Download 1 POLICY REFORM: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION WEEK 3: DAY

POLICY REFORM: THE SOCIAL DIMENSION
WEEK 3: DAY 1
AN INTRODUCTION TO GENDER ECONOMICS: WOMEN IN THE HOUSEHOLD
by Kirsten Friis-Jensen and Noman Kanafani, Royal Agricultural University
CONTENTS
1. INTRODUCTION
2. KEY CONCEPTS
2.1. The Household
2.2. Reproduction and Production
2.3. Gender versus Sex Division of Labour
2.4. Wage Labour versus Non-Wage Labour
2.5. Cash Crop versus Food Crop Production
2.6. Harmony versus Conflict of Interests within the Household
3. GENDER IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
3.1. New Home Economics
3.1.1. Human-Capital Earning Model
3.1.2. The Household Utility Function
3.2. The Boserupian Thesis
3.2.1. Boserup's Agricultural Systems
3.2.2. The Links between Agricultural Systems and Gender
3.3. Limits of the Models
4. POLICY REFORM INFLUENCE ON GENDER
4.1. Promotion of Cash Crops
4.1.1. Cash Crops and Male-Female Comparative Advantages
4.1.2. Cash Crops and the Agricultural Systems
4.2. New technology.
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
6. QUESTIONS FOR DISCUSSION
APPENDIX: BOSERUP’S AGRICULTURAL SYSTEMS
REFERENCES
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1. INTRODUCTION
The aim of this chapter is to investigate the gender dimension within economic analysis at the
micro level. The intention is to see how various measures of policy reform may affect men and
women differently.
Economists like to think of their discipline as «genderless» discipline. We rarely think of men
and women when we use economic tools of analysis. This is especially true because
conventional economic theory takes the «individual» as the basic unit of analysis. Yet, this
«individual» has been always referred to as the "economic man", as a «he». And «he» has
become an institutionalised term, synonymous with a human being. The feminists, however
see that as a symptom of the rooted male-bias of economics.
Taking the individual as the main decision-making unit does not mean that economists ignore
family as a basic social institution. It is true that the theory pays hardly any attention to the
economic relations and transactions which take place within the family. But the main cause of
that is the implicit assumption of conventional theory that the interest of the family, as a unit, is
in harmony with the interests of every member of it. Consequently, economists often overlook
what really goes on within the households. The household demands resources, transforms them
into services and offers them for sale at the market- place. The transformation process as well
as the distribution of benefits happens without conflict. Traditional economics views the
household as a smooth-working unit where all participants’ utility and preferences are fulfilled
according to a well functioning distribution and a balance is maintained between the family's
needs and constraints. This implicit, and unrealistic, assumption turns the family into a
somewhat mysterious institution, a "black-box" and helps disguise the intentional, or nonintentional, male bias. No doubt that many economists were totally shocked when they were
accused of being «male chauvinists»!
Although much has happen since then, it is not possible yet to claim that we know now all what
need to be known about that «black box». The process of looking into it was gradual and slow.
It started with the seminal articles of Mincer (1962) and Becker (1965) which concentrated on
the allocation of women’s time. These articles made economists aware of the possible gender
dimension in their theory and of the possible conflict between the family and its individual
members: i.e. of the question concerning the individual’s willingness to maximise the family’s
well-being (Blau and Ferber, 1986). However, the first empirically based analysis of women’s
participation in the labour force, with its link to the evolution of farming systems, did not come
before 1970. It was undertaken by Ester Boserup who attempted to correlate that evolution
process with population growth and technological change in the less-developed countries
(LDCs).
This chapter will concentrate on intra-household relations. The aim is to look at the effect of
these relations on men’s and women's options to become fully integrated in the economic
system within the agricultural environment in developing countries. It has been suggested that
gender differences are easier to expose within this framework. This is because in the economic
systems where many domestic duties have been transferred into semi-public or commercialised
goods (like kindergartens, supermarkets, old age homes, hospitals and so forth), the difference
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between men’s and women’s economic options becomes less clear. It is important to keep in
mind however that such differences in option exists also in developed economies - it is only a
matter of extent and degree of clarity.
We shall start by introducing some basic key concepts before moving to introduce two different
household models which attempt to look into the «black box». After a short evaluation of these
models we shall see how some instruments of policy reform can lead to different effects on
men and women, depending on which theoretical approaches is adopted. Finally we shall end
by summing up the chapter and drawing some conclusions.
2. KEY CONCEPTS
2.1. The Household
The household in this paper is either a nuclear family, which is a "coalition" of two adult agents
(male and female) and one or more dependent agents (children), or a household consisting of
one male and two or more wives and their children. These two types are distinct from the
extended family where the number of adult agents is larger and family relations are broader
(parents, aunts, uncles, cousins..etc). It is obvious that the extended family is a more
appropriate unit for analysis within rural environment in the developing countries. Yet, since
our central concern is gender relations, and since increasing the number of adult agents would
complicate the analysis, we shall use the above definitions of the household/family as a
working reference. Actually, the basic nature of the economic relations between men and
women changes only a little in the various family structures.
Naturally, the family as a social institution does not exist only for economic reasons. Yet, our
concern will be exclusively that, i.e. economic theory’s effort to comprehend and justify the
existence and the working of this social institution from an economic dimension.
2.2. Reproduction and production
The time of any individual is usually divided into work and non-work. The time spent at work,
unlike non-work time, generates income. Non-working time, on the other hand, can be
subdivided into two fractions: time for domestic duties and leisure time. Economics has little
to say about leisure time, whereas work time and time spend on domestic duties are quite
relevant. These are also referred to as production and reproduction times respectively.
Production involves all activities which generate present or future income. In agriculture this
typically involves time spent on production of food and cash crops, husbandry, poultry,
weaving, handicrafts and off-farm work.
Reproduction refers to various types of activities including biological reproduction (birth and
early caretaking of infants), generational reproduction (upbringing, socialisation and education
of children) and daily maintenance of the household, including collecting firewood and water,
cooking, cleaning, sewing, nursing the sick and so forth.
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The distinction between productive and reproductive activities is significant, because it is often
alleged that only productive work has economic value. This implies either that women do not
work or that their work is inferior in economic sense. It is obvious that the household existence
depends on the interaction between male and female activities since both productive and
reproductive tasks must be carried out.
As reproductive work, in traditional treatments, has no economic value, it seldom appears in
national statistics and surveys. Yet, it is quite possible to assign shadow prices for leisure and
reproduction times and incorporate them in national accounts as well as in family statistics.
The value of the time spent on non-work can be estimated as the forgone income due to not
working, and several reproductive activities result in good and services that would otherwise
have to be bought in the market. But even when this is done, women’s work will be
underestimated. This is because typical areas of female work pay less per hour compared to
men's productive tasks. Women are supposed thus to work more hours to equal the income of
the male in the household.
