Download Generalized Conversational Implicatures

A. Reboul, L2C2, CNRS, Lyon
Generalized Conversational Implicatures
The Gricean account
In his well-known 1957 paper, Grice
distinguished between two kinds of meaning:
Natural meaning:
 These spots mean measles.
Non-natural meaning (meaningNN):
 These three rings on the bus bell mean that the
bus is full.
 Linguistic communication ressorts to meaningNN.
Grice proposed the following definition of
meaningNN:
“A meantNN something by x” is roughly
equivalent to “A intended the utterance of x to
produce some effect in an audience by means
of the recognition of this intention.”
 MeaningNN involves a double intention:
 A primary intention to produce a specific effect in
the hearer;
 A secondary intention that the primary intention be
satisfied through the hearer’s recognition of the
primary intention.
Grice also introduced in 1975 the notion
of implicature:
Implicatures are accessed by
inference, but they are different from
implications by the fact that the
inferential processes leading to them
are non-demonstrative;
These non-demonstrative inferential
processes rest on the cooperative
principle and the maxims of
conversation.
Cooperative principle: Contribute what is
required by the accepted purpose of the
conversation.
Maxims:
Maxim of Quality: Make your contribution true;
so do not convey what you believe false or
unjustified.
Maxim of Quantity: Be as informative as
required.
Maxim of Relation: Be relevant.
Maxim of Manner: Be perspicuous; so avoid
obscurity and ambiguity, and strive for brevity
and order.
Among implicatures, Grice distinguished
between:
Conventional implicatures:
 John is poor, but honnest.
 CI: Poor people are not honnest.
Conversational implicatures:
 Anne lives somewhere in Burgundy.
 ci: The speaker does not know where exactly Anne
lives in Burgundy.
Conversational implicatures, by contrast with
conventional implicatures, are cancellable and
reinforcable.
However, Grice introduced a further
distinction, among conversational
implicatures, between;
Generalized Conversational Implicatures:
 More conventional (depending on lexical items),
but still cancellable and reinforcable:
 Peter has done some of his exercises.
 Gci: Peter has not done all of his exercises.
Particularized Conversational Implicatures:
 Linked to the context:
 Anne lives somewhere in Burgundy.
 Pci: The speaker does not know where exactly Anne
lives.
Two accounts of GCIs
Neo-Gricean accounts (Horn, Levinson):
Maintain the distinction between GCIs and
PCIs;
Account for the GCIs by specific principles
complementing the Gricean maxims.
Post-Gricean accounts (Relevance Theory):
Deny that there is any difference between
GCIs and PCIs;
Account for all conversational implicatures as
based on contextual inferences, constrained
by the Relevance Principle.
Horn’s account is based on the Q- and Rprinciples:
Q-principle: Say as much as you can modulo
Quality and R.
 “a lower bounding hearer-based guarantee of
sufficiency of informative content” (Horn 2004).
R-principle: Say no more than you must,
modulo Q.
 “an upper-bounding correlate of the law of Least
Effort, dictating minimization of form” (Horn
2004).
All Neo-Gricean accounts share a general
hypothesis:
Inference is cheap,
articulation expensive…
Levinson 2000.
Minimax principles are basically economic
principles to the effect that cost should be
minimized, while benefit should be
maximized.
Neo-Gricean accounts are minimax accounts
which contrast speaker and hearer:
The Q-principle on the hearer’s side
(maintaining understandability);
The R-principle on the speaker’s side
(reducing articulation by triming the linguistic
form).
Scalar implicatures:
The Tokyo orchestra played some of
Beethoven concerti.
 GCI: The Tokyo Orchestra did not play all of
Beethoven concerti.
Contrast set implicatures:
The flag is white.
 GCI: The flag is only white (not white and red,
not white and green, etc.).
Horn insists on the importance of form rather
than content in the generation of implicit
meaning, notably in his discussion of
categorical sentences:
A: All/every F is G.
E: No F is G.
I: Some F is/are G.
O: Not every F is G.
Some F is not G.
