the innovation adoption process. Do not forget the value of feedback, even if it costs time. Feedback helps you to learn the effectiveness of your strategy. Instructions for Playing the Game 1. Click on the link provided below to open the program for Village 1. 2. At the prompt, click on "Open" to play the game. Diffusion Game: Village One (Not active until Monday, December 1st). A Real World Example The Diffusion Game is fun to play and provides an excellent summary of the materials in this section of Sociology 415. The game, however, is noticeably artificial. This link presents an example of an Application of the Diffusion Game in Afghanistan by a former student who took Sociology 515, a version of this course developed for the Masters in Professional Agriculture program at ISU. 20 The policy of being too cautious is the greatest risk of all. Jawaharlal Nehru Sociology and Technology In a subsequent web page to this course you will read about some sampler technologies selected to guide our discussions. Each technology offers promise for greatly improving food safety, the economy, animal welfare, and the health and well-being of people worldwide. Each one also raises concerns about potential negative effects on the environment and on our health and well-being. Given inevitable dilemmas that must be faced in evaluating relationships among science, technology, and society, the public is faced with fundamental questions they expect will be addressed by sociologists in their efforts to shape societal institutions in ways that promote productivity, efficiency, and equitable distribution of resources. Answering these questions defines the research, teaching, and outreach agendas for sociologists. Some key questions posed to sociologists are: What are the costs and benefits of adopting or rejecting a particular technology? In what ways is technology development affected by power relationships in society? What are the best types of technologies for the economy, for the environment, for families? What are the correct ethical guidelines to take in evaluating new technologies? What types of decision-making processes can we expect the public to engage in as they evaluate new technologies? What can be done and what should be done to help citizens address the complex issues involved in evaluating new technologies? Can contentious public discourse erode public confidence in science and technology? If so, what actions might facilitate thoughtful and respectful decision-making about new technologies? Which technologies likely will be accepted by the public and which ones likely will be rejected? What strategies can be used to influence the public to either adopt or reject a new technology? Possible Approaches to the Sociology of Technology The examples listed above reflect the types of questions posed to sociologists. What, then, should be the structure of this course in exploring them? Consider three not mutually exclusive approaches that can be taken to organize this course. Societal Structure and Functioning One approach would be to focus our attention upon understanding how technologies can significantly affect the structure and functioning of societal institutions. What have been the effects of birth control procedures on the size of families, on the strength of family ties, and on the meaning of family in American society? How have petroleum-based production systems affected environmental quality? Have environmentally-friendly production systems improved environmental quality 21 and what negative effects, if any, have they had on productivity and efficiency? What have been the societal consequences of the development of cell phones, computers, antibiotics, new construction materials, and on and on.... That is, are we better off today than we were yesterday? And can we improve the living conditions for future generations? These types of issues motivate sociologists to investigate relationships among science, technology, and society. By the way, sociologists view technology more broadly than the average person. To a sociologist, "feminism," and "global thinking," to name two examples of nonmaterial innovations, along with material innovations, are considered to be technology. Environmentalism, for example, is a nonmaterial technology important to understanding the structure and functioning of America. Distribution of Costs and Benefits All new technologies have some negative consequences for everyone and bring about less access to societal resources for some. That is, it is inevitable that technology is flawed and, given that some persons always will have a vested interest in maintaining the status quo, technology adoption always will create some "losers." Can we anticipate negative consequences of new technologies? Are negative consequences distributed, intentionally or unintentionally, in an inequitable manner? Do powerful segments of society manipulate technology development and dissemination in such a manner as to exploit resources from the less powerful and thereby unevenly distribute negative consequences to them? What types of societal-level policies might be instituted so as to mitigate inequitable distribution of negative consequences? Thus, this approach to investigating linkages among science, technology, and society focuses on how power relationships influence technology development and risk management. Human Agency Sociological interest in human agency focuses on citizen involvement in technology policy. The central questions regard the role of the active citizen in shaping technology policy and obligations of societal institutions to solicit and respond to citizen input. How do citizens (oftentimes, we will use the word consumers) influence the adoption or rejection of new technologies? How do consumers react to hearing information about new agricultural technologies? Do citizens behave rationally in evaluating complex technologies? What types of communication messages are most (and least) effective in conveying complex information to consumers? What are effective strategies for gaining adoption of complex and controversial agricultural technologies? What is the role of the social scientist in facilitating well-reasoned public decision making about complex technologies? Can controversial decision-making take place in a manner that respects the opinions of others? In summary, a focus on human agency involves understanding public responses and facilitating well-reasoned and respectful discourse regarding technology. This type of inquiry provides the scientist not only with an understanding of these issues but theoretical and 22 applied knowledge for acting as a change agent; that is, as someone who helps influence the adoption or rejection of complex and controversial technologies. 23 Technology: No Place for Wimps! Scott Adams: Dilbert Sociology 415 In the previous section, we learned that the sociology of technology addresses issues of technology development and dissemination within three areas: societal well-being, equitable distribution of risks, and human agency. Because explorations into societal well-being and equitable distribution of risks typically fall within the domain of professional sociologists, and because this course is designed for students majoring in many disciplines, Sociology 415 focuses its attention primarily upon human agency. Sociology 415 covers risk evaluations, consumer perceptions, technology communication, social issues of public policy formation, and strategies for gaining either the adoption or rejection of agricultural technologies. That is, the course addresses issues likely to have the most pragmatic applications to commercial and public sector endeavors outside the domain of professional sociology. Unit One: Science, Technology, and Society A. Public Responses to Risk Why are people sometimes skeptical of new technologies? Is skepticism justified? What is the "consumer's dilemma? We learn about the rational and emotional elements of risk perceptions. We learn about the justifications for skepticism and the abuse of skepticism by those who choose to fearmonger. We learn why change agents expect public skepticism and their stratigies for addressing skepticism. B. Philosophies of Science, Technology, and Society Philosophy of Science What is science? What are the relationships among science and society? If we are going to learn how to significantly influence public decisions regarding new technologies, we must have a good sense of the strengths and limitations of science. We will need to become wiser about what science can accomplish and the many ways in which it fails to achieve objective analysis of technology. That is, if we are going to learn to gain adoption or rejection of technology, we need to know our product; we need to know how scientific research and technology development take place. The conclusion we inevitably will arrive at is that it is impossible for scientific research, and therefore for technology development, to be unbiased and objective. Knowing this inevitability will give us a sound philosophical perspective by which to view technology and public opinions about technology. Philosophy of Technology What are the ways in which people think about technology? 24 In what ways do differing philosophies of technology affect technology development and policy? What are current paradigms (i.e., broad, philosophical perspectives) about technology? Is more technology always a good thing or always a bad thing? Are current paradigms leading Americans to make decisions about technology that later will create significant problems for our society? A quotation I like to use to justify the content of Sociology 415 is, "The choice of technology, whether for a rich or poor country, is probably the most important decision to be made" (George McRobie, Conservation Letter, October, 1976). Even if it is not the most important decision to be made, certainly technology choice is critical to societal well-being. The paradigm citizens use to evaluate technology--to decide what is good and bad technology--can have a significant effect on the well-being of future generations. Social Philosophy What are the fundamental principles of sociology? How can these principles be used to understand linkages among science, technology, and society? Sociology is guided by three paradigms: social structure, critical, and human agency. These paradigms are represented above in the description of three approaches that might be taken in organizing this course. The social structure paradigm focuses upon societal structure and functioning, the critical paradigm attends to power relationships and inequalities, and the human agency paradigm emphasizes the role of citizens in shaping their society. This course focuses upon human agency. But it includes sections that discuss social structure and critical evaluations and it incorporates the perspectives of social structure and critical thinking into its presentation of risk communication and the diffusion of innovations. C. Relationships Among Science, Technology, and Society How do science and technology affect the well-being of social systems? How do social institutions and public policies affect science and technology? We learn the importance of public attention to relationships among science, technology, and society. We learn how economic, cultural, and political features of society affect and are affected by science and technology. How does science and technology development work in practice? How does science affect and how is it affected by public perceptions and policies? What are some important take-home messages for all citizens in a democracy regarding the enterprises of science and technology development? Unit Two: Risk Assessment What are the approaches used to assess risk? What are the strengths and weaknesses of each approach? The materials presented thus far provide the philosophical basis to begin the applied unit of Sociology 415. We start by learning approaches to technology risk assessment. This information is critical because we need to know the source of risk assessments and the strengths and weaknesses of each source. Knowing the strengths and weaknesses of different approaches to risk assessment helps us understand public responses and how to tailor risk communication messages to fit different types of risk assessment. Importantly, as responsible change agents, we need to know the limitations of different types of risk assessment. The key point of this section is that technology should be evaluated simultaneously from multiple approaches wherein 25 each approach might yield different findings about the wisdom of adopting a technology. Unit Three: Risk Communication A. Globalization What is "Globalization"? How does globalization affect the sociology of technology? We define globalization as the rules for international trade in goods and services. These rules provide the context for technology development and dissemination, which can enable some societies to improve their well-being and exploit resources from other societies. B. Risk Communication: Theory and Applications What is the best approach for communicating about technology and risk to the public? What are effective procedures for reducing/creating public outrage about a new technology? This section describes guidelines for risk communication. Risk is conceptualized as hazard + outrage, where hazard is assessment of technical risk and outrage is public responses to hazard that reflect trust, perceived fairness, and other nontechnical issues. Suggestions are offered about how to present technical risk to the public, how to reduce outrage, and how to manage risk communication about complex and controversial technology. C. The Media and Risk Communication How does the media affect public decisions about new technologies? What should be the role of the media regarding public discourse about new technologies? Dr. Eric Abbott, from the Greenlee School of Journalism and Communications, conducts research on the risk communication cycle, public views of technology, and communication strategies for presenting high risk technology to the public. Dr. Abbott uses the example of food safety to describe how the mass media views public concern about technology and how the media and scientists can best present controversial topics to the public. D. Risk and Public Policy What are some pragmatic and ethical approaches for a public to take in evaluating risk and setting risk policy? K.S. Shrader-Frechette, in Risk and Rationality, asks, "How does a society evaluate and regulate risks associated with technology?" In answering this question, she explores conflict between science and populist movements, the contrasting philosophies of cultural relativists and naive positivists, false dichotomies between "actual" and "perceived" risk, and problems with quantitative risk assessment. Shrader-Frechette concludes her book by presenting workable risk management principles. Unit Four: Diffusion of Innovations A. The Diffusion of Innovations How can the change agent influence the adoption of new technologies? 26 What are the ethical obligations of the change agent? If public opinions about technology cannot be swayed by risk communication alone, then what are approaches to gaining adoption/rejection of technology? In this section, we learn the processes that take place in public decision-making about technology and risk. We learn the time sequence of events that occur leading to adoption/rejection decisions. As part of this education, we learn how to influence the adoption/rejection of technology. The principle textbook, The Diffusion of Innovations, Fifth Edition, written by Everett Rogers, describes procedures for gaining adoption of technology. The same procedures can be used to gain rejection of technology. In some cases, the sociologist might believe that technology adoption is desirable for the well-being of a society (e.g., adoption of condom use as protection from HIV infection) and in other cases might strive for technology rejection (e.g., rejection of dangerous and illegal drug use). Other times, the sociologist might not have sufficient evidence to claim that either adoption or rejection necessarily will make society better (e.g., it would be difficult to claim, from a scientific perspective, that American society would be better or worse off if laws allowing abortions were banned). We will learn strategies that can be used to influence public opinion regarding technology decisions. The choice of whether to seek adoption or rejection is up to you. What we will focus upon, in addition to learning diffusion strategies, is learning the ethics of using diffusion strategies. B. The Diffusion Game We will use the principles of diffusion to gain adoption of a hypothetical innovation within a computer simulation exercise. The exercise will test your skills as a change agent. Course Summary In Sociology 415 we will learn about relationships among science, technology, and society. We will learn how philosophical paradigms affect societal choices about technology. We will learn what types of messages are effective at what stages of the diffusion process in influencing public opinion. We will learn how to gain adoption/rejection of complex and controversial technologies. Related Courses These ISU courses provide instruction on topics covered in Sociology 415. ECON 460: Agricultural, Food, and Trade Policy. Description and analysis of economic problems of U.S. agriculture. Explanation and economic analysis of government policies and programs to develop agriculture, conserve agricultural resources, address consumer food concerns, stabilize farm prices, and raise farm incomes. The influence of macropolicy, world economy, and international trade on U.S. agriculture. JLMC 347: Science Communication. Science Communication. Reporting and writing about science and technology topics for general audiences. Outlets for stories include print, broadcast and online media. Story topics include reporting about basic, applied sciences and social sciences, as well as ethical, political and policy issues related to science and technology. PHIL 343: Philosophy of Technology. Conditions under which technological innovations contribute to human emancipation, relationship of technology and democracy, utility and 27 limits of technical rationality, and problems of ensuring that benefits of technological advance are communally shared. PHIL 480: Controversies in Science. Philosophical treatment of a branch of science that has (or has had) significant social, political, religious and/or moral implications. 28 Ours is a world of nuclear giants and ethical infants. If we continue to develop our technology without wisdom or prudence, our servant may prove to be our executioner. Omar Bradley, General of the Army, 1950. Introduction The social problem we address in this course is, "How does society bring about the adoption of beneficial innovations (or the rejection of harmful ones) as quickly as possible within an arena of public discourse that respects the opinions of others?" If the innovation is mainly a beneficial one, then society wants to adopt it as soon as possible. If the innovation is a harmful one, then society wants to reject it as soon as possible. For simplicity, we will orient this course to the adoption of mainly beneficial innovations. All the same principles we will learn to bring about the adoption of a favorable innovation (e.g., treating water to prevent water-borne illnesses) can be used as well to bring about the rejection of a harmful innovation (e.g., smoking tobacco). An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new. What might seem familiar to some is new to others. Innovations can be material or nonmaterial. In practice, these two types of innovations become intertwined because the adoption of material innovations brings about changes in social relations. That is, culture responds to changes in material conditions. Understanding relationships among culture, values, existing practices, and political/social/economic relations is a necessary condition to understanding and facilitating technology transfer. Innovations need not be "high tech" in nature. In a developing country an innovation might be boiling water to prevent disease. Or, an innovation might be the adoption of condom use to help reduce the incidence of sexually transmitted diseases. An innovation might be a new approach to teach calculus to high school students. It might be a new business plan for a corporation. An innovation can be any type of material or nonmaterial idea, practice, or object that is seen as new by potential adopters. We might classify innovations as either low involvement or high involvement. By low involvement innovations we mean ones that elicit little public controversy. A new type of shaving cream that promises "less skin irritation," for example, is unlikely to create much concern among opposition groups or raise much public outcry. A high involvement innovation is one that does create public concern. It causes concern because it challenges strongly held beliefs (e.g., stem cell research), sounds scary (e.g., food irradiation), threatens ones environment (e.g., large-scale hog confinement operations), raises the specter of unknown negative consequences (e.g., genetic modification of organisms), or creates other concerns. Typically, for high involvement innovations we mean ones where an organized group is actively opposing the change. Hence, the adoption of the innovation must come about within the context of organized opposition. To simplify our discussion we will assume that the innovation under consideration is safe, wholesome, etc., and that, as change agents we are seeking adoption of this innovation. Thus, here is our challenge: "How do we facilitate the adoption of a [favorable] innovation as quickly as possible while encouraging public discourse that is respectful of the opinions of others?" 29 The Consumer's Dilemma To answer our question we need first to understand our audience: Consumers. Oftentimes, the word "consumer," when used in the context of discussions about the adoption of new technologies, particularly when the discussions are held by persons working in the life and physical sciences, becomes synonymous with words like, "irrational," "uninformed," and "unreasonable in their lack of trust in government institutions." Indeed, public responses to new technologies can differ from those of a trained scientist. But to fully understand new technologies as viewed by the public, and to facilitate rapid adoption of these technologies (that for simplicity we will assume to be mainly beneficial), we need to gain a more accurate and complete profile of the consumer. To do so, please consider these illustrative points: 1. Do you own a cellular telephone? With no further instructions or plans (and presuming it were legal to do so), could you build a working cellular telephone by purchasing the needed parts and assembling them correctly? If not, then you are IGNORANT! Being ignorant, or uninformed is unavoidable. All of us are ignorant and uniformed. That does not necessarily mean we are irrational and unreasonable, just ignorant. 2. Do you have 100% trust in everything that your government tells you 100% of the time? If not, then you DO NOT TRUST YOUR GOVERNMENT! Not fully trusting your government does not mean you are unreasonable. A social scientist would assert that not only would you be a fool to trust your government completely, but you would be a irresponsible citizen to do so. A democracy simply will not work if its citizens do not ask questions, challenge, probe, and offer alternative proposals for action. 3. Suppose you are walking down a well-known path through the woods. You walk this path often. On this day as you walk, close to your feet your hear a rustle in the leaves? Do you take notice, move to the side, check it out? If so, you are SKEPTICAL! Being skeptical does not mean you are irrational, it means you are doing what comes naturally: checking out potential dangers. You can see the point I am making by presenting these silly examples. Being ignorant is unavoidable. Being untrusting is one's responsibility. Being skeptical is a survival skill. Being ignorant, untrusting, and skeptical are neither character flaws nor indications of an irrational person. Thus, when first hearing about a complex, controversial technology, the reasonable, rational person will be skeptical about adopting it. One might argue that once the individual receives the scientific facts about a high-involvement innovation they would be irrational to continue to be untrusting and skeptical. After all, now they are no longer ignorant, but informed about the scientific facts. Here's the rub. First, science is never perfect. It cannot be. So, hearing the scientific facts will not necessarily reduce skepticism because people know that scientists sometimes make mistakes. We will talk about this phenomena more in later sections of this course. Second, and key to understanding the difference between low- and high-involvement innovations, for high-involvement innovations the public is also receiving information from scientists who are concerned about potential negative consequences of the innovation. The public is being "educated" from both sides! Without having the knowledge base of the scientist an otherwise highly educated person, a reasonable person, a rational person will wonder, "Who is right?" That is, knowing that sometimes scientists make mistakes and that sometimes governmental regulatory agencies make mistakes, the consumer's dilemma is, "Whom do I trust this time?" Education of the Public 30 How do we overcome reasonable, rational, uninformed fear of controversial new technologies? (I will no longer remind us that when we state we are seeking to "gain adoption" we are assuming the technology is mainly beneficial. We will, however, spend a lot of time in the course on understanding the decisions that determine whether we consider a technology to be mainly beneficial). The reasonable answer to this question is to educate the public about the new technology. Tell them the scientific facts. Certainly, distributing scientific facts is an essential first step to gaining adoption. But guess what? In the initial stages of gaining adoption, when scientists are telling the public about the favorable qualities of the new technology, public acceptance will drop dramatically! Why? Because opponents of the technology also are distributing information and negative information carries disproportionate weight in the initial stages of the diffusion of innovations. Why so much weight to negative information? Why does the public listen more to non-scientists? The public does not listen more to non-scientists, but during the initial phases of the diffusion of innovations they listen and pay heed. To return to our silly example, most likely the rustle in the leaves is being caused by something no more harmful than a chipmunk. But it could be rabid raccoon. Science sometimes makes mistakes! One might respond to my scenario thus far by saying that those who distribute negative information about new technologies are pseudo-scientists who twist scientific findings for the purpose of fearmongering. Sometimes they are; there is money to be made in fearmongering. Importantly, however, science messes up often enough that sometimes persons who raise concerns have valid points. For example, no matter how much one might dismiss the proclamations of Public Citizen (the organization founded by consumer activist Ralph Nader), the fact remains that this and similar organizations have made valuable contributions to improving the safety of all citizens. So, if education will not work, then what does? That is what we will learn in this course. We will need to cover a lot of material before we are ready to answer this question. I hope you find the material informative and enjoyable. 31 Everybody wants to be second. Joseph Borsa MDS Nordion [in referring to adoption of irradiated food] Introduction Food irradiation is the post-harvest application of ionizing radiation to preserve food, prevent migration of invasive insects, increase shelf life through delayed sprouting or ripening, or sterilize meats from bacteria that can cause food borne illness. Fresh fruits, vegitables, and meats can be exposed to sufficient levels of gamma radiation to kill harmful bacteria in the food or insects that live on the food. Sources of radiation include radioactive substances, such as Cobalt 59, or electricity generated with electron beam accelerators. Approximately 60 countries allow foods to be irradiated, with an estimated 500,000 metric tons of foods irradiated annually worldwide. Given the complexity of process, the seeming oximoron of exposing food we eat to high doses of radiation, and other concerns consumers have expressed emotions ranging from skepticism to outrage over this technology. More information about food irradiation is provided on the Sociology web page regarding Sampler Technologies. At the outset of Sociology 415 we will view a 15 minute video reproduction of a presentation by an expert panel of four persons regarding food irradiation. Two persons on the panel (Ms. Ellen Haas and Dr. Walter Bernstein) speak out against food irradiation and the remaining two members of the panel (Dr. George Giddings and Dr. Edward Remmer) speak in favor of the technology. The audience includes persons attending an episode of the popular television production, The Donahue Show, starring Mr. Phil Donahue. This presentation occurred in 1985, when the topic of food irradiation was just being introduced to the American public. In the video, one can see the reactions of consumers as they hear about food irradiation for the first time. And one can see their reactions to a panel of experts strongly disagreeing with one another about the science behind food irradiation, its safety, and its feasibility for use in the U.S. food system. We will watch this video as a way of introducing ourselves to the contentious, confusing, and complex arena of science risk communication. In this way, we will be introduced to the central question of this course: How does one gain adoption of complex and controversial innovations? 32 What, Me Worry? Alfred E. Newman, Mad Magazine Introduction One of the central purposes of this course is to learn how to gain adoption of technologies considered to be mainly beneficial that the public initially rejects. These technologies might be advanced (e.g., biotechnology) or not (e.g., boiling water in undeveloped areas to prevent disease). They might be material (e.g., confined animal feeding operations) or nonmaterial (e.g., a new school curriculum, or perhaps a new business plan). The central feature they share is public skepticism about them that delays their adoption and thereby hinders scientists' ability to improve the well-being of society, under the assumption that the technology is mainly beneficial. This web page addresses the roots of consumer skepticism about new technologies. It discusses the legitimacy of skepticism as a positive feature of an informed public. At the same time, it describes how unjustified skepticism engendered by the fearmongering of some organizations and individuals can create negative consequences for society. It explains the role of the change agent in understanding skepticism, respecting its legitimacy from the perspective of the public, and gaining adoption of new technologies among skeptical consumers. Why are Consumers Skeptical? To gain adoption of a mainly beneficial technology, one must realize that skepticism about it likely will occur, even after the public is presented with the scientific facts about this technology. In this presentation we will learn the root causes of skepticism. Before doing so, we need to recognize that skepticism can hinder the adoption of mainly beneficial technologies. Scientists who labor to improve our quality of life understandably become frustrated when the public rejects new technologies based upon what scientists consider to be unreasonable fears about them. Certainly, if it inhibits the adoption of mainly beneficial technologies, unreasonable skepticism can hinder scientists' ability to improve the well being of society. So, "Why are Consumers Skeptical?" Typically, life and physical scientists answer this question by saying that the general public is ignorant about the technology being considered and about science in general. Many scientists believe that if the public only knew the scientific facts about a technology, or only knew more about science, they would not harbor unreasonable skepticism about the technology. It is true that society most likely would be better off if the public knew more about science. But these assumptions that greater education about science in general and about the technology under consideration will necessarily increase acceptance of it are incorrect for five reasons: 1. The presumption that knowing more about science will improve acceptance of new technologies is incorrect because when people learn more about the actual practice of science they also learn more about its limitations. Science can never be totally objective, value-free, and unbiased. Scientific studies always have limitations. And the 33 2. 3. 4. 5. practice of science always is guided by the questions being asked; wherein funding agencies strongly influence which questions are asked. Therefore, science education is not a good predictor of technology adoption. In fact, some of the strongest critics of a particular technology typically are people with the most education about science and the technology. The presumption that knowing more about the technology under consideration will improve acceptance of it is incorrect because when people learn more they also learn more about the limitations of the technology and its potential negative consequences. That is, organizations opposed to controversial technologies also are educating the public about the technology. The public is hearing two sides of an issue. Because consumers who might otherwise be highly educated often do not have the advanced education within a particular scientific discipline to fully understand the arguments made by proponents and opponents, they are uncertain about whom to trust. Thinking that gaining more science and technology knowledge will improve acceptance of a technology ignores the fact that persons might understand science and the technology, but be opposed to it based upon moral or ethical reasons. One might, for example, be highly educated in general and highly educated about genetic modification and be opposed to biotechnologies because they feel that these technologies create too many negative consequences for farmers. Certainly, learning the scientific facts about a technology is a necessary element of gaining adoption of it. But many years of research and practice show that learning the facts is not the key element of gaining adoption. Adoption is a much more complex issue than simply learning scientific facts. In later sections of this course we will learn about the complexity of adoption decisions. Thinking that learning the scientific facts about a technology will increase adoption of it assumes that the public trusts the scientists who are proponents of the technology. The public trusts scientists in general, but might not trust them immediately when they learn about a new technology. They initially might be skeptical. So, if ignorance cannot explain skepticism, then: "Why are consumers skeptical?" Skepticism as a Rational Response The key to understanding public skepticism is to recognize that sometimes it is well founded. For example: Sometimes, scientists make mistakes... Vioxx: A good medicine for relieving pain, but with more severe negative side effects than originally realized. Thalidomide: Developed to treat pregnant women with nausea, it causes severe birth defects. Hydroxycut: Developed as a weight loss product, it causes liver damage. Sometimes, government management of technology is flawed... Space Shuttle Challenger: Scientists' voices not sufficiently heeded. Food Safety: The FDA and lobbyists. Food Safety: The FDA and food inspections. Sometimes, industry management of technology is flawed... Ford Pinto: Organizational greed and technology. Chicken Production: Arsenic and banned antibiotics in chicken production. Sometimes, government and industry management of technology is flawed... 34 Love Canal: David vs. Goliath. Sometimes, industry lies... Tobacco: Decades of Deception. OxyContin: A Recent Deception. Sometimes, scientists lie... Stem Cell Research: Faking results. Stem Cell Research: Issuing misleading statements. Medical Research: Fraud or Mistake? Science Fraud: Cooking the books. Science Fraud: Fraud at Iowa State University. Science Fraud: More science, more fraud. Discussion When we recognize that consumer skepticism of new technologies sometimes is well founded, we acknowledge that it is a rational, reasonable response by citizens. In fact, skepticism is a survival trait. It has a firm foundation in fact. Homo Sapiens would not have survived on this planet without exhibiting skepticism about possible dangers. And skepticism can have a long memory. For example, farmers in less developed countries know the many disadvantages and unintended negative consequences of adopting agricultural practices associated with the green revolution. They therefore are hesitant to take at face value the promises of technologies that sound similar, such as those associated with the biotechnology revolution. With these facts in mind, we can conclude that skepticism is not irrational, it is warranted. Therefore, when change agents attempt to convince the public to adopt new technologies, they should expect to observe public skepticism. Because skepticism is warranted, the effective change agent will reframe the question from, "Why are consumers skeptical?" to "How can we overcome skepticism about this technology?" This reframing of the question gives legitimacy to consumer skepticism. It switches the burden of adoption from the consumer to the change agent. That is, we no longer ask, "Why are consumers so unreasonable?" We instead ask, "How can we overcome legitimate skepticism about this new technology?" One objective of this course will be to learn how to overcome public skepticism about new technologies, whether these technologies be material or nonmaterial, advanced or simple. Skepticism of Skepticism As noted in the discussion above, public skepticism of new technologies is warranted because science, industry, and regulation cannot always be trusted. At the same time, people and organizations that raise concerns about technology sometimes cannot be trusted. Fearmongering and Technology... Sometimes, organizations make claims about technologies that are not well supported by scientific facts: Top Ten Travesties: American Council on Science and Health. Cyclamates: Skepticism about a good technology. Alar: Much ado about nothing? Alar: Fearmongering or not? 35 Fearmongering for Profit... Sometimes, to make a profit, organizations will mislead the public about technology: Erin Brockovich: Science, the Public, and the Courts. Disseminating Misleading Information... Sometimes, the opinions offered by non-scientific groups seem to be those offered by professional scientific organizations: The website for the American College of Pediatricians, for example, might look like it offers the opinions of the American Academy of Pediatrics, which is the professional association of pediatricians. It does not. Rather, it presents opinions representative of the socially conservative, religiously fundamentalist position. Discussion Fearmongering can create problems when organizations are successful at convincing the public to reject mainly beneficial technologies. When citizens are persuaded by junk science or by fearmongering, then they unnecessarily punish industry or reject technologies that can improve societal well being. Therefore, just as citizens should be active in learning about the limitations of new technologies, they should be active in learning about its benefits. Because individuals and organizations sometimes engage in unreasonable fearmongering, the change agent might be inclined to dismiss consumer skepticism as an irresponsible perception. The effective change agent will not follow this path of blaming consumers for nonadoption for two reasons. 1. As noted above, skepticism is warranted because sometimes it is well founded. 2. Dismissing a perception that the public considers as legitimate is not the most effective approach to gaining consumer confidence in and subsequent adoption of a new technology. The Bottom Line At the end of the day, consumer skepticism does not have as strong a negative effect on technology adoption as is sometimes believed. Skepticism can be a significant barrier to adoption. And it sometimes prevents or significantly delays the adoption of presumably good innovations or brings about unnecessary punishment of an industry. But for most technologies skepticism can be eased and adoption gained. Too often, adoption of mainly beneficial technologies is unnecessarily delayed because scientists pursue inadvisable approaches to risk communication. Techniques for gaining adoption of presumably beneficial innovations can and have overcome skepticism for many different types of technologies in many settings worldwide. The effective change agent will expect skepticism, respect its legitimacy, and learn how to alleviate it and gain adoption of the mainly beneficial technology. Ethical Issues One of the main objectives of this course is to learn techniques to overcome public skepticism for the purpose of gaining adoption of presumably beneficial technologies. As part of their work in gaining adoption, change agents should recognize that all technologies 36 are flawed in some respects. Also, the adoption of new technologies always brings about negative consequences for some segments of the population. The change agent, therefore, needs to understand as best as possible the potential negative consequences of technology adoption and seek ways to mitigate them. We will learn about these ethical issues at various points throughout this course. 