Download The Role of Religion in Iraqi Nationaiism: 1918-1932

The Role of Religion in Iraqi Nationaiism: 1918-1932
V. O. Lockwood-Drummond
Institute of Islamic Studies
McGill University
Montreal, Quebec,
Canada
A thesis submitted to the Faculty of Graduate
Studies and Research in partial f u l f h e n t of the
requirements for the degree of Master of Arts
O Lockwood-Drummond 1997
Libtary
1+Ia, , National
,
Bibliothèque nationale
du Canada
Acquisitions and
BibliographE Services
Acquisitions et
seMces bibliographiques
395 Wellington Street
OttawaON K 1 A W
Canada
395. nie Wellington
Ottawa ON K i A ON4
Canada
Y0wNs
Vons
-
Our Ua Nano m?khcwwe
The author has granted a nonexclusive licence ailowing the
National Library of Canada to
reproduce, loan, distribute or sell
copies of this thesis in microform,
paper or electronic formats.
L'auteur a accordé une licence non
exclusive permettant à la
Bibliothèque nationale du Canada de
reproduire, prêter, distribuer ou
vendre des copies de cette thèse sous
la forme de rnicrofiche/film, de
reproduction sur papier ou sur format
électronique.
The author retains ownership of the
copyright in ths thesis. Neither the
thesis nor substantial extracts fiom it
may be prhted or otherwise
reproduced without the author's
permission.
L'auteur conserve la propriété du
droit d'auteur qui protège cette thèse.
Ni la thèse ni des extraits substantiels
de celle-ci ne doivent être imprimés
ou autrement reproduits sans son
autorisation.
ABSTRACT
Author:
V. Lockwood - Drummond
Title of Thesis:
The Role of Religion in [raqi Nationalism: 19 18 - 1932.
Department:
Institute of Islamic Studies, McGill University
Degree:
Master of Arts
This thesis proposes to deal with the Iraqi Nationalkt rnovement from its emergence
after the Fust World War to the establishment of an independent Lraq in 1932. During these
years the British controlled Iraq under a mandate granted by the League of Nations. This.
in spite of the simultaneous creation of an Iraqi monarchy. Neither the new monarch nor
the people were content with the political arrangement, based as it was on foreign control.
but the drive for independence emanated from a srnail group of political activists. Both
major religious sects of Islam, Sunni and Shi'a, played a leading role in the nationaiist
movement: in fact. the movernent cannot be understood without an appreciation of Islam.
and its major variations, in Iraqi life.
A historkal background highlights the conditions which allowed lraqism to take
precedent over Arabism after the war and examines the reactions of Iraqis to the invasion
by modem conquerors and their later occupation. Additionally, it provides a chronological
account of the important events during the mandate period and the buildup of Iraqi
resentment of foreign control which precipitated their demand for self-government.
This thesis is a broad study of the nascent nationalist rnovement in postwar Lraq
which engaged in a desperate banle to transform a mandated temtory into a sovereign state.
Focus is on the role religion played in its beginnuigs and on the contribution of both Shi'is
and Sunnis whose combined and independent efforts led to the formation of modem Iraq.
Sommaire
Auteur:
V. O. Lockwood - Drummond
Titre:
Le rôle de la religion dans le nationalisme iraquien:
Section:
Institut des études islamiques
Diplorne:
M. A.
Cette thèse traite du mouvement nationaliste de l'Iraq depuis ses débuts
après la Première Guerre Mondiale jusqu' à l'établissement de l'indépendence de
1'en 1932. Pendant cette période, malgré la création de la monarchie, I'Iraq était
sous contrôle de la Grande Bretagne mandatée par la Ligue des Nations. Ni le
nouveau monarch ni le peuple iraquiens n'étaient satisfaits de cette arrangement
politique base sur une contrôle étranger. Par ailleurs, un groupuscule d'activistes
fut le moteur de l'indépendence. Les deux sectes principales Sunni et Shi'a ont joué
un rôle important dans le mouvement nationaliste. En fait on ne peut comprendre œ
mouvement sans connaître l'Islam et ses diverses répercussions sur la vie des
Iraquiens.
La recherche historique met en évidence les conditions qui ont permis
I'ascendant de 1"'Iraquisme" sur I"'Arabisme7' après la Première Guerre: en outre,
elle permet d'examiner les réactions des Iraquiens face à l'invasion des conquérants
modernes et de l'occupation de leur temtoire qui suivit: eiie facilite aussi le cornpterendu chronologique des événements majeurs de cette période du mandat: eue
explique le rejet grandissant des iraquiens du contrôle étranger. ce qui précipita leur
demande d' autonomie.
Cette thèse étudie d'une manière générale le mouvement nationaliste naissant
dans l'Iraq de 1' Après-Guerre qui s'engagea dans une bataille acharnée pour
transformer ce territoire mandaté en un état souverain. Elle met l'accent. d'une part.
sur le rôle joué par la religion lors de la naissance du nationalisme, et d'autre part,
sur la contribution autant des Shi'as que des Sunnis, dont les efforts unis ou
séparés ont permis la construction de I'iraq moderne.
Acknowledgements
First and foremost, 1 wish to express my sincere gratitude to the Director of the
Islamic Institute at McGill University, Professor -4. Uner Turgay. who supported and
facilitated the completion of this study from the outset. 1 also wish to thank Ann Yaxley of
the lslamic Institutie for her kindness. The invaluable assistance and consideration of
Wayne St. Thomas, Salwa Ferahian. and Steve Millier of the Islamic Studies Library staff
greatly contnbuted to this thesis. Specifically, 1 wish to acknowledge my indebtedness to
Professors Erik Knudsen and Nancy Carrol of the Amencan College of Switzerland
without whom this work might never have been attempted: and, to the innumerable
students from A. C. S. who inspired my interest in the Middle East and who 1 rernember
with sincere affection.
1 would also Iike to express my gratitude to family and fnends who have motivated
me and aiiowed for my eccentricities. To Deborah for her professionalism in translating my
abstract , Alexandra w hose linguistic abilities are without paraiiel, Barbara for her
exceptional insight in the role of religion, Michaei Paul, the judge and jury of ihe
significant, and Barbara A m for teaching me the vagaries of the intemet - thank you.
Among the many others who have supported me in my dedication to education. 1 am
especially gratefûi to Reita, Rana, Patricia, Isobel, Bob, Pme. Tom, Audrey, John, Mary.
Alex, Janice, Gordon, and lastly, my own group of seven: Stephanie, David, Michaela
Amal, Hannah, Katherine, and Ian.
Most importantly, 1 wish to acknowiedge the devotion and encouragement of my
parents, Rachel and Alexander Dnimmond, and it is to them that 1 dedicate this thesis.
Table Of Contents
Abstract
Sommaire
Acknowledgements
Contents
Introduction
Chapter One: Mesopotamian Inheritance
Ottoman Rule in the Nineteenth Century
Policies of Abdulharnid II: 1876- 1909
Diffenng Policies of the Young Turks: 1908- 19 18
Western Expansionism and the Great War
Resistance and Accomodation in Mesopotamia
Chapter Two: Occupation and Mandate 1918- 1920
Arab Nationalism in Paris and Darnascus
Iraqi Nationalist Resistance
Al-Thawra ai-Iraqiyya al-Kubra
Role of Religion in the Iraqi Revolt
Diarchal Governrnent in Baghdad
Chapter Three: Growth of Nationalism in Iraq
Parties and Groups in the National Movement
Role of Religion in the National Struggle
Kurds and Other Minorities
British Reaction to the Nationalist Movement
National Institutions
Chapter Four: The Nationalist Movement: 1921- 1932
King Faisal and His Cabinets
The Treaty and Nationaiist Opposition: 1921 - 1924
Mosul, Oil, and Geographic Unity
Parliament and the Nationalist Opposition
independence and the National Movement
Conclusion
Bibliography
Religion was vitai to all aspects of life in ancient Mesopotamia; in that of the
nomadic Arab tribes who roarned the great western desen: and, wiih the coming of Islam.
in that of the conqueron who ruled over the nch lands of the Tigris and Euphrates. In fact.
due to Islam's belief in joint sovereignty of the religious and the secdar, lslamic law played
a legitirnate role in the temporal affairs of a reaim ruied by the orthodox Abbasid caliphs.
This was a precept which was upheld for cennines by the caliph-sultans of the Ottoman
Empire. Therefore, by vimie of the religious and temporal past k i n g concordant, it was
not unnaniral that religion played a major role in early Iraqi nationalism, which touched the
Lives of ninety-five percent of the people in Iraq who were ~ u s l i m . '
Yet nationalism as an ideology is secular, based on individual self-determination
and, more often than not, a common race, culture, and language. The Arab lands in the
Middle East differed demographicaily however, and this had an influence. In Greater Syria
for example, the religious, ethnic, and linguistic divisions produced a Sunni Arab majority
amid Shi'i Arab, Alawi, Drue, Christian, and Jewish minorities. Here, Sunni Arabs.
whose religious liberalkm was weil-suited to secuiar ideologies, were at the forefront of
nascent Arâb autonomist and nationalist movements.
In the area designated by the Abbasids as 'Irak 'Arabi and Jazirah, the self-same
divisions produced a Shi' i Arab majority. Nonetheless, having politically and socially
dominated the country for centuries, the Sunnis continued to dominate as an inherent nght.
As in Greater Syria, Sunni Arabs in Iraq were religiously individualistic. They too were
prone to involvement in Arab separatist movements. Conversely, Shi'i Arabs were
religiously dominated by their pnesthood, whose 'national' inchation was for an Islamic
state with a consultative body ruled by Shi'i legists. Sunni Kurds, the largest non-Arab
rninority in the country, held national aspirations of their own, completely separate from an
Arab state. The remaining five percent of the population, consisting of other non-Arab
minorities, were isolated from and, with rare exception, unaffected by autonomist or
nationalist endeavor.
Of Iraqis who aspired to national independence after the war of 1914 - 1918, the
three largest groups, though Muslim. were motivated by self-interest and not by a cornmon
goal. Clothed in the orthodoxy and heterodoxy of Islam. Muslirn Arab sectarianism caused
disunity and disharmony, as well as a social. economic, and political disparity. Moreover,
despite efforts to the contrary, this did not abate with the dissolution of the Ottoman
Empire. Why. if there was between the Sunni and Shi'i Arab a cornmon culture, a comrnon
history. and a common language, could this schism not be heaied?
Acnialiy, for a bief interlude, a healing did occur in an Iraqi nationalist rebellion
which brought Sunnis and Shi'i Arabs together in a common goal: the ousting of postwar
military occupation forces offensive to both secrs.'
Iraqis, mesmerized by promises of
power, compromised with each other, with imperialist Britain, and with the nationalist
regimes of the Turks and the ~olsheviks.~
Historians have argued that whereas the Sunni Amb looked to the West, the Shi'i
Arab looked to the East, both seekhg to strengthen their sectarian aiiiances and political
power. But the Iraqi dilemma at this time did not concem sectarianism as such but rather
internai demographics which could aiter past political roles in Iraq. Notwithstanding the
Sunni majonty throughout the Muslirn world, the Shi'i Arabs were the majonty in Iraq
and, poiiticaiiy rnotivated by Shi'i clergy, Shi'i nationalisis, and other outside influences:
could overwhelm the Sunnis, despite the advantage of Sunni Kurdish numbers.
Therefore, to retain Sunni Arab dominance in Iraq two solutions were evident.
although both would cause a renewal of the schism between the sects. One solution was
that of fomiing a temporary alliance with the foreign occupying power-and
future
mandatory authority under the aegis of the League of Nations in Geneva. The Shi'a were
opposed to such a foreign alliance under any pretext, although they themselves had been
dominated by a foreign-bom priesthood for centuries.
Other Sunni Arabs saw the solution in Arab nationalism and its goal of a single
Arab nation rather than a particularist independent state. This would preclude forging a
specific Iraqi loyalty or a unique h q i identity. Naturatly. the Shi'i Arabs of Iraq were
opposed to what would be a predominantly Sunni Arab nation, as were the Kurds who,
though Surmi, would be excluded from real power. While Arab nationalism per se did not
prosper in Iraq at this partïcular rime, it did influence the Shi'i status quo and Iraqi future
generations?
The solution to continued Sunni politicai dominion proved to be the intrusion and
designs of the mandatory power. However, Iraqi nationalism thnved within the purported
democratic institutions of Iraq's constitutional monarchy and both Sunni and Shi'i Lraqi
nationalists, the nemesis of the mandatory power, were influentid in achieving Lraqi
independence. The national stniggle was not merely for independence however. nor was it
for the liberal nationalism which espoused liberty, equality, and fraternity? Rather the
nationalist movement in Iraq desired iiberation from centuries of alien domination. and an
independent, self-governing state within the boundaries of Islam. For religion played a
major role, indeed, in the nationalist politics of Iraq in the mandate era.
This thesis is concemed with the historical background to [raqi nationalism, the
emergence of the Iraqi nationalist movement after 1918, and its progress until the
independence of Iraq in 1932. It examuies the role Islam played during these formative
y e m with a view to the differing participation of Sunni and Shi'i segments of the country's
population. It also demonstrates that the people in general reacted strongly to foreign
military occupation and to the mandate which followed, despite the establishment of the
Iraqi monarchy which d e d in diarchy7 with the mandatory power. It m e r shows thai
diffenng religious sects and ethnic groups within Islam participated in the nationaikt
movement in a distinctive fashion. The reason for their differences was, more than
anythmg else, based on the degree of political power they wanted to exercise in
government.
The focus of the thesis is on the struggle for independence by M u s h nationalists
under the terms of a mandate imposed by the League of Nations. Emphasis is on Arab
influences rather than Kurdish, though their inclusion in the overall Islamic theme will be
recognized.
Many works have deait with Arab Nationalism in generai and a few scholars have
made specific references to Iraqi Nationdism. There is no work, however. which
specificaily examines the role religion played in the Iraqi nationalist movement from 19 18
to 1932. This work is intended to c o n f m the distinct participation of both Shi'i and Sunni
Arabs in the process which led to the formation of the state of Iraq.
..
C. Ernest Dawn, 'The Origins of Arab Nationalism," in The O w s of Arab Na_rionalism, edited by
Rashid Khalidi. (New York: Columbia University Ress. 1991). Dawn quotes Talib Mushaq, an Inqi Arab
Ottoman bureaucrat under the Monarchy. as saying: "Were we reaiIy subjects of impenalism when h q was
under Ottoman rule? Never! We were one nation, living under one flag. The bond of religion bound us with
the firmest of ties. islam united Our hearts and our feelings, and made us one bloc, supporting each other
like a solid building. P. 19.
l
'The iraqi Revolt brought Shi'i and Sunni Arabs together religiously, in joint
services in the mosques of
Baghdad and politically, after these religious services, by mernbers of Iraq; nationalist societies who
planned the revolt in conjunction with the Shi'i clergy in the Holy Shi'i cities. who incited the tribes to
revolt. David Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace: Creatin~the Modem Middle East 19 14- 1922 (New
York: Henry HoIt and Company. 1989) Although the revolt has k e n referred to as k i n g primarily antiBritish and not nationalistic, Fromkin argues that that is not a satisfactory explanation coming as it did in
the same moment in time as riots and rebetlions elsewhere in the Middle East. E g y ~ t . 'Transjordan',
Palestine. P. 453.
Hanna Batatu. T
e
hq
h (Classesandceofon: Pnnceton
University Press, 1979). Batatu documents the visit of a Turkish major in Mustafa Kemal's liberation m y
to Najaf, as well as, a Bolshevik pamphlet circulated in Iraq, the 'Society for the Libernuon of the Moslem
East' (Jam'iyyarTaWilis-ish-Sharq-il-Islam)and the interest of the Shi'a (and the Turks) in ri Bolshevik
rnovement headquartered in Anatolia. Pp. 1 137-39.
Studies (London: Wiedenfeld and
Elie Kedouie, The Chatham House Version and Other Middl-tern
Nicolson. 1970). The author points out that the Shi'i clergy were encounged by the defeat of the Ottomans
in 1918 to seek 'power and preponderance' in Iraq. P. 250. Pnor to the Inqi revolt of 1920, they
themselves were encouraged by the Turks and the Bokheviks, references to this point of view may be found
in the work of Hanna Batatu noted above.
The appointment by King Faisai of a Syrian Arab nationalist, Sati al-Husn,as Director of Education in
Iraq in 1922 had a direct influence over the glorification of Amb history within the state ducational system
which influenced young Iraqis as they grew to manhood, particulady in the late nineteen thirties and eady
nineteen forties.
Hans Kohn. The Age of Nationalism: The First Era of Global History. (New York: Harpers & Brothers.
Publishers, 1962) Kohn daims that "...in most of the new states emerging from the First World
War...there was. ..an illiberai nationality poticy in which the power of the state was put. in the n m e of
nationdism. into the service of the dominant ethnic group. Instead of bi-national or constitutionally multiethnic states, the ideai of the pure nation-state was procIairned.*' p. 25.
'
A diarchy refers to a govemment by two independent authorities, especiaily. the reformeci indian
constitution started in 192 1.
Political domination by waves of Foreign conquerors was endemic in the history of
Mesopotamia The ultimate conquest during the First World War was duly followed by
military occupation and political domination by a foreign power under the aegis of the
League of Nations. In similar episodes throughout the centuries, Mesopotamians bore the
ravages of continuous religious, political, and temtorial conflict. Not merely confined to
extemal forces, confiict was also internal. Sectarian and racial divisions were causative
factors influencing the religious, social, and economic lives of Mesopotamians for over a
thousand years. Awareness of these factors and their influence is essential to an
appreciation of the social and political dilemma which confronted these lands, the former
Ottoman provinces of Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul. This analysis contemplates the role of
established religious dicta in the formation of Iraqi nationalism.
Though contemporary nationalism emerged belatedly in the Middle East compared
ro Europe, the last decade of the Ottoman Empire witnessed the awakening of
Mesopotamians to a latent Arab aliegiance. When faced with Turkish nationalism and
British imperialism, Mesopotamians, of whom the Arabs formed the vast majority,
dernanded autonomy cvithin the Empire. ALthough an independent nation was not within
the realm of their imaginings at this tirne, the concept of nation was not entirely foreign
inasmuch as the Islamic comrnunity had k e n viewed as such in the religious and political
sense. It was also possible to conceive of an Arab tribe as a nation -a
people imbued with
a cornmon history, language, and culture. and a desert land bordering the sown. The
overview below, from Ancient Mesopotarnia to the British occupation after the Fint World
War, clarifies the importance of the foregoing and the role of religion prier to nationdism.
From iü ancient beginning religion played a vital role in the history of
Mesopotamia. Although the Arab Islamic conquest was crucial to the religious and culturai
legacy of Mesopotamia, a developed Arab culture existed even prior to the fïrst civilization
of Sumer city-states. Arab nomads. who migrated from the western desert shared with the
Akkadians a language with similar "patterns of grammar, syntax. and phnseology ."' Their
religion, iike that of the Sumenans, was polytheistic and associationistic: they believed in
one living God, yet associated with God eatthly things and "beiings that were not ~ o d . " '
On the other hand, Arab tribesmen who had converted to Islam, in contrat to the ancient
Mesopotamians, pledged aliegiance to One God and disassociated from other lesser g o d d
Furthemore, a cornrnon racial heritage was found in the conquerors of ancient
Mesopotamia; Akkadims and Sargonids, Amorites and Assynans, Canaanites and
Aramaens all shared the same roots of Semitic conquest. These conquerors, as well as
those of non-Semitic heritage. adopted as their own the structure, culture. and religion of
sumer.'
Consequently, this first civilization continued to exist withm the parameten of
conquest. When subsequently the Greeks, Persians, Seleucids, Parthians, and Sassanids
conquered the region, they imposed their own cultures and religions. thereby severing the
link with ancient Mesopotamia Nonetheless, the Sernitic connection sunrived.
in 633 AD, great Arab tribal armies under Khalid ibn ai-Walid, the Muslim general
of Medina, took the town of ai-Hirah on the western desen fringe of Persian Sassanid
territoq?
R.V. Bodley writes that envoys had k e n sent earlier from Medina to the
Sassanid d e r announcing the coming of a new religion and the peril in its rejection.'
Prophesy became reality as Muslim Arabs conquered Mesopotamia and assured the fuial
destruction of the Sassanid dynasty in later battles at Ctesiphon and Nehavend. Arab
government replaced Persian, although much of Persian administration and custom
remained. Arab tribal amies. clustered in camp cities on the eùge of the desert. clung to the
pmservation of Arab culture and superiority over the larger Persian Sassanid population.'
According to Bernard Lewis, the camp cities of Kufah and Basra played a vital role
in the expansion of the Arab nation during the conquests, however. he points out that "the
pietists were assigned a minor role" in its creation - although religion was the "symbol of
Arab unity and victory.'% Yet Islam itseif embraçed the concept of nation. The comrnunity
played a major role as in a modem nation state. The Qur'an's scope extended beyond
religion to civil law. Islam's spiriaial and temporal leader, the caliph, niled in consensus,
ijmu, with the
Muslim community. The Arabic Qur'an, the Sunnah of the Rophet, and the
Shari'a were, figuratively speaking, the boudaries of Islam.
W~thindecades of the Arab conquest, Islam itself was rent by discord over the
legitirnacy of caliphal succession, causing senous confiid in Mesopotamia where the fourth
caliph had made his capital. Caliph Ali ibn Abi Talib, whose nile was contested by
Muwiyyah the Umayyad govemor of Damascus, was assassinated by a dissident Kharidji
aibesrnan in the mosque of Kufah in 661 AD.' Subsequently, his son Husain was killed in
banle against the ruling Umayyads near Karbala in 680 AD. Thereafter, supporters of Ali,
the Shi'at Ni, built shrines to their martyrs in the holy cities of Shi'ism which became
centers of Shi'i pilgrimage and learning.
Many of the Shi'at Aii remained in Mesopotamia, while others migmted to northem
Persia amid throngs of the discontented. These later rebelled against the Amb govemment.
As for the Persian Sassanids, they slowly a
ssimilm the Arabic language and many
abandoiied Zorastnanisrn for Islam in the eighth century.1° According to the tenets of Islam
conceming non-Muslirns, the conquered were not coerced and could h i y accep or reject
the new religion. Those who chose to continue in their custornary beliefs could choose to
die by the sword or live conditionaiiy in pace with thar Muslim miers.
However, peace was elusive in Mesopotamia. In 750 AD, the Umayyads were
defeated by the Abbasids, who estabiished the caliphate in the Abbasid province of 'Irak
Arabi'. Baghdad, built in 780 AD, became the seat of the Abbasid dynasty and the syrnbol
of Sunni dominance. Abbasid rule, though it lasted successfully until 1258 AD. was
LUiuted by alien political domination d e r the ninth century .' ' Various conquerors mled the
region until the sixteenth century at which time the Persians reconquered Mesopotamia led
by a Shi' i Safavid Shah. Withui decades, the Ottomans defeated the Safavids and Sunni
government was restored to Baghdad. However, the resulting proximity of the Sunni and
Shi'i empires served to revive the reiigious rift of the past and continuous sectarian contlict
once again becarne temtorial.
After Shi'ism had k e n declared the Safavid state religion in 1504 AD, the Shah
insisted that the protection of the Shi'i holy cities was the prerogative of the Persian
Empire.' Conversely. the Sultan claimed that the lands of the Umayyad and Abbasid were
a heritage of the ûttornan Empire, its ultimate fate. Antagonism generated by constant
confiict undermined ail efforts at reconciliation.
'
The intractable banier of alienation and
distrust which existed between both sects, now extended to the Ottoman Sunni pvernment
and the Shi'i Arab community, which contended that the govemment was. in fact.
illegitimate according to Shi'i law.
During the eighteenth century, a Sunni Afghan invasion of Persia precipitated the
migration of many of the Shi'i Penian religious and merchant class of Isfahan to the Shi'i
holy cities of Najaf and ~arbala." This created an alien force within Mesopotamia which
eventually led to Shi'i Persian domination over the indigenous Shi'i Arabcommunity and
the Shi'i holy cities. Moreover, the Shi'i Persian doctors of religious law, rnujtahidin.
resident in Mesopotamia acquired preeminent reiigious and political leadership among the
Shi'a of Mesopotamia and of Persia. Their privileged status was tolerated by the Sunni
Ottoman government which accrued great benefit fiom Shi'i pilgrimage and burial trafic.
Sunni Arab dominance in Mesopotamia existed by vimie of Sunni Ottoman rule.
The Ottoman Sultan was an orthodox Muslirn of the Hanafite schoot of law. His
government army and courts were distinctly Sunni. Phebe Marr observes that "the shi'i.
or Jafarire school of law was neither recognized in the Ottoman code nor accorded a place
within the shari'ah
...courts.", nor did the Shi'a in Mesopotamia hold administrative.
military. or teaching positions in Sunni Ottoman instinitions." Yet the religious and cultural
legacy of the Islamic Arab conquest of Mesopotamia was the only instrument capable of
healing and uniting the cloven Muslirn Arab cornmunities.
Islam caused a similar religious cleavage arnung the Kurdish tribes in the northem
province of Mosul, although o d y small percentage of Kwds adopted Shi'ism. Sunni tribes
mainly adhered to the Sufi Qadiri order in the southem Iraqi Kurdistan and Nakshabandi
order in the north. Culturai solidarity nurtured a living bond among the predominantly
Sunni Kurds of Iraq and their kinsmen in Anatolia Syria, Persia, and Armenia. The rise of
Kurdish nationaiism in the nineteenth century affected the whole of Kurdistan.16 Tribal
aghas ruied in Mosul, Sulairnmiyya and remote highland strongholds where. despite
persistent tribal rivalry, the Kurds remained far rernoved from the inter-Arab contlict to the
south. Though subdued by the Ottomans in the sixteenth century, ihey were never
conquered by them.
Not ail conquerors of Mesopotamia came bearing arms. British merchants
penetrated the head of the Persian Gulf before the eighteenth century bearing Ottoman trade
treaties of privilege, sethg up warehouses ai Basra and Baghdad, and using their trade
advantage to the detriment of indigenous Arabs, Christians, and .Jews.17 The Gulf becarne
a strategic link in protecting India, Britaui's eastem empire, therefore Bntain encouraged
these commercial ventures. Furthemore. despite Britain's promise to do so, upholding the
integrity of the Ottoman Empire was not an ironclad requisite of British diplomacy.
Mesopotamia became a pawn in the "Great Game" of f o i h g Russian efforts to invade
British lndial* Thus, both economically and strategicaily, Bntain held a vested interest in
Mesopotamia -a
double-edged sword which it used to came Mesopotamia's future.
Ottoman Rule in the Nineteenth Century
in the heght of increased Western technologicd advances and weakening Ottoman
military and financiai institutions, the Ottoman governrnent legislated social, political and
economic refoms and fostered technologicd and economic concessions destined to bring
Mesopotamia into the modem age. This, all within the general frarnework of the Tanzimt-i
Hayriye -an
era of reform in the Ottoman Empire from 1 8 3 9 4 8 7 6 fostered the
conditions necessary for the integration of the provinces of Baghdad and Basra into the
world economy l9 and changed the political climate of Mesopotamia. thereby preparing the
ground for Iraqi nationalism.
During this penod, British telegnph lines covered the countryside and British
stearnships plowed the river Tigris. Tribal shaikhs, who d e d the land and the sea routes
south of Baghdad, saw these changes as a threat to the status quo. Anarchy and acts of
piracy went hand in hand with modemization. In 1869, the year of the opening of the Suez
Canai to worldwide shipping, an enlightened Ottoman statesman found the solution to tribal
unrest and the furthering of the airns of the Ottoman government.
Midhat Pasha, a dedicated reformer and governor of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872,
transformed Mesopotamia. He paved the streets, introduced electrical light and a horse-
drawn tramway; he initiated state steamship service between Baghdad and Oman, and built
Baghdad's Fust modem bridge over the Tigris in an attempt to control recalcitrant
floodwaters from the upper reaches of the great river. The pasha's enactment of the Law of
the Vilayet of 1864 cenualized and rnodemized Mesopotamian administration. which
thereafter became a maileable system of provincial and district subdivision. For the first
tirne, administration councils included local representatives from among Muslirn and nonMusiim notables, enabling them to gain hitherto inaccessible administrative experience."
With the enactment of the Ottoman Public Education Law of 1869, Midhat Pasha
established a secular state SChool system in Mesopotarnia b r e a h g the traditional religious
monopoly over education. Traditional educational methods, both Sunni and Shi' i, taught
M u s h students the alphabet, the Qur'an, and Arabic at mosque schools. Non-Muslims
attended confessional schools or private western mission schools. Primas, and secondary
Ottoman state education was free to ail classes and religions. Students were taught science.
mathematics and western languages for the fmt time. Secular state education becarne the
vehicle for improving the provincial mind and prepared many Mesopotamians for higher
education and careers in the Ottoman bureaucracy and military. WMe Sunnis profited from
this reform; Shi'i students refused state education rather than risk Sunni indoctrination
which later becarne a serious obstacle to their future in govemment and the professions."
Of course, not aiI children attended school, as is clearly iliustrated by the low literacy rate."
Membea of the tribes who formed the greater part of the population were rarely litente.
their education was Limited to the teaching of their tribal eiders and the art of survival.
Not oniy did Midhat Pasha inaugurate administrative and educational change. he
irrevocably transfonned the structure of tribal society. To provide the stability necessary for
agrarian reform and econornic revival, Midhat Pasha applied the provisions of the Land
Law of 1858 to settle the tribes on the land. The intent of the law was to provide
smallholdings for the tribesmen, however, the majority of tribesmen refused to register for
legal titie to the land due to their fear of govenunent control, taxation and conscription.
Consequently, many shaikhs and their families registered for vas t tribal domains, thereby
creating a wedthy elite which later becarne a powerful political force. The shaikh, former
tribal champion and protector, became a land lord; the tribesman, once the unfettered
pastoraiist, became one of his legion of tenant farmer~.'~The 1858 Land Law was a
primary factor in the fragmentation of much of traditional tribai society and transforming
the religious, social, econornic, and political smicnire of ~ e s o p o t a m i a . ~ ~
Land settlement created a subordinate status arnongst the tnbesmen which had farreaching consequences long after Midhat Pasha's tenure. The tribal community had been a
primitive society with culturai, historie, and linguistic ties bound by families. clans. and a
tribal body which meted out justice, shared its bounty, offered its protection and resolution
by consensus. It adhered to ancient tribal custorns; religion played a rninor role. As Hanna
Batatu observes, "...Islam sat lightly on ~edouins."'~
Therefore, it was not circurnstance
alone. nor religion, nor environment but the tribesrnan's need of communal bonding d e r
the transition from nomadic to sedentas, Iife which made him responsive to the procession
of itinerant emissaries From the holy cities of the Shi'a in the late nineteenth century.
On the other hand, the Shi'i Persian mujtahidin in Karbala and Najaf had their own
motives for seeking to convert the tribes. the most immediate being their need of an
indigenous source of income and a protective force for the holy cities and their pilgrims.
Regardless of need or motive, the Sunni Ottoman govemment apparently attributed Little
importance to a possible change in tribal ailegiance slated to strengthen the Shi'i politicai
leadership and influence the country's political future. An ironic and unintended effect of
nibal conversion to Shi'ism was the major demographic change in the country. By the t m
of the twentieth century, the majority of the population in Mesopotamia was Shi'i rab?
The political impact of this change only becarne evident in the early years of the monarchy.
Midhat Pasha's success in implementing Tanzimat reforms in the Balkans, prior to
his govemorship of Baghdad, provided the stimulus necessary to create the same miracle in
~esopotamia.'~His reforms as govemor of Baghdad from 1869 to 1872 prepared the
ground for future growth in Mesopotamia, drawing it into the orbit of the coming age and
into the world economy. Stephen Longrigg, an iraqi scholar with little praise for Ottoman
good intentions, nonetheless pnised Midhat Pasha for his agarian-tribal policy, his
introduction of representative govemment, and his "expansion of the provincial rnind"
through edu~ation.'~These policies created an indigenous elite whose very existence
ailowed for the emergence of a nationalkt consciousness. On the other hand, while Midhat
Pasha succeeded in curbing ulmM control over education he aiso created conditions
conducive to increasing Shi'i polity in southem Mesopotamia. Many of the reforms of this
great statesman were successful, others drew critici~rn:'~di provided the basis for further
reforms in Mesopotamia during the reigns of Abdulhamid II and the Young Turks.
PoIicies of Abdulhamid II: 1876 - 1909
In the beginning of his reign, Sultan Abdulhamid II adopted the Liberal poiicies of
the previous govemment and, in order to aven interventionist reform by European powers.
he promulgated the Empire's fint constitution, principally drafted by Midhat Pasha.
Mesopotamian representatives to the Ottoman parliament. including notables from iMosul.
Baghdad, and Basra provinces, were corporately elected according to the Law of the
Vilayets instituted by the Pasha in 1869." 0 the critical a f t e m t h of the 1877-78 war with
Russia however, the Sultan took power into his own hands and unilaterally suspended both
the constitution and the parliament. The sultanate reverted to a pre-Tanzimat absolutism
which lasted over thiny yean. in a speech from the throne afier the 1908 Young Turk
revolution whch restored the constitution, Abdulhamid referred to its suspension as an act
of expediency. His subjects. unprepared as they were for constitutional govemment.
required modem education to fully understand its advantages and re~~onsibilities."
While Abduhamid pnontized educational reform
during
hs
reign,
he
simultaneously followed policies of economic regeneration and Muslirn unification.
hstability in the provinces convinced the Sultan that a modem communications systern
would ensure the prosperity and unity of his ~mpire" therefore he fostered economic ties
with western nations, especidy Gemany. An important step occurred when. in 1888, the
Orient Express heralded the state visit of Kaiser Wilhelm II who assured Abdulhamid of
Germany's fidelity and in 1898, at the tomb of Salah al-Din, of its pro-hiamic
~entirnents.~'As a result, a German fm was granted the Bosphorus to Ankara railroad
concession and a German rnilitary mission was assigned to reorganize the Ottoman army.
The awarding of the Berlin-Baghdad Railway concession in 1899 brought about
international complications focusing on pan-Germanic intentions in the Middle E a ~ t . ' ~
Germany 's growing railroad and cornniercial interests in Mesopotamia was evident in its
consulates and warehouses at Baghdad. Mosul and Basra. Moreover. it was German
expertise, and worldwide Muslim contributions. which built the pilgrim railroad from
Damascus tu Medina, thereby furthering Abdulhamid's programme of rnodemization and
highlighting his desire for Muslim unity?
The Sultan's pan-Islarnic policy paved the way for the conversion of the Mid-
Euphrates tribes to Shi'ism on a grand scale, since it disregardeci the differences inherent in
sectarianism. Steps were taken by the Sunni Ottoman govemment to promote Sunnism in
the region. however they proved inadequate. They inciuded: the inauguration of a Sunni
academy in Mesopotamia, al-Madrasa al-[lmiyya alSunniyya by Shaikh Muhammad Sa'id
al-Naqshbandi in 1898; the appointment of five S
to Basra, Karbala and the
Munrafiq district in 1905; and. the proposed instituthg of "mobile rnudraras" of Sunni
u
h by a Baghdadi schoiar, d i m Ahmad Shakir al-Ahsi.)" The Ottoman archives contain
ample documents waming of the unprecedented trend in Shi'i conversion. yet from the
Sunni point of view too lifde was done too late to stem the tide."
Ottoman reluctance to curtail Shi'i conversion may bc found in the Sultan's desire
to promote Muslim unity throughout his empire. In the 1890s, Shi'ism's supreme mu/rahid
resident in Mesopotamia, Mina Hasan Shirazi (d.i896), becaw invoived in the religious
and political unnst in Persia emanating h m a British tobacco concession granted by the
Shah. Upon k i n g deported h m Persia, thc nligious reformer J
d al-Din al-Afghani,
the most avid and vocal exponent of a movement pmtesting the 'sale' of the resources of an
Islamic state to foreign infidels, sought Shirazi's guidance of the movement?' Distressecl
merchants and tobacco growers in Persia appealed to the leadhg Shi'i mujtahui in T e h .
whereupon he appealed to the supreme Shi'i rn~jtahrif.'~In alliance with Persian clergy,
reformers, and urban merchants. who were at the root of the unrest, Shirazi addressed
himself to the Shah of Persia to no avail.
As the movement progressed from passive protest to religious revolt in the major
cities of Persia, Shirazi issued a fatwa
in Decernber 1891 boyconing the smoking of
tobacco und the abolition of the British r n o n ~ ~ oAmid
l ~ . pervasive
~~
foreign intrigue and
the threat of a holy war. jihad, the Shah abolished the tobacco concession. Shirazi's role in
the success of a movement designed to thwart foreign influence was indicative of the
growing political power of Shi'i leadership. At same time. the Sultan profited from a visit
from Afghani by prevding upon him to write to Shi'i ulmnn promoting pan-Islamisrn and
prornising favours in retwn for supporting his cdiphate.'"
Meanwhile. despite the Sultan's promotion of Muslirn unity in the Arab provinces
by awarding high positions in his govemment to Sunni Arabs, many Arabs, including the
Hijazis and the Sanusis. gave the Sultan only nominal s u p p o d 2 Furthemore. although
pan-Islamism strengthened the political power of the Shi'a of Najaf and Karbala, it changed
Little in Baghdad where Sunni Arab dominance prevaiied in tbe govemment and the
military. Muslim military conscription, until the turn of the century only applicable to
Sunnis, was a negative result of pan-lslamism for the Shi'a and the tribes. since previously
they had been granted exemption from rnilitary duty upon paying a tax. Moreover, while
Sunnis took advantage of educational opportunity, the Shi'a continued at traditional
mosque schools and refùsed to participate in the more modem Sunni state system.
