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Political Science Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Following Negotiated Settlements Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas [email protected] Building Peace after Civil Wars Political Science Negotiated settlements are often unstable Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war recurrence o Peacebuilding security objectives o Successful Agreements Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell and Hoddie 2003) Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010) Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009) o Peacebuilding and democratization Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives War-to-Democracy Dilemma Political Science Democratization may generate post-civil war instability o Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre (2009), Brancati and Snyder (2013) Democracy objectives may undermine post-war security Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy How can post-war governments maintain security while instituting democratic reforms? False Dichotomy Political Science Post-Civil War Democratization and Security o Joshi et al (2015) Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadly o Democracy Requires: Broad participation Open competition Meaningful translation of votes into national representation Theory: Electoral Reform and Peace Duration Political Science Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the incumbent government is committed to the peace process Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents to renege on peace process Theory: Electoral Laws Political Science Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to limit political competition Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral systems) Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system which limits competition Theory: Reform as a Signal Political Science Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent government o Past systems may have ensured access to goods and services o Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating their supporters Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are interested in the peace process H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence. Theory: Reform as a Deterrent Political Science Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election more stable o Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon the peace process after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013) o Militant groups rely on some civilian support o Electoral reforms make conventional participation more attractive than supporting violent dissent H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform has taken place. Research Design Political Science Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from 19892010 o UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010) o UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011) o Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012) Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1) Independent Variable: Electoral Reform o 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial implementation, 3=Fully implemented Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral Reforms Research Design cont. Political Science Controls o Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration. Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping o Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict, Incompatibility with Government o Government Controls: Polity II o Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year Model: Weibull Duration Model o Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and LogLogistic Duration Models o Used Selection Models for robustness Results: Electoral Reforms after Full Implementation Substantive Results H1 Electoral Reforms H2 Electoral Reforms *First Election Political Science Predicted Impact on Recurrence Actual Impact on Recurrence Statistically Significant? Reduction in Risk of Recurrence Negative Negative Yes (Reject H0 by 95%) 97.2% Negative Negative Yes (Reject H0 by 99%) 99.9% Impact of Electoral Reforms cont. Political Science Table II: Hazard Ratios for each stage of implementation Electoral Reforms Initiated Electoral Reforms Mostly Implemented Electoral Reforms Fully Implemented Electoral Reform Implementation Reduced Risk by 69.7% Reduced Risk by 90.9% Reduced Risk by 97.2% Graphical Illustration Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements Political Science Further Robustness Checks Political Science Examine rates of Pro-Government and Antigovernment violence after civil wars o o o o o o SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011) Peace agreements in Africa and Latin America Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace agreements Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8% Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81% Results remain robust when only looking at election violence Substantive Findings and Conclusion Political Science Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms o Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to abide by the peace process o Ensures that post-war elections are stable Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process by allowing conventional participation o Results remain robust when looking at post-war event data Thank you for your time Questions? Eric Keels Ph.D. Candidate Department of Political Science University of North Texas [email protected] Political Science Descriptive Statistics Descriptive Statistics Political Science Total Peace Agreements Electoral Reform Inclusion Average Implementation Minimum Implementation Maximum Implementation 37 57% 1.37 0 3 Full Model Table I Weibull Hazard Model on Risk of Peace Failure Political Science Model 1 Implemented Disarmament Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 -8.816*** (0.453) 1.883*** (0.702) -8.756*** (1.305) 0.0391 (0.343) -0.589 (0.470) 1.715 (1.070) -1.296*** (0.111) 0.119 (0.753) -0.157** (0.0627) 0.179 (0.721) -1.156** (0.470) -1.231** (0.598) -8.835*** (0.456) 1.872** (0.753) -9.193*** (1.846) 0.0168 (0.344) -0.619 (0.457) 1.773* (1.067) -1.299*** (0.113) 0.140 (0.765) -0.162** (0.0653) 0.254 (0.725) 0.660 (1.180) -1.214** (0.594) -2.170*** (0.310) -0.500 (0.762) 2.573 (3.292) -0.500 (0.766) 2.629 (3.260) -8.788*** (0.472) 1.660** (0.713) -8.167*** (0.716) 0.0158 (0.342) -0.617 (0.450) 1.768* (1.059) -1.305*** (0.106) 0.150 (0.760) -0.162** (0.0650) 0.248 (0.720) 0.690 (1.200) -1.193** (0.599) -7.147*** (1.012) -0.497 (0.765) 2.618 (3.224) 0.78 6.04** 329 1.22 1736.95*** 329 1.24 1634.08*** 329 1.24 2586.91*** 329 Implemented Demobilization Implemented Reintegration Implemented Transitional Political Power-Sharing lnGDP Per Capita Major War War Duration Government Incompatibility Polity II Peacekeeping Operation First Post-war Election Implementation of Electoral Reforms Electoral Reform*First Election Ethnic War Constant P 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖 2 Observations Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 DDR Robustness Check Table IV DDR Index Check Political Science Model 1 DDR Index -69.73*** (3.645) 0.0158 (0.342) -0.617 (0.450) 1.768* (1.059) -1.328*** (0.104) 0.150 (0.760) -0.162** (0.0650) 0.248 (0.720) 0.690 (1.200) -1.193** (0.599) -7.247*** (1.012) -0.497 (0.765) 2.643 (3.224) Transitional Political Power-Sharing lnGDP Per Capita Major War War Duration Government Incompatibility Polity II Peacekeeping Operation First Post-war Election Implementation of Electoral Reforms Electoral Reform*First Election Ethnic War Constant Chi Squared P Observations 2253.24*** 1.24 329 Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Selection Model (whether reforms are implemented) Political Science Log Logistic Regression Selection Model Selection Stage (Probit Predicting Implementation) Full Model (Log Logistic Duration Model) Integrated Army 1.700** (0.705) -2.009** (0.931) DDR -0.483 (0.764) -1.418 (1.435) -4.60e-05 (6.60e-05) 0.00148** (0.000696) 2.326** (0.928) -4.814 (3.009) GDP per Capita Peacekeeping Operation Polity II -0.300 (0.254) Major War -2.400*** (0.651) War Duration 0.354** (0.145) Ethnic Fractionalization -0.900 (1.078) Electoral Reforms 12.19*** (3.032) Inverse Mills Ratio -1.564** (0.739) Monopoly Ethnic Group -2.570* (1.413) Political Power-Sharing 0.121 (0.760) Constant -2.992*** (1.128) 11.40*** (3.981) Observations 371 18.88*** 308 381.62*** 0.54 (0.30) Gamma Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 Selection Model (Whether reforms are included in peace agreement) Bivariate Probit Model Predicting a) Choice to Include Electoral Reform and b) Choice to Return to Civil War Equation Predicting Return to Violence Implementation of Electoral Reforms -1.00 (0.41)** -0.0003 (0.0001)*** 0.10 (0.04)** 0.86 (0.32)*** 0.16 (0.45) -0.07 (0.03)** 0.38 (0.36) 0.44 (0.37) -0.13 (0.04)*** 0.03 (0.05) -0.02 (0.03) 230.3 (113.6)** GDP Per Capita War Duration Major War Peacekeeping Operation Polity II Transitional Power-sharing Government Ethnic War T1 T2 T3 Constant Equation Predicting the Inclusion of Electoral Reforms in Peace Agreements Peacekeeping Operation GDP Per Capita Ethnic War Polity II Past Experience with Democracy Constant Rho 𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖 2 N Model I 1.09 (0.49)** 0.00001 (0.00004) -1.65 (0.50)*** -0.08 (0.04)* 0.28 (0.44) 0.55 (0.44) -0.23(Not statistically different) 77.32*** 357 Robust standard errors in parentheses. *** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1 Political Science SCAD Data TABLE I Negative Binomial Regression Total Violence vs. Election Related Violence Political Science Total Antigovernment Violence Model 1 Election Antigovernment Violence Model 2 0.274** (0.114) -1.660* (0.858) 0.256 (0.201) -0.856 (0.547) -0.875 (0.631) -0.405 (0.378) 0.430** (0.204) -0.00258 (0.00877) 1.48e-06** (6.10e-07) 0.00282 (0.00231) -0.0544 (0.0408) 0.149 (0.161) -4.359** (2.050) 1.570*** (0.339) 1.893** (0.785) -1.407 (1.854) -1.992** (0.789) 1.579*** (0.540) 0.0100 (0.0267) 2.98e-06 (2.72e-06) 0.00792 (0.00592) -0.0566 (0.0633) Constant -0.0270 (1.122) 𝐶ℎ𝑖 2 Lagged Antigovernment Violence Electoral Reform Disarmament First Election Peacekeeping Operation Ongoing Civil War Transitional Power-Sharing Infant Mortality Rate Total Casualties Duration Lagged Polity II Total ProGovernment Violence Model 3 Election ProGovernment Violence Model 4 -5.184* (2.921) -1.460** (0.590) 0.198 (0.244) -0.155 (0.724) -2.110*** (0.517) -0.149 (0.512) 0.780*** (0.241) 0.0181 (0.0119) 2.70e-06*** (5.40e-07) 0.00204 (0.00272) -0.0160 (0.0372) 0.522 (0.343) -3.066* (1.571) -5.152*** (1.339) 1.159*** (0.353) 4.013*** (1.115) -2.683** (1.109) -1.822 (1.191) 1.517*** (0.431) -0.0109 (0.0222) 3.62e-06* (2.08e-06) 8.94e-05 (0.00527) 0.210*** (0.0754) -0.134 (0.231) -3.277 (2.608) 75.00*** 188.62*** 56.79*** 516.46*** 3.73 260 17.1 260 5.03 260 20.3 260 Lagged Pro-Government Violence Alpha Observations Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1