Another difference between women's and men's work, which also makes calculation even
harder, refers to the nature of time allocation. Men perform their duties by doing one task at a
time and their working day stops when they have conducted their part of the productive
activities. Women, in contrast, work within the household and their duties are often overlapping. They usually conduct more than one duty at the same time. And since their
responsibilities are numerous and continuous, the border between their work and leisure time is
often unclear and probably non-existent.
2.3. Gender division versus sex division of labour
Needless to say that the above division between production and reproduction reflects also the
standard division between men and women's time use. This however is mainly due to gender
rather than sex differentiation between men and women, i.e. it is due to bias and discrimination
rather than to the biological difference between the male and female. Apart from biological
reproduction, all the above mentioned activities can in principle be carried out by any person
independent of his or her sex. The term «gender» is therefore used in order to describe the
socially defined allocation of tasks between men and women. From this follows that typical
male and female work areas are defined differently in different cultures, and that gender
division of labour changes over time.
2.4. Wage labour versus non-wage labour
The traditional division of labour does not only mean that men are usually responsible for
production and women for reproduction tasks, but also that women’s productive labour is often
not accounted for. Rural women undertake productive activities that are complementary to
traditional male activities: weeding and harvesting are often carried out by women and
children, but these are usually counted as non-wage labour. This means that the whole family
is involved in productive activities, but final payment will often be received by the husband.
Also women are often responsible for producing for the household's domestic consumption
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(vegetables, eggs, clothes, mats, bricks for house repairs.. etc.). It is clear that these activities
are substitutes for buying the goods, but yet are not probably accounted for. Typically women
carry out these responsibilities along with all the reproduction tasks referred to earlier.
It is important to note that, although women’s main contribution is in the field of reproduction
and non-wage labour, they have often their own production activities which bring them own
income. These are typically related to marketing the surpluses of home food production and
extending domestic work, such as washing and cleaning for other people, along with many
types of handicrafts.
2.5. Cash Crop versus Food Crop Production
It is important also, within the agricultural context, to distinguish between cash crops and food
crops. Cash crop production (sugar cane, cocoa, peanuts, cotton, pineapples. etc.) are carried
out by farmers to receive cash income. Food crops on the other hand are produced primarily to
meet the household's basic food needs and the surplus is usually sold on the local market to
generate extra income for the household.
Much of the difference in production methods and productivity between these two crops is a
result of the substantial difference in the research and development (R&D) directed to them by
national and international agencies. Cash crop production is typically seen as an important
input to industry and significant contributor to the balance of payments. It receives, therefore,
much public attention and support. The commercial interests in cash production are also large
since it requires manufactured input (pesticides, fertiliser and high yield variety seeds). These
factors explain the relatively intensive public and commercial involvement in cash crops in
order to raise both demand for inputs and farmers’ productivity.
Food crop production receives, on the contrary, far less attention, probably because production
here is typically based on home-produced inputs (gain from last year’s harvest, animal manure
and manual weeding). Food crop production rests often on traditional knowledge and practice
and the cycle runs independent of public and commercial interests. Furthermore, sales of
surplus usually take place in the informal markets which typically are not incorporated in
national statistics and surveys. The consequence is that production and productivity of food
crops grow at a much slower speed than that of cash crops, and the productivity gap between
them is continually widening.
There exists also a clear gender differentiation in responsibilities with respect to this crop
division. Whereas men typically are involved in the production of cash crops, women are
usually responsible for domestic food crops.
2.6. Harmony versus Conflict of Interests within the Household
Total household income consists of all incomes from production activities along with the value
of domestic production in kind. Any income generated from off-farm work is also included. It
is often assumed that members of each household pool their incomes together and redistribute
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them in such a way as to benefit all members equally.1 This is basically why traditional
economic theory reaches almost the same conclusions even when the family, rather than the
individual, is taken as basic decision unit. But the supposed harmony of interests of all the
members of the household may not exist in fact. The root of the problem is that while conflict
of interests within the household is quite conceivable, the household money income is usually
controlled by the adult male, although this income is a result of the collective efforts and work
of all family members.
To mention just one area where conflict of interest exists, we can refer to the surveys from
many parts of the worlds which show that women have a higher marginal propensity than men
(within the same income group) to spend on consumption items that benefit children and
enhance their capacities (Walters 1995, Elson, 1991). From this follows that women's proceeds
from their own productive activities is more likely to benefit the whole family, whereas men
would typically choose to spend a higher share of the income they control on their own
consumption. The fact that men generally earn more than women and, consequently, spend
larger absolute amounts on their families disguises their documented more selfish behaviour
(see Rogers 1995 for survey results from the Dominican Republic).
The possible conflict in interests exists along with an utterly unequal distribution of power and
means. Men control not only the main part of the household income, but also are typically the
actual owner of the household assets, including land. And although this factor is highly
culturally dependent, men often exercise ownership rights while women has a mere usership
rights with respect to household assets. If and when differences in preferences create an
internal conflict of interest in the household, husbands, who hold almost all the cards, usually
succeed in settling the matter in their own favour.2
3. GENDER IN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
Economists have developed some models to try to understand what is really going on within
the so-called "black box" of the household. We shall present here two different approaches
which attempt to explain and/or find out the root of gender differences, both within and outside
the household. The first approach is within the framework known as the New Home
Economics (NHE), and the second is usually refereed to as Boserup's Thesis. It is interesting
that both models arrive at the same conclusions with respect to the exclusion and degradation
of women in the labour market. But while the former interprets that as a logical consequence
of the households’ optimisation process, the latter sees it mainly as a product of the European
cultural influence and hegemony over local societies in LDCs.
1
This is the treatment in the so-called family welfare model, where the family acts as if it is
maximising an egalitarian family social welfare function. Family welfare here is the sum of
the utilities of all its members. The household members, in other words, act co-operatively the
whole way through. (See Stiglitz 1988 ).
2
The well-known economist A. Sen wrote: »Overall, men and boys have the upper hand over
women and girls in the distribution of household resources, particularly when these resources are
scarce». (Cited in Bunivic and Mehra, 1990)
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3.1. New Home Economics
This is the neo-classical approach to the subject. The model is developed and based on the
gender division of labour that appeared during the industrialisation process in Europe and
United States. According to this approach, the family is a product of the attempt of two
individual adults to gain higher utility. And since specialisation and exchange lead to larger
overall benefits, according to standard economic reasoning, then gender specialisation would
also maximise the family’s utility. Marriage, or cohabitation, is then a convenient transaction
on the basis of which a division of labour between man and women takes place, and that
division is governed purely by marginal productivities and optimisation requirements.
Cohabiting is an institution through which each adult "hires" the other and receives residual
"profits" in return: women "hire" men as breadwinners and men "hire" women as nursemaids,
and this brings about more utility for each of them than if they have chosen to live separately.