From the 1880s. Sunnis attended institutes of higher leaming in Istanbul, such as
the militaiy academy, Harbiye, and the civil service academy, Muikiye.
Few
Mesopotamians attended the Mulkiye. One exception was Hakki Ismail Baban, a Sunni
Kurdish notable, a literary figure, and an outspoken future deputy for Baghdad in 1908 and
1912; he was also a Unionist and Ottoman rninister of education in 19 10-11.'" Meanwhile,
Sunni graduates of the preparatory schools in Baghdad fùled the cadet ranks at the Harbiye
and demonstrated an exceptional bent for military service. A notable example was Baghdadi
General Mahmud Sevket, the commander of the "Action Army". Hareket Ordusu. which
restored order to Istanbul in the wake of the rebellion of 1909."
Cadets at the Harbiye, of whom many were to become important leaders in the
evolving States of the Middle East after the First World War. were subject to the ideas and
influences of Pmssian instmctors, a tradition instituted by Helmuth von Molke in the 1830s
during the reign of Sultan Mahmud II. Another influence, which was perceived in his
published work and personal leadership, was that of General Colmar von der Goltz. head
of the Gerrnan military mission from 1883 to 1895. Goltz reorganized the Ottoman army in
1909, commanded the Ottoman Sixth Army Corps at Baghdad in 19 15;'
and personally
led Arab regiments whose officers had attended the Harbiye to victory at Kut al-Amara.
Despite Abdulhamid's successful policies of reform and modernization. his
oppressive policies caused deep resentment among the younj educated elite. Yet control of
the press. curtailment of travei, and isolation frorn ail western influence were negligible
compared with the Sultan's insidious espionage system found in every corner of the
empire. An apt comment on Hamidian policy was 'Balik Basran Koknr' -the fish putrefies
from its head d o ~ n w a r d s . 'Resistance
~
to this repressive d e was at first covert and
locaiized, later it grew to encompass exiled groups in Europe. In its greatest strength as the
Cornmittee for Union and Progress, the resistance had its Salonka headquarters in
Macedonia, a hotbed of Balkan nationalism policed by international powers.
While Unionist leaders in Saionika advocated the overthrow of the sultan and the
restoration of the Ottoman constitution. it was not planned for the summer of 1908. Emest
Ramsaur points to unforeseen circumstances as the pnmary cause of the fortuitous
revolution, not the least of which was the meeting between the king of England and the czar
of Russia to decide Macedonia's fate. The prospect of continued international control drew
an unanticipated response fiom the Unionists in the Third Army Corps in Macedonia,
unanticipated response from the Unionists in the Third Army Corps in Macedonia which
included Turkish junior officers to whom the menace of foreign power rneant
comprornising Ottoman sovereignty.'" Notwithstanding this nationalist fervour, it was the
menace of palace reprisais that ultimately galvanized the revolutionists into action.
Bred on the nationahst zeal found in the military academies of Istanbul. these
young Turkish anny officers -arnong
h e m Major Enver and Adjutant-Major Niyazi-
initiated an armed insurrection when discovery by the Sultan's surveillance seemed
imminent. Evan Lewin, wnting in 19 16. affirms Enver Bey's role in the revolution begun
at Resna and the proclamation in favour of the constitution on July 23. 1908."~The junior
officen of the Third A m y Corps responsible for the coup d'etat set in motion demands for
the restoration of the constitution by more and more army units and civilian g r o u p ~ . ~ ~
These demands were not lost on Abduihamid, nor was a demand from the Unionist
leadership. The Sultan. rather than lose his throne, agreed to constitutionai govemment.
Though self-interest is not to be denied. it was in Abdulhamid's role of sultan and
caliph that he encouraged a counter-revolution in April of 1909 by re:igious studenü and
soldiers in Istanbul against the secuiarist Young Turk regime. Albert Hourmi documents
the role of the sultan as a 'defender of the state which was virtually the last relic of the
of that role. which
political power and independence of Sunni ~ s l a r n . ' ~Symbols
~
Abdulhamid upheld for ail his repressive measures. were his part in the counterrevolution.
his construction of the Hijaz railway and his anti-westernism despite the growing ties with
Gemany. Moreover, whether only for personal aggrandizement, Abdulhamid fostered
Islamic unity and educative opportunity among all subjects of his empire. and in so doing.
he allowed for the growth of nationaiism. In the last throes of empire and beyond, despite
the limitation on politicai freedom identifïed with the suitanate, Mesoptamians voiced a
preference for a r e m to Ottoman rule as late as 1923 rather than that of a govemment
controlled by an infidel power.5'
Differing Policies of the Young Turk Regime: 1908 - 1918
Following the coup d'eut of Iuly 1908 by the young Turkish officers of the Third
A m y Corps, the Cornmittee of Union and Rogress in Salonika sent a cornmittee of seven
Unionists to Istanbul to oversee the establishment of a new government according to the
dicîates of the 1876 constitution. Pokies of Abdulhamid were swept aside; the old
infrastructure of religion and bureaucracy was tom down and replaced by secuhization
and decenaalization. All citizens. whether Turk, Arab. Christian or Jew. were equal before
the law as privilege gave way to egalitarianism. When the Onoman parliament reconvened
in December 1908 Mesopotamia was represented by seventeen delegates."
Those initial
representatives included Sayy id Talib ai-Nagi b and Ahmad Pasha al-Zuhayr of B a m ,
Khudr Ludi of Dayr aldur. ismail Hakki Baban and Hasqail Sassoon of Baghdad. Arab
delegates from the Arab provinces of the empirc found autonomist inspiration in their
common religious, historie. cultural, and linguistic bonds.
However, the enrhusiasm of Muslims and non-Muslirns for the constitution was not
shared by ail. Elie Kedourie notes a similar, dispassionate response to the constiturion's
restoration in the Arab provinces. In fact, many Arabs were dismayed by the
.
transformation of government policy.53 In accordance with this new policy exuberant
young Unionists ousted influential religious notables, judges, and ciiy officiais from
positions in public institutions. Bataîu portrays the Unionists removal of religious officiais
from hi& office as an attempt to desû-oy "the very Islamic fabnc" w hich assured Arab
dominance." Philip IreIand describes Sunni concerns regarding the "imligiousness" of
the Young Turks. and the position of those who met clandestinely, for feu of reprisal,
while vehemently opposing the Young Turk policies."
Zeine Zeine emphasizes mat
although the Arabs criticized the government, their allegiance to the calipkk never
fdtered? Sunni discontent with the Young Turk ngime found release in aaxent secret
societies advocating Arab autonomy. a pncursor of the nationalisrn to corne.
Initially, the Shi' a of Mesopotamia welcorned Young Turk egalitarian policies and
constitutional freedoms offering political and educational change. This new political
position allowed for open political discourse a a time when the involvement of the
mujtahidin in Persian constitutionai poiitics became a controversial issue between student
and teacher. Educationally, having obtained a fama from Shi'i mujtahid Muhammad Sa'id
al-Habbubi, Shi'ism's first secuiar school in Baghdad was opened. sponsored by such
Shi'i and Sunni liberals as Iafar Abu T i m a n and Ali al-~azirgan." Shi'i euphoria was
short-lived however. Afier the counter-revolution, Shi'i institutions were closed for their
failure to comply with the cuniculum of the state system. Moreover, neither Persian student
nor Persian cleric in Mesopotamia were able to escape Young Turk policy: foreigners. no
longer privileged, became Liable for taxation and conscription for the first tirne?
These
policies were responsible for the exodus of a considerable number of Persian students
which diminished the financial power and independence of the leading rnujtahidin.
By April 1909 many factions in the empire complained there was Little advantage in
constitutionalism and agitated for the r e m of sultanic rule. Religious students and
impoverished r n p s in Istanbul, encouraged by their sultan and caliph, launched a counterrevolution. However the Third Army Corps from Macedonia quickly crushed the revoit and
declared martial law; thereafter the reins of constitutional governrnent were firmly in the
hands of the military. Liberalizing policies onginaily brought about by the restoration of the
constitution were amended and limitations were put on civil liberties to protect the state. For
his part in the counter-revolution, Sultan Abdulharnid II was deposed by the Ottoman
Nationd Assembly on A p d 27, 1909; and, a fama issued by the leading Muslirn authority,
the Sheikh-al-lslam, approved the Sultan's deposition. 59
Revolution once again threatened the Ottomans as nationalkt forces in the empire's
European provinces demanded independence and, despite Turkish resistance. they seceded
from the empire. This awoke in the Young Turks a sense of their own nationalism and a
determination to protect Turkish dominion. in 1913, a coup d'etat was executed by Enver
Bey which established the supremacy of the Cornmittee of Union and Progress until the
Ottoman defeat in 1918. The Turkification policies which followed the coup d'etat created
strong resistance arnong the non-Turkish population. Whereas in the past k a b s . as
Muslims, had accepted Ottoman hegemony, this attempt by a secularist govemrnent to rob
them of their Arab inheritance was not acceptable to Arab delegates in the Ottoman chamber
of deputies who demanded Arab autonomy. in fact. enforced Turkification policies not
only brought forth demands for Anb autonomy, they proved to be a catalyst in the
emergence of Arab nationali~rn.'~
Sayyid Talib al-Nagib of Basra, an Arab delegate and Sunni political activist, had
led Arab delegates in the chamber of deputies in opposition to an Ottoman govemrnent
proposal in 1909, allowing the British to monopolize navigation on the Tigns by acquiring
govemrnent stearnships. Acting in concert Baghdadis of every race and creed resisted the
acquisition: arnong them were Sunni merchants Abd al-Qadir al-Khadairi and Mahmud
Shabandar and Shi'i Jafar Abu Timrnan; Unionist deputies Jewish Hasqail Sassoon and
Citing
Kurdish Ismail Hakki Baban: and the Shi3 religionkt Shaikh Ibrahim Kh~rasani.~'
the commercial and political disadvantage to Mesopotamia and the Empire, telegrams from
Baghdad, Basra, and Mosul besieged Arab delegates in the Chamber of Deputies. who
voted overwhelmingly against the proposal. Mahmud Haddad sums up this resistance to
foreign expansion as protonationalistic, anti-European rather than anti-govemment.
However, Mesopotamians sought to align themselves with "Islamic authority" in Istanbul.
62
rather than Unionist policy or Turkish nationdism.
In 1913, Sayyid Talib al-Nagib was again successful in foiling an Ottoman
govenunent proposa1 to exploit Mesopotamia under a property law dowing the sale of
state land to foreigners, thereby averting the sale of state land in ~Mesopotarniato Zionist
interests intent on creating a homeland for the ~ e w s . ~The
) impoverished Ottoman treasury
sought to profit h m the auctioning of Sultan Abdulhamid's vast saniyya estates in Aman
and Baghdad provinces, which had reverted to the state afier his deposition. This prornpted
an immediate protest by Basra and Baghdad notables, as weil as the Euphrates tribes within
whose temtories these lands were to be found. In order to circumvent provincial disorder
which the sale of these lands in Mesopotamia would have caused, the Ottoman rninister of
the interior, Talaat Bey, announced the state lands, dready sold, had k e n reclaimed?
A M e r drarna was enacted in 1913 involving an attempt by the Ottoman and
British governments to wrest control of the Shan al-Arab watenvay from the Basra
municipaiity. Here international issues were at stake: involving an increase in Ottoman
customs duties and supervision of the Shatt under joint British-Ottoman authority. In fact.
a condition of the resolution of the Baghdad railway negotiations k i n g conducted at the
tirne was the recognition of Britain's navigational rights "up to and beyond ~aghdad."~'
While Sayyid Talib and the Reform Party of Basra fought Ottoman legislation intended ta
provide new provincial administration which would achieve these ends? angered Basra
citizens sought to sever Basra from the control of Istanbul. demanding 'Arabia for the
Arabs'. Despite dernands by Mesopotamians to the contrary. history relates Sayyid Talib's
f d u r e to thwart international control of his country's waterways.
These incidents in Baghdad and in Basra demonstrate the growing resistance in
Mesopotamia to the Young Turk govemment and the Arab desire for autonomy. However.
Mesopotarnians also sought the reintroduction of Arabic in the schools, the use of Arabic in
local administration, and the appointment of local officiais. These incidents aiso illustrate a
gradua1 but insistent rise in nationalist sentiment. However. these sentiments were not
geographically limited. Cries for autonomy and independence were k i n g heard from many
lands throughout the Middle East and around the world.
Immediately after the Young Turk revolution of 1908 some efforts were made to
create a bond between Arabs and Turks, such as the Ottoman-Arab Fraternity (Ai-&ha alArabi al-Uthmani) formed by Arab exiles in Paris. The Literary Club (Al-Muntada al-
in Istanbul in 1908 and the Ottoman Decentralization Party in Cairo in 1912.67Sunni Arab
ties to Istanbul were bound by Islam, therefore societies advocated autonomy not
independence. When all Arab societies were banned after the counter-revolution of 1909,
the Ottoman-Arab Fraternity re-emerged in Paris as the Young Arab Association (d-
Jami'ah al-Arabiyah al-Fatat), an Arab nationalist secret society of mainly Syrian
membeehip. The Covenant (&Md)), was a secret society advocating autonomy whose
founding members were mainly Mesopotamians: it was originally composed of Arab and
Turkish anny oficers, however, it becarne pnmady Arab after 1914.~'
Membership in al-Ahd was recruited from among the off'cers who attended the
Ottoman military academy and General Staîf College. the Mektebi-i Harbiye. where their
Pmssian instructors gave them a thorough grounding in German nationalism. The Staff
College was referred to as a 'training ground for funire nationalkt leaders': an apt
description for Lraqis Jafar al-Askari. Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Nuri al-Sa'id. Yasin al-
Hashimi, and Jamil a l - ~ i d f a ' i .One
~ ~ of its most famous Turkish graduates was Mustafa
Kemal, a renowned m y commander during the First world War. a fervent Turkish
nationalist in the liberation of Anatolia, and father of modem Turkey. Another was Enver
Bey, a hero of the Young Turk revolution of 1908 and Ottoman war minister from 19 14 to
1918. The army was an avenue to power for these young officers in the coming world
conflict which led to their leadership in the post-war modem state.
Once Abddhamid's regime capitulated in 1908, the constitution was restored and
the Young Turk govenunent brought about considerable change which gave new-found
freedoms to Ottoman citizens; however, secularist and nationalist policies did much to h m
the progressive spirit of the govenunent in its relations with the Anb provinces. As
Sianford Shaw so rightly concludes, the Young Turks were awakened to their own Turkish
identity, which eventuaily destroyed Islamic unity and contributed to the evolution of Arab
nationali~rn.~~
The spirit of nationalism was very much alive in the early decades of the
twentieth century. This spirit, of itself, could account for the autonornist drive of the Arabs
in the Ottoman Empire; however, what applied the spur to that drive was Arab resistance to
enforced Turliificaîion which posited the loss of Arab identity."
Western Expansionism and the Great War
Foreign expansionism in the Persian Gulf was a characteristic of the early twentieth
century. The Tmcial shaikhdorns had long tolerated Britain's supremacy in the Persian
Gulf for its commercial, political, and military capabilities. Due to their proximity to Bntish
India, the British considered the Gulf and its headwaters their private preserve. Increased
international shipping and rurnours of establishing German submarine facilities in the Gulf
alerted Britain to the danger to their exclusive rightd2 However. a compromise agreement
was reached between British and Geman diplomats in 1913 which allowed for the
concluding of the Baghdad railway negotiations-and
nunoured German naval facilities-thereby
for the abandonment of the
assuring Britain's continued supremacy in Gulf
~ a t e r s . 'Moreover,
~
the "Great Game" rivalry between Britain and Russia came to an end
after Russia's defeat by Iapan in 1905. To protect their individuai interests in Persia. a
compromise agreement was signed between the two govements assigning a sphere of
influence to Russia in the north and to Britain in the south. Needless to Say the area of
Persian control was severely limited.
As war in Europe became imminent, Britain's concem with its Anglo-Persian oil
refinery on the Shatt a i - h b intensified, supplying a s it did the Bntish oïl-driven fleet.
Russia concentrated on securing its interests on the Caspian Sea and the Germans focused
on subversive activity throughout Persia, attempting to control the Shah in Teheran and
evenniaily the country itself. Expansionist policies abounded as the region feil under the
designs and influences of Euopean powers. As Peter the Great had dreamt of a vast
Oriental empire, so Winston Churchill dreamt of a British imperial Middle East, and British
India, with its teeming millions. of establishing colonies in the Tigris and Euphrates
vdeys. Meanwhile, Enver Pasha dreamed of an extended Turkish Islamic Empire.74
In Istanbul, liberal rninisters were in favow of a reconciliahon with Britain. whose
influence with the Ottomans had declined after its occupation of Egypt in 1882. The war
advocates, of whom Enver Pasha was one, were convinced that the revival of the Ottoman
Empire would be assured by an alliance with Germany. In January 1914. the mival of
German General Ono Liman von Sanders as the inspecter-general of the Ottoman army was
a telling blow to the Liberals. Nevertheless, the Ottoman military establishment rernained
firmiy in the han& of Enver, the young Ottoman vice-generalissimo who chose once again
to lead the empire into revolutionary
In the summer of 1914, Enver and memkrs of the central cornmittee of the Union
and Rogress party made ovemires to Gemany and a secret alliance was signed between
the Ottoman Empire and the Central Powers. While most Onomans' wished to guard their
neutrality. the govemment, &er an unsuccessN foray into Entente negotiations, finally
declared war on the side of Gcrmany. To the G e m High Command, the Ottoman
alliance was of great benefit in diverting AUied forces from the western front and guarding
the Straits separating the Mediterranean and Black ~ e a s . 'These
~
straits were the crucial
connection between Russia and its western Allies, and their access to raw material in the
Balkans. On the other hand, the Ottomans' truncated communications system was a
disaster which msaicted the provisioning of supplies and troops to the war fronts on the
periphery of the empire.
The most valuable Ottoman contribution to the war effort was the remarkable
defense of the Dardaneiles at Gallipoli in eariy 1915 by General Liman von Sanders and his
chief of staff, Mustafa Kemal. The defending Turkish and Arab ûvops under their command
not only held their ground against the Entente amies, but ultimately forced the invaders to
withdraw in January 1916. Iraqi Yasin al-Ifashirni had commanded an Iraqi division in
Syna untii discovery of subversive Axab nationalist activity caused its tramfer to Gallipoli.
An Oaoman loyalist who also served on the Caucasian and Palestinian fronts: al-tfashimi
was decorated with the Cross of Victory by German Emperor Wrlbeh II?
Less spectacular were the catastrophe in the Caucasus against the Russians Ied by
Enver and the assadt on the Suez Canal against the British Ied by combined German and
Turkish forces; both these theatres of war were handicapped by supply and problerns of
communication. The Sixth A m y Corps on the Mesopotamian front under German Generai
von der Golz presented the Entente with its second major defeat by the Ottomans.
The war in Mesopotamia began in late 1914 with the ianding of British-Indian forces
at Fao and their occupation of Basra with littie or no Ottoman re~istance.~~
At the battle of
Shaiba on the Tigris just north of Basra, indigenous Arab tribes fought with the Ottoman
army. After the British victory, however, the now hostile Arab tribesmen silently allowed
the northward passage of the invading British tro~ps.'~From that tirne fonvard. the local
tribes abandoned the retreating Ottomans who had o u ü m their supplies and foilowed in the
annies' wake Iooting and robbing the fallen. This is not to Say that Mesoporamians were not
arnong the permanent troops in the Ottoman army. There were Arab regiments of loyal Iraqi
Arab and Kurdish officers and regdar soldiery. Meanwhile, the British pushed northward
to engage the enerny u n d Ctestiphon where they were forced to retreat southwards.
The battie for Kut al-Amara in 1915-16 was a measure of British rnilitary error and
judgement in the early months of the war on the Mesopotamian front against a strong
Ottoman army. Officered by Arab officen who were products of the military academies of
Istanbul, the Ottomans were commanded by Gennan General von der Goltz of the
Mesopotamian Sixth Corps headquartered in Baghdad. It was a major defeat for the
British, both militarily and moraliy. Despite the retaking of Kut the following year, the high
cost of victory in men, equipment, and prestige piayed a crucial role in future British policy
in Mesopotamia.
Important factors in the eventual routing of the Ottoman army were the transfer of
seasoned Indian Muslim troops, unable to stand the rigoun of the European clirnate, from
the Western front to ~esopotamia~'
and Enver Pasha's decision to transfer the Sixth Amiy
towards A ~ t o l i aBaghdad
~~
was f i d l y taken by the British-Indian expeditionary force in
March 1917. and, a . that tirne. Generai Stanley Maude. the British commander in chief.
proclaimed Britain's intention of rewarding its liberated inhabitants with self-govemment83
The id1 of Baghdad &er centuries of Muslim rule was a tragedy to most Muslims.
although the reactions of the Sunnis and Shi'is in Mesopotamia were conflicting. In April
1917, the British-sponsored Arab Bulletin in Cairo reported that the Sunnis genuinely
bemoaned the Oaoman defeat aud the loss of Baghdad to an infidel powertS while the
Shi'a were porûayed as delighted that the Sunni government had fallen and now foresaw
,pater reiigious, economic. and political freedoms for the ~hi'a?
D. G. Hogarth of the Arab Bulletin remindeci his readers that the Shi'a have no
desire for "unity in Islam." nor do they have "craviog for temporal dominion" which
motivates the Sunnis; it maftered liüie if Baghdad was under Christian government or not.
as long as Shi'ism was ~n.irn~eded.8~
This view conflicted with the stated desire of the
Shi'i Persian rnu$ahidin of Mesopotamia for "îempral dominion" if o d y in an Islamic
state
and, as they had cleariy indicated by their continued involvement in the politics of both
Persia and Mesoptamia. the mm.tahidin's readiness to assume temporal power.
Within weeks of the original onslaught of the war, Islam's highest authority in
Istanbul, the SheiWt-al-Islam , issued a fahua proclairning a jihad against the Allies; a
tactic used by the Ottomans to gain the participation of their Muslim s~bjects.'~When the
call for a j i M agauist tbe infidei was made in the mosques of Mesopotamia, the British
feared its effed on the Indian Muslims who made up the main body of thur troops. While
the Germans, hoping for a mass desertion, translated the proclamation into Arabic and
Urdu and dropped leafiets on the western front where indian M u s h tmops were also
deployed.' British fears pmved groundless, as did Gemian hopes. The jihad had litde
dfect on the Muslim f a i m in a war where the infidel was both d y and adversary alike.
Exploited by the Turks and harassed by the British. Mesoptamians concentrated
on daily acts of suMval and aüempted to avoid direct involvement in the contlict which
engulfed them. However, isolated as they were from the outside world. they were.
nonetbeless. captives of the war's progress and of its outcome. Most Mesopotamians
remainecl largely apathetic to the war, yet some did play a d e resisting or collaborating
with the ultimate victors.
Warti me Resistance and Accormciation in Mesopotamia
From the outset of the First Wodd War, the Musiim attitude towards the invasion of
Mesopotamia took different forms of collaboration and resistance. Only those w ho stood
to
gain from the Bntish presence supponed it; thai is. certain Sunni and Shi'i notables.
shaikhs, and urban baoking, mercantile, and professional interests. Yet indicatiors of
resistance prior to the invasion can also be found in those self same interests. For example.
Baghdadi merchants resisted a foreign aansprtation monopoly of 1909 and Basra notables
and shaikhs similariy resi-d
an exploitation of staîe land and conml of river navigation in
1913F9 Their success was due to emerging protonationalist sentiment in defense of
Mesopotamian sovereignty .
During the initial stages of the British invasiou, tenifieci Arab inhabitants of Basra
collaborated with the Bntish and local shaikhs offered tûeir service^.^ How ever. local
response in other regions was wholly dependent on tbe vested interests of the merchants
and landlords and the @cuiar
religious aniliation of the ulrmia and tribes. Reeva Simon
estimates thac between 11.000 and 18.000 Arabs tribesmen, Shi'i and Sumi, fought with
the Ottoman forces during the Fvst Wodd ~ a r . ~ '
Of the Sunni Arab officers with the Oaoman Sixth Army Corps in Mesopotamia
who were captured or sumndered to the British many volunteenxi to fight for Amb
independence with the British-sponsored Arab revolt of the Hijazis against the On~i-.
The success of this revolt was in direct con-
to the fdure of the cail for a J h d against
the British and its M e s by the caliph in Istanbul.
92
The disintegration of the Ottoman
Empire has been direcdy attributed to the negative response of the Muslim faithful and to
the nationalist aspirations of the Arab cevolt. Aside from these Arab officers and men who
fought in the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, the Arabs in the Ottoman army who fought in such
battles as Shaiba and Kut al-Amara remained loyal to the Ottoman cause.
Loyalty to the caliph influenced many Sunni Arabs to favour Ottoman rule in
Mesopotamia as it did Kurds, dthough the northem districts witnessed linle of the actual
fighting u n d
the last year of the war. However as Sunni Muslims. the Kurds of
Mesopotamia were among the most loyal of troops in the Ottoman Army during World War
1, just as they were loyal to the pan-[slamicist Abdulhamid II and his Harnidiye regiments.
Having discouraged their separatist activity after the counter-revolution of 1909. the Young
Turk regirne used the opposite strategy in 1914, encouraging Kurdish nationalist activity
within the empire, to gain their loyalty once agaim9) In fact, Sunni Kurds were arnong the
few who responded eagerly to the jihad against the Entente in 1914, resisting the infidels
as Loyal Muslims and Ottoman subjects. Their religious fervour was used to dvantage by
the Ottomans against Christian populations in the Caucasus.
Most resistance to the British prior to and during the war came from the Shi'i
Persianmujtahidin in Najaf and Karbala who feared their power would lessen under British
r ~ l e . ~ 'Much
'
more preferable to these mujtahidut were the Ottomans -and the Germanswho would allow the former status quo in the Arab provinces to continue. while they, the
leaders, concentrated on creating an environment capable of supporting an Islamic state in
a Mesopotamia of the future.
The hostility of the Shi'i priesthood to British designs in Mesopotamia never
altered. It began in the eariy nineteenth century with British interference in the distribution
of Shi'i charitable hinds from Oudh in British India. The Shi'i mujtahidin. were most
vulnerable in the area of charitable funds. These funds. amounting to untold thousands of
pounds sterling, symbolized the political power of the Shi'i clergy, their independence and
their prestige. It became clear that the chantable income and the political power of the
mujrahidm would be more secure under Ottoman rule. In 1912, the British Resident in
Baghdad decided to designate the distributors of the fund, thereby resaicting Shi'i direct
control. Hostility escalated when the Bntish atternpted to create a Tobacco monopoly in
Persia, a parochial concem of the leading mujtahid of Shi'ism in Mesopotamia. And again,
when European penetration of Peaian and Libya threatened the Muslirn faithhil. the Shi'i
clergy issued religious decrees, fatwas. and instituted a jihad m~vement.'~
When the c d carne from the Shi'i holy cities for volunteers to fight the infidel
invasion, it was the Sh'i clergy who led them. Arnong their leaders were Shaykh alS hari' a Isfahani, Mahdi al-Khalisi, Muhammad Sa' id Habbubi, Mustafa &Kas hani, Mahdi
al-Haydari, and Muhsin a l - ~ a k i m .Though
~~
it has k e n said that Shi'i urban merchants
took no part in the resistance against the British, the grandfather of Jafar Abu Timrnan. an
Iraqi Shi'i naùonaiist during the monarchic period, was an exception. A wealthy Shi'i
merchant of Baghdad with a long memory, he had suffered fmancially with the advent of
the British steamship in the nineteenth cent~~l-y~'
ruid was deterrnined to fight further British
expansionism. Abu Tirnman, the elder, spent his remaihg fortune maintaining a group of
Shi'i volunteen in the Ottoman A m y throughout the war.
Long-suffering Shi'i residents of Najaf, in contrast, forcefully evicted Turkish
troops fiom their city in April 1915, afier months of k i n g exploited by them. Tribal groups
who then controlled the c i q were forced to surrender to the British in 19 17? But the
British were no more tolerated by the Najafis than the Turks and resistance organizations
were formed to liberate the city from British control. The League of Islamic Awakening,
Jimyat al Nahda al Islamiya, was among the most zealous; its membenhip included clencs.
wnters, landlords, and mbal shaikhs. League members assassinated the British political
officer, Captain Marshall, in March 1918 hoping to generate a rebeilion among the Iocal
t r i b e ~ ? ~The tribal rebeUion did not materialize however, and those involved in the
assassination of the British officer were executed by the British.
The Ottomans used religion as a wartime tactic in their attempt to uni@ Muslirns
against their enemies. They were successful to a limited degree in Mesopotamia but only
with those traditionaüy loyal to the symbol of M u s h authority, the caliph in Istanbul.
When the war ended d evidence of Ottoman authority disappeared and British rnilitary
occupation prevailed.'OOYet few Mesopotamians gave their loyalty to the victors. Ottoman
rule at its worse was. afier dl, Muslirn d e and much preferred to that of the infidel.
Resistance had rnany faces of loyalty for the multi-religious. multiethnic Mesopotamians
who had a long history of political domination.
Mesopotamia harboured pre-Mamic civilizations whose history and culture
established the foundation of a unique Iraqi identity. The seventh cenhuy Arab conquest of
the country f d y established its Islamic conîîgpration. Whde the Sh'a becme an
important mùiority in the land, their dismist of Sunni dominance contributed to their
alienation fiom political power. Once in power, the Sunni Arab was relucîant to share with
the Arab Shi'a whose control by non-lraqis legitimized their exclusion. It becarne inherent
in the Sunnis of Iraq to consider only themselves privileged to rule. By the late nineteenth
century, an Ottoman statesman was instrumental in introducing refonns in Iraq which
prepared the people for the advent of nationalism. The sum of h q i progress towards
emancipation began with Midhat Pasha and Sultan Abdulhiunid, gathering force with the
Young Turks and gaining hirther mornentum with the British after the First Wodd War.
The age of conqueroe having passed. many Shi'a and Sunnis responded to a growing
nationaiist consciousness directed against impenalist Britain, the last conqueror.
' Ismail Rozi al-Faruqi and David E. Sopha eds..
Historicril Atlas of Religions of the Worid (New York:
Macmillan. 1974)' p. 7.
' Ibid., p. 8.
John Bagot Glubb.
p. 143 & p. 357.
''
and Times of M u h m (London: Hodder and Stoughton Limited. 1970).
Academic Arnerican Encyclopedia, 1980 ed.,
S.V.
"Mesopotamia"
Zarrinkub. Abd al-Husain. 'The Arab Conquest of lran and its Aftermath." in The Cambridge History of
4, T
e
h uas ArabCambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1975). 'The taking of Hira and the pillage of the Arab-inhabited mas on the banks of the Euphrates M
only just been completed when Abu Bakr's orden reached Khalid. to decamp with his m y to Syria." P. 8.
b,vol.
%. V. Bodey, The Messeneer: The Life of Mohammed (New York: Doubleday & Company, [nc..
1946). Abdullah bin Rawaha is named as emissary to Persia. P. 280. See also. W. Montgomery Watt.
Muhammad: Prowhet and Statesrnan (London: Oxford University Press. 1961) The &ab Christian Shayban
tribe defeated Persian uoops prier to 632 AD; Muhammad probably had alliances with these border tribes.
Pp. 216-218.
Gaston Wiet, Baehdad: Metro~oIisof the Abbasid Cali~hate(Norman: University of Oklahoma Press.
1971). 'The conquenng Arabs, constituting the actual nation. had decided views of superiority over the
natives. who retained their way of life without king molested and who were cared for. since it was they
who paid most of the taxes." P. 5. Originally. they were offered conversion. tribute. or the sword.
Bernard Lewis. The Arabs in History, 6th. ed. (Oxford: Oxford University Press. 1993), pp. 54-56.
Y
George Jordac, The Voice of Human Justice (Iran:Ansariyan Publications. 1990). p.504-06. See also. H.
A. R. Gibb, "Ali b. Abi Talib," (London: Luzac & Co.. 1960). pp. 38 1-386.
'O Zarrinkub, "Arab Conquest of Iran," p. xxii. See also. Lewis. The Arabs in Histoy. Tax-paying nonMuslims were necessary to support Muslirns in power, so conversion of the Persians came Iater. Pp. 7172.
Albert Hotirani, A History of the Arab Peo~les (Cambridge: The Belknap Press of Harvard University
Press, 199l), pp. 209-213. See aiso. Phebe M m ,The Modem History of lraq (Boulder: Westview Press.
1985), pp. 17- 18.
"
" Yitzhak Nakash, The Shi'ah of Iraq (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994). Satàvids and Qajars
claimed "the Shah should be the sole protector of Shi'i interests in Iraq. at the core of whch were the shnne
cities of ai-Najaf. Karbala. Kazimayn, and Samarra." P. 14.
l 3 Robert W. Olson, The S i e s of Mosul & Ottoman-Pe~anRelation: 1718- 1743 (Bloomington: indiana
University miblications. 1975). Nadir Shah wanted the Shi'i Ja' fari school of law accepted into Orthodoxy
as a fifth sect; Shi'i and Sunni ulerna meeting at Hilla in 1743 did not "resolve doctrinal ciifferences." P.
185. See, Steven H. Longrigg, Four Centuries of Modem iaq (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1925). p. 147.
of tgg. From 1722 to 1763 Persian d a m a arriveci in Iraq in considerable numbers due to
' Nakash.
the Sunni-Afghan capture of Isfahan: Nadir Shah's atternpt at Sunni-Shi'i reconcitiation. and the
appropriation of religious endowments supporting the Shi'i clergy in Persia. P. 15.
'' Marr, Modem History of Irq, p. 7.
Robert Olson. The Emer~enceof Kurdish Nationalism and the Sheikh Sa'id Rebellion: 1880-1925.
(Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989). Shaikh übaydallah referred to the independence of whole of
Kurdistan and a Kurdish nation in 1880. P. 2. See also. Sa'ad Jawad, Iraq and Kurdish Ouestion: 19581970. (London: Ithaca Press, 1981), p. 4.
l6
l7
Hanna Batatu. The Old Social Classes, pp. 236-38.
''David Fromkin. A Peace to End Al1 Peace, p. 28.
'*James L. Gelvin, 'The League of Nations and the Question of National Identity in the Fertile Crescent"
World Affairs 158 (1995), p. 35.
Bernard Lewis. The Emereence of Modem Turkev (London: Oxford University Press. 1975). p. 368.
'' Marr, Modem Historv of b,p 7. See d s o Nakash, Shiah of h q ,
- Longrigg, Four Centuries.
-1
p. 255.
The literacy rate was one half percent in 1850 & five percent in 1900. P. 7 1.
(London:
'3 Steven Helmsley Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950: A Political. Social. and Economic History
Oxford University Press. 1953). p. 34. 37.
M m . Modem Historv. As applied to Iraq, the refom was intended as a lure to induce the tribes to seule
and the shaikhs to develop a vested interest in the presewation of the existing political order. P. 24.
Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 13. 41. See also. Hanna Batatu. "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements:
Characteristics, Cause and Prospects." The Middle East Journal 35 ( 1981). Here Bafâtu contends that after
conversion the tribes were govemed by tribai custom rather than the Shariah or Shia law. P. 585.
I6
Nakash, of,
p. 269.
" Lewis. Emergence of Modem Turkey, In the Balkans, Micihat Pasha brought law and order. inuoduced
ri
new hierarchy. opened schools. orphanages, industries. roads. bridges. wateways. and a newspaper. He
"...increased the provincial revenue fiom 26.000 to 300.000 purses." P. 390. See dso. Zeine N. Zeine.
Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emergence of hrab Nationalism (Beirut: Khayat's. 1958). p. 25.
'' Longrigg, Four Centuries
Doreen W d n e r , Land and Poverrv in the Middle East (London: Royal lnstitute of International Affairs.
1948)- p. 16. See &o. Peter Sluglett & Marion Farouk-Sluglett. 'The Application of the 1858 Land Code
in Greater Syria: Some Prelirninary Obsewations," in b n d Tenure in the Middle East and North Afnca, ed.
by Tarif Khalidi (Beirut: Amencan University of Beirut, 1984). p. 418. See dso. Batatu, Old Social
Classes, p. 78.
"
Roderic H. Davison, 'The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Govemment of the Ottoman
Empire," in Beginnings of Modernizati~nin the Middle Etist, ed. by William R. Polk and Richard L.
chambers (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press. f 968)- pp. 103. 107.
Ahmad Feroz. The Y o u Turks: The Cornittee of Union and P r o ~ e s sin Turkish Politics 1908 - 1914
(Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969), p.29. See also, Lewis, Emergencc of Modem Turkey, AWulhamid [I's
regime contributeci to the educational reform and expansion in Istanbul and the provinces. P. 177.
"
3'
EIie Kedourie, Arabic Political Memoirs and Other Studies (London: Frank Cass, 1974). p. 124-25.
33
Roderic H. Davison, m e ? : A Short Historv (Cambridge: The Eothen Press. 1988), p. 95.
Evans Lewin, The German Road to the East (London: William Heinemann. 19 16), pp. 85-89. See aiso.
Philip W. Ireland, 1
(New York: Russell & Russell, 1970). p. 39;
and Charles Issawi. & Fertile Crescent: 1800-1914 (New York: Oxford University Press. 1988). Kuwait
was vetoed as a Berlin-Baghdad Railway terminus. due the potential danger to Bombay's proximity. P. 259.
Zeine. Arab Turkish Relations. As Zeine States "it was inconceivable to the vast rnajority of Muslim
Ambs not to support the Cdiphate because support of the Caliphate was support of IsIam." P. 54.
Abdulhamid II desired to enhance his role of sultan-caiiph and promote mu-westemism.
'5
m.
