Download Post-War Electoral Reform and Peace Duration

Political Science
Post-War Electoral Reform
and Peace Duration
Following Negotiated
Settlements
Eric Keels
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of North Texas
[email protected]
Building Peace after Civil
Wars
Political Science
 Negotiated settlements are often unstable
 Post-civil war peacebuilding and civil war recurrence
o Peacebuilding security objectives
o Successful Agreements
 Reduce Commitment Problems (Walter 2002; Fortna 2004; Hartzell
and Hoddie 2003)
 Share Information (Mattes and Savun 2010)
 Raise costs for Defection (Mattes and Savun 2009)
o Peacebuilding and democratization
 Incompatibility between security and democracy objectives
War-to-Democracy
Dilemma
Political Science
 Democratization may generate post-civil war instability
o Paris (2004), Jarstad and Sisk (2008), Autesserre (2009), Brancati and
Snyder (2013)
 Democracy objectives may undermine post-war security
 Security objectives may undermine post-war democracy
 How can post-war governments maintain security while
instituting democratic reforms?
False Dichotomy
Political Science
 Post-Civil War Democratization and Security
o Joshi et al (2015)
 Primary focus on elections rather than democracy more broadly
o Democracy Requires:
 Broad participation
 Open competition
 Meaningful translation of votes into national
representation
Theory: Electoral Reform and
Peace Duration
Political Science
 Revisions to electoral laws act as a signal to opponents that the
incumbent government is committed to the peace process
 Revisions to electoral laws make it more difficult for dissidents
to renege on peace process
Theory: Electoral Laws
Political Science
 Electoral laws have historically been a way for governments to
limit political competition
 Laws determine who is allowed to participate (vote or run for
office) and how votes are translated into representation (electoral
systems)
 Post-war elections may occur under the old electoral system
which limits competition
Theory: Reform as a Signal
Political Science
 Electoral reforms are costly for elites in the incumbent
government
o Past systems may have ensured access to goods and services
o Elites shoulder considerable risk by alienating their
supporters
 Implementing these reforms act as a costly signal that elites are
interested in the peace process
 H1: The implementation of electoral reforms called for in peace
agreements reduces the risk of civil war recurrence.
Theory: Reform as a
Deterrent
Political Science
 Electoral reforms should make the initial post-civil war election
more stable
o Armed militant groups have an incentive to abandon the peace process
after losing (Brancati and Snyder 2013)
o Militant groups rely on some civilian support
o Electoral reforms make conventional participation more attractive than
supporting violent dissent
 H2: First post-war elections that occur after electoral reforms are
implemented reduce the risk of civil war recurrence as compared
to first post-war elections that occur when no electoral reform
has taken place.
Research Design
Political Science
 Post-Civil War Comprehensive Peace Agreements from 19892010
o UCDP Conflict Termination Dataset (Kreutz 2010)
o UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset (Högbladh 2011)
o Peace Accords Matrix (Joshi and Darby 2012)
 Dependent Variable: Civil War Recurrence (0,1)
 Independent Variable: Electoral Reform
o 0=No reform implemented, 1= Reform initiated, 2=Partial
implementation, 3=Fully implemented
 Independent Variable: First Post-War Election*Electoral
Reforms
Research Design cont.
Political Science
 Controls
o Agreement Provisions: Disarmament, Demobilization, and Reintegration.
Transitional Power-Sharing and Peacekeeping
o Conflict Variables: Conflict Intensity, Conflict Duration, Ethnic Conflict,
Incompatibility with Government
o Government Controls: Polity II
o Economic Controls: Logged GDP Per Capita
 Unit of Analysis: Post-war Country Year
 Model: Weibull Duration Model
o Robustness checks with Cox Proportional Hazard Models and
LogLogistic Duration Models
o Used Selection Models for robustness
Results: Electoral Reforms
after Full Implementation
Substantive
Results
H1
Electoral
Reforms
H2
Electoral
Reforms *First
Election
Political Science
Predicted Impact
on Recurrence
Actual Impact on
Recurrence
Statistically
Significant?
Reduction in Risk
of Recurrence
Negative
Negative
Yes
(Reject H0 by
95%)
97.2%
Negative
Negative
Yes
(Reject H0 by
99%)
99.9%
Impact of Electoral Reforms
cont.