37 Humanity is acquiring all the right technology for all the wrong reasons. R. Buckminster Fuller It is a characteristic of our times that we must keep ourselves informed about relationships among science, technology, and society. I encourage you to provide the class with information about technology-related issues of importance to you so we can discuss them within the context of the course materials. I hope you will watch for media reports on issues that might be of interest to the class. We can talk about a wide range of topics regarding the sociology of technology and risk communication. This sampler provides information about six technologies of importance to Iowans: large-scale hog confinement operations, food irradiation, genetically modified foods, Proposition 2, Nanotechnology, and stem cells. Food irradition, genetically modified foods, and nanotechnology are examples of advanced technologies designed for food engineering. Large-scale hog confinement operations represent an example of a technology cluster designed for food production. Proposition 2 represents a nonmaterial technology, one designed primarily for societal engineering regarding animal welfare. the use of stem cells might improve treatments for a wide variety of health problems and physical disabilities. Let's not limit our discussions to just these technologies, but let's begin with them. Most likely, some members of the class will be very knowledgeable about one or more of these technologies. Perhaps they will allow us to "pick their brains" about them in our class discussions. Large-Scale Hog Confinement Operations The building of large-scale hog confinement operations in Iowa occurs in response to needed economies of scale to successfully compete in an industry that is experiencing rapid vertical integration and increases in the size of production units. Concerns arise, however, about potential negative effects on human health, reduced quality of life in rural areas, decreased land values, animal welfare, and short- and long-term environmental damage to water and air quality. These concerns have motivated public resistance to the operations as well as calls for additional technologies to reduce undesirable odors and other environmental problems. Go to: Large-Scale Hog Confinement Operations to read about this issue. Food Irradiation Food irradiation--the exposure of food to high energy gamma rays for the purpose of post-harvest insect control, extension of shelf-life, and the killing of harmful bacteria in meats and seafood--has been the focus of heated debate for over twenty-five years! This controversial technology holds the promise of safer foods that remain fresh longer, but raises health and environmental concerns. Go to: Food Irradiation to read about this issue. 38 Genetically Modified Foods Genetically modified foods are created by transferring genetic material from one organism to another. Proponents say they will reduce dependence upon pesticides, improve the environment, and reduce world hunger. Opponents raise concerns about safety, environmental degradation, and furthering of income inequalities. Go to: Genetically Modified Foods to read about this issue. Proposition 2 In 2008, California citizens voted in favor of the Prevention of Farm Animal Cruelty Act (Proposition 2). Proposition 2 prohibits the confinement of certain farm animals in a manner that does not allow them to turn around freely, lie down, stand up, and fully extend their limbs. Proponents argue that this innovation contributes to the humane treatment of animals. Opponents say that Proposition 2 was a misguided attempt at animal welfare and burdens farmers with unnecessary expenses. Go to: Proposition 2 to read about this issue. Nanotechnology Nanotechnology refers to the scientific study of and engineering with particles at the molecular and atomic scale, wherin "nano" refers to particles that equal 1 billionth of a meter in size. Nanotechnology involves three related areas of inquiry: 1) the study of how the properties of elements change at very small scale, 2) the development of technologies to improve health, the environment, and production efficiency for a wide array of applications, and 3) the development of nanomachines ("microbots") that build and reproduce nanotechnologies. Nanotechnology offers great promise for improving human well-being. In the wrong hands, however, it might be the mechanism by which a small rouge group could destroy all humanity. Go to: Nanotechnology to read about this issue. Stem Cells The use of stem cells to stimulate tissue renewal might yield important treatments for a wide variety of health problems and physical disabilities. This area of science, however, raises issues in ethics, economics, and culture. Go to: Stem Cells to read about this issue. 39 The scientist has no other method than doing his damnedest. Percy W. Bridgman. Introduction If we in this course are to understand relationships among science, technology, and society and learn to act effectively as change agents to gain adoption/rejection of agricultural technologies, we need to know the strengths and limitations of science. We need to know our product. Scientific inquiry operates under certain rules. We will begin our understanding of science by learning the rules of scientific investigations. Then, we will learn from philosophers of science how the actual practice of science really works. This page reviews fundamental principles of the philosophy of science. It describes science in relation to other epistemologies, briefly reviews the history of science philosophy, and shows that some rather "non-scientific" notions are an integral part of the actual practice of science. Compass Key Questions What is science? What are the relationships among science and society? Examples Can we expect that the sampler technologies will be shown to be flawed? What is the role of the active citizen in evaluating risks associated with new technologies? What is the role of the scientist in developing new technologies and presenting information about them to the public? Epistemologies To understand sociology or any other science we need to understand the key principles of scientific inquiry. Before I describe these principles I will define science and compare it with four other epistemologies (ways of knowing about reality) using the typology (classification scheme) presented by Walter Wallace in The Logic of Science in Sociology. 40 Religion requires one to have faith in the existence of certain absolute truths to know reality. The Mystical epistemology relies upon the opinions of gifted persons who have divine insight into reality (e.g., prophets, clairvoyants). The Authoritarian epistemology relies upon the opinions of persons in authority or well-respected persons or entities to know reality. The Logico-Deductive epistemology relies upon established procedures for collecting observations that reflect reality, as much as possible, without bias or intervention by the person(s) making the observations. Science, like the Logico-Deductive epistemology, relies upon observations collected in a manner that is as unbiased as possible. Science differs from the Logico-Deductive epistemology in that it requires also the testing or development of theory, or an explanation of why an event occurs that can be falsified by observation. A scientific theory is a set of empirically falsifiable, abstract statements about reality. Simply put, it is a story about how reality works that can be falsified by observation. Science requires theory for three reasons: 1. Theory provides an explanation of why an event occurs. In contrast, empirical generalizations merely summarize a specific set of observations. Fishbein and Ajzen's theory of reasoned action, for example, is a set of abstract statements that can and have been applied successfully to understand and predict a very wide range of behaviors. 2. Scientists use theory to help others in the community of scholars (persons trained and certified as members of a scientific discipline) with their investigations. Limitations to the theory of rational expectations discovered in a study of one behavior, for example, might prove helpful in understanding or predicting another behavior. 3. By gaining support for theory (based upon analysis of quantitative data, qualitative data, or some combination of these), scientists feel confident about applying theory to improve the well-being of human, animal, and plant populations by building bridges, growing food, raising healthy families, and so on. Some Notes About Science Falsification The ability of theories to be falsified by observation is the critical component of science that sets it apart from other forms of knowing. Actually, theories can be falsified only in principle because if one can never verify the truth then one cannot falsify it either (see discussion below on Evolution vs. Creationism). Still, it is the idea that theories can in principle be falsified by observations that sets science apart from other forms of knowing. Deduction and Induction To say that science necessarily entails the use of theory is not to say that science must be deductive (research designs that begin with an established theory). Quite to the contrary, an essential element of scientific inquiry is inductive creation/reformulation of theory. Still, it is the focus on theory, whether its testing through deductive procedures or its development through inductive procedures, that defines science as a unique epistemology. Evolution or Creationism? To emphasize the importance of theory in science we can compare scientific and 41 religious explanations of the origin of the species. Judeo-Christian stories about creation (i.e., Creationism, Intelligent Design), for example, which state that the universe and everything in it were created by a supernatural--and therefore unobservable--being, might in fact accurately depict creation, including the origin of the human species. These stories, however, cannot be falsified because one cannot disprove the existence of an absolute god or intelligent designer. Creationism and intelligent design, therefore, are not and can never be scientific theories. The theory of evolution, on the other hand, can be falsified by observation and thereby qualifies as a scientific theory. Of course, if one can never know Absolute Truth, one can never fully know that a theory has been falsified! That is, true falsification is never achievable (see this related article by Kate Becker)! Explanations of "what is science," therefore become complicated and compromised. As do attempts to distinguish science from "non-science," including attempts to dismiss creationism and intelligent design from the realm of science. Still, it is possible to draw a line in the sand between science and creationism/intelligent design because, in principle, one could not devise an experiment to test the existence of God or an Intelligent Designer but one could bring observations to bear on falsifying the theory of evolution. If you think the qualifier "in principle" is too big a concession to make for the purpose of defining science, then please recognize that if one attempts to make a logical argument for the existence of God then one must make big concessions also (see this related paper written by Wade A. Tisthammer). In summary, epistemologically, one cannot argue that creationism or evolution is a "better" or the "more correct" story. They simply are different types of stories. Science, however, MUST be based upon stories that in principle can be falsified by observation. The advantage of science over other approaches to knowing is that observations can be replicated by others using the same procedures that produced the original observations. Replication gives one a sense of confidence that an observation (e.g., the tensile strength of steel under certain conditions of temperature and pressure) did not occur by chance or miracle (e.g., leading one to have a certain amount of confidence that the bridge will not collapse). This related presentation provides a more detailed comparision of Science and Intelligent Design. What is Good Science? When is a set of statements about reality considered to be a theory? When is someone's work considered to be science? What is good science? To answer these questions, we must understand the rules of science. To understand the rules of science, we will trace the path of how the rules were developed by examining the philosophy of positivism and its various critiques by the philosophy of phenomenology. Rules of Positivism Positivism attempts to establish a set of rules for science that can verify the truthfulness of 42 statements about 'reality' in an objective, value-free, unbiased manner. The positivist philosophy can be presented in various ways; the presentation below reduces positivism to four rules: 1. Rule of operationalism: Record only that which is actually manifested in experience. Rely only upon sense data. Rule out the metaphysical or theological bases for verification. That is, only data directly observable by the senses are proper for scientific inquiry. 2. Rule of nominalism: No generalized constructs or terms that cannot be reconstructed by reference to sense data. 3. Rule of value-free knowledge: Scientific inquiry must be value-free and unbiased. 4. Unity of scientific method The scientific method is universal and equally applicable to all areas of inquiry. All sciences must obey Rules 1-3 above. The Phenomenological Critique of Positivism Phenomenology argues that the rules of positivism, although noble in intent, are impossible to follow in practice. Blind adherence to the rules of positivism, argue phenomenologists, ignores the true nature and obscures the real value of science. 1. Critique of the rule of operationalism: What constitutes sense data? How does one obtain pure sense data that is not filtered through the personality, experience, and preconceived ideas of the scientist? Given that humans are thinking beings, the rule of operationalism becomes not only restrictive to the social sciences, which seek to understand the thinking of individuals and collectivities, but in itself a contradiction in that scientists are thinking beings who make observations about reality. Nothing is observed directly by the senses; all observations are filtered through the experiences and biases of humans who interpret the raw sense data gathered by their eyes, ears, etc. 2. Critique of the rule of nominalism: Logical atomism, or the reduction of all observations to their basic components of sense data results in an attempt to reduce all statements ad infinitum to some fundamental building block of reality. An understanding of reality, however, always reflects abstractions drawn from sense data. The sparrow, for example, might be reduced in description to the nature of its atomic structure. But the "sparrow" is an abstraction of these building blocks. All the description possible, from now until eternity, of the basic building blocks of the sparrow never will equal "sparrow" until the observer calls this collection of building blocks a sparrow, thereby creating the abstract concept: sparrow. 3. Critique of the omission of values: Once the rules of operationalism and nominalism are shown to be logically impossible to follow, then it becomes evident that all observations are influenced by the values and biases of the observer. That is, observation is a human endeavor, one affected by values and bias. 4. Critique of the principle of one science: If one cannot establish a set of rules for verification, then science becomes a human enterprise, subject to the dynamics of other human enterprises. Because no science can adhere to the rules of positivism, then none are required to do so. But this rule--that all sciences must adhere to the same set of guidelines--does hold true. All sciences--life, physical, and social--must adhere to the same rules. It is just that these rules cannot be the rules of positivism because the rules of positivism cannot be followed by any science. The Hypothetico-Deductive Model 43 Another approach to verifying the truthfulness of statements about reality is to assess them as logical conclusions of laws established a priori through the human experience. The Hypothetico-Deductive (HD) model, in effect, admits that the rules of positivism are impossible to follow--that objective, value-free, unbiased observations are impossible to obtain. The HD approach is to establish a set of rules whereby objective, value-free, unbiased conclusions can be drawn from admittedly biased observations. In the HD model, the explanandum (event to be explained) is a conclusion drawn from premises (explanans) that cover one or more universal laws. The HD model takes the following form: Law: Always, if A then B. Observe: A. Then: B. For example: Law: All men are mortal. Observe: Socrates is a man. Then: Socrates is mortal. The Phenomenological Critique of the HD Model The HD model allows for symmetry of explanation and prediction, but suffers from two fundamental problems: The Problem of Deduction Deduction is the derivation of hypotheses from a given law (or axiom). The problem of deduction is that the law used as the initial explanans might be an accidental law, one that appears to be true, but is not. That is, prediction does not mean explanation. For example, the geocentric solar system described by Ptolemy can predict with good accuracy the movement of the planets. But the heliocentric solar system described by Copernicus is the correct (as far as we know!) law of the movement of the planets. Thus, if one begins with the wrong law, then one's conclusions will be incorrect. I am not going to challenge the law of physical mortality used in the example given above regarding Socrates. But, other laws that seemed to be inviolable have been falsified. For example, when an apple departs from the apple tree and travels toward the Earth, perhaps taking a detour upon the head of Sir Isaac Newton, it certainly seems like the lighter mass object is being pulled by the heavier mass object (i.e., gravity). But, so I am told by physicists, what actually is happening, at least from the perspective of the special theory of relativity, our latest invention to explain falling phenomena, is that the Earth and the apple both are in a free-fall through a curved space-time continuum. In other words, what we think is true today might not be true tomorrow. [Note: Actually, the theory of gravity works just fine most of the time. Physicists still rely strongly upon the theory of gravity. It is only when matter speeds up considerably that they must turn to the special theory of relativity for a more accurate depiction of events.] The Problem of Induction Induction refers to the building of theory by summarizing a set of empirical generalizations within the context of a philosophy about how "reality" works (I placed reality in quotation marks to point out that I am not asserting that one absolute reality necessarily exists). The problem with induction is that a set of observations that support a law do not verify the law because there might be some other equally 44 logical explanation for the same set of observations. To very briefly summarize an excellent volume of work by Karl Popper regarding the problem of induction, scientific inquiry can falsify a theory, but never can verify it. The Community of Scholars Approach The phenomenological critique of positivism refutes the principle of verification. The community of scholars approach, therefore, is to relax the verification principle, but still rule out metaphysical justification in favor of empirical falsification of statements about reality. This approach entails a big concession-that truth cannot be verified-and therefore requires establishing a criterion for deciding what constitutes sound science. The community of scholars approach to evaluating science relies upon the consensus (or intersubjective) opinion of the community of scholars (i.e., basically, all those persons who hold a PhD degree in a particular scientific discipline) regarding the acceptability of statements about reality. What is good science? According to the community of scholars approach, the answer to this question rests with the opinions of the community of scholars. It is this community that decides when work meets the criteria of good science. And it is this community that decides not the truthfulness of statements, but their acceptance as the best statements possible until something better comes along. In practice, technical reports of scientific investigation are submitted by the author(s) for review by the community of scholars (See for example, the review of MS#08-084). Typically, the procedure is to submit a manuscript to a professional journal. The Editor of the journal distributes copies of the manuscript to 2-4 reviewers, who are not told the identity of the author(s). The reviewers evaluate the quality of the scientific investigation as it is reported in the manuscript. If they think the manuscript is clearly written and reflects acceptable scientific procedures, then they recommend it be published as an article in the journal. Upon publication, the study is considered to be "acceptable science." The Phenomenological Critique of the Community of Scholars Approach This approach of peer reviewing manuscripts for publication sounds straightforward, right? Not so fast, argues Thomas Kuhn, in The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Kuhn points out that the peer review process cannot be an objective one. It includes elements of other epistemologies, such as religious beliefs, authoritarianism, and mysticism. If the findings of an investigation challenge long-held beliefs, for example, they will be scrutinized more vigorously. If they challenge positions held by leading persons in the community of scholars or threaten strong economic benefits promised by a new technology, then they are looked upon with greater skepticism. If the findings do not sit well with the religious, political, or philosophical positions of the reviewers or the Editor of a professional journal, it will be more difficult for these persons to find the manuscript acceptable. Thus, the community of scholars, like any other human collectivity, is influenced by power structures, economics, religion, politics, culture, and so on. Summary This page describes different types of epistemologies--ways of knowing. Science differs from other epistemologies in that its stories about reality must in principle be capable of being 45 falsified by observation. Thus, science posits theories (stories about reality) that use abstract concepts (so they can be applied to many situations or events) to describe reality. These theories can be cast aside with sufficient evidence contradicting them. Science is not necessarily a better epistemology than others, it is simply a different form of knowing. The advantage of science is that, with sufficient training, anyone can conduct scientific investigations. In principle, scientific findings are immune from special characteristics of the observer. Because scientific findings can be replicated by anyone with similar training and access to observations (e.g., equipment, funds, contacts with human or animal subjects), people gain a sense of confidence in scientific findings. Also, the peer review process helps to ensure that science is conducted with expertise and integrity. But science is conducted by scientists, who exhibit individual traits and respond to the expectations of the collective. That is, science is influenced by politics, economics, religion, culture, and social relations. So, the enterprise of science includes other epistemologies, such as religion, authoritarianism, and mysticism. Scientists are committed to doing the best they can to behave in an objective, unbiased, and value-free manner. But they know that these goals cannot be reached. The philosopher P.W. Bridgman said it well, "The scientist has no other method than doing his damnedest." Suggested Readings These books and articles provide excellent summaries of the philosophy of science. They will reference philosophers who have made important contributions to understanding scientific inquiry. 1. Benton, Ted (1977) Philosophical Foundations of the Three Sociologies. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 2. Carmines, Edward G. and Richard A. Zeller (1979) Reliability and Validity Assessment. Beverly Hills, CA: Sage. 3. Fales, Evan (1982) "Must Sociology be Qualitative." Qualitative Sociology 5(2): 89-105. 4. Feyerabend, Paul (1975) Against Method. London, NLB. 5. Giddens, Anthony (1974) Positivism and Sociology. London: Heinemann. 6. Hamilton, Peter (1974) Knowledge and Social Structure. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 7. Kuhn, Thomas S. (1962) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago: University of Chicago Press. 8. Smart, Barry (1976) Sociology, Phenomenology and Marxian Analysis. London: Routledge and Kegan Paul. 9. Wallace, Walter L. (1971) The Logic of Science in Sociology. New York: Aldine. Links Related to the Philosophy of Science Lyle Zynda's lectures on the philosophy of science delve perhaps too deeply into some topics than is necessary for this course, but provide a good background on the key issues affecting scientific inquiry. Wade A. Tisthammer's paper on The Nature and Philosophy of Science addresses many of the same topics covered on this page. Patrick O'Driscoll provides a comprehensive explanations of logical fallacies at Fallacy Files. 46 Now I am become Death, the destroyer of worlds. J. Robert Oppenheimer -(citing his translation of the Hindu, Sanskrit text, 'Bhagavad-gita' after witnessing the first atomic bomb detonation at Trinity Site, just west of Socorro, New Mexico on July 16, 1945). Introduction Dr. Robert Hollinger, of ISU's Department of Philosophy, reviews key features of western philosophies of technology from Aristotle to Habermas. Dr. Hollinger presents us with more than just a history of philosophical perspectives on technology; he describes a way of understanding different perspectives used to evaluate it today. Compass Key Questions What are the ways in which people think about technology? Examples Is technology inherently good or bad or neither? Do persons opposed to new agricultural technologies adequately understand the technology and its potential benefits? Are persons opposed to new agricultural technologies irrational in their thinking about the technology? Are proponents of new agricultural technologies insensitive to the needs of the public? Are proponents of new agricultural technologies driven primarily by greed in their support of the new technology? Do our regulatory agencies do a good job of ensuring the safety of new agricultural technologies? Philosophy of Technology: Classical, Enlightenment, Critical Classical Greek Philosophy Greek Typology of the Three Forms of Knowledge: Theoretical Knowledge: Knowledge about the immutable laws of the cosmos (e.g., physics, math, astronomy). Knowledge about things that can be directly observed. Practical Knowledge: Knowledge related to social life (e.g., politics, ethics, social interaction). Wisdom gained from experience with living. Productive Knowledge: Knowledge about how to do things (e.g., technology). 47 Knowledge and skills required to achieve goals. Plato considered productive knowledge (i.e., technology) to be the direct (i.e., unbiased, value-free) outcome of theoretical knowledge. Thus, technology was neither good nor bad, but the natural outcome of deductive reasoning from the immutable laws of nature. This viewpoint implies that persons without theoretical knowledge are unqualified to question technology and its consequences. Aristotle also viewed these three forms of knowledge as relatively distinct. Aristotle's viewpoint, however, recognized that theoretical knowledge sometimes can be rather brutal in practice. Application in Context How does the classical Greek philosophy affect perspectives on technology today? Michael Fumento voices strong concerns about the qualifications and integrity of consumer groups who question the efficacy of agricultural technologies. His viewpoints on Bogus Biotech offer a contemporary example of the classical philosophy of technology. A technology related to the genetic modification of food is the "terminator" seed--a seed that produces a plant with sterile seeds. Thus, a farmer would not be able to save seed from year to year, but instead would have to buy new seed each year. Many objections have been raised about the brutal consequences of this technology for subsistence farmers in developing countries. The Union of Concerned Scientists describes these objections and asks the U.S. Department of Agriculture to drop its patents on such seeds. Enlightenment Philosophy Enlightenment refers to the rise of science as a respected form of knowledge acquisition that can be used to solve practical problems. From the Enlightenment perspective, knowledge is power and progress is good. The technological imperative (or technological fix) is the view that all practical problems can be viewed as technical problems and all technical problems can be informed by scientific theory. Note that the development of sociology during the Enlightenment period represented a dramatic break from the classical Greek philosophy that theoretical knowledge (science) could not be applied to practical (social) problems. Application in Context How does the Enlightenment philosophy affect perspectives on technology today? Is the human race better off today than it was 1,000 years ago? This question is a matter of opinion; but it is certain that the scientific approach has produced a vast knowledge base that has been used to make dramatic changes in our environment and behavior. The presentation by the Council for Biotechnology Information regarding the many potential benefits of the genetic modification of foods provides a 48 contemporary example of Enlightenment philosophy. Critical philosophy From the Enlightenment perspective, science provides a means to dominate nature through an ongoing process of improving technology and solving social problems. From an Enlightenment perspective, all problems, including social problems, are seen as technological in nature (e.g., the solution to crime is more prisons and longer sentences for convicted felons). From the Critical perspective, Enlightenment philosophy contains an inherent flaw in defining all problems from the point of view of the technological imperative. It states that Enlightenment philosophy, if taken to the extreme, can result in politics, religion, and social life being viewed as technically governed and therefore subject to technically-defined solutions, which can effectively eliminate much of the power of people to govern themselves. Critical philosophy views Enlightenment philosophy as not necessarily malevolent by nature, but flawed because it leads to unworkable, unethical solutions. Critical philosophy "looks behind" the development of technology to view the motivations involved in producing the technology, the assumptions made about its safety and proper use, and the ethics implied by noting who will be most benefited by the technology. Critical philosophy pays particular interest in how the power elite of a society influences technology development and dissemination. Critical philosophy does not necessarily posit malevolent intentions of the power elite in their influence over technology development and dissemination; people sometimes are not fully aware of the consequences of their actions and sometimes seemingly benign actions bring about negative consequences. Whether intentionally malevolent or not, critical philosophy notes that power and resources, including risks, are shared disproportionately. The less powerful will bear more than an equal share of technological risks because technology is developed by and for the benefit of the powerful elite. Marxian social philosophy, as one form of critical philosophy, would anticipate a malevolent purpose of the power elite to control society and distribute risks inequitably. From a Marxian point of view, the power elite always attempts to exploit resources from the less powerful. Application in Context How does the critical philosophy affect perspectives on technology today? The Center for Food Safety offers a good example of the use of critical philosophy to examine the societal implications of genetically modified foods as well as other controversial technologies. Resolution of Enlightenment and Critical Philosophies Is there some way to resolve differences between Enlightenment and Critical philosophies of technology? 49 Philosophers such as Jurgen Habermas and others note that society must learn to: 1. keep abreast of technological advances, and, 2. establish institutions to control the direction and use of technology in an ethical manner. This strategy seeks separability between the good and bad consequences of technology. Critical to this strategy is that: 1. citizens to be active in learning about technology and influencing public policy, and 2. societal institutions must be responsive to citizen input. 50 The sociological imagination enables us to grasp history and biography and the relations between the two within society. C. Wright Mills Introduction We will use a sociological perspective to review the course materials. Although human agency is the focus of the course, we will use the social structure and critical paradigms also to understand the context of human agency and inform our discussion of technology transfer. Compass Key Questions What are the fundamental principles of sociology? How can these principles be used to understand linkages among science, technology, and society? Examples What are the effects of technology adoption on the structure and functioning of society? Are the negative consequences of new technologies distributed fairly among powerful and less powerful segments of society? How does human interaction affect public responses to new technologies? The Sociological Perspective The sociological perspective is that: People behave differently in groups than they do as individuals. Human interaction influences individual and collective decision making. Normative expectations (i.e., societal-level "rules") affect behavior. Normative expectations can be changed by negotiation of the rules through human interaction. This perspective is used by sociologists to frame their approaches to improving society. Sociologists are charged with the tasks of: Monitoring and suggesting changes to societal structure to improve its functioning. Improving society by noting the presence of inequalities in the distribution of valued resources and suggesting ways to reduce inequalities. Facilitating social cohesion (i.e., sense of belonging) among the members of society. 51 To accomplish these tasks, sociologists rely upon three paradigms (i.e., broad philosophical viewpoints; worldviews) to guide their research and outreach activities: Social Structure (Structure-Functionalism) Structure-functionalism relies upon an "organic" analogy of human society as being "like an organism," a system of interdependent parts that function for the benefit of the whole. Thus, just as a human body consists of parts that function as an interdependent system for the survival of the organism, society consists of a system of interdependent institutions and organizations that function for the survival of the society. Relying upon the successes of biologists in understanding the human body, functionalists took a similar approach to understanding human social systems. Social systems were dissected into their "parts," or institutions (family, education, economy, polity, and religion), and these parts were examined to find out how they worked and their importance for the larger social system. The rationale was that if scientists could understand how institutions worked, then their performance could be optimized to create an efficient and productive society. This approach as proved to be very successful and is the predominant philosophy guiding macro-level sociology today. Structure-functionalism arose in part as a reaction to the limitations of utilitarian philosophy, where people were viewed as strictly rational, calculating entrepreneurs in a free, open, unregulated, and competitive marketplace. The tenet of functionalism, and the fundamental building block of all sociology, is that people behave differently in groups than they do as individuals. Groups have "lives of their own," so to speak. Or, as you might hear from a sociologist, "the whole is greater than the sum of its parts." Just as the "invisible hand of order" can guide economic relations, "social forces" can guide social relations, and thus yield for society very positive outcomes (volunteerism, democracy, laws, moral and ethical standards for behavior, family and educational systems, communities) and very negative outcomes (discrimination, organized crime, moral decay, warfare, poverty). The idea of the functionalists was to create a science of society that could examine the parts of human social systems and make them work for the betterment of all. And it is the task of sociologists to use scientific principles to help create the best form of society possible. Listed below are the central tenets of the functionalist approach to understanding human social systems. We will use these tenets throughout this course to gain a functionalist perspective on technology issues facing America today. 1. Society as a system of interrelated parts functioning for the good of the whole. Keep in mind that functionalism is always oriented toward what is good for the whole. As we examine different philosophical foundations of sociology, we will note the advantages and disadvantages of this perspective. 2. All social systems have four key functions: Adaptation, Goal-Attainment, Integration, Latency. These functional imperatives roughly correspond to the five institutions of human societies (economics, politics, family/education, and religion). By understanding which functional imperative is most closely related to current issues of America, we can understand the importance of the issue and its likely impact on the well-being of America. 3. Social action takes place within a social system of cultural norms and institutional structures. 52 Implications of structure-function theory for the sociology of technology: 1. The Structure-Function paradigm focuses upon the functions and dysfunctions of technology for the society as a whole. 2. There is an emphasis on equilibrium and stability of the social system. 3. Social action takes place within a social system of cultural norms and institutional structures. That is, technology must be compatible with existing ideas and practices. 4. There is an emphasis on integrating technology within a complex system of institutions and norms. 5. There is an emphasis on alleviating, as much as possible, the negative consequences of new technologies within the context of advancing technological progress for adaptation. Application in Context Hog lots in Iowa? One might ask, "For the benefit of Iowa, should local communities be given control over the siting of large-scale hog confinement operations?" If no significant harm to Iowa can be documented by limiting local control and Iowa is seen to benefit from the revenues of hog lots, then the structure function paradigm suggests limiting local control for the benefit of Iowa. Critical Sociology (Marxian Analysis) From the critical perspective, society is a system of competing parts in conflict for scarce resources. All social systems are considered to have a small minority of power elites who control most of the functions of society. All social action, including the development and dissemination of technology, takes place within an arena of conflict and exploitation of secondary segments of society by dominant segments of society. Thus, from the social structure paradigm, new technologies arise in response to demand for improved efficiency, productivity, and societal well-being. From the critical perspective, however, new technologies are supplied by the power elite to further their class interests. That is, technology is developed for and by the power elite. An essential element of this paradigm is that exploitation of power is considered to be inherent in society and therefore inevitable in the development and dissemination of technology. The critical perspective relies heavily upon ideas set forth by Karl Marx in his critiques of capitalist society. Marx relied upon the philosophical perspective of dialectical materialism to guide his critique of capitalism. The dialectic, as used by Marx and Georg Hegel, has a three-part structure: the thesis (i.e., status quo or central argument), the antithesis (i.e., an alternative to the status quo or the counter-condition of the central argument), and the synthesis (i.e., the resolution of the conflict of the thesis and antithesis, usually considered to be an "advancement" over the thesis, a "move forward" to something better). Although Karl Marx's idea of a communist utopian society failed due to an inadequate understanding of human motivation and organization, his identification of potential problems with human social systems still is a crucial element of all the social sciences. His hypotheses that human societies can experience sufficient organized and intentional exploitation by powerful elite's to lead to their collapse have received enough support that citizens should be aware of these potential problems and maintain a constant vigil against their becoming too severe. 53 Listed below are the central tenets of the Marxian approach to understanding human social systems. We will use these tenets throughout this course to gain a Marxian perspective on technology issues facing America today. 