3" Nakash, Shiah of
Nakash considers Selim Deringil's findings of conversion to Shi'ism
mainly in the 1890's and early 1900s. Pp. 4 1-42.
ris
king
Selim Deringil, 'The Struggie Against Shi'isrn in Hamidian Iraq: A Study in Ottoman CounterPropaganda," Die Welt des I s b 30 (1990): p. 49.
j7
Nikk Keddie, ReliPion and Rebellion: The Tobacco Protest of 1 89 1- 1 892 (London: Frank Cass. 1966).
p. 69.
Ibid., p. 90. See also, Nakash, Shiah of Irq, p. 2 10.
Keddie, R e w o n and Re$ellion, p. 95.
"
Ibid., p. 72.
'''Zeine, Arab-Turkish Reiations, p. 54. See dso, Davison, Turkev: A Short History, p. 94.
"'Ahmad. Young Turks, p. 170.
Reeva Simon, h a Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Im~lernentationof a Nationalist
Ideoloa (New York: Columbia University Press, 1986). p. 10.
a
Longrigg, Iraq. 1900 to 1950, p. 39.
Emest Edmonston Ramsaur Jr.. The Y o u n ~Turks: Relude to the Revolution of 1908 (New York:
Russell & Russell, 1970), p. 1 16.
.'7
JX
Lewin, Cjerman p. 141.
.''
Davison, Turkev: a Short History, p.
50
105.
H o u m i r History of the Arab Peo~les,p. 3 14.
Batatu. Old Social Classa. In J d y 1923, four hundred Iraqis sent a petition to the cdiph in Istanbul
appeding to be delivered from infidels and King Faisal. P. 323.
5'
M m . History of Iraq, p. 27.
53
Kedourie. Arab Political Memoirs, pp. 1 2 4 132.
"
Batatu. Old Social C w . Batm lists Sayyids Isa Jamil and Najm-id-Din Haidan as having been
rejected or ousted by the CUP in Baghdad. Pp. 170, 171.
Ireland, Iraci: A Studv in Political Deveio~ment,pp. 227-28. See also, Howard Morley Sachar. The
Emer~ence
of the Middle East: 1914-1924 (London: Penguin Press, 1970). Sharif Husain cited the Young
Turks "...irreligiousness." P. 130.
55
'"ine,
&& , -uT
Nakash, Shiah in
p. 72.
m, p. 54.
Ahmad. Young Turks, The author cites 2000 1st.. 2nd.. and 3rd. class rnujtahids living in &Najaf and
Nakash also notes that Iraq's Persian
W a l a in 1902-03. Pp. 23, 207. See also Nakrtsh,
in
colony, which numbered 80,000 in 1919 enjoyed the pnvileged status of foreign subjects. Pp. 17. 250.
Stanford J. Shaw and Ezel Kural Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Empire and Modern Turkev, Vol. 2.
Rf
R v l i n
(Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1977), p. 282.
59
Marr, M w s t o w of &. 'The impetus of Arab nationalism was the 1st. and rnost significant.
contribution of the Young Turks to Iraq." P. 28.
M
" Batatu, OId Social Classes, pp. 275-82. See aiso, Mahrnud Haddad, "Iraq Be fore World War 1: A Case Of
Anti-European Arab Ottomanism." in The Orieins of Arab Nationalism ed. by Rashid Khalidi. et al. (New
York: Columbia University Press. 1991). It was opposed by 10 out of 60 ;\rab deputies. among thern
Shawkat Pasha of Diwaniyya, Ahmad Pasha al-Zuhayr of Basra, & Khudr Lutfr of Dayr al-Zur. Pp. 123-28.
See also, Ahmad
Shawkat Pasha and General von der GoIz who opposed it were a c c d of
planning the Cornmittee of Union and Progress overthrow. Pp. 56-57.
" Batatu, OId Social Classes, The author discusses the project as k i n g that of the Allegemeine Judische
Kolonisations-Organisation and an riutonornous Jewish state in Mesopotamia. Pp. 286-89.
Haddad,''lraq before World War 1." pp. 131- 132.
" Lewin. Geman Road to East, p. 71. See also, Haddad, "Iraq before World War 1," p. 133.
Haddad, "Iraq Before World War 1," pp. 133-134.
" The Ottoman Arab Fraternity in Paris, which later became the Arab Youth Society. al-Fritat, in
Beirut -
the Decentralization Society in Cairo - and the Literary Club in Baghdad.
B i d w d , plun d&'id. Egyptian Aziz Ali al-Misri and Algerian Salim al-kaTirifounded ai-Ahd: Nuri
as-Sa'id, Mar ai-Askari, and Taha al-Hashimi of Baghdad were founding members. P. 17. See also, Eliezer
Tauber, The Emer~enceof the Arab Movements of World War 1 (London: Frank Cass and Co.. Ltd..
1993). Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. and Jamil al-Midfa'i of Mosul were d s o founding members. P. 7.
* Phebe
M m , "Yasin al-Hashimi: The Rise and Fall of a Nationalist"
University, 1966), p. 55.
'O
(Ph. D. dissertation, Harvard
Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman Empire, p. 3 10.
Marr, "Yain al-Hashid." In 1913, the Young Turks did make concessions to Arab identity. Arabic was
language in primary schools and Arabs received more local appointrnents and governorships; but too late to
"...stem the tide of Arab nationalisrn." P. 422.
"
" Issawi, The Fertile Crescen?. Rivai
European shipping lines in the Gulf from 1890-tg10 were British
lndia Steam Navigation Co., the French Messagerie Maritimes. the Russian Steamship and Commercial
Co.. the German Hambourg-Amerika Line. the Austrian Lloyd and the Ottoman Harnidiyeh Line arnongst
istorv of Ottoman Ern~ire,p. 3 14.
others. P. 259. See dso, Shaw, H'
*
.
Policv in Mes1903- 19 14 (London: Ithaca Press. 1976). p. 263. See
Stuart A. Cohen,
also, William R. Polk, The Arab World Todav (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, I980), p. 90.
74
Davison. Turkey A short History, p. 115. See dso, Ulrich Tmmpener. Gemauy and the Ottoman
Em~ire:1914- 1918 (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1968). p. 369.
Enver Bey was a p o t general. for his troops took temble losses against the Russians. After the war. he
organized a pan-Turanian movement in Samarkand, Central Asia: he was killed leading a pan-Turanian
brigade against the BOIShevi ks.
75
(Fmkfurt%
am Main: -4kadamische
Peter Graf Kielmansegg, 9
Verlags-gesellschafk Athenaion, 1975). "Die Deutsche Interesse an diesem Raum war. als der +grosse
Konflict sich im Sommer 1914 abzeichnete weiter gewachsen: einmal wegen der Bedeutung der DardaneIlen
fur die Isolierung Russlands. zum andern, weil man hoffte, der Einfluss &r Sultans auf der Moharnmadanischer Volker sei gross genug urn mit seiner Hilfe die Kolonidreiche Englands und Frankreich in Ummhe
sturzen zu konnen." P. 102. See dso. Bernadotte E. Schmitt and Harold C. Vedeler. The World in the
Crucible: 1914-1919 (New York: Harper and Row. 1984), p. 15.
'6
T h e woefully thin communications of the Turkish military organization
Schmitt,. possessed no unbroken rail link from Anatolia CO Syria and central Mesopotamia. since the AnatoliaBaghdad railway had not finished its tunnels through the mountains." P. 102. See also, Trumpener.
G e m n v and the Ottoman Empire, p. 8.
'' M m . "Yasin al-Hashimi," pp. 70-71. See dso, Simon.
'9
Iraq Between Two World Wars, p. 67.
Ibid., Ali Jawdat ai-Ayyubi surrendered at Basra. P. 423.
" Some of the Arab uibes offered their services to the British (& the Turks) for a price. but the British M
orders not to engage the indigenous tribes as they had an unsavory and untmstworthy reputation.
''
Kielmansegg, m
.
p. 98.
'' Schmidt, World in the Crucible. After Kut was retaken. Maude banled retreating Turks weakened by
the
loss of the 6th A m y Corps to the Persian front who pursued Enver's vision of an Islamic empire. P. 63.
'' Ibid.
'The British...issued an appeai for collaboration with the British 'liberators'. holding out vaguely
the prospect of independence. self-government and Arab union or federation." The proclamation belonged to
Britain's overail policy of exploiung in political warfare the discontent of the Arabs. P. 164.
Elie Kedourie, Eneland and the Middle East: The Desnuction of the Ottoman Empire. 19 13-1921
(London: Bowes and Bowes. 19%), p. 23C.
RL
Ibid., p. 230.
Ibid.. pp. 230-3 1.
bid. The impact of Baghdad's defeat in March 1917 was felt throughout the Islamic world. "delivering a
final crushing blow to the faltering Holy War conducted since November 1914." Pp. 1 63- 165.
" Trumpener, German~and Ottoman E m ~ i r e ,p.
n9
1 17.
See this chapter, pages 21 and 22.
Hennas J. Bergman, "The Diplornatic Missionary: John Van Ess in Iraq." The Muslim World 72 ( 1982).
Van Ess, an Arnerican rnissionary who operated the Boys' School of High Hope at Basra. quoted an Arab
Shaikh with 12,000 anned tribesmen who, in 19 14, demanded the equivalent of $200,000to fight with the
British; they had aiready been offered $125,000 by the Turks. The British refused. P. 183-184.
'O
Simon, Iraci-Between Two Wars, p. 46.
Y2
Shaw, Historv of the Ottoman E m ~ i r and
e Modem Turkev, p. 3 10.
93
Jawad, Irasthe K w w Ouestion, p.5.
* Cohen, British Policv in Mesouotamia, in September 1914, the rnujtahids rvere wamed thac urtless they
stopped their political acùvities against the British, their funds from the Oudh Beqm would c-.
95
P. 1O.
Nakasb Shiah in @, p. 57.
Bamtu. Uld Social Classe& p. 294.
*~akash,Shiah of kq, p. 20. See also. Batam Old Socid Classq, p. 9; and Arnold T. Wilson. Lovalties:
M ~ m t a m i a19141917 a n d o n : Oxford University Press, t 930). The Turks were aiso omed from
Karbala Hillah and Kufah by the Shi'i inhabitants. P. 72.
Tauber, Amb Movements in Wald War L Najaf uibal families rebeiied agahst the British in 1918, who
laid siege to the city, ody for it to be relieved by the intercession of the supreme Shi'i mujrnhid,
Muhammad Kasim Y d ,upon sumader of the assassins. P. 3 1-32 See also, bngrigg, Iraa: 11950,
The minder of the afficer was *an opeaing move of a G e m organized progamme for a series of such
crimes." P. 95.
99
"One of the -test
postwar controversia over the disposition of an Onoman province took place at the
Ottoman army was a m d l y in command of the city of
Mosul when the armistice of Mudros rvas signed in 19 18, rherefore, the Onornan surrender to the British
m y was after the fact. Mosui was occupied by the British four days after the armistice was siLausanne COIlfimnce of 1923 over Mosul. The
CHAPTERTWO
OCCUPATION
AND MANDATE 1918 - 1921
After victory had k e n achieved at Baghdad in 19 17. there wzs Little doubt that
Britain would fil1 the power vacuum in Iraq following four hundred years of Ottoman rule.'
However. active resistance to the post war Bntish occupation reflected the Iraqi fear of
British permanence. There were those who concurred with British mie, in particuiar Sunni
Arab notables and shaikhs. but there were others, especiaily Shi'i d a m . who were
opposed to an infidei overlordship. The Iraqis who made the Paris Peace Conference their
battleground for Arab independence acknowledged the necessity of short-term Western
assistance in the initiai stages of Iraqi self-government. Yet when independence was denied
them at the San Remo conference in favour of a British mandate under the auspices of the
League of Nations. the battleground becarne Iraq.
The protection of its economic and strategic interests in the Middle East had k e n an
immediate concem of the British govemment after the armistice of 1918. To a Britain
depleted by a war which had cost so much in British lives and resources, the protection of
its oil interests in Persia. the as yet undeveloped oil potential in Mosul, the irnperial air
roure, and the sea approaches to Bntish India were of vital importance. By 1919, the cost
of the occupation of Iraq had risen to 2,700,000 pounds sterling per month.'
causing
domestic pressure to weigh heavily on Britain's maintainhg its overseas cornrnitments. Ai
the same tirne, expansionisr designs of emerging nationalist regirnes in Turkey and Iran, as
weii as those of the Bolshevik state, made the British presence in Iraq strategically
imperative. The key to protecting British economic and strategic interests was an haqi
mandate which wiis vehemently opposed by both Sumi and Shi'i haqi nationaiists.
Active resistance to British expansionism in what was then Mesopotamia was
evident corn die nim of the cenhuy; therefore. not surprisingly, it continued afrer the war's
end. Out of the Ottoman defeat, the British. French. and Americans made grandiose
dedarations favouring emancipation of the former Ottoman possessions. Under the guise
of the Oceupied Enemy Temtory Administration, the British brought order out of the chaos
that war had caused and assumed direct conûol of the country, much to the chagrin of
nationalist elements. Resistance to British authority in Iraq became a major dynamic of the
postwar era and throughout the mandate.
Sir Percy Cox, the pre-war British resident in the Persian Gulf and chief political
oficer from 1914-1918, undertook that authority in the postwar era. He was known and
respected by many Iraqis for his understanding of Arabs and the Middle East in general.
However, Con was temporarily posted to Persia and his deputy. Colonel Arnold Wilson,
replaced him as acting civil commissioner. Trained in India, Wilson identified with al1 the
imperialistic vimies of men who had controiled British India for centuries. Intrinsically, he
was an outspoken advocate of British direct rule in Iraq, believing Arabs incapable of self-
pvemment He refused the repatrïation of experienced iraqi ex-army oficen now
empioyed by the Syrian Arab govemment, among whom were commanding officers with
at least one holding the rank of general.'
Wilson was, for whatever motive. a major factor
influencing continued British direct d e in Iraq and rebellion against such d e .
Though Colonel Wilson created efficient govenunent with Muslirn Indian civil
servants and law and order with a Musiirn Indian police force, he created considerable
hostility towards the British presence. He osiracized the local e m s . foimer Iraqi
members of the Oaoman civii semce, creabllig unemployment. He collected more taxes
than any previous govemment, thereby increasing govemment revenue but provoking the
urban and shaikhly landowners? Shi'i m$ahidin and tribal shaikhs became incmingly
apprehensive about the diniinution of their powers under British d e . Aside from Bntain's
miiitaq might, its mie was irnpressive by providing a stable and durable govenunent
39
which was, nonetheless, never popular with the tribes of Iraq nor with the Shi'a.
Conversely. Sunni notables and shaikhs. having habiniaily Lived in the shadow of the
incumbent power for centuries, became the bulwark of the British administration.
In an attempt to demonstrate a seerningly pro-British majority. discourage a
growing nationaiist trend, and ascenain the political will of the Iraqi people. Colonel
Wilson proposed a postwar plebiscite. Only particular strata of Iraqi society, for example.
uifluential urban elite or pro-British tribal shaikhs. participated in the B ritish-controlled
plebiscite: however, the British govemment would be infonned of the Iraqi preference on
such questions as the future boundaries. ruler. and govemment of an h q i state.'
The designated boundaries of h q from Mosul in the north to the Persian Gulf in
the south were unanimously agreed upon. The choice of ruler ran the gamut of a son of the
Sharif of Mecca to the Englishman Cox to
'an Iraqi for the
Iraq", the most frequently
mentioned of whom was Sayyid Talib al-Nagib of Basra. From Karbala carne a petition
demanding an Islamic govemrnent have a representative clencd council to assure its
adherence to Islamic Iaw which bore the signature of the supreme Sh'i Persian rnujtahid.
Mirza Muhammad Taqi ~ h i r a z i . ~
One of the most important petitions subrnitted during the plebiscire delineated the
choices of the people of Baghdad who manifested a desire for an end to sectarian conflict
and for the unity of Shi'a and Sunnis within the above mentioned national borders of an
Iraqi state. Daîed January 1919, the petiûon also demanded an Arab constitutional
monarchy within an Islamic nation. This was a manifestation of [raqi nationalisrn long
before the onslaught of postwar Arab nationalism. It read:
We, the representatives of the Shi'ites and Sunnis, residents of Baghdad
and suburbs, inasmuch as we are an Islamic nation, desire that the regions
extending from north of Mosul tilI the Persian gulf shail be one state, Arab,
at whose head shaU be a M u s h Arab king, one of the sons of our lord,
Sharif Husayn. He shali be subject to a national legislative council, whose
seat shall be in the capital of Iraq, Baghdad. '
The piebiscite did not elicit the expected response in favour of British d e : rather it
a f f m e d the Iraqis' desire for independence. Sunnis and Shi'is of Baghdad would prefer
to unite, to govem, to be subject to a monarch and the laws of Islam. After centuries of
disunity and subordination to alien conquerors, this was a momentous decision. Many
prominent Shi'i and Sunni signatories of the Baghdad petition. including Shaikh Sa'id alNaqshabandi, Iafar Abu Timrnan. and Ali al-Bazirgan. later played significant roles in the
modem state of Iraq and attempted to rnake the words of their petition a reality. Yet the
words of the Sunni Nagib of Baghdad, reflecting Iraq's traditional role. foreshadowed the
future of the Iraqi state.
The English "have conquered this country, they have expended their werilth. and they have
watered the soi1 with their blood. The blood of Englishrnen. of Austraiians. of Canadians.
Muslims frorn India and idoiaters has drienckd the dust of Iraq... Other conquerors have
overwhelmed ùiis country. As it fefl to them so it has falIen to the English ...And when 1
am sked what is m y opinion as to the continuance of British rule, 1 reply I am the
subject of the victor."
The piebiscite brought to the fore the desires of Iraqis relative to British d e in Iraq
and the effect of their support or opposition of Britain itself. This was not the result
Colonel Wilson expected from his proposal -a
proposai better left unproposed sowing as
it did the hope of selfdetermination and the seed of nationalist revolt. Shi'i Arabs. making
up fifty-five percent of the population, were opposed to d e by the British. therefore
Britain's interests would of necessity suffer under a Shi'i-dominated Islamic government.
Conversely, the Sunni Arabs, an Iraqi rninonty who had enjoyed centuries of social and
political dominance under the Sunni Ottomans, by catering to British interests could expect
to retain that dominance. However, insofar as the British were concemed, it was obvious
that the emancipation of the country was in direct opposition io the interests of imperial
Britain. In fact, at the peace conference in Paris the victors were in the throes of discussing
spheres of influence in the Middle East and the advisability of mandatory tutelage in Lieu of
immediate independence.
Nationalism in Paris and Damascus
In its tirne, the First World War was the most cataclysmic event known to man in
terms of the humanity it absorbed, the destruction it wrought, and the transformation of
society forged in its aftermath. What endured was the classic dynamic of conflict: to the
victors go the spoils. They were the reapers of the harvest and nowhere was the harvest
greater than in the Middle East.
in January 19 19, at the peace conference in Paris. Aiiied statesmen prepared to
dispose of the Ottoman Empire arnid an atmosphere at once militarist and imperialist, yet
with an aura of regret. To the gathered representative delegations of former Ottomans. the
Anglo-French Declaration of November 19 18 offered freedom and self-govemment.' An
earlier announcement by the Amencan President. Woodrow Wilson, assured the
emancipation of those fomerly under Ottoman rule.lo Amid the plethora of secret
agreements and documents however, there emerged insrnountable barriers to the
independence of the Ottoman Empire's former citizens.'
'
Amir Faisal ibn Husain ai-Hashim of the Hijaz, headed the Arab delegation as the
representative of his father, the Sharif of Mecca. and of Anb nationalist daims to
independence. Faisal came to Versailles to redeem a secret pledge given by the British to
the Sharif in r e m for Arab allegiance during the war. The Arab delegates were Amir
Faisal, Rusnim Haidar, Fa'iz al-Ghusayn, Awni Abd al-Hadi. Jamd Mardan, Ahmad aiQadri, and Tahsin al-Qadri of al-Fatat and the Iraqi, Nuri al-Sa'id of al-~hd." Faisd
seemingly spoke for al1 Arabs, despite reports that Ibn Saud showed no interest in an Arab
nation nor did Iraqis offer support for his father as king of the "Arab nation".13 Arab
nationalists claimed independence within a single united Arab nation as defined in the
Damascus Protocol of 19 15 signed by Arab nationalists from Damascus and ~ a ~ h d a d . "
Rumours and signs of British duplicity did not dispel Arab hopes although
inevitably, the power of Europe prevailed. AUied statesmen established a League of
Nations as keeper of world p e a ~ e . and
' ~ readied a mandatory system of tutelage for nascent
States until they were able to rule independentiy in theû own right. ln April 1920. the
mandates were announced. France was assigned the mandate for Syna and Lebanon. in
recognition of its nineteenth century claim as protector of Chnstians in the Levant. Britain
was assigned the mandates for Palestine and Iraq, guardians of the imperhl route to
India? Throughout the Middle East. Arab aspirations for independence and trust in the
West were laid waste."
Yet, not only the hungenng of Europe, but other factors directly linked to the local
context aiso weighed in the decision to h t independence. Iraq, as a new state. would
have had littie chance of sumival before the rising tide of Kemalist forces to the north and
the acquisitiveness of Ibn Saud in the southwest.18 Nor couid a weak state survive the
internai threat of the Shi'i demand for an Islarnic state or the Kurds' repeated bid for an
independent Kurdistan.
Arabs felt betrayed by the decision of the AUies nonetheless. Yet Kedourie denies
the alleged betrayal, insofar as the Sharif of Mecca was perfectly aware of British
obligations to the French in Syria. A fact corroborated by D. R. Hogarth of the wanime
Arab Bureau in Cairo, and by Mohammed Rashid Rida, the nationalist ideologue.19 The
Husain-McMahon correspondence of 1916 clearly stipulated the French and British spheres
of influence in S y n a Mesopotamia and Palestine. David Frornkin speculates that President
Wilson's noble ta& had "pitched the world's hopes too high:" that the promises of the West
This. Arabs saw as a beuayal.
allowed subject peoples to believe in their ernan~i~ation.'~
while the decision to impose a mandate was influenced b the acquisitiveness of the AUies
and the divisions and conflicting goals of the Arabs.
In early 1919, Faisal's memorandum to the Council of Ten stated his belief that
nationai status for a single Arab nation was premature, the Hijaz and Syna should be
granted independence. while Iraq should not rather it should receive the assistance of a
foreign power.
" Aware of the machinations of the European powers.
Faisal used them to
further his own ambitions. Overtures were made to him at Versailles by the French and the
Zionists. The Amir had Listened to them
Arab unity was not achieved at the peace
conferences, however, arnong its Arab delegates and members of the Arab government in
Damascus were those who would further the aims of Arabism and independence for iraq.
The Arab Revolt of June 19 16. led by the charismatic Arnir Faisal ibn al-Hashirni.
is important to this study only insofar as it affects Iraq. Many of its participants becarne
Ieading political figures in h q ; its leader became a king whose adherence to Arab
nationalism influenced many generations of Iraqis. As for the motivation for the Arab revott
against the Ottomans, sufice it to Say that the Sharif of Mecm was aware of the Young
Turks' intention to remove him from off~ce.'~
The Sharif s agent approached the British in
Cako, and they saw mutual advantage in an alliance. They signed a secret agreement
prornising the Sharif a single united Arab nation -with
certain limitations- and the Bntish
support of the Arabs in their war effort. As eariy as 1915, the British reco,gnized the
possibilities in cultivating the forces of Arab naiionalism as a political tool with the potentiai
for shaping the Middle East of the future.'" Consequently, a yemlia Arab army was
formed of Bedouin tribesmen and regular troops, former Ottoman junior officers who had
k e n captured or had defected, and a full complement of Bntish liaison officers and rnilitary
advisors. While the significance of the military contribution of the Arab Revolt to the Ailied
cause has k e n questioned by historians, afier the cal1 for a jihad against the Allies. the
psychological impact of the revoit by the Sharif of Mecca - t h e holy city of islam and
birthplace of the Prophet-
inflicted ùnmeasurable h m on the Ottoman war effort.''
According to T. E. Lawrence, at the forefront of every Sharifian guerda raid and
railroad blast dong the road to Damascus were Sunni Iraqis, Arab nationalists to the core.
AU served their apprenticeship at the Harbiye, in the officers corps of the Ottoman Army
and as members of al-Ahd. Among them were Jafar Pasha Askari, Nuri Pasha Said,
Shukri Pasha Ayyubi, Jamil Pasha Midfa'i, and Mawlud Pasha Mukhiis -the
filst regdar
44
officer to join Faisal and former commander of the Turkish c a v w at Shaiba "who. for
rampant nationalism, had been twice degraded in the Turkish a m ~ y . "Al1
~ ~becarne membea
of the postwar Arab government in Syria and many fùture prime rninisters of Iraq.
At the end of the war, the Arab govemment in Damascus was installed under the
aegis of the British commander in chef in the Levant, General Allenby . Headed by the
Sharifian Amir Faisal, the govemment's real power actually Iay with the Arab nationaiist
society, ai-Fatat, whose rnemben were in the majority Syrian civilians. Officer members
of al-Ahd also held important posts. such as the Iraqi Generai of the Sharifian army, Jafar
&Askari, the govemor of Aleppo. Iraqi Generai Yasin ai-Hashimi of the Ottoman army in
Palestine becarne chief of staff of the new Arab army in Syria. However, in 1919. local
nationaiists opted for independent statu for Syria; rather than an Arab nation unithg ai! the
former Ottoman Arab provinces. Consequently, Syria declared its comection with the
Hijaz religious not political," aithough Faisal remained its head of state Ai-Ahd split into
two regionai factions, al-Ahd al-Suri and al-Ahd al-lraqi. each faction focusing on local
independence. Iraqis resigned their positions in the Arab government in Syria and many
attempted to r e m to Iraq. However. the British in Baghdad, intent on direct nile. refùsed
the repatriation of Iraqis whose nationalist tendencies could pose a problem to that nile.
As talk of mandates for the Arab provinces progressed at the peace conference in
Paris, preparation for armed opposition against British rule began in the northem reaches of
Iraq. in December 1919, local tribes and Iraqi officea of ai-Ahd al-Iraqi in Syria attacked
an isolated British post in the town of Dayr al-Zur on the Syria-Iraq border." When the
mandates were announced in April 1920, a rash of anti-British agitation broke out in the
major cities of the Middle East. A second attack on a British ganison at Tal Afar in May
1920 was led by an lraqi Sharifian officer, Jamil al-Midfa'i, with a band of four hundred
local tribe~rnen.'~These raids marked the beginning of armed resistance against the British
Occupation.
Iraqi National Resistance
To the British in Baghdad. intent upon creating an adjunct to Britain's colonial
empire, a border incident on the Upper Euphrates by discontented Iraqi Arab officers in
Syna and local tribesmen was of Littie importance. By arbiuarily sening the Syrian-Iraqi
border on the K a n river, and dividing the domain of a Iocai tribe, the map makers in
London and Park gave the vibesmen reason to attack the outpost at Dayr al-Zur. However.
the Ahd ai-Iraqi attack on Tal Afar, a town some tifty kilometers from iMosul. was an
incident which did concem Baghdad. British officen were killed and the town of Td Afar
was taken over by Ahd ai-Inqi revolutionaries. When the Iraqis marched on Mosul
itself," the British authorities in Baghdad sent ground troops and air power against them
whereupon the revolutionaries retreated to Syrian territory
Yet stili the British were not overly disturbed by these signs of northern discontent.
They had successfully quelled a rebeihon in northeast Iraq which had threatened British
hegemony in Iraqi Kurdistan. Sayyid Mahmud Barzinji, a Kurdish shaikh who had created
an independent govemment in Sulaimiyya had also been defeated by British air power."
Having been promised a state of their own by the peacemakers in Europe. the Kurds were
not involved in the Iraqi national struggle nor in the h q i attempt to create an independent
govemment ; they were, however, growing impatient for self-government.
Whiie plans were k i n g laid to strip Britain of its power in Iraq, the Briùsh were
creating efficient government, collecting taxes and making costly long-term improvements
to irrigation facilities. These improvements distressed the tribal shaikhs who were losing
profits in the process. If Iraqis protested they were threatened with fines, the right of
assembly, or other restrictions. The status quo was becoming increasingly galling to the
tribes who were at no time enamoured with efficient government, nor paying taxes, nor
forced labour. In the meantime. the tribes were being stirred up by nationalists and the
Shi'i clergy against continuance of British rule.
Notwithstanding the turmoil in the north, the British who had arrived in the region
in the seventeenth century were not lacking in supporters in the countryside. They had
recruited Sunni tribal shaikhs during the great war, particularly those of the Dulaim. the
Anaiza, and the Shammar in the northwest, as weil as Shi'i tribes in the south. including
the Bani as an." Under the British occupation, these shaikhs were given positions of
authority, land. and British subsidies; in retum. they gave loyalty to the British on demand
and collected taxes from their uibe~rnen.'~The British also found support for their
administration arnong urban Sunni religious notables, Jewish banking interests. and
merchants of aü persuasions. Of the urban elements who refùsed to support the British
presence, the most troublesome were young unemployed Arab bureaucrats whose positions
had been usurped by hdian Muslims employed by the British adminis~ation.'~Other
disruptive forces were local members of al-Ahd and the newly-founded nationalist societies
in Iraq such as the Baghdad-based Independence Guard, Haras al-Istiqlal.
Founded directly after the British plebiscite of L919. membership in Haras al-
Istiqlal was open to both Muslirn sects although it was predominantly Shi'a. The "piding
nucleus" of Haras %Istiqlal (and the centrai cornmittee of the Inqi nationalist movement).
was Aref Hilmiat al-Alusi. Naji Shawkat, Mal Baban, ALi al-Bazirgan and M a r Abu
~imman." The society was dedicated to the complete withdrawal of the British from iraq
and the independence of a united nation-state incorporating the former Ottoman provinces
of Baghdad, Basra, and ~ o s u l In
. ~direct
~ contrast to attitudes during the war. Haras
contacted the Hashimites in the Hijaz and in Syria declaring their desire for an Inqi
monarchy headed by a son of the Sharif. Shi'i nationalist societies formed at this hme
intent on founding a reiigiouslycontrolled klamic tat te,^' are discussed in chapter three.
Meanwhile, al-Ahd al-hqi nationalists in Syria made contact with the Shi'i Penian
clergy in kaq, known to be anti-British, in an effort to mutudy work for Inqi
independence. Many membea of al-Ahd were Sunni Ottoman ex-officers who had served
in the Sharifian army. however, it's acknowledged leader, Yasin al-Hashimi, had rernained
47
an Ottoman loyalist as well as an Arab nationalist. It was he who instigated the first
nationalist attacks in northem Iraq before k i n g imprisoned by the British during this
period, ostensibly for subversive activities . Yet as early as July 1919. an iraqi exSharifian in Syria, Jafar al-Askari, was in correspondence with the chef Shi' i mujtahid,
Muhammad Taqi al-~hirazi.)' As a result, an unusual alliance was forged between the
Sunni Arab nationalists in Syria and Iraq and Shi'i Penian mujtahidin in the holy cities
whose goal was not a united Arab nation but an Islamic state in Iraq controlled by the Shi'i
clergy. Moreover, differences within nationalist ranks arose between those in favour of
Bntish assistance in a future Iraqi state, rnembers of al-Ahd al-haqi, and those who were
diarnetricaliy opposed to British aid, rnembers of Haras al-Istiqlal.
An alliance had also k e n formed between the Haras nationalists and the Shr' i
rnujtahidin who, in tum, were allied with many of the Shi'i shaikhs of the southem Iraq.
The liaison between the nationalists in Baghdad, the mujtahidin in the Shi'i holy cities. and
the shaikhs of the Middle Euphrates tribes was Jafar Abu Tirnrnan. a Shi'i merchant from
the Baghdadi suburb of Kadhirnain who was dedicated to the reconciliation of the Shi'is
and Sunnis and the eliminaûon of Bntish power in Iraq. According to Batatu. Abu
Timrnan's enduring significance derives from his role in the great iraqi revolt and to huii
belongs "...the credit for bringing, at that historical juncture. Shi'is and Sunnis t ~ g e t h e r . " ~ ~
Haras al-Istiqlal members were the political backbone of the Iraqi nationalist revolt .
As the peace conferences drew to a close and the mandates were announced, Arab
resentment enipted. Arabs found expression for their bittemess and sense of betrayal in
riots in Damascus and lerusalem, but none were as effective, as those in Baghdad. Whde
the British public. in response to the violent reactions to the mandate. demanded immediate
withdrawal of British forces, the lessening of its military cornmitments, the reducing of its
expenditures abroad, and increasing post-war rehabilitation at home. However, the Bntish
did not withdraw from Iraq nor their daim to the coveted oiifields of ~ o s u l . ' ' ~
Al-Thawra al-Iraqiyya al-Kubra
After the announcement of the British mandate of Iraq in 1920, the resentment of
Iiaqi Arabs resulted in a nationalist' revolt. There are two views conceming the onset of
revolution: first, that it was planned; and second, that it was spontaneous. The latter view
holds that a Shi'i tribal shaikh was imprisoned for failure to pay taxes. and was rescued by
members of his tribe." The former view holds that these events were planned by nationalist
activists in conjunction wiih tribal leaders and the clergy." In support of this view is a
fatwa issued by the chef mujtdid Muhammad Taqi a l 8 hirazi, legitirnating the revolt.'"
Actuaüy, the document insisted that peacefùi measures should first be atternpted. after
which defensive measures could be taken.
Whether the revolt was planned or spontaneous, there are differences of opinion as
to the reai cause of rebeilion in Iraq in 1920 and each theory deserves mention. Firstly.
many historians are of the opinion that the Iraqi revolt was a direct response to the
announcement of the British mandate when ail hope for independence was extinguished."
While it is m e that anti-British demonstrations broke out at that time. these particular
dernonstrations were only indirectly involved in the revolt. They were part of a chain
reaction in the Fertile Crescent to the San Remo announcement of the mandates.
Secondly, Batatu cl-
that the Iraqi revolt was a "shakhs' affair". as opposed to
a nationalist movement, and that the shaikhs were used by a few "insignifkant nationaiists"
for their own ends."' Undoubtedly, the main concems of the rebellious shaikhs were land
acquisition , enforced taxation, and conscripted labour for irrigation maintenance.
Yet
significant numbers of al-Ahd and Haras nationalists are recorded as having k e n involved
in the revoit conducting political meetings and instailing provisional govemments. as noted
below. Ireland argues similarly that these shaikhs' had a legitimate grievance against the
autocracy of cenain pro-British shaikhs whose authority and landownership were protected
by the British; however. neither the shaikhs who rebelled. nor their tribesmen. saw any
advantage in the abstract concept of nati~nalism.'~
Longrigg attributes the revolt to the Indianization of the British Administration. as
well as tribal grievances, religious influence, and nationalist pr~paganda.'~From 19 14 to
1920 Iraq was controlled by a British India policy. employing Indian civil servants. indian
policemen, Indian laws. and Indian currency." Tribal policy was pattemed on the
Sandeman system used in India. giving the shaikh authority and largesse as long as he
maintained fealty to Britain. Iraqis feared the settlement of Muslim colonists from India in
the Tigris and Euphrates valley. Their fears were not groundless. The introduction of the
Indian rupee demonstrated to every h q i Britain's intention to recreate Bntish India in Iraq.
As the memoirs of the British irrigation expert Sir William Willcocks show. colonization
was, if not planned, at least predi~ted.'~
In contrast, Philby points to the Ahd al-Iraqi attack of May 1920 on the garrison of
Ta1 Afar as the signal for the rev01t.'~ This amck in which Bntish officers were killed by
local tribesmen was, Philby asserts, a continuation of the Arab nationalist agenda in
northem Iraq agauist British rule. Moreover, because the British in Baghdad did not
retaliate after the first attack, the commander of the British forces, General Haldane, alleges
that an uprising became a certainty5' As important to the mid-Euphrates tribes' was the
lack of numencal strength of the British standing army. Yet no concrete evidence exists
coordinating these attacks in the northwest with the revolt in the south despite propaganda
and the alliance between al-Ahd al-hqi and the Shi'i mujtahidin.
While all of the above factors were present, they did not preclude local nationalist
activity arousing the tribes, nor did they exclude international involvement in the revolt.
Outside influence was plentiful and varied, especially in the Shi'i holy cities. FO; example,
after the war the Arnericans demanded an "open door" policy in the Middle East. including
oil exploration in Iraq. Amencan interest in the potential oilfields of Mosd led to the
involvement of the Standard Oil Company and that of the American consul in Baghdad in
subsidizing the i n ~ u r ~ e n t s .Within
~'
this Ume frame, the Bolsheviks were involved in a
uoika which included Turks and iraqi Shi'is. A representative of the Kernalists. Major
Ajaimi, was known to have been in Najaf and Karbala, and the Bolsheviks to have
specificaiiy mentioned the name of Mina Muhammad Rida, the son of the supreme Shi'i
mujtahid, Mohamrnad Taqi Shirazi, as working for their cause.53
Whatever sparked the revolt the tribesmen did release their shaikh from the British
jail at Rumaitha and, as if by prearranged signal ,the whole southem region was enflamed.
Led by Shi' i shaikhs of the Middle Euphrates tribes for the most part, attacks on British
fortifications created havoc in the countryside and dong the railroads. These tribes were by
far the most powerful force among the Iraqis. The revolt spread to other tribes and
gradually extended to Kirkuk and Khaniquin. Chaos reigned for four months during which
time the holy cities of Najaf and Karbala were taken over by the revolutionaries.
British miiitaty forces had been reduced to a bare minimum and lone Bntish officen
were guarding isolated outp~sts.~'Before reinforcements could arrive rnany of these
officers were kiiled. Large nurnbers of troops from India and Persia were employed at great
cost to bring order to the country; however, it was Britain's use of air power whch was
decisive in bringing peace to the countryside. For aii intents and purposes, the revolt was
suppressed by Ocrober 1920 although there were pockets of Iraqi resistance util February
1921. The outcome of the revolt, in the long t e m , despite arguments to the contrary, was
the modification of Britain's implementation of mandatory govemment in hq.