Political Science
Table II:
Hazard Ratios for each
stage of
implementation
Electoral Reforms
Initiated
Electoral Reforms
Mostly Implemented
Electoral Reforms
Fully Implemented
Electoral Reform
Implementation
Reduced Risk by
69.7%
Reduced Risk by
90.9%
Reduced Risk by
97.2%
Graphical Illustration

Figure I: The Impact of Electoral Reforms on the
Survival of Peace Following Negotiated Settlements
Political Science
Further Robustness Checks
Political Science
 Examine rates of Pro-Government and
Antigovernment violence after civil wars
o
o
o
o
o
o
SCAD dataset (Salehyan et al 2011)
Peace agreements in Africa and Latin America
Measured simple inclusion of Electoral Reform in peace agreements
Reduced rates pro-government violence by 76.8%
Reduced rates of antigovernment violence by 81%
Results remain robust when only looking at election violence
Substantive Findings and
Conclusion
Political Science
 Post-Civil War Electoral Reforms
o Reduce the risk of civil war recurrence
 Implementing these costly reforms signals a willingness to
abide by the peace process
o Ensures that post-war elections are stable
 Reduces the ability of dissidents to abandon the peace process
by allowing conventional participation
o Results remain robust when looking at post-war event
data
Thank you for your time
 Questions?
 Eric Keels
Ph.D. Candidate
Department of Political Science
University of North Texas
[email protected]
Political Science
Descriptive Statistics
Descriptive
Statistics
Political Science
Total Peace Agreements
Electoral Reform
Inclusion
Average
Implementation
Minimum
Implementation
Maximum
Implementation
37
57%
1.37
0
3
Full Model
Table I
Weibull Hazard Model on Risk of Peace Failure
Political Science
Model 1
Implemented Disarmament
Model 2
Model 3
Model 4
-8.816***
(0.453)
1.883***
(0.702)
-8.756***
(1.305)
0.0391
(0.343)
-0.589
(0.470)
1.715
(1.070)
-1.296***
(0.111)
0.119
(0.753)
-0.157**
(0.0627)
0.179
(0.721)
-1.156**
(0.470)
-1.231**
(0.598)
-8.835***
(0.456)
1.872**
(0.753)
-9.193***
(1.846)
0.0168
(0.344)
-0.619
(0.457)
1.773*
(1.067)
-1.299***
(0.113)
0.140
(0.765)
-0.162**
(0.0653)
0.254
(0.725)
0.660
(1.180)
-1.214**
(0.594)
-2.170***
(0.310)
-0.500
(0.762)
2.573
(3.292)
-0.500
(0.766)
2.629
(3.260)
-8.788***
(0.472)
1.660**
(0.713)
-8.167***
(0.716)
0.0158
(0.342)
-0.617
(0.450)
1.768*
(1.059)
-1.305***
(0.106)
0.150
(0.760)
-0.162**
(0.0650)
0.248
(0.720)
0.690
(1.200)
-1.193**
(0.599)
-7.147***
(1.012)
-0.497
(0.765)
2.618
(3.224)
0.78
6.04**
329
1.22
1736.95***
329
1.24
1634.08***
329
1.24
2586.91***
329
Implemented Demobilization
Implemented Reintegration
Implemented Transitional Political Power-Sharing
lnGDP Per Capita
Major War
War Duration
Government Incompatibility
Polity II
Peacekeeping Operation
First Post-war Election
Implementation of Electoral Reforms
Electoral Reform*First Election
Ethnic War
Constant
P
𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖 2
Observations
Coefficients Listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
DDR Robustness Check
Table IV
DDR Index Check
Political Science
Model 1
DDR Index
-69.73***
(3.645)
0.0158
(0.342)
-0.617
(0.450)
1.768*
(1.059)
-1.328***
(0.104)
0.150
(0.760)
-0.162**
(0.0650)
0.248
(0.720)
0.690
(1.200)
-1.193**
(0.599)
-7.247***
(1.012)
-0.497
(0.765)
2.643
(3.224)
Transitional Political Power-Sharing
lnGDP Per Capita
Major War
War Duration
Government Incompatibility
Polity II
Peacekeeping Operation
First Post-war Election
Implementation of Electoral Reforms
Electoral Reform*First Election
Ethnic War
Constant
Chi Squared
P
Observations
2253.24***
1.24
329
Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Selection Model (whether
reforms are implemented)
Political Science
Log Logistic Regression
Selection Model
Selection Stage
(Probit Predicting Implementation)
Full Model
(Log Logistic Duration Model)
Integrated Army
1.700**
(0.705)
-2.009**
(0.931)
DDR
-0.483
(0.764)
-1.418
(1.435)
-4.60e-05
(6.60e-05)
0.00148**
(0.000696)
2.326**
(0.928)
-4.814
(3.009)
GDP per Capita
Peacekeeping Operation
Polity II
-0.300
(0.254)
Major War
-2.400***
(0.651)
War Duration
0.354**
(0.145)
Ethnic Fractionalization
-0.900
(1.078)
Electoral Reforms
12.19***
(3.032)
Inverse Mills Ratio
-1.564**
(0.739)
Monopoly Ethnic Group
-2.570*
(1.413)
Political Power-Sharing
0.121
(0.760)
Constant
-2.992***
(1.128)
11.40***
(3.981)
Observations
371
18.88***
308
381.62***
0.54
(0.30)
Gamma
Robust standard errors in parentheses. Inverse Mills Ratio measures degree of selection effects.