 “It is because the basic forms [A/E] are not only
more informative but briefer than their I/O
counterparts that the use of the latter will
strongly implicate against the former” (Horn,
2004).
According to Levinson, both scalar and
contrast set implicatures are lexicalized as
default interpretations:
In other words, unless the implicature is
explicitly cancelled, it will be the interpretation
of the utterance:
 The Tokyo orchestra played some Beethoven
concerti.
 Cheap interpretation (implicature): The Tokyo
Orchestra did not play all of Beethoven concerti.
 Costly interpretation (logical): The Tokyo
Orchestra played some and possibly all Beethoven
concerti.
Relevance Theory is also a minimax
account, but is only concerned by cost and
benefit for the hearer.
Relevance is defined as a balance between
interpretive costs and cognitive effects
(benefits).
By contrast with Neo-Gricean accounts,
Relevance Theory considers that inference
and linguistic processing are both costly.
It is linked to the Gricean account not through
maxims or principles, but through a double
intentional account.
According to RT, any act of communication is
subtended by two intentions:
Informative intention: to make manifest or
more manifest to the audience a set of
assumptions I.
Communicative intention: to make mutually
manifest to audience and communicator that
the communicator has this informative
intention.
The communicative intention is what puts the
ostensive in “ostensive-inferential
communication”.
The fact that communication is ostensive is
the justification for the communicative
principle of relevance:
“Every ostensive stimulus conveys a
presumption of its own optimal relevance”.
The CPR triggers the least-effort heuristic.
Whereas Neo-Gricean accounts concentrate
on a lexical account for GCIs, Post-Gricean
accounts insist that all conversational
implicatures are context-dependent.
On the least-effort heuristic account,
hypotheses are generated relative to context
and are assessed successively, beginning
with the more easily accessed ones.
Given that two interpretations are available
for any ci, the (easy) “logical” one and the
(difficult) “pragmatic” one, the pramatic
interpretation will be accessed only if the
logical one is unsatisfactory.
Grice
meaning
Logic of
conversation
PostGricean
Neo-Gricean
The Tokyo orchestra played some
Beethoven concerti.
The Neo-Gricean and Post-Gricean accounts
make different predictions:
 Logical interpretation: The Tokyo Orchestra played
some and possibly all Beethoven concerti.
 Neo-Gricean accounts: costly;
 Post-Gricean accounts: cheap.
 Pragmatic interpretation: The Tokyo Orchestra did
not play all Beethoven concerti.
 Neo-Gricean accounts: cheap;
 Post-Gricean accounts: costly.
Generalized Conversational Implicatures
Scalars
Interpretation of scalar terms
GCI theory
literal
Relevance Theory
Default enrichment
+ context-sensitive
cancellation
No enrichment,
Hence slower/later
Hence
faster/earlier
Default enrichment
Context-sensitive
enrichment
Hence
faster/earlier
Hence slower/later
Enriched
There are been two main types of
experimental studies:
Developmental studies;
Time course of comprehension among adults.
A general characteristics of scalar terms is
that, though the stronger term implies the
weaker term, the weaker term implicates the
negation of the stronger term.
From a developmental point of view, one
would expect the easy interpretation to
precede the difficult interpretation:
GCI theory: pragmatic interpretation first;
RT: logical interpretation first.
Interpretation of scalar terms
GCI theory
literal
Relevance Theory
Default enrichment
+ context-sensitive
cancellation
No enrichment,
Hence later
Hence earlier
Default enrichment
Context-sensitive
enrichment
Hence earlier
Hence later
Enriched
Children were presented with 3 boxes:
Box 1: open with a toy parrot and a toy bear;
Box 2: open with a toy parrot;
Box 3: closed.
They are told by a puppet:
“A friend of mine gave me this box (box 3) and
said: ‘All I know is that whatever is in this box
(box 3) looks like what is inside this box (box
1) or what is inside this box (box 2)’”
The participants had to say whether they
agreed or not with a further statement.
Noveck 2001
Participants were presented with a statement
and asked whether they agree or disagree.
Noveck 2001
Logical interpretations precede pragmatic
interpretations.