Fighting in the revolt involved tribes from a wide m a covering most of southem
Iraq and north of Baghdad as far as Mosul. Many h q i tribes distanced themselves from
the conflict; notably the pro-British mbes of the upper Euphrates and the lower Tigris. The
ethnic minonties were not involved; nor the Sunni Kurds whose nationalist rebeilion of
1919 had ended in defeat, but Shi'i Kurds near the Persian frontier joined the revolt briefly.
While the countryside b e d i a t e l y south and north of Baghdad was imrnened in rebellion.
the cities did not take part in the acnial physicd conflict. aithough iraqi nationalists
continued the political and religious revolution within the urban areas.
Initial victories resulted in the Iraqi occupation of Ba'quba in the vicinity of Samarra
and Mandaii near the lranian frontier where nationalist politicians set up provisionai
govemments which were symbolic, though short-lived? Once the British rein forcements
arrived, overwhelming odds made short shrift of the revolt's nationalist govemments. The
Shi'i tribes fought most of the banles and suffered most of the losses. ln fact. Colonel
Lawrence, who advocated a free and independent Iraq, reported in the British press that
some ten thousand tribesmen were killed or wounded? By late August, many religious
and nationalist leaders of the revolt had been arrested, deported, or executed. Haras alIstiqlal was abandoned: its prominent members including Sayy id Muhammad al-S adr.
Jafar Abu Timman. Aii al-Bazirgan, Yusuf ai-Suwaidi, and Shaikh al-Daud sought refùge
from the British in Mecca and Syria, only reniming after the general amnesty of 1921.
Despite the Mure of the revolt, Iraqis consider the combined efforts of Inqi tribal.
religious, and nationalist elements5' in the Inqi national struggle for independence to be
the most enduring characteristics of the great Iraqi revolt, al-Thmvra al-iraqiyya al-Kubra.
Less enduring but of greater significance was the phenomenon of Islarnic unity.
Role of Religion in the Mandate Reaction
Sectarian conflict which rent the early Musiim comrnunity and which was a primary
cause of the wars between the Persians and Ottomans was responsible for four centuries of
Sunni Arab dominance and Shi'i Arab subordination under the Ottomans. The result was
a deeply-imbedded social, economic, and political disunity between the two communities.
From the late nineteenth century, the Shi'i Penian mujtahidin in Najaf, Karbala, Samarra.
and Kadhimain became increasing powerful and with their growing political successes in
the twentieth century came their determination to establish a Shi'i polity in southem Iraq?
The Shi'i Arab cornrnunity, dorninaîed as it was by its religious hierarchy, was open
to political mobilization by its clergy.
59
Conversely, Sunni Arabs. who are not obliged to
follow the ,guidance of an mdividual religious leader as are the Shi' a. were not similady
infiuenced in their political opinions.
The religious cornmitment of the Sunni Arab
community was more liberal and individudistic and, since most Sunnis were concentrated
in urban areas, they were more politicdy aware. Beginning with a 1920 fanva issued by
the chief mujtahid. Muhammad Taqi al-S hirazi. warning the Shi' i community that service
in the infidel administration was con-
to Islamic law, political mobilization of the Shi'i
masses against British d e became a potent force in the hands of the Shi'i clergy
As previously noted, the Shi'i Persian rnujtahidin in the hoiy cities and the Arab
nationalists of al-Ahd formed an alliance, while Iraqi nationalists of Haras al-Istiqlal and
the Shi' i clergy formed a similar agreement. 6'
During the following summer. both Arab
and Iraqi nationalist propagandists flourished in the streets of Baghdad whilst the rebellious
tribes raged throughout the countryside.
At this time. the most active were not the
nationalists of al-Ahd ai-Iraqi but those of Haras al-Istiqlal.
So passionate was the
nationalist cornmitment that Sunnis and Shi'a, traditional sectarian adversaries. laid aide
their age-old enmity and made comrnon cause in the cities in their desire for independence.
Joint religious ceremonies in the mosques of Baghdad becarne political forums after
the services whereupon nationalists of H a m al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd spoke before the
crowds. Underground groups were formed and worked to stir up the people against
foreign rule. Nationalist propaganda found fertile soi1 among the unemployed ex-Ottoman
bureaucrats, the eflendis of Baghdad whose resentment of the Bntish was evident and
volatile. 62 AS it had with the Shi'i Persian clergy of Najaf and Karbala who had long
fought Bntish expansion in Muslim lands. Each group looked to its own self-interest, yet
was willing to compromise. Thousands attended the religious ceremonies and political
meetings which continued throughout the month of Ramadan.
Sunni celebrations of Muhammad's birthday. the mawlud. and the Shi'i
commemoration of Husain's death, the ta '&a. were held simultaneously in the mosques
and in the homes of Shi'i and Sunni ~ a g h d a d i s .There
~ ~ was great significance in these
joint seMces. The anniversary of the birth of the Prophet was celebrated by all Muslims.
However, the laying aside of the enmity of the Shi' a and the Sunni in the ta'czja was said
CObe
unprecedented in the Muslim world.
Themes of unity ernphasized at these joint ceremonies and meetings were important
to Iraqi nati~nalisrn.~'After centuries of conflict, the unification of Sunni and Shi'a was of
momentous importance to the future of Iraq. In a letter to Mar Abu Timman. the chef Shi'i
mujtahid expressed his joy with the "bnity of the nation": however, he reminded the Inqi
nationalist that the damu were still concemed with the rights of the people.n5 Refemng, no
doubt, to the Shi3 majority. While certain Sunni religious leaders were known to
disapprove of the combined services, this did nothing
t~ dispel
the emotional bond formed
between the Sunni and Shivaat this time.
Although the sectarian reconciliation was occurred primarily in Baghdad and
Kadhirnain, it augured well for the future of Iraq. Hama Batatu emphasizes that the tender
bond created between Sunnis and Shi'is was an irnplicit promise of the graduai g~owthof
an Iraqi nationalist community6'
Yet this bond dissolved once the Inqi revolt was
suppressed by the British. Moreover. the leadhg Shi'i mujtahidin (who were Persian)
were found unacceptable as representatives of the rebel Shi'i tribesmen. Theû non-lnqi
status was used, and would be used again in the funire. to curtail their influence with the
Shi'i Arabs of Iraq. Nevertheless, Shi'i and Sunni opposition to the British mandate did
not cease. nor did religious participation in the nationalist cause.
Diarchal Government in Baghdad
Dernonstrations during the months prior to the h q i revolt brought the British
government face to face with the ~ n p o p u l ~ of
t y British direct mie in Iraq. Reeva Simon
promotes the traditional argument of British indecisiveness in the various depamnents of
the Bntish govemment over Iraq's status which inciuded: ( 1) the support of British
Arabists in Cairo for Arab nationalist govemment; (2) and. the advocacy of British
impenalists in India for direct ~ u l e The
. ~ ~most fervent advocate of direct rule was Colonel
Wilson in Baghdad. Conversely, Colonel Lawrence mounted a campaign against direct
d e in the British newspapers while favouring an Arab nationaiist government for Iraq.
Citing the financial burden to the nation caused by the British occupation of Iraq,
the Bntish press and public demanded overseas comrnitments be temiinated or dnsticdly
reduced. According to Kedourîe, a change of policy became evident when the alternative to
the British withdrawal was estabtishing an indigenous government in Baghdad;
this
change. however, was due more to the campaign in the British press than to pressures
arising out of the h q i revoit? In fact, before the revolt got under way. a British House of
Comrnons debate in early June 1920 laid the goundwork for a poiicy change, an h b
government, and a treaty relationship between Britain and Iraq.69 London arranged for the
replacement of the postwar British administration in Iraq by an interim A n b govemment to
be implernented by Sir Percy Cox upon his r e m to Baghdad in October 1920.
According to Article 22 of the Covenant of the League Nations, the British mandate
of Iraq was effective until such tirne as lraq fuifilled designated prerequisites for self-
govemrnent and attained membership in the League of ~ations." These prerequisites
were: a constituent assembly, a constitution. a parliament. democratic elections. and
defined borders. The responsibility of preparing the h q i leaders for self-government and
realinng the Iraqi ambitions for independence lay in the hands of the British high
commissioner of h q , as representative of the mandatory power.
Upon his arriva1 in Iraq in October 1920, Sir Percy Cox issued a proclamation
advising Iraqis that a national govemment would be set up when ali hostilities c e a ~ e d . ~in'
the interim, a Council of State, representative of the major cities and tribes, was instaiied.
President of the Iraqi Council of Ministers was the leader of the Sunni religious comrnunity
of Baghdad. Abd al-Rahman al~ailani'~;
the minister of interior, Sunni Sayyid Talib al-
Nagib of Basra; the minister of defense, Sunni ex-Sharifian Jafar &Askari of Baghdad:
the minister of education and health, a moderate Shi'i rnujtuhid. Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi
Tabataba'i:
the minister of finance, the Jewish fmancier Hasqail Sassoon: and five
ministers without porfolio included two Christian notables and three Shi'i tribal leaders."
British advisors assigned to each minister reported directly to the high commissioner.
Although the Council of State had ali the uappings of high office. Cox a c W y held the
power of ultimate authoriry invested in his office by the League of Nations.
The Council was called upon to assist in the drafting of an electoral law and
establishing a constituent assembly. At British insistence, it made provision for tribal
representation despite the obvious inexperience of the shaikhs in the political system."
The Council also arranged for the repatriation of Iraqis whose retum had not k e n
sanctioned by the former British administration. In eariy 1921. a large contingent of Lraqi
officers arrived from Syria and Turkey, including Nuri al-Sa'id. Tahsin &Askari, Tawfiq
al-Suwaidi. and Naji al-~uwaidi.'' Nuri al-Sa'id. former chef of staff of the Sharifian
m y during the Arab revolt, was appointed chef of staff of the newly created Iraqi a m y .
While a general amnesty had been declared, notable exceptions were made against
the r e m of certain Iraqis. Yasin al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Jarnil al-Madfa'i. and
Mawlud Mukhlis of al-Ahd al-Ii-aqi in Syria who had been involved in the deaths of British
officers in northem Iraq. Sayyid Muhammad &Sadr, Yusuf al-Suwaidi, Ah Al-Bazirgan.
and Jafar Abu Tirnman of the defunct Haras al-Istiqlal who had been politicaiiy active in
the iraqi revolt against British rule.
76
The independeni Arab state envisioned by Iraqi nationalists did not fully materialize.
The petition of Baghdad, it is to be remembered, sought not only the unification of an
Islamic nation fiom the Persian Gulf to Mosul, but also the Ulufication of the Shi'a and
Sunni within an Arab kingdom. While the province of Mosul did become an integral part
of the Iraqi state, Iraqi unity was hampered not oniy by the British and the Shi' a but by the
Sunni proclivity for Arab nationalkm which would give them advantage in a larger Arab
entity. A constitutional monarchy did materialize, however. In a well-planned scenario
staged by T. E. Lawrence and Winston Churchill, Britain's Colonial Secretary. a
conference of Middle East experts in Cairo was arranged to decide, arnong other things. a
future Iraqi govemrnent in keeping with important British priorities.
In March 1921, the Arabists who gathered in Cairo proposed an Iraqi constitutional
monarchy, an Anb govemrnent, and an army which would reduce the burden to British
t a ~ p a y e r s .Meanwhile,
~~
the Nagib of Baghdad, Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani. Taiib Pasha.
and Hikrnat Sulayman formed a movement advocating an Iraqi d e r for 1raq." Yet the
proposed h q i candidates were eliminated by diplomatically applied pressure or simple
coercion by the British. For exarnple, Sayyid Talib Pasha al-Nagib of Basra. an early
defender of Iraqi sovereignty whose reputation was tainted by corruption and British
disfavour, was an outstanding candidate who was exiled. Churchill's desire that Britain
remain a strong presence in Iraq took the f o m of support for a Sumi Arab king who
would be amenable to British interests. One candidate , Amir Faisal of the Hijaz whose
reputation as an Arab nationalist and a leader of the Arab revolt did not preclude h s
susceptibiiity to British persuasion, fulfded Britain's requirements.
King Faisal 1was the Fust Arab to ascend the throne of ancient Mesopotamia since
the thixteenth century. Although an orthodox Sunni, he was acceptable to the Iraqi S h ' a
because of Faisal's descent from the Prophet through his daughter Fatima and his grandson
Hasan. Nonetheless, his overtures to the leading Shi'i clergy were met with suspicion.
Faisal realized the danger of such an independent and highiy politicaiiy religious body
within Iraq's
border^^^ -a danger increasingly apparent with the formation of the Iraqi
governrnent . Upon his arriva1 from Jidda in June 1921, Faisal was also disappointed with
his reception from the people of Iraq who evinced Little feeling for independence or for
unity, a feeling he was determined to create."
The king was more popular with the Bedouin tribes. His thunderous welcome at
Rarnadi by the pro-British chiefs of the hilaim and Anaiza bore witness to his having spent
his earfy youth in the Hijaz in the traditional manner with the Bedouin. Sluglett, however.
makes the point that other than these tribal shaikhs, whose actual degiance was to British
power, there were only the few educated urban Sunni elite and Sharifian offcers who were
actually in favour of Faisal's rule." Indeed, his sources of support were primarily those
who had served with hirn in the Hijaz and in Syria. nationalists desirous of gaining power
for thernselves in an independent Iraqi state. Principal among his supporters were the Sunni
Iraqi Arab officers Nuri al-Sa'id and Jafar al-Askari and the Syrian Arab Sati al-Husri from
Aleppo; the Syrian Rustam Haidar was a Shi'i Arab from ~aa1bek.x'
Shortly afier the king's arrival, the council of ministers was dissolved and an iraqi
government was instaiied wherein the British high cornmissioner held effective p ~ w e r . ' ~
This menage à deux was a f o m of government modeled on a sirnilar diarchy introduced in
British Lndia in 1921. The key to iraqi acceptance of this arrangement was King Faisai. His
nomination by the British resulted from their understanding that he would be conducive to
their interests and guidance -a
misplaced conception of a king who aspired not only to the
leadership of an independent h q i state but of a fume united Arab nation .
Faisal believed that Iraqis, backward and iuiterate, must be ,@ded and indoctrinated
in a deliberate mariner? Ismail Haqqi Baban of Baghdad, an Ottoman ex-deputy,
emphasized in 1913 that the Iraqi masses 'must be led by a suong ha~~d."'~
Yet Faisal did
not lead with a strong hand, rather he led with persuasion and compromise. Growing up in
the Ottoman capital, he had Iearned to dissemble. to manoeuvre in a world of politics and
intrigue; as a deputy in the Ottoman parliament, he had played a dual role of Ottoman
loyalist and Arab nationalist? T. E. Lawrence described Faisai as "tenacious and weak";
while the French viewed him as treacherous."
His willingness to compromise. once he
was deprived of his throne in Syrïa, gained hirn a second throne in kaq; however. his
willingness to compromise with the French and the Zionists at the peace conference gained
him threats of deposition or worse from local notables and nationalists in ~yr-ia?
In choosing Faisal as king, the British introduced into iraq a strong advocate of
pan-Arabism and its implied unification of Arab States. However. there were many
divisions of Arab nationalism in the Middle East in the early twentieth cenniry. including
levels of local, religious, and secular nationalism. iraqi nationalism, Kurdish nationalism.
and Arab nationalism were d l present in Iraq in the 1920s. and although their ultimate goals
differed al1 shared the same desire for independence and the end of British influence.
Despite promises of independence,
the Arabs had returned from the peace
conferences with the knowledge that once more they would be subject to the political
domination of a foreign power. Moreover, although the revolt in Iraq whch followed the
announcement of the mandate was the result of a compiex of factors. a primary cause was.
without doubt, the devastating feeling of betrayal and resentment at the fdure of Britain to
honour its cornmitment to the Arabs. The healing of centuries-old conflicts which unified
Arab Muslims at this time, though historic. was fleeting. Once the revoit was suppressed
by the British, the Sunnis and the Shi'is no longer presented a united front and they fell
into the age-old abyss of anirnosity and dienation. The constitutional rnonarchy imposed
on lraqis was guided by infidel mandatory tutelage und prerequisites to independence, the
estabiishing of democratic institutions and geographical unity dernanded by a coterie of
European statesmen, were fidfilled. Furthemore, once the ahen Sunni monarch was
enthroned as king of Iraq and his cornrades-in-amis, the Sharifians, were installed in
positions of power, there was little hope of a united Iraq emerging out of the ashes of what
had been the Ottoman Empire. Resentment of foreign domination continued as Iraqi
nationalists sought to extricate the country from an unbidden bondage.
' Emest Main. 'riiQ-h m Mandate to I n d e e e n c e (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press. 1935). David
Lloyd George, Prime Minisrer of Great Britain. stated in the British House of Commons before the end of
the war that Bntain would be assigned the mandate for Iraq and Mosul. P. 7 1.
Daniel Silverfarb, l
1986). p. 7.
t (New York: Oxford University Press.
of Baltimore: The Johns Hopkins
Aaron S. Klieman.
University Press, 1970).Col. Wilson viewed Iraq as a future British protectorate, beiieving Iraqis should be
"...given as much freedom and self-government as is in accordance with 'good and safe government."' P. 53.
See also M m , "Yasin al-Hashimi." Iraqi Generds were more or less "running the whole of the military and
civil administration in Syria." Yet Wilson advised al-Hashimi. al-Said. and al-Suwaidi they could only hope
to work on municipal councils in Iraq. P. 433. See also. Fromkin. A Peace to End al1 Peace, p. 326,
' Eliezer Tauber, The Formation of Modem Swia and Iraq
(Essex. England: Frank C a s and Co.. Ltd..
1995). p. 185.
Nakash, Shiah of Iraq, No unified opinion emerged. what the plebiscite showed was a wiltingness of many
Shi'is and Sunnis to tolerate British rule if it memt irnproved economic conditions. P. 62.
"id.
Shirazi issued a fanva forbidding Shi'i from asking for other than a Muslim d e r . P. 65.
' Tauber, Fonn&on
"edourie,
of Modem Svria and Trag, p. 279.
Endand and the Middle East, p. 184.
The text of the Anglo-French Declaration of November 7. 1918 was known to most politicized k a b s .
'O Hans Kohn, The Age of Nationalism. Wilson wrote in the 1901 Atlantic Monthlv: 'The East is to be
opened up and tmsformed whether we will or no; the standards of the West are to be imposed upon i t
nations and peoples which had stood still the centuries through are to be quickened. and made part of the
universal world of commerce and ideas which has so steadily been a-making by the advance of European
power from age to age. It is Our pamcular duty, as it has been England's. to moderate the process in the
interests of liberty; to impart to the people thus driven out upon the road to change ...the free intercourse and
the naturai development which shall make [hem at last equal members of the farnily of nations." P. 13 1.
" In particular the Husain-McMahon correspondence, Balfour Declaration, and Sykes-Picot Agreement;
these wartime secret agreements divided up the Ottoman Empire between the British, French, and Russians.
" Tauber.
Formation of S y i a and Erag, p. 116.
l 3 A. T. Wilson, Lovaitiss. "Sharif Husain carried no weight in Mesopotarnia; his .pretensions were
ridiculed ...his claims to speak on behalf of Sunni and Shi'iah were vehemently denied." P. 305.
" The Darnascus Protocol of 19 15 delineated the borders of the Arab nation and was signed by Syrian and
h q i Arab nationalists among whom was the iraqi Ottoman General Yasin al-Hashimi.
'' Kohn, Age of Nationalism. 'The Leaguc of Nations was created to h m e s s ambitious nationaiist
tendencies, ruid guard the hard won peace and distribure justice." P -133. South African Jan Smuts,in favour
of the mandate system, said 'The world has to be done al1 over again on a new basis and on an enormous
scaie...Europe is k i n g liquidated and the League of Nations must be the heir in the great estate." P. 162
'"rance
was granted Mosul in the Sykes-Picot agreement. In r e m for relinquishing these daims. France
got a 25 percent share in Mosul's oil by Britain. Many deds were stnick during the mandate negotiations.
in which the spoils of the Ottoman Empire were divided by the great powers.
-
.
-
*
-
Kohn, Reffections on Modem mov: The Histonan and Human Responsibility (Connecticut:
Greenwood Press Publishers. 1963). "From the Arab point of view. the policy foliowed by the West after
both World War 1 and World War II seemed to have the purpose of wedcening, dividing, and humiliating the
Arabs and driving them against their will. into an attitude of hostiiity towards the West." P. 200.
!'
''Mrs. Steuart Erskine. K i n ~Faisai of & (London: Hutchison & Co. Publishers. Ltd..
l9
Kedoune. çhatham House Version* p. 375. See dso. Sachar. E
Fromkin. A P
w
x
1933). p. t 1.
, p. 128.
d Al1 Peace, p. 399.
Formation Of Modem Svria and Iraq. In 1919. Amir Faisal describeci Iraq thus "aside from three
'civilized' towns, Iraq consisted of immense 'wastes' oniy inhabited by semi-settied nornads. therefore.
representatives of its Arab government should be selected for the present not elected." And further. 'The
world wishes to exploit Mesopotarnia rapidIy, and we therefore believe that the system of govemment there
wili have to be buttressed by the men and matenal resources of a great foreign power." Pp. 1 16.329.
" Tauber.
" Erskine. Kine Faisal, p 99.
Tauber, Fmergence of Ar& M o v e m . The Ottomans' intention to remove the Sharif and his sons was
corroborated by .4mir Faisal who made plans with Arab nationalists in Dmascus for an Arab revolt. P. 62.
Schmitt. World in the Crucible, p. 160.
Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace. The author States history was rewritten by the British in 1918. The
British Public were told the Hejaz army was enormous when actually it was only a few thousands. P. 327.
26
T.E. Lawrence, Revolt in the Desen (London: Jonathan Cape. 1927). p. 35.
" Tauber.
The Formation of Syria and Iraq, p. 330.
Ibid., p. 201. See also, Longngg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 1 19. See also. Main. Iraq: From Mandate to
Independence, p. 70.
Sachar, Emereence of the Middle East. Sunni lraqi Jamil ai-Midfa'i's attack on Tal'afar led the British
refused his repatriation until 1923. P. 36. See Tauber, Formation of Svria and Inq. Al-Midfa'i organized an
attack on Mosul after Tal'afar, however. the attackers were defeated by British air power. P. 336.
29
m.
Tauber, Formation of Modem S ~ r i aa d
Members of a very active branch of ai-Ahd al-lraqi in
Mosul were in direct contact with the Iraqi nationaiists in Syria. In an attempt to unify iraqi resistance they
"'calIedupon Christians to remernber that they were from the same Semitic race a s Muslims." P. 263.
Abdulghani Jasim M. 1ma- & Iran The Years of Crisis (London: Croom Helm Ltd.. 1984). p. 13 1.
Geoffrey L. Simons, Sumer to Sakiam (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1994). The Kurds were
defeated &ter a bornbing by squadrons of the British Royal Air Force in the winter of 1919 - 1920. P. 179.
j'
Nakash. a i a h of Irsig. The British were warned by the paramount shaikh of the Bani Hasan. Urnran alHajj Sa'dun, in May 1920 that an anti-British "propaganda offensive" was brewing and adviseci taking
strong action against the ringleaders in Karbala. P. 71.
j'
j3
This was the Sandernan system, a system used by the British in India to achieve the sarne ends.
3.1 Kedourie, Eneland and the Middle East. In June 1920, a member of the British House of Commons
submitted during a debate thar Arab and hdian tension waf "notorious" and that the presence of Indian
uoops in Lraq was "the main cause of the political difficulties in that country today." P. 194.
3s
A nucleus of Sunni and Shi'i k a b s and Sunni Kurds. P. 221.
Batatu, Qld Soc-.
'' Tauber, *of.
The proognm was to unite Iraqi communities and sects.
m.
Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr was president; Shi'i
oppose British assistance, and aid independence for
members included Ja'far Abu Timman, Muhammad Rida al-shabibi. Muhammad Baqir al-Shabibi. Shakir
Mahmud, Naji Shawkat, Sami Shawkat; Sunnis were represented by Ali al-Bazirgan. Yusuf al-Suwaidi rud
Kurd Jalal Baban; Afaj, Dagharra. and Awabid tribal chiefs were also members. Imam Muhammad Taqi dShirazi was contacted in April 1919. Pp. 286-289.
37 Ibid. The Iraqi-Arab society (al-Jam'iyya d-lraqiyya ai-Arabiyya) was established in Karbala in 1920 rrnd
headed by Mirza Mohammed Rida. the son of Imam al-Shi&. It had isfarnic ovenones and svove to set up
an Islarnic Arab government in Iraq. The British claimed it was finance by Turkey. P. 29 1.
38 Ibid. Al-Ahd al-iraqi had its h e a d q u % m in Syria. where it 'reached the peak of its activity ...with the
conquest of Dayr al-Zur in the border region between Syria and Iraq.' From there they spresid propa_wd;i
within Iraq, mainly in cooperauon with al-Ahd in Mosul. There was also a b m c h in Baghdad. P. 363.
39
Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 294-95.
A. J. P. Taylor. W I i s h History. 19 14- 1945 (London: Oxford University Press. 1965). p. 153.
"' Tauber, *ofModern
On June 30, 1920, Sha'lun Abu al-Jun of the Zawalin tribe.
imprisoned by the British, was released by his tribesmen which was a signal for the revolt to begin. P. 307.
" Sources on
the lraqi Revolt include the works cited in this study in English by Hanna Batatu. Stephen
Longrigg, Y i W Nakash, and Eliezer Tauber. AIso, in Arabic. those of ai-Bazirgan and al-Firman.
" Nakash.
Shiah of
m.The fatwa was signed by Shirazi in August 1920just before his death. P. 7 1.
U
Becween Two W a . Factors leading to the revolt inciuded "local opposition to British mle
Simon,
incîted by San Remo, by the results of the plebiscite, and by propaganda from Syna." One h q i author.
Fa'riq aI-Fir'aun. refers to the revoIt as a regional tribal insurrection against British methods while another.
Ali al-Bazirgan. insists it was an anti-British nationalist revolt. P. 52. See Man. Historv of k q , p. 32.
" Batatu.
The Old Social Classes, p. 1 19.
* Ireland. @: A Study in Political Develo~ment,pp. 247-49.
47
Longrigg, ha: 190- 1950, pp. 1 10. 1 14. See also Slugiett. Britain in k q , p. 26; and also M m .
Modem History of Traq, p. 3 1.
a Fromkin, A Peaçe to End al1 Pme. Seventy million predominantly Sunni Muslirns Iived in India and s
large part of the British Indian Army and its civil service was Sunni. P. 97.
''Tauber, Formation of Svria and m.The Times of London quoted possibiy three million Indians. P. 185.
Klieman, Foundations of British Policv, p. 57.
.
-
Lieut. General Sir Aylmer L. Hddane, The Insurrecmn i n Mesopcrtamia. (London: W. Blackwood rud
Sons, 1922). A pro-British Amarat chef of the Anizah, Fahd Beg ibn Hadhdhal, said "if you do not
reoccupy Dair ai-Zaur you will have a rebellion on the Lower Euphrates within six months." P. 33.
5'
''
Fromkin. A Peace to End al1 Peace. t ) Standard OiI sent an undercover geologicd team forbidden to enter
Occupied Enemy Temtory in 1919.2) A letter, written by the Arnerican consul in Baghdad, was taken from
a rebel rribesman which proved funds were k i n g distributed through him to the rebels. Pp. 533-35.
53
Batatu, Old Social Classes. Mina Muhammad Rida was the son of the chief mujtahid. P. 1 142.
" Main, From Mandate to -nq.
170.000 square miles of territory. P. 6 1.
The British reduced their military to 3.500 men deployed to guard
55
Longrigg, & 1900-195Q p. 125.
56 Kedoune, EnsIand and the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence regaled the British public in the press with al1 the
misdeeds of the colonial administration and cites ten thousand Arabs killed as 'sacnficed.' P. 273. See also.
Ireland, Iraa: A Studv in Politicai Develo~ment,p. 273.
Batatu. OId Social Cl-.
The author Iists many of "Islam's nobility". the sadah. "...as being active in
the Iraqi 'uprising' against the British': Muhammad as-Sadr, Hadi al-Zuwain. Alwan as-Sayyid Abbas.
Muhsin Abu Tabikh, Alwan al-Yasiri, Nur al-Yasiri, and Hadi al-Mgutar." P. 166.
'"akash,
The Shi& of Iraq. p. 75.
59
Batatu, "lraq's Underground Movements: Charactenstics. Causes and Prospects." p. 586-587. See also.
Marr. m H i s t o r v * . Each Shi'a follows a leading Shi'i mujtahid which gives a sense of stronger
leadership and cohesion to the Shi'i community than the Sunni comrnunity which does not. P. 5.
Tauber. Formation of Sy-ia and b.
This appeared immediately before the mandate announcement in latc
of
April, strengthening the participation the ulama and tribal shdchs in the nationalist movement, P. 294.
See also, Slugiett. Britain in Iraq, p. 39.
" Kedourie. Eneland and the Middle East. Jafar &Askari
corresponded with mujtahid Muhammad Taqi alShirazi in July 1919. Also, Mawlud Mukhlis sent propaganda from Dair as-Zur in as fat. as Amara J a n u q
1920. Pp. 187, 190. An alliance existed but there is no evidence that Sharifians actually traincd the tribes.
63 Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Iraq. In May, Abu Timman made contact with Shi'i iilama rind
tribal shaikhs from Karbala and Najaf at Shirazi's home. Peaceful demonsmtions were to foIIow combined
Sunni and Shi'a religious ceremonies. "During the next three months ceremonies of Mawlud (a Sunni rite
celebrating the birth of Muhammad) and of ru':iyu (a Shi'a rite comrnemorating the d a t h of Husayn) were
heid simultaneously in the mosques of Baghchi" Decisions to dernonsnation peacefully for independence
were made. if the British refused, they would revolt P. 296. See also Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi." pp. 51-52.
Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Iraq. September 1920 nationalist propagan& quoced "the
readiness of Arabs to die for their country"; favouring unity of the Shi'a and Sunni in a common nationalist
cause, and demanding the retum of al1 Imqi politicai exiles. P. 284
" Ibid., p. 299.
h4
Batatu, The Otd Social Classes, p. 23. See aiso Nakash. U
h of Irag, p. 69.
''
Simon. Iraa Between Two World Wars. This had providcd Arab nationalists from h q "five years to
regroup and formulate their own plan." Pp. 46, 38. See also Erskine. King Faisal. These British Arabists
had been part of the wartime Arab Bureau in Egypt: a "...Political Intelligence center for al1 Arab-speaking
countries within the sphere of the British high comrnissioner." P. 52.
a Kedourie, m a n d and the Middle East. T. E. Lawrence. the Sharifians' champion in the British Press.
carnpaigned against British mle in iraq and for the Arabs' right to rule there. while former Middle East
'hands' championed these Iraqis in the House of Commons and the Colonial office. Pp. 198-99.
70
Gelvin, T h e League of Nations." p. 55.
7'
Klieman, Foundations of British Poficv, p. 61. See Tauber, *
of,
7'
Hourani, &story of the Arab Peo-.
p. 317.
The Naguibs were the head of the nobility of Sunni Islam. P. 7 1.
I9W 195Q p. 127. See also Kohn. History of N-sm
Longrigg.
Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi, pp. 97-98.
73
'"lretand. Iraa.-- A S
t
u
representatives per district. P. 292.
d
-
.
in
the
p. 308. See also
s The cococil accepted Jafar Pasha's proposal of two tribal
Tauber, Formation of Modem Svria and Irag. The Minister of Defense Mar al-Askari's was Nuri alSa'id's brother-in-law and former commander of the Arab Northern h y from the Hijaz. P. 32 1. See also
1900 - 1950. Nuri is referred to as "a brilliant officer and pre- 19 14 patriot." P. 129.
Longrigg, b:
75
'"auber.
Formation of Modern Svria and Irari, p. 322-23.
mi
Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950. The agenda included the selection of a d e r . the treamient of the
Kurds. the reduction of British financial burden, and the defense of lraq d e r the British rnilitary had
withdrawn. P. 130. See also Marr. "Yasin al-Hashimi." Among the "experts" were Sir Percy Cox. Gertrude
Bell, and T. E.. Lawrence. Also. Iraqis Jafar al-Askari. a Sunni Arab. and Sassoon Hasqail. a lew. P. 430.
b.Talib Prisha al-Nagib, an important iraqi Ottoman deputy from Basra and poli tica1 activist.
fought for Arab rights from 1908-19 14. P. 305. See also Tauber. Formation of Svria and @, p. 334.
" Ireland.
Nakash, The Shiah of Iraq, p. 72. The author highlights the leading role played by Shaikh al-Shari'a
Isfahani in the Iraqi revoit and his subsequent Ieading role during the time of the monarchy. P. 7 1.
79
'"Gerald de Gaury, Three
''
.
.
in B&dad , (London: Hutchison. 1961 1. p. 25.
Sluglett. Britain in Iraq: 1914-1932, p. 68.
" M m ,Modem Historv of Iraq, p. 36.
William R. Polk. The Arab Wodd. Polk refers to this period as a school for national independence and
graduation from this "schooi of mandates" was entry into the world of the international state system. p. 64.
"
nJ
Batatu. OId Social Classes. Faisal said "there is still no iraqi people but unimaginable masses of people.
devoid of any patriotic idea...we want to fashion a people which we would train. educate. and refine." P. 25.
''
ibid. Refemng to Iraqis. the full quote reads: "As long as government will not interfere in the private Iife
of the inhabitants and concern itself with their lodging, with their food even. as long as they will not be led
by force and against cheir wishes towards progress like soldiers, there will be hem neither prospetity nor
civilization. They must be led by a srrong hand." P. 32 1.
X6
De Gaury, Three K i n ~ in
s Baphdad, pp. 32-33.
"
MalcoIm E. Brown. The Letters of T. E. Lawrence (London: Oxford University Press. 199 1 ), p. 349.-
Tauber, Formation of Modern Swia and Iraq. 'There was talk of assassination, deposition and replacing
hirn." However, a delegation went to Faisal, headed by Arnir Mahrnud al-Fa'ur and Ahmad Muraywid, and
inferred that if he wanted to keep his position he must give up this peaceful policy with France and give the
t r i k s a free hand. P. 47. See also As'ad ûaghir, Mudhakirati. (Qahirah: Dar al-Qahirah lil-tiba'ah, 1953).
The author, who was with the delegation, claims that Mreiwed emphasized that the "Lajmat al-Istifta"' only
listen to demands of complete independence. p. 132.
Chapter Three
Growth of the Iraqi National Movement
Building on pre-war patriotism and protonationaiism. the Iraqi nationalist
movement emerged in the Iraqi revoit of 1920 in response to a growing nationalist
sentiment. To h q i nationalists. the suuggle to end alien domination. achieve complete
independence. and institute indigenous self-government in a modem lraqi srne was
paramount. To Arab Nationalists, the criterion was that such a struggle >hould ultimaîely
uni- self-goveming A n b States politicaily in one Arab nation. This implied a Sunni
dominated state which wouid gain &ab unity few convens among the country's Shi*i
k a b s and Sunni Kurds. On the other hand. the Iraqi national movement went hand m
hand with the stniggle for social, econornic. and political equality for a i i w h c h nationalism
implied. yet rare1y achieved.
Factors which contributed to the growth of nationalism in Iraq, and which made the
vision of an independent Iraqi state possible. have been previously mentioned in this study.
These were: the introduction of modem methods of communication and transponation: the
birth of a new chss whose education and world view were modem. influenced by
European and Arab points of view:
'
and the growing awareness of Iraq's hisroncal
subordination to foreign powers. Though secularism was present in ail these factors.
religion nevertheless played a major role. Nationalism was destined to favour some Iraqis
substantially more than others, yet ail fought for emancipation from centuries of alien
domination. When the govemment of Iraq was inaugurated in the autumn of 192 1. the
ideology of the state had not as yet been defined: however, Iraqi nationalism k a m e more
prominent than Arab nationalism.
Nationalism in terms of level of consensus was minimal. Nationalism. both lnqi
and Arab, was an elite, as opposed to a popular, movement. Notables. officiais, and
officers were exposed to modem forms of nationalism in the years prior to the First World
War. This, however, did not develop into a national-scale sentiment in Iraq because of the
low level of communication among urban areas, and between urban and ninl areas. While
urban dwellers were aware of a higher form of government and their relationship with it.
nomads and rural dwellers had Little knowledge of govemment, apart from paying taxes
and military conscription.
Throughout the 1920s only a very small segment of the Muslim population was
involved in the nationalist movement. Politicai activists came from the educated classes.
pnmarily those Sunnis and Shi'is who had k e n introduced to the nationalist idea via the
academic and military institutions of Istanbul or Europe. Nonetheless. having been charged
with the emotionalism of postwar demands for self-determination, the masses were for
independence. They refused to accept colonial stanis even though they were not endowed
with a well-defined nationaiist consciousness~
Nationaiism in terms of locus of identity demands a closer questioning of the past.
Which level of identity was important to the iraqi -Muslim.
Arab. or Iraqi? As subjects of
the Ottoman Empire for example, h q i s identified with the political and religious dualism of
the caliph-sultans as Muslims. "This dualism is inherent in Islamic society of which the
Umma of Muhammad is the g e ~ . " 3
Moreover, although under Ottoman rule [raqis were
subjected to alien rule, it was still Muslirn d e and, tlïerefore. acceptable. Yet, when the
Ottomans' policy of secuiarization sought to diminish that Muslim identification after the
deposition of the pan-Isiamicist Abdulhamid II, the Iraqis resisted.