1. Society as a system of competing parts in conflict for scarce resources. From the perspective of Marxism, the fundamental processes of society are competition and conflict, rather than cooperation for the good of the whole, which we noted (with qualifications) was the emphasis in structure-functionalism. 2. All social systems have a small minority of powerful elite's For Marx, these persons/organizations were those most closely linked with the means of production: the owners of large industries. 3. Social action takes place within an arena of conflict and exploitation between dominant and secondary segments of society. With the Marxian approach, it is instructive to identify the dominant and secondary segments that affect and will be affected by the outcome of social action regarding current issues. Using Marxism, we anticipate that dominant segments will use their power to exploit resources from secondary segments of society. Marx's Dialectical Materialism To understand Marxian social philosophy, it is instructive to review its underlying principle, which is dialectical materialism. The dialectic consists of three parts: the thesis (the status quo, or our current understanding of "reality"), the antithesis (a contradiction to the status quo, or a recognized flaw in our current understanding of "reality"), and the synthesis (a suggested alternative to the status quo, or an improved understanding of "reality"). In one sense, the dialectic refers to inherent, inevitable conflict. Thus, citizens must inevitably wrestle with society as it is, the recognized flaws in society, and suggested alternatives for an improved society. In another sense, the dialectic is a method for achieving progress. Thus, citizens can use the dialectical way of thinking to improve society by recognizing and attempting to overcome its flaws. Marx focused on material conditions (e.g., food, clothing, housing, access to health care and education). For Marx, the dialectic represented inherent conflict between the means and relations of production. Owners were forced to exploit labor to achieve the competitive edge over their rivals in the capitalist economy, but in the process, destroyed the very source of their profit: labor. Thus, Marx used dialectical materialism to understand capitalist society and its flaws for the purpose of suggesting an alternative that would create a better society. Thesis: Means of production. The status quo was capitalist society, which required the lowest possible labor costs. Antithesis: Relations of production. Marx witnessed firsthand the horrific conditions of manual labor in industrialized England in the mid-19th century. Synthesis: Communism. To eliminate poverty and the misuse of power in capitalist society, Marx proposed a society that would end the holding of private property-people would work for the common good and share in the fruits of their labor. This solution is seriously flawed in several respects. First, it errs in focusing too strongly upon the economic conditions of society. Certainly, economic conditions are important, but they are not the only ones to affect divisions among people and subsequently the well-being 54 of society. Differences in religion, race, and gender, for example, also are sources of inequalities and exploitation. Contemporary theories of conflict therefore have expanded Marx's insights to incorporate a broader range of potential divisions among populations. One might respond that these extensions of Marxism reinforce rather than contradict the theory. And to some extent they do. The flaw in Marxism is that it ignores the fact that other divisions among people sometimes are more important to their cooperating with one another than are economic ones. Therefore, the potential revolution predicted, and advocated, by Marx based upon economic divisions is diffused to some extent by other societal divisions. Second, Marx failed to recognize the power of democratic political systems. No one is pretending that all persons in democracies have equal influence on decisions. Democracies do, however, offer a path to change that does not require revolutions against unmoving sources of power. Third, Marx did not and realistically in his time could not anticipate the rise of the mass consumption, mass production society. That is, Marxian theory does not account for the rise of economic power among workers as a means to consume the goods and services they produce. Fourth, and most importantly, Marx failed to recognize a basic human need for meritocracy: to be rewarded for extra effort and productivity. A communist society society fails to satisfy people's desires to advance themselves through their efforts. Incorrect Assumptions of Marx's dialectical materialism: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. too much emphasis on economic relations. social conflict is rarely bipolarized. political interests are not strictly class (economic) based. power rests on more than economic relations. conflict does not always cause social change. Correct Assumptions of the critical perspective: 1. inherent conflict between "haves" and "have nots" and focus on intentional manipulation by the power elite to maintain unequal distribution of resources. 2. role of power in the distribution of resources. 3. conflict as a major source of change in social systems. Marx's understanding of societies, the people that live in them, and capitalist economy is sufficiently flawed that his suggested solution to capitalism is itself inherently flawed. Marxian social philosophy is valuable today, however, because it reminds us of the potential exploitation of the less powerful by the more powerful and of the need for the less powerful to be mindful of this potential. Here is an example of how we can apply this philosophy to contemporary society. Mrs. LaVon Griffieon, in her essay, Food for Thought, notes that "We are so trusting in our ignorance." I think this statement epitomizes contemporary applications of the Marxian critique of society. Mrs. Griffieon has learned firsthand, as a "farm wife living in Iowa," that the forces of multinational agribusiness organizations might create a structure of agriculture that will be detrimental, rather than beneficial, to the well-being of society. One in which ordinary farmers are exploited by too powerful multinational agribusiness firms. To effectively apply Marxian theory to today's conditions, therefore, we should recognize that: 1. the more powerful are in a position to exploit resources from the less powerful, 2. the less powerful as a result of their lack of access to decision making can become alienated (i.e., separated) from society and therefore more likely to engage in less productive or even deviant activities, 3. citizens of democracies, who have the opportunity to institute change, need to be ever mindful of potential exploitation and take actions to protect equal opportunities for all. 55 Thus, 1. Individual interests are distinct from, and opposed to, the general interest represented by the State. Citizens do not consider themselves as participants in public affairs, but view the state as an external necessity of which they have to take account. 2. The state is the rule of reason in society, the incarnation of freedom. The citizen, as a separate individual, has civil and economic, but not political interests. 3. Reconciliation of this conflict is based on the fact that people are creatures of reason. If freedom is located in the selfish desires of the individuals, then social life would appear possible only by setting up an external organization to limit this freedom; government then appears as a necessary evil. But if citizens realize that their true freedom consists in the acceptance of principles, of laws which are their own, a synthesis of universal and particular interests becomes possible. This synthesis can be actualized only in and through political institutions, whereby the State is distinguished from civil society. Civil life then remains as an element of the State, but only as a subordinate moment in it. Political interests transcend but do not replace individual economic interests. People have a universal side and so can accept universal laws without becoming unfree. Marx could not accept this abdication of power, and citizen responsibly, to the State. He saw the need for citizens to become more politically active, especially given the terrible conditions of the working class and the inevitable (in his opinion) collapse of capitalism. Implications of conflict theory for the sociology of technology: 1. 2. 3. 4. Focus on biased estimations of risk. Focus on unequal distribution of risk. Focus on ethical need for a technology. Focus on potential for changing social relationships from the introduction of a technology. 5. Emphasis on preventing the negative consequences of new technologies. Application in Context Hog lots in Iowa? From the critical perspective, the answer to the question posed above is that people should "revolt," not in a violent way, but through their voting power, to establish laws to enable local people to control their well-being in the face of powerful corporations who care only for profit and not about the welfare of local citizens. Human Agency (Symbolic Interactionism) This paradigm focuses not upon societal institutions or power relationships within society, but upon interactions among the members of the society. It addresses issues of how people make the rules that determine which technologies will be adopted and which ones will be rejected. In a democratic society, ultimately, it is the people who decide whether to adopt new technology, assuming they have full knowledge and access to power through their 56 votes and other means of influence. The central question addressed from the perspective of human agency is, "How do people evaluate technology?" Where did society come from, anyway? Well, from us! From the perspective of symbolic interactionism, society is in a constant state of re-creation through interaction and negotiation of meanings. We created the rules we live by, and, importantly, we re-create these rules everyday through our interactions with one another. Mostly, societies are conservative with respect to social change. But, our redefining of: 1) the symbolic meanings we attach to things and events, 2) our sense of morality and ethics, and 3) what we choose to value have important implications for the rules we create and the ways we choose to live with one another. Listed below is a very abbreviated outline of the central tenets of the symbolic interactionist approach to understanding human social systems. We will use these tenets throughout this course to gain a symbolic perspective on technology issues facing America today. 1. Reality is socially constructed through our interactions with one another. Morality, ethics, and values, are not given; we create them through our interactions with one another. 2. Social action is influenced by person's beliefs, attitudes, perceptions, and negotiations of meanings. 3. The rules are open for grabs. If you do not like your society: work hard to change it! Key concepts: definition of the situation, perception, social construction of reality, morality. A critical element of human agency is the notion of socially constructed reality, or to be more directed toward the content of this course, socially constructed risk assessments. The essential features of socially constructed risk assessments are: Persuasive arguments. Social comparison. Choice shift. New technologies bring about uncertainty within an arena of ignorance. That is, most persons do not have the educational background to understand, for example, the science of biotechnology. We are neither uneducated nor stupid, but simply ignorant about much of the world around us. Thus, we face the consumer's dilemma: We must make a decision about whom to trust in the face of our ignorance. Active citizens begin by hearing out persuasive arguments in favor of and in opposition to the new technology. The arguments themselves, however, although necessary to gaining acceptance of the technology, are not sufficient to do so. Why? Because experience tells the public that even very highly trusted research and development organizations sometimes make mistakes and that, sometimes, new technologies are developed just for the economic benefit of the powerful elite. So, people turn to others for guidance. They socially compare their opinions with those of others. In a sense, people seek safety in numbers. If consumers sense a consensus of thought in favor a new technology--an indication that it is social acceptable--then their choice shift moves toward adoption. Without a sense that they are making a wise decision, however, their choice shift moves toward rejection of the technology. Implications of symbolic interactionism for the sociology of technology: 1. Focus on socially constructed nature of risk. 2. Focus on cultural influences on risk construction. 3. Focus on changing definitions of appropriate technology. Consideration of ethics and morals. 57 4. Emphasis on understanding the meaning of a technology for members of the society. Application in Context Hog lots in Iowa? Should the siting of large-scale hog confinement operations be subject to local control? From the perspective of human agency, the sociologist will focus on understanding the decision made by investigating social comparison processes. If sociologists choose to do so, they also can focus on influencing this decision by applying principles of innovation diffusion. If sociologists, as change agents, choose to influence, then they must utilize the social structure and critical paradigms to decide what is best for society and how best to mitigate the inevitable negative consequences of new technology development. Summary Sociology 415 addresses issues of social structure and exploitation of power in technology development and dissemination, but its primary focus is upon the effects of human agency on technology adoption and rejection. Thus, the process of socially constructed risk assessments is a critical element of the strategies we will learn about later in discussing techniques of technology transfer. 58 We live in a society exquisitely dependent upon science and technology, in which hardly anyone knows anything about science and technology. Carl Sagan Introduction Our first objective in Unit One is to explore relationships among science, technology, and society. To provide some structure to meeting this objective, we will review the book, Science, Technology, and Society, written by Andrew Webster. You are not required to read Webster's book. This section and the one that follows it will outline the principles we need to learn. Compass Key Questions How do science and technology affect the well-being of social systems? Examples Based upon the materials shown in the example web pages for the sampler technologies (or, if you wish, other web-based materials on these technologies), do you think the sampler technologies are being "oversold" to the public? Will the public loose confidence in these technologies when their flaws are revealed? Are proponents and opponents of the sampler technologies being fully honest in their presentations? Should proponents and opponents be fully honest? Do they need to be? How do social institutions and public policies affect science and technology? Is the American public sufficiently informed about science and technology to make a valuable contribution to technology policy? Should the public be concerned that institutions such as Iowa State University have sold themselves out to commercial interests? Can you site instances that lead you to believe that research conducted at ISU is biased in favor of commercial interests? What can scientists do to give the public more confidence in the integrity of their research? Does American society have adequate control over the sampler technologies? How can science and technology development be controlled? Should a society even attempt to control advances in pure science? 59 Overview of Webster's Science, Technology, and Society Andrew Webster examines how the economic, cultural, and political features of society affect and are affected by science and technology. He points out differences in popular images of science and the actual practice of science as it is conducted at research institutions and in the private sector. Webster highlights the ways in which scientific facts reflect "invention" as much as they do "discovery." He points out ways in which science and technology can be exploited for societal goals, keeping in mind that the setting of societal goals relies upon political and economic relationships among citizens. Webster ends his book by offering some suggestions for controlling science and technology to maximize benefits to the most persons possible. Webster is writing from the perspective of a citizen living in a democratic society. This course assumes the same. That is, it assumes that citizens have legal protections sufficient to enable them to critique new technologies and provide input regarding technology policy. Science in the Real World Webster introduces us to the Discovery Dome, an exhibit he visited that emphases a hands-on approach to understanding how technology works. Webster points out that this emphasis might increase awareness and appreciation of technology and perhaps reduce fears of it. But real understanding of technology, which can lead to a better understanding of technological risks, requires also an understanding of how science works. Typically, scientific method is presented as asocial, apolitical, non-economic, expert, progressive, and so forth. Such an approach furthers the image of science as being objective, pure, beyond the realm of people and their failings, and devoted only to making all of our lives better. The problem with presenting such an image, however, is that while it seeks to increase confidence in science, particularly in comparison with other methods of knowledge acquisition, it sets unattainable expectations that lead to diminished public confidence when science and technology inevitably are revealed to be flawed. No scientific research is perfect and all technology is flawed in some respects. The paradox of science, therefore, is that attempts to present it as infallible inevitably erode confidence in it. Understanding this paradox provides us with insights for developing strategies for gaining adoption of complex and controversial technology, topics to be explored later in this course. That is, change agents, persons seeking to gain adoption of an innovation, are faced with the dilemma of presenting a technology as safe and beneficial without overselling it, knowing that, inevitably, the technology is flawed and will bring undesirable consequences to some segments of the population. Active Citizens Webster argues that science is socially constructed. By this he means that science is not an objective, value-free pursuit of knowledge guided solely by theoretical propositions. Instead, the enterprise of science--which questions get asked, which research gets funded, how research is conducted, how findings are interpreted--is dependent upon negotiation and debate among scientists and between scientists and the public. Scientists tend to pursue questions of more immediate interest to the public, with greater potential for lucrative patents, or that are more popular among funding agencies. In short, science is an enterprise as much influenced by social, political, and economic vested interests as any other human enterprise within a democratic society. 60 If Webster is correct in his assertion that science is negotiated, then citizens must be aware of their influence on science and their responsibility to help guide science to produce the kind of technology best suited to their society's well-being. If, indeed, science and technology are socially constructed and reflect socioeconomic and political interests, then science policy--the decision-making regarding what types of science and technology will be funded by the public--becomes central to a society seeking to use the very powerful tools of science to produce technology for the common good. Application in Context Have the potential benefits of genetic engineering been oversold to the public? 1. From your reading of the Sampler materials, and other information you know about genetic engineering, do you think the public has been adequately informed about both the benefits and potential problems associated with this technology? 2. Do you think proponents and opponents of genetic engineering have been fully honest with the public? 3. Do proponents and opponents have an obligation to be fully honest with the public? 4. What actions should/can active citizens take to learn the facts about genetic modification of food? Science and Science Policy By their very nature, the uncertainties of innovative technology make it difficult for such decisions to be made. Thus, because most efforts of science policy are directed toward technology transfer, questions about how innovations are encouraged, measured, and evaluated are a crucial element of science policy. Science policy typically assumes that: 1. 2. 3. 4. technology is independent of social (meaning cultural, economic, political) context, scientists (experts) also are authorities on correct science policy, technology can be objectively evaluated in any social context, and science must be held accountable to the public. Each of these assumptions has its shortcomings. 1. Because technology is embedded within a social context, it is influenced by social, political, and economic interests and its transfer from one social system to another can be problematic. 2. Expert opinion regarding the production of technology does not necessarily imply expert opinion regarding the use and transfer of technology. 3. Evaluation of technology is exceedingly difficult, and depends upon a wide range of indicators, including ones outside the domain of science (e.g., is legalized abortion moral?). Problems related to technology transfer and evaluation, therefore, make it difficult to determine how and to what extent science and technology have met public needs. Society and Science Policy 61 Webster takes note of an emerging emphasis on the commercialization of public sector research and development. Public universities are being encouraged to enter into cooperative agreements with the private sector to develop and transfer technology with national and international commercial potential. The role of the state and commercial interests in setting science policy has always been a concern of scientists, even though they often benefit from national policy objectives and technology transfer to the commercial sector. Webster discusses three concerns that have been voiced about this trend by scientists conducting research in public universities: 1. To what extent will commercial interests manipulate the direction and focus of scientific research? 2. Will the conditions of work and the relationships among scholars change with increased emphasis upon meeting the needs of the commercial sector? 3. What impact will commercialization have on the free access to and exchange of information, data, materials, and findings among scientists? The Public and Science Policy Controlling science is an exceptionally difficult task; who or what is to be controlled for what purposes? To what extent should the public be involved in setting the directions and scope of science? The public's involvement in setting national research priorities requires public knowledge of not just the content of science, but the institution of science as well. Thus, knowledge of content is a necessary, but not sufficient condition for deciding wise science policy (and it is very difficult to educate the public about complex technologies). The media plays a very important role in shaping public opinion. Traditionally, the media has portrayed the institution of science as authoritative, objective, unbiased, and so forth. But with increasing public concern over the risks associated with advanced technology, and increased attention directed toward the shortcomings of technology, the media has taken a more critical look at both the content and practice of science. In turn, the public has become more skeptical of science and technology. Pressure groups tend to focus on a single technology or scientific theory for the purpose of challenging the value of science in building a good society. This type of challenge to science typically takes the form of public debate and confrontations between the citizen groups and representatives of the scientific community or business leaders with vested interests in a specific technology. Sometimes public pressure can have significant effects on the direction and outputs of science. The movement toward the development and dissemination of appropriate technology in developing nations, for example, has dramatically affected research and outreach worldwide. The alternative science movement attempts to institutionalize alternative approaches to science to maintain an emphasis on critical evaluation of established research and development organizations. Feminist and religious organizations, to name two examples, attempt to redirect approaches taken by scientific institutions in recruiting scholars, setting research priorities, and developing technology. Webster concludes that the public, through various forms of advocacy groups, can exert significant influences on scientific institutions and the content of science, including the formulation of what is considered to be scientific facts. Application in Context 62 Has Iowa "Sold Itself Out" to Corporate Farming? 1. The state of Iowa is making large investments into biotechnology. And the Republican and Democratic candidates for Governor support increasing investments in biotechnology. At the same time, the legislature cut funding from the Leopold Center for Sustainable Agriculture by 86 percent. Has Iowa "sold itself out" corporate farming? 2. Has Iowa State University "sold itself out" to large, corporate interests? Policy Recommendations Webster reminds us of the inherent connections among science, technology, and society. He points out that science is a human enterprise and thus is influenced by social, political, and economic interests. He encourages citizens living in a country ruled by democratic processes to be active--to become aware of and involved in science and technology policy formation. He urges us to recognize some general principles of science and technology development. Science can be neither objective nor infallible. It is necessary, therefore, for active citizens in a democratic society to take the responsibility for the ownership of science and technology development. In addition to these recommendations for citizens, Webster suggests five directions for the social science research on science. Webster suggests that social scientists should pay greater attention to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. the 'political economy' of the scientific laboratory, the organization and culture of private sector research and development, the impact of public interest groups on science and technology, integrating other social sciences into the sociology of science, and building linkages between the sociology of science and public policy makers who influence the direction of science and technology. 63 So oft in theologic wars, the disputants, I ween, rail on in utter ignorance of what each other mean and prate about an elephant not one of them has seen! John Godfrey Saxe, The Blind Men and the Elephant. Introduction The materials presented thus far provide the philosophical basis to begin the applied unit of Sociology 415. We start by learning seven approaches to risk assessment of technologies. Knowing different approaches to risk assessment and the strengths and weaknesses of each helps us understand public responses to technologies and tailor risk communication messages to fit different types of technologies. Importantly, as responsible change agents, we need to know for ourselves the limitations of different types of risk assessment. The key point of this section is that technology should be evaluated simultaneously from multiple approaches wherein each approach might yield different findings about the wisdom of adopting a technology. Social Theories of Risk, edited by Sheldon Krimsky and Dominic Golding, addresses how individuals and institutions evaluate and communicate to the public about technology risks. We review the chapter written by Ortwin Renn entitled, "Concepts of Risk: A Classification," to learn about approaches to evaluating technology. Renn classifies different approaches to risk assessment by their answers to three essential questions: 1. How can we specify or measure uncertainties? 2. What are the undesirable outcomes? 3. What is the underlying concept of reality? The approaches to risk assessment derived from this classification scheme are organized into four sections: Technical Risk Assessment, Economic Risk Assessment, Psychological Risk Assessment, Sociological Risk Assessment. Three Approaches to Technical Risk Assessment The Actuarial Approach Characteristics Risk is measured as expected value (i.e., arithmetic average) based upon previous occurrences of undesirable events. Undesirable events are defined as physical harm to humans or other ecosystems, wherein these events can be observed with sense data (e.g., excluding events such as subjective perceptions). The underlying concept of reality is positivist: that undesirable events are easily recognized, agree upon by all, and limited to what is observed. Assumptions This approach assumes that sufficient data exists to make meaningful predictions about future events and that the causal mechanism that underlies the occurrence of previous 64 undesirable events will remain stable over the prediction period. Strengths and Limitations The actuarial approach provides quantification of undesirable events and an indication of what frequency to expect for future occurrences of these events. It assigns risk without prejudice because it does not provide an explanation of why undesirable events occur. Because it does not attempt to identify causal mechanism, however, it gives little guidance on how to prevent or predict future occurrences of undesirable events. Also, because the actuarial approach attempts to quantify hazard, it is subject to the types of observation and measurement errors described in the next sections on critiques of risk assessment. Examples of Use The assignment of automobile insurance rates for different segments of the population provides a good example of the actuarial approach to risk assessment. Younger drivers pay higher insurance rates than do older drivers because historical evidence shows that younger drivers have more accidents than do older drivers. This assignment of a higher insurance rate to John, Jr. is not an expression of prejudice against him; it is simply an assertion that persons in his age group are more likely to be involved in an automobile accident than persons in the age group of John, Sr. John, Jr. might be an excellent driver, perhaps even a better one than is John, Sr. But Jr. pays a higher rate for automobile insurance due to the expected value for his age group. The Toxicological/Epidemiological Approach Characteristics The toxicological/epidemiological approach attempts to identify causal mechanisms in occurrences of undesirable events. This focus on explaining why negative events occur requires the application of scientific theory to analysis of previous events. Hence, this approach represents a considerable advancement over the actuarial approach in its attempt to explain the occurrence of undesirable events. As with the actuarial approach, undesirable events are considered to be observable and reality is thought of as positivist in nature. Assumptions This approach assumes that the correct theoretical explanation has been applied to the data on previous undesirable events. It assumes that events can be explained and that future events will, under conditions specified by a theory, occur in accordance with theoretical predictions. Strengths and Limitations The toxicological/epidemiological approach provides quantification of undesirable events, an explanation of these events, and therefore a rationale for predicting the occurrence of undesirable events in the future if theoretical conditions exist. But it depends upon correct specification of theory. If the theory is free from misspecified spurious or suppressor relationships, then the risk assessment will be relatively correct subject to the errors of observation and measurement as described below and in the critique of risk assessment. Examples of Use Modeling events is a common practice in science and modeling undesirable events is one of the keystones of risk assessment. In quantitative risk assessment, technical experts attempt to derive expected frequencies of undesirable events based upon experience with 65 previous events and theoretical expectations of conditions occurring that would lead to an undesirable event occurring in the future. Thus, a technical expert might conclude theoretically that the use of Pesticide A will result in one additional person in ten million contracting cancer than would be the case if Pesticide A were not to be used. The Probabilistic Approach Characteristics Probabilistic risk assessment is the use of modeling applied to technology systems rather than to a single event. This approach relies upon the application of logic systems such as fault-tree or event-tree analyses to arrive at a quantitative assessment of overall system failure as some function of the probability of the failure for each of the components of the system. Undesirable events are considered as observable and positivist in nature. Assumptions The approach assumes that theories for each individual risk assessment are correct and that the procedure for combining the probabilities of individual failures to arrive at an overall assessment of failure is correct. Strengths and Limitations The probabilistic approach is useful for quantifying the probability of system failure for complex technologies. It is difficult to model, however, the probability of common mode failure, (the simultaneous breakdown of more than one system component) and humanmachine interactions. The approach is limited by all the possible errors of observation and measurement outlined in the critiques of risk assessment. But note that such failures in precision can occur for each component of the overall system and that each probability for error is multiplied by the probability for error in subsequent components. Thus, the overall assessment of failure can be highly inaccurate. Examples of Use Many technologies consist of a system of individual technologies. In fact, the technologies people tend to fear the most--nuclear power plants, petrochemical refineries, and food safety nets--consist of many individual components that might fail, which would result in total system failure. The risk management approach taken in such cases is to institute backup systems in the event that one system fails and early warning systems to detect an impending component or system failure. Application in Context What is the technical risk assessment of food irradiation? Quantitative Risk Assessments Food irradiation is perhaps the most studied food processing technology, with over 50 years of research on its effects. In theory, the dosages of gamma rays applied in food processing should allow for virtually no chance of survival for microorganisms living in or on the food. Studies that seem to show adverse health effects from eating irradiated food have been discounted because of serious flaws in methodology. The U.S. Food and Drug Administration has determined that irradiated food is safe to eat. 66 Critical Thinking Qualified epidemiologists have critiqued the studies used by the FDA in approving food irradiation as having serious flaws in methodology. These persons nevertheless support the technology. Therefore, note that technical assessments are critiqued as being flawed by both proponents and opponents of food irradiation. Is it possible to conduct scientific inquiry that is not flawed? If not, then how should the consumer interpret conflicting accounts of scientific credibility? Critiques of Technical Risk Assessment Ortwin Renn Understanding that risk is multifaceted explains how societies can be in conflict over technology adoption and why technology adoption sometimes can take a long time to achieve. Renn makes these observations about approaches to risk assessment: 1. All approaches have benefits and drawbacks. 2. All approaches are necessary for a complete understanding of risk. Renn offers these critiques of technical risk assessment: People have different values and preferences that affect their perceptions of risk. Human interaction with technological systems is difficult to model quantitatively. Outside the domain of all forms of technical assessment, for example, is the probability of technology failure due to human mismanagement or irresponsible behavior. The institutional structure designed to manage risk itself might be inadequately designed or managed to do so. Technical approaches imply risk management practices in proportion to quantitative risk assessment. People, however, also desire risk management policies that include objectives such as fairness, equity, and sense of morality/ethics. John Adams Adams, (Risk, 1995) points out that risk is not easily measured, agreed upon by diverse audiences, or managed. In asking, "Can we assess risk better?," he is not so much posing a problem that has a one best solution as challenging us to become more involved in understanding and evaluating relationships among science, technology, and society. Adams notes that sometimes the public and scientific experts differ in their evaluations of technology risk. This disagreement occurs, in part, because the public uses a wide variety of criteria, including some nonscientific criteria, in its evaluations of risk. Adams distinguishes between formal and informal approaches to risk evaluation, wherein formal approaches emphasize technical assessments of health and safety hazards and informal approaches address social, political, economic, and ethical issues. He observes that the typical response of technical risk evaluators to nontechnical evaluations is a patronizing effort to further educate the public about the real risks associated with a technology. Adams rejects as a false dichotomy the notion that technical experts know actual risk and the public harbors uninformed, misinformed, and even irrational perceptions of risk. He asserts that individual and group risk-taking involve instead a balancing act between social, political, economic, and ethical costs and benefits. He argues that adherence to the false dichotomy has led to many misguided attempts to educate the public into thinking correctly 67 about a new technology. Given that such educational efforts are necessary but not sufficient motivators of attitudinal and behavioral change (even when scientists do have a good knowledge of actual hazards), scientific experts experience inevitable failures and subsequent frustration in their attempts at risk communication. Adams points out the actual versus perceived dichotomy is false in two respects: 1. Technical risk assessments are neither entirely objective nor necessarily very precise. Sometimes no data exists upon which to make a risk assessment. For new technologies, this problem is common. For complex technological systems, the problem increases geometrically. That is, there might be no data for a particular component of the system and there might be no data for the combination of various components with one another. Inadequate data, improper recording of data, and data that are difficult to disaggregate also can create problems in technical risk assessments. When technical risk assessments are demanded, and the data are inadequate for such assessments, guesswork must be made, which elicits problems with values and opinions entering into presumably objective indicators of risk. Technical risk assessment is further hampered by accident migration (the tendency for ignored areas of accident occurrence to experience increased accidents) and regression towards the mean (the natural ebb and flow of accidents associated with a certain range of events). Cultural filtering determines which types of risk will be assessed and the outcome of the risk assessment. Noise (measurement error in collecting data), "near misses" (ambiguous data), and bias (misrepresentation of data) also affect quantitative risk assessment. Deriving cost/benefit analysis for a technology not yet in use can be especially difficult. First, to assess expected utility, the user of the technology must be fully informed of the risks associated with it. The educational requirements for a complex technology, however, can be extensive. Second, users must be able to incorporate subjective evaluations into their expectations of utility. As noted, these evaluations depend upon the social construction of risk, which not only include many subjectively defined shared values, but require some lag time to fully develop. 