The merits of specialisation within the household is borrowed from the familiar concepts of
absolute and comparative advantages in international trade theory. The absolute advantages
appear when one person is more efficient than the other at household or reproductive work, and
at the same time is less efficient than the other at productive work. One person might have a
higher value of time spent at home relative to market earning power as compared to the other
person, and visa versa. Comparative advantage, which is a less obvious case, appears when
one individual is actually more efficient than the other both at productive and reproductive
activities. In both cases, of course, specialisation would be beneficial (Box 1).
It is suggested that typical families all over the world in general, and in the LDCs in particular,
exhibit strong absolute advantages between men and women. This is because girls are
traditionally brought up and trained in housework while boys are usually given productive
skills. The fact that biological reproduction is an exclusive domain for women strengthens this
trend. Comparative advantages within the family may appear in societies which have already
gone a long way on the road to male-female equality.
The Human Capital Earning Model
It is clear from the examples in Box 1 that the wage differential between men and women in the
market place plays the decisive role in determining the optimal allocation of time within the
household. It is also well-known and fully documented, that women all over the world earn
less than men (see for example Blau and Fermer, 1986). New Home Economics explains this
differential in earning by three factors: the opportunity costs of childbearing, education
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Box 1: The Advantages of Marriage
Assume that there are two persons M and W and that each of them has a total of 10 hours per day for both market
and non-market work. M earns 15 units per hour at the market while W earns only 10 units. Household work has
a value as well and is defined as the opportunity cost of not working on the market, i.e. 15 for M and 10 for W.
Absolute Advantages:
In this case W needs only 1 hour to do all the household work per day while M needs 2 hours, i.e. W is more
efficient at household work while M earns more at the market. As it can be seen in the following simple
calculation, marriage and specialisation are quite useful. The time spent on household work is reduced and income
from market work increased. Note that, after marriage, W spends an extra hour on the housework instead of the 2
hours M used to spend. Thus W is losing 10 units in income, but M is gaining 2 hours and is earning 30 units
more per day. The net gain is 20, and since W and M pool their resources together, both are supposed to become
better off by specialising.
Absolute
Advantages
Work type
Separate production
Market work
Housework
Specialisation & Exchange
Market work
Housework
M
8 h x 15 units
=
120 units
2 h x 15 units=
30 units
10 h x 15
units=
150 units
0 h x 15 units=
0 units
W
9 x 10 units=
90 units
1 h x 10 units=
10 units
8 h x 10 units=
80 units
2 h x 10 units=
20 units
Income
210 units
40 units
230 units
20 units
Comparative Advantages:
Even if M is more efficient at housework as well as in the market place, marriage and specialisation are
beneficiary. In the following example W needs 2 hours for reproductive work while M can do all his housework in
1 hour. As it can be seen in the following table, M should do all the household work and the family’s income from
market work will increase by 5 units.
Comparative
Advantages
Work type
Separate production
Market work
Housework
M
9 h x 15 units=
135 units
W
Income
Specialisation & Exchange
Market work
Housework
1 h x 15 units=
15 units
8 h x 15 units=
120 units
2 h x 15 units=
30 units
8 x 10 units=
80 units
2 h x 10 units=
20 units
10 h x 10
units=
100 units
0 h x 10 units=
0 units
215 units
35 units
220 units
30 units
Of course, W is not assigned any work at home only because M is relatively more efficient in doing that than in
working at market place. If wage differentials between them was 100%, just like the difference in efficiency at
household work, then specialisation by either of them in either of the two types of work would give the same
income. Actually, in this case the partners will not gain economically from marrying, i.e. from pooling their
resources together. Also, an increase in housework, due to say producing children, will reduce the family’s
income. But this does not necessarily imply that having children reduces the attraction of marriage. The utility
function of marriage incorporates several arguments (variables) along with income. Some of these arguments,
which increase utility, are non-monetary, such as the satisfaction
and happiness derived from love and from having
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children. Note finally that since we are implicitly assuming constant returns, the above simple examples results in
complete specialisation, i.e. sharing the household work is ruled out.
and work experience. These factors are incorporated in the human-capital earning equation.
Both men and women aim at maximising their life income, and in order to do that they invest
in themselves, i.e. they educate and train themselves and accumulate human capital. The
positive relation between human capital accumulation and the resulting increase in earning
power is formalised in the human-capital earnings function. The function suggests that the individual’s net earning in every period, Yt is the sum of basic earnings without education plus
the return on human capital investment that the individual has accumulated up to that period,
net of investment expenditure. Formally this can be expressed as follows (Mincer and
Polachek, 1980):
t-1
In Yt = In E0 + (r) . S ki + In (1 - kt )
i=0
where
Eo
r
k
(1)
is the individual’s basic earning without education,
is the average rate of return on the individual's human capital investment (assumed
constant and the same in every period),
is the ratio of investment expenditure to gross earning.
If we divide human capital investment into two components only, investment in schooling
(from year 0 to year s-1) and investment in formal and informal job training (as accumulated
from year s to year t-1), the above equation may be written as:
s-1
t-1
In Yt = In E0 + (r) . S ki + (r) . S kj + In (1 - kt ).
(2)
i=0
j=s
Also, investment ought to be decomposed explicitly here between net and gross, i.e. the factor
of human capital depreciation should be taken into account. When net investment is negative,
i.e. skills are being eroded, earning power declines. It is suggested here that skill depreciation
due to non-use of human capital stock is by far more important than depreciation due to use or
ageing » (Mincer and Polachek, 1980).
The model’s central point, in as far as we are concerned with here, is to demonstrate that both
the optimal magnitude and optimal distribution of human investment are substantially different
between men and women. The differences emerge basically because women’s work, unlike
that of men, is discontinuous. The «perfectly rational» variations in magnitude and pattern of
human investments «explain» the differences in earning between men and women.
It has been suggested that the above function fits the actual individual earning profiles of male
workers. The model also fits women's earnings profiles, provided they have continual contact
with the labour market, i.e. provided that their work habits are similar to those of men.
When we deal with women, two statistically documented facts should be taken into account.
Firstly, after marriage, women spend less than half of their lifetime in the labour market.
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Secondly, that this does not mean only fewer working years during a lifetime but several entries
into and exits from the labour market, which imply discontinuity of work experience.
In as far as the general pattern of investment allocation is concerned, it has been pointed out for
example, that when work experience is expected to be continuous, and the purpose of
investment is the acquisition and maintenance of market earning power, post-school investment
ratios kj would be expected to decline smoothly and continuously. This conclusion emerges
from models of optimal distribution of investment as well as from the simple observation that
as (t) increases, the remaining working life would shortens. Thus the incentives to invest in
post-schooling decline over the continuous working life.
The model arrives at two basic conclusions:
- Since job-related investment in human capital commands a return which is received at
work, the shorter the expected and actual duration of work experience, the weaker the incentives to augment job skills over the life cycle.
- Given the discontinuity of women's work, the conclusions that human capital
investment declines continuously over the successive years of life after leaving school is no
longer valid. The more the participation is continuous, the larger the investments on initial job
experience relative to later jobs will be.