As Arabs, and more than seventy percent of Iraqis were Arab, they resisted the
attempt to rob them of their identifcation with more than a millennium of Arab culture and
history during the period of "Young Turk Turanian chauvinism".'
The Arabs gave
expression to their Arab identity by dernanding auionomy for the &ab provinces within the
empire m d the reinstaternent of the &ic
language in their schoois and local
administration. However. it was not only Turanian chauvinism but dso Europem
sxpansionism which gave nse to the protonationalist response of "Arabia for the Arabs".
The embryonic Iraqi identity which grew out of the bond created m o n g Arab
Muslims during the nationalist revolt against alien domination could have gemiinated and
matured. had it k e n hinher nourished by the nationalist eiite of the time. Iraqi identity
could have endured together with an inherent Arab or Muslim identification among Sunnis
and Shi'is. However. there were Iraqis who believed an Iraqi identity existed. A case in
point is excerpt from an article published in Mosul in 1919: "From a reiigious.
ueographicd. and economic viewpoint we are tied to Iraq, and the fate of Baghdad will be
2
our frite also. We cannot live without Mosul and Baghdad because Our needs are common
and our interests are rnut~ai.''~ Iraq, as we know it today, was considered one unit.
historicÿlly. geographicdl y. and econornically ; in which many Iraqis were considered
similarly linked.
Hourani believes a c o m o n characteristic of the educated Arab of the 1930s was
his absorption with the collective identity of his nationab In hq.Muslims made up ninety-
tive percent of the population: and. the largest racial group was Arab. albeit divided dong
.;ectarian lines.' Sunni Kurds who constituted more than one fifth of Traqi Muslims svinced
no desire for an h q i identity due to traditional animosity towards Aiabs
and. more
importantly. their strong identification with Kurdish tribes in other States. The rernaining
five percent. those %lands of nations' preserved by the Face of the d e t system and the
Ottoman Empire, were neither Amb nor Muslim. Yet ethnic and religious homogeneity
ÿre
not neçessariiy indicators of national identity. Nor may a collective identity be presumed
tiom among the disparate peoples of Iraq who shared centuries of comrnon history.
evidence of which does not constitute an agreed Iraqi identity.
Arab tnbes in the mid-nineteenth century accounted for more than half of the
population of [raq. William Polk ascribes to the notion that the Bedouin "nations" of the
Great Syrian Desen were for all practical purposes autonomous ~ t a t e sThe
. ~ Arab nomad
identified with his family, clan, region and, with an interactive society until change forced
on it by the West shattered it.9 Having enjoyed the benefits of primitive nationdism. the
tribal collective not unnanirally refused the impositions of westemized govemment which
they saw as unfavourable to the ,pater tribal interest.
The revolt of the tribes reflected their identification of govemment as an antagonist.
The nationalists of Iraq and the mujtahidin of Shi'ism, whose power was at its height in
1920, attempted to use the tribes to create their respective envisioned forrns of national
identity. For one, a theocratic state based on the political power and aspirations of the Shi'i
Persian clergy in Iraq, for the other, a nation-state based on Arab supremacy as envisioned
by the Iraqi Arab and local nationalists whose ideological goals. though sirnilar. were
different and were bound to create dissidence in govemment.
Nationalism in Iraq, within the spectrum of ideology. was rooted in a fm
foundation in the religious political nationalism of Islamisrn and in the constitutionalism of
~ttomanism.'~
However, when the Ottomans were defeated in World War I. Ottomanism
was no longer an option. The burgeoning cause of Arab nationalism was not unknown in
Iraq, but few Iraqis supported the idea of Arab unity." During the mandate era, the most
compelling ideologies in Iraq were Arab nationalism and Iraqi nationalisrn. The first. a
supranational idea of the unity of . h b States in one single nation founded on cornmon Arab
bonds of language and history, and. in its original form. of Islam. The second. a local
nationalism which embraced the idea of the unity of di Iraqis in one state which espoused
ail its ethnic, Linguistic. racial, and religious diversities.
Though many Iraqis were determined Arabists. there were those whose local
loyalties were simiiarly resolute. For a time Iraqis functioned within what Au al-Azmeh
refers to as the more contemporary "parailel nationalism" of h q i and &ab, Syrian and
Arab, or Egyptian and Arab nationalism without denacting one from the other."
Understandably, not aU nationalists in Iraq were taken with the emotionaiism of an
ideology attached to Arab renaissance. nor were others with the challenges of [raqi
~niversality.'~
However from the very outset thts variance of ideology did nothing to deter
nationalists, intent as they were. fiom focusing on the independence of the h q i state and
the termination of the British mandate.
h its genesis. Arab nationalism for obvious reasons attracted only h q i Sunni
Arabs of the urban middle and lower middle classes. Fint. during the centuries of ûttoman
domination of Iraq, the Sunni Arabs gravitated towards the cities where they were favoured
by the Sunni Ottoman administration, in conuast to the Shi'i Arabs who were rnistrusted
for their unorthodoxy and past loyalty to Shi'i Persia. Consequently. h q i Sunnis became
more sociaily and politicdy advantaged. They achieved prominence in the Ottoman
bureaucracy, the military, and the parliament. As urbanized and politicized Sunnis. they
were the fint to demand autonomy for the Arab provinces in Istanbul. the milieu of Arab
nationalism aspirations. Obviously, the Shi'i Arabs of iraq were not drawn to an ideology
where the Sunni Arab would predominate nor were Sunni Kurds drawn to the idea of an
Arab nation which would subordinate the Kurdish minority."
Kohn daims that the programme of the Arab National Committee of 1905 cailed for
the unification and federation of Arab States based on the renaissance of Islam and the Amb
past, as did that of the Sharif of Mecca in 1916."
Sirnilarly. Dawn contends that
"Arabism" sought the renaissance of Islam and the Arab nation out of the pre-Islamic Arab
past, the waves of the Semitic conquests, and the days of glory of the Abbasid caliphate.I6
This was a concept which influenced Arabs throughout the Middle East. The force of
Turkish secularization and nationalisrn developed Arabism further, although the secularist
factor inherent in nationalism itself influenced Arab nationalism in Syria and in Lebanon
with its Christian Arab population more so than in Iraq. Khalidi sees Arab nationalism as
69
representative of an "expression of identity and group solidarity". exemplified by the d i n g
elite and by the new social forces Muenced by western idead7
Whether these views were expressed as Arabism, Arab nationalism, or panArabism. fundamentally the ideal and the goal were similar. They did not becorne
uinuential in the postwar Fertile Crescent. Arab struggles for independence at ths tirne
were struggles for local independence, and Arab political activists were, in pracîice,
regionalists. According to Tauber, when the choice had to be made. "Separate national
identities and separate nationalist ideas prevailed over the general Arab idea-"ls This proved
m e in Iraq, dthough Iraqi nationalism succeeded in part because the equation was
simplified: the government was involved, the people were not.
Sluglea contends that Iraqis have k e n ascribed a "greater degree of coherence and
continuity within national thinking than acnially existed"; that patriotisrn, Iraqi nationdism.
and pan-Arab nationalism existed for them simply as nationali~m.'~
This. however.
postulates an unfounded ignorance arnong politicdly aware Iraqis. adrnittedly very feW.
when acnidy ihere was Little misinterpretation. The dynamic of politics is power, and
many Arab and Iraqi nationalisü sought power in the 1920s by any means. IdeoloBes
were no&set in concrete. Yet that changed when independence was in sight -witness
the
frantic manoeuvring for power arnong the avowed Arab and Iraqi nationalisü towards the
end of the mandate compared to its beginning; witness the power stniggle between the
Sunni Arab king and his ministers, his comrades-in-arms and Arab nationalist colleagues,
in the last days of mandatory tutelage. What can be said is that in iraq nationalism did not
necessarily imply Liberty and equaiity although it did imply some degree of fraternity; the
ideals of nationalism in Iraq were not coherent with those of the West.
Iraqi nationalisrn emerged out of a pauioùc response to foreign expansionisrn which
would have depnved Iraqis of a country in which nationalism could grow. Iraqis proved
prior to the First World War that the protection of the citizen's rights, no matter what his
religion or social affiliation. and the protection of the country's sovereignty were
paramount.'O Of course, these sentiments did not last. Nationalism was detected in the
resistance of Iraqis in a war which was primarily a struggle between European nations for
world power; and, in a revolt to oust their conquerors who attempted to legitimize their
d e : and later, in the tenacity of nationalist demands for independence.
When the Syrian pan-Arab ideologue and educator. Sati ai-Husri, was appointed
Director-General of Education. he was given license by an alien king commined to an Arab
nation to implant pan-Arabist ideas in the mincis and history books of the youth of Iraq. Al-
Husri spread the idea of Arab u n i t ~ ,beiieving it to be the "best way of effacing
regionalism"."
The king, however. was more intent on nation-building. He attempted to
form an Iraqi army and to forge an Iraqi identity through the integration of ail the e t h c and
sectarian diversities of Iraq. Though not entirely successful, what emerged in the state's
infancy was Iraqi nationalism, not pan-Arabism.
Although during the fmt decades of the twentieth century the majority of Iraqis
were politically unaware, arnong those who were, there were few '"pan-Arab nationalistsT
in the strict sense of king in favor of merging Iraq into a larger Arab entity.""
Most
historians agree that the niling elite in its totality was very small. According to Tarbush.
out of fifty-nine Jiaqi rninisters who held cabinet posts berween October 1920 and October
1936. the "inner circle" of cabinet ministers nurnbered only fourteen: eleven Sunnis, two
Shi'a, and one ~ e w . 'Five
~ Sunnis and one Shi'a in this elite group were Arab nationalists
in Faisal's entourage; however, Iraqi nationalists outnumbered the Arabists in parliament.
Politicai Parties and Groups in the Nationalkt Movement
Irnpottant contributon to the growth of Iraqi nationalism in the early twentieth
century were the members of the nationalist societies and political parties who encouraged
political activity and provincial separatism. Because of its exposure to western ideas and
expansionism, Basra was one of the fmt cities where clubs and societies advocating
autonomy were formed and much of Iraqi protonationalism evolved. Less isolated than
Basra fiom the Ottoman capital, Baghdadis and Mosulis thrived on clandestine Literary and
political associations. Also, Iraqi representatives in the Ottoman parliament and officen in
the ûttoman arrny were engaged in political activity in the very center of Ottoman power.
Some of Iraq's earliest activists were: Talïb al-Nagib and Abduilah Bashayan of Basra:
Yusuf al-Suwaidi, Kamil ai-Tabaqchali, and Abd-al-Rahman al-Haidari of Baghdad: and
Abd-al-Ghani al-Nagib, Muhammad al-Fakhrim and Habib al-Ubaidi of ~ o s u l . "
The original aim of most Arab secret societies was intemal autonomy for the Arab
provinces. although there were those whose aim was decentralkation or independence.
Two of these Arab secret societies are relevant to this thesis. The Covenant, al- Ahd, whic h
was founded in Istanbul in 19L3 by mainly Arab army officers who were Sunni and whose
original goal was local autonomy within an Ottoman federation."
Also, the Young Arab
Society, Jamiyyat al-Arabiyyat al-Fatat, known latterly as al-Fatat. which was founded in
Paris in 1909 and, from the outset, was dedicated to Arab independence?
Tawfiq al-Suwaidi was Iraq's fust arnbassador to Iran in 1929 and an early Iraqi
member of al-Fatat."
Rustum Haidar, a founding member of al-Fatat, was an Arab
delegate at Versailles in 1919 and one of King Faisal's entourage in Iraq; he was a Syrian
Shi'a who became an Iraqi citizen, cabinet a s t e r , and head of the Royal Diwan. Jafar alAskari, Ah Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Yasin al-Hashimi, Jamil ai-Midfa'i, and Nuri al-Sa'id were
a i l membea
of al-Ahd who participated in the flairs of the Iraqi state.
M e r hostilities ceased, members of al-Ahd and al-Fatat assisted in forming an
Arab govemment in Syria in 1918. Within months, Shi' i and Sunni merchants. teachers.
bureaucrats, oficers, and dama
'' had formed the Independence Guard, Haras al-Istiqlal,
in Baghdad. This populist, nationalist society was dedicated to the Liberation of the country
from aii foreign influence^.'^ Long festering opposition to British occupation involving
both the Ahd and Haras al-Istiqlal., escalated into a full scale revolt in 1920. After its
defeat, Haras al-Istiqlal was outiawed and its leaders were hanged, exiled. or in f~ight.~'
The Covenant, al-Ahd, whose goals became nationalistic d e r 1919, was
a viaduct for
Arab Nationalist aspirations of Ottoman officers and, as early as 1913, had branches in
Mosul and ~ a ~ h d a d . Yasin
"
al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, and Jamil al-Midfa'i were
the founders of the Mosul branch while serving in the Ottoman amiy in the area. The
members of these societies formed the nucleus of nationalist activity from 1918- 1932.
From July 1922 kaqi politicians intent on furthering their persona1 goals forrned
political parties with iittie or no agenda. Three parties with defuiite nationalist tendencies
emerged. The Free or Liberty Party, Hizb al-Hm, headed by Mahmud ai-Gailani, the son
of the Nagib of Baghdad, was rnonarchist. The National Party, ai-Hizb al-Watani. was an
opposition party led by Shi'i nationalist Jafar Abu Timman. Its membershtp included
middle merchants, nationatist inteilectuals, members of the academic, law, and literary
professions, and discontented ex-Sharifian officers." The Iraqi Renaissance Party, Hizb
an-Nahdha al-hqiya, headed by Shi'i Sayyid Mohammad al-Sadr and Mohammad Husain
Charchafchi, advocated, as did the National party, independence and govemment reform in
educational, agricultural, irrigation, and public welfare sectoa.
in August 1922, both these Shi'i-led parties united in violent anti-British
demonstrations in front of the Palace. The British high coMnissioner demanded that the
govemment take action against the instigators. The parties were disbanded and their leaders
exiled. The pro-monarchist Free Party, although not involved, ody lasted the term of the
Nagib of Baghdad's premiership." Ln fact, political parties seerned to stay alive only as
long as their leader was in power; then they dissolved. As Tarbush correctly emphasizes,
political parties were a one-man shows.3'
The Progress Party, Hizb al-Taqaddam, was formed in 1925 by Abd al-Muhsin
Sa'dun who served as prime minister in four cabinets. Sa'dun was a Sunni pro-British
tribal shaikh from the Muntafïq who had attended the shaikhs' coLlege in Istanbul, had been
a deputy to the Ottoman parliament and an officer in the ûttoman army. The Peoples'
Party, Hizb al-Sha'ab., was the vehicle for promoting the political career of the Sunni Arab
nationdist Yasin al-Hashimi whose postwar nationalist activities in Syria eamed him a seat
on the opposition bench which attacked the government on treaty issues. Al-Hashirni
advocated Iraqi independence and League membership, developed national administration.
agriculture, economy, and education, and strengthening "the patxiotic feeling and spreading
the soiidarity" among the population.)s
Al-Hashimi transferred Ioyalties briefly in 1926 when he becarne minister of finance
at which time, the Peoples' Party was dissolved. During the interim. the iraqi Nationalist
Party, Hisb al-Watani al-Iraqiya the old Nationalist party had been banned but was revived
again headed by Jafar Abu Timman. He and al-Hashimi combined nationalist forces which
put al-Hashimi, whose cabinet had by then been defeated, back on the opposition benches.
A reformist party greatly influencing politics in the 1930s was the Jarna' at al-Ahali.
Essentiaily Iraqist, al-Ahali was formed in 1929 by Iraqi students at the American
University of ~eirut,-'~
among its members in Iraq were Iafar Abu Timman, Kamil
Chadirchi, and Yusuf Izz al-Din. The lraqi Covenant party was formed in 1930 by a
member of the defunct secret society al-Ahd in support of Nuri al-Sa'id's govemment: it
followed the pattern of most political parties and dissolved when Nuri resigned in 1932. Ali
Jawdat al-Ayyubi fonned the National Unity parîy to support his govemment. While in
late 1930, together with Hikmat Sulaiman, a brother of the renowned Ottoman vizier,
Mehmet Shevket, al-Hashimi formed yet another opposition party narned rather ironically
the National Brotherhood, al-Ikha al-Watani. Penrose describes the Brotherhood as "hostile
to any concessions to, or even recognition of any other sentiment than Arab nationahsm".
directly opposing King Faisal, who was prepared to mediate with the British, and the 1930
treaty with Bntain." The National Brotherhood and the Iraqi Nationalist Party formed an
alliance dedicated to eliminating British and monarchist influence.
The desire for Arab autonomy resulted
in
the foming of man? societies md clubs
in Iraq in the early mentieth century and were secular and others were bound by religion.
albeit sectarian. Societies and clubs founded in the large urban centen were more often
Sunm and seculariy-oriented. w h l e those founded in the h d y cities of the Sh'a were
religously onented. Religron played a major d e in the protests against discnmnator).
policies of the infidel overlord. the foreign imperialist. Religious affiliation. in fact. was the
m a t salient level of organization among the pditically-oriented elite. The pre-monarchic
wrieties, Haras al-Istiqlal and al-Ahd al-Iraqi, were non-sectarian to a limited d e p and
their memkrs played important roles in the formation o f the Iraqi state. However. Islam
was an integal part of the Iraqi govemment; at
the opening of the Iraqi pariiament, King
Faisal declared Iraq an Isiamic state bound by and under the protection of Islamic law."
Role of Religion in the National Stmggle
Illustrating the correlation between religion and natrondism. Kedourie reminds us
that while Abraham was a man possessed of a vision of Orr God. he was also a Bedouin
chef 'intent on endowing his horde with a national identity'; and, Mubarrunad was a man
endowed by God as 'the seai of the Prophets' and the founder of a ~ation.~~
Abraham was
a religious man and, one might say. a C l i l t i d s t ; while Muhammad was a man who
founded a religmn and a d o n -an Arab raiion whose religious and politicai institutions
were attended by one
der. Wwn utes d y Sumi politid theoxy as "the idealizaûon of
this d e r . the caliph, and his governwnt, the calipharr-
hawing on this reference. he
says that i W y if Muslims were govemed as one nation, the law and the faithfui wodd
fom me amgrcgation uni@ under one d e r as in the pst If such a form of govemment
..
Eoidd heal the schisrn of centuries, then such a &on
should exist However, considering
Iraq's disparate sec@ and eaimc groups, the theory of one nation for aii Mus1ims -or d
Arab-
was MH naxsarily ideal.
In the years immediately preceding the mandate, many Sunnis and Shi'a advocated
just such a platform by urging the formation of an Islamic Arab state. An alliance was
formed between Sunni Iraqis and the Shi'i pnesthmd which, although these alliances
proved to be pure subterfuge on both sides, '" succeeded in brkfly bndging the religious
differences of centunes between the two sects and inciting the tribal shaikhs to revolt. Of
course, having eluded Ottoman control for centuries and evaded British control during the
postwar occupation. these norninally-religious. freedom-loving shaikhs would hardly have
k e n tempted by old rnasters in new garb, whether they be Persian or Iraqi.
The degree and distinction of Muslim participation in the national struggle varied:
prirnarily geographically, raciaily, and religiously defined, M u s h society in Iraq was
divided between the Shi'i Arabs in the south, Sunni Arabs in central Iraq, and Sunni Kurds
in the north. This, a result of history more than geographic division, fostered isolationist
and separatist tendencies. Muslim orthodoxy united the Sunni Arabs with the caliphate in
Istanbul: the holy cities of Shi'ism were catalysts which bound the Shi'i Arab to their COreligionisü in Persia; and, although mountain ranges divided the Kurds of Iraq from their
kinsmen in distant lands, they were united in language. culture, and history.
Participation in government by the Shi'i Arab had k e n negligible during Ottoman
nite; therefore, in Iraq's formative years, the fight for equality in politicai representation
was taken up by the Shi'i clergy in Najaf, Karbala, Samara, and KaWnain, as well as by
the political opposition parties. Sunni Arabs focused on retaining their aimost exclusive
political power in government by aligning thernselves with the Sunni king and a British
mandatory whose interests were served best by collaboration. Sunni Kurdish participation
in the Iraqi nationaiist movement was virtuaily nonexistent simply because they demanded
a state of their own or, at the very least, autonomy in their own areas. From t h e to time,
however, there were token Kurdish ministers in Iraqi cabinets and Kurdish tribal shaikhs
played a large role in representative government.
Religious politics was a crucial issue in postwar Iraq where Sunni dominance had
existed unchdenged throughout Ottoman rule. A constant reminder of the tenuous Sunni
position was the overwhelming ratio of Shi'a to Sunnis and the power of the Persianulama
who supported the formation of a Shi'i state in southem Iraq. A leading mujtahid had
formulated a theory which supported the Persian constitution definhg the nature of the
Shi'i legists representation in such an Islamic state to ensure the protection of religion."
Although a Sh'i state in Iraq did not materialize, the intention the mujtahids was evident in
the petitions of the plebiscite and the support of the Iraqi revolt. In fact, the vehicle for
Muhammad Taqi Shirazi's Islamic state was to have been the 1920 revolt. However after it
had been suppressed, the British refused to accept Shi'i Persian mujtahidin as mediators
for the rebel Shi'i tribesmen owing to their non-hqi status which subdued the Shi'i clencs
for want of a legal basis for dissent."
During the mandate, the Sunni and the Shi'a confronted entirely different religious
and social impediments to power in Iraq. On the one hand, there was the continued Sunni
fear of the political power of the Shi3 r
h and, on the other, the Shi'a lack of the
education required for government employ and rePresentation."
Had the Iraqi Shi' i
community not k e n dissuaded by their non-kaqi clergy to forego the opportunities of the
state school system, the educationd impediment would not have existed. Equally, had the
mujtahids not been motivated by political goals, a collective Iraqi identity could have
eradicated fear of Shi'i Persian encroachrnent.
As it was, the realities relative to
governrnenr power merely ensured the Sunni dominant position.
Sunni dominance did not, however, inhibit Shi'i opposition. An elected constituent
assembly was necessary to ratiQ the lraqi constitution, the electoral law, and the treaty of
alliance. Yet in early 1922, the Shi' i mujtahidin attempted to control the formation of the
democratic processes of state governrnent by issuing afatwa forbidding Shi'i participation
in the election of a national constituent assembly. Ironically, the Shi' a refusal to vote in
elections was a direct contradiction to their demand for equal representation.
77
The foliowing year another fatwa
was issued in the same vein, however. a third
fatwa involving the protection of the state brought kaqi government action. The Turkish
nationalists had by then Liberated Anatolia and laid claim to Mosul. Turkish irregulars
crossed the frontier, attacking the Christians and intirnidating the Kurds. In April 1923.
pro-Turkish elements within the Shi'i clergy prevailed upon Mahdi al-Khalasi to issue a
fatwa making it iIIegal. haram, to defend Iraq against fellow Mu~lims.'~This was the
undoing of the non-Iraqi clergy. Shaikh Mahdi Al-Khalisi was deported and many Shi3
Persian clergy left Iraq in protest, depriving the Shi'is in Iraq of their leadership.
Thereder, the Shi'i community participated in the elections which produced a
national constituent assembly. Their grievances continued against the government however,
especidy their lack of representation proportionate to their n~rnbers.''~As has already been
made clear, few Iraqi Shi'a had the educationai background for political representation.
Moreover, many of the Persians in the holy cities who were capable spoke no Arabic. the
language of the state; they owed no loyaity to Iraq and were not loath to obstruct the normal
processes of state. Although al-Khaiasi did not r e m . permission was granted to the
Persian rnujtahidin by the h q i government to r e m to Iraq in 1924 with a proviso which
forbade future involvement in Iraqi politics.'7 Most Shi'i religious leaders were not only
anti-Sumi, they was anti-British. which made the participation of the Shi'is in diarcha1
government mcult
indeed. The Kurdish rninority in northeastern [raq, though Sunni.
proved as difficult by refusing integration within the greater Iraqi community.
The Kurds and Other Minorities of Iraq.
One of the greatest legacy of the Ottoman Empire to its minorities was the
imposition of the millet system, a confessional form of semi-autonomy which ensured the
presenration of their language, culture, and history: in short, their nationality. One of the
major beneficiaries was the Kurds, the largest non-Arab minority in Iraq, a semi-nomadic
people living in northeastem Iraq whose ethnic identity remained intact through close
kinship with other Kurdish tribes in the Ottoman Empire, in Persia, and in Russia. For
decades Kurdish nationalists had fought for an independent state of Kurdistan which would
encompass the millions of Kurds living in these areas. In 1910, Kurdish students and
lawyers formed the fmt Kurdish political Party. Kurdish Hope. It elicited Little support
fiom a mountain people dorninated by religion and powefil shaikhs?'
however, with the
help of the British, a Kurdish delegation at the postwar peace conferences petitioned AUied
statesmen for Kurdish independence. In contrast to the Arabs, the Kurds were = w t e d
national status in August 1920 in the Treaty of Sèvres. subject to its ratifi~ation."~
The Kurds in Iraq speak an hdo-European language which has Sorani and
Kimianji dialects; they are ethnically m
an and claim descent from the Medes. They were
predominantly Sunni Shafites who converted to Islam in the sixteenth c e n t ~ r y . ~ ~
Approxirnately one percent of Kurds were Persian-speaking Shi'a who were loyal to
Pesia. Rival Sunni Sufi shaikhs of the Qadiri or Naqshbandi orders and their tribesmen
Iived mainly in isolated mountain strongholds in the 1920s. The semi-feudal tribal structure
current at the time bound the tribesmen to their leaders by both religious and tribal bonds.
Powemil tribal aghas. landowners of great tracts of cultivable land worked by serfs. had
profited from Ottoman land registry in the Tanzimat era and the British occupation. Those
tribal leaders who bore the title of shaikh were Sunni religious dignitaries, the spiritual
leaders of the Kurdish tnbes, many of whom were sayyids, descendants of the Prophet,
and respected for the? noble ancestry.
Many early Kurdish nationalists were Sufi Shaikhs of Ottoman Kurdistan such as:
Shaikh Ubaiduilah of Shamdinan and Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan in northern Iraq adherents of the Naqshbandi order-
and Sayyid
Mahmud of Barzinja in southem Iraq -who
Shaikh Sa'id and Sayyid Shaikh
adhered to the Qadîri order?
Robert Olson
documents the stages of the Kurdish national movement from the rebeilion of Shaikh
Ubaiduilah and the Kurdish Tribal League in the 1880s to the rebellion of Shaik Sa' id in
the 1920s; he finds a pattern in the Kurds' "sense of cornrnunity" and their dominance by
religious figures in their national movement. *'
For exampie, in Iuly 1880, two hundred religious representatives of the Kurdish
Tribal League met with Ubaiduilah, the spiritual leader of Ottoman Kurdistan. to discuss
the establishment of the state of ~urdistan.'~As a result and in retaliation for Persian raids
on Kurdish temtory, UbaiduiIah Ied a successful Kurdish revoit against the Persians:
however, when he tumed against the Ottomans he met with defeat." Conversely. Kurdish
tribesmen, religious zealots, fierce fighters, and excellent horsemen, were used to
advantage by the Ottoman Sultan in the Hamidiye cavaky regiments and by the Young
Turks in the Ottoman army defending Islam against the infidel. The postwar Shaikh Sa' id
rebellion, coinciding with those in Suiaimaniya, was unsuccessful.
The interest shown by the British in establishing a f o m of Kurdish autonomy in
1918 was rnainly to keep the Northern Tier, always a sensitive area. free from foreign
penetration and, most importantly, to influence the disposition of Mosul in the future. The
British had, through their involvement with international oil cartels, economic and strategic
interests in the province. However, when Britain changed iü pro-Kurd position in favour
of a pro-Arab policy, it was to the detriment of the Kurd as Britain intended the inclusion of
certain Kurdish areas into an Iraqi state." Ln April 1920. the British accepted a mandate for
Iraq-the Arab provinces of Basra and Baghdad-
and for the Kurdish province of Mosul.
Whlle the Kurdish nationalists anticipated an independent Kurdistan, Turkish
nationalists contested the occupation of Anatolia in a passionate war of liberation.
Meanwhile, although the Kurds were ili-prepared for self-government, they had been given
a degree of local autonomy and a governor of Sulairnaniyya during the British occupation.
The national revival in Turkey nuiiified the Treaty of Sèvres and, inevitably, the promise of
an independent ~urdistan?
To compensate the Kurds, the British promised local
autonomy within Iraq. This, however, did littie to appease the Kurds who rebeiled against
British control. Although their attempt to achieve independence was defeated once again.
the Kurds steadfastly clung to their national identity and refüsed assimilation within the
Iraqi state.
Inter-tribal conflict was traditional to the Kurdish tribes of Mosul, Kirkuk, and
Sulaimaniya. Tribal power was set in geographical patterns: the Qadin Baizinji shaikhs of
Sulairnaniya dominated the south where tribes spoke Sorani, and the Naqshabandi Barzani
shaikhs of Baradost controlled the north where the dialect was Kirmanji. Their diversity
and nvalry iimited the unified leadership necessary against a common enemy. In
Sulaimaniya, the centre of Kurdish nationdism. the d e of the Baninjis was law.
'' and it
was from here that Shaikh Mahmud Barzinji led the f ~ s of
t many Kurdish rebellions
against Baghdad until his final exile in 193 1. Thereafter. Mahmud' s rival, Shaikh Ahmad
of the Barzanis led the Kurdish nationalist srruggle against Baghdad. Constant inter-tribal
rivalry decidedly harmed the Kurdish nationalist movement, preventing the emergence of a
capable or committed Kurdish leader.
Kurdish opposition to Baghdad was characterimi by this persistent national
struggle. in an attempt to establish a Kurdish state in southem Kurdistan, Shaikh Mahmud
Barzinji rose in revolt against Bntish military occupation in 19 19. Subdued within weeks.
the revolt resdted in the Shaikh's exile to India. However, when the Turks sought Kurdish
support to regain Mosul, the British brought back Mahmud to raüy lus tribesmen a g a k t
them. In 1922, the Kurds rose up again. This time, if oniy briefly, Mahmud succeeded in
instituting independent governrnent in ~ u l a i m a n i ~When
a ~ ~ the Royal A i . force defeated
the Kurds in Sulaimaniya, Mahmud, bowed but not beaten, fled to the mountain fastness of
Kurdistan, only to return again.
The 1923 peace negotiations in Lausanne, revoking the provisions for the state of
Kurdistan made at Sevres, centered on Turkey's clairn to Mosul province and Britain's
concern, on behalf of Iraq, for Kurdish nghts. Abdul Rahman Ghassernlou argues that
once "the Mosul question was arranged to Britain's Iiking and the British had signed a
concession for oil, the question of Kurdish rights was dropped, never again to be revived
by the Briti~h."'~While it is true that Kurdish nghts were visible in the autonomy offered
by the British in 1918 and 1921 and applied spasmodicaily by the central govenunent in
Baghdad, it was the League of Nations not Britain which showed concem for minority
rights in Mosul. Rich in oil deposits. Mosul was coveted by the Turks and the British who
were determined to gain the province for Iraq.
in 1924, a referendurn was held to rneasure Kurdish opinion vis-&vis the future of
Mosul. The Kurds of Sulaimaniya, swayed by their economic ties to Baghdad, voted in
favour of lraq in contrast to Mosulis' negative vote, while Kurkukites demurred. One year
later. the League of Nations commission report awarded the Mosul province to Inq with
the following stipulations: 1) the British mandate must continue for twenty-five years, 2)
Kurdish must be the officid language and, 3) Kurdish officiais must be appointed in
Kurdish areas. FaiIing that, demarcation dong the Little Zab wodd mean the loss of Anb
Mosul yet it would stdl gain the Kirkuk oilfields for Iraq. While it is not known if the
Kurdish referendum influenced this decision, Gertrude Bell, an advocate of Inqi rule.
stated the belief that it was a guarantee of the growth of Kurdish nati~nalism.~'
For decades Kurds had punued their goal of an independent Kurdistan. free of
alien masten and alien governrnent. Certainly, the great majority of the Kurds of Iraq were
not prepared io play a role in a state where Arabs predorninated, despite sectarian
agreement.. However once the Treaty of Lausanne was signed, the Kurds were more
redistic and wiliing to accept
reiationship with ~aghdad.""
autonomy, "either federated or in some other close
h q i ministers in Baghdad disagreed. In their view, the
Kurdish people fomed an integral part of the Iraq state and, despite continuous rebellion,
Iraqis expected the Kurds would at length willingly accept their inclusion in the Lraqi state.
They were mistaken. The Kurds of Iraq continued to fight for a free and independent state.
yet, they were no doser to achieving their goal at the end of the mandate than at the
partition of Mosul from Turkey.
The smaiier non-Muslim minorities of Lraq who lived largely in isolated villages in
the Mosul province or the main urban centers resisted integrahon with the greater M u s h
population. They had enjoyed comparative independence during Ottoman tirnes and were
miniature nations within themselves. Yazidis who live in the Jabai Sinjar West of Mosul are
Kurds by ethnic origin and language but not by religion. The religious practices of this
sect, erroneously attributed to devil worship, have a basis in ~orastrianism." Theu
objection to military conscription led to persecution in the 1930s. A Yazidi leader. Daud
Daud, fled with his tribesmen radier than endure forced conscription which resulted in two
hundred Yazidis kiiled and, in a subsequent tribunal, leaders were hanged or imprisoned.63
Christian minodies also lived isolated within their own communities, among whom
were Assyrians, Jacobites, Chaldeans, Syrian Catholics, Mandeans, and Armenians whose
métiers were those of artisan, cultivator, hotelier, professional, and teacher. Many of the
Assyrians. who spoke Aramaic, originaliy lived in the Hakkiari district of Turkish
Kurdistan. Having fought aiongside their Czarist protectors, they fled an advancing
Ottoman army in 1917 and arriving in Persia, they fought with the British forces. At war's
end, many Assyrians soldiers joined the British Iraqi Ievies and the community settled in
Iraq under British protection and, being Protestants, the Church of England. The Turks had
refused their r e m to Hakkiari. In 1925, the League of Nations recommended that the
Assyrians be granted local autonomy in northern Iraq afier the demarcation of the Turkish-
Iraqi frontier south of Hakkiari
AIthough dispersed throughout the northern
region, the Assyrian community continued to foiiow their pauiarch, the Mar Shamoun.
The Jews of Iraq were urban dwellers who lived in large communities in Baghdad
and Mosul. They, too, were accustomed to the aütonomy of the millet; yet as bankers,
doctors, and merchants they were "closely affiIiated with the Iraqi ~ o m m u n i t y " . ~ ~
.Moreover. man. of the most affluent associated with the Bntish and foreipn interesls
abroad. Hasqail Sassoon was the Jewish community's m a t active politician pnor to and
duing the monarchy; an Ottoman pariiamentanan and an Iraqi minister of finance in the
provisional pvemment in 1920. he served in many Iraq cabinets under the monarchy.
Minorities played no real role in the Iraqi national movement preferring, as they had
in the pst. ia remain wi thin their own communities. gurded by their own leaders. At the
end of the mandate. there were appmximately 90.000 Jews, 80,000 Chnstians, 60.000
Turcomans. 4.000 Yazidis, and 4,000 Sabeans in Iraq which açcounted for five percent
of the population.66 Before the League of Nations approved Iraqi membership in 1932. it
demanded a guarantee of protection for Iraq's racial and religious minorities which the
newly-emergmg state was obliged to gwe, in writing, to the Cound of the League.
British Reaction to the Nationalist Movement
1n the early twentieth cenniry. a wave of religious rebellions and nsing na~onaiism
was endemic to colonialism. Britain faced mest in Cathoiic and Protestant Ireland, Hindu
and Muslim India, Coptic and Muslim Egypt, Jewish and ~ u s l i m
NPallestine. as well as in
~raq.~' The Iraqi revolt of Shi'a and Sunni Arabs against the British was a clear indicauon
of the power of religion and nationdim. Britain was aware tbaf as the rnandatory power.
if it was to achieve its strategic and economic goals in the couotry, it had to pacify the
future architects of Iraqi s t a t e h d
In.1921. Britain's High cornmissioner portrayed Iraqi n a t i d s m as sensitive.
suggesting tn the Colonial Offce that to ensure the &on
of a' national state conducive to
B n tish intereats it should 'ï~eadsoftly" with regards to the mandate.
Having ~ c e n i l yput
down a natiooalist-inspird tribal revoit and imposed an imperialist-inspird Sunni
monarchy,it was in the British interest to oter to Iraq sensitivity. However, when Iraqi
nationalists demanded an end to the mandate in exchange for a eeaty relationship endoaed
by a seerningly docile king, the British Lion roared. Winston Churchill let it be known that
as long as Britain was paying the bills, British interests would be s e r ~ e d . ~ ~
Iraqi nationalists believed that the imposition of the mandate denied them their
birthnght,
'O
whereas, the British believed the mandate to be a means of recuperating its
recent losses and protecting its future gains. However, if a maty relationship would
appease the Iraqis, the British were not adverse to this arrangement and promises were
made accordingly. The arrangement, however, was to be within the d a t e which was
made public when the bague of Nations' approved the treaty in November 192 1. The
reaction of anti-British Sunni and Shi'i nationalists -Jafar
Abu Timman, M o h m a d al-
Sadr, Ali al-Bazirgan, Shaikh Ahmad al-Da'ud, and Rashid a i - K h o j a was to present the
king with demands proroguing mandatory authority, and k a t e n h g his deposition if their
demands were not met."
From that moment forward the exmme nationalists sought an
end to the mandate and British influence in Iraq.