2. Technical risk assessments exclude considerations of political, social, and ethical goals. Even to the extent that technical risk assessments accurately reflect hazards, because they ostensibly exclude consideration of political, social, and ethical goals, they provide only a limited appraisal of the value of a technology. A technology might contain few hazards but engender much outrage. The abortion of a human fetus, for example, is a fairly safe technology (for the mother) but raises strong emotional feelings in American society. On a different note, some argue that risk assessments intentionally include political and economic considerations. See: Risky Business: How Scientific Are Science-Based Risk Assessments? Michael Bell and Diane Mayerfeld Bell and Mayerfeld (The Rationalization of Risk, 1999: full text article) , like Renn and Adams, note important limitations to technical approaches to risk assessment: Quantitative risk estimates are precise, but often are not accurate because they rely upon a whole series of assumptions, guesses, and extrapolations that limit their accuracy. Estimated risks often do not account for multiple hazards that occur in conjunction with one another in complex technological systems. For example, we might estimate 68 the risk of pesticides A and B, but often we do not estimate the risk of pesticide A in combination with pesticide B. Numbers often carry disproportionate effect in technological assessments of risk. Technical risk assessments often falsely homogenize populations. That is, the risk for a child might be different than the risk for an adult. Judith Bradbury Bradbury (Science, Technology, and Human Values 14: 380-389, 1989) notes that all forms of risk assessment have limitations. Therefore, risk communication strategies that rely too closely upon a single risk assessment framework will not be as effective as they could or should be. Technical approaches define risk as the product of the probability and consequences of an adverse event. Assessments of probability and consequences are made by technical experts as part of quantitative risk assessments. From the perspective of the technical approach, risk can be evaluated independently of political, economic, or social conditions. Thus, risk resides primarily in the technology and its relationship to foreseeable consequences. The technical approach implies communication strategies that educate the public about technical risk assessments. Technical assessments are considered to represent actual risks. When these risks are deemed by regulatory agencies to be minimal, then, if possible, they are not conveyed to the public to avoid unnecessary concern. When risk assessments become public and consumer perceptions do not coincide with actual risk, then, from the technical perspective, acceptance of a new technology can be unnecessarily delayed or implementation can become more expensive than necessary. Thus, public rejection of the logic of technical risk assessments is considered to be irrational. Risk communication strategies thereby focuses upon educating an ignorant and sometimes irrational public about actual risk. Strategies seek to reduce outrage based upon inaccurate perceptions so as to retain a focus on actual risk. Bradbury asserts that this approach ignores the economic, political, and cultural dimensions of risk assessment and management. The public is not necessarily ignorant of technical risk assessments nor are they being irrational in expressing skepticism about a technology when technical assessments show it to be a minimal risk. Rather, the public evaluates technology on a broader set of criteria than is considered in technical risk assessments. Bradbury asks, for example, "Who bears the burden of responsibility for defined risk?" and " Who decides how risk will be evaluated?" She argues that because technical assessments ignore economic, political, and cultural issues, risk communication strategies that focus upon education about technical facts are necessary but insufficient to sway public opinion. Risk Perceptions and Risk Management Managing risk, then, is a key motivator of much professional practice. But the objective of managing risk must be as free from misplaced concreteness as possible to avoid polemics. Myths about nature, or cultural outlooks, affect all risk evaluations. These myths--also called paradigms, ideologies, belief systems--are the set of assumptions about reality formed through shared experience, supported by interactions with others, and routinely go unquestioned. They are culturally constructed and maintained. What happens when observations about reality do not correspond with our assumptions about it? Certainly, we should avoid being too hasty to revise paradigms; they must have enjoyed a great deal of support at some point in time to have gained their standing. Yet, to cling too long to paradigms with many anomalies is to engage in the fallacy of misplaced concreteness: to believe in the paradigm in spite of overwhelming evidence that refutes it. But paradigms carry much emotional baggage. Revising them or exchanging them for 69 radically different ones requires not only much scientific debate, but much soul-searching as well. Thus, evaluations of risk, if they place pressure on paradigms, which they sometimes do, will instigate debates about paradigms that reflect cultural outlooks. Hence, debates about high risk technology often entail emotionally charged debate that reflects cultural outlook. Can we manage risk better? Adams suggests keeping in mind the following observations on the evaluation of risk by technical experts: 1. 2. 3. 4. Remember, everyone else is seeking to manage risk, too. They are all guessing; if they knew for certain, they would not be dealing with risk. Their guesses are strongly influenced by their beliefs. Their behavior is strongly influenced by their guesses and tends to reinforce their beliefs. 5. It is the behavior of others, and the behavior of nature, that constitute the actual risk environment. 6. It will never be possible to capture "objective risk." 70 In everything one thing is impossible: rationality. Friedrich Nietzsche Introduction It seems like such a simple thing, does it not? Rationality. We all have it, all the time, in all settings (well, mostly anyway). Or do we? Can we be irrational or perhaps nonrational? Or perhaps can we be rational and irrational and nonrational all at the same time. Here, we explore the concept of rationality in its various manifestations. Our purpose in doing so is to better understand why people judge technologies as good or bad, safe or unsafe, and to understand why two seemingly "rational" persons can view the same technology so differently. Given its importance for understanding human behavior it is not surprising to learn that much has been written about rationality. We limit our reading mostly to a single source, the writings of the sociologist Max Weber. We will supplement Weber's writings with a brief review of the literature regarding rational choice theories as they are conceived in the social sciences (particularly in the disciplines of sociology and economics). The majority of the text here is borrowed from a paper I and co-authors published in the journal Science Communication. Rationality Max Weber's (1968[1921]) treatises on rationality distinguish between zweckrational motivations (i.e., ones aimed at attaining "rationally pursued and calculated ends" p. 24-26) and wertrational motivations (i.e., ones guided by a "conscious belief in [a] value [orientation] for its own sake" p. 24). To Weber, wertrational expressions have importance to the actor "independently of [their] prospects of success" (Weber, 1968[1921]: 24). Wertrational expressions thereby are neither irrational nor nonrational but instead are "induced by immanent or transcendental (as opposed to instrumental) values and thus by intrinsic rather than extrinsic motivation" (Zafirovski, 2005). In distinguishing between zweckrational (i.e., formal) and wertrational (i.e., substantive) motivations Weber posed a complementary ontological position to that offered in other social sciences, particularly to that offered in economics as the foundation of rational choice theory (e.g., Boudon, 1981; Coleman, 1990; Elster, 1989; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997; Sen, 1977; Simon, 1982). Rational choice theory posits that individuals in their decision making seek to maximize their benefits and minimize their costs related to some form of goal-attainment (e.g., Sen, 1977). "Thin" forms of rational choice assume that economic benefits define the first-order ends and motives for goal-attainment whereas "thick" forms of rational choice broaden the definition of potential ends to include non-economic goals, such as prestige, power, influence, and the like, including expressions of value orientations (Elster, 1989; Hechter and Kanazawa, 1997). In either its thin or thick versions the essential element of rational choice is that behavior in some manner is oriented toward achieving an extrinsically identifiable goal, whether this goal be defined by the maximization of economic or non-economic utility (Boudon, 1981; Sen, 1977). As might be expected the teleological determination inherent within thick rational choice theory, wherein it is assumed that the actor is pursuing "some goal," in addition to its assumptions about full knowledge, intentionality, and transitivity have engendered debate within the social sciences regarding its falsifiability and eventual pragmatic usefulness (e.g., Ackerman, 1997; Sen, 1977; Smelser, 1992). We pass on this debate to explore instead the distinction drawn by Weber between rational behavior oriented toward extrinsically defined 71 goals, whether these goals be economic or non-economic ones (i.e., formal rationality), and rational behavior reflecting intrinsic self-expressions of values that present merits to the actor in and of themselves, ones that have importance to the actor independently of their prospects of success (i.e., substantive rationality). Weber's typology has proved valuable to social scientists in understanding human motivation and in informing approaches to incorporating such motivations within public policy formation (Ritzer, 2010). In considering sound public policy formation, for example, policy makers might wonder about the extent to which public opinions offered only for the sake of expressing value-based orientations (i.e., an expression of substantive rationality) should be incorporated into policy deliberations. Hence, from an applied perspective empirically validating this distinction might highlight the significance of such expressions as a mechanism by which people support experts' recommendations (e.g., Kahan, et al., 2006; Kahan and Slovic, 2006; Sunstein, 2005, 2006). And conceptually, such an evaluation would support Weber's typological distinction between zweckrational and wertrational motivations. Consider a situation wherein a person believes that they share the same values as another person and then rates this person on their competency (i.e., their skills and ability to accomplish a task) and their fiduciary responsibility (i.e., their willingness to do the right thing in accomplishing a task). The hypothesized relationship between perceived shared values and evaluations of fiduciary responsibility seems to conform with the description of formal rationality. That is, it seems like a logical means-ends relationship to assume that a perception of shared values with an agent would influence an actor to believe that the agent will "do the right thing." On the other hand, the hypothesized relationship between perceived shared values and evaluations of competence does not seem to meet the requirements of formal rationality because a sense of shared values seems to provide neither a necessary nor sufficient condition to infer competence. For example, Stephanie might believe that Natalie shares her same values but has not the competency to successfully carry out her task-related responsibilities. Conversely, Stephanie might believe that Natalie does not share her same values but recognizes that Natalie nevertheless is highly competent at carrying out her task-related responsibilities. The specified relationship between shared values and competency, therefore, might reflect some type of rationality, but inasmuch as it does not represent a logical connection between means and ends cannot in itself represent formal rationality. Nor is it likely that such an expression be deemed as irrational, at least within the scope of contemporary social science definitions of rationality (e.g., Zafirovski, 2005). The question becomes, then, does this seemingly nonrational expression of values represent an extension of rational choice in that it is directed toward goal-attainment (i.e., thick rational choice) or does it reflect an expression of values in themselves (i.e., substantive rationality)? Thick forms of rational choice theory might consider this relationship as an expression of formal rationality in that it reflects attributed competence for the prospects of attaining an extrinsically identifiable goal. For example, although Stephanie might believe that Natalie does not have the competence necessary to successfully complete a task she nevertheless might attribute competence to her as a means of encouraging her to attain an extrinsically identifiable goal (i.e., "I desire for Natalie to be successful"). Alternatively, this expression might reflect substantive rationality in that it represents an assertion of values in themselves without regard for the prospects of success. For example, although Stephanie might believe that Natalie does not have the competence necessary to successfully complete a task she nevertheless might attribute competence to her as a means of expressing her value-orientation regardless of whether the task is successfully completed (i.e., "I wish to express my support for Natalie's values"). The results of empirical inquiry regarding consumers' perceptions of the U.S. food system found evidence that consumers' evaluations reflected elements of both substantive and formal rationality. The significance of this finding can be illustrated by considering it within the context of contemporary civic discourse regarding the extent to which public values should be incorporated within social policy formation. We explore this line of inquiry 72 specifically with regard to consumer perspectives of U.S. agricultural production goals. Much of contemporary debate about the extent to which the public should be involved in technology policy formation centers upon issues in agricultural production (e.g., Sunstein, 2005, 2006), wherein U.S. consumers express their opinions about agricultural practices through their adoption or rejection of new technologies (e.g., Israel and Hoban, 1992; Sapp and Korsching, 2004) and their advocacy for legislative changes in agricultural policies (e.g., Auld, 1990; Humane Society of the United States, 2011; Lovvorn and Perry, 2009; Lulka, 2011; Sierra Club 2011). Within the past decade especially consumers have successfully pursued legislative solutions, particularly with regard to addressing environmental and animal welfare issues, typically lobbying for what experts consider to be less rational technologies (e.g., Croney, 2010). As expected, however, citizens' pursuit of legislative solutions raises questions about the extent to which social policy should be determined by people whose opinions are relatively uniformed and sometimes reflect ineffective use of decision-making heuristics (see especially reviews by Dietz and Stern (2008) and Renn (2008)). Sunstein (2005), for example, in assessing public responses to genetically modified food products, proposes that because people's opinions always will be influenced by a lack of full knowledge and the use of heuristics that often mislead them regarding actual risks (i.e., as determined by expert risk analysis), a deliberative society is best served by having expert panels listen to citizens' value expressions but develop social policies that conform with scientific findings. He thereby argues that expert panels should be the principal agents in forming social policy, policy that is guided by values but not by blunders. Of course, ample evidence exists to note that the enterprise of science itself is guided by politics, economics, religious beliefs, culture, and the like (e.g., Freudenburg, 1988; Shrader-Frechette, 1991). And sound scientific evidence might be superseded by the implementation of politically expedient social policies. For example, whereas civic leaders in the European Union might recognize that restrictions placed upon imports of genetically modified food arising from consumer-voiced safety concerns are unsupported by scientific evidence they might nevertheless impose such restrictions to appease concerned consumers (e.g., Carter and Gruere, 2003). As a further potential limitation of the expert panel approach one wonders about the extent to which a skeptical public will accept the idea of social policy being influenced for the most part by panels comprised of persons whom they mistrust (Croney, 2010). Fischhoff (1995), for example, notes that approaches that ignore public opinion, present just the facts, interpret the facts for the public, or rely upon other strategies that represent a one-way communication from risk experts to the public have in the past failed both to adequately inform public opinions and achieve public support. Therefore, within a democratic society it might be unrealistic to presume that citizens will delegate social policy decision-making to expert panels. Nevertheless, Sunstein (2005) echoes the sentiments of others (e.g., Goklanv, 2001; Graham, 2004; Hanekamp, 2006; Powell, 2010) in advocating for a greater influence of science-based expert opinion when designing social policies. In contrast to this position, Kahan and colleagues (e.g., Culture Cognition Project, 2011) contend that greater attention should be paid to the value-based expressions of citizens. They assert that the key determinants of trust in and support for social policies are the value-orientations that citizens use to inform their policy preferences rather than the heuristics they use to interpret risks. Relying upon the grid-group typology advanced by Douglas and Wildavsky (1982), Kahan and colleagues propose that effective and acceptable social policies can be achieved when they elicit a sense of shared values among persons/groups with differing value-orientations. It should be noted that value-orientations do not necessarily predict social policy preferences. For example, a person with an egalitarian value-orientation and a global vision might support the agricultural production goal to "grow enough food to help feed the world." A person with an egalitarian valueorientation and a vision limited to "America first," on the other hand, might oppose this goal. Thus, as Sunstein (2006) notes, the culture cognition approach might simply 73 represent one form of bounded rationality. Nevertheless, the findings of Kahan and associates support the claim that policies that give people a sense of shared values can be effective in gaining consensus support. Recent legislative action regarding egg production, for example, represents in part a reconciliation among institutional representatives who express differing value-orientations (e.g., Humane Society of the United States, 2011). It should be recognized that some persons even if they hold strong opinions do not necessarily wish an audience for them among policy makers. And to the extent that one believes that experts share their values then one might feel comfortable with policy being guided by these experts. Yet it is not uncommon, especially within the arena of agricultural production policy formation for expert opinions to differ substantially from those of a public that has only their value-orientations to offer as justification for policy alternatives. For example, whereas experts in a recent policy debate strongly agreed that the current size of hen cages were scientifically justified, U.S. consumers successfully voiced their valueoriented opinions that cages needed to be larger (Humane Society of the United States, 2011). In this sense, although public opinions might be relatively uniformed, they nevertheless are important to policy formation and not necessarily irrational in content. To the extent that citizens wish to be heard, therefore, the question for a democratic society becomes to what extent should policy makers heed the advice of relatively uniformed citizens in lieu of the advice offered by experts? Our findings can be interpreted to support either of the two perspectives described above. To the extent that the findings here demonstrate an intrinsic importance to value expression they support social policy formation that facilitates reconciliations among groups/people with diverse value-orientations. This approach, however, might be frustrated if citizens are expressing their values with no desire to attain an externally identifiable goal, as would be the case when these expressions represent instances of substantive rationality. In this case, pursuing such approaches will be ineffective to the extent that values are entrenched. Alternatively, in indicating that citizens to some extent express their values with no extrinsically identifiable rationale in mind, the findings here support social policy formation that accentuates decisions made by expert panels. After all, if citizens express their values with no more rationale than their desire to do so then it seems prudent for a nation to provide expert guidance to social policy formation. However, along these same lines the findings indicate that expert panel approaches, ones that listen to but overrule citizens' value-orientations, might be difficult to implement because people strongly desire valueexpression. Also, implementing such approaches might foment distrust in societal institutions to the extent that they are perceived as being insensitive to citizens' values. In conclusion, finding that consumers seemingly use both substantive and formal rationality to evaluate the U.S. food system presents challenges to gauging the extent to which consumer opinions should be incorporated into social policy formation. If indeed it is unrealistic to implement expert panel approaches to social policy formation then the most successful approach to achieving acceptable U.S. agricultural production policies, even if in some cases this approach might be either inefficient or ineffective, will involve actions taken by agricultural producers, agribusiness firms, and agriculture-related government institutions to develop goals and pursue agricultural production practices that are based upon mutual understandings and shared values with consumers. With these considerations in mind, we believe our results indicate that developing both well-reasoned and publically acceptable technology-related policy will require greater rather than less emphasis upon furthering effective science communication theory and practice. References Ackerman, F. 1997. "Consumed in Theory: Alternative Perspectives on the Economics of Consumption." Journal of Economic Issues 31: 651-664. Auld, M.E. 1990. 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"The Rational Choice Perspective." Rationality and Society 4: 381-410. Starr, C. 1969. "Social Benefit Versus Technological Risk." Science 165: 1232. Sunstein, C.R. 2005. Laws of Fear: Beyond the Precautionary Principle. New York: Cambridge University Press. Sunstein, C.R. 2006. "Misfearing: A Reply." Harvard Law Review 119: 1110-1125. Weber, M. 1968[1921]. Economy and Society, Volume 1. Edited by G. Roth and C. Wittich. Berkeley, CA: University of California Press. Zafirovski, M. 2005. "Is Sociology the Science of the Irrational? Conceptions of Rationality in Sociological Theory." The American Sociologist 36: 85-110. 76 Be wary of the man who urges an action in which he himself incurs no risk. Joaquin Setanti Introduction Technical approaches assume that risk is tied to the technology, that it is associated with the probability of failure of the technology itself. In this sense, technical approaches ask, "How safe is the technology?" Social science approaches view risk as perceptions held about the technology. Risk assessments note that the human enterprises using technology are intrinsically flawed. Knowing that failure will somehow occur, the question thus becomes, "Is the technology safe enough?" The first social science approach we discuss is the economic one. The economic approach seeks to assign monetary quantification of the costs and benefits of a technology. The Economic Approach Characteristics Risk is measured as expected utility and undesirable events are defined as instances where the costs of a technology outweigh its benefits. Expected utility is the estimated value of the technology in consideration of its use and the costs of its use. From the economic perspective, if estimated benefits outweigh the estimated costs, then the technology has a favorable overall risk assessment. This approach marks a significant departure from technical approaches in that the maximization of satisfaction rather than reduction of physical harm is the desired outcome. In the move from technical to social science risk assessment the central question shifts from, "Is the technology safe?" to "Is the technology safe enough?" This excerpt from Science for All Americans (J. James Rutherford and Andres Ahlgren, 1990. American Association for the Advancement of Science) describes the key elements of cost-benefit analysis: Rarely are technology-related issues simple and one-sided. Relevant technical facts alone, even when known and available (which often they are not), usually do not settle matters entirely in favor of one side or the other. The chances of reaching good personal or collective decisions about technology depend on having information that neither enthusiasts nor skeptics are always ready to volunteer. The long-term interests of society are best served, therefore, by having processes for ensuring that key questions concerning proposals to curtail or introduce technology are raised and that as much relevant knowledge as possible is brought to bear on them. Considering these questions does not ensure that the best decision will always be made, but the failure to raise key questions will almost certainly result in poor decisions. The key questions concerning any proposed new technology should include the following: 1. What are alternative ways to accomplish the same ends? 2. What advantages and disadvantages are there to the alternatives? 3. What trade-offs would be necessary between positive and negative side effects of each? 4. Who are the main beneficiaries? 5. Who will receive few or no benefits? 6. Who will suffer as a result of the proposed new technology? 77 7. How long will the benefits last? 8. Will the technology have other applications? Whom will they benefit? 9. What will the proposed new technology cost to build and operate? How does that compare to the cost of alternatives? 10. Will people other than the beneficiaries have to hear the costs? 11. Who should underwrite the development costs of a proposed new technology? 12. How will the costs change over time? 13. What will the social costs be? 14. What risks are associated with the proposed new technology? 15. What risks are associated with not using it? 16. Who will be in greatest danger? 17. What risk will the technology present to other species of life and to the environment? 18. In the worst possible case, what trouble could it cause? Who would be held responsible? How could the trouble be undone or limited? 19. What people, materials, tools, knowledge, and know-how will be needed to build, install, and operate the proposed new technology? Are they available? if not, how will they be obtained, and from where? 20. What energy sources will be needed for construction or manufacture, and also for operation? 21. What resources will be needed to maintain, update, and repair the new technology? 22. What will be done to dispose safely of the new technology's waste materials? 23. As it becomes obsolete or worn out, how will the technology be replaced? 24. What will become of the material of which it was made and the people whose jobs depended on it? Individual citizens may seldom be in a position to ask or demand answers for these questions on a public level, but their knowledge of the relevance and importance of answers increases the attention given to the questions by private enterprise, interest groups, and public officials. Furthermore, individuals may ask the same questions with regard to their own use of technology (e.g., their own use of efficient household appliances, of substances that contribute to pollution, of foods and fabrics). The cumulative effect of individual decisions can have as great an impact on the large scale use of technology as pressure on public decisions can. Not all such questions can be answered readily. Most technological decisions have to be made on the basis of incomplete in-formation, and political factors are likely to have as much influence as technical ones, and sometimes more. But scientists, mathematicians, and engineers have a special role in looking as far ahead and as far afield as is practical to estimate benefits, side effects, and risks. They can also assist by designing adequate detection devices and monitoring techniques, and by setting up procedures for the collection and statistical analysis of relevant data. Assumptions The economic approach assumes that costs and benefits can be accurately estimated and agreed upon by all. It assumes that costs and benefits can be measured in economic terms using a common denominator (i.e., money). Also, it assumes that all potential costs and benefits have been anticipated and integrated within the cost/benefit analysis. The economic approach assumes a rational actor; that is, someone who acts entirely upon estimated utilitarian costs and benefits and who has full knowledge of these costs and benefits. Strengths and Limitations Evaluating risk as a function of costs and benefits provides a universally understood basis 78 for technology assessment. But realizing the potential usefulness of the economic approach entails overcoming some important limitations: 1. Cost benefit analysis relies upon estimated costs and benefits, which are subject to the types of observation and measurement errors of technical risk assessments. 2. Costs and benefits do not necessarily accrue at the same time. Benefits might lag behind costs or costs might lag behind benefits. 3. It is difficult to place issues of social welfare and perceptions of equity and fairness in terms amenable to cost/benefit analysis. 4. The assumption of a rational actor rarely holds true in practice. People take into account other issues besides utilitarian ones in making decisions about complex and controversial technologies. 5. The reliance upon utilitarian contractual exchange poses potential ethical problems for a society. Utilitarian contractual exchange would bring about a situation where the poorest communities would bargain for the most risk (i.e., exchanging risk for cash), meaning that the poorest members of society would bear the most cost for potentially hazardous technologies. 6. It can be difficult to include in cost-benefit analysis all favorable and unfavorable externalities (i.e., costs and benefits not immediately recognized in the initial evaluation of a technology). Examples of Use Cost-benefit analysis provides a valuable tool for understanding what is exchanged for technology risk. By weighing potential benefits against estimated risks, the public is provided with the information needed for rational decision making regarding the level of risk they are willing to tolerate in exchange for potential payoffs from a technology. This brief paper published by Health and Safety Executive provides a template for cost-benefit analysis of safety measures: Cost Benefit Analysis Checklist. Application in Context What is the cost-benefit analysis of food irradiation? This is the most recent information available on the web regarding retail sales of irradiated food: 1. On May 16, 2000, Huisken Meats (now, Branding Iron), based in Minneapolis, MN, began the first commercial market testing of irradiated food (i.e., frozen beef patties). This initial rollout to 84 groceries quickly expanded to hundreds of stores in Minnesota and other states. 2. On July 31, 2000, Hawaii Pride began shipping irradiated fruit products to the mainland United States. In May, 1999, 3. The SureBeam Corporation, a division of Titan Corporation, opened its first irradiation facility. One year later, in cooperation with Huisken Meats, it was shipping irradiated ground beef patties to thousands of groceries in 32 states. By January of 2004, however, SureBeam was out of business due to poor demand for irradiated food (see related article). 79 All technology should be assumed guilty until proven innocent. David Brower Introduction Technical and economic approaches assume that risk assessments represent rational responses to the objective facts of the technology. As noted earlier, these assumptions cannot be met in practice. The approaches nevertheless assume that assessments are as rational as can be achieved. They rely upon either expected values or utility. The psychological approach notes that subjective, or emotional, elements affect risk assessments. That is, some aspects of technology seem more threatening than others, depending upon human resonses to them. The Psychological Approach Characteristics Risk is measured as subjective utility. Subjective utility takes into account not only assessments of technical hazard (i.e., estimated physical harm), but also outrage, (i.e., emotional reactions to estimates of technical hazard). The approach focuses on personal preferences rather than "objectively defined" probabilities and attempts not to define hazard but explain why people are willing to accept some risks and not others. More detail on outrage factors is outlined in a later section of Soc 415. Assumptions The psychological approach assumes that subjective utilities are adequately recognized by the actor and that these assessments are rationally applied to intentions and behavior. Hence, it assumes that behavior follows from perceptions, even if perceptions are not necessarily based upon technical assessments of hazard but reflect instead emotional reactions to estimated hazard. Strengths and Limitations This approach recognizes that emotions guide risk assessments as much as do rational decisions about probability of harm and the balance of utilitarian costs and benefits. It brings people and their emotions into the risk assessment process. It is difficult, however, to translate emotional reactions into public risk policy. Should public policy be altered because people fear a technology that technical experts deem to be low risk? The theoretical model depicted in this diagram provide an example of the psychological approach to understanding public responses to technology. Examples of Use Knowing public outrage related to a technology can help in the design of risk communication strategies and message content. Psychological research has identified twelve key attributes of technologies that affect emotional responses to them: 1. Voluntary/Coerced. Risks we take upon ourselves create less outrage than those forced upon us. 2. Natural/Industrial. Natural risks are viewed with less emotional response than risks 80 created by human actions. 3. Familiar/Unfamiliar. Things familiar are considered less risky than the unfamiliar. 4. Memorable/Not Memorable. Linking technologies to highly memorable tragedies makes them seem more risky. 5. Not Dreaded/Dreaded. Linking technologies to dreaded events (i.e., cancer) makes them seem more risky. 6. Chronic/Catastrophic. Risks we face everyday create less outrage than the catastrophic event. 7. Knowable/Unknowable. People tend to fear the unknown. Opponents of a new technology can always use this outrage factor to their advantage because, de facto, using new technologies involves uncertainties. 8. Control/Not in Control. We feel safer when we have the ability to regulate the use of a technology. 9. Fair/Unfair. People will become more outraged about a technology if they think they must bear more costs or fewer benefits than do others. 10. Morally Irrelevant/Relevant. Linking the use of a technology with immoral motives creates outrage. Linking it with moral standards lessens outrage. 11. Trustworthy/Untrustworthy. Trust in the experts who develop or endorse a new technology might be the most important factor influencing outrage. 12. Responsive/Unresponsive. Outrage is reduced when persons/organizations responsible for the development or regulation of a new technology seem responsive to public concerns. Knowing the key determinants of public outrage related to a technology can help change agents design risk communication strategies and message content. In the section on Risk Communication we will learn many important guidelines for communicating to an outraged public about complex and controversial technology. Application in Context What are psychological perspectives on food irradiation? Opinion polls generally show that most consumers are concerned about food safety and consider irradiation to be a safe process. Few opinion polls, however, inform respondents of the concerns raised by its opponents. From the psychological perspective, one would assume that hearing negative information would yield unfavorable opinions of food irradiation. And the results of polls that include statements from opponents show this shift toward negative evaluations of food irradiation. Example of the Psychological Approach Trust, Emotion, Sex, Politics, and Science: Surveying the Risk-Assessment Battlefield Paul Slovic: Risk Analysis, vol. 19(4) 1999. Full text article. Slovic asserts that risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. He expresses concerns that controversy and conflict might have become too pervasive. It might be that the quality of society erodes with too contentious public discourse about technology policy. The irony, he states, is that at the same time our nation has expended considerable resources to make life safer, many persons have become more, not less, concerned about risk. To understand this phenomenon, Slovic describes the nature of risk assessment and its 81 relationship to public perceptions. He distinguishes between hazard--technical assessment of potential physical harm--and risk--socially constructed perceptions of risk. [Earlier, we said that Risk = Hazard (technical assessment) + Outrage (emotional assessment). Here, Slovic is saying that Risk is the socially constructed sum of hazard and public perceptions. Thus the two perspectives are very similar.] Slovic states that assessments of danger, both by technicians and the public, are influenced by political, economic, cultural, and other social factors. Importantly, it is definitions of risk that affect risk policy--defining risk is an exercise in power. Thus, risk controversies are not about science versus misguided public perceptions of science, wherein the unwashed public needs to be educated about "real" risks. Rather, risk controversies are struggles over whom will define risk. The public cannot be labeled as irrational because their judgments about risk are influenced by emotion. The viewpoints of scientists also are influenced by emotion, politics, economics, and so forth. Technology policy discourse, therefore, is not about whom is correct about assessment of danger, but whose assumptions about political, social, and economic conditions win out in the risk assessment battlefield. Thus, danger is real, but risk is socially constructed. Scientific literacy and public education are important, therefore, but they are not central to risk controversies. Slovic raises concerns about how disparities between "real" and "perceived" risk might engender public discourse that, itself, is a risk to the social fabric of society. Trust is a critical factor in risk assessment and management. Social relationships of all kinds, notes Slovic, are strongly influenced by trust. Unfortunately, trust is fragile. Slovic states that the limitations of risk science, the importance and difficulty of maintaining trust, and the complex, sociopolitical nature of risk point to the need for a new approach to risk assessment--one that focuses upon introducing more public participation into both risk assessments and risk decision-making to make the decision process more democratic, improve the relevance and quality of technical analysis, and increase the legitimacy and public acceptance of the resulting decisions. Slovic argues that the system destroys trust. The pervasiveness of media attention to technology and risk assessments destroys trust because most of what the media reports is trust-destroying news. Also, powerful special interest groups find access to the media. Slovic states that the young science of risk assessment cannot prevail against the level and intensity of assaults against it. Slovic thereby argues that whoever controls the definition of risk controls technology policy. In contrast to others who note also the seemingly disproportionate effect of negative citizen opinion upon risk assessment, Slovic states that more, not less, citizen involvement is needed to adequately manage risk. It seems like Slovic is not comfortable with technology policy formed through contentious debate between scientific experts and special interest groups and therefore urges more widespread involvement in risk management by the public. 