Prospective work discontinuity induces women to acquire less job-training than men during
their pre-maternal employment. Prolonged non-participation in labour markets during the
period of childbearing and child care causes depreciation of skills acquired at school and at
work. It has also been suggested that «depreciation rate is higher when the accumulated stock
of human capital is larger». And to the extent that there is a prospect of continuity of
employment after the children reach school age, women have stronger incentives to resume
investments in job related skills. Thus, women’s optimal investment profile exhibit negative
investment in human capital during childbearing (depreciation), and two peaks before and after
that.3
In their effort to optimise their life earnings, women «chose» typically to have less education
than men. The rate of return on education is relatively lower for women. As women
know/assume that their participation in the labour force on average will be low and
discontinuous (because of biological reproductive tasks), their choice of less education is
consistent with the goal of maximising life income.
3
Mincer and Polachek (1980) applied also their model empirically using a small survey of the
US labour market. They attempted to find out to what extent the actual wage-gap (of 152%)
between married women and men with the same average schooling, can be explained by
differences in work histories, job investment and depreciation. Their results suggests that, if
women’s work experiences were as long as that of men, 45% of the wage gap would be
erased. They concluded that "At this stage of the research we cannot conclude that the
remaining unexplained part of the wage gap is attributable to discrimination, nor, for that
matter, that this explained part is not affected by discrimination." (P. 199)
It is interesting to note that E0, the basic earning without human capital investment or job
training, is typically lower for women than for men. The model, of course, fails to explain that.
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The human-capital earning model delivers a powerful attempt to explain the differences
between men and women's return on education and work experience. This, perhaps indirectly,
points at the opportunity cost of having children and of being involved in reproductive
activities. The model demonstrate that reproductive work has an acknowledged economic
value in terms of opportunity costs in two fields: first, the loss of income in off-work periods
and second the reduction of future income because of discontinuous work experience over the
years.
The Household Utility Function
As pointed out earlier, the family's utility function includes several arguments, monetary and
non-monetary. Individuals in the neo-classical world enjoy freedom of choice and they must
bear responsibility for the choices they make. One interesting question in this respect is why
does women «choose» to step out of the economic sphere and concentrate on reproductive
work? Considering that women’s weak economic position is due to their reproductive tasks (as
the above model suggests), why do they choose to do them, to have children for example? Is it
the case that non-monetary arguments in the household utility function appeal more to women
than to men? New Family Economies seems to answer this question affirmatively: women's
own preferences are more inclined towards non-market, non-monetary and non-earthly things!
The theory argues further that non-market-activities are not insignificant or inferior, they just
happen outside the economic framework.
The New Family Economics then understands and presents the household in terms of free
choices and optimisation under resource scarcity constraint and within specific social
environment. The gain from marriage is greater the more complementary the inputs of husband
and wife are. In societies with low substitution between market and non-market work, the
complementarity between gender will have greater influence on the family's well-being. As a
society moves towards greater substitution between work spheres, the dependence of one
gender on the other decreases, since the formerly home-made goods and services become
available at the market. Thus, as long as each family member is able to supply inputs and
services that are needed by the other member, the new approach provides useful insight on the
working of the family system.
3.2. The Boserupian Thesis
This model, unlike the earlier one, is historical, developed within agricultural systems in
particular and has more practical foundation. It aims at shedding light on family arrangements
within particular geographical regions and particular modes of production.
The gender aspects of different agricultural societies was almost an exclusive domain of anthropologists studying the social context of different production moods. Ester Boserup, a Danish
economist, presented in 1970 the first comprehensive, empirically based analysis of men and
women's evolutionary participation in the agriculture in LDC's. Her first work was published
in 1965: The Conditions of Agricultural Growth - The Economics of agrarian change under
Population pressure. The book is a critique of the pessimistic neo-Malthusian school which
suggests a negative relation between population pressure and agricultural growth. Based on
historical research, she postulated that the two variables are positively linked. This book has
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little to say about gender relations, apart pointing out that women generally have longer
working days than men in most rural societies. She published her seminal work Women's role
in Economic Development in 1970 where she linked her earlier agrarian development thesis to
gender issues. It is therefore important to grasp the insight of her earlier work in order to
understand her perception of gender relations in rural production. Boserup’s thesis allows both
for predicting the possible effects of the evolution in agriculture on gender issues and provides
a useful tool for formulating agricultural strategies.
Boserup's Agricultural Systems
By studying the world-wide evolution of agricultural systems over the past three centuries,
Boserup tried to link population increases to technological changes. Her findings went against
mainstream classical economics in two central areas, land use and incentive to work.
It is a generally accepted that increasing population pressure requires more and more land, and
that diminishing returns get larger as more and more marginal land is cultivated. Yet Boserup
claims that ".. this land almost always has been a part of a given community's productive
system, as fallow land, pasture, hunting ground or otherwise". Thus rather than seeing fallow
land and forest as unused, she considers them as integrated part of the existing cultivation
system. As population pressure emerges, the intensity of land utilisation increases and
agricultural methods changes from backward primitive technology towards more advanced
methods.
She distinguishes between five historical agricultural cultivation systems, forest-fallow, bushfallow, short-fallow, annual cropping and multi-cropping cultivation. The first system, forestfallow cultivation, is the most primitive seen from technological point of view. However, this
system provides the highest yields per man hour. The basic features of the five systems are
presented in Appendix 1.
The evolution from one cultivation system to another happens, according to Boserup, in
response to the relative increase in population. The move from the forest-fallow system to the
bush-fallow system, for example, requires increase in labour burden because of higher intensity
of land use and more frequent need of land clearing. As the periods of fallow shorten, working
tools improve and ashes are used as fertiliser. Further increases in population stimulate other
changes including further reduction of fallow periods. Cultivation of grass land requires either
frequent weeding or even the use of plough since grass roots are not affected by fire. As the
intensification in cultivation reduces soil fertility the use of animal manure became necessary.
At this stage of development private rights to common land emerge along with small holdings
and landless population groups. The system of annual crop production, annual crop rotation
and production of fodder becomes common. Yield per hectare keeps increasing until the last
stage of multi-cropping of several growing seasons per year, usually supported by irrigation, is
reached.
One of the central ideas of the thesis is that changes in cultivation systems require more labour
input and that the productivity per labour unit declines. In self-sufficient and low population
density systems people extend labour only to the point where the community's needs for food
are met. This leaves plenty of time for leisure. In this respect Boserup thesis goes against the
12
non-historic claim of economists about the "economic man" who aims always towards profit or
income maximisation.
Needless to say that different cultivation systems and different stages in each system can
coexist, because differences in soil fertility enable some communities to use less labourintensive systems compared to other neighbouring communities. Also, Boserup’s cultivation
systems are analysed in pre-industrial areas where the main concern is to produce food. The
exposition provides insights on why new farming systems can be difficult to promote in areas
of more or less self-sufficient farming. Also the analysis shed lights on the importance of
incentives to substitute leisure with labour and stresses that marginal return of labour should be
sufficiently high if potential high yielding arable land, with low population density, is to be
utilised to produce surpluses over the needs of the community.