John Darwin, writing on Bntish imperid policy. admits that the dificulty in iraq
lay not in restructuring an old but in constnicting a new regime. Ln a region "which tacked
aimost ail the attributes of political, social, economic, or religious unity," the British
wanted to form of Basra, Baghdad, and Mosul a united nation-state -not
out of nanird
tendency or historical precedent, but because Britain was convinced the provinces codd
only be ruied as a coalesced e n t i ~Danvin
. ~ ~ suggests diat imperid econornies demanded a
strong autonomous regirne and that local advantages would aid and abet Britain's imperid
poiicy. These advantages were: 1) the strategic importance of the state to British security in
the region which made withdrawai unlikely: 2) the embryonic natue of iraq which
prevented growth of a nationalist movement capable of hstrating Bntish a h ; and, 3) the
military conquest and administrative power which gave Bntain direct influence and "real
control over the representatives of local ~pinion."'~
Despite its seerning soundness, Danvin's appraisal of the Iraqi scene can be
disputed on several counts. It is tme that the construction of a new regime was necessary to
Iraq, as it was to most States in the Middle East (and elsewhere, for exarnple, Africa and the
Balkans) fabricated at will by Europeans out of the former provinces of the Oaoman
Empire. However, centralization of the three provinces was the only hope of protecting
Britain's interests overall -its
air routes. sea routes, oil interests. and supremacy in the
area. The British desire to form of Basra. Baghdad, and Mosul one state for the reasons
stated above was impossible without the prompt reconciliation of its various racial and
religious groups. As to the uniikelihood of withdrawai or the British "bag and baggage
policy", to the British public -no
hostage to an air and sea route to India -withdrawal,
from the nationalist revoit to the acquisition of Mosul, seemed highly likely." Once Mosul
did become a part of the mater Iraqi entity and the oiI concession was "bagged", so to
speak, withdrawal became a certainty. Moreover, persistent nationalist opposition
fnistnted the British from 1921 until 1923," and, except for the penod of indecision over
Mosul, continued until 1932 when both British and iraqi aims were met. Finally. it is
histoncally impossible to negate Darwin's last point, military conquest and administrative
power did account for British influence and conuol, regardless of how it was gained or
maintained; the diarchy did not give Iraqis (not even the King)equal power with Britaid6
Derek Hopwood sees the mandatory power in Iraq as rejecting those elements not
conducive to British influence, which it saw as "nationaiist", and choosing instead more
stable factors to create the Iraqi state? In the early years, British reaction to the nationalist
movement was to offer minor concessions whiie demanding treaties to protect its own
national interests and to establish a facade of democntic institutions and national
government. In order to bolster the popularity of the politicai system, the British preferred
thek decisions legitimated by the king, identified as a British subordinate throughout his
reign. There was neither constituent assembly nor constitution during this penod. Tribal
shaikhs, subsidized by the British governrnent in r e m for loyalty, were a primary tool
used by the British to oppose renegade h q i nationalists.
No sooner was Faisal instailed than he questioned the treaty anangement. When
negotiations became long and devious, Britain began thinking of deposing him andor
evacuating the country. The British often threatened withdrawal. One reason they did not
was the low-cost of conirolling Iraq with minimal air power. The British dealt with Arab
and Kurdish intemal dissent with squadrons of the Royd Air Force, as they did with the
Turks and Wahhabis on Iraq's borders.
From 1920 to 1932 the British ceaction to the nationalist movement varied. When
the nationalists demonstrated violently against the Bntish mandate, the High commissioner
imposed his authority on the country as he had in August 1922; when they obstructed the
establishment of govemment institutions, the British advocated the exile of foreign
nationals as they had in June 1923; or when they objected to British treaties. the British
sought the shaikhs' support to achieve their objective as in June 1924 or used possible loss
of Mosul to gain nationalist accord for the oil concession as in September 1925. The king
was not immune to British authority: however, it was partly Faisal's intransigence which
caused Britain to give ''piecemeal" concessions from 1926 onwards. Once the prerequisites
were fulfilled and the treaty revision of 1927 was signed, the British reaction was to bow to
pressure from London and Baghdad and to apply for Iraqi membership in the League of
Nations at the earliest opportunity. In this way, independence was guaranteed. the mandate
was ended as were the responsibilities for Iraq's intemal affairs.
National Institutions
The Sunni Arab king owed his crown to British vested interest in Iraq, yet he owed
his allegiance to the people of Iraq and the cause of Arab unity for which he, and many
Iraqis, had fought. He was fùily aware that the survival of Iraq -and
his crown-
was
ensured o d y as long as the British interest was served and that the independence of the
state was attainable only by the efforts of the nationalist mo~ernent.'~
Therefore. Faisal
attempted to conciliate al1 interesfi: the British, the nationalists, and his own which sought
the creation of a Hashemite dynasty in Iraq. Consequently, towards the end of his reign
when the national goal was within reach, he attempted to form a coalition government of
Arab and Iraqi nationalists. Meanwhile, Faisai attempted to build a nation -a
identity-
national
which embraced Iraq's diverse religious and ethnic g r ~ u p s . ~ ~
Faisal was identifiai with the Arab revolt in the Hijaz, the Arab government in
Syria, and the Arab delegation at the peace conferences. He had been educated in Istanbul.
had served as a deputy for the Hijaz in the Ottoman parliament and had accrued an
international stature with French and British statesmen as well as Zionist arbiters. He was
well-versed in the functions of state government, its compromises and its intrigues. In
meeting with his fist government in 192 1, Faisal gave priority to govemment institutions
important to Iraq's independence. Believing his failure in Syria was due to the lack of a
strong army, Faisal focused on building a m i l i t q arm and an air force - capable of
defending the nation and uniQing the state."
He also gave importance to a state school
system which would provide education for the young (thereby, he felt. ensuring the future
of the state). Furthemore, he was intent on the integration of racial and sectanan eiernents
into those institutions of government which would foster the creation of an Iraqi identity.
During the interim government of 1920 an inchoate national army had been created
by the MUiistry of Defense and its minister, the former commander in chef of the Sharifian
forces Jafar al-Askari. On his repatriation fiom Syria in 1921, Nuri alSa'id was appointed
commander of general staff of the Iraqi army. From the beginning of h s reign, Faisai took
a keen interest in improving this volunteer. indigenous force as a means of furthering
national goals and fostering national sentiment." Most officers were Sunni Arabs or
Kurds, although there was a rare Shi'a, Christian or tribal officer. An Iraqi prime rninister,
Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun of the Muntafiq, had attended the tribal school in Istanbul, served in
the ûttornan army, and as an aide to the Ottoman Sultan. Mark Heller points out that the
88
veteran Sunni Sharifian and Ottoman officers, who bore significant animosity towards each
other, füled the top ranks because they were the only Iraqis with military qualifications.'"
In contrast, the rank and file were mainly from the Shi'i tribes in the south.
At this early stage, the iraqi army was not capable of defending the counüy: it was
an army king schooled for the füture. From 1922 a British Royal Air Force squadron was
used for both interna1 and extemai defense, controlling fractious tribes and guarding remote
frontiers of the state. Iraq bordered the newlyemerging States of Turkey. Iran. and Saudi
Arabia, whose strong nationaiist leaders -Mustafa
Aziz ibn Faisal al-Saud-
Kemal, Riza Khan Pavlavi, and Abdul
were a constant source (but not the only source) of problems
during the mandate period. Turkish nationalists made persistent raids over the northem
frontier until 1924; Wahhabi fanatics raided in the southwest u n d 1927; and, a strong
Iranian conscripted army attacked h q i Arab tribes to the east of the Shatt al-Arab.
Although peace maties were signed with Turkey and Saudi Arabia during Faisal's reign,
he was aware that building a strong national army before independence was imperative.
British military advisors attached to the rninistry of defense and to the Iraqi army
bore the major responsibiiity for decision-making. Privileged Sunni Arab and Sunni Kurd
cadets were trained in England, as were a few from Shi3 tribes near Nasiriya Amara, and
ill la.'^ In 1927, an Iraqi officers' training coilege and an h q i Royal Air Force were
founded. Still the rank and file of the army were mainly recruited from the Shi'i tribes and.
being voluntary, the army offered no incentive for the masses. At this time, the Iraqi army
had a permanent force of fifteen hundred volunteers and six hundred and forty officerssJ -
an army too srnail to control a tribal rebellion in which the tribes were better equipped than
the army, much less to control the frontiers of a state.
Military conscription would have solved many problerns in the early years.
However, strong opposition -from
the British-
the Shi'a, the Kurds. the tribes and, oddly enough.
made miüiary conscription in Iraq unfeasible. Traditionally, the tribes and
non-Muslims had paid exemptions rather than serve in a conscripted army.
Despite
opposition, the king worked unùringly to have passed a compulsory conscription biii in
which he was supported by important politicians. Faisal's desire for a conscnpted army
which would act as an encouragement to the national spirit would aiso give some degree of
homogeneity to recruits drawn from diverse racial and religious backgrounds and serve as a
symbol of national sovereignty, maintainhg intemal security and acting as a deterrence to
extemal agg~ession.~~
Aside fiom the impracticality of attempting to solve the nation's ills
solely through compulsory service, the army was kept under strength for economic and
strategic rasons.
Most importantly, the mandatory authority, which had no wish to
weaken its own position, was a major opponent of conscription and widespread state
education among the politicdy uninformed masses of Iraq.
Many histonans have noted the role of education in the development of nationdism.
Elie Kedourie wrote that the goal of education, while teaching literature and mathematics
and other skiils, was primarily political, and in the sarne vein. "National self-determination
is, in the final analysis, detemination of will, and nationalism is. in the fust place. the
method of teaching right determination of ~ i i l . " ' ~ WMe Hans Kohn reco,@zed the
importance of the educator in promoting nationalism. he said, "lt was the schoolmaster to
whom the new struggle for independence was conducted with greater forethougb and
caution and, rnoreover, smick deeper roots in all classes of the popdation-*'''
Education in Iraq during the mandate was largely limited to the provision of primary
One reason for
schooling with advanced training availabie only to prornising student~.'~
minimal education was budgetary considerations. another the view of those concemed with
the direction of policy that education was a luxury and, therefore, a low pnority. Sluglen
States that Iraqi politicians had no wish to change the existing Ottoman system of
rudimentq primary public education. Similarly, the author points out that British dictums
of the time deemed it k w i s e and u n j ~ s ~ e dto"spend public fun& educating a class of
young people for whom no jobs existed and who were destined to becorne political
90
a g i t a t o r ~The
. ~ ~ conflict over whether or how to distribute the benefits of education rnay
also be seen as the dynamic of a class smiggle between traditional Iraqi groups.
The Director General of Education from 1922 to 1927, Syrian Sati al-Husri, whose
education policy focused on limiting education to the upper classes and the urban centea
generally, can also be seen as preserving the existing class structure, which was drawn
dong class and religious ine es.^' Lionel Smith. the British hspector General of Education
in Iraq from 1920 to 1930, believed that Iraq was not properly equipped for independence.
in general, and Ieast of all educationally. He was of the opinion that the duty of education
was to combat illiteracy through the spread of elementary education, combining it with
higher education with a view to govemment employment of the carefblly selected few. In
essence, Smith agreed with Husn and admired hun for both his administrative expertise
and "knowledge of and passion for ed~cation."~'Here then is an instance of agreement
between the Sunni nationalist political elite, largely well-educated, and the British
imperialist mandatory authority. Both groups believed that an educated Shi'a majority
would be potentialiy dangerous to both.
Sati al-Husri was a prominent exponent of Arab nationalism in Iraq, and he made a
clear distinction between it and Islamic nationalism. In an article published in 1944, he
wrote: "Whoever opposes Arab unity, on the pretext of Muslim unity, contradicts the
simplest requirements of reason and logic, and 1 hesitatingly Say that to contradict iogic to
this extent cm be the result only of deceit or of deception."
'9
Inspired by Geman
philosophy, he believed, 'The nation was the prirnary existentid focus, logically prior to
statehood, geography, and even reiigious identity."
Arab nationalism, therefore, was expressed through the curriculum of the state
school system. Under Husri's personal direction. textbooks were rewritten to elllninate
pre-Arab Iraqi history and to reflect a notion of h q i identity which began with -and
was
limited to- Arab nationdism. Similarly, in an effort to further promote Arab nationdism.
Husri engaged Syrians and Palestinians as teachers in the Iraqi state school system.
Husri's insistence on pan-Arabism and anti-sectarianisrn as the basis for the state of
Iraq and as its ultimate goal caused conflict with non-Arab groups, such as the Kurds, and
also with the Shi'a who though Arab identified strongly with the Shi'i Persian clergy.
These conflicts precipitated his eventual resignation from the rninistry of education in 1927.
Reeva Simon attributes the failure of Iraq to integrate its minorities to Husn's anti-sectarian
policy which weakened the Iraqi entity itself and promoted xenophobia and racial
prej~dice.~"It is ciifficuit not to agree with such a conclusion when. for the most part.
education was Lunited to the larger cities, to a privileged class, and its curriculum, dedicated
to Arabisrn, was imposed upon the students of private. mission. and non-Musiim schools.
Aithough the barracks and the schoolroom encouraged national sentiment to a
certain extent, there was no cornmonality strong enough to create an Iraqi national
identityg5 Without the stimulus of mutual nationalist articulation, the multi-layered nature
of the people was not conducive to the creation of such an identity. Furthemore. [raqis had
been too long associated with the sectarian rivalry and social stratification of the Sunni
Ottoman Empire for a mere decade to eradicate centuries of tradition. Nakash however,
contends that the Shi'i Arab did attempt to accommodate a dual Shi'i-Iraqi identity and
contrary to widely-held belief sought integration in the Iraqi state, not self-de or a merger
of Iraq and
The cardinal elernent of iden~cationin Iraq was Islam: therefore.
national identity was contingent upon achieving solidarity among Muslim elements.
Yet this aione would not sufice. For Iraqi national identity to evolve. a new
paradigm for nationalkm would have to be ernbraced whereby the multi-layered reality of
Iraq -the
religious, ethnic, Linguistic, and cultural reaiity-
could be recognized. Lord
Acton's beiief that a state of various races and religions had the greatest potential for
achieving success was as true for Iraq as any other nationO9' in creating a new p d g m
for such a state, the integration of the Arab, Persian, Kurd, Christian. and Jew in aU their
diversities had to be a prionfy of the nationalist rnovement.
Among the nationalist groups which aspired to power once the Iraqi govenunent
was in place, the most successful was a group of Sunni Arab nationalists who had aliied
themselves with the Sharif of Mecca and the British in Cairo in 1916. Mostly military men,
they had proven themselves capable of g~veming.~'After graduating from the irnperial
rnilitary academies in Istanbul they cornmanded Ottoman and Sharifian arrnies in the great
world war and Ied governments in Arab Liberated Syria. Their view of the ski11 and wisdom
of goveming was not inspired by public service rather by the desire for personai power.
Accustomed to command, they saw themselves as bringing progress to a provincial Iraq
which could benefit from their education and experience. Their loyalty at this time was
prirnarily to the larger Arab entity and to the coterie of Arab nationalist officers with whom
they shared a rveltmschauung, a world view.
''
Their Sharifian leader and king shared
these selfsame Ioyalties and appointed many of the Sunni Arab officers to high office.
There were other groups whose share of power was not comparable to that of the
priviieged few who were among the king's closest companions. Ex-Ottoman bureaucrats
from the old Sunni families of Iraq bitterly resented these young Arab officers who had had
neither position nor power before the war. These ex-officiais fought to reestablish
themselves in government and succeeded in k i n g appointed to the cabinet in the mandate
era. In contnst, demographic equality was not significant in t e m of cabinet appointments
and government representation for Shi' i Arab nationalists. Although there were few Lraqi
Shi'a capable of goveming, there were exceptions to the nile to be sure.loO Following the
inauguration of the monarchy, Shi'i Arab laity, merchants, and landoviners joined with
their Sunni colleagues in a banle within govemment institutions for independence from
foreign control and equality of indigenous opPo&
ty.
''
Iraqi involvement in the nationalist movement began in the parliament, the
bureaucracy, and the academies of Istanbul, as well as the major cities of the Sunni
Ottoman Empire where secret political societies flourished. In Iraq, these societies were
nationaiist and non-nationalist, sectarian and non-sectarian, and, in most cases.
membership reflected this orientation. However, religious differences were
"bridged
withm the nationalist movement in the 1920 revolt in Iraq and between Sunni and Shi'i
ularndo2which succeeded in briefly healing age-old animosities within Islam. Religious
motivation was behind the phenomenal role played by the Shi'i dama in the revolt and their
alliance with the nationaiists; a literal crusade agauist the infidel in traq.lo3 Political
dissension occurred within nationalist ranks when pan-Arab nationalists favoured limited
cooperation with the British while Iraqi nationalists rejected any and al1 concert with
foreigners. AU attempts to coordinate the efforts of these two groups failed and a later
attempt to unite nationalkt forces in 1930 f d e d yet again.
The British reaction to nationaiism in Lraq was to control the extremists and support
the moderates whose desire for power proved them amenable to British influence. King
Faisal, attempting to strengthen his position with both moderate and extremist nationalists.
urban officiais and tribal shaikhs, concentrated on achieving national goals in lieu of
supranational unity in the future. The victors in the battle within the nationalist movernent
were a Sunni elite consisting of Sharifian ex-oficers and Ottoman ex-oficials who ruled
Lraq with British consent for over a decade. The nationalist opposition in Iraq consisted of
Sunni extremists who were Arab nationalists, Shi' i extrernist who were lraqi nationaiists,
and Shi'i politicians who wore no nationaiist stripe. However, most nationalist rnovements
in the Middle East which emerged in the early twentieth century had "signifcant Muslim
components, both in t e m of mernbers and of concepts" although nationalism per se was
not expressed as such.lM
' Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 22.
See also Gelvin. 'The Lcague of Nations." The author contends that
dependent capitalisrn and modem institutions the Tanzirnat era and the mandates and ".,.parailel evolutionary
paths..." of protonationalism in the twentieth century produced national & supranational identities. P. 35,
' Edith and E.
?nd National kvetopment (London: Ernest Benn
F. Penrose, - w o n s
Ltd., 1978), p. 45.
Lewis, Arabs in Historv. "In that time and place it was inevitabie." P. 44.
'Zeine N. Zeine.
.S-
'Had Arab consciousness k e n submerge3 and destroyed by the
Young Turks as is claimed, 'they' would have had little difficulty in Turkifying the Arab lands". P. 122.
Tauber, Fo-on
of the Modem Syria and I q , p. 333.
Albert Hourani, A Historv of the Arab Peoulee pp. 308.-309.
Marion Farouk-Sluglett and Peter Sluglett, 'The Historiography of Iraq," Ametican Historical Review 96
(December 1991). The authors maintain that "experts" pronounce Iraq a heterogeneous population, but i t
has a homogeneous population of more than 70% Arab and 95% Muslim. P. 1413.
William R. Polk, The Arab World Todq, p. 68.
Y
Ibid., p. 69. See also Farouk-Sluglett. 'The Historiography of Iraq." p. 141 1.
Kohn, HistorvsfNationaIismt. Early "Islarnic religious nationalism" was responsible for the
Arabism of Mesopotamia and Syria having first superseded purely primitive tribal organization. P. 366.
'O
Mohamrnad A. Tarbush, The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Studv Of lraq to 1941 (London:
KPI Limited. 1982). In 1937 the anti pan-Arabist Iraqi press wrote "when the position and politics of I r q
are considered, we must not view Iraq as a hostage to Arab unity, but instead. we must view it a s an
independent country having its daily tasks and international obligations." P. 258.
"
l2
Aziz Al-Azmeh, "Nationalism and the Arabs." Arab Studies O u ~ e r I y17 (Winter 1995). p. 1 1.
l 3 Penrose. m:_Inteniationais. In nation-state nationalism, traditional Ioyaities baianced "rnass
appeal& emotional drive" of pan-Arabism. P. 366. See also Rashid Khalidi. "Arab Nationalism: Historical
Problems in Literature." American Historical Review 158 (December 1991). Nation-state nationaiism was a
competing form of loyalty to Arab nationalism which was not pan-Arabism. Le. Arabs unity in a single
Arab nation. P. 1365.
. .
'" Farouk-Sluglett, 'The Hi-~hv
of hq,"p. 1415.
'' Kohn, History of Nationalism. It reads that "a federal union of Arab counuies, the r e t m of the Caiiphate
to the land of its origin, and the restoration of Damascus and Baghdad to their ancient glory." p. 279.
l6 Dawn. From Ottarnanism to Arabism. Dawn claims 'Arabism originated as a defense of Islam' which, in
the face of Young Turk secular policies, was likely. pp. 184-187. See Kohn. History of the East. He
identifies Islarnic religious nationaiism bridges the pre-Islarnic past and the Arab conquests. p. 266.
l7
Rashid Khalidi. "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problems in Literature." p. 1363.
l8
Tauber, F o m o n of Modern S-yria -,
p. 334.
l9
Farouk-Sluglett. "Historiography of Modern Iraq," p. 14 14.
a Cohen,
..
. .
British
Polrcv xn
A British navigational monopoIy was to offset the German
Me-.
Baghdad Railroad. P. î57-9.
" Phebe M m ,'The Development of a Nationalkt Ideology in
Iraq: 1920- 194 1
." Muslim
World, Lxxv
(ApnI 1985). p.95.
- Farouk-Sluglett, "Historiography of Iraq," p. 1415.
77
'3
Tarbush, -sof
'"Simons,
pp. 46-47.
pp. 17 1- 172.
Tauber, Arab Movements in World War 1. Iraqi. Syrian, Lebanese, Li byan. and Hijazi activists numbered
57 in ai-Ahd and 1 15 in al-Fatat between 1914- 19 18: 8 from al-Fatat and 17 Iraqis irom al-Ahd were active
pnor to 1914 of these. the 17 Sharifian Arab nationalist al-Ahd activists governed Iraq after 1 92 1. P. I 13 .
See also Marr, Modern Ristorv of
Formed in 19 13, ai-Ahd had 4,000 members by 1914. P. 99.
'' Fromkin, A Peace to End Al1 Peace. The author contends that the nationalists. were actually separatists,
not dernanding independence but equal representation. P. 102. See Dawn, Onomanism to Anbism, p. 152.
B i r d w d Nuri as-Sa'id: A Studv in Arab Leadership, p. 15. See dso M m , "Yasin ai-Hashimi." In
Paris seven Muslim students iounded al-Fatat dedicated to independence from the empire. p. 66.
-?
" Simon. kgq Between Two Wm, p. 34. See Tauber, Formation of Modem Syia and Irag Haras could
better mediate Shi'i-Sunni nationalist goals with Shi'i mujtahids. P. 287. See Marr. "Yasin al-Hashimi."
The Shi'i Jafar Abu Timrnan. the Sunni Ali al-Bazirgan. and the Kurd Jaial Baban were members. P. 432.
" Tauber, Formation of Modem Syria and kq. Before anythmg else it intended to unite the Iraqis of various
communes and sects and to invest their efforts to put an end to divisive factors in religion. P. 289. Haras
was an Iraqi nationalist party which had goals and a membership inclined towards a liberated h q .
Naksh. Shiah of Iraq. Outlawing of Haras al-Istiqlal and exiling members proved ineffective. and the
momentum created by the celebrations continued. P. 70.See Tauber. b a t i o n of Svria and Irag. He lists
Sunnis Ali al-Bazirgan. M a l Baban. Shakir Mahmud. and Yusuf al-Suwaidi; Shi'is Jafar al-Timrnan. Mirra
Muhammad Rida, Baqir al-Shabibi. Naji and Sami Shawkat, and Sayyid Muhammad ai-Sadr. P. 286.
JO
Frornkin, A Peace to End AI1 Peace, p. 99. See also Nakash, Shiah of Irag. Al-Ahd Shi'i symprithizer
Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi facilitated contacts between Sharifians & Mujtahids in 1919- 1920. P.6 1.
'' Ibid. The majority of the rnembers were tradesmen and handicraft workers. P. 295.
'' Tarbush. The Role of the Militay in Poiitics, p.
62.
3s Ibid., p. 63.
Marion Farouk-SIuglett and Peter Sluglett, & Since 1958: From Revolution to Dictatorship (London:
KPI Limited, 1987)' p. 14 15.
j6
j7
Penrose,
v
t
p. 82.
j8 Kohn, Historv of Nationalisrn in the East. In 1925. Faisal ceminded parliament "Istamic law was based
upon negotiation and discussion. and that the Koran comrnanded men to take counsel togethet." P. 3 12.
39
Kedourie, J V a t i o n m , pp. 73-75.
a Dawn, Ottomanism to Arabism, p. 190.
'' Nakash.
m.
of
The mujtahids desire for an Islamic state free of dien control was not shared by al1
Shi'is. The Sharifians stressed independence and the Iraqi right to self-mle as in Syria not "the stniggle
between Mustim & Christian." P. 68. See Wilson, Lovalties, p. 251. See also Kedourie, England. p. 183.
'' Nakash, -of.
A political theory by Muhammad Husayn Na'ini published in 1909. P. 50.
ibid. The leading mujtahid Shaikfi al-Shari'a Isfahani was refused permission by the British to "negotiate
the terms of submission of the insurgent Shi'i tribes...as Iranian subjects, the mujtahids' political outlook
was 'colored' From an Iraqi national point of view." P. 5.
43
" Farouk-SIuglett,
"Historiography of Iraq." Despite state education since Midhat Pasha's tenure, Shi'is
excluded themselves from state schools resulting in few qudified Shi'a in govemmental employ. P. 1413.
Kohn. m t o r y of N a t i o n a b . "So suong was the national sentiment of common Orientai interests even
among these divines, who were thorough-going reactionaries in religion and formerly animatecl by an
unbound hostility to the Sunnites." P. 3 12.
J6
Nakash, Shiah of iq,p. 277.
Ibid. NakaSh maintains the mujtahidin were penniless in Persia and womed about their wealth in Iraq; the
Mid-Euphrates tribes accused them of becorning wealthy at the expense of Iraqis, leading the tribes astray in
the 1920 revolt, and asked they remain in Persia while h q i Arab Shi'i mujtahidin took their place. p. 76.
"
JR
Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion, p. 5.
Kurdish Ouesti~n,p. 6. See also Ismet Sherif Vanly.
Faisal of IraQ, p. 161. See Jawad
Erskine,
"Kurdistan in Iraq." In Peo~leWithout a Countm: The Kurds and Kurdistan. ed. by G. Chalimd (London:
Zed Press, 1978). Kurd General Sherif Pasha, Ottoman Ambassador to Sweden represented Kurds. "Articles
62.63, and 64 envisaged the creation of an independent Kurdish state" as a mandated temtory. Pp. 159-160.
J9
Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion, p. 3.
"
Stephen Pelletiere, The Kurds: An U n s a l e Element in the Gulf (Boulder: Westview Press. 1984).p. 42.
" Olson.
Emereence of Kurdish Nationalism. Previously leaders were princes, emirs or tribal aghas. P. 1.
Jawad, Kurdish Ouestion. Tribal representatives gathered at Ubaidullah's headquarters at Nehri to discuss
a revolt of nationalistic goals. They asked Britain and Russia for assistance against the Turks. Pp. 4. 26.
53
Kendal. 'The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire," in People W i@out
ri Countrv: The Kurds and Kurdistak
ed. By G. Chaliand (London: Zed Press, 1978). The Shaikh inherited his religious influence from the
Naqshabandi order. P. 3 1.
Olson, Erner~enceof Kurdish Nationaiism. As late as March 1921, the British states "purely Kurdish
areas should not be included in the Arab State of Mesopotamia." p. 58. By September 1925. British poticy
had changed from thoughts of Kurdish statehood to Kurdish autonomy within the Arab state of Iraq. P. 147.
55
Longrigg. Iraq: 1900- 1950. p. 131. See Sirnons. From Sumer to Sacidam. p. 263. See also Jawad. The
Kurdish Question. In 1923 Kurdistan was divided between Turkey. Iraq, Iran,Syria. and the USSR. P. 6.
56
" Erskine, King Faisai of Iraq, p.
140.
Jawad, The Kurdish Ouestion. Shaikh Mahmud -who the British appointed governor of Sulaimaniya in
1918- declared himseif King of Kurdistan in 1922, as the Anglo-hqi treaty was being debated it left Faisai
no aiternative but to treat him as a fellow d e r . Pp. 7-9. See also. Abdulghani, Iranûnd
Mahmud's
rivai Shaikh Ahmad of Barzan also led the rebellions of 19 19, 1927, 1931-32. P. 131.
59
Abdul Rahman Ghassemlou,
60
Pelletiere, The K U , p. 60.
(London: Collets Holdings Ltd.. 196% p. 70.
Farouk-Sluglett, "Historiography of Iraq." The authors daim that there were some 500. 000 Kurds in
the Mosul 'wilayet' in 1921. P. 1413. See also Erskine, King Faisal of Iraq, p. I 39
O'
63
..
Tarbush. The Role of the Military in PolitICS, p. 1 11.
Ibid., p.96. See also Silverfarb. Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East, p. 34.
..
Ahmad A. R. Shikara,
Politics 1921- 1941: n e btetaçtion-tic
Policv (London: LAAM Ltd., 1987). p. 23.
politics and
65
06
~~~a
Ibid., p. 24.
''John Darwin, Britain. E w ~ and
t the Middle East: Im~eriaiPolicv on
the Aftemath of War 1918- 1922.
(Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1993). Postwar insurrection appeared in many of British colonies where it haî
forrneriy mled supreme. In 1919, Hiuel told Wilson in Iraq " We musc swim with the new tidc which is set
towards education and not towards the government of what used to be cailed the subject peoples." P. 267.
ha
Sluglen,
min
p. 70.
*
Kliernan,. *
Churchill's acnial words to Cox were "advise Faisal that
whether under a mandate or treaty arrangement Britain expected to be consuited so long as we are meeting
heavy financial charges in Mesopotamia." P. 168.
7 " P e n r ~ ~M.
e t The nationalists also protested the alien fonn of government imposed upon Iraq. P. 84.
in
h,p. 305.
"
Sluglett.
72
Darwin, Britain. W Dand
~ the Middle East, p. 273.
73
Ibid., p. 274. Kliernan. Foundations. Turkish-Russian annexation could threaten impecial security. P. 4.
'' Sluglett, Britain in M. Sluglett refers to British withdrawal numerous cimes. as the 'bag and baggage'
policy, "Quit Mesopotamia", or the evacuation of Iraq. Pp. 42. 37, 79-8 1. 109. 264.
'' Ibid. Anglo-iraqi Treaty of 1922. Protocol of 1923. Anglo-iraqi Treaty of
1926, of 1927. and of 1930.
Pp. S. 80, 124, 154. 169.
Elie Kedourie, Nationalism (London: Hutchkon University Library 1960). The British desire to dominate
the Middle East and elirninate other foreign influenceresulted in an interest in Arab nationalism in 19 16. P.
99. See also Siuglett. Brirain in Iraq, p. 21.
76
Derek Hopwood. "Social Structures and the New State 1921- 1958," in
Hopwood (Oxford: Ithaca Press. 1993), p. 7.
77
m-.Power and Societv. ed. Derek
Batatu. Old Social Classes, pp. 25-26. See dso Tarbush, Role of the Militarv in Politics, pp. 37, 38.
Abdulghani. Iran and iq. The author argues "the failure to m a t e a new national identity for the h q i
state" led to the assertion of Kurdish nationalism rather than assimilation by Arab nationalism. P. 131.
The failure was not to give the Kurds prornised limited autonomy, not the fear of Arab nationalism.
..
..
Tarbush, Bple of the M i l w in Politic& p. 79.
"Mm,
"Yasin al-Hashimi." A volunteer cost 100 pounds a year - very expensive for a new state. P. 436.
Mark Heller, "Politics and the Military in Iraq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British Influence".
Forces and Society 4 (1977). p. 84. See also Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 173.
83
- Man. "Yasin al- Hashimi," p. 173. See also Tarbush. Role of the Military in poli tic^, p. 78.
Armed
RS
Tarbush, Role of th-
..
.
in poli tic^, pp. 77. 83.
*
Ibid., p. 73.
86
Kedourie, Nationalism, p. 8 1. 83 -
X7
Kohn, History of Nationalism, p. 79-
m.
Sluglett.
Education's share of the national budget grew. In 19 19. it was I percent of the
national budget; it increased to 3 percent in 1921; 4 -5 percent in 1925: and 6 percent in 1929. P. 287.
R9 Ibid..
An educator in Sudan feared "the effects of unrestrained access to Western learning." P. 274.
Simons. From Sumer to SxU?m. Iraq's class structure was already in flux and genented. p. 192. See also
Kedourie. Nationalism Transformed by the mandate, "the traditionai urban poups, of which Shi ' i tes.
Kurds, and Jews were an important element. found themselves undermined by the Sunni elite." P. 128.
VO
91
Hodgkin, "Lionel Smith: Education in Iraq," p. 257. See also. Samir ai-Khalil, Re~ubiicof Fear: The
of M o d e m (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1989),p. 160.
Sati al-Husri. "MusIim Unity and Arab Unity." In Arab Nationalism: An Antholow, rd. Sylvia G .
Haim. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962. p. 151.
Simons, Sumer to Sacidam, A prominent intellectual. Sati al-Husn was 2lso a colleague of Zia Gokalp.
the theonst of Turkish nationalism. P. 91. See aiso Al-Azmeh. "Nationdism and the Arabs," p. 6.
Y3
Yi
Simon.
Berween Two W a a p. 33.
Farouk-Sluglett Iraa Since 1958. This revoit was significantly "the first manifestation of a forrn of lraqi
national identity." P. IO.
YS
" Nakash. Shiah in Iraq, p.
" Kedourie, Nationalism.
138.
"A state which is incompetent to satisS, different races condemns itseIf."Pp. 133.
Y8
Biton Cooper Busch, Britain, India. and the Arabs: 19 14 - !9Z1 (Berkeley: Berkeley University Press,
1971). The British Foreign Office in 1919 marked Sharifians as educated men with Western ideas; one
official said "...the success of Our regime in Mesopotamia depends on Our finding a sphere for these men."
Iraqi Sharifians in Faisal's Syrian government expected the sarne privilege and high office in Iraq. P. 342.
99
Reeva Simon. 'The Education of an Iraqi A m y Officer," in The Origins of Arab Nationalism. ed. by
Rashid Khalidi et al (New York: Columbia University Press, 1991). p. 163.
lm Sluglett, 'The Historbgraphy of Iraq." Although modern state education was instituted in the lace 19th
century, "few if my Shi'is aaended new state schools. Consequently when the Iraqi state was created i n
1920. there were few qualified Shi'is able or wiiling to take part in the leadership or in the administration.
and this situation continued with regard to cabinet participation throughout the monarchy." P. 1413.
'O' Ndcash. The Shiah of b.
"Internai poiitics was dorninated by the British. the Sunni ex-Ottoman
officers, and by the royal family...in the palace." While each was motivated by different interests. "they
shared a degree of cornmon interest in their attempt to undermine the position of Shi'i Islam in Iraq. P. 75.
Kohn, Nationalism and Imberiaiism. Bridging these differencescreated a united front in the revolts. P.
1 15. See also Sluglett, Britain in Irag. An alliance between Sunni and Shi'i dama also existed. P. 303
'O3 Nakash, a a h of b.
The mujtahids saw British occupation of Palestine and Iraq as an attempt to
control Persia by a ueaty relationship and a threat against Islam. Their religious motivation is cornborateci
by the words of Shaikh ai-Shari'a Isfahani and Mina Muhammad Taqi Shirazi in 1920. P. 67.
John Esposito and John Voll, Islam and Democracv (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996). p. 5.
'IM
CHAPTER
FOUR
THE
NATIONALMOVEMENT:1921 - 1932
In a petition presented to the British occupation administration in 1919. the Shi'a
and Sunnis of Baghdad expressed their wish for an independent Arab state under a Muslirn
Arab king, subject to a national legislative council.' This rare example of cooperation
between traditional antagonists anticipated the decision taken by the British at Cairo in
1921. The British choice of king was Faisal, a son of the Sharif Husain. According to
Tarbush. the prince had corne to gnps with the grim reality of the hiture of the Hijaz. the
wisdom of a British relationship.' and. no doubt. the unlikelihood of another offer of
kingship. Having failed in Syria and forfeited his throne, he would not fail in Iraq. Faisal
understood the necessity of identiwing himself with the people, of cultivahg "'enduring
ties of common feeling and purpose" arnong the diverse racial and religious Croups of
1raq.) Although an Arab nationalist whose dtimate goal was a unifed Arab nation, Faisal
ibn Husain al-Hashimi focused first on replacing the British mandate with a treaty of
alliance in order to ensure the emergence of a sovereign state of h q .
The coronation of King Faisal 1 of Iraq on August 23, 1921 took place amid tense
negotiations to defme the position of the king within the mandatory structure. The
ceremony was suitably sensitive to colonial interests; therefore. the demand that the king
formally deciare his subordination to British authority in his coronation speech was
withdrawn.' The king's rather cryptic acceptance of that authority, as interpreted by the
British high commissioner, was suffkiently servile to reassure the British govemrnent in
London.' However, Faisal was no sooner enthroned than he became the center of a crisis
over the Anglo-Iraqi treaty.
Differences arising out of the British concept of the king's role and Faisal's own
concept of thaî role led to disagreement between the British and their protégé. The king
clearly recogmzed the importance of adhering to the British lead; yet, he demanded iraq's
retationship with Briîain be dictated solely by the parameters of a treaty, not a
Although Faisal's atternpt to gain public support for the treaty failed. the British were
already regretting theîr choice of king. Angered by the crisis and the king's 'treachery'.
Winston Churchill, the British colonial secretary, let it be known that treaty, mandate. or
both, "Faisal would be a long time finding a third throne."'