82 That great, growling engine of change -- technology. Alvin Toffler, Future Shock, 1970 The Sociological Approach Technical, economic, and psychological approaches emphasize individual-level decision making, whether in the quantification of the potential for technology failure, the rational assessment of costs and benefits, or the emotional response to a technology. The sociological approach emphasizes the socially constructed nature of risk. Characteristics It is recognized that risk perceptions reflect negotiated meanings through interaction with others. Renn classifies sociological approaches to risk using two dimensions: 1. Individual versus structural, and 2. Objective versus constructivist. Structural assessments emphasize the importance of societal definitions of risk rather than the processes by which risk evaluations are formulated. Individual approaches focus on how socially constructed risk is achieved through human interaction. Objective approaches are positivist in considering risks as observable and real whereas constructivist approaches think of risk as social artifacts fabricated from social interaction. Dr. Sapp prefers the taxonomy presented in the Course Description, wherein sociological studies are classified according to their emphasis on: 1. Social structure and functioning, 2. Critical theory, or 3. Human agency. Whatever the classification system used, the critical element of the sociological perspective is that humans, through their interactions with one another, create expectations that influence public decision making regarding complex and controversial technology. Assumptions The assumptions of the sociological approach are that humans behave differently in groups than they would as individuals, that normative expectations are formed through human interaction, and that these expectations influence risk evaluations. Strengths and Limitations The sociological approach can be used to understand and influence the social construction of risk. By understanding fundamental properties of human collectivities (e.g., collectivities have prestige hierarchies and normative expectations for behavior) one can gain an understanding of the process of public decision making and exert some influence upon public decisions. Much more description of the sociological approach and its strengths and limitations is provided in the sections on the Diffusion of Innovations. Examples of Use Because sociological studies on risk are undertaken from three different paradigms, 83 examples of their use vary widely. In Soc 415, we will emphasize principles of human agency to focus on understanding and influencing the behavior of rational actors in their risk decisions. Social mobilization theory, as one example of the structure-function paradigm, examines the circumstances under which individuals are motivated to actively promote or oppose certain technologies. Also as examples of the structure-function paradigm, organization theory investigates organizational change that occurs in response to the adoption of new technologies and systems theory examines how institutions affect and are affected by technological adoption. The critical paradigm motivates studies on the distribution of risk and the control of technology development and dissemination by the powerful elite. The human agency paradigm investigates how interaction with others influences consumers' opinions about complex and controversial technologies. Application in Context How do social factors affect opinions of food irradiation? At the same time that Huisken Meats began their market testing of irradiated beef patties in Minneapolis, MN, sociologists at Iowa State University began tracking consumer opinions in a study of how human agency affects adoption of food irradiation. Although much research has been conducted on human agency over the past 35 years, few opportunities have arisen where researchers were able to track opinions over time beginning at the introduction of a controversial technology. As anticipated from theories of human agency, initial public skepticism toward irradiated food shifted toward acceptance over time. This shift was influenced most strongly by endorsements of respected people/organizations. Unit Three discusses this "diffusion effect" in more detail. Examples of the Sociological Approach Contemporary philosophy focuses as much on the social construction of risk assessment, management, and communication as classifying technology as good, bad, or indifferent. The central issues addressed relate to citizen involvement--or lack of involvement--in technology policy making. Contemporary viewpoints acknowledge improvements in living conditions brought about by advances in technology while noting that the manner in which risk is defined and by whom strongly affects technology policy. This section reviews viewpoints offered by Ulrich Beck, Michael Bell and Diane Mayerfeld, and William Freudenburg on relationships among risk, power, and democracy. The Risk Society Ulrich Beck, in Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity, expands upon the solution offered by Habermas to the critical philosophy of technology. Beck challenges our understandings of modernity, science, and technology and, in so doing, helps us recognize the need for new conceptions of these endeavors and our place in a society characterized not by relations of production, but by relations of risk. That is, Beck thinks the focal point of science and technology policies should be the effects of technology on the welfare of all citizens, not on the benefits enjoyed by a few citizens. The Introduction to Risk Society, written by Scott Lash and Brian Wynne, provides a good review of Beck's viewpoints. This Introduction is summarized here. 84 Philosophers and social scientists long have sought to develop approaches for maximizing the use of beneficial technology while avoiding its negative consequences. Beck asserts that the dominant perspectives reflect scientism--the culture of science--which excludes non-rational forms of discourse and argument. Thus, arguments not endorsed by officially sponsored scientific or governmental agencies, or those put forth by external agencies, such as consumer advocacy groups, are considered non-rational if they challenge assumptions of the status quo. Public skepticism is treated as non-rational and thus is not considered to be of sufficient importance to be taken seriously except as a barrier to scientific and technological progress. In the politics of technology evaluation even social scientific explanations of risk can be relegated to reflect merely the inaccurate perceptions of a misinformed public. As stated by Lash and Wynne, "technical experts are given pole position to define agendas and impose bounding premises a priori on risk discourses." Beck argues for a new paradigm of risk evaluation, one that recognizes the benefits of technology development, but at the same time recognizes the many different and equally legitimate ways that technology can be rationally evaluated. This reflexive modernization, in contrast with traditional modernization, seeks to understand technology in practice--the unintended, unavoidable, and undesirable consequences of technology adoption--and the necessary and beneficial aspects of socially constructed risk assessments on technology development and use. General Principles of Reflexive Modernization 1. Physical risks always are created and effected in social systems, for example by organizations and institutions that are supposed to manage and control the risky activity. 2. The magnitude of the physical risks is therefore a direct function of the quality of social relations and processes. 3. The primary risk, even for the most technically intensive activities, is therefore that of the public's social dependency upon institutions and actors who might not have their best interests in mind. The Rationalization of Risk Michael Bell and Diane Mayerfeld (full text article) express concerns about how the language employed by experts to convey risk to the public can be used to manipulate rather than inform. They argue that what is different about the worries of the present day is neither the number of hazards we face nor the degree of uncertainty we feel about our lives, but rather it is the language we use to think and talk about them. They note that the language of risk can be used to explain uncertainty; but it also can be used to explain it away. Bell and Mayerfeld suggest that the language of risk as it is being used today has some strikingly undemocratic implications and strongly urge greater caution in its use by social scientists and policy makers. Bell and Mayerfeld disagree that our times are more risky than the times of our ancestors. Their observations are that: We live in a time of much risk; but so have others before us. People always have sought for some sense of control over uncertainties. What is changed is not the amount of risk, but control over the language of risk. Historically, risk definition has fallen primarily to technicians with the expertise to understand the technical aspects of material innovations. But it should be recognized that evaluations of risk are subjective, not objective. Therefore control over the manner in which risk is defined and assessed is critical to risk management and communication. 85 Quantitative risk estimates are precise, but often are not accurate because they rely upon a whole series of assumptions, guesses, and extrapolations that limit their accuracy. Estimated risks often do not account for multiple hazards that occur in conjunction with one another in complex technological systems. For example, we might estimate the risk of pesticides A and B, but often we do not estimate the risk of pesticide A in combination with pesticide B. Numbers often carry disproportionate effect in technological assessments of risk. Risk assessments often falsely homogenize populations. That is, the risk for a child might be different than the risk for an adult. Given the limitations of risk assessment, control over risk definitions and strategic communication with the public become central to risk management: Because people are aware of the limitations of quantitative risk assessment, they tend to respond with skepticism to these assessments, even though they tend to trust science and science-based organizations. The field of risk communication arose in response to this form of "illogical" reasoning by the public. Most risk communication efforts begin with the premise that scientific experts know actual risk and the skeptical public, out of ignorance or irrational fear or both, misperceives actual risk. The goal of risk communication, therefore, is to educate the public for the purpose of removing their irrational fears. A central assumption of this approach is that experts favor the technology being discussed and non-experts (i.e., the public) opposes the technology. "In its most extreme form, manipulative risk communication results in legal maneuvering to withhold information from the public altogether." "In short, risk communication is infected with a contempt for the public, which perpetuates its undemocratic bias and also ensures the continued failure of risk communication efforts." If control over language strongly affects risk management, then advanced procedures must be developed for interacting with the public about technology and risk: "Risk is a far from neutral language. Rather than representing interest-free rationality, nameless knowledge that applies to everyone, risk represents the deeply interested knowledge of those who are able to command it." People are becoming more aware of how power relationships influence risk. "The reaction against risk represents democracy, not the hysteria of the ill-informed." Risk assessments often falsely divide the population into those affected and those unaffected. Humanist viewpoints consider all to be affected when some are affected. If control over language is critical to risk assessment and management, then citizens need to be become aware of risk assessment procedures and risk communication techniques used to convey information about technologies to them. The tenets of the critical philosophy alert us to the need to become aware also of how power relationships can affect risk assessment and communication. Beck argues that technology advancement occurs so rapidly that our institutions cannot keep up, leading to a "risk society." To Beck, new hazards have led to new critiques of technology. Bell and Mayerfeld believe that we have no more hazards or worry about hazards than we had before. Instead, we have a growth of new language for debating about hazards and greater public interest in discussing potential hazards related to technology development. "The real uncertainty at stake in the language of risk is the relationship between power and democracy." 86 Recreancy and Societal Institutions William Freudenburg (full text article) points out that the earliest discussions of risk were framed almost exclusively in terms chosen by engineers. Within the technical community, two explanations typically are given for public reactions to what the technicians deem to be objectively defined risk. The first is that the public is ignorant and/or irrational. From this definition of the situation, policy focuses on education of the ignorant and easily manipulated public. The second explanation, associated more with economists, is that public reactions represent economically rational, although understandably selfish, responses to risk. From this view, policy focuses on providing adequate compensation for risks endured. The problem with the first view is that technical definitions of objective risk are not always precise (see Technical Risk Assessment) and always are influenced by social and cultural factors. The problem with the economic approach is defining adequate compensation. Events vary in the amount of outrage they create and it is difficult to assign monetary value to risk and negative health outcomes. Increasingly, the findings from empirical studies are providing paradoxical with respect to the individualistic theoretical perspectives that have predominated in the past. Research shows that differences in risk perceptions cannot be attributed to differences in information levels, but are attributed more to differences in cultural outlooks and personal values. Freudenburg notes that with increasing complexity of technological innovations and societal division of labor people find themselves in a position of not knowing much about highly complex and potentially dangerous technologies. They therefore must rely upon their judgments about whom to trust. Like Slovic, Freudenburg is aware that: the public is not irrational in their skepticism about complex technologies, but rather cautious in deciding whom to trust in their understandable state of ignorance about these technologies, the public and scientists rely upon social as well as technical criteria to evaluate risk, claims that the public is irrational in part are responsible for increasingly contentious debate about complex technologies, some special interest groups profit from fear mongering within this atmosphere of ignorance and fragile trust, the media have a difficult job of presenting varying viewpoints on technical issues. Freudenburg wants to look at societal not individualist explanations for this pervasive problem because contentious public debate can: delay implementation of valuable technologies, hasten implementation of undesirable technologies, and create public discourse that in itself might be harmful to the social fabric of society. Freudenburg uses the term recreancy, which means institutional failure resulting either from lack of competence and/or fiduciary responsibility, to refer to societal-level inadequacies in risk assessment, management, and communication. Recreancy does not necessarily result from "villainy," but instead comes about from inadequate societal-level definitions of risk, procedures for evaluating risk, risk management practices, and poor risk communication techniques. In other words, it is societal structure and functioning that is inadequate, not familiarity with technology or irrational thinking, in bringing about wise technology development and policy. Freudenburg offers suggestions for improving societal-level capacity in risk assessment, management, and communication: 1. Assess the level of recreancy in American society, 2. Become more aware of societal-level influences on risk assessment, management, 87 and communication, 3. Build institutional capacity to facilitate wise technology policymaking. Summary Beck thinks that because society has become more risky, citizens need to become more involved in the process of risk assessment and management. Bell and Mayerfeld, on the other hand, think that the world is no more risky than it has been before, but that control over the language of risk, which strongly affects technology assessment and management, has become more advanced and therefore in need of more careful scrutiny by the public. Freudenburg focuses on organic social solidarity--the trust citizens place in societal institutions to behave with competence (i.e., skills, expertise, experience) and fiduciary responsibility (i.e., honesty, integrity). Each perspective highlights characteristics of society that must be addressed in understanding the sociology of technology. Given the emphasis of this course on human agency, we will direct most of our attention to techniques of gaining adoption of technologies considered to be mainly beneficial. The approach we will rely upon is "diffusion of innovations." This approach will be described in detail in the final section of the course. Application in Context How does the language of risk affect your perceptions of technology? The first four links presented on the Sampler web site regarding genetic engineering present this technology in a favorable manner, while the last four links present concerns about and objections to it. Skim through these materials again looking for key terms, use of language, or the context in which arguments are presented to investigate how the language of risk is used to sway opinion. What are some key terms or phrases advocates use to make genetic modification of food seem like a good idea? What key terms or phrases do opponents use to make this technology seem like a bad idea? 88 Nobody believes the official spokesman... but everybody trusts an unidentified source. Ron Nesen Introduction Democratically governed nations require that citizens fulfill their twofold responsibility to challenge institutions so that they might adapt to ever changing social and environmental changes and support institutions so they might serve the needs of the people. Thus, to some extent societal institutions at the same time must be trusted and not trusted. This presentation focuses upon the determinants of trust in societal institutions. Compass Key Questions What are the key determinants that affect public trust in societal institutions? Examples What are the key characteristics of societal institutions that make them trustworthy? To what extent do citizens use formal and substantive rationality when evaluating societal institutions? Are expressions of substantive rationality conducive to deliberative social policy formation? Recreancy, Rationality, Trust, and Public Policy The attached paper describes the roles of citizens, the responsibilities of societal institutions, and the key factors affecting public trust in societal institutions. It describes formal and substantive rationality and the effects of these two forms of rational decision making on the quality of social policy formation. Consumer Trust in the U.S. Food System: Expressions of Formal and Substantive Rationality Within the Recrancy Theorem. 89 It has been said that democracy is the worst form of government except all the others that have been tried. Sir Winston Churchill Introduction The anthropological approach to risk assessment focuses upon the extent to which underlying value-orientations affect individuals' perceptions of risk. This approach, most closely associated with the work of Mary Douglas and Aaron Wildavsky, posits that cultural ways of life can be classified along two dimensions, termed "group" and "grid." A "high group" dimension emphasizes the importance of collective sentiments. A "high grid" dimension emphasizes the importance of a highly structured society. When considered as complements to one another, these dimensions imply four value-orientations. A high-group, high-grid orientation emphasizes strong collective control over society, with a focus on hierarchy. A high-group, low-grid orientation emphasizes collective control through individualized actions, with a focus on egalitarianism. A low-group, high-grid orientation emphasizes the individual within a hierarchical structure, with a focus on fatalism. And a low-group, low-grid orientation emphasizes the individual with little need for hierarchy, with a focus on individualism. This chart depicts the culture cognition approach to defining value orientations. The anthropological approach to risk assessment is to understand how individuals' value orientations affect their perceptions of risk. An egalitarian, for example, might perceive little risk in society recognizing same-sex marriages, whereas a persons with a value-orientation of hierarchy might be very concerned about society adopting such a policy. The anthropological approach to social change is for change agents to attempt to bridge value-orientations so as to capture consent for change from the majority of persons. For example, one approach to reconciling differences of opinions among those who want greater collective control over environmental pollutants and those who prefer an individualized approach is to create a system of "carbon credits (Sarah Ploss: Introduction to Carbon Credits) that can be bought and sold as commodities, thereby satisfying the value orientation of the individualists, but collectively act to reduce carbon emissions. No person can become an expert on all topics, but all citizens within a democracy can influence social policy. And the public typically desires to exert much influence upon public policy even when they have little understanding of complex and controversial innovations. The question becomes, To what extent should ordinary citizens influence social policy related to the use and regulation of advanced technologies about which they have little 90 understanding? Compass Key Questions To what extent and in what manner should the opinions of the public be incorporated within the formation of social policies designed to regulate complex technologies? Examples Why should a technologically advanced society give much credence to the opinions of a largely ignorant public? Should? How do social institutions and public policies affect science and technology? Is the American public sufficiently informed about science and technology to make a valuable contribution to technology policy? To what extent should people's values be taken into consideration in forming social policy related to advanced technologies? Debate Regarding the Role of Citizen Input Into Technology Policy Cass R. Sunstein, Director of the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs under President Obama, argues that advanced societies are too strongly influenced by "laws of fears," that is, regulations that ignore sound scientific evidence in favor of misinformed and misguided public opinions. Mr. Sunstein believes that public policy should be guided by values, but not by the blunders of ordinary people. In contrast, Dan Kahan and colleagues argue that social policy formation should pay greater attention to the value-orientations of the public. Please read the papers shown below and be prepared in class to discuss the extent to which the public's value-orientations should be included when forming regulatory policies regarding advanced technologies. Kahan, Dan M., Paul Slovic, Donald Braman, and John Gastil, Fear of Democracy: A Cultural Evaluation of Sunstein on Risk. Sunstein, Cass R., Misfearing: A Reply. Kahan, Dan M., and Paul Slovic, Cultural Evaluation of Risk: 'Values' or 'Blunders'? 91 For a list of all the ways technology has failed to improve the quality of life, please press three. Alice Kahn Introduction Link to PowerPoint presentation regarding Globalization. Several of the readings in this section refer to globalization. In simple terms, globalization is the development of rules by nations to govern international trade for the purpose of increased efficiency in the production and distribution of goods and services. Rules for trade are developed and enforced by organizations such as the World Trade Organization (WTO), a governing body representing a consortium of 153 nations. The proposed benefits of globalization are: 1) increases in economic productivity achieved through efficient resource allocation, and 2) greater political stability achieved through economic interdependence. Hence, it is assumed that if nations become economically interdependent, they will be less likely to wage war upon one another or tolerate political instability at home. According to some sources, it was the desire to achieve political stability in post-WWII Europe that most influenced the development of the European Union, the first large-scale cooperative economic arrangement among Western, industrialized nations. Principle of Comparative Advantage To understand the economic motivation for globalization, it is important to understand the principle of comparative advantage. This principle, attributed to David Ricardo (1772 1823), posits that nations can be most productive through specialization in areas where they have a ratio advantage, relative to other nations, in the production of a good or service. Consider this often used example. Two nations--England and Portugal--produce two commodities--wheat and wine. The cost per unit in labor hours to produce wheat is 15 hours in England and 10 hours in Portugal. The cost per unit in labor hours to produce wine is 30 hours in England and 15 hours in Portugal. Thus, Portugal has an absolute advantage in labor hours to produce both wheat and wine. But, Portugal has a relatively better ratio at producing wine and England has a relatively better ratio at producing wheat. That is, the ratio of producing wheat to wine in Portuagal is 2/3 whereas the ratio of producing wheat to wine in England is only 1/2. So, even though Portugal has an absolute advantage at producing both wheat and wine, Portugal has a comparative advantage in the production of wine and England has a comparative advantage in the production of wheat. How can these comparative advantages be used to improve the total production of wheat and wine? Suppose England has 270 total labor hours at its disposal and Portugal has 180 hours of labor at its disposal (i.e., "labor hours" encompasses size of labor force and technical capacity). Suppose, before trade, that England produces and consumes 8 units of wheat (at 15 hours/unit = 120 hours) and 5 units of wine (at 30 hours/unit = 150 hours) and Portugal produces and consumes 9 units of wheat (at 10 hours/unit = 90 hours) and 6 units of wine (at 15 hours/unit = 90 hours). The total production of wheat equals 17 units and the total production of wine equals 11 units. Now, suppose England specializes in wheat production 92 and Portugal specializes in wine production. England can produce 18 units of wheat (at 15 hours/unit = 270 hours) and Portugal can produce 12 units of wine (at 15 hours/unit = 180 hours). Note that total production of both wheat and wine have increased by one unit! Through specialization and trade, England and Portugal, taking advantage of their comparative advantage, can increase total production of both wheat and wine. This principle assumes: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. no transport costs, constant costs and no economies of scale, just two countries producing these goods, traded goods are interchangeable, factors of production are perfectly mobile, perfect knowledge, so that all buyers and sellers know where the cheapest goods can be found internationally, and 7. no tariffs or other trade barriers (i.e., perceived restrictions on trade). Obviously, world trade is considerably more complicated than the exchange of two goods between two countries. But taken to a global scale, in theory the principle of comparative advantage should increase productivity for all. The restrictions implied by the first six assumptions listed above presumably can be overcome with trade volume and relatively standard practices of production, transportation, and monetary exchange. If transportation costs are small relative to the volume of trade, for example, then they will not hinder the benefits of globalization. The key factor that makes this system work is assumption number 7: no tariffs or other trade barriers. The objective of governing bodies such as the WTO, therefore, is to reduce trade barriers as much as possible to optimize the free flow of goods and services worldwide. Thus, nations, working in groups or as single units, usually informed and pressured by multinational corporations, actively pursue restriction of trade barriers within the WTO. Concerns About Globalization Much has been written about the possible negative consequences of globalization. Some of the key concerns are summarized below. Economic Leakage Economic leakage refers to the movement of profit margins from primary, to secondary, to tertiary markets. Primary markets are oriented mainly toward the production of raw commodities (e.g., food commodities, such as corn, wheat, soybeans; mined goods, such as raw ore and minerals). Secondary markets focus mainly upon the further processing of raw commodities (e.g., corn syrup, bread, soy-based oil products, steel, cut minerals). Tertiary markets specialize in facilitating production and trade by providing financing, access to markets, and access to information about markets (e.g., the Chicago Mercantile Exchange, the NYSE, Citibank). Typically, profit margin increases as goods move from primary to secondary to tertiary markets. Thus, a nation whose economy focuses almost exclusively upon primary commodity production will experience "economic leakage" of potential profits to nations involved in secondary and tertiary markets because it is not involved in these more lucrative ventures. Perpetual Status A concern expressed about the WTO and other organizations that govern international 93 trade is that nations involved in primary commodity production will find it very difficult to develop secondary or tertiary markets. Suppose, for example, that Nation A, which is involved mainly in primary commodity production, wants to build an industry that can further develop its raw commodities. Such industrial development requires much investment of capital. Thus, Nation A might want to provide over the short run government subsidies to help the new industry bear the burden of start-up costs and operating losses until it can become efficient enough to compete in world markets. Such subsidies would be considered illegal under current and proposed WTO rules. Nations not yet developed enough to enjoy the increased profit margins of secondary and tertiary markets might never be able to do so under WTO regulation. Environmental Degradation Another concern expressed about globalization is that nations wishing to establish laws to protect their environmental quality might not be able to do so under WTO regulations. Consider a case in 1996 when Venezuela brought a claim against the United States alleging that the U.S. Clean Air Act unfairly discriminated against Venezuela gas exports to the US because the act required foreign gasoline sold in the US to be no more contaminated than the average level of contaminants in US gas. The WTO ruled in favor of Venezuela. So, the US rewrote the Clean Air Act to allow both domestic and foreign gas producers to produce more contaminated gas. In another WTO ruling, Japan was forced to lift its import ban on certain fruits that might bear dangerous insects, even though to get rid of those insects Japan needed to use harmful pesticides. Thus, in principle, any action taken by any country to protect its environment that might be perceived as restricting free trade can be overturned by the WTO. Research on the Effects of Globalization The articles linked below summarize key research findings regarding relationships between globalization and wages, income inequality, and social mobility of nation states. Research indicates that Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) tends to increase wage levels and reduce poverty in both developing and developed nations. For developing countries, FDI tends to increase income inequalities in the short run but decrease income inequalities with greater investment over time. For developed countries, FDI tends to decrease income inequalities. Income inqualities among the richest and poorest nations seems to be decreasing. Matthew Slaughter and Phillip Swagel: Does Globalization Lower Wages and Export Jobs? Gary Clyde Hufbauer: Globalization Facts and Consequences. Almas Heshmati: The Relationship Between Income Inequality and Globalization. Glenn Firebaugh and Brian Goesling: Accounting for the Recent Decline in Global Income Inequality. Robert Hunter Wade: Income Inequality and Globalization: Comment on Firebaugh and Goesling. It can be difficult to determine the extent to which changes in wages, income inquality, and social mobility reflect globalization or technological advancements, which themselves result in part from globalization. The research indicates that, overall, globalization seems to be improving the economies of both the developed and developing nations. 94 Technology is a blessing wrapped in a curse; it can carry you far, but it can drop you hard, and in a New York minute. Paul Quinnett, Darwin's Bass, 1996. Introduction How does a society evaluate and regulate risks associated with technology? K.S. ShraderFrechette, in her book, Risk and Rationality: Philosophical Foundations for Populist Reforms, provides some workable principles for societies to use in their efforts at risk management. Compass Key Questions What are some pragmatic and ethical approaches for the public to take in evaluating risk and setting technology policy? Examples What procedures should be used to mediate dilemmas of risk assessment regarding the sampler technologies? Are opponents of the sampler technologies reasonable in their objections? How much should public policy reflect objections of opposition groups? Is the public adequately protected against unethical practices in the development and dissemination of the sampler technologies? What should be the role of the government in protecting consumers from the sampler technologies? Risk Perceptions and Public Policy Shrader-Frechette seeks workable solutions for wise public policy formation. She describes the dilemmas faced in risk assessment, controversies that arise in public debate about risk, and unethical technology policies and then suggests guidelines for good technology policy formation. Five Dilemmas of Risk Assessment Public policy is formulated within the context of risk perceptions, which, in turn, reflect the public's opinions of the quality of risk assessment. Risk assessors must estimate as closely as possible the potential hazards of new technology. Their assessments are evaluated by a public that desires that social and ethical as well as technical criteria be used in making risk 95 assessments. Risk assessors and the public then face dilemmas in their attempts to balance technical evaluations with the public's desires for nontechnical input into risk assessment. 1. The Fact-Value Dilemma: Risk evaluations cannot be both wholly factual/scientific and wholly sanctioned via democratic processes because lay persons want ethical/moral considerations to be taken into account. 2. The Standardization Dilemma Risk assessors seek standardization of evaluation criteria to avoid the appearance of arbitrariness. But local groups want them to take into account their special conditions. 3. The Contributors Dilemma Risk assessment can be costly to undertake. Thus, many potential hazards are not examined. In addition, aggregate effects of subthreashold levels of risk often go untested. Pesticides A and B might be considered safe, for example, but are these pesticides safe when they both are applied to the same crop? 4. The De Minimis Dilemma How safe is safe enough? Declaring a threshold level at which to define negligible risk is a difficult task when citizens hold different expectations of safety. 5. The Consent Dilemma Persons most affected by risk are sometimes those persons least able to give consent. Persons who lack the economic means and political access to challenge public policy might also be the ones who bear most of the burden of potential hazards. Of course, no perfect solution exists to resolve these dilemmas. Shrader-Frechette's interest is in bringing these contradictions to light so the public can openly discuss competing agendas as part of the policy making process. Attacks on the Public's Aversion to Risk When the public does not accept the risk definitions of technical experts, experts typically blame the public for their reluctance to adopt the innovation. Shrader-Frechette reviews some of the accusations directed at a skeptical public delivered by technical experts and a counterpoint to each accusation. 1. The public is anti-technology: The public engages in irrational witch hunts against new technologies. The public has inconsistent fears of technology. Opponents are motivated by sectarian, antitechnology sentiment, choose to be panic struck about imagined dangers from technology rather than real threats to the economy or education. They serve their own moral purpose by attacking new technologies. Counterargument: It is not irrational to question the efficacy of new technologies that have come under criticism. Imagine yourself walking a well-trusted path through the woods, a path you have taken many times before. You hear a rustle in the leaves at your feet. Do you investigate the source of the sound? Of course you do. Our species would not have survived on Earth this long if we were not genetically hard wired to be skeptical. Thus, challenging the efficacy of new technologies is not irrational; it is very rational. Furthermore, challenging new technology is the responsibility of the active citizen; democracies require questioning to work well. 2. Opponents of new technology are remote from power and influence: They are ineffectuals, distrustful of those in the center of power. They are anti-industry and therefore opposed to new technologies developed by industry. Counterargument: Risk choices are determined largely by philosophy and psychology, not place in the social structure. This argument is not consistent with the facts of powerful persons also being opposed to various technologies. The moniker, "big business" does instill a sense of mistrust in the American public. But, in fact, most of the time the public embraces new technologies. 3. Laypersons ignore the fact that society is getting safer: Critics of technology fail to 96 recognize that life is getting longer, not shorter; health is better, not worse. Counterargument: Distribution of risk is important also. And so are moral/ethical considerations in regard to how advances are made to improving longevity and safety. 4. The public will never be satisfied with anything but 100% safety: The public is unrealistic in their expectations of safety. Counterargument: The public has the right, in fact, a responsibility, to challenge new technology, to ask questions and seek understandable answers. Shrader-Frechette notes that attributions of motives to laypersons oftentimes are inappropriate and unfounded. She suggests that we must develop a new theory of rationality that respects the responsibilities and viewpoints of active citizens. Public Policy in Developing Countries Shrader-Frechette points out the sometimes developed countries explain away unethical dissemination of known hazardous technology to developing nations with rationalizations about their efforts at promoting progress. She describes five such rationalizations: 1. The Isolationist Strategy: Abide by current laws only in imposing risk. That is, if a known hazardous technology (e.g., DDT in pesticides) is not illegal in the developing country then it is ok to sell this technology in that country. The problem with this strategy is that the developed nation knows that the laws of the underdeveloped nation are inadequate to reduce risk. 2. The Social Progress Strategy: Hazards are a necessary evil for social progress. But, ask Shrader-Frechette, progress for whom and at what risks for the local population? 3. The Countervailing-Benefits Strategy: Recipients of banned products are better off than they would be without them (i.e., the benefits outweigh the costs). But, are some costs preventable evils that never should be allowed? 4. The Consent Strategy: If persons in the host country agree to accept the risk, then it is ethical to impose it upon them. But, can the people of host countries give informed consent? 5. The Reasonable-Possibility Strategy: It is impossible to prevent use of banned products. But, we regulate industry all the time and can regulate ourselves in host countries. Shrader-Frechette implores citizens in developed countries to extend the same ethics to developing countries they impose upon themselves in setting technology policy. Technology and Public Policy What should be the role of government and industry in protecting the public from exposure to unnecessary risks? This question lies at the heart of technology public policy formation. Shrader-Frechette suggests guidelines that can be used to help formulate wise technology public policy. 1. Minimizing harm is more important than providing good. 2. Because they have fewer financial resources, the public needs more protection than does industry. 3. Consumers need self-determination--the chance to reject new technologies. 4. Societies need to stress the importance of values and long-term economic gain vs. short-term economic benefits. Summary 97 Shrader-Frechette points out that technology policy making is not an unambiguous process. Risk assessors and policymakers face dilemmas in their attempts to be objective and fair and also take into account special needs and interests. Research and development organizations sometimes become frustrated with a skeptical public. And it can sometimes be too easy to rationalize unethical dissemination of hazardous technologies for the sake of profits. Shrader-Frechette offers guidelines to help citizens form wise technology policy. 