The Link Between Agricultural Systems and Gender
As mentioned earlier, it was only in 1970 that Boserup looked at the evolution of farming
systems with respect to men's and women’s labour participation, and linked that to population
increase and technological changes. She distinguished between three types of farming systems
on the basis of gender participation: female, male and mixed farming systems.
The female farming systems. This system was dominant in areas with abundant land relative
to labour. Land rights were often connected to use right rather than to ownership. Farming
here was based on burn and slash methods with the hoe as the basic tool. Female farming
systems dominated large parts of Africa (South of the Sahara) and was found in some areas of
India, Thailand and China. Gender division of labour in this system is straightforward: except
for land clearing, most of the work is done by women. Women supported themselves and their
families and tended to be independent and mobile. They hardly used any purchased inputs and
the crops were almost exclusively for home consumption. Production surplus were traded by
women and used as supplements to their in-kind subsistence earnings. "Africa", noted Boserup
«is the region of female farming par excellence».
The male farming systems. This system emerged from the female system due to increased
population pressure and the resulting need to use plough draft animals and apply relatively less
extensive cultivation. The advent of the plough, according to Boserup, usually entails a radical
shift in sex roles in agriculture. The introduction of farming systems where the main
equipment is operated by men entails a tremendous change in work distribution and in economic and social relations between sexes, perhaps because of the physical power required.4
Access to land here depends on ownership, and production patterns are based on relatively
intensive cultivation. Field labour is done almost entirely by men and is supplemented by hired
labour. If women contribute at all, it is during harvest time and other peak periods.
Satisfaction of the family's economic needs in this system depends entirely on men and was
dominant relatively early in the Middle East and most parts of Asia and Latin America.
4
Boserup (1970) noted that «in primitive agricultural systems, the difference in
productivity between male and female agricultural labour is roughly proportional to the difference in physical strength.» p.53
13
The system requires the existence of a landless workers (male and female), where landless
families may be totally dependent on women's ability to get wage work. With the change from
shifting cultivation to plough cultivation "men’s burden of work usually increases while that of
women diminishes. As long as population density remains low enough to allow extensive
plough cultivation without irrigation...women may have little agricultural wok to do" (Boserup,
1970, p 34).5
The mixed farming system. This system emerges due to an even more rapid increase in
population density and introduction of even more intensive cultivation: year-round intensive
cultivation and multiple cropping often facilitated often by irrigation. The system shares many
of the characteristics of the male farming systems and is found all over the world in different
designs. Labour demand is high and women are drawn back to the fields to perform manual
tasks such as weeding, transplanting and harvesting. However, unlike their role in the female
systems, women are not independent producers here but subordinated non-wage labourers on
their husbands’ fields or hired workers. The central feature in this system is the division of
labour between men and women: women do the manual inferior work under the supervision of
men. This is direct result of men's monopoly over new equipment and modern agricultural
methods.6
The introduction of new improved equipment, which reduced the need for men's muscular
strength, should have brought women back into the production sphere or opened the horizon to
the female systems. But, on the contrary, the productivity gap between men and women tends
to widen because of men monopoly over the new. Thus, in the course of agricultural
development, men’s labour productivity tends to increase while women’s remains more or less
static. The corollary of the relative decline in women’s labour productivity is a decline in their
status within the agriculture system and in their social status within the family.
Boserup sums up here thesis in a few words: «the sex roles in farming can be briefly described
as follows: in very sparsely populated regions where shifting cultivation is used, men do little
farm work, the women do the most. In somewhat more densely populated regions, where the
agriculture system is that of extensive plough cultivation, women do little farm work and men
do much more. Finally, in region of intensive cultivation of irrigated land, both men and
women must put hard work into agriculture in order to earn enough to support a family on a
small piece of land» (p. 35).
5
Polygamy in the female agri-system is quite normal and is a source of wealth to the family
according to Boserup. The logic behind that is found in the abundant land and that every
woman in the household has a right to a plot of land. Boserup found that taking an additional
wife usually double household’s income even though the household's labour input increases on
average only by 33%. However, in the male farming system where women's labour input is
low and land is obtained by title rather than by need, an additional wife lowers the household
aggregate wealth. Polygamy in this systems is a result rather than a cause, of wealth.
6
Note that reproduction work is carried out almost exclusively by women in the above
mentioned three systems.
14
When these findings were related to the agricultural cultivation systems outlined in Appendix
1, Boserup concluded that the first three systems, forest, bush and short fallow, very often are
found to be female dominated, whereas annual cropping and multi-cropping cultivation fits the
characteristics of male-farming systems.
Various systems correspond with entirely different household functions and entirely different
intra household relations. On the other hand, changes in agricultural systems take place only
slowly because such changes require often shifts between gender's labour input and increase in
work burden. Also customs usually impede the development of new systems, especially when
the execution of specific duties are required to be carried out by the other sex.
The question that needs to be answered then is what is the origin of the males’ monopoly over
new techniques and what are the factors behind the immature and forced shifts towards mixed
farming systems? Boserup argued that in many parts of the world, notably in Africa (South of
the Sahara), mixed farming systems were artificially created by ignorant European colonialists.
This was done via the use of two powerful tools: introduction of private land-titles and new
technology.
The introduction of land titles in female-dominated agricultural systems and of new
technologies to subsistence farmers to develop more commercialised farm units are historically
tied to the European colonisation of many parts of the developing countries. The European
ideal image of a farmer is an active male working on his own land whereas women are assumed
to be secondary and suited for nursing and cooking. They neither recognised, nor probably
wanted to recognise, the role of African women as producers: they simply had little
understanding of the female agri-system. The colonists’ own involvement in African farming
and their wish to "modernise" traditional agricultural systems led to unilateral promotion and
introduction of technology for men exclusively.
The European settlers, colonial administrators and technical advisors, Boserup pointed out,
«are largely responsible for the deterioration in the status of women in the agricultural sectors
of developing countries. It was they who neglected the female agricultural labour force».
Furthermore she pointed out powerfully that «all Europeans shared the opinion that men are
superior to women in the art of farming and it then seemed to follow that for the development
of agriculture, male farming ought to be prompted to replace female farming. Many Europeans
did all they could to achieve this» (p. 54).7
The background of the «progress» towards the mixed farming system is neither natural nor a
consequence of some optimization of family utility based on free choices, as claimed in the
former model. It is rather, according to Boserup, a result of the interpretation of the surrounding world of the concept of "farmer". Just as "he" has become the institutionalised term
for agent in economic theory, a farmer became synonymous exclusively with men, and
7
Boserup pointed out that maybe the Europeans were impressed by the higher intensity of
cultivation and better yields in the fields where men help the women. But this is again a sign
of their ignorance, because men originally take part in cultivation only when and where
intensive cultivation methods are needed, as demonstrated earlier.