From the beginning of the monarchy in 1921, three factions influenced affairs in the
mi provinces of Baghdad and Basra -Mosul
was to become a province of Iraq in
lanuary 1926. These factions were: (1) the British. through the representaûve powea of its
high commissioner in Baghdad; (2) King Faisal and his Iraqi and Syrian Arab nationalist
entourage; and, (3) the h q i Shi'i and Sunni nationalist opposition. This triad. while
forming the institutions and fulfilling the conditions requisite to independence, effectively
controlled the power of the state in Iraq until 1932.
Undeniably, the British were obsessed by their vital lines of communication and
economic interests. In fact. Britain viewed Iraq as a possible catalyst in its postwar
economic rebirth.'
The king envisioned an Lraq devoid of ethnic disunity, sectarian
discord, social inequality and economic dilemma but only as a preliminary step to uniting
ail Arab States in an Arab nation or federation which he would foster and d e . However,
consideration must be given to his ambition of building not only a state but an Iraqi heritage
for his descendants. With the exception of its important influence on the educational
system, Arab nationalism lay practically dorrnant in Iraq untii afier independence. Arab and
Iraqi nationalists, moderates and extrernists, sought power as a means towards realizing
their divergent goals; however, the pathway to that realization was strewn with struggles
for personal power and wealth. These goals did not take precedence over the Iraqi desire
for independence from British d e .
101
It is to be rernembered that, dthough nationalist leaders were fighting for power.
the legai nght to power in Iraq lay in the discretion of the League of Nations which had
invested in Britain the responsibility for preparing the former Ottoman provinces for
independence. Although nationalists might weil have questioned the legality of League
authority over Iraq in t e m of popular sovereignty, it was incumbent upon the government
to prepare for and be worthy of independence -fulfillment
of which would be their
passport to League membership and Iraqi emancipation. The fint steps had been taken: an
indigenous army was formed, a constitution and a treaty of alliance drafted. Only the
approvai of the govemment and the ratification of the documents by a national constituent
assernbiy was required for them to p a s into law. Many nationaiists and non-nationalists
considered the survival of Iraq dependent on British assistance while others weighed the
possibility of unilateral independence. a return to the Turkish fold. or a merger with iraq's
Persian neighbour. As reveaied above in chapter three, both Sunni and Shi'a, in spite of
divided ideological loyaities and conflicting ultimate goals, charted the coune of the
country' s future.
Sluglen has constructed a loose categorization of lnqi poiiticians in this period: the
'court,' composed of Faisal and hs close companions; the nationalists. who were mostly
urban Sunnis, for reasons of education and political experience: and, as we have noted. the
Shi'a, who were in the majority, but not ail nati~nalists.'~Because of the highly personal.
as opposed to party-oriented, nature of Iraqi politics during this period. individuais
sometimes belonged to more than one of the above-mentioned groups. In several cases,
loyalties were owed to di three categories. Thus Faisal's imer circle included men who
were hindamentaily nationalist (such as Jarnii ai-Midfa'i, Yasin al-Hashimi) as well as antinationalist (Muhammad al-Sadr). Muhsin Abu Tabikh followed ''cornplex courses of
action", to use Sluglett's phrase, and at various times belonged to each of the categories.
Most nationaiists refused to iimit the growth of the state in its formative years,
however, there were elements which objected to the controlling influence of the British.
102
Therefore, from the f i t days of his reign, not unlike the politicaily charged days of the
Young Turks, the king was obliged to "run with the hare and hunt with the hounds.""
Although it is tme that Sunnis held the positions of power, Faisai's appointments to his
cabinets, whether as a matter of policy or a means of insuring his own popularity, included
a superficial srnattering of Shi'is, Kurds, and other minorities. It has in fact been said that
Faisal gave no indication of Shi'a or Sunni bias; like Sharif Husain of Mecca, his son
apparently held " a simple pre-schsm interpretation" of Islam."
THE KING AND HIS CABINETS
In September 1921, the fust cabinet was appointed by royal decree and included a
nucleus of predominantty Sunni ministers from the provisional government. Iraq's fus[
prime rninister was Abd al-Rahman ai-Gailani, the Sunni Nagib of ~aghdad;" two of
Faisal's rninisters, Jafar al-Askari and Hasqail Sassoon, formed part of the 'inner circle'
while the new rninister of justice, Naji al-Suwaidi, was a dedicated Sunni Iraqi nationalist.
The cabinet itself was representative of most groups in Iraq. Faisal created a power base
through his appointments of Sunni Arab nationaiists who had k e n loyal to him in the past.
including: Jafar al-Askari, Nuri al-Sa'id, J
d al Midfa'i. and Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi
-
each of whom eventudy became prime minister.I4 The iraqi army, commanded by the exSharifian Nuri al-Sa'id, was created by his comrade-in-arrns. Jafar al-Askari, the rninister
of defense.
Tarbush roughly estimates that between 1921 and 1936 city notables received fi@four percent of cabinet posts, the officer class thirty-eight percent, and the merchant class
eight percent." Of the fourteen prime ministers from 192 1 to 1932, there were nine former
S u n i Ottoman officers; similarly thuty-six of the fifty-six major cabinet memben during
the same penod were officers. It was these men who retumed to Iraq with Faisai. whose
ailegiance he could count on, who fded most of the important civil and rnilitary posts. With
successive governrnents, those in power rarely changed. The same nationalists exchanged
places at the top; the reshuffling of posts was primarily among the Sumi urban nationalists
not averse to excluding from power representatives of the majority Shi'i cornrnunity or the
largest non-Arab minority, the Kurds.
One example of tokenism in Faisal's cabinet appointrnents was his habitua1
selection of a Shi'a to the position of minister of education, although Sati al-Husri who
held the nominally subordinate post of director-general of education from 1922 to 1927
wielded the real power over educational policy. In fact, the Shi'i ministerial appointee was
frequently a religious leader from Karbaia or Najaf who did not speak Arabic.I6 The
inability of these appointees to participare consmictively in cabinet affairs because of their
lack of Arabic serves to highlight Faisal's strategy of a highly symbolic appointment to a
position which remained, for al1 intents and purposes. impotent.
h o t h e r exarnple of tokenism was the inclusion of Muslim and non-Muslim
minorities in the govemment. Jmal and Jdal Baban of the landowning nobility, the Sadah.
were Sunni Kurds who heid cabinet posts during the mandate." Hasqail Sassoon. the
previously mentioned Jewish deputy for Baghdad in 1913, was the minister of finance in
the Fmt and successive governrnents. Tribal shaikhs were influentid in Baghdadi politics;
as hereditary chieftains, they controiled the tribal domain, although, as pillars of Bntish
authority, few tribal shaikhs achieved cabinet rank. The exception was the erudite Abd alMuhsin Sa'dun of a tribal Sadah farnily and prime rninister four times in the 1920s.
The Sunni Arab nationalists who were appointed io the cabinet by the king and
composed the governing elite were mainly those of whom the Bntish approved or found it
expedient to appoint. Three prominent non-Iraqi Arab nationalists appointed were: Sati alHusri, director-general of education; Tahsin al-Qadri. his military attaché; and the Shi'i
Rusturn Haidar, Faisal's fmt chief of the Royal Diwan. AU became Iragi citizens and held
important govemment positions weU beyond independence. Sunni and Shi'i nationalists in
opposition to the govemment and to the British presence were not within Faisal's inner
sanctum. They disapproved of the alien king and, in fact. made ineffectua1 attempts to
depose him in 1921 and again in 1930.
In late 1921, the Anglo-Iraqi treaty was sent to the League of Nations for approval
while the constitution. drafted by the king, the prime minister, and the British high
cornmissioner was presented to the cabinet. Aithough the constitution was designed to give
legislative powers to the king and the representatives of the people. "the British controlled
one and the nationalists the other."ls Although, the king was perceived as a pawn of the
British throughout his reign, his influence over the cabinet was considerable. inasmuch as
there was Little scope for nationalist participation in government until a parliament was
inaugurated. When the League of Nations declared its approval of the treaty within the
manahte framework, the extrernists reacted by mobiiizing nationalist forces against both
the British and the king.
It seems that the British-Iraqi treaty of alliance was misconstrued by nationalists as
the end of mandatory tutelage. To the Iraqi nationalists, who perhaps saw the treaty as a
recognition of sovereignty, the mandate was a form of colonization. To the British. the
treaty was intended to protect British rights in 1raq,Ig not to replace the mandate which
legitimized Britain's position in Iraq. Understandably, negotiations were long and arduous.
uisistence on a treaty relationship, prirnarily due to cost effectiveness. was defmed
at the conference in Cairo in March 1921. Under such a treaty arrangement the fmancial
burden of the mandate would be removed from the Bntish treasury to the Iraqi govemment
whiie maintainhg Britaùi's legitimate authority as delegated by the League. Cabinets were
appointed or dismissed by the king as dictated by Bntish authority. Decision-making would
continue to be controlled by British advisors responsible to the high commissioner. Britain
would remain responsible for intemal order and for the defense of Iraq by the British air
force which was due to take over in 1922 from the British m y . The Iraqi army would be
105
kept under-manned and under-armed. The uibes were better equipped than the Iraqi -y"
-but
less of a threat to the British. Sunni and Shi'i nationalists were, nanirally, against a
treaty which recailed so vividly Iraq's long history of foreign domination.
National opposition to the treaty and the mandate was mounted by the nationalists,
the intelligentsia, and the Iraqi press. A delegation of Sunni and Shi'i extremis& presented
the king with demands which would Lunit British d e to "diplornatic representation" and
would end British influence in ~raq." In effect, the nationalists issued demands for
irnmediate liberation. independence. and self-government which would, if not met. lead to
Faisal's deposition. In support of the nationalists, prorninent Shi' i clergy panicipated in
17
anti-British demonstrations in which the Shi'a and the Sunnis were united once more. --
in their opposition to the British the mujtahidin issued a f
a to~ which
~ many
Shi' a rernained faithful, forbidding Shi' a from government service. Moreover in April
1922. there was funher opposition rnounted at a conference in the Shi'i holy city of
Karbala. The funire Ayatollah, Mahdi al-Khalisi, c d e d together two hundred [nqi dama.
notables and tribal shaikhs including those of the Mid-Euphtes, the self-same tribes
which led the 1920 h q i revoit - seemingiy to discuss m e n t Wahhabi raids but. in
reality, to foment discontent and opposition to the treat~.'~ The king declined the
invitation, as did the proBritish Sunni tribal shaikhs. Except for the Mid-Euphrates tribes.
there was no W i e d opposition to the treaty although the mujtahidin issued a jihad against
the Wahhabis to which the Sunni dama objected.
Meanwhile, a member of the Nagib's cabinet. the Shi'i leader Jafar Abu Timman.
"resigned rather than sign the treaty"?
His National Party joined with the Renaissance
Party in anti-treaty nationalist demonstrations which fmally halted the entire election
process for a constituent assembly. The extremists denounced the treaty, the mandate, and
the Sunni cabinet and called for the appointment of a Shi'i scholar, Sayyid M u h m a d alSadr, as prime minister."
In August 1922, the king's encouragement of the extrernisd6 provoked the
resignation of the prime minister and the rancour of the high commissioner. Faisal ensuing
illness is said to have saved his deposition. Determinecf to thwart nationaiist ambitions, Sir
Percy Cox assumed direct administrative authority over Iraq. After taking control of the
government, he banished the nationalist leaders to an island in the Persian p i f . He ordered
the bombing of vengeful ixibes. He dismissed Arab officiais with exverne nationalist
tendencies and had advisors act for them; he suspended the freedom of press and assembly:
and he banned the Shi'i political parties" who issued manifestoes protesting British
interference. The British high commissioner issued an ultimatum -sign the treaty or revert
to strict mandatory d e . "Al1 pretense of autonomy" was over?
The cabinet fonned in September 1922 was again headed by prime minister Abd al-
Rahman al-Gailani; it also included the defense rninister, Jafar &Askari and the new
interior minister, Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun. AU were Sunni nationalists. In October of thaî
year, pressured by the Bntish. the cabinet approved the Anglo-hqi treaty of alliance: its
.
subsidiary financial, judicial, military and foreign and domestic agreements: and. in
accordance with the mandate, a constitution and electoral law." The lack of an elected
national constituent assembly delayed the raüfïcation of the treaty and the constitution.
Meanwhile, British personnel were to advise each Iraqi minister, to supervise the lraqi
army, and to decide Iraqi financial and foreign poiicy while preparing haqis for self-
govemment. In essence. the Bntish had achieved actuai control of Iraq, its govemment,
and its rnilitary .
The Iraqi cabinet's approval of the treaty did not end opposition however, nor did it
ensure the treaty's ratification by a national constituent assembly. To both Sumi and Shi'i
nationaiists, the treaty bore the stigma of subjection. Ratification of the treaty was also
harnpered by the govemment's fear that its legitimacy would be jeopardized by the Shi'is
refusal to participate in the elections of an assembly while Shi'i and Sunni nationalists and
non-nationaiists continued to protest the British mandate. This anti-British activity
1O7
produced an anti-electionfatwa. Sayyid Mahdi Khdisi, Sayyid Abdul-Hasan Isfahani, and
Mina Muhammad Husain Na'ini issued fatwar declaring it udawful for Muslims to vote
in the elections; disobedience would esult in 4'excommunication'~.30In November 1922,
the elderly prime minister, Abd al-Rahman al-Gailani, resigned in favour of Abd al-Muhsin
Sa'dun, a prime minister of ‘@ester vigour and readier mind, and one who could form a
more effective counterpoise to Faisal",
who was again consorting with the opposition.
The king feared an h q i might yet mie Iraq, a possibility discussed by h q i nationalists.
Diarchal authority functioned as an integral part of the central govemment and each
Iraqi minister had a pardel British advisor in order to prepare Iraqis for self-government."
Deeply resented by the Iraqi ministers, the Sunni Arab nationalist politician Yasin alHashimi. who joined Sa'dun's cabinet in Novernber 1922, was no exception. An avid
opponent of the pro-British govemment and the Anglo-hqi treaty but prone to
opportunism. he was penuaded to accept a mînistenai position despite the govemment's
position favouring the treaty."
Hashirni, hprisoned by the British in late 1919 for
subversive activities while a mernber of the postwar Arab governrnent in Syria, had p a t e r
influence at the time than Faisal -a fact which the king resented and refused to forget."
Understandably, Yasin al-Hashimi did not belong to the govemrnent 'inner circle':
however, owing to his political acumen, he held various cabinet posts but spent most of his
energies in opposition. He headed the Treaty Cornmittee from 1922 to 1924 which he
attempted to innuence. Of the m e e n members of the cornmittee, nine were tribal shaikhs:
seven Arabs and two Kurds who vacillated on the treaty issue
35
- a consideration which
both the government and the opposition attempted to exploit. Almost three years would
pass between the draftuig of the treaty and its ratification, during which tirne changes
affecting the terms of the treaty of alliance and the acquisition of the province of Mosul
would prove more favourable to Iraqis.
Ln February 1923, nationalists' articles in the Iraqi press critical of the mandate
concurred with the British press' advocacy of the withdrawal of the British frorn Iraq. The
press thus influenced the British govemment's curtailment of the original terms of the
Anglo-hqi treaty. '' Jh April 1923, a protocol of the Anglo-Inqi treaty of 1922 reduced
the mandatory period from twenty to four years - a more viable proposition for both
Sunni and Shi'i nationalists. However, the failure to elect a constituent assembly. due in
large part to opposition by the Shi'i Persian clergy," necessitated the intervention of the
Iraqi government to rat@ the treaty and the constitution.
Important steps taken by the cabinet in April 1923 affected the Shi'i cornmunity.
First, the British announced that the protocol to the Anglo-hqi treaty would not take effect
until after the "ratification of a peace treaty with Turkey.""
Turkish nationalists under
Mustafa Kemal had by then liberated Anatolia and they claimed their former province of
Mosul by reason of race. economics ties, and occupation d e r the armistice. They had not
only repossessed their own country, they had deprived Iraqi Kurds of a promised
independence and proffered Iraqis a renewal of their former ties. Had the Turks not
abolished the caliphate the following year, the Iraqis rnight have been more prone to accept.
Acts of intimidation and agression by the Turks against the local inhabitants on the
northem frontier were causing concem in Baghdad and London. When a religious decree
issued in Karbala by the Shi'i Persian clergy in April 1923 favoured the Turks, Baghdad
reaçted imrnediately. Pro-Turkish efements within the SM'i Persian clergy prevailed upon
the Shi'i alUn Mahdi ai-Khalisi to issue a fanva which forbade m y Shi'a to defend Lraq
against his brother Mu~lirns.'~This fatwa -and
participation in eiections-
a second fatwa
forbidding Shi'a
was the undoing of the non-hqi clergy. An amendment to the
immigration law. allowing for the deportation of non-Iraqis for anti-govenunent activity,
was invoked to end the political power of the Shi'i Persian mujtahidin in Iraq."
Mahdi al-Khalisi and his family were deported and traveled to Mecca in June 1923.
whereupon Isfahani. Na'ini, and other ~rlmna lefi for Persia in protest."
The response
from the Shi'i Mid-Euphrates tnbes and the Shi'i comrnunity was not excessive. Since the
death of the supreme mujtahid in December 1920, the leadership of the Shi'i c o m n i t y
had been divided, allowing for the "Anb rnujtahids to quietly chailenge Persian influence."
The most outstanding of the Iraqi Shi'i Arab mujtahidin to emerge was Muhammad Husayn
Kashif al-Ghita who was descended from a local tribal f a ~ n i l y .Al-Ghita
~~
helped to
reconciie the Shi'a with their loss of leadership and assisted in the fight for Shi'i rights and
representation in govemment. Permission for the Persians' r e m to Lraq was granted by
the Iraqi governrnent under conditions which forbade funire involvernent in Iraqi politics.
Ln summarizing the influence of the Persian clergy up to this tirne, the Slugletts note
that the clergy's opposition was not directed agauist the predorninantly Sunni govenment.
Rather, as was shown by their support of the Ottomans against the English during the war
and. no doubt, their stand in favour of the Turkish caliphate until it was abolished in 1924,
they were inclined to "stand on the side of 'Islam' against 'the infidels"'.'"
Hans Kohn
contends that it was "cornmon Oriental interests" which motivaied the divines, normally
hostile to Sunnis and especially Turks "known for their irreligious attitude" who were
threatening M o s ~ l . "Shi'i
~ Persian clergy were accused of inept leadership, especially mielection decrees, anti-government activity, and appeals to foreign elements. narnely Persia
After June 1923, the Iraqi Shi'a ceased to maintain a united political front. Two
groups emerged: those who worked with Sunni nationalists to oppose the Bntish presence
in Iraq and those who defined theû self-interest more narrowly and sought to improve the
status of the Shi'a through cooperation with the British. The latter group, whose
characteristic withdrawal from Ottoman politics lefi it w ith few politically experienced
leaders relative to the Iraqi Sunnis, relied on the British to protect their i n t e r e d s
Although there were notable exceptions. this placed the majonty of Shi'a in opposition to
the nationalists.
With the depamire of the influentid non-Iraqi clergy, the Shi' i Arabs participated in
the political process. Elections took place for the National Constituent Assembly which
Dw to
convened in March 1924 under the presidency of Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun?
nationalist opposition more than six months would elapse before the Assembly ratified the
treaty and then only after a British threat to apply the original mandate."
Extreme
nationalists were not deterred by the British ultimatum however. Shi'i Sayyid Muhammad
al-Sadr, who advocated a policy of alliance with those Sunni politicians who opposed the
ruiing elite, joined
Yasin al-Hashirni, Naji al-Suwaidi, and Shaikh Ahmad al-Da'ud in an
effort to discourage the Shi'i shaikhs of the Euphrates from "voting the treaty through the
Constituent ~ s s e r n b l y . "Sluglen
~~
states that the shaikhs favoured British rule because they
felt it would better protect their rights than the Iraqi govemment.
Members of the Assembly were pressured and manipulated by inrimidahg articles in
the Iraqi government press. Kedourie quotes from articles airned at extremist deputies
using the Mosul negotiations in process as a lever suggesting they would lose Mosul
province if they did not rat@ the treaty. One quote reads "Raiher than have Sir Percy Cox
and the full rnight of Britain to defend Mosul...the Assembly prefers to trust Shaikh Ahmad
ai-Shaikh Daoud to defend Mosul against the Turks." In another, published just pnor to the
vote on ratification, the author asks the nationalists to consider if they wished
'?O
restore
Mosul to the Turks or to keep it for ~raq.'*~When the nationalists did rahfy the treaty, an
addendurn stipulated that the document would have no affect "if the govemment does not
safeguard die rights of Iraq in the whole of the Mosul vilayet.'"'
According to Longrigg, the nationalist campaign consisted of intimidation and
violence by both the government and the opposition, one instance of whch led to the
wounding of two pro-Treaty deputies in the s t r e e t ~ . ~in' June 1924, an ad hoc session of
the constituent assembly was cailed by Prime Minister Jafar al-Askari to ratiw the treaty.
The loydties of the pro-treaty and anti-treaty nationalists in the National Constituent
Assembly and the power of the aibal shaikhs who were Shi'a and Sunni. Arab and Kurd
are listed below:
Favored: Jafar al-Askari, Ali Jawdat, Nuri as-Sa'id, Sabih Nasha't, Abd al-Muhsin
Shaliash, Yusuf Ghanirnah, Yasin al-Amir, Akbashi as-Sa'd, Sulaiman Ghazalah,
Da' ud al-Haidari, Habib at-Talibani, 1shaq Afia' irn, Mirzah Faraj, Fatah Muhammad.
k a t Uthman, Sa'id Qadir, Taufiq Ahmad, Ali as-Sulaiman, Fatah Sirsirn, Yahya
Smikah, Shawaya al-Fahad, Falih as-Suhyud, Shabib al-Mazban, Abd ar-Rahman
al-Haidari, al-Majid ash-Shawi -25 nationalists, 7 Arab and 5 Kurdish shaikhs.
Opposed: Yasin al-Hashimi, Ra'uf al-Chadirchi, Ahmad as-Da'ud, Naji as-Suwaidi.
Abd ar-Razzaq Sharif, Muhammad Zaki, Asif Qasim Aqha, Da'ud al-Chalabi, Abd
ar-Razzaq, Ahmad ash-Shawwish -10 nationalists, 13 Arab & 1 Kurdish shaikh. ''
There were eight abstentions and thirty-one absentees. Notably absent were Jafar Abu
Tùnman who had renounced politics but not his convictions: and Sayyid Muhammad alSadr, the Shi'i scholar and political non-nationalist activist. Ten of the fifteen rnembers of
the Treaty Cornmittee which Yasin al-Hashirni headed and influenced were opposed to the
ratification of the treaty.
Those h q i nationalists and non-nationdisis who delayed the growth of the state in its
formative years fought the British on every issue, demanding independence at every turn. It
is remarkable that, in spite of political rivahy, they chose not to be so resolute with the iraqi
government of the day. Yet, the inevitability of establishing dernocratic institutions had to
be acknowledged if independent self-government was to be achieved. The Anglo-Iraqi
Treaty of 1922 provided for British supervisory responsibilities; however. it also provided
for religious and educational freedom and an Iraqi constitution
s3
without whch the
prerequisites to independence could not be fulfded.
Opposition to the treaty was oniy part of a major power struggle between Iraqi
nationalist politicians and the mandatory authonty. The constituent assembly also debated
the Iraqi constitution, which was k a l l y ratifïed in July of 1924. The constitution decreed
that: Islam become the official state religion and Arabic the official language: that Christian
and Jewish communities be accorded their own religious counciis; and, that Sunni and
Shi' i courts be built into a unified Muslim legal ~ystern.'~
Tribal law, already paramount in
the rural areas since 1916 via the Tribal Criminal and Disputes Replation, was officially
entrenched in the Constitution in 1925.55thereby increasing the power of the tribal shaikhs.
The constitution provided for a monarchy, parliamentary govemment. bicameral
legislatue, an appointed senate, and an elected house of representatives.
The vident anti-British elements had gradudy disappeared from the political scene:
the Sunni Kurdish shaikhs of the Barzinjis and Shi'i Arab shaikhs of the Mid-Euphrates
were replaced by more pliant candidates; however, the Sunni Iraqi nationalists formed
political parties in opposition to the govemment. There was no place for those unwilling to
work within the mandatory structure. As long as the Briùsh prioritized appointments. those
in power included Sunni Sharifian officers, Sunni urban officiais, and pro-British tribal
shaikhs, Sunni and Shi'a, Arab and Kurd. Those excluded were the extreme lraqi
nationalists of both sects, secular and religious. Once the treaty had been ratified, Jafar alAskari and his cabinet resigned office, the constituent assembly was dissolved, and Yasin
al-Hashimi, usuaiIy arnong the opposition, took over as the new prime minister.
Sunni Prime Minister Yasin al-Hashirni's cabinet of August 1924 was a variation on
former cabinets: Rashid Ali al-Gailani, a Sunni Judge in the Appellate Court, was W s t e r
of justice: Muzahim &Pachachi, a Sunni iawyer and Arab nationalist, minister of works
and communications; Muhammad Rida al-Shabibi, a Sh'i p e t , intellectual and merchant.
minister of education: Hasqail Sassoon. Jewish financier, minister of finance. AU of the
above were from Baghdad. Ibrahim al-Haidari of Irbil, a Sunni Kurd and former Shaikh alIslam, was minister of auqaf, and, Abd al-Muhsin al-Sa'dun, a Sunni shaikh from the
Muntûfq and former Ottoman deputy, officer, and graduate of the Shaikhs' Coiiege in
Istanbul, minister of the interior? Sa'dun was an Anglophile whose post was engineered
by the British to contain the ambitious prime minister, his rival in the nationalist movement.
MOSUL,
OL,AND GEOGRAPHICAL
UNITY
The cabinet's negotiations of the ternis of the oil concession with the Britishcontroiled consortium went hand in hand with Turkey's c l a h to Mosul at a hearing with
the League of Nations Council in September 1924. Terms involved the sale of royaities, the
b a i s for royalties. and a dernand for twenty percent equity in the company
- originaliy
given to the Turks and at San Remo to the Iraqis - for participation in iü management."
Company negotiators refused the Iraqi request for a share in the company; rather the union
of Mosul with Iraq was used as leverage to intimidate cabinet members. After months of
debate, the oii concession was acquired by the Turkish Petroleum Company, later the [raqi
Petroleum Company, "without Iraqi participation", an outcome that resulted in the
resignation of two cabinet ministers, Rashid Ali al-Gailani and Muhammad Rida al-
hab bibi? Iraq agreed to a seventy-five year concession which
was approved in March
1925. The oil concession was successfully tied to the assessment of the northem border
and the disposition of ~ o s u 1 . ~ ~
A volatile area and a constant threat to the stabiiity of the [raqi govemment. Mosul
was of economic, political, and religious interest ro Iraq. The disposition of the province of
Mosul caused controversy among the Iraqis, the Kurds, the Turks, and the British. The
Kurds ciaimed the province as part of Kurdistan, rebelling when the British attempted to
include Mosul in the mandate for Iraq in 1920. The Turks pressed their c l a h to their
former province by armed incursions over the border, attacking Christian inhabitants. and
intirnidahg Kurdish tribesmen. However. with its close proximity to the routes to Persia
and India and its oil potential, Mosul was of strategic and economic importance to the
British. AUy and enemy alike coveted the oil-rich provinceoO
British statesmen, acting on behaif of Iraq, and their Turkish counterparts failed to
resolve the question of Mosul during the negotiations at the Lausanne conference in 1923.
As a resuit, a League of Nations' commission of inqujr was set up. The predominance of
an Arab population in Mosul was proven by the British and used as the basis for a
legitirnate daim to the province; there were too few Osrnanli Turks in the province to
support Turkey's claim? Turkish border attacks on the Christian minorities were another
important factor infiuencing the union of Mosul with Iraq. In September 1924, at a hearing
in Geneva on Turkey's daim to the temtory, the League of Nations upheld the decision of
its commission. Turkey challengd the League's authority; however, the Permanent Court
of International Justice also upheld the League's de~ision.~'As compensation. a BritishIraqi agreement assigned Turkey ten percent of Mosul's oil production.
ûil had not, as yet, become a profitable source of revenue for Iraq; exploration and
production had not even begun. Yet there was no question that Mosul with its potential oil
wealth would benefit the economy. In fact, many h q i s believed that without Mosul's oil
income the provinces of Baghdad and Basra codd not survive economically, nor could the
minority Sunnis s w i v e in a "Shi'i-dominated tat te."^^ In consequence, nationalists agreed
that its acquisition was worth the price that had to be paid - t h e Anglo-Iraqi treaty of 1926.
The League of Nations' award of Mosul to Iraq was contingent upon the prolongation of
the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty for tweniy-five years
-
unless the League accepted Iraqi
membership at an emlier date.64 To protect Kurdish rights, the League insisted on this
condition; otherwise, it decreed, Mosul would go to Turkey. It was also a consideration in
the simultaneous assaying of the Iraqi-Turkish frontier.
The demarcation of national borders was a prerequisite to self-government but it also
helped to establish foreign policy with Iraq's neighbours. With the Great Western Desert as
a frontier, border problerns between Syria and Iraq were minimal
- no more than the
traditional rivalries of nomadic nibes. A green line indiscriminately drawn on a map of the
southem desert by Iraq's British high commissioner, Sir Percy Cox, in 1922 was agreed to
by Kuwait's d e r at the tirne, Amir Mubarak? This "line in the sand" became the official
Iraqi-Kuwaiti border,
Iraqi relations with Turkey's Mustafa Kemal, the Najd's Faisal ibn Saud. and
Persia's Reza Khan who aii beset Iraq with border disputes were not quite as amicable.
Sunni Turks attacked Christian inhabitants in the north, 66 Wahhabi purists attacked Arab
tnbes in the south, and Shi'i Persians incited Arab and Kurdish t r i k s in the east. The Iraqi-
Turkish border was established by the League of Nations Council in October 1924 as an
intenm frontier and. on the recornrnendation of the bague's commission. "the retention of
the Brussels line" was confmed in July 1925 provided Kurdish rights were ~rotected.~'
The Iraqi southem frontier with Najd was problematic for most of the mandate.
necessitating constant parrollhg by the Royal Air Force. In the name of purist religion and
led by the fanatic Shaikh Faisal al-Dawish. Arabian Wahhabis attacked Iraqi frontier
outposts and isolated Shi'i towns and tribesmen until 1929?
A civil war between ibn
Saud and al-Dawish succeeded in ending the raids and a Saudi-[raqi treaty and boundary
(with fiee zones) were eventudy established in 1931.
Border disputes with Persia involved the Shatt al-Arab waterline and the Iraqi
Kurds sanctuary. Tariq Isrnael identifies three penods and issues pertinent to the Shatt
dispute: the period of regional imperid rivalry when tribal allegiances were considered:
during imperialist expansion, the geographically fixed points: and. during nationalist
rivairy. the cultural characteristics of population^.^^ The legality of an 1864 OttomanPersian treaty setthg the boundaries was disputed. In 1932, Iran (until 1925 known as
Persia) requested that the Shatt al-Arab boundary be detemiined on the 'Thalweg principle"
which Iraq rejected." Persians granting sanctuary to the rebel h q i Kurds frorn lraqi
govemment forces was an issue not settied during the mandate.
Although sorne issues were dealt with, not dl border problems could be resolved.
Iran and Iraq saw armed conflict throughout the 1980s. regional and international conflict
plagued Iraq and Kuwait in 1961 and 1990, and recuning Kurdish problems cause strife
with Tebran and Ankara even today. However in the 1920s, the h q i govemment was
intent on securing her borders not as an independent sovereign state but as one of the
prerequisites to statehood demanded by the League of Nations.
The iraqi bicarneral parliament was inaugurated by King Faisal in 1925. The first
president of the senate was Yusuf al-Suwaidi, a dedicated Iraqi Sunni nationalist. early
member of al-Fatat and of Haras al-Istiqlal, and among those exiled after the revolt of
1920.'~A young Baghdadi lawyer and Sunni mernber of Sa'dun's cabinet. Rashid Ab alGailani, becarne president of the chamber of deputies. Among the parliament's eighty-eight
deputies and twenty senators. Sunni and Shi'i Arab notables and shaikhs predominated
with only the rare rninority representative. The emergence of govemment and opposition
parties was an evolution of parliarnentary development; the Progressive Party was the party
of the Sunni prime rninister Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun and the Nationalist Party that of the
Shi'i nationahst Jafar Abu ~ i r n m a n . ~Yasin
~
al-Hashimi. the leader of the opposition.
formed the Peoples' Party, a non-sectarian parliamentas, bloc of twenty delegates which
included the Shi'is Baqir and Moharnmad Rida Shabibi. both of whom could provide the
opposition with Shi'i support.73 After five years of summary decision-making by the
cabinet, the parliarnentary system gave the opposition a forum for debate.
Cabinet appointments were still made by the king and approved by the British. In an
effort to gain at least a share of the political power, many ShiTa reversed their former
intractable opposition to the British. Pro-British shaikhs were also a source of British
power in Iraq's parliament, as they had k e n in the constituent assembly. Furthermore,
whiie many of the former official class resented the infidel bitterly, they were not loathe to
cooperate with the British. On the other hand, they did not hide their "distaste for, and poor
opinion of Faisal" and his Sharifians who headed many of the cabinets during the
mandate.''
Nevertheless, Sunni ex-officers Jafar al-Askari. Nuri al-Sa'id. Ali Jawdat ai-
Ayyubi, and Amin Zaki, although Arab nationalists, were not wanting in Iraqi nationalist
much they wanted power and prestige.
sentiment -however
De Gaury's evaluation of the Iraqi parliament contends that: 1) there were insufficient
experienced men to work the system even had they wished to do so or had they understood
it; 2) other govemment business was held up dunng elections because the bureaucracy was
busy rigging the latter. and, 3) courts were compt because judges were insufficientiy
~ a i d . 'Emest
~
Main state that there were only a few men of Cabinet rank in the entire
country and it was, in
In late 1921.
+
-
:
a democracy but an oligarchy with a king at its head.76
.dis& in Iraq divided into two camps: extrernists, both Shi'i and
Sunni, demandea cornplete British withdrawal and complete Iraqi independence while
moderates, mostly Sunni. were arnenable to a treaty relationship with Britain providing that
the mandate was revoked. The British and the mandate remained. The ensuing years saw
the downfall of the Shi'i Persian clergy, the disappearance of many Shi'i activists from the
political scene, and the entrenchment of Sunni officen and urban notables in positions of
power. By the second session of parliament in 1926, prerequisites for independence were
realized and the Lraqi nationalists demanded self-government.
In Novernber 1926. with the appointment of two Shi'is to the cabinet, the minister
of education Sayyid Abd al-Mahdi (a Shi'i tribal shaikh of the M ~ n t ~and
q ) the minister of
irrigation and agriculture Abd al-Husain al-Chalabi. a step forward in Shi'i representation.
The new prime minister, Jafar &Askari, headed a coterie of Sunni officen and Iawyers
who were "strongly influenced by the militaristic and Iegalistic thinking" of the Ottoman
Empire -including
the Sharifians al-Askari, al-Sa'id, al-Hashimi, and Zaki as weii as
members of the legai profession. such as Rashid &Gailani and Ra'uf al-~hadirchi."
Conscription becarne an important parliarnentary issue despite Shi'i and Kurdish
(and British) opposition. Aware that the Iraqi army was rnilitarily incapable of defendhg
Iraq against outside aggression, the govemment introduced the National Defense bili. It had
k e n a hard-fought issue since the beginning of the monarchy, and in the constituent
assembly in 1924. its introduction in parliament in 1927 brought about a strong Shi'i
reaction. Its advocates, the king, the Sharifians, and the moderate nationalists, who were
mostiy Sunni, had headed the military in Iraq since conscription was introduced by the
Ottomans in the Iate nineteenth century. The moderates believed that conscription would not
only strengthen the army numencally but was also "an easy way to achieve national
cohesion and the development of a consensus which would somehow dissolve ethnic and
religious differen~es."~~
The king and his rninisten toured the counüy to generate votes in favour of
conscription, at times. offering promises of lucrative position in governrnent. Its
opponents, however, represented both those who would be obliged to serve in the rank
and file, -rnainly
the tribes, Shi'a, and Kurds-
and the mandatory power. The British
were unwilling to aid in forcibly instituting a bilI which would give Iraq a strong
indigenous army and limit its own effectiveness. When it was introduced in parliament, the
Shi'i minister of education, Sayyid Abd &Mahdi, resigned in protest. Shi'a and the Kurds
attacked the National Defense bill in the nationalist press and in the parliament untii it was
eventually tabied. Consequentiy, conscription was not introduced until 1934.
In 1927, Iraqi nationalists demanded a revision of the new treaty and a review of
Iraq's status, citing Iraq's parliamentary and governrnental capability in directing affairs of
state. Nationalists demanded a lessening of British administrative control. finding the
presence of British advisors consûicting and not conducive to Iraqi interests. They also
demanded a reduction in the cost of British wartime railway and port facilities to a level
which the h q i economy could support. ln late 1927, the
treaty revision was signed in
London by King Faisal. Prime Minister Jafar al-Askari, and the British high comrnissioner:
however, iittle except a recognition of Lraq's independent status was changed. The treaty
promised to support Iraqi rnembership in the League if "progress is maintaineci"; a
Limitation, seized upon by nationalisü in parliament, to which al1 other issues were
s~brnerged.~~
None of the modifications to the F i c i a l and Military Agreements, to which the
extreme nationalists objected, had k e n addressed.
The king, who had demanded the
relinquishment of British military control to the lraqi army and the fledgling h q i Air
Force, confidently began a "trial of strength with the British high cornrnissioner which
Iasted until 1929 -neither
communicated personally for two years.sO
While Faisal continued to ask for a lessening of British militlvy control. the British
government persisted in refusing. According to Batatu, the dedock between the Iraqi
monarch and the British govemment was broken by a change in British policy: Faisal had
outplayed the British and military control "eventually found expression in the Anglo-Lraqi
Treaty of 1930."~'The financial agreement, however, remained in effect. Yasin ai-Hashrmi
and, a member of the opposition, Rashid ai-Gailani resigned in protest against
unduninished British control. The following month the cabinet of Jafar ai-Askari also
resigned and Inq sought admittance to the League of Nations.