98 The moment a man talks to his fellows he begins to lie. Hilaire Belloc Introduction Sociology 415 focuses upon human agency in the sociology of technology. We are interested in understanding public responses to complex and controversial technologies, with the intent of learning how to gain adoption of these technologies by an understandably and justifiably skeptical public. We pursue this line of inquiry with the realization that all technologies are flawed and their adoption will bring about negative consequences for some segments of the population. We nevertheless seek adoption under the premise that the technology is mainly beneficial for the public. We might recognize, for example, the flaws in and negative consequences of adopting condom use for the prevention of sexually transmitted diseases, but nevertheless advocate for such adoption in the belief that condom use will mainly benefit the society. With these considerations in mind, we turn our attention to learning techniques of risk communication. Risk communication can involve two related messages, "Watch out!" or "Don't worry." Risk communication, whether designed to mobilize citizens to take protective measures (e.g., "better strengthen the levy") or stop worrying (e.g., "irradiated food is safe to eat"), involves similar elements. These are: 1) the dissemination of information, 2) persuasion to take some action, and 3) the provision of assistance in taking the desired action. Experience in seeking adoption of many different technologies, in settings worldwide, for many years teaches us that these tasks are much more difficult to achieve than one might initially believe. We begin this topic by reviewing a history of risk communication efforts followed by an explanation of the limitation of each one. Next, we learn techniques of risk communication developed through experience and the application of social science theories derived from the disciplines of psychology, economics, and sociology. We end this section by pointing out the limitations of risk communication as only communication. In the final section of the course, we learn that convincing the public to either "watch out" or "stop worrying" requires more than communication itself, it requires approaches for manipulating the social construction of risk perceptions. Risk Communication: History. Baruch Fischhoff's 1995 review of twenty years of process in risk communication research and practice (full text article.) revealed some effective and ineffective techniques for telling the public about technology. His review is organized within eight developmental stages that span the 20 year period from 1975 to 1995. He describes each stage and its strengths and limitations. He concludes his review by offering suggestions for improvements that need to be made in future efforts at risk communication. First Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Get the Numbers Right" Fischhoff notes that communication often begins before a word is said; that is, the viewpoint that nothing needs to be said is a form of communication in itself. This form of noncommunication often represents the initial reaction of technical experts regarding public input to risk assessments. One can understand, for example, the perspective of risk experts who painstakingly master the assessments of technologies 99 when they believe that little communication is needed or should be expected from them with a public who is for the most part ignorant of the risk issues associated with a technology. And certainly, the "paradox of democracy" precludes public discussion ad infinitum regarding the adoption of new or maintenance of existing technologies. Yet, because within democratic societies the public will have input to decision making, it becomes requisite de facto for risk experts to convey their findings to the public. Second Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Tell Them the Numbers" When requested to do so, risk managers present their findings to the public, often with little interpretation or explanation of them. Although this approach to information delivery seems forthright in its intent at objectivity, it can be viewed by the public as an indication of distance or even arrogance by the risk managers. And subsequent attempts by the public to provide interpretation can be hindered by lack of information or expertise or politicized by subjective evaluations of the meaning and usefulness of the raw data. This approach is further hampered by its premise that the numbers are correct. As has been often noted (see: Technical Risk Assessment), risk assessments can be limited in their applicability or outright flawed for many reasons, including occasional acts of dishonesty by scientists or technology managers. Therefore, just presenting facts, in addition to being limited by its appearance of condescending distance, is flawed in its premise that the numbers provide a complete and accurate assessment of risk. Third Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Explain What We Mean by the Numbers" Once one begins to explain numbers, inevitably one begins to introduce subjective evaluations of these numbers. And the public recognizes the subjective nature of these explanations. This recognition sometimes leads to contentious public discourse about interpretations. Typically, proponents and opponents of a technology will offer their conflicting interpretations of the numbers, and in this exercise, the viewpoints of opponents will influence public opinion more so than those of proponents because negative information, initially, carries more weight (see: Consumer Skepticism and The Social Problem). The ensuing dilemma for scientists (see: Science, Technology, and Society) is deciding how much explanation about a technology to provide to the public. These dilemmas and the consequent unfavorable public reactions to any confessed limitations of the technology lead some risk communication experts to declare that what is at stake is control over the language of risk (see the viewpoints offered by Paul Slovic, below). This approach has its limitations as well. At this developmental stage, it should be recognized that explanation of the numbers can engender controversies that proponents likely will lose because negative information, initially, carries disproportionate weight. Fourth Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Show Them That They've Accepted Similar Risks in the Past" It might seem intuitively appealing to compare a technology under consideration with a technology previously considered as risky but now accepted as being of little risk. This approach in effect says to the public, "See how silly you are now to doubt now when your doubts in the past have proven to be groundless." This approach to risk communication, first, assumes that the risk assessments are correct, which sometimes is not the case. Secondly, the condescending attitude it conveys is unlikely to sway public opinion favorably. Third, technology comparisons are difficult to make, even when the public is willing to accept some risk, when often they prefer to bear no risk. Fifth Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Show Them That It's a Good Deal for Them" Explaining both costs and benefits can be a highly effective approach to helping the 100 public reach decisions about a technology. The public is in effect asked to join with risk experts in evaluating the merits and limitations of a technology. This approach suffers from similar pitfalls as the third developmental stage, wherein explanations of costs and benefits themselves can become problematic within contentious public discourse. Because no technology can claim 100% safety, the public must eventually weigh benefits and risks, presuming these can be agreed upon. Sixth Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Treat Them Nicely" Aretha Franklin had it right, it's about R.E.S.P.E.C.T. In addition to honest, balanced messages, people want to be treated with respect, and from respect and a sense that experts have sufficient expertise, comes trust. The public needs to feel as if their opinions, and even their emotions, are respected as legitimate. Seventh Developmental Stage: "All We Have to Do is Make Them Partners" Treating the public with respect is an essential element of the decency they deserve. Yet this approach can seem patronizing if it is not accompanied by a true partnership of ideas. In fact, even a less educated public can make valuable suggestions to technology improvement. The "indigenous knowledge" of the public can enhance the effectiveness of a technology. Simply asking for input from the public can significantly improve the relationship with it. "Partnerships are essential to creating the human relations needed to damp the social amplification of minor risks--as well as to generate concern where it is warranted." Summary The quantity of social science research on risk communication has increased dramatically over the past thirty years in response to a growing awareness among risk assessors, risk managers, and consumers that the public should be better informed and more active in technology development and policy making. Led primarily by psychologists, research has explored key determinants of consumer understandings, misunderstandings, and outrage concerning risks associated with a wide variety of new technologies. Early investigations into consumer risk perceptions revealed that the public often has much different viewpoints about risk than do experts. Studies showed that expert and public opinions often were inverted, where the public was least concerned about hazards that most concerned scientific experts and most concerned about risks of least concern to scientists. Early efforts at risk communication, therefore, focused on developing procedures to convey "actual" risk to consumers who held uninformed and sometimes irrational "perceptions" of risk. After further investigations, scholars became more aware of the many limitations of technical risk assessments and risk management practices. Scholars become more aware also that value orientations can be legitimate criteria for establishing technology policy (e.g., chemical warfare is rejected by civilized nations not because it is scientifically flawed or inefficient but because people consider it to be ethically abhorrent). Such awareness greatly changed the nature of risk communication research and application. The recognition that technical assessments are biased and flawed and that valueorientations are equally important to risk assessment as are technical assessments altered the risk communication paradigm from a focus upon "educating an irrational public" to one of "exchanging information and opinions" among the many stakeholders in technology policy making. Guiding Principles of Risk Communication 101 This presentation reviews the Joint United Nations Food and Agriculture Organization/World Health Organization (FAO/WHO) Expert Commission report on The Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters (1998). Two other books provide similar information on risk communication as is found in the FAO/WHO report: Risk Communication: A Handbook for Communicating Environmental, Safety, and Health Risks, Second Edition, by Regina E. Lundgren and Andrea H. McMakin (Battelle Press, 1998), and Responding to Community Outrage: Strategies for Effective Risk Communication, by Peter M. Sandman (American Industrial Hygiene Association, 1993). Peter M. Sandman[1], a leading consultant on risk communication, says that, "watch out!" and "stop worrying" almost certainly were among the first phrases uttered in the early development of language. These phases embody the two essential goals of risk communication: 1. to warn others of potential harm, and 2. to inform others that there is no need to be concerned about harm. Sandman notes that risk communication, defined in this manner, essentially represents one-way communication of knowledge to others. As such, this form of risk communication reflects three assumptions: 1. that the source of the warning/reassurance knows more about the risk than the audience, 2. that the source is primarily concerned about the best interests of the audience, and 3. that the warnings/reassurances are based upon actual information rather than just values or preferences. For many warnings (e.g., yelling out about a falling tree limb) and reassurances (e.g., telling others that a gas leak has been repaired), "watch out!" and "stop worrying" are pragmatic forms of risk communication. Disseminating information about complex and controversial technologies, however, presents challenges for which "watch out!" and "stop worrying" often are not adequate to create/reduce a sufficient amount of perceived risk/lack of risk to be effective approaches to risk communication. The reason that "watch out!" and "stop worrying" are inadequate forms of risk communication is that people realize that sources of warnings/reassurances sometimes must rely upon flawed technical assessments and the political, economic, and cultural context of new technology diffusion influences sources to embed value-judgments into warnings/reassurances. Because the public realizes that risk assessments of complex and controversial technologies are flawed and influenced by political, economic, and cultural context, Sandman recommends that risk communication regarding them should be multi-directional; it should stimulate debate in addition to transferring knowledge. To Sandman, the criteria for evaluating "effective risk communication" should be the openness of the decision-making process and the extent to which value claims are distinguished from (admittedly flawed) scientific claims. Everett Rogers [2] author of The Diffusion of Innovations, makes a similar argument. He states that diffusion of information about complex and controversial technologies must avoid the pitfalls of the hypodermic-needle model, wherein the paradigm of risk communication is "injection of knowledge about actual risks" into an uninformed public. Instead, diffusion should consist of two-way communication between the public and developers of new technologies. The FAO/WHO report, The Application of Risk Communication to Food Standards and Safety Matters, incorporates these suggestions into its definition of risk communication: Risk communication is the exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and risk-related factors among risk assessors, risk managers, 102 consumers, and other interested parties. The goals of risk communication, according to the FAO/WHO report, are to: 1. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the risk analysis process, 2. Promote consistency and transparency in arriving at and implementing risk management decisions, 3. Promote awareness and understanding of the specific issues of the risk analysis process, 4. Strengthen the working relationships and mutual respect among risk assessment and management participants, 5. Exchange information among interested parties to risk analysis and management, and 6. Foster public trust and confidence in risk analysis and management. The FAO/WHO report, therefore, considers risk communication as an integral part of technology development and analysis rather than as a one-way transfer of knowledge from scientists to consumers. Multi-directional communication aimed at an inclusive process of informed decision-making that respects the value-orientations of others has been adopted as the most effective approach because experience demonstrates that one-way communication must rely upon flawed analysis and inevitably reflects biased judgments and value orientations of risk assessors in addition to errors resulting from lack of sufficient data on failure probabilities. Susan G. Hadden, in A Citizen's Right to Know: Risk Communication and Public Policy, argues that citizens have a right to know the risks to which they have been exposed and what policies are in place to regulate these risks and a right to participate in risk assessment and management decisions. The essential element of risk communication, therefore, as stated in the FAO/WHO report, is facilitation of the identification of risks and informed weighing of decision alternatives by risk managers and the public. That is, proper risk communication is interactive risk communication. Elements of Effective Risk Communication The principles described above note that transmission of scientific knowledge alone is insufficient for proper risk communication. Scientific knowledge should not be considered as flawless, value-free, and unbiased. Nor should scientific knowledge be considered as the only criteria for technology adoption. Technology policy, however, should be science based. Transmission of scientific knowledge, therefore, is a necessary component of risk communication. Essential aspects of proper risk communication, as described in the FAO/WHO report, include: Knowing the audience. The audience should be analyzed to understand their knowledge and opinions regarding the new technology. Listening to all interested parties is a critical element of this task. Involving scientific experts. Technology policy decisions should be science based. Hence, scientific experts should be called upon to relate current knowledge about the technology in a clear and concise manner. Establishing expertise in communication. The FAO/WHO report states that successful risk communication requires expertise in conveying information in a manner that can be clearly understood by most citizens. This suggestion has created some controversy among scientists who wonder why all the burden for information dissemination should fall upon them. They wonder why citizens do not make more effort at understanding science. Being a credible source of information. Factors that influence source credibility include perceived competence, trustworthiness, and sincere interest in the well-being of the 103 public. Consistent messages help establish credibility. It is the nature of science, however, that new knowledge alters existing risk estimates. Thus, scientists, who are obligated to report their findings, oftentimes face the dilemma of reporting new knowledge that will erode public confidence in science. Sharing responsibility. Scientists, regulatory agencies, and industry must share responsibility for developing and managing effective and safe technologies. Increasingly, these parties are pointing out that consumers also must bear responsibility for becoming more informed and active in technology development and policy making. Differentiating between science and value judgment. Certainly, a fundamental goal of science is to conduct value-free, unbiased research. Therefore, risk communication should focus upon facts, not values. Unfortunately, this approach to risk communication is impossible because it is impossible for any science to be free of bias and value judgments. Scientists should, as much as possible, omit their value judgments from risk communication and point out where judgment is most likely to affect risk assessments. Assuring transparency. As much as possible within legitimate requirements to assure confidentially, scientists should help the public understand the technology development and risk assessment process. Placing the risk in perspective. Risks and benefits and the probabilities of each should be compared with one another. One must use caution, however, in comparing risks because the choice of risks compared might reflect bias. Risk comparisons should not be made unless the estimates are equally sound, directly comparable, and relevant to the audience. The FAO/WHO report lists the following elements that might be included as part of a risk communication program: The nature of risk The characteristics of the hazard, The estimated magnitude of the hazard, The urgency of addressing the hazard, Whether the hazard is becoming smaller or larger over time/space, The probability of exposure to the hazard, and Who is at greatest risk from the hazard. The nature of the benefits The estimated benefits associated with the technology, and Who is most likely to be benefited by adoption of the technology. The uncertainties in risk assessment The The The The methods used to assess the risk, weaknesses or inadequacies of the risk assessment, assumptions used in the risk assessment, and sensitivity of the risk/benefits estimates to changes in the assumptions. Risk management options The The The The The policy(ies) suggested to control the risk, action(s) individuals might take to control their exposure to the risk, estimated effectiveness of different management options, costs and benefits of different management options, and justification for selecting a particular risk management option. Barriers to Effective Risk Communication 104 The shift in paradigms from "informing an irrational public" to "facilitating informed and respectful discussion among interested stakeholders" greatly improved the quality of risk communication research and practice. Which is not to say that unavoidable barriers remain to effective risk communication. The FAO/WHO report describes barriers to effective risk communication that occur due to limitations of the risk assessment process and social processes of human interaction and decision making: Barriers within the risk analysis process Lack of information. Lack of information always poses problems for risk communication because, by nature, little information exists about how well new technologies will perform in practice. New findings and new applications of technologies can reveal flaws not previously known or anticipated. Access to information. Lack of access to proprietary information held by private firms limits the abilities of risk assessors to adequately evaluate new technologies. Incomplete participation in the process. Lack of participation by appropriate experts or stakeholders limits the abilities of risk assessors to evaluate hazards and of risk communicators to effectively convey important information. Sometime, non-participation occurs because of the nature of technology development, assessment, and dissemination processes themselves. Lack of knowledge about the development of a new technology, lack of resources to learn about them, and lack of access to relevant information can influence some who should become involved to not participate. Barriers associated with human agency Differences in perceptions. People from different segments of society or who hold different value orientations view the same scientific facts differently. Concerns about hazards and viewpoints about how best to manage risks vary by individual and sub-populations. People differ in the extent to which they are exposed and attend to hazard analyses. The effectiveness of risk communication is enhanced when people become aware of differences in perceptions and the reasons for these differences. Differences in receptivity. Given similar perceptions of risk, people differ in their concerns about it. Some persons might consider, for example, a 1/100 chance of technology failure to be acceptable while others think of this estimate as too risky. Lack of understanding of the scientific process.Most persons do not have a thorough understanding of the scientific process, resulting not necessarily out of a lack of formal education or awareness of important societal issues, but from ignorance of science. Even the most educated among us are ignorant in many ways. Risk communication should attempt to use non-technical terms to overcome barriers related to ignorance. Risk communication should focus as well on educating the public about the process of science, wherein it is not uncommon that new findings alter existing risk estimates and controversy among scientists is common rather than an indication of poor science. Source credibility. Trust in the sources of information about new technologies is perhaps the most important factor influencing public opinions. Trust is associated with perceptions of expertise, accuracy, and concern for the public welfare. Distrust arises with suspicions of bias or conflicts of interest. Once lost, trust is difficult to regain. Media effects. Most persons receive their information about new technologies from the media. Because relatively few reporters have extensive backgrounds in the sciences, they rely heavily upon scientists to present their information in a clear and concise manner using non-technical language. Reporters are ethically bound to present differing viewpoints rather than what a scientist might consider to be the "truth." Scientists therefore oftentimes blame the media for public controversy they think never would have occurred if the media had not presented the viewpoints of 105 opposition groups. Risk communicators need training in media skills and reporters need more training in science. Societal characteristics. Language barriers, cultural differences, illiteracy, geographic barriers, discrimination, exploitation of power, and other characteristics of society influence perceptions of risk, receptivity to risk messages, source credibility, and opinions about risk. As much as possible, societal differences that might affect risk perceptions and risk communication effectiveness need to be identified. The section on Diffusion of Innovations, Part II in Sociology 415 describes procedures that can be used to improve risk communication to disadvantaged audiences. Strategies for Effective Risk Communication The complexity of risk communication requires that communication programs be tailored to each setting. It is possible, however, to describe general strategies that research and experience have shown to be effective across a wide variety of settings. The outline presented here summarizes the large body of risk communication research and program experience to date. Strategies for implementing the suggestions offered in this section are addressed in more detail in Diffusion of Innovations, Parts I and II. Techniques for risk communication and public relations campaigns are covered in JLMC 424: Public Relations Campaigns, offered by Iowa State University's Greenlee School of Journalism and Communications. General Considerations According to the FAO/WHO report, systematic approach to risk communication recognizes the importance of gathering background information, thorough preparation, effective dissemination of information, and program evaluation. Background information Understand the scientific knowledge about the technology, Understand public perceptions by gathering information through surveys and other social science methods, Find out what information people need and want, and Be sensitive to differences in perceptions, access to information, receptivity to information, and social context. Preparation Avoid overly simplistic comparisons between familiar risks and new risks because they might appear to be flippant and insincere. Recognize and respond to the emotional aspects of risk perceptions. Sandman states that Risk = Hazard + Outrage, wherein hazard is the technical assessment of risk and outrage is the emotional response to hazard analysis. Hazard and outrage are equally important determinants of public risk assessments. Express the risk in several ways without avoiding the central issues of the new technology. Maintain an openness to and recognition of public responsibilities. Build public awareness of the benefits of the new technology. Communication Accept and involve the public as a legitimate partner to technology policy making. Share the public's concern rather than dismiss it as not being legitimate. Be honest, frank, and open at all times. 106 Explain the overall risk assessment before presenting the more detailed statistics. Coordinate and collaborate with other credible sources. Meet the needs of the media. Review and Evaluation Evaluate the effectiveness of the risk communication program. Emphasize ongoing actions to monitor, manage, and reduce risk exposure. Risk Communication and Outrage We noted that outrage--emotional responses to risk information--is equally as important as hazard--technical evaluations of the probability of technology failure--in public risk assessments. "Outrage factors," as they are described by Peter M. Sandman, are key factors affecting emotional reactions to new technologies. Outrage and Risk Perceptions The FAO/WHO report outlines outrage factors that affect risk perceptions: Unknown, unfamiliar, or rare events are more likely to create outrage. Outrage increases when events are seen to be outside one's control. Risks perceived to result from industry action(s) create more outrage than those viewed as natural occurrences. Risks that raise moral or ethical questions are more likely to create outrage. An unresponsive decision-making process will create outrage. The FAO/WHO report suggests these approaches to reducing outrage: Make risks voluntary by giving the public input into the decision making process and control over the regulation of risks. Show that expert disagreement about risk simply represents a range of uncertainty, not uncertainty about the quality of science used to estimate risk. Acknowledge that uncertainty exists. Treat all stakeholders with respect. Always consider public concerns and complaints seriously. Risk Communication Strategy and Use of Outrage Factors Sometimes, persons/organizations attempt to create outrage as a means of warning about risk. Various agencies of the U.S. government and some private organizations, for example, try to create outrage about cigarette smoking to reduce its use. And sometimes persons/organizations want to reduce outrage when they think the public is overly concerned about a low-risk technology. Earlier in Sociology 415, we learned from Bell and Mayerfeld that the "language of risk" can be an effective tool in swaying public opinion. Thus, persons/organizations interested in swaying public opinion learn to use language in a manner that creates/reduces outrage. Proponents and opponents of the sampler technologies, for example, are familiar with outrage factors and attempt to create/reduce public outrage regarding these technologies. Research and experience have identified twelve key factors that tend to create/reduce outrage regarding new technologies: 1. Voluntary/Coerced. Risks we take upon ourselves create less outrage than those forced upon us. 2. Natural/Industrial. Natural risks are viewed with less emotional response than risks created by human actions. 107 3. Familiar/Unfamiliar. Things familiar are considered less risky than the unfamiliar. 4. Memorable/Not Memorable. Linking technologies to highly memorable tragedies makes them seem more risky. 5. Not Dreaded/Dreaded. Linking technologies to dreaded events (i.e., cancer) makes them seem more risky. 6. Chronic/Catastrophic. Risks we face everyday create less outrage than the catastrophic event. 7. Knowable/Unknowable. People tend to fear the unknown. Opponents of a new technology can always use this outrage factor to their advantage because, de facto, using new technologies involves uncertainties. 8. Control/Not in Control. We feel safer when we have the ability to regulate the use of a technology. 9. Fair/Unfair. People will become more outraged about a technology if they think they must bear more costs or fewer benefits than do others. 10. Morally Irrelevant/Relevant. Linking the use of a technology with immoral motives creates outrage. Linking it with moral standards lessens outrage. 11. Trustworthy/Untrustworthy. Trust in the experts who develop or endorse a new technology might be the most important factor influencing outrage. 12. Responsive/Unresponsive. Outrage is reduced when persons/organizations responsible for the development or regulation of a new technology seem responsive to public concerns. Thus, proponents of a technology attempt to convey to the public that the technology is well known, under control, familiar, trustworthy, and so forth. Opponents want the technology to appear uncertain, unresponsive, unfair, not trustworthy and so on. Risk Communication: Non-Crisis Situations Risk communication is not limited to crisis situations. Rather, risk communication is an ongoing process of informing, listening to, and responding to the public. Responsive risk communication programs help prevent crises and establish source credibility when crises emerge. The FAO/WHO report describes important steps to take in developing responsive risk communication programs: Background information Anticipate potential hazards before they become significant. Keep abreast of the target audience--their perceptions, knowledge, and motivations to become involved in technology policy making. Determine which communication channels are most effective for different types of risk information. Preparation Provide ongoing information about the technology, including updates on risk assessments. Identify shared values and concerns among the target audience. Make messages interesting and relevant by focusing upon people rather than statistics. Maintain good working relationships with the media. Communication Keep messages in the mass media and in public forums. Sustain regular communication to enable citizens to become involved in ongoing decision making. 108 Make certain that risk communication is multi-directional: listen to the public and facilitate their involvement in decision making. Review and Evaluation Continue to evaluate the effectiveness of the risk communication program. Test the clarity and understanding of messages. Educate risk assessors and managers on the principles of risk communication. Engender cooperation among the public, management, and regulatory agencies. Risk Communication: Crisis Situations By definition, a crisis is short-lived. The public's memory of how a crisis is handled, however, can affect risk perceptions and outrage for a long time. The suggestions offered by the FAO/WHO report can help mitigate the negative consequences of a crisis situation. Describe in an open and honest manner the extent of the crisis and measures being taken to control it. Inform the public about how to reduce their risk exposure. Help the public identify the hazard and how to avoid it. Describe how to prevent further exposure to the risk. Provide complete, up-to-date, and accurate information about the crisis. Keep messages simple. Too many facts can be overwhelming. Do not, however, omit key facts in the hope that the public will not hear about them. Choose and rely upon a media spokesperson. The public should know who is the spokesperson. Make this person available to the media at all times. Hold regular briefings with representatives of the public and regulatory agencies. Peter M. Sandman makes some additional suggestions for handling a risk crisis: Acknowledge prior misbehavior. The prerogative of deciding when you can put your mistakes behind you belongs to your stakeholders, not to you. The more often and apologetically you acknowledge the sins of the past, the more quickly others decide it's time to move on. Acknowledge current problems. Omissions, distortions, and "spin control" can damage credibility nearly as much as outright lies. The only way to build credibility is to acknowledge problems. Share control and be accountable. The higher the outrage, the less willing people are to leave the control in your hands. Look for ways to put the control elsewhere (or to show that it is already elsewhere). Let others--regulators, neighbors, activists--keep you honest and certify your good performance. 109 I disapprove of what you say, but I will defend to the death your right to say it. Voltaire Introduction Dr. Eric Abbott, from ISU's Greenlee School of Journalism and Communications, conducts research on the risk communication cycle, public views of technology, and communication strategies for presenting controversial technologies to the public. Dr. Abbott uses the example of food safety to describe how the mass media views public concern about technology and how the media and scientists can best present controversial topics to the public. Compass Key Questions How does the media affect public decisions about new technologies? What should be the role of the media regarding public discourse about new technologies? Examples Have the media presented the sampler technologies in a fairminded manner? In what ways might media presentations about the sampler technologies be improved? Have either proponents or opponents of the sampler technologies received more attention in the media than they deserve to receive? The Media and Risk Communication Dr. Abbott poses three questions he considers central to understanding the role of the media in public evaluations of technology perceived as being high risk: 1. What determines how the media covers high risk technology? 2. What effect does media coverage have on public opinion? 3. What kind of communication strategies are most effective in increasing public understanding of high risk technology? How Does the Media Cover High Risk Technology? The Natural History Model Dr. Abbott points out that the mass media is a key source of information about risk issues. Risk information presented to the public, however, does not occur randomly. The Natural 110 History Explanation presented by Anthony Downs posits that risk communication occurs in four stages: 1. In the pre-problem stage the technology is available for public use, but the public is largely unaware of it because of little media coverage. 2. The second stage is characterized by alarmed discovery as the media present the problem to the public. Typically in this stage, experts (relying upon Enlightenment philosophical approaches to technology and risk) argue that the problems can be solved through more and better science. 3. In the third stage the public becomes aware of the costs of the technological fix offered by experts. 4. As the topic becomes more complex, media coverage declines until, in the fourth stage, public interest declines in mass media coverage of the technology and its risks. The Public Arena Model This model posits that risk issues must compete with other newsworthy items for mass media exposure. Risks associated with complex and controversial technologies might be covered in the media, but their length of coverage and degree of exposure (e.g., placement in a newspaper), depends upon other topics of the day. Coverage of highly controversial technology might get pushed to the back page during a period when news with greater mass appeal occurs at the same time. Or, technology that might otherwise not raise a great amount of controversy might receive much media coverage during a slow news day. The Hoopla Effect Dr. Abbott has developed a perspective on risk communication that emphasizes how media coverage can lead to a heightened perception of risk. When a risk issue comes to the attention of the media and is presented to the public, individuals and organizations that have a vested interest in the issue take the opportunity to provide the media with more information, which then is presented to the public. This cycle of activity can create a heightened sense of awareness about the risk issue that does not necessarily coincide with reality. News about crime, for example, is easy and inexpensive for the media to present; so, the media are inclined to present much information about crime. This over-coverage of crime can give the public a sense that crime is a bigger risk than it actually is. The result is the hoopla effect. This graph shows the hoopla effect for newspaper articles on genetically modified foods from 1997-2000: 111 [D] It should be kept in mind that the hoopla effect is a natural occurrence of reporting about controversial technology because of the polarization of opinion that occurs through social interaction. That is, when people begin talking about a controversial topic, their feelings about it become intensified. Reporting about controversial technology places the journalist in a difficult position because reporting of the controversy, itself, can stimulate a hoopla effect. Yet the journalist is entitled, even obligated, to report about controversial technology. Journalists sometimes are blamed unnecessarily for increasing controversy, when, in fact, they are doing the job we expect of them: reporting controversy surrounding complex technology. To the extent that the public is responsive to the hoopla effect, their evaluation of technology can reflect the coverage of the risk as it is presented in the media. Presentation by the media, and access to the media by vested interest groups, therefore, can affect public evaluations of technology. Research shows that negative media information carries disproportionate weight in influencing initial public opinions of technology. As Dr. Abbott points out, negative information is fast and effective while positive information is slow, difficult, and expensive to convey to the public. Traditionally, it has been thought that mass media messages are most effective at the awareness stage of a diffusion program and interpersonal channels are most effective at the decision stage. What are some appropriate ways that the media can present risk information to the public? 1. One approach is to define a risk vs. no-risk situation. One might define the risk of smoking cigarettes, for example, with respect to the lowered risk of not smoking cigarettes. 2. A second approach is to present a risk in comparison with a related risk. For example, presenting the risks associated with chemical food preservatives as compared with the risk of contracting botulism (a potentially fatal illness resulting from eating spoiled food). 3. A third approach is to compare a risk with some benefit. One might compare the risks 112 associated with agricultural pesticide use, for example, with the benefits of lower food prices. What happens when public perceptions of risk differ from the viewpoint of scientists? Previously, we pointed out the pitfalls of approaching risk decisions from the perspective that the scientific view is "actual" risk and the public view is "perceived" (and therefore, incorrect) risk. It will be important for us to keep this false dichotomy in mind as we review the literature on risk communication. For now, we consider the strengths and limitations of three approaches to media communications with the public about complex and controversial technologies: 1. One strategy for communicating to the public about risk would be to cater to public fears about technology. Dr. Abbott states that this approach is used often, but is not conducive to good public evaluation of technology because it tends to make scientific evaluations irrelevant to the process. 