15
women's contribution in agricultural production has been since either grossly underestimated if
not totally ignored.
3.3. Limits of the Models
New Home Economics focuses on the family's joint ability to optimize utility, while Boserup's
thesis concentrate on the shifts in economic and social power which take place when femaleand male farming systems develop towards mixed farming system. Reproductive work, in both
models, is carried out by women. However, since Boserup’s farming systems are distinguished
on the basis of gender participation in the productive sphere, she considers reproductive tasks
as barriers for women to become fully recognized agents in the economy, affecting their
bargaining power and economic independence.
The neoclassical approach aims to explain gender differences within the family by abstracting
the human relations and reducing them to a single dimension. The advantage of the model is
its ability to become an integrated part of modern economics. However, and as pointed out
earlier, one of the basic disadvantages of NHE is the assumed harmony of interests within the
household. The two adults of the household are self-employed in a joint business (say a farm)
with pooled income. A common utility function is often assumed in order to determine the
optimal allocation of work burden. The claim of interests harmony is probably the main
reason behind the conclusion of Ferber and Birnbaum (1977) that NHE is trapped within the
neoclassical assumptions which make it unable to answer the kind of feminist questions about
gender.
Boserup's thesis shows the change in intra household relations due to the differentiated access
of the family’s partners to knowledge and assets along with the effect of internal and external
traditions and attitudes. Her subdivision of agricultural systems is less abstract than the
treatment of NHE and is easy to grasp. It has been suggested that her work «provided much of
the substance for the increased attention to women’s issues by the UN, development agencies
and NGOs starting from 1995" (Buvinic and Mehra, 1990). The central idea in her work, the
linkage between population and technological changes on the one hand and women's status and
involvement in the labour force on the other, have been subject to critique. The difficulties in
incorporating her concepts in modern economic theory are also obvious since cultural traditions
and attitudes play important role in the model. It is also fair to say that at least one, albeit
extreme, implication of her thesis, that development has a negative impact on women, is still in
need of more convincing empirical evidence.
The above models have been among the first attempts to include women and gender aspects in
the production framework. Both have been used as basis for household surveys and have been
extended by other economists. Furthermore, both have been subject to criticism from
feminists. Beneria (1995), among others, finds NHE and Boserup's thesis counter-productive
to compare with the early attempts of "discovering women». Both models are thought to have
made substantial compromises to remain within mainstream economics. It is also argued that
NHE suffers from circular reasoning, as Ferber and Birnbaum (1977) pointed out: women
specialize in housework because they earn less on the labour market, and they earn less because
they specialize in housework. They find that NHE legalizes the differences between genders
16
and accepts it as a natural consequence of women's larger involvement in the reproductive
sphere. Furthermore, the model’s conclusions can be misused to maintain and prolong
women's economic insignificance and men's economic control. Critics also claim that the
model fails to explain the economic sanity behind the shifts in contemporary family institutions
towards single-headed families and the increase in the rate of divorce in Western societies (Allén, 1990). These tendencies can also be found now in Southern Africa, Latin America and
parts of Asia as well. The factual changes in the family institution, according to the critics,
imply that the model may lead to wrong conclusions and misguided policy recommendations
about the most suitable development strategy for the family and the economy.
4. POLICY REFORMS AND GENDER
We shall attempt here to see the possible effects of some policy measures on gender issues in
light of the above reviewed models. The policy reform measures are the promotion of export
cash crops and the introduction of new technologies. Men has been almost exclusively the
target group for these policy reform measures. Our aim here is to use the above reviewed
models in order to find out whether it makes really economic sense to involve men and leave
women outside. An additional objective is to investigate the possible consequences of such
targeting on intra-household relations.
4.1. Promotion of Cash Crops
Agricultural-based economies are often dependent on their ability to produce export crops and
thereby reduce deficits in the balance of payments. Rural households, on the other hand, are
changing from semi self-sufficient farming units towards consumer units in need of cash
money income to meet demands for paying taxes, school and hospital fees and purchasing
consumers goods. Cash crop promotion is often seen as the answer to fulfil both the
economy’s need for foreign exchange and the family's need for cash income.
The shift to cash crop production often means a change in agricultural strategy from a
diversified production pattern of several products to a mono-culture strategy. Our concern here
is not to discuss the overall benefits of cash crops versus food crops, but rather the gender
implications of such transformation.8 In societies where women carry the main responsibilities
of meeting children's needs and men control the cash, an increase in household income does not
necessarily lead to higher standard of living for women and children. The shift towards cash
8
A shift to cash crops can result in a reduction of food supply at local markets. As food
production becomes a second priority area, the decline in the family’s food surplus may
correspond with higher food prices. Some households would then be affected both from the
decline in their own food production and the increase in food prices on the market. The
question is whether the supposed increase in income from cash crops compensates for that and
maintains, or even increase, the household’s disposable income? This is a difficult question to
answer here because it depends on several variables. But noticing that the prices of tropical
and sub-tropical cash crops have actually declined by an almost 40% during the 1980s (Koopman, 1992), the proposition that the decline in food production was not accompanied by an
increase in cash crop income cannot be excluded.
17
crops affects the households’ production strategy and consumption patterns. A re-orientation
of the farm's production towards a greater emphasis on cash crop production changes the intrafamily relations and the household's ability to acquire the most needed commodities since these
are no longer produced domestically and income changes from in-kind income to cash.
Cash-crops and male-female comparative advantages
New home economics, as pointed out earlier, builds on the concepts of absolute and comparative advantages. The approach is usually used to analyse wage employment options, where
women's pay is generally below men's. Suppose that a peasant household intend to shift to cash
crop production. Suppose also that the male is currently involved in off-farm work and the
woman in food crop production (as well as reproduction). Based on the male/female wage
differential, it is easy to demonstrate that the family will be better-off if the man continues with
his off-farm work and the woman is trained to produce cash crops . This straight forward
conclusion of the theory is based on the comparison of agrarian wage levels of men and women
which suggests that the marginal gain from involving women in cash crop production makes
economic sense.9
The conclusion is especially true when women have already some experience and know-how in
agriculture production. The opportunity cost of the woman getting involved in cash crop
production is estimated to be 20-50% lower than the cost of the man's giving-up their off-farm
wages. (The family can chose either to earn the same income with less working hours or more
income for the same hours...) An additional advantage of this would be a reduction of the risk
associated with harvest failure. When the man is responsible for cash crop production and the
woman is working off-farm, crop failure means a loss of the man's opportunity gain from offfarm work, which is higher than that of the woman.10
The conclusion from NHE is clear then: when a farm household becomes engaged in cash crop
production and when one of the adult has the opportunity to work off-farm, the family will be
better off if the husband takes additional wage labour and the wife is fully involved in the
running of the farm (along with reproductive duties). The basic logic of this is essentially the
same as in the commonly observed and well known pattern where women take care of food
crop production while men seek off-farm employment.