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
Selection Model (Whether
reforms are included in peace
agreement)
Bivariate Probit Model Predicting a) Choice to Include Electoral Reform
and b) Choice to Return to Civil War
Equation Predicting Return to Violence
Implementation of Electoral Reforms
-1.00
(0.41)**
-0.0003
(0.0001)***
0.10
(0.04)**
0.86
(0.32)***
0.16
(0.45)
-0.07
(0.03)**
0.38
(0.36)
0.44
(0.37)
-0.13
(0.04)***
0.03
(0.05)
-0.02
(0.03)
230.3
(113.6)**
GDP Per Capita
War Duration
Major War
Peacekeeping Operation
Polity II
Transitional Power-sharing Government
Ethnic War
T1
T2
T3
Constant
Equation Predicting the Inclusion of Electoral Reforms in Peace
Agreements
Peacekeeping Operation
GDP Per Capita
Ethnic War
Polity II
Past Experience with Democracy
Constant
Rho
𝑊𝑎𝑙𝑑 𝐶ℎ𝑖 2
N
Model I
1.09
(0.49)**
0.00001
(0.00004)
-1.65
(0.50)***
-0.08
(0.04)*
0.28
(0.44)
0.55
(0.44)
-0.23(Not statistically different)
77.32***
357
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
*** p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1
Political Science
SCAD Data
TABLE I
Negative Binomial Regression
Total Violence vs. Election Related Violence
Political Science
Total
Antigovernment
Violence
Model 1
Election
Antigovernment
Violence
Model 2
0.274**
(0.114)
-1.660*
(0.858)
0.256
(0.201)
-0.856
(0.547)
-0.875
(0.631)
-0.405
(0.378)
0.430**
(0.204)
-0.00258
(0.00877)
1.48e-06**
(6.10e-07)
0.00282
(0.00231)
-0.0544
(0.0408)
0.149
(0.161)
-4.359**
(2.050)
1.570***
(0.339)
1.893**
(0.785)
-1.407
(1.854)
-1.992**
(0.789)
1.579***
(0.540)
0.0100
(0.0267)
2.98e-06
(2.72e-06)
0.00792
(0.00592)
-0.0566
(0.0633)
Constant
-0.0270
(1.122)
𝐶ℎ𝑖 2
Lagged Antigovernment Violence
Electoral Reform
Disarmament
First Election
Peacekeeping Operation
Ongoing Civil War
Transitional Power-Sharing
Infant Mortality Rate
Total Casualties
Duration
Lagged Polity II
Total
ProGovernment
Violence
Model 3
Election
ProGovernment
Violence
Model 4
-5.184*
(2.921)
-1.460**
(0.590)
0.198
(0.244)
-0.155
(0.724)
-2.110***
(0.517)
-0.149
(0.512)
0.780***
(0.241)
0.0181
(0.0119)
2.70e-06***
(5.40e-07)
0.00204
(0.00272)
-0.0160
(0.0372)
0.522
(0.343)
-3.066*
(1.571)
-5.152***
(1.339)
1.159***
(0.353)
4.013***
(1.115)
-2.683**
(1.109)
-1.822
(1.191)
1.517***
(0.431)
-0.0109
(0.0222)
3.62e-06*
(2.08e-06)
8.94e-05
(0.00527)
0.210***
(0.0754)
-0.134
(0.231)
-3.277
(2.608)
75.00***
188.62***
56.79***
516.46***
3.73
260
17.1
260
5.03
260
20.3
260
Lagged Pro-Government Violence
Alpha
Observations
Coefficients listed. Robust standard errors in parentheses
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1