2. A second strategy is to define away the problem (e.g., "America has the safest food supply in the world"). As pointed out by Andrew Webster, taking this approach most likely will result in lowering public confidence in science because technologies inevitably will fail. 3. A third strategy is to facilitate dialogue between scientists and the public. This strategy emphasizes the importance of explaining difficult terms and processes in everyday language. It also stresses the importance of legitimizing fears and presenting the technology as an alternative to other risks. Unfortunately, sometimes when proponents of a technology claim they want to facilitate dialogue what they really mean is they want to facilitate dialogue in the form of "educating the public." Application in Context How Effective are Different Approaches to Communicating with the Public? Later in this section of Sociology 415 we will review a videotape of a television program that features a debate between proponents and opponents of food irradiation. We will learn more about how proponents and opponents attempt to reduce or create outrage about this technology. As you view the videotape, look for instances where proponents attempt to define away the problem or dismiss fears and where opponents try to cater to fears. What can the mass media do to better present technology to the public? Because journalists (like the rest of us) typically are ignorant of how advanced technology actually works and lack adequate space to educated the public about the technology, they must be careful about how they frame a story. Also, the mass media needs to pay careful attention to emphasizing key points in a story to help the public follow a story about a controversial technology. 113 Good ideas do not sell themselves. Everett Rogers, The Diffusion of Innovations, Fifth Edition Introduction Everett Rogers' Diffusion of Innovations is the definitive source for learning strategies aimed at gaining adoption of complex and controversial technologies. The diffusion of innovations approach relies upon well-established theories in sociology, psychology, and mass communications to develop a concise and easily understood approach to consumer acceptance of new technologies. Rogers reminds us that the dissemination of technology, given its inevitable unanticipated, unintended, and undesirable consequences for some, and sometimes for all, entails a strong commitment to ethical standards of professional practice. The mistake made most often in attempts at technology transfer is to assume that transmission of the scientific facts about the technology will be sufficient to gain adoption of it. Because science is known to fail, because factors other than technical risk assessments affect decisions to adopt, because for complex and controversial technologies the public demands attention to their values and assurances of competence to give their trust to the developers and managers of these technologies, technology transfer strategies must find ways to address value-based concerns, instill trust in technical risk assessments, and ease the transition to using the new technology. As we learned in the two preceding sections, critical elements of technology transfer include implementing good risk communication skills and working with the media to facilitate reasonable presentation of arguments in favor of and opposition to the new technology. To effectively gain adoption (or rejection; this is the last time I will say both), however, one must also: Influence the social comparison process that provides the required connection between persuasive arguments and choice shift (i.e., understand the social system), Understand the innovation-decision process (i.e., the time sequence of adoption decisions), Assist in easing the transition to the new technology, which includes changing attitudes, behaviors, and infrastructure support for the new technology (i.e., reduce transaction costs), and Mitigate negative consequences associated with new technology adoption. The case illustration of Los Molinos (pages 1-5), where the change agent (Nelida) was able to achieve only 5% adoption of water boiling in her Peruvian village demonstrates the importance of customs, interpersonal networks, opinion leaders, and change-agent characteristics on adoption decisions. In Diffusion of Innovations, Rogers teaches us that knowledge acquisition, risk evaluation, value acceptance, social/economic/political constraints, adaptation to specific situations, time, money, and the expertise of change agents all influence the adoption of an innovation. Suggestions for reading the Rogers textbook for Sociology 415: The presentation of materials on the next two web pages follows a different order from that presented in the Rogers textbook. The suggested ordering for reading the textbook is: Diffusion of Innovations, Part I on WebCT: 114 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter Chapter 1: 6: 8: 9: 5: 7: Elements of Diffusion. Attributes of Innovations. Diffusion Networks. The Change Agent. The Innovation-Decision Process. Innovativeness and Adopter Categories. Diffusion of Innovations, Part II on WebCT: 1. Chapter 11: Consequences of Innovations. 2. Chapter 3: Contributions and Criticisms of Diffusion Research. Diffusion of Innovations: Part I This section describes the diffusion of innovations model, explains its importance for understanding public responses to complex and controversial technologies, and provides an approach to gaining adoption if one chooses to do so. Compass Key Questions How is technology adoption influenced by social factors? How can the change agent influence the adoption of new technologies? Examples How do characteristics of the sampler technologies affect their rate of adoption? Who are the opinion leaders for each of the sampler technologies? What strategies might be effective at gaining adoption/rejection of the sampler technologies? Who likely are the opinion leaders for each of the sampler technologies? Elements of Diffusion (Chapter 1) Diffusion is a process whereby an (1) innovation is (2) communicated through certain channels (3) over time (4) within social systems. The approaches to risk communication reviewed thus far in Sociology 415 emphasize the importance of understanding characteristics of complex innovations and developing effective risk communication techniques for instilling trust and reducing outrage. The diffusion of innovations approach posits further that risk communication strategies differ over time and within different social systems. An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new. What might seem familiar to some is new to others. Innovations can be material or nonmaterial. The adoption of material innovations brings about changes in social relations, which means that nonmaterial issues arise in the adoption of material innovations. That is, culture changes with changes in material conditions. Understanding relationships among culture, values, 115 existing practices, and political/social/economic relations is a necessary element of technology transfer. Chapter 1 provides an overview of the diffusion of innovations approach. Please read it thoroughly before proceeding through this WebCT presentation. Characteristics of Innovations (Chapter 6) Innovations vary in the extent to which they offer easily observed costs and benefits compared with existing ideas or practices. The key characteristics of an innovation are its: 1. Relative advantage: the degree to which the innovation is perceived as better than the idea it supersedes. Relative advantage refers to the extent to which the innovation is more productive, efficient, costs less, or improves in some other manner upon existing practices. It might seem like relative advantage alone should be enough to persuade persons to adopt an innovation. Certainly relative advantage is a key indicator of adoption. But sometimes relative advantage is a matter of debate (e.g., legalized abortion), not immediately evident (e.g., sustainable agricultural practices), complex to understand (e.g., food irradiation), circumvented by economic/business/political circumstances (e.g., the popularity of the VHS over the Beta format for home use video tapes), considered as morally abhorrent (e.g., chemical warfare), or moderated by difficulties involved in the transition from the old to the new (e.g., switching from traditional television to HDTV). Don't better ideas eventually win out? Not always (ask users of Macintosh computers). And sometimes good ideas like genetically modified food (accept, for the sake of argument, the value judgment here) undergo delays and considerable costs to developers due to initial public resistance that might have been avoided if change agents had focused upon factors other than just relative advantage (e.g., biotechnology companies have had to spend much money on repairing public relations by not anticipating public resistance in Europe to genetically modified foods). Thus, good ideas do not sell themselves because "good" can be relative, not immediately evident, complex to understand, circumvented by the market, considered to be morally abhorrent, or difficult to implement. 2. Compatibility: the degree to which the innovation is perceived as being consistent with existing values, past experiences, and needs of potential adopters. Compatibility is the trump card for all innovations, even those with high relative advantage. An innovation must be considered socially acceptable to be implemented. And some innovations require much time and discussion before they become socially acceptable. If the idea seems morally irreconcilable, then the innovation will not be adopted (e.g., euthanasia for the terminally ill is having a hard time catching on with the American public; human cloning might never be accepted). If the innovation is very or sometimes even just a little bit different than current practices, then the innovation will not be adopted (e.g., news reports state that the U.S. Treasury might have to give up on Sacagawea dollars because people do not like to use them). 3. Complexity: the degree to which the innovation is perceived as difficult to understand and use. 116 An innovation need not be particularly complex from the viewpoint of its developers. Feminists, for example, often complain that the public simply doesn't "get it." It is the perception of the end user that means the most for achieving public adoption of a new technology. Food irradiation is difficult to understand, which is part of the reason it has been slow to be adopted by Americans. Personal computers were difficult to learn about when they first were introduced, which slowed their adoption despite their clear relative advantages. No-till farming was complex to understand and also difficult at first to implement because one had to make required adjustments to existing machinery oneself before manufacturers saw sufficient demand to mass produce no-till equipment. 4. Trialability: the degree to which the innovation may be experimented with on a limited basis. Innovations are easier to adopt if they can be tried out in part, on a temporary basis, or easily dispensed with after trial. Nuclear waste storage facilities have to be located and built correctly the first time. There is no going back from affirmative action, civil rights legislation, legalized marriage for gay/lesbian couples, and so forth. 5. Observability: the degree to which the results of the innovation are visible to others. The chances of adoption are greater if folks can easily observe relative advantages of the new technology. In fact, after some adopt, observability can improve the diffusion effect, a critical component of technology transfer we will learn about later in Part I. The advantages of genetically modified foods are not easily observable, at least not at present, for consumers. Therefore, challenges to gm foods carry greater weight than if gm foods had highly visible benefits. A no-tilled farm field had negative observability at first because "good" farmers did not leave plant residue on their fields; they instead left the ground clean of plant residue with deep furrows. Diffusion Networks (Chapter 8) Communication and the Diffusion Effect Mass media presentations create awareness, disseminate hardware (information about the innovation), software (information about how the innovation works), and innovationevaluation (information about how well the innovation works) messages, and provide feedback to potential adopters about those who have adopted. Because they create awareness, mass communications place some pressure upon opinion leaders to make decisions about the new technology, the importance of which will be explained later in Part I. Interpersonal communications between experts and the public, opinion leaders and the public, and among friends and family are equally as essential as mass communications in bringing about new technology adoption. Knowing the viewpoints of close referent others (e.g., family and friends) and opinion leaders is a critical element of the social comparison process leading to choice shift. 117 Diffusion takes place within the context of structures of social relationships based upon power, norms, and public acceptability. Recognizing the influence of social comparison processes on technology transfer is the first essential contribution of the diffusion of innovations model beyond the risk communication techniques addressed in previous sections of Sociology 415. To understand the role of social comparison processes, we begin by defining the diffusion effect as the cumulative increasing degree of influence upon an individual to adopt or reject an innovation, resulting from the activation of peer networks about an innovation in a social system. Technology adoption, as a form of human agency, depends strongly upon social comparison processes that lead to choice shift. Social comparison processes gather inertia as more persons shift their choice in the prevailing direction of others. Consider the introduction of a complex technology. This innovation creates uncertainties about safety, environmental quality, and so forth. So, people listen to persuasive arguments in favor of and in opposition to the new technology. The public, being ignorant (not irrational) about the science of the technology, then faces the consumer's dilemma of choosing whom to trust. The social comparison process then becomes critical because people seek information beyond that provided by proponents and opponents; that is, they seek some indication of whom to trust. The important aspect of social systems to recognize is that social collectivities have prestige hierarchies; the opinions of some persons/organizations carry more weight than those of others during the social comparison process. Rogers refers to these more prestigious persons/organizations as opinion leaders. Opinion leaders, as highly prestigious social comparison others, have the ability to sway choice shift towards adoption or rejection. Thus, it is the opinions of opinion leaders that strongly influences adoption or rejection. Keep in mind that technology adoption always brings about culture change. Thus, an adoption decision is, in the sociological sense, a change in normative expectations (i.e., rules for behavior). Adoption, therefore, is not always a simple process, wherein the new technology is incorporated within the society with very little change to structure and culture. Sometimes, structure and culture must change considerably to adopt and the public requires assurances from opinion leaders to make such a change. Recognizing the importance of the viewpoints of opinion leaders in influencing adoption decisions provides the change agent with insight into how to bring about desired change, which is to focus upon gaining adoption by opinion leaders with the knowledge that it will be opinion leaders who will persuade others to adopt. We will return to the role of the change agent later in this section. Models of Mass Communication Flows: As noted regarding relative advantage, transmission of scientific facts about a new technology sometimes is insufficient to gain adoption. Rogers refers to the hypodermic needle model as the attempt to gain adoption of a complex and controversial technology by transmission of facts alone. He states that this model has had limited success. The two-step flow model, on the other hand, which posits that interpretations of facts are mediated by interactions with others, particularly in learning the viewpoints of opinion leaders, has been shown to provide better explanation of adoption of complex technologies. The "two steps" refer to mass media presentations of the viewpoints of proponents and opponents followed by interactions with others and opinion leaders. Change agent communication with others is aided by homophily--similarity in socioeconomic characteristics--and hindered by heterophily--dissimilarity in socioeconomic characteristics. The negative effects on interpersonal persuasion resulting from change agent heterophily with potential adopters can be mitigated by understanding and operating within communication networks (i.e., interconnected individuals linked by patterned flows of communication). The structure of a communication network might be such that change 118 agents can gain access to heterophilous opinion leaders by relying upon the strengthof-weak-ties provided by interstitial persons. Imagine a communication structure consisting of two cliques of relatively heterophilous persons, wherein each clique is strongly influenced by one opinion leader. Imagine further that one person (typically, not a strong opinion leader) from each clique has a "weak" tie (i.e., occasional meetings, conversations; perhaps a common interest) with one another. The "strength" of this weak tie between these two interstitial (i.e., bridging) persons is that the change agent can ask the interstitial person with whom he/she is homophilous to provide an introduction to the heterophilous interstitial person and thereby gain access to the heterophilous opinion leader. Characteristics of Opinion Leaders: A key aspect of understanding how the social system affects diffusion is that social systems have prestige hierarchies: some persons/organizations are more influential than others. The social comparison process is affected most by opinion leaders. To effectively gain adoption of a new technology, the change agent should know how to identify opinion leaders in the social system. Sometimes, this task is fairly straightforward in that highly influential persons/organizations can be named by members of the social system in a social survey. To learn opinion leaders regarding food safety, for example, one might conduct a nationwide social survey of adults to ask them whom they most trust regarding food safety information. In other cases, for example within a community, opinion leadership can be more difficult to identify. This segment describes opinion leaders and a procedure for identifying them within a community. The defining characteristic of opinion leaders is they are well respected in their social system. Respect can be associated with higher socioeconomic status (i.e., education, occupation, income), but does not require it. Opinion leaders, for whatever reason, sway adoption decisions through their influence (i.e., informal persuasion), not power (i.e., affect on behavior arising from the use or threat of using force). Monomorphic opinion leaders affect decisions within a relatively narrow range of issues (e.g., the American Medical Association is influential regarding health-related technology choice); polymorphic opinion leaders influence decisions across several issue areas (e.g., the opinion of the magazine Consumer Reports is respected on many topics). Five Approaches to Identifying Opinion Leaders The five approaches listed below vary in their expense of implementation and accuracy in locating opinion leaders. To illustrate these approaches, they are presented within the context of locating opinion leaders in a community, say for the purpose of gaining adoption of a municipal bond levy to fund additions and improvements to the school system. 1. Positional: In this approach, persons in elected or appointed positions in the community are assumed to be opinion leaders. Thus, the school superintendent, city council persons, and the mayor would be assumed to be opinion leaders on school-related issues. This approach is inexpensive--one could learn with a telephone call to the local courthouse who occupies elected and appointed positions. But the approach can be highly inaccurate because it assumes opinion leadership based upon position, rather than respect. 2. Self-Designating: Here, the change agent asks selected individuals to identify themselves as being influential on school-related issues. The approach has the advantage of getting input on influence from community members, and therefore is more accurate than the positional approach. It requires a bit more expense in that the change agent typically will travel to the community to interview persons for the needed information. A potential pitfall of the 119 self-designating approach is that persons might over- or under-estimate their influence on others. 3. Reputational: The reputational approach relies upon the nominations of selected individuals on, for example, "the ten most influential persons in this community regarding school-related issues." Using the reputational approach generally improves the accuracy of identifying opinion leaders because one is getting information from more than one source about the influence of others in the community. Typically, persons using the reputational approach will "sno-ball" their nominations from key informants. Key informants are persons who have a thorough knowledge of the community and how it works: newspaper editors, bankers, real estate agents, school superintendents, and city council members make good key informants (the newspaper editor likely will only provide names to talk with, rather than more information, due to issues of confidentiality). Nominations from these key informants are contacted and asked to name their "10 most influential persons...," and so on, until the list of nominations is "sno-balled" into a comprehensive list of persons. Using informal "eyeballing" of the nominations, or sometimes very sophisticated network analysis software, the change agent selects from all nominations the "most often nominated" persons as "reputational" opinion leaders. Remember to ask about opinion leadership with respect to some specific area of skill (e.g., "school-related issues") because opinion leaders in one issue area might not be opinion leaders in another area. 4. Sociometric: As noted by Rogers, opinion leaders typically are located at the center of communication networks. Sociometry is the mapping, usually using sophisticated network analysis software, of contacts among a potential list of opinion leaders (usually those identified by the reputational approach). This mapping of contacts helps the change agent locate persons who are at the center of communications about the issue area. A question asked of reputational leaders to map contacts might be, "How often do you contact [person X] about school-related issues in this community?" One interesting use of sociometric analysis is the identification of cliques of leaders. Personal histories or acquired characteristics such as skin color or gender can underlie the formation of leadership cliques in a community. Sociometric maps can help identify "natural" boundaries among cliques of opinion leaders. Sociometric maps also can help identify interstitial persons, who link leadership cliques. Interstitial persons might be somewhat marginal to their respective cliques, but because they are connected with other cliques, they can provide the change agent with access to cliques that might otherwise be difficult for the change agent to gain rapport. Interstitial persons might have a "weak" tie to one another (i.e., they might not contact one another very often). But the strength" of this weak tie is it gives the change agent access to different cliques of opinion leaders. 5. Observation: There is no substitute for observing social action within the community. Some opinion leaders are not located at the center of a communication network, but prefer by their personality to be located a bit outside the everyday communication pattern. Also, reputation can be misleading. If the sociometric analysis is conducted using reputational leaders, an important leader might have been left off of the map altogether. Observation, because of costs related to lodging, food, and travel, is the most expensive of the techniques described here, but it is also the most accurate. The Change Agent (Chapter 9) 120 The change agent influences clients' innovation decisions in a direction deemed desirable by a change agency. Change agents act as linkers between the change agency and clients. The change agent: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. develops a perceived need for change, establishes an information exchange relationship (credibility), diagnoses problems, creates intent to change in the client, translates intent into action, stabilizes adoption and prevents discontinuance, and achieves a terminal relationship. Change agent success depends upon: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. 6. 7. 8. change agent effort, change agency vs. client orientation, change agent empathy, homophily and change agent contact, change agent contact with lower status clients, effective use of paraprofessional aides, working with opinion leaders, and the client's evaluative ability to judge the innovation for themselves (the change agent should educate as well as diffuse). Good listening skills are essential to change agent success in working with opinion leaders. These links provide information on how to learn good listening skills: Reflective Listening: Listen and send it back. Active Listening: Communication in Organizations. Centralized and Decentralized Diffusion Systems The classical diffusion approach assumes a centralized research and development organization that makes most decisions about the innovation and its diffusion. The advantages of the centralized approach to technology development and dissemination are: 1. a collectivity of technical experts devoted to improving the quality of the technology, 2. coordinated efforts at technology transfer, and 3. a limited ability to gain adoption of innovations not popular but important for societal well-being (e.g., seat belt requirements, anti-smoking campaigns, environmental protection laws, civil rights legislation). The decentralized diffusion approach entails technology development and dissemination from small firms, local entrepreneurs, and grass-roots organizations. The advantages of decentralized innovation development and diffusion are: 1. advancement of needed changes in the social system (i.e., social movements regarding civil rights, feminism, environmentalism), 2. encouragement of local initiative in small firms, 3. local control of technology development, and 4. motivation for self-reliance. The Innovation Decision Process (Chapter 5) The presentation thus far has focused primarily upon relationships between the social system and innovation adoption. This segment describes the time sequence of events leading to adoption. The innovation-decision process is a theoretical model of the stages of decision making resulting in confirmed adoption of a new technology. The process is one 121 example of the axiom underlying social-psychological approaches to explaining attitude and behavior change called the hierarchy-of-effects principle. This principle states that: knowledge causes an evaluation (or attitude) that leads to a commitment to take action that results in behavior change. The theoretical development of this principle in the mid-1960's coincided with the formulation of the innovation-decision process and other conceptual approaches to explaining behavior change related to attitude change (in contrast to stimulus-response approaches to behavior change). Stages of the Innovation-Decision Process: 1. Knowledge. Most often, potential adopters become aware of the innovation through mass media messages distributed by news outlets, trade journals, internet web sites, and scientific publications. Because consumers' engage in selective exposure to preferred sources of information and selective perception of certain types of information, change agents must carefully plan their presentations of hardware, software, and innovation-evaluation information. Knowledge acquisition about low-involvement innovations--new products with few perceived risks (i.e., consumer goods)--raises uncertainties for the consumer. Is this a high quality product? Is it being sold at a good price? Will it be a popular choice for others? Learning about high involvement innovations--complex, controversial technologies--raises these same uncertainties and many more. Am I being told all the truth about this technology? Is it safe for me and others? Will its adoption lead to inequities in the sharing of risk? Knowledge diffusion can be a difficult period for proponents of a new technology. Much more information must be disseminated than for low involvement innovations. The information is more technical and, by nature, less certain because the technology is new. Most importantly, perhaps, active opposition groups disseminate unfavorable messages about the technology. It is critical for proponents to recognize that, because negative information carries disproportionate weight, they usually are at a disadvantage during the knowledge stage of diffusion. It is equally critical for proponents to recognize that the consumer is not being irrational by not immediately accepting the scientific viewpoint of a new technology, but instead is being justifiably skeptical of a new technology that is being opposed by consumer advocacy organizations. 2. Persuasion. For low involvement innovations much of the diffusion process rests upon marketing principles of product, pricing, place, and promotion. Gaining adoption of high involvement innovations also requires attention to these four p's, but demands further that the social comparison process be influenced by opinion leaders supportive of the technology because, unlike for low involvement innovations, consumers are being exposed to messages that oppose high involvement innovations. Thus, gaining adoption of a complex, controversial technology requires a good product, price, and so forth, but it requires also that respected opinion leaders who support it to counter the opposition arguments. One has to sell a low involvement technology to a passive audience; one has to sell a high involvement innovation to an audience who is exposed to active opposition to it. Whereas opponents typically have the advantage at the knowledge stage, proponents usually gain the advantage at the persuasion stage. This shift occurs because research and development organizations usually are university based or are otherwise respected technology development firms. Thus, they enjoy the reputation of being relatively correct in their risk assessments and trustworthy in their pursuit of improving society. Respected opinion leaders, therefore, because they have close 122 contacts with centralized research and development organizations and because they know that most often the technologies produced by these organizations will be based upon sound scientific principles, support the new technology. Given that support from opinion leaders is critical to gaining adoption of high involvement innovations in the face of arguments by well-organized opposition groups, proponents typically regain their lost initiative at the persuasion stage. We might at this time begin a healthy debate about the characteristics of an ideal society. We might discuss and debate about the concept of progress. We might argue that scientists usually receive support from opinion leaders because they usually are correct. We might also consider the interlocking nature of relationships among powerful research and development organizations and opinion leaders and whether these relationships further the common good. The good change agent, as we will discuss in Part II of this section will ask many questions about the inevitable negative consequences of new technology adoption. For now, it is important to realize that centralized research and development organizations and opinion leaders often are of the same mind and therefore proponents usually have the advantage over opponents at the persuasion stage. 3. Decision. The decision that the innovation is worthy of being adopted represents a major advance for proponents of a high involvement technology. Proponents, with support from opinion leaders, have overcome opposition arguments to convince consumers to accept the technology. This act of symbolic adoption, however important it is, does not assure behavioral adoption. Symbolic adoption by more and more consumers does add inertia to the diffusion effect. As more persons adopt, there is increasing pressure for non-adopters to adopt. This pressure to adopt comes about because adoption of a new technology: Oftentimes brings about changes in related technologies. Changes in computer hardware and software capabilities, for example, often go hand-in-hand, making it difficult to hold on to a personal computer and still be able to utilize software that others have adopted. Can be accompanied by changes in infrastructure support for older technologies. Can sometimes bring about changes in laws that favor the newer technology. Can shift economic advantage to use of the newer technology. Is accompanied by cultural changes that favor the newer technology. That is, not adopting sometimes can bring about social, economic, and political disadvantages as others adopt. 4. Implementation. Implementation refers to the initial trial period for the new technology. The move from symbolic adoption to implementation is not necessarily an easy one. Obstacles to implementation include: Transaction costs: It might be expensive to make the move to the new technology, even though it has long-term economic advantages. Infrastructure support: Because the technology is new, technical support, servicing, retail chains, and other aspects of market development might not be sufficient to encourage implementation. Personal decisions: The end-use might recognize the relative advantages of the new technology, but find themselves in cash-flow problem, in the middle of another transition, or at the end of their career and not willing to invest in change that reaps only long-term benefits. Implementation often entails re-invention, an alteration of the innovation by the adopter. Adopters alter the new technology to fit their specific needs. Sometimes, 123 alterations are trivial in nature, reflecting more a narcissism of small differences rather than a substantive change in the makeup or functioning of the innovation. Such modifications might be nevertheless important for confirmation in that people usually like to feel some sense of ownership over new technologies. The advantages of re-invention include: increased flexibility in applications of the innovation, increased relative advantage for local use, and increased sense of ownership over the new technology. Re-invention can create problems for the adopter, however, and is not always encouraged by research and development organizations. Disadvantages of re-invention include: improper application leading to less effectiveness of the innovation, inability of the research and development organization to maintain quality control over the technology in use, legal problems if the change infringes upon the protection of a closely related technology. 5. Confirmation. Confirmation involves seeking of reinforcement for the adoption decision and integration of the new technology within the framework of existing practices. Because social comparison is critical to adopting high-involvement innovations, reinforcement of the social acceptability of the innovation after implementation is an important aspect of the innovation-decision process. Social psychologists working in the 1950's recognized the importance of dissonance reduction on behavior change. Once a difficult decision has been made the adopter finds it psychologically satisfying to accentuate the good reasons for making the decision to adopt and decentuate the good reasons for not adopting. Note for yourself how your thoughts about the good qualities of that other automobile (an expensive item for most persons to purchase) diminish after taking ownership of the automobile you selected to purchase. This game we play to sooth our anxieties about difficult decisions becomes more important the greater the stakes involved in the adoption decision. Adopters of complex, controversial technologies, therefore, look for signals that their decision was the correct one. Good change agents, therefore, will reinforce the decision and seek ways to facilitate the transition to using the new technology (most likely, your automobile dealer contacted you shortly after your purchase to confirm your decision and seek your feedback on the product). Discontinuance, or rejection of a technology, can occur anytime including during confirmation. Replacement discontinuance occurs when a better innovation is introduced and adopted. Disenchantment discontinuance results when problems arise with the design or usefulness of the innovation that were not anticipated. Highly complex innovations can be discontinued when persons think they can master them but find they cannot. Changes in policy or in economic, social, or environmental conditions can lessen the effectiveness of the innovation. Nothing is certain but change, right? Innovativeness and Adopter Categories (Chapter 7) Experience has taught diffusion scholars that adopters can be classified within five categories: innovators, early adopters, early majority, late majority, and laggards. The specific percentage of adopters in each category is not critical information; neither are the differences in characteristics that separate any two of the categories. The importance of the classification scheme is to highlight that the characteristics and needs of potential adopters 124 differ during the diffusion process. Of special importance is recognizing the roles played by innovators and early adopters. Innovators with respect to one new technology but be laggards with respect to another. People do, however, tend to exhibit socioeconomic and psychological qualities that place them within certain adopter categories: 1. Innovators (first 5 percent of adopters) tend to be venturesome, cosmopolite, networked with other innovators, have available financial resources, understand complex technical knowledge, and be able to cope with uncertainty. Change agents should recognize that, for high-involvement innovations, innovators do not significantly affect adoption decisions. Innovators, by definition, are too socially marginal to gain the respect needed to be an opinion leader. Thus, while adoption by innovators might encourage the change agent (as it did Nelida in Los Molinas), it cannot be expected that innovators will generate much diffusion effect. 2. Early Adopters (next 10 percent of adopters) are respected and more local than innovators. It is from this category that the change agent should expect to locate opinion leaders. These persons are venturesome, but sufficiently skeptical to recognize good innovations from poor ones. Because opinion leaders have more influence on the diffusion effect than persons in any other adopter category, it is persons in this category that the change agent attempts to persuade to adopt. 3. Early Majority (next 35 percent) tend to interact frequently with peers, seldom hold positions of opinion leadership but have strong interconnectedness within the system's interpersonal networks, and tend to have a long period of deliberation before making an adoption decision. 4. Late Majority (next 35 percent) tend to adopt from economic/social necessity due to the diffusion effect. They usually are skeptical and cautious and have few extra resources to risk on high-involvement innovations. 5. Laggards (final 15 percent) are the most localite, suspicious of change agents and innovations, and have few resources to risk. It might sound as if the laggards are a doltish lot. In fact, persons within this category might be highly innovative in their symbolic adoption but slow to implement because they have few financial resources to offset transition costs or little access to innovation-evaluation information. By coincidence or design, laggards are the "smartest" ones when seemingly beneficial innovations become unexpectedly costly or ineffective. The inability of some to adopt when they would like to do so underscores the fact that new technology adoption can further existing inequalities. That is, if the new technology creates economic advantages, but requires resources to offset transaction costs, then income inequalities can widen as a result of new technology adoption. The innovativeness-needs paradox refers to the social problem wherein the individuals who most need the benefits of an innovation generally are the last to adopt it. Empirical Example In The Social Fabric and Innovation Diffusion: The Case of Food Irradiation Stephen Sapp and Peter Korsching describe how the diffusion approach can be used to understand consumer opinions of food irradiation. They found that, while information about food irradiation from its opponents can create negative opinions about it, over time these opinions become more positive due mainly to the consumer's compliance with the viewpoints of opinion leaders. Thus, their findings support the diffusion of innovations approach in showing that opinion leader influence can have a significant effect on consumer opinions. 