Cash-crops in the agriculture systems
Boserup has throughout her work pointed out that when agricultural change follows traditional
patterns, it generally benefits men and reduce women's involvement in manual agricultural
tasks. We shall use her framework now to shed light on the possible effects of the shift to cash
crop production on intra-household relations. It is clear that these effects depend on which type
9
The example is based on several assumptions, including that women’s productivity in cash
crops production is similar to the man’s, that off-farm job opportunities are available, that the
family’s plot of land is too small, ...etc.
10
Female agricultural workers were found to earn about one-half of the male’s wage at the late
1980s in the Sub-Sahara region. (Mehra 1995). Boserup (1970) found that in areas with short
supply of female labour, the wage gab between men's and women's is 10% whereas the gab is
generally between 30 and 50%.
18
of agriculture system prevails. Let us start by assuming that the economic motivation for a
shift to cash crop production is present for, at least, the male member of the family.
The introduction of cash crop production in the male farming systems will probably result in
increasing women’s workburden and the potential for internal conflicts within the family.
Women are expected now to supply the additional labour needed in peak periods and a number
of additional manual tasks, like weeding and application of manure, are often transfered to the
wives. Naturally, working hours for both men and women increase, but one should keep in
mind that the women's re-productional workload is often huge and does not lessen with the
shift to cash crop production. The production shift then results in intensifying women’s hours
of work and extending their day. Manual female labour, furthermore, requires physical
strength and often is boring, whereas that of the husbands is more varied and creative.
The change of family production from food crops to cash crops changes the household's
income type and brings about serious internal conflicts. The cash money will be often
transferred directly to the husbands whereas women have usually more access to the proceeds
from any surplus of food crops production. Also basic household needs, which are the main
concern of women, are often automatically satisfied with food-crop production, while much
bargaining and arguments will be needed to ensure a reasonable allocation of the cash money
on different consumption goods. It is also suggested that the shift to cash crops marginalize
women even further because they will be left out of planning future production, including the
decision about the amount of debt to be carried by the family, and will lag behind with respect
to technical knowledge. Boserup concluded then that the unilateral promotion of cash crops
among men will have substantial effects on intra-household relations, increasing women’s
work burden and financial uncertainty in the short run, and reducing their social and economic
status in the long run. The above reasoning is also valid with respect to introducing cash crops
into the mixed farming system.
Changes in intra- household relations are much more evident when cash crop production is
promoted among men in the female dominated agricultural systems. This is because of two
factors. Firstly, new cash crops creates a conflict in allocating the limited land between food
crop and cash crop production. Secondly, women’s work will be now required both in their
own fields and in the husbands’ fields as non-wage labour. Variation in productivity, in
bargaining power and the transformation from extensive to intensive land use reduce women's
access to land and results thereby in an insufficient self-supply of food. The introduction of
cash crops leads in fact to income transfers from wife to husband.
The supply of wives and children as non-wage labour does not necessarily bring them a share
of the income from cash crops. The apparent income increase of the household may turn out to
be an income transfer from other members of the household. This transformation, according to
Boserup (1970) will lead to the "reduction of women's role to that of family aids or of hired
workers on land belonging to male farmers, with a correspondingly enhanced male status over
women".
When the intra-household situation is characterized by a low allocation of resources from
husbands to their wives, women will be forced to intensify their engagement in independent
19
income generating schemes to support their children. One apparent way to achieve that is to
improve food crop productivity. Yet, poor research and development into traditional food
crops and the limited access of women to credit and thereby to modern inputs, hinder the
adoption of such schemes. It has become, therefore, difficult to compete with cash crop
production and the widespread prejudice of women’s conservative attitude to agricultural
transformation gets even stronger (Buvinic and Mehra, 1990).
In short then, the unilateral promotion of cash crops is not seen to be sensible from Boserup's
gender perspective. The extension of farmers' working day and the use of new agricultural
methods are seen as natural consequences of the population increase, but changes in production
patterns benefit men more than women and help to widen the gap between their social and
economic status. A more equal approach could raise both genders’ knowledge and provide
wider development options for the single household and society at large. This would require
however that men give up some of their gender- biased "rights".
The two approaches reviewed above can, in some sense, be used then to demonstrate the
weakness and faulty of excluding or not targeting cash crops promoting strategies towards
women. But this should not overlook the fact that there are substantially different approaches
with different values and tools of analysis, as will be made clear in the following paragraph
4.2. New Technology
Although both men and women are involved in agricultural production in LDCs, the
introduction of new technology is targeted mostly towards men only. This is probably due to
the perception that men are more «modern», less risk-averse and more willing to deploy new
methods in their production systems than women. Women are seen to be conservative and
bound by traditions (Buvinic and Mehra, 1990).
Changes in agricultural systems affect men and women differently, as made clear in the
previous pages. Yet, technology as such could reduce the differences between sexes by
reducing the significance of the discrepancy between men’s and women's physical power.
Technology can also increase women's productivity, since it usually helps to decrease the
physical efforts needed for specific tasks. But, alas, gender-dominated attitudes to technology
have affected female agri-systems negatively. New technologies have often benefited men, and
women are degraded to doing the manual work in the male dominated agricultural systems.
Women suffer generally from poor access to information, from exclusion from education
opportunities and programmes directed towards enhancing rural technical capacities.
The human-capital earnings function, within the NHE, suggests that there is a substantial
difference in the return to education between men and women. This is clearly pointed out in
the Mincer and Polachek (1980) model. The implication is that society's benefits from
educating men are much higher than from educating women, and men should maintain their
monopoly of new technologies and production methods. Technological-male monopoly and
bias is, in some sense, nothing less than a "natural" consequence of rational social cost and
benefits calculations.
20
Boserup’s approach, on the other hand, stresses that this bias has its root in the Europeancolonialist perception of agriculture, where men play the most conspicuous role in production
while women are almost invisible. The original exclusion of women creates the ground for
further exclusion and the process continues as a snow ball.
Both approaches then provide explanations of the current state of technology bias, but Boserup
clearly views that as being result of misconception and discrimination. Also, the evaluation of
the effect of this state on women in particular and the society in general is substantially
different between the two approaches. Boserup insists on the need to conduct R&D in food
crops areas and the importance of targeting new technologies and production methods toward
women.
The issue of technology and gender was closely looked at by Koopman (1992), Buvinic and
Mehra (1990) and Mehra (1992). These surveys reach the following observations. Firstly,
there is only very limited R&D in the area of food production in sub-Sahara Africa. From this
follows that women's production methods have little hope for improvement. Secondly, casual
female workers are the first to loose their jobs when new technology takes over in labour
intensive areas of production. Thirdly, women are often excluded form attending educational
programmes offered to farmers and this leads to widening the division between men and
women's educational and training standards.