These results have been replicated
repeatedly, in other studies, some of which
have used different methodologies.
This strongly suggests that the Neo-Gricean
account is not correct and that the PostGricean account is correct.
Default pragmatic interpretations, not being
the literal or lexical interpretation for the
scalar terms, have to be learned.
Thus, one should not expect them to be the
first to appear:
It is normal to find that literal or lexical
interpretations precede default pragmatic
interpretations for scalar terms.
Thus the developmental evidence does not
contradict the Neo-Gricean account.
Interpretation of scalar terms
GCI theory
literal
Relevance Theory
Default enrichment
+ context-sensitive
cancellation
No enrichment,
Hence slower
Hence faster
Default enrichment
Context-sensitive
enrichment
Hence faster
Hence slower
Enriched
The (22) participants were presented with
the same task twice, that is judging whether
a sentence is true or false.
They were given two different instructions:
First, to treat “some” as some and possibly all:
 Logical answer;
Second, to treat “some” as some but not all:
 Pragmatic answer.
 According to N-G, the logical answer should be
more costly, leading to more errors and to a slower
answer;
 According to P-G, the pragmatic answer should be
more costly, leading to more errors and to a slower
answer.
Bott & Noveck 2004
Bott & Noveck 2004
Two conditions:
A logical condition:
 Mary says that the following sentence is true: “Some
elephants are mammals”
A pragmatic condition:
 Mary says that the following sentence is false: “Some
elephants are mammals”
One task (with the same 2 instructions as
before):
Saying whether one agrees or disagrees with
Mary’s evaluation of the sentence.
 The correct answer is the same (agree) for both the
logical and the pramatic interpretation.
Bott & Noveck 2004
Bott & Noveck 2004
Task: making true/false judgments about the
sentences T1-T6, but with no instructions as
to the interpretation of some:
There is thus no “correct” interpretation.
Results are the measure of pramatic (“false”)
as opposed to logical (“true”) answers, as
well as reaction times for the two types of
answers:
40% of participants responded “true” to T1
sentences (logical interpretation);
60% responded false to T1 (pragmatic
interpretation).
Varying the cognitive resources:
Short condition: 900 ms:
 Neo-Gricean prediction:
 More some and not all answers;
 Post-Gricean prediction:
 More some and possibly all answers;
Long condition: 3 seconds:
 Neo-Gricean prediction:
 More some and possibly all answers;
 Post-Gricean prediction:
 More some and not all answers.
Bott & Noveck 2004
Logical interpretations are given more often than
are pragmatic interpretations.
Logical interpretations are assessed more
quickly than pragmatic interpretations.
These are robust effects.
Given people more time to answer augments the
pourcentage of pragmatic answers.
All of this strongly suggests that the Neo-Gricean
account is not correct and that the Post-Gricean
account is correct.
Contrast sets
Scalars do not allow lexical manipulation, but
contrast set implicatures do.
Basically, contrast set implicatures arise
when a term belonging to a set (e.g., colors)
is used, triggering an implicature that denies
the conjunctions of the chosen term and the
other terms in the set:
The flag is white.
 Gci: The flag is only white (not white and red,
not white and black, etc.).
Levinson proposes a default account, according
to which the pragmatic interpretation (only X) is a
default interpretation triggered by the lexical
item (X) itself.
This predicts that if a term is replaced by a
pseudo-word, the pragmatic interpretation
should not arise.
Thus, a comparison between two sentences,
identical apart from the replacement of a
contrast set term with a pseudo-word, should
show very different results regarding contrast set
implicature.
Some sentences semantically impose strong
constraints on their components:
 This is the case for comparative sentences:
 George W. Bush is as/more/less intelligent than
George W. Bush.
 George W. Bush is as/more/less intelligent than
Barack Obama.
 The first sentence is nonsensical, while the
second is fine:
 The things compared must be different.
Better red wine than no white wine.
Better no red wine than no white wine.
The question to be answered is:
 “What does the speaker prefer, white wine or red
wine?”
The answer is the same regardless of whether
the speaker said the first or second sentence:
 “White wine”.