125 Changing people's customs is an even more delicate responsibility than surgery. Edward H. Spicer, Human Problems in Technological Change. These things must be done delicately, or you hurt the spell. The Wicked Witch of the West, The Wizard of Oz. Introduction Research and experience have shown that the diffusion of innovations approach is highly effective in gaining adoption of many types of innovations across a wide variety of settings. The question that remains to be addressed in Sociology 415 is, "Should sociologists become involved as change agents?" Recall that we are thinking of the sociologist as employed by the public with funding from their tax dollars. Recall also that all innovations inevitably bring about negative consequences for some members of the population. So, should a publicly funded employee seek change that will benefit some and create negative consequences for others? Should the sociologist, as a publicly employed scientist, advocate for/against adoption of genetically modified food, food irradiation, affirmative action, feminism, environmentalism, use of contraceptives ... ? This question is as old as the field of sociology and cannot be answered by policy. The answer is left to the judgment of the sociologist. What Rogers asks us to keep in mind as we consider our options is that sometimes seemingly benign actions aimed at societal improvement undertaken with the best of intentions can create very negative consequences (e.g., read "Steel Axes for Stone-Age Aborigines," pages 421-422 in Rogers, or for examples closer to home, read about the failed Pruitt-Igoe Housing Project or the controversial social program of forced school busing). In Chapters 3 and 11, Rogers describes how social change can result in unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable consequences and recommends approaches sociologists can take to avoid negative consequences when they become involved in the delicate process of acting as a change agents. Compass Key Questions What are the ethical obligations of the change agent? How can negative consequences associated with technology adoption be mitigated? Examples What negative consequences might be anticipated as a result of societal adoption or rejection of the sampler technologies? What policies might be adopted to mitigate negative consequences of societal adoption or rejection of the sampler technologies? 126 Contributions and Criticisms of the Diffusion Approach This final section of Sociology 415 reviews contributions and criticisms of the diffusion of innovations approach and suggestions offered by Everett Rogers for mitigating negative consequences associated with new technology adoption. The central point of Chapters 3 and 11 is that change agents, given their accountability to all citizens, have a responsibility to address negative consequences. Contributions of the Diffusion of Innovations Approach Rogers first reviews contributions of the diffusion approach in helping sociologists and other change agents gain adoption of new technologies. 1. The diffusion model is relevant to many disciplines and topics. The model enjoys much popularity among a wide variety of academic disciplines, public agencies, and private firms in providing insight into adoption decisions and strategies for gaining adoption. The approach works, it works in many settings worldwide, and it has done so for many years. The diffusion of innovations model serves as the foundation for every social change program in the world. 2. The model has a strong applied focus. Although supported by much sound social science theory, one need not be an professional social scientist to develop practical programs for social change. The methodology of diffusion is clear-cut and relatively easy to implement. Criticisms of the Diffusion of Innovations Approach Because the sociologist is supposed to engineer society in a favorable manner, the unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable consequences of technology adoption need to be foreseen and mitigated as much as possible. No small task! This section describes criticisms of the diffusion approach. Not all the criticisms reviewed by Rogers are presented here. Some of them are relevant only to professional sociologists conducting research on the model itself. Please read all the criticisms of the model presented in Chapter 3, but just the ones likely to be of interested to most persons are listed below. Overadoption Overadoption is adoption when experts suggest rejection, or less adoption. This criticism is a variation on the theme that one can have too much of a good thing. Too much housing development in certain locations, for example, can be detrimental to environmental quality. Too much use of antibiotics in medications, animal feed, and cleaning products frightens microbiologists who express concerns about bacteria developing a strong resistance to antibiotics, thereby becoming "supergerms" that will be difficult to defeat. Sometimes, good innovations should not be adopted by persons who cannot afford them or cannot use them wisely because of insufficient knowledge of how they work. Thus, the delicate task of social change is fraught with many hidden dangers. One value choice leads to another. Questions that come to mind are: Which innovations should be diffused? Who should have them? Who should not have them? Should limits be placed upon technology adoption? Pro-Innovation Bias 127 The pro-innovation bias is the implication that the innovation should be adopted by all members of the social system. New technologies offer wonderful promises for a better, brighter tomorrow. Many technologies have lengthened the life span, eased burdens, and provided much entertainment and pleasure. Technological failures, however, sometimes bring about heartbreaking catastrophes. Given their responsibilities to all citizens to improve society, sociologists are obligated to investigate potential negative consequences rather than blindly accept the promises of new technologies. The sociologist must be critical in evaluating new technologies, recognizing that some technologies are produced for and by the power elite. Reduction of inequalities sometimes requires the sociologist to note that adoption will increase inequalities or cause the less powerful to bear a disproportionate share of the risk. The Individual-Blame Bias The individual-blame bias is a tendency to blame individuals for their non-adoption. Of course, some persons are laggards simply because they do not like change, are slow to understand new technologies, and so forth. The responsible change agent, however, must look beyond such individualistic explanations to fully understand non-adoption because not all laggards are ignorant, resistant to change, or otherwise personally predisposed to reject new technologies. One course of action for the change agent to pursue in understanding non-adoption is to investigate how the characteristics of the innovation might influence some persons to be laggards. It might be, for example, that laggards fully understand the features of the innovation but do not find it compatible with their values (e.g., Amish and Mennonites reject many technologies based upon their religious beliefs). Laggards might want to adopt an innovation but do not have the financial ability to do so (e.g., safer automobiles tend to be more expensive to purchase). It might be that laggards do not have a good opportunity to adopt because the innovation is not easily available to them (e.g., a person might be anxiously awaiting the opportunity to have a cable connection to the internet when it becomes available in their geographic area). The explanations provided above for non-adoption focus upon legitimate reasons why some persons are laggards. The system-blame perspective, as a second explanation of non-adoption, seeks to understand why many persons rather than just laggards do not adopt. Why, for example, were many persons reluctant to wear seatbelts when driving their automobiles? Blaming many persons for being ignorant, lazy, etc. when many persons are made aware of a new technology is not an adequate explanation for widespread non-adoption. To understand why many persons do not adopt an innovation that seems beneficial, sociologists must investigate system-level constraints to adoption. What might seem like individual reluctance to adopt might be a symptom of cultural or structural conditions in society that impede adoption. It might be that issues of compatibility are widely felt within a society (e.g., many persons reject abortion because they consider it to be immoral, or said another way, they see abortion as harmful rather than as beneficial). It might be that societal infrastructure does not encourage adoption (e.g., it has taken time for policies to be developed to support individual use of ethanol as a fuel additive). It might be that societal infrastructure erodes the effects of adoption (e.g., Ralph Nader, in Unsafe at Any Speed, pointed out that, even if drivers wore seatbelts, automobile and highway construction technologies and policies significantly contributed to motor vehicle injuries and deaths). It might be that societal-level practices constrain adoption (e.g., a colleague noted 128 that practices in some countries encourage unsafe of dangerous pesticides because powerful interest groups are capable of influencing national policies). No-till farming, for example, was difficult to diffuse because the prevailing culture defined a "good farmer" as one who removed all crop residue from the field and cut deep furrows with mole board plows after harvest. Redefining the "good farmer" was a critical part of gaining adoption of no-till conservation practices. A second system-level explanation for slow adoption is that new innovations might threaten the status of the power elite. If so, then the power elite might create barriers to the development and dissemination of the new technology. Issues Related to Furthering Inequalities The critical perspective of sociology asserts that the powerful elite will intentionally encourage the development of technologies that maintain or further their class standing. Such activity might or might not occur; it is difficult to prove technological conspiracies to further inequalities. Proving intent by the powerful elite, however, is unnecessary when investigating negative consequences of technology adoption. Whether by intent of the powerful elite or not, new technology adoption can further inequalities between upper and lower classes. New technology adoption can further inequalities for several reasons: 1. People in upper classes typically have greater input to research and development planning and decision making. Through their contacts and memberships on committees and advisory councils they can suggest needs for technologies that seem appropriate to them and consequently tend to benefit them more than they benefit persons in lower class positions. 2. Upper class people are more likely to hear about new technologies earlier than are persons in lower class positions. Earlier knowledge of emerging technologies gives upper class persons an edge in planning for change. Upper class persons are more likely to hear innovation-evaluation information earlier than their lower class counterparts and therefore know in advance how well a new technology works. 3. By definition, upper class persons have greater economic resources that allow them to take risks on new technologies that would be too great for persons with less money. Thus, because upper class persons have more input to technology research and development, learn earlier than other persons about new technologies, and are in a better position to take economic risks, they are able to take advantage of beneficial technologies earlier than persons in lower class positions. These privileges can further inequalities because oftentimes the marginal benefits of a new technology are highest at its early stages of implementation. Profit margins are higher early on and decrease as competing firms produce similar technologies or as patents expire. Competitive advantages of increased efficiency or productivity are higher early on and decrease as others adopt similar practices. Persons in position to adopt early, therefore, reap more benefits. Rogers refers to advantages accrued through early adoption as windfall profits. If the elite adopt a beneficial technology early, then inequalities increase, whether through intentional conspiracies or not. Exploitation of Weaker Social Systems The Enlightenment perspective is that "the more advanced the technology the better" because everyone benefits from increased productivity and efficiency. The critical 129 perspective, on the other hand, asserts that technology adoption might decrease rather than increase quality of life. The critical perspective outlines four ways in which the more powerful can exploit resources from the less powerful through diffusion of new technologies: 1. Economic Leakage refers to loss of potential income to another social system. Economic leakage occurs, for example, when people living in one town conduct most of their shopping in a neighboring town; money "leaks" out of their home town. To better understand the process of economic leakage and how it can be a mechanism of exploitation it is instructive to place the phenomenon within the context of different levels of economic development. A primary economy is one that focuses mainly upon raw commodity production (e.g., growing food crops, mining raw ore). A secondary economy is capable of further manufacturing of raw commodities; it adds value to raw commodities (e.g., processing food products, finishing metals and minerals). A tertiary economy finances raw commodity production and manufacturing and coordinates trade in raw and value-added goods. Typically, profit margins increase in more advanced economies. Social systems with secondary economies are in a position to further economic leakage from social systems with primary economies by providing them with technologies that increase their capacity to produce raw commodities. The transfer of production technology from the secondary to primary economy serves as an investment that increases profits to the secondary economy because the primary economy can produce more raw materials at a lower unit cost. Similarly, tertiary economies are in a position to increase their profits by transferring technologies to primary and secondary economies that increase their capacities to produce and process raw commodities. From the structure-function perspective, such activity increases the productivity and efficiency of the global capitalist system and is therefore beneficial to all. From the critical perspective, technology transfer for the purpose of increasing raw commodity production and processing by a social system with a tertiary economy amounts to exploitation of weaker social systems. From either perspective, the long-term well-being of social systems with primary economies can be decreased if tertiary economies transfer only raw commodity production technologies to them because less developed social systems can find it difficult to increase their capabilities to develop secondary or tertiary economies. They advance technologically in producing raw commodities, but they remain less developed because they do not advance technologically in adding value to raw commodities. Americans sometimes wonder why the United States has liberal trade policies for transferring production technologies to less developed countries. Understood from the perspective of economic leakage, one realizes that, as a social system with a tertiary economy, the U.S. benefits by providing technologies that increase the rate of production of raw commodities because it will enjoy the higher profit margins of financing greater commodity production and processing. 2. Dependency refers simply to relying upon other social systems to support production in the host social system. If, for example, a less developed country adopts technologies more advanced than their current capabilities, they become dependent upon the core country that provided the technology to train persons to use the technologies, repair them, and integrate them within production systems that rely upon other technologies provided by core countries. 130 Another advantage to the United States of transferring production technologies to less developed (i.e., host) countries is that they become dependent upon the U.S. for training users of the technologies and providing parts and other support services for technology maintenance. 3. Political influence of leaders of host countries facilitates transfer of technologies that can further the economic position of core countries. Because technology transfer is an important element of trade, trade policies can transcend differences in political and ideological outlooks. The United States has supported dictatorships and traded with communist nations and nations with many human rights violations whose trade policies favor U.S. economic development and technology transfer. 4. Too rapid social change sometimes can result from technology transfer. Indicators of too rapid social change are feelings of anomie (loss of common values, sense of mission, or feelings of belonging) and alienation (feelings of being unimportant, disconnected from others) that can result in higher rates of crime, family disruption, and loss of productivity. Rapid social change can create vulnerabilities in social structure and functioning that allow core countries to exploit local resources or influence technology and trade policies. The web pages listed below discuss issues of rapid social change and negative consequences that can result from too rapid adoption of core-country technologies. The Consequences of Culture Change. Globalization and Rapid Social Change. Social Change After the September 11 Terrorist Attack on the United States. Rogers summarizes this classical approach to development in a chart that shows the dominant paradigm of development and suggested alternatives to it. Ethical Responsibilities of Change Agents Everett Rogers suggests ways the change agent can act responsibly in diffusing information about new technologies. The guiding principle is that, because the diffusion approach is effective in gaining adoption of innovations, the change agent has a responsibility to explore potential negative as well as positive consequences associated with technology adoption. Principles of Ethical Conduct Ethical conduct for a change agent involves asking questions that explore motives for technology development and dissemination and potential negative consequences of technology adoption. Typical Diffusion Questions: 131 Rogers notes that too often change agents focus their attention too strongly upon gaining adoption. In so doing they ask questions that focus their attention only on adoption: 1. How are technological innovations diffused in a social system? 2. What are the characteristics of innovators, etc.? 3. What is the role of opinion leaders in the interpersonal networks through which a new idea diffuses in a social system? More Appropriate Questions: Rogers states that more appropriate questions explore the social context of technology development and dissemination: 1. 2. 3. 4. What criteria guide the choice of which innovations will be diffused? Who decides which innovations should be developed? Who controls the communication channels? What is the nature of the society's social structure and what will be the impact of the innovation on this structure? Strategies for Reducing Inequalities Rogers suggests strategies the change agent can use to reduce gap-widening consequences of new technology adoption. He organizes these suggestions into the three major reasons why socioeconomic gaps widen as a result of innovation adoption: Strategies When Ups Have Greater Access to Information: 1. Provide redundant information to allow Downs the opportunity to hear and understand information about innovations. 2. Tailor messages to Downs. Messages, for example, might rely more upon drawings and pictures than text. 3. Tailor media to Downs. Rogers points out that in the United States, for example, persons of lower socioeconomic class depend upon television more than print media to learn about innovations. 4. Organize small group presentations to Downs to help them understand innovations. 5. Encourage more change agent contact among Downs. Rogers notes that, because change agents typically are more homophilous (i.e., similar in social characteristics) with Ups and heterophilous (dissimilar in social characteristics) with Downs, they tend to focus too much of their attention on gaining adoption among Ups rather than Downs. Rogers urges change agents to more actively seek contact with Downs. Strategies When Ups Have Greater Access to Innovation-Evaluation Information: 1. Typically, change agents identify opinion leaders that influence Ups. Rogers suggests that change agents identify opinion leaders among downs to provide them with innovation-evaluation information. 2. Use change agent aides among downs. Rogers notes that experience has shown that using paraprofessional aides recruited from among Downs helps Downs better understand innovation-evaluation information and gain trust in change agents. 3. Organize groups among the downs. Rogers reinforces the need for change agents to have more contact with Downs, including organizing interest groups who might serve as information providers for a wide variety of innovations. Strategies When Ups Possess Greater Slack Resources: 1. Encourage core social systems to develop and disseminate technology appropriate to the socioeconomic conditions of the host social system. Oftentimes, the technology of most use to host social systems is much less advanced than the technology most 132 2. 3. 4. 5. advocated by the core social system. Appropriate technology can be less expensive to implement and lessen dependency upon core social systems. Urge change agents to help Downs form cooperatives to provide them with purchasing and selling power in relation to core social systems. Encourage research and development organizations to include Downs in the planning and dissemination of new technologies. Advocate for core social systems to fund special agencies to work only with the Downs. Encourage change agents to place more emphasis on diffusion of decentralized innovations. Decentralized innovations, in contrast with centralized innovations, encourage greater sharing of power and information. They take more of a problemcentered approach to technology development, are highly adaptable to local conditions, come from experimentation by nonexperts in local settings, and give power to local people to make adoption decisions. Summary Because all technologies bring about negative consequences for some, the delicate process of technology transfer is, itself, a complex and controversial task. Change agents, knowing the power of the diffusion approach in gaining adoption, must be aware of the responsibilities that accompany the application of diffusion strategies. Change agents should strive to reduce the gap-widening effects of new technology adoption. 133 The choice of technology, whether for a rich or poor country, is probably the most important decision to be made. George McRobie, Conservation Foundation Letter, October, 1976. Science, Technology, and Society 1. Because technology is embedded within a social context, it is influenced by social, political, and economic interests and its transfer from one social system to another can be problematic. 2. Expert opinion regarding the production of technology does not necessarily imply expert opinion regarding the use and transfer of technology. 3. Evaluation of technology is exceedingly difficult, and depends upon a wide range of indicators, including ones outside the domain of science (e.g., is legalized abortion moral?). Social scientists should pay greater attention to: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. the 'political economy' of the scientific laboratory, the organization and culture of private sector research and development, the impact of public interest groups on science and technology, integrating other social sciences into the sociology of science, and building linkages between the sociology of science and public policy makers who influence the direction of science and technology. The Philosophy of Technology 1. From the Classical perspective, technology is neither good nor bad, but a simple derivation from the immutable laws of the universe. 2. From the Enlightenment perspective, science provides a means to dominate nature through an ongoing process of improving technology and solving social problems. 3. From the Critical perspective, technology is created by and for the benefit of the power elite who use technology to exploit resources from the less powerful. 4. Risk is not necessarily a neutral language. It might represent the deeply interested knowledge of those who are able to command it. 5. "The real uncertainty at stake in the language of risk is the relationship between power and democracy." The Philosophy of Science 1. It is impossible for science to be objective, value-free, and unbiased. 2. The best approach to achieving as much objectivity as possible is to rely upon the intersubjective opinion of the community of scholars. 3. The community of scholars, however, harbors inherent biases characteristic of all human collectivities. 4. If science is inherently biased, then so is technology in its development, assessment, dissemination, and management. Social Philosophy 1. The social structure paradigm views society as if it were a living organism. Society is conceptualized as having parts, or institutions (i.e., economy, religion, education, family, politics), wherein each part performs an essential function and works in 134 harmony with the other institutions for the benefit of the whole society. This emphasis on society as a whole means that technologies are evaluated for how they benefit the overall efficiency and productivity of the society in meeting its needs for survival. 2. From the critical perspective, society is a system of competing parts in conflict for scarce resources. All social systems are considered to have a small minority of power elites who control most of the functions of society. All social action, including the development and dissemination of technology, takes place within an arena of conflict and exploitation of secondary segments of society by dominant segments of society. 3. The human agency paradigm focuses not upon societal institutions or power relationships within society, but upon interactions among the members of the society. It addresses issues of how people make the rules that determine which technologies will be adopted and which ones will be rejected. Risk Assessment 1. Technical approaches to risk assessment attempt to identify hazard, the probability of technology failure. 2. Cost-benefit approaches estimate potential costs, including the costs of potential technology failure, in relation to potential benefits of a technology. 3. Psychological approaches focus on how knowledge acquisition and emotions affect public perceptions of technology risk. 4. Sociological approaches note that risks are socially constructed through people's interactions with others. Perceived social acceptability plays an important role in public risk assessments. 5. Cultural approaches point out that moral and ethical issues affect public perceptions of a technology. 6. All approaches to risk assessment have benefits and drawbacks. 7. All approaches are necessary for a complete understanding of risk. Critiques of Risk Assessment Part I Can we assess risk better? John Adams notes that sometimes the public and scientific experts differ in their evaluations of technology risk. This disagreement occurs, in part, because the public uses a wide variety of criteria, including some nonscientific criteria, in its evaluations of risk. Adams suggests keeping in mind the following observations on the evaluation of risk by technical experts: 1. 2. 3. 4. Remember, everyone else is seeking to manage risk, too. They are all guessing; if they knew for certain, they would not be dealing with risk. Their guesses are strongly influenced by their beliefs. Their behavior is strongly influenced by their guesses and tends to reinforce their beliefs. 5. It is the behavior of others, and the behavior of nature, that constitute the actual risk environment. 6. It will never be possible to capture "objective risk." Part II The approach taken to risk assessment influences what is assessed and the outcome of the assessment. In this section, we discussed how approaches to risk assessment differ. 1. The technical approach implies communication strategies that educate the public about technical risk assessments. When risk assessments become public and consumer perceptions do not coincide with actual risk, then, from the technical perspective, acceptance of a new technology can be unnecessarily delayed or implementation can become more expensive than necessary. Thus, public rejection of 135 the logic of technical risk assessments is considered to be irrational. Risk communication strategies focuses upon educating an ignorant and sometimes irrational public about actual risk. Strategies seek to reduce outrage based upon inaccurate perceptions so as to retain a focus on actual risk. 2. The psychometric approach seeks to identify the cognitive, emotional, and socialdemographic determinants of public perceptions of risk. Why do we respond to risks in the way we do? Why do public perceptions of risk differ so greatly from those of technical experts? The psychometric approach has discovered how outrage factors affect public responses to risk and developed strategies for overcoming public resistance to new technologies. Risk communication strategy seeks to reduce outrage by appealing to the public's sense of voluntariness, control, fairness, and moral responsibility in technology development and dissemination. 3. The social process approach begins with the premise that risk and technology are social processes rather than physical entities that exist independently of the humans who assess and experience them. Risk communication is viewed as interactive among technicians, the public, and organizations that have a vested interest in gaining either adoption or rejection of the technology. This approach thereby emphasizes the free exchange of ideas and mediation of sometimes competing agendas regarding risk assessment and management. The focus is more upon the quality of discourse rather than the substance of the arguments themselves. Risk and Public Policy 1. Public policy is formulated within the context of risk perceptions, which, in turn, reflect the public's opinions of the quality of risk assessment. 2. Risk assessors and the public face dilemmas (i.e., fact-value, standardization, contributor's, de minimis, and consent) in their attempts to balance technical evaluations with the public's desires for nontechnical input into risk assessment. 3. Accusations directed at a skeptical public delivered by technical experts assert that the public is anti-technology, are remote from power and influence, will never be satisfied with anything but 100% safety. 4. Attributions of motives to laypersons oftentimes are inappropriate and unfounded. 5. Sometimes developed countries explain away unethical dissemination of known hazardous technology to developing nations with rationalizations (i.e., isolationist, social-progress, countervailing benefits, and consent) about their efforts at promoting progress. 6. The government and industry should recognize that minimizing harm is more important than providing good, protect the public, assist consumers in their self-determination, and stress the importance of values and long-term economic gain vs. short-term economic benefits. Risk and Public Discourse 1. Risk management has become increasingly politicized and contentious. Controversy and conflict might have become too pervasive. It might be that the quality of society erodes with too contentious public discourse about technology policy. 2. Risk controversies are not about science versus misguided public perceptions of science, wherein the unwashed public needs to be educated about "real" risks. Rather, risk controversies are struggles over whom will define risk. 3. Disparities between "real" and "perceived" risk might engender public discourse that, itself, is a risk to the social fabric of society. 4. The pervasiveness of media attention to technology and risk assessments destroys trust because most of what the media reports is trust-destroying news. 5. The increasing complexity of technological innovations and societal division of labor leaves citizens in a position of not knowing much about highly complex and potentially dangerous technologies. They must rely upon their judgments about whom to trust. 6. The public is not irrational in their skepticism about complex technologies, but rather 136 7. 8. 9. 10. 11. 12. cautious in deciding whom to trust in their understandable state of ignorance about these technologies. The public and scientists rely upon social as well as technical criteria to evaluate risk. Claims that the public is irrational in part are responsible for increasingly contentious debate about complex technologies. Some special interest groups profit from fear mongering within this atmosphere of ignorance and fragile trust. The media have a difficult job of presenting varying viewpoints on technical issues. The concept recreancy refers to institutional failure resulting either from lack of competence and/or fiduciary responsibility, to refer to societal-level inadequacies in risk assessment, management, and communication. Improving societal-level capacity in risk assessment, management, and communication requires social scientists to assess the level of recreancy in American society, become more aware of societal-level influences on risk assessment, management, and communication, and build institutional capacity to facilitate wise technology policymaking. The Media and Risk Management 1. The Natural History Explanation posits that risk communication occurs in four stages: pre-problem, alarmed discovery, awareness of technological fixes, and loss of interest in the topic. 2. The Public Arena Model posits that risk issues must compete with other newsworthy items for mass media exposure. Risks associated with complex and controversial technologies might be covered in the media, but their length of coverage and degree of exposure depends upon other topics of the day. 3. The Hoopla Effect refers to heightened awareness of controversy due to media reports of controversy. 4. Research shows that negative media information carries disproportionate weight in influencing initial public opinions of technology. Risk Communication Risk communication is the exchange of information and opinions concerning risk and risk-related factors among risk assessors, risk managers, consumers, and other interested parties. The goals of risk communication are to: 1. Improve the effectiveness and efficiency of the risk analysis process, 2. Promote consistency and transparency in arriving at and implementing risk management decisions, 3. Promote awareness and understanding of the specific issues of the risk analysis process, 4. Strengthen the working relationships and mutual respect among risk assessment and management participants, 5. Exchange information among interested parties to risk analysis and management, and 6. Foster public trust and confidence in risk analysis and management. Essential aspects of proper risk communication include knowing the audience, involving scientific experts, establishing expertise in communication, being a credible source of information, sharing responsibility, differentiating between science and value judgment, assuring transparency, and placing risk in perspective. The following elements should be included as part of a risk communication program: 1. 2. 3. 4. knowing the nature of risk, knowing the nature of the benefits, knowing the uncertainties in risk assessment, pursuing risk management options, 137 5. recognizing barriers to risk assessment, and 6. recognizing barriers associated with human agency, Strategies for effective risk communication include: 1. 2. 3. 4. 5. gathering background information, preparation of technical facts, recognition of outrage conditions, two-way communication, and review and evaluation of previous communication. Strategies for mitigating negative consequences of a risk crisis include: 1. Describe in an open and honest manner the extent of the crisis and measures being taken to control it. 2. Inform the public about how to reduce their risk exposure. 3. Help the public identify the hazard and how to avoid it. 4. Describe how to prevent further exposure to the risk. 5. Provide complete, up-to-date, and accurate information about the crisis. 6. Keep messages simple. 7. Choose and rely upon a media spokesperson. 8. Acknowledge prior misbehavior. 9. Acknowledge current problems. 10. Share control and be accountable. Diffusion of Innovations 1. The mistake made most often in attempts at technology transfer is to assume that transmission of the scientific facts about the technology will be sufficient to gain adoption of it. 2. To effectively gain adoption, one must influence the social comparison process, understand the innovation-decision process, assist in easing the transition to the new technology, and mitigate negative consequences associated with new technology adoption. 3. Diffusion is a process whereby an innovation is communicated through certain channels over time within social systems. 4. An innovation is an idea, practice, or object that is perceived as new. Innovations can be material or nonmaterial. 5. Innovations vary in relative advantage, compatibility, complexity, trialability, and observability. 6. Mass media presentations create awareness, disseminate hardware, software, and innovation-evaluation messages, and provide feedback to potential adopters about those who have adopted. Because they create awareness, mass communications place some pressure upon opinion leaders to make decisions about a new technology. 7. Interpersonal communications between experts and the public, opinion leaders and the public, and among friends and family are equally as essential as mass communications in bringing about new technology adoption. 8. Diffusion takes place within the context of structures of social relationships based upon power, norms, and public acceptability. 9. Technology adoption, as a form of human agency, depends strongly upon social comparison processes that lead to choice shift. 10. Technology adoption always brings about changes in normative expectations. 11. The two-step flow model has been shown to provide good explanation of adoption of complex technologies. 12. Change agent communication with others is aided by homophily and hindered by heterophily. 13. The defining characteristic of opinion leaders is they are well respected in their social system. 138 14. Techniques for identifying opinion leaders include the positional, self-designating, reputational, sociometric, and observational. 15. Cliques of heterophilous opinion leaders are bridged by interstitial persons. 16. Change agent success depends upon effort, client orientation, empathy, contact with opinion leaders, contact with lower status clients, and effective use of paraprofessional aides. 17. The classical diffusion approach assumes a centralized research and development organization that makes most decisions about the innovation and its diffusion. The decentralized diffusion approach entails technology development and dissemination from small firms, local entrepreneurs, and grass-roots organizations. 18. The innovation-decision process involves knowledge, persuasion, symbolic adoption, implementation, and confirmation. 19. Re-invention can lead to increased flexibility in applications of the innovation, increased relative advantage for local use, and increased sense of ownership over the new technology. It can also bring about improper application leading to less effectiveness of the innovation, inability of the research and development organization to maintain quality control over the technology in use, and legal problems if the change infringes upon the protection of a closely related technology. 20. Innovators are quick to adopt, but have little influence on others to adopt. Opinion leaders are early adopters. The early and late majority follow the lead of opinion leaders and are thus influenced by the diffusion effect. Laggards are slow to adopt or never adopt. 21. Laggards are not necessarily slow to symbolically adopt an innovation. 22. All adoption leads to unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable consequences for some. 23. Because the sociologist is supposed to engineer society in a favorable manner, the unintended, unanticipated, and undesirable consequences of technology adoption need to be foreseen and mitigated as much as possible. 24. Overadoption is adoption when experts suggest rejection, or less adoption. This criticism is a variation on the theme that one can have too much of a good thing. 25. The pro-innovation bias is the implication that the innovation should be adopted by all members of the social system. 26. The individual-blame bias is a tendency to blame individuals for their non-adoption. 27. Whether by intent of the powerful elite or not, new technology adoption can further inequalities between upper and lower classes due to economic leakage, political influence, too rapid social change, and dependency upon the developers of new technologies. 28. The change agent is ethically responsible for attempting to mitigate negative consequences associated with new technology adoption. 139