The studies concluded that targeting technological improvements to men exclusively has a high
social cost because it widens the poverty-gap and undermines the long run development
potential of the country. This is based on the fact that female-headed families dominate the
poorest groups of the population, that the poorest households are the most dependent on
women's ability to generate income, and that the increase in male unemployment often results
in increasing the work burden of other family members which affect children's education. The
conclusion is that by excluding women from development measures like education and access
to technology, the social cost increases and the individuals’ options to participate in
development becomes dependent on gender. This does not only marginalise women but also
their children, one-half of whom are boys!
5. CONCLUDING REMARKS
We started this chapter by introducing a range of key concepts to become familiar with the
basic ideas that can be grouped under the heading Gender Economics. Thereafter we attempted
to present two distinct theoretical frameworks to analyse gender issues. The first approach,
NHE, explains and justifies women's degradation in the labour market by their biological
reproductive obligations. The second approach, Boserup’s thesis, sees the existing genderwork division as a historical phenomenon and largely a result of European cultural hegemony.
Women, according to Boserup, are not "naturally" dependent on a male breadwinner.
Both approaches recognize, nevertheless, that men are more integrated in the labour market and
have better economic options than women - implying that gender matters. This ought to
21
promote a rethinking of our comprehension of modern economic theory as a genderless
discipline.
The basic idea of the NHE is finding out how a household allocates the labour of its members
in order to maximise the family’s goal function. Family time allocation is simply dictated by
the absolute and comparative advantages of its various members. Family members, to use the
words of Becker (1965) «who are relatively more efficient at market activities use less of their
time in consumption activities (i.e. work in the home) than other members». One of the
frequently cited weaknesses of this approach is its assumption that people always behave
rationally. This leads sometimes to baffling implications, let alone that almost all outcomes are
in some sense optimal. The real picture that emerges from real observed life has little
resemblance to the conclusions of the rational maximization model. It is apparent that the roles
of husband and wife are largely predetermined by tradition and cultural factors.11 On the other
hand the approach misses the whole point of gender issues. By assuming a common household
utility function, the NHE has very little to say about intra-family relations. Somehow, conflict
of interests within the family are dismissed by assumption.12
We have also looked into the common practice of targeting some policy measures toward men
exclusively and analyse the merits of this from within the above mentioned frameworks. The
major difficulty in comparing the results from the two approaches is that while NHE takes the
present situation as given and points out at what is most beneficial for the family, the second
approach stresses that current conditions are unfair and result from discrimination. This
approach, just like feminist schools of thought, points out that once these unfair conditions are
changed, the benefits (which are not exclusively economic benefits) will be larger.
Furthermore, what is claimed by the NHE to be good for the family may turn out to be good
only for the adult-male member.
The main conclusion in this paper is that one has to work closely with every policy reform
measure to understand its possible outcomes on gender relations, and that the outcomes again
depend on the incorporated theoretical approach. Gender issues are becoming increasingly
important and are slowly gaining some «respectability» even among economists. This says
something about standard economic theory not about gender!
11
Cf. Ferber and Birnbaum (1977) and Blau and Ferber (1986).
It is important to point out here that there are a number of attempts to find the family
cooperative/non-cooperative equilibriums when its various members are perusing different
interests. Cf. footnote no.1. However such models require even a higher degree of rationality.
12
22
Questions for Discussion
This chapter has probably raised more questions than answers. Our aim however was to shed
some light on the gender aspects which are, otherwise, often overlooked in economic analysis.
The aim is to provoke new way of thinking about the family, household decision-making and
intra-household relations. We recommend that you work in groups and discuss the ideas
presented here using your own experiences and intimate knowledge of your own surroundings.
1. Discuss the implied principle of rationality in the NHE. Is this an inescapable concept when
one tries to model human behaviour and relations? Does the lack of perfectly rational
behaviour emerge from ignorance on the part of economic agents or is economic rationality and
personal material gain too narrow a motive to be an exclusive guide of human decisionmaking?
2. Discuss the issue of harmony of interest within the household. Is the apparent harmony a
result of women’s inferior status, i.e. a result of obedience? What will the socio-economic
consequences be if women becomes fully integrated in the economic system?
3. Try to analyse the possible effects of other measures of structural adjustment, such as
reduction in social public spending, introduction of fee payments in schools and hospitals,
inflation control measures, on intra-household relations and on women.
23
APPENDIX 1: Boserupian Thesis - the link between population pressure, technology and gender.
Agricultural
system
Charateristics
Land and labour use
Forest-fallow
cultivation
Fallow periode: More than 25 years
Landscape: Forest
Clearing method : fire
Growing season on cleared land: 1- 2 years
Technology: Use of the hoe, no weeding, ashes as fertiliser
Others: Very low level of exchange of products and services
_ Very extensive land use
_ Low population/land ratio
_ High output/labour ratio
_ Right to cultivate within the territory
_ High leisure/labour ratio
Bush-fallow
cultivation
Fallow periode: 6-10 years
Landscape: Bush and small threes
Clearing method: fire and hand tools
Growing season : 2 - 10 years
TECHNOLOGY: THE HOE, LOW LEVEL OF WEEDING, ASHES AS FERTILIZER
OTHERS: LOW LEVEL OF EXCHANGE OF PRODUCTS AND SERVICES
_ Extensive land use
- LOW POPULATION/LAND RATIO
_ High out put/labour ratio
_ HIGH LESIURE/LABOUR RATIO
_ Cultivation rights starts to appear
_ Landless group appears
Short-fallow
cultivation
Fallow periode: 1-2 years
Landscape: Wild grass
Clearing method: Plough and draft animals
GROWING SEASON: 1-2 YEARS
TECHNOLOGY: PLOUGH AND DRAFT ANIMALS, ANIMAL MANURE AS FERTILIZER, wild
grass areas as fodder, WEEDING NEEDED
Others: Transactions of products and services slowly emerging
_ Increasing land use,
_ Increasing population/land ratio
_ Declining out put/labour ratio
_ Seasonal underemployment
_ Landlords appears
_ Small scale farmers offer seasonal labour
Annual cropping
Fallow periode: less than 6 month
Landscape: Cultivated land
_ Most fertile land under plough
_ Marginal land used as grassing area for
24
Multi-cropping
Growing season: annual
Technology: Animal manure & nitrogin fixing plants as fertilizer, Plough and draft
animals, Annual rotation of crops, grass production and other fodder crops
Others: Money transactions slowly emerging
domestic animals
_ Seasonal underemployment
_ Increasing labour input, decreasing
lesiure
Fallow periode: 0 - 3 month
Landscape: Cultivated land
Growing season: The same plot used at least twice per year
Technology: Plough and draft animals, Husbandary in stable, IRRIGATION
ANIMAL MANURE AND NITROGIN FIXING PLANTS AS FERTILIZER
OTHERS: MONEY TRANSACTIONS ARE MORE COMMON
_ Intensive land use
_ High labour/land ratio
_ Low out put/labour ratio
_ Individual title over land
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by Kirsten Friis-Jensen and Noman Kanafani
Department of Economics and Natural Resources
Royal Agriculture University
Rolighedsvej 26
DK - 1958 Frederiksberg C
Denmark
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