This raises a puzzle:
 The second negation (in the 2nd sentence) does
not seem to make any difference.
Three relevant situations:
 Only red wine;
 Only white wine;
 Both red and white wine.
Interpretations:
 No white wine = only red wine
 No red wine = only white wine
 Red wine = red and possibly also white wine
Better red wine than no white wine.
 Better red wine and white wine than only red
wine.
Better no red wine than no white wine.
 Better only white wine than only red wine.
The expressions <red wine, white wine> belong
to a contrast set.
According to Levinson, these expressions should
trigger the default (pragmatic) interpretations:
Only red wine;
Only white wine.
 Better red wine than no white wine.
 Better no red wine than no white wine.
The pragmatic interpretation of the 1st sentence
yields the nonsensical interpretation:
 Better only red wine than only red wine.
 In other words, the pragmatic interpretation is
impossible in Koenig sentences.
Contrast set terms:
Better coffee than no tea.
Better no coffee than no tea.
 Predictions of Neo-Gricean accounts: the 1st
sentence should be more costly to interpret than the
2nd one (default enrichment + context-sensitive
cancellation vs. no enrichment).
 Predictions of Post-Gricean accounts: no difference
(no enrichment).
Pseudo-words:
Better pekuva than no luveka.
Better no pekuva than no luveka.
 Predictions of both : no difference (no enrichment).
Neo-Gricean accounts:
There should be a significant difference in the
results for the regular as opposed to the pseudoword sentences.
 A correct answer should be given significatively less
often for the regular sentences than for the pseudoword sentences.
Post-Gricean accounts:
No significative difference.
Subjects (adults) were presented with one of
four sentences in a scenario and asked to
indicate what the preference of the speaker of
the sentence is:
A man arrives very late at a parent-teacher
meeting. Everyone is drinking a hot drink, but there
isn’t much left. Someone brings him a cup. He
says:
 Better coffee than no tea.
 Better no coffee than no tea.
An anthropologist arrives very late at a feast in
Papouasy-New Guinea. There is no much left to
drink. Someone brings him a gourd. The
anthropologist says:
 Better pekuva than no luveka.
 Better no pekuva than no luveka.
Utterances
coffee
tea
Don’t know
Better coffee than no tea
31
63
6
Better no coffee than no tea
0
93
7
Utterances
pekuva
luveka
Don’t know
Better pekuva than no luveka
7
67
26
Better no pekuva than no
luveka
6
94
0
Reboul 2004
The results are extremely similar between
the regular words condition and the pseudoword condition.
This verifies the predictions of Post-Gricean
accounts;
However, again, it contradicts the predictions
of Neo-Gricean accounts.
Scalars
Contrast set
• Cancellation
• Default
enrichment
Grice
• MeaningNN
• Maxims
NG
• Lexical
interpretation
• Contextual
enrichment
PG
GCIs
Neo
Default
enrichment
Contextual
cancellation
Post
Contextual
enrichment
PostGricean
NeoGricean
Lexicon
(Lex.)
Adult reaction times
(RT)
Developmental
(Dev.)
Dev.
pragmatic
logical
RT
pragmatic
logical
Lex.
pseudowords
Words
Dev.
logical
pragmatic
RT
logical
pragmatic
Lex.
pseudo-words = words
Dev.
literal
pragmatic
RT
literal
pragmatic
Lex.
pseudo-words = words
 Noveck, I (2001) “When children are more logical than
adults”, Cognition 78/2, 165-188.
 Noveck, I. & Bott, L. (2004) “Some utterances are
underinformative”, Journal of Memory and Language 51/3,
437-457.
 Reboul, A. (2004) “Conversational implicatures”, in Noveck, I.
& Sperber, D. (eds) Towards Experimental Pragmatics,
Palgrave.
 Noveck, I. & Sperber, D. (2007) “The why and how of
experimental pragmatics”, in Burton-Roberts, N. (ed.)
Advances in Pragmatics, Palgrave.
 Noveck, I. & Reboul, A. (2008) “Experimental pragmatics”,
TICS 12/11, 425-431.
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