Membership in the League was up for review every four years. In early 1927, Iraq
applied to the British for an end to the mandate and recornmendation for membership. In
July of that same year. the Iraqis were advised that although Britain would not recommend
Iraq for membership in 1928, providing Iraq continued its socio-economic progress. a
recomrnendation would be made in 1932. Such a condition, as c m be expected, was a
blow to the extreme nationalists who had presumed their right to emancipation once the
prerequisites were hilfilled. The nationalists argued that progress was ody possible with
less British control, an argument which caused serious upheaval in parliament on both the
govemment and the opposition sides.
In 1928, the new Labour government in London, reaiizing that the state of Britain's
economy necessitated changes in overseas commitments, promised to i-ecornrnend Iraq
without qualification. British socialists offered to apply for Iraq's admittance to the League
in 1932 which sparked a British cabinet crisis frorn January to April 1929. There were, in
fact, conditions attached to this offer because Britain insisted that the Iraqi government buy
British prewar construction in Iraq and sign a new treaty to protect imperiai interests. In
essence, this l e . to the high commissioner's promise to support Iraq's "early entry" into
the League and a new treaty of alliance, with forma1 relaxaiion of British control?'
Despite the govemment's obsession with treaties and the nationalists' cry for
independence, the standard of living was low. the economy stagnant. and the army
incapable of defending Iraq against outside aggression. Clearly, the need to solve these
socio-econornic problems was evident, however, financial resources were Limited: the total
revenue of the government was 3.9 million pounds in 1921 and only 4.1 M o n pounds in
1933, compared with 129.3 million pounds in 1 9 5 8 . ~The
~ fuiancial outlook changed in
October 1927 when a substantial oiiwell was found at Baba Gurgur near Kirkuk which
eventually produced revenue to resolve some of Iraq's formidable socio-economic issues.
Also in 1927, the Shi'a became active on the political scene. They had strong
nationalist leadership, a tribal 'bloc' in parliament, and an intelligentsia who were capable
of power-sharing in govemment?* The fanva issued by Mirza Muhammad Taqi ai-Shirari
in 1920 against working for the infidel had been revokeddS and Sh'i participation in
govemment and the civil service had increased. However, the Shi'a struggled against
attempts to diseredit Iraqi Shi'a by questioning their Arab ongin and discrimination in state
education, especidy in rural areas? Both were issues which had to be addressed by their
political representatives in parliament.
A serious incident created havoc arnong the Shi'a when an anti-Shi'i publication by a
Syrian teacher in Iraq, Anis al-Nusuli, caused Shi'i riots and demonstrations. A major
repercussions was the resignation of the Arab nationalist Sati al-Husri, the director-general
of education. A second incident involved a clash between government troops and Shi'i
moumers in a religious procession in Kadhimain. This event caused senous consternation
in govemment circles."
In Ianuary 1928. a new cabinet ushered in Abd al-Muhsh
Sa'dun as prime minister, Nuri al-Sa'id as minister of defense, and othen of their
supporters in the Progressive Party. The May 1928 pariiamentary electims resulted in
fewer elected Sunnis than normal, whereas an unprecedented 26 Shi'a were elected to the
Chamber of Deputies. as well as 16 Kurds. 16 Bedouin Shaikhs. 4 Christians. 4 Jews. and
34 ~ u n n i s B. y~ early
~
1929, political events in iraq had become reactionary and nationalists
pressed for independence.
INDEPENDENCE
AND THE NATIONALIST
MOVEMENT
The nationalists' demand for an end to the mandate and to the high commissioners'
authority caused a violent parliarnentary crisis and four changes of government in 1929.
When Sa'dun replaced Askari in 1928, the nationalist opposition in parliament imrnediately
debated the modifications of the treaîy and the financial and military agreements. However.
Iraqi demands for the "assumption by Iraq of complete responsibility for its defense. Iraqi
comrnand over the joint forces. uansfer to haqis of the railroad and port of Basra. and
relief from the expenses of the high commissioner's retin~e."~
met with a British refusal
and, in Ianuary 1929, resulted in Prime Minister Sa'dun's resignation.
In Aprii 1929, the Iraqi nationalist Tawfiq al-Suwaidi formed a new cabinet and.
leaving the maty issue aside, stressed the need for socio-econornic development in Iraq.
His povernrnent was neither popular with the opposition nor the king and was replaced in
June 1929. The opposition contuiued to debate in parliament modifications to the treaty
and, as Marr clairns, "the consistency of their attacks on the Bntish were, in fact.
responsible for the eventual relinquishment of the Bntish hold on the instruments of
intemal power."
90
Whether this is a vaiid assumption or not, the fact remains that the
British socialisü who came to power in England in mid-1929 -aided by the British press.
the public, and the state of the economy -voted to reconcile Bntain's interests with those
'
of Iraq and terminate its mandate over the latter in 1932.~
In September 1929 the king appointed Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun to form his fourth
cabinet with Naji ai-Suwaidi, Nuri al-Sa'id Yasin al-Hashimi, Amin WU, Naji Shawkat,
Abd al-Aziz al-Qassab. and Abd al-Husain al-Chalabi. 92 The conscription issue was again
bitterly opposed, as was the attempt to estabiish new treaty relations with Britain. The
nationalists violent opposition to these issues and personal attacks on the pro-British prime
rninister Sa'dun and his cabinet resulted in the suicide of Sa'dun on November 13. 1929.
Naji al-Suwaidi took over as prime minister and attempted unsuccessfully, to W e r die
program set by Sa'dun: al-Suwaidi and his cabinet resigned four months later.
Nuri al-Sa'id, a fervent Arab nationalist and Sharifian commander who had sexved
in many cabinets, was appointed prime rninister in March 1930. Arnong his ministers
were the ex-S hari fian Jarnii al-Micifa' i, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi, Jafar al-Askari, the Sunni
Arab notable JamiI al-Rawi, the Kurdish lawyer Jamai Baban, and the Shi'i Abd al-Husain
a l - ~ h a l a b i .Treaty
~ ~ negotiations began immediately. The terms of the treaty established a
close alliance between Iraq and Bntain. An important issue was the transfer of rniiitary
commitments to Iraq while still allowing for Britain's defense of Iraq in case of war and
necessitating the leasing of two air bases from the h q i s . The treaty's validity was 25 years
fiom Iraq's admission to the League of Nations. In March 1930, after the t e m of the
treaty had been announced, the nationalists provoked violent anti-treaty demonstrations.
The main obstacle to a positive end to the ueaty negotiations was the Iraqi
nationalists' objection to the air bases. Nationalists saw them as a symbol of foreign
domination and as infringing on Iraq's sovereignty. However, the Bntish Air Ministry
rehised '20 rely on Iraqi controlled air bases for refueling purposes" or to relinquish air
bases 9' which linked the Bntish air route to India, provided support to Iraq in tirne of war.
and defended Bntish interests in the oilfields of northem Iraq. The Iraqi government feared
that without the air bases Britain would retain the mandate. In Apnl 1930. when it was still
doubtfui that the League would end the mandate without an Anglo-Lraqi treaty of alliance,
Kùig Faisai, Prime Minister Nuri al-Sa'id and Defense Minister Jafar al-Askari suggested a
compromise rneant to satisw both the opposition and the British -withdrawal
from the
Mosul and Hinaidi air bases, retention of Shaiba in the south and the building of
Habbaniya, fi@ miles West of Baghdad. 9 5
Although the nationalists objected. and continued to object. to the treaty it was the
only means to assuring independence and their assumption of power in the future. The
mling elite consisted mainly of a handful of Sunni politicians. dl eager for personal power
and prestigious position - each supported by his own clique and political Party.
Accordingly, in June 1930. an extraordinary session of parliament was called where. once
again, the shaikhs influenced the vote in favour of the ratification of an Anglo-iraqi treaty
which fmaily paved the way for Iraqi admission to the League and independent statehood.
The struggle for independence had been, as Marr points out, 'me one issue w h c h
united the nationalists"; now, with independence in sight, it precipitated a stmggle for
power among the nationalist politicians in the govemment and the opposition. 96 Extremists
Yasin al-Hashimi, Ali Jawdat al-Ayyubi. Naji al-Suwaidi, and Rashid Ali alGailmi
resigned from Parliament and continued their opposition to the new Angio-Iraqi treaty in
the press. New parties carne into k i n g such as the National Brotherhood Party. al-Ikha alWatani, fomed by Sunnis Yasin al-Hashimi and Rashid Ah al-Gailani which united
briefly with Shi'i Jafar Abu Timman's h q i Nationalist Party, al-Watani al-lnqiyya.
Young Iraqi university students of both sects fonned a socialist group, the Jama'at alAhali, with an Iraqist and reformist programme: its rnembership "believed in religion,
tradition, and the redistribution of wedth."
97
One of its major proponents was Jafar Abu
Timman, the Shi'i h q i nationalist who has k e n hailed as a unifying force for Shi' i and
Sunni cohesion during the lraqi revolt of 1920.
Meanwhile, Prime Minister Nun al-Sa'id attended a meeting in Geneva to discuss
Iraq's membership in the League of Nations, which would end the British mandate and
create of Iraq an independent nation. A special commission of inquiry looked into Iraq's
self-governing capabilities to which the Bntish gave guarantees of moral responsibility.
After formal debate, the decision was reached. Iraqi membership in the League of Nations
was unanimously approved on October 3, 1932.9~
in a mandate situation the eventud aim is statehood or, as Kedourie contends, "selfdetermination is the political issue par excellence": in the case of Iraq it was national policy
in Britain, in the face of economic hardship, and not Iraqis which had dictated the decision
to terminate the mandate.99 Whiie this may be me, Longrigg comectly observes that
nationalism was "the strongest single force in contemporary Iraqi politics."
'O0
although the
self-detemination issue of the Iraqi nationaiist movement ultimately caused the demise of
the mandate.
Yet Batatu advances an intriguing theory substantiated by Baghdadi police and British
intelligence files on Jafar Abu Timrnan, Muhammad al-Sadr, and Yasin al- ash hi mi.'^'
From August 1928 to April 1929, an Iraqi met with Soviet diplomats in Persia representing
Shi'i and Sunni members of an Lraqi revolutionary party who sought Soviet moral support.
training, and arms for an uprising in Iraq. In early 1929, a pro-Soviet article in an Iraqi
newspaper stated that if "the policy of irnperialisrn continues unchanged Iraqis mus t seek
other means to achieve independence; an article which al-Sadr implied was "cdculated to
induce the Bntish to soften their policy towards Iraq." This theory suggests that once aware
of Iraqi ovemires to the Russians, the Iraqis were offered independence to protect British
future interests.
The national movernent in Iraq had been galvanized by the Baghdadis desire to create
an independent Islamic state bound by a national legislature headed by a Muslim Arab king.
This was to be accomplished through the efforts of Iraqi nationalists representing both
religious sects. Inevitably, political differences surfaced between the Shi'a and Sunnis. A
major source of these differences was the political activity of the non-Iraqi Shi'i religious
leadership, an ultra-conservative and xenophobic group w hic h was responsible for
inhibithg Shi'i and Sunni unity in the nationalist mo~ernent'~'while also seeking
proportional representation. Aithough the Sunni ruling elite was ensconced in govemment.
the Iraqi nationalists in parliament influenced the flairs of state and the lessening convoi
of the mandatory power, eventually achieving success and the independence of Iraq.
Iraq's Arab king worked within the framework of the national movement,
attempting to forge an iraqi identity by integrating the diverse religious and racial peoples of
Iraq. Thus. Faisal "in spite of his descent from the Rophet and his standing in the Muslim
world, Faisal did not go in State on Fndays. His son and his grandson did not parade their
religion. though that is no reason to doubt the genuineness of their beliefs."lO-'h Iraq, the
invisible nature of religion in Sunni nationalism contrasted with that of Shi'i nationalism:
however, the foregoing is evidence of the nature of religious loyakies in both groups within
the national movement.
Iraq was faced with implementing a democratic constitution unsuitable to its
tradition as a Muslim nation and was mled by a Sunni governing class which numbered not
more than two or three hundred at the most.
'OJ
The King attempted to form a coalition
cabinet of Sumis and Shi'is towards the end of the mandate without success. After
independence, the Arab nationalist party accepted cabinet posts in a coalition government.
however, the Iraqi nationalist party did not receive a similar offer - a rneasure designed to
divide and d e which effectively dissolved the short-iived nationalist alliance. Arab
nationalism became a major force in the 1930s, a force which had leamed al-Husri's
message of "Arabism fmt"
'Os
in the h q i state school system. Notwithstanding the
innuences of Arabism and irnpenalism which molded the future, h q i Sunni and Shi'i
nationalists achieved the liberation, independence, and self-government for which they so
tenaciously fought for twelve years and brought into being a sovereign Iraqi state.
126
' Tauber. Formation of Modern Svria and Iraq. "We. the representatives of the Shi'ites and Sunnis, residents
of Baghdad and suburbs. inasmuch as we are an Islamic nation. desire that the regions extending from north
of Mosul till the Persian gulf shall be one state. Arab, at whose head shall be a Muslim Arab king, one of
the sons of our lord. Sharif Husayn. He shall be subject to a national legislative council. whose seat shafl
be in the capital of Iraq, Baghdad." P. 279. A petition received during the British plebiscite of 1918- 1919.
...
' Tarbush. The Role of the Milim
in Pol=,
p. 37. See also Main.
From Mandate to Independence,
p. 77.
' Batatu, Qld Social Classes, p. 15.
Simons. h:
From Sumer to Saddarn (London: The Macmillan Press Ltd.. 1994). The British who M
encouraged prewar Arab nationdism now sought to contain it: they placed Faisal on the throne of iraq not
" 3 s a gesture of Arab independence. rather as a means of securing British influence" in the country. P. 190.
See also Fromkin. A Peace to End A11 Peace, p. 469. See also Longrigg, ira$; 1900 to 195Q, p. 133.
' Sluglett, Britain in Iraq.
it &. "Apart from my personal ideas in direction of Arab nationality 1 am an
instrument of British policy. H.M.Govemment and 1 are in the same boat and musc sink or swirn together.
Were insirument to fail and in consequence they left Iraq, 1 should have to leave too. Having, so to speak,
chosen me, you must treat me as one of yourseIves, and I must be uusted as H. M. Government uusts you.
1 undertake to be guided by your advice...and the mere fact of your presence here and that of Advisors should
be sufficient guarantee to those whom it may concem of preservation of your interests." P. 7 1.
Fromkin, Peace to End Al1 Peace, p. 508. See KIiernan, Foundations of British Policv. At Caïro. the
British agreed to create "under strict British supervision" an Arab govemment. an Iraqi army, and police
force, to enable Britain to withdraw its troops, reduce its expenditures and safeguard its interests. P. 7.
' Klieman,
F o u n d ~ o n of
s British Policy, p. 163.
"ritain was in financial straits after World War 1, and it laid great store in the govemment's interest in the
oilfields - o n e reason British P. M. Lloyd George refused the suggested 'scuttle' policy.
Y Tauber, Formation. lnqi nationalist leaders Jafar Abu Timman. Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr. Yusuf alSuwaîdi, Ali al-Bazirgan. and Shaikh Daud were among those who opposed cooperation with the British in
1920. P. 301. Al1 were part of the opposition to govemrnent between 1921-32.
p. 173. See also Nakash, Shiah of Iraq. Shi'i Shaikh Mahdi al-Khaiisi and
Sluglett. Britain in
Sayyid Muhammad ai-Sadr accepted Faisal because of his relation to Mecca and Sharif Husain and gave him
"conditional supporr if his mle was free of foreign interference and he was bound by a parliament." P. 77.
"
.
*
..
Tarbush, Role of the Mi1ita-yin Politrc~,p. 183.
" Lawrence,
Revolt in the D e s e ~p. 172.
Cohen. British Policy. The "Anglophile tendencies of the Naguib of Baghdad had been duly noted. as the
p. 22 1.
fact that he was "bitterly hostile" to the Young Turks. P. 299. See also Batatu, Old Social CI-,
"
" Batatu,
Old Social Classes, p. 334.
l5 Tarbush. Role of the Militarv in Politics, p. 44. See also Batatu. Old Social Classes. Notables h m
Baghdad. Basra, and Mosul who served as mernbers of the Chamber of Deputies in the Ottoman parliament
were appointed to serve in the new govemment, as were pro-British notables and shaikhs. P. 221.
16
Shglett,
min
p. 277.
' Tarbush, Role of the Military in Politics. Jamal Baban held five cabinet posts while Jalal B a b a held
tluee. P. 46. Ashraf or Sadah were those whose lineage showed direct descent From the tribe of the Prophet.
Simons, From Sumer ro Sacida, p. 183. See d s o Klieman. Foundations of British Policy. Britain never
considered giving up the mandate which was its "judicial right to remain in Iraq." P. 90
l9
'O
Batatu, OId Sqcial C b , pp. 25-26.
SiugIett, Britain in Iraq. It was to convoke a National Congress. appoint a Minister for Foreign Affairs.
withdraw British advisors, and limit Sir Percy Cox's hnctions to diplornatic representation. P. 305.
"
" Hms Kohn,
Historv of Nationalism in the East (London: George Routledge & Sons. 1929). p. 309.
m.
M m ,"Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 110. See Nakash,
Neither Faisal nor any Sunni tribal shaikh
attended the conference. Those who did r e W to "sanction counterattacks against the Ikhwan." P. 78. See
dso, Sluglett. Bntain in u-iiq. They demandeci: a jihad against the Wahhabis, a convocation of a national
assembly, half of Iraqi cabinets and officiais be Shi'a. and British recognition of Iraqi independence. P. 305.
'' Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p.
113.
Ibid., p. 114. See also Sluglett, Britain in Iraq. By March 1923, ai-Sadr had advised his supporters that
oniy if demands for participation were met should vote in elections. P. 307.
'5
Sluglett, &gain in Irag. Faisal's suppon of the Shi'i hierarchy angered h s mostly Sunni cabinet -aware
of the Shi'is' dislike of thern- and the British -1ikely to demand his "abdication or deposition." P. 307.
26
Kohn. Historv of Nationalism, p. 309. See also Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 141. See also Sluglett.
Britain in Iraq. Nationalists Sunni &Pachachi and Shi'i Abu Timman went to Henjam. the Shi'i religious
scholars Sayyid Muhammad &Sadr and Shaikh Muhammad al-Khdisi left rather than face arrest. P. 306.
'7
Kohn, Bistory of Nationalism. Iraqi nationalists gathered at the palace on August 21, 1922 and publicly
denounced the British; the king, rather than punish the nationalists. was conveniently iIl. P. 309. See d s o
Sluglett, Brirain in Iraq. Only Faisal's appendicitis saved him from deposition. P. 306.
" Ireland. Iraa: A Studv in Political Development, pp. 290-29 1.
Naksh, The Shiah of Irag. The fatwa: "We have passed judgment againsr the elections. Whoever takes
part in them is fighting God. the Prophet, and the imams, and will not be buied in Muslim cemeteries."
P. 79. See d s o Erskine, King Faisal, pp. 152- 162. See d s o Kelidar, Intemtion of Modem Iraq, p. 18.
Batatu, Old Social Classes. A number of Sunni sadah inciuding Talib ai-Nagib. Ahmad Basha'yan.
Muhammad Amin Basha'yan, and Abd al-Karim Sa'dun met to discuss with other landowners the setting up
of a republic with Abd al-Muhsin Sa'dun as president. Pp. 188-89.
" Kedourie, Chatham House Version. The British theory of Lrayi tutelage was to dlow Iraqi officiais who
were incompetent and corrupt to "make mistalces if they want to, don't harnper their initiative". P. 263. See
also Marr, Historv of Modem Iraq. The advisory system was the basis of British indirect rule. P 38.
j3 Marr, "Yasin ai-Hashimi." 'The British made public acceptance of the Treaty a prereqWsite for any
cabinet taking office." Hashirni previously opposed it in opposition or would "straddle the fence" P. 1 4 4
Tauber, Emergence of Modem S y i a and Irag. Faisal had lirnited influence in postwar Syria; influentid alFatat activists at the Syrian congress of March 1920 who announced Syria's complete independence included
Sati al-Husri, Rustum Haidar, Ali Rida Rikabi, and Ahmad Muraywid, as well as lraqi Yasin al-Hashirni.
P. 327. See Kedourie, m
d and the Middle
p. 171. See also Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 197.
m,
"
M m . "Yasin al-Hashimi." Tribal delegates against the treaty were leaders of the Iraqi revolt. '-Abd al-Hajj
Sikr. head of the ai-Fatlah tribe and Shaikh Umr al-Hajj Alwan. a sayyid frorn Karbala, whose votes could
be swayed by the guaranteeing of their land rights and tribal law." P. 137-139.
36
Main.
to u n d e n c e , p. 23. See also Sluglen .-
Amin al-Charchafchi. Abd
al-Hasul Kubba, and Sayyid Muhammad Mahdi Basir were either arrested or deported. P. 307.
"
Nakash. Shiah of Iraq. The Shi'i mujtahids feared that the election of Shi'i laity to a constituent
assembly would undennine the their position and that of Islam. P. 79.
3R
Kohn, Histop of Nationalism, p. 3 1 1.
m.
39 Nakash, Shi& of
The mujtahids alluded to British 'infidels' attacking Turkish Muslims. P. 80. See
also Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 1 140.
Nakash, W
-.
The "injudicious act of protest" by nine prominent Persian mujtahids who Ieti for
Qum was a relief to the government. P. 82. See also Kedourie, The C w m House Version, p. 250.
Ahmad Kazerni-Moussavi. T h e StniggIe for Authority in the Nineteenth Century Shiite Community:
The Emergence of the Institution of Marja-i Taqlid" (Ph. D. dissertation, McGill University. 1992).
Isfahani and Na'ini retunied to Najaf six months later. but modernizing trends checked the religious
authorities. the marja'iyat. P. 199. See also Batatu, "Iraq's Shi'a Movements: Characteristics. Causes, and
Prospects." The "great Ayatollah Mahdi al-Khalisi" was prominent in the 1920 "uprising". P. 593.
."
'"
Nakash. Shiah of Iraq. When the supreme Persian rnujtahid died. no was Ieading Shi'i cleric which
improved "the position of Iess senior Arab mujtahidin" such as Iraqi Arab Ali Kashif al-Ghita. Pp. 76. 85.
Peter Sluglett and Marion Farouk-Sluglett, "Sunnis and Shi'is Revisited Sectarianism and Ethnicity in
Authorirarian Iraq," in Iraa: Power and Socie ed. by Derek Hopwood (Oxford: Ithsca Press. 1993). p. 84.
43
Kohn, Estory of Nationalisrll, p. 3 1 2.
"
Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 3 1 1.
* Ibid. When the mujtahids al-Isfahani and ai-Na'ini were given permission to return to Iraq they w m
obliged to revoke their anti-election fatwas as well as renouncc active politics. P. 307. See also Lon_gigg.
Ir=: 1900 to 1950, p. 150.
Kohn. Histow of Nationalm. British prime minister MacDonald gave the Zraqis until July 1 1. 1924 to
ratify the treaty, after which it would be withdrawn. The president of the lraqi Constituent Assembiy,
'without previous notification' catled together its members; 69 of 100 members rippeared and voted 37 for
p. 196.
and 24 against ratification. P. 3 13. See dso Simons,,-
'"Sluglett, Britain in Iraq, p. 3 10. See Batatu,
laic
o
S-
"
34 out of 99 were tribal shaikhs. P. 95.
Kedourie. Chatham House ver si or^ p. 257.
Farouk-Slugiett, Iraqi Since 1958, p. 273. See Ireland, Iraq: A Studv in Political Develo~ment,p. 103.
51
Longrigg, Iraq: I9OO to 1950,p. 150.
'' Man. "Yasin Al-Hashimi," As quoted from Iraqi government documents. P. 438.
53
Sachar. m e n c e of the Middle East p. 381.
" Simons, From Sumer to Saddam, p.
55
197.
Farouk-Slugiett. Iraq Since 1958, p. 12.
57
Marr, Modem
m m , p. 42.
Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 154.
59
Batatu, 01d Social Classes, p. 189.
* Kohn.
Historv of Nationalism. Yet France willing telinquished its daim to Mosul in 1920 when by
mutuai agreement. Britain assigned one quarter of the oi1 of Mosul to France. Pp. 306, 3 13.
" Sirnons,. -S
The League had "predictably' decided in favour of Britain. the Coun with the
League which unpredictably demanded Britain's guarantee for the protection of the Kurds. P. 197.
" Batatu. Old Social Classes,
* Sluglett,
p. 13.
p. 124.
Deborah Amos, Lines (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1991). p. 7. John Bulloch mi
Harvey Morris. Saddam's War: The Orieins of the Kuwait Conflict and the International Resuonse
(London: Faber and Faber. 199:). With Ibn Saud at Uqair in 1922. Cox draws the iraqi, Saudi. and Kuwaiti
frontiers with a 'red' pencil, thus ending conflict for at tirne, it was renewed in 1990. P. 123.
"
Kedourie, Chatham House Version. A reason the MosuI settlernent -and the demarcation of the frontierfavoured Iraq was the Turks mistreatment of the Assyrîan Christians. P. 246
66
M m , Modern Historv of Iraq. These rights included having their own language, teachers and officiais in
their own schools and local administration. Pp. 42-43. See aIso M m . "Yasin al-Hashimi." p. 152.
67
6R
ri<)
70
Batatu, Old Social Classes, p. 329. De Gaury, Three Kinas, p. 83. Longrigg. Iraa: 1900 to 1950, p. 137.
Ismael, Roots of Conflict, p. 1.
Ibid.. p. 10. See Abdulghani, Iraq and Iran. A repercussion frorn the Anglo-Iraqi Treaty of 1932. p. S.
Longrigg, Iraa: 1900 to 1950. Yusuf Suwaidi, the Senate president, was an early nationalist who was
mested by the Cornmittee of Union and Progress for his nationalist activities in 1913. Pp. 46. 164.
"
'' Kohn. Historv of Nationalism,
73
p. 3 13.
Man, "Yasin ai-Hashirni," p. 161.
'' Kedourie, Chatham House Version. Kedourie is here refemng to the Nagib of Baghdad. Sayyid Abd aiRahman al-Gailani. an oIder and wiser man who cooperated with the British and was fust premier. P. 255.
75
De Gaury, 'Ihree Kings in Ba~hdad,pp. 63-64.
76
Main. Iraa_from Mandate to ~~~~~ndencc, p. 166.
Man, "Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 164.
Ibid., p. 174.
79
Ibid., p. 178.
Batatu,
,-O
p. 328.
Ibid., p. 332.
Kohn.
(London: George Routledge & Sons, 1932). p.
220. See also Kohn, History of Nationdism. "At the end of 1927, a treaty was concluded between lraq and
Great Britain, anticipating the abolition of mandatory status" and admission to the League. P. 3 14.
RZ
Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 178.
'' Nakash. Shiah of
ira^. Arab Mujtahid Muhammad Hasan Kashif ai-Ghita acted independently to lift ban
and promised to aid with conscription in return for half of government appointment for Shi'is. P. 37.
"
Ibid. Pan-Arabists in Iraq stressed the Persian threat, however, Shi'is argued their CO-religionistshad no
bearing on their Iraqi national identity to which they were faithful. P. 1 13.
Between the Two W a . It was viewed as rinti-Shi'i provocation by the governrnent. P. 1 19.
X7
Simon,
na
Longrigg, Iraa: 1900 to 1950. These numbers were the effect of strong mti-govemment Shi'ism. P. 180.
Marr, "Yasin al-Hashimi." p. 180.
"
Silverfarb, Bnfain's.
This was part of a wider policy and at this time India. Ireland.
Egypt, and Transjordan was given more self-nile. P. 18.
"
Longrigg,
92
'' Ibid..
m: 19ûû to 1950, p. 181.
p. 182.
YJ
Silverfarb, Britain's Informal Empire, p. 24.
V5
Ibid.. p. 153.
Y6
M m , .'Yasin al-Hashimi," p. 189.
Tarbush,
s
pp.o
129- 131.
f
Kedourie, Nationaiism, p. 136-7'O0
Longrigg, Iraq: 1900 to 1950, p. 191.
'O'
Batatu, Old Social Classes, pp. 1 156- 1 158.
'@M m . "Yasin ai-Hashimi." Shi'i extremists. secular and religious. were accused of inept leadership and
excluded from power. while the Sunni ruling elite. the Sharifians. "rose to positions of influence and
prestige." P. 141.
'O3
De Gaury, Three Kine in Baghdad, p. 63.
Hodgkin, "Lionel Smith Education in Iraq." Smith. a British official. described the Sunni politicians
as. "more or Iess incornpetent and conupt placehoiders paraiyzing any kind of good governrnent." P. 254
' O 5 William L. Cleveland, The Making of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and a
Thought of Sati al-Husri (Princeton: Princeton University Press. 1971), p. 182.
Conclusion
The nationalist movement in Iraq which emerged after the defeat of the Ottoman
Empire in 1918 was born out of the desire of Lraqis for independence. for libention from
centuries of alien domination. and for self-government in a united sovereign state within the
boundaries of Islam. Not di nationalisis in Iraq shared these goals however, there were
those who envisioned Iraq as a theocratic state. as
a supranational component, or as a
natioid entity comprising a distinct society. Some idealized a cornmon future. while others
were motivated by particular interests. Notwithstanding these differences. Sunnis and
Shi'is both participated in a unique manner in the national struggle which led to the
formation of the state of Iraq as we know it today.
Racial and sectarian divisions were. generally, more important than their common
herirage as citizens of the Ottoman Empire or members of the Muslirn cornmunity. In the
1920s. the reason for their differences was. more than anything else. based on the degee
of political power they wanted to exercise in government. Sunni Kurds who had resisted
assimilation by their Arab and Turkish CO-religionists preferred instead the bonds of
kinship with other Kurds in other lands. Sunni Arabs. although a minorit'y in the plurdism
of lraqi society, who had b e n politically and socidy dominant under the Sunni Ottoman
Turks sought to mie again in Baghdad as in the past. Shi'i Arabs, the largest majority in
h q who had been excluded from and subordinated to the advantages of Sunni power.
sought equal representation. The greatest impedirnent to a united iraq state a t h s time was
the religious dichotomy between Sunni and Shi'i Arabs.
Based on a dispute within the Islarnic cornmunity of the seventh century w h c h
remained undiminished with the passage of time. this religious schism played a major role
in the national struggle for independence. It was also a prirnary cause of the social.
economic. and political disparity between the Sunni and Shi'i Arabs of Iraq. As this thesis
has shown however. the advent of change in the late nineteenth cenniry which prepared
Iraqis for protonationalist activity saw the rise of a powerfid Shi'i Penian clergy in the holy
cities and increased Sh'i Arab politicai awareness in the urban areas. as well as Sunni h b
involvement in autonomist societies of the rnilitary institutions of Istanbul and the major
cities of the empire. Sectarian differences which were briefly bridged in the protonationalist
response to the Young Turk regirne after 1908 and in the formation of a nonsectarian
nationalist society in 1919, cuiminated in joint religious and political events prior to the
nationalist revolt against the infidel British administration of 1920.
Sunni and Shi3 Arabs could agree on a cornmon enemy. without agreeing on a
mutual politically acceptable form of state. Was religion the dynamic responsible'? Did the
Shi'i and Sunni dichotomy prevent or make this happen? Sunnism, though practiced by the
majority of Muslims worfdwide, was a minority in Iraq. Conversely. the largest majority in
Iraq was the Shi'a due to the conversion of numerous Arab tribes, a majonty controlled by
Shi'ism's most prominent religious herarchy resident in the Shi' i holy cities of Iraq w ho
were Persian. Couid both sects lay aside the schism of centuries and share the rnantle of
power in an independent Iraq?
As the preceding pages have illustrated, the most propitious events in the rise of
h q i nationaiism had religious overtones: among others, the effort by mernben of differin;
sects and religions who acted in concert to limit the growth of foreign expansionism in Iraq;
the resistance of the Shi'i Arabs and their ulama to the British invasion; the co1Iaboration of
Sunni Arab officers with the British in a revolt against the Ottomans: the postwar uprising
against their former ailies by these sarne Sunni nationalist officers and their inexplicable
aiiiance with the S h ' i Persian clergy of Najaf; the revolt of Shi'i Arab tribes against the
British administration fostered by clerics and nationalists; and, the uniting of both Sunni
and Shi'i Arabs in unprecedented joint religious and political events in support of the bid
for independence it inspired. Aithough unity dissolved in the aftermaih of defeat. religion
continued to play a major role in the nationdist opposition to British rule.
During the formative years of the h q i state, the Shi'i Persian d a m a denounced the
infidel. the mandate. and the Anglo-lraqi treaty, w h l e attempting ro rouse the tnbes in a
second [raqi revolt. They inundated the Shi'i A n b cornmunit)' with religious edicts which
forbade Shi'is working in an infidel administration, participating in govemment elections.
and. lastly, defending [raq against brother Muslims. Their anti-govemment strategy had
been successful. however this edict roused the government to action. X leading politicized
clenc was deported and other u l m withdrew to [ran in protest leaving the Shi'i leaderless.
Their political strength. their one effective resource against Sunni dominance. dissipated.
Although Shi'i and Sunni Iraqi nationalists continued to demonstrate againsr the British
mandate and the pro-British Sunni elitr in power. they could not defeat the elections w h c h
Irgitimizcd the haqi government and its democratic institutions. These crucial years of state
formation were conspicuous for the role played by religion in nationalist politics in kaq.
The new h q i parliament becarne a forum for h q i nationalist opposition to the proBritish Sunni Sharifian elite who held the most important portfolios in the cabinet. In fact.
the composition of most h q i cabinets showed a serious irnbalance. Sunnis predominated
while the Shi'i Arab, Sunni Kurd. Christian, and Jew held only token representation.
Nevertheless, the nationalist opposition combined forces and fought to Mt the power of
the Sharif'ians as they did in vetoing the conscription bill in 1977. They consistently fought
the Anglo-hqi treaties -four
during the twelve year mandate - which gave the Bntish
increasing influence. At every opportunity, the Iraqi nationalists opposed continuation of
the British mandate.
When the British negotiated for the h q i acquisition of Mosul province. they ais0
ÿrranged for a government oil concession to be senled in favour of Bntish interests. While
the terms of the oil concession were unacceptable to Iraqi nationalists, the oil potential of
hfosul would ensure the economic stabilit y necessana for i ndependence. Hoc\ ever. the
condinon attached to acquinng the oil-nch province by the League of 'iauons was a
mens-five year extension of the British mandate. a condition wtuch iraqis were loathe to
accept once al1 the prerequisites to independence were fui filled.
By constant nationalist pressure in parfiament Iraqis evennially forced the Bntish to
consider Iraqi independence at a much eariier dare than anticipated. The terminauon of the
mandate was. however. contingent upon I q ' s acceptance of a preferential mty to protect
British interests and Bntain's future ifluence in Iraq. Without the treaty Britain would not
agree to Iraqi independence. therefore. Iraqi nationdists were forced to compromise.
Sunm and Sh'i nationalists pamapated in this pursuit of an independent Iraqi state.
however, there w ere those w ho envisioned a tufid
Arab nation. Faisal' s
mintment of a
S p a n Arab nationalkt to the directorate of public educaaon, for example, had divided
rather than W i e d Iraqis and had susrained raîher than elirninated secrananism. Iraqi youth
were subjected to unequai ediicational oppornuiity and. subsequently. unequa1
representation in future Iraqi govemments. Conversely, in his atkmpts ar nation-building
and in spite of his penchant for Arab uoity, the kmg artempted to umfy Iraqis by reconciling
the sects. Faisal knew the cardinal element of idenafication was fsiam and Iraqi unity was
dependent upon solidarity arnong its Muslim elements. A solidarity which would not on1y
resmct British and Persian influence but allow for independent govenunent under his d e .
as weU as. pmcipîxon of Iraqis of both sects.
W e it is tme rhat the Shi'i Arab cummunity in Iraq was infiuenad by its religious
political leadership prior to 1924, once that lntluence was minimmd, the d e p of Shi*a
paracipation in electiom, politicai pasties, and govemment o p t i o n was meaningful and
had improved significantly by the end of the mandate. Yet Shfi representdon was limited
by the Sunni elite who f e d Shi'i power and mistwted Shi'i alledance. Meanwhile,
Shi'i Ar& sou@ integmûon in the Iraqi state, not self-mle or a merger of Iraq and Iran.
The Shi'a also sought to acc~inmodatetheir Shi'i-AmbIraqi identity.
bManyShi'i Arab poliucians made important conuibutions to die lormauon ot' the
Iraqi state. A case in point was Sayyid iMuhamad Husayn Kashif al-Ghita. a prominent
Shi*i Arab mujtahd who was also a political activist. Jafar Abu Timrnan, a respected Shi' i
merchant and pasionate iraqi naiionalist. was most responsible for the unit). of Shi'is and
Sumis
in
the summer of 1920. Briefly Iraqi minister of commerce in 19-22, Abu Th=
devoted his life to the demise of British influence and the dawn of Iraqi independence.
Sayyid Muhammad al-Sadr. a distinguished Shi' i scholar and president of Haras al-1s tiqlal.
shared his exile in Mecca with Abu Timman after the Iraqi revolt He fought for Sh'i nghts
and Iraqi independence throughout the mandate. as leader of the Renaissance party and the
Iraqi senate. Both alSadr and abu Timman. and Sunni opposition leader Y asin al-Hashimi.
were implicated in subversive artempts to ehnate the British. Wary of the Shi*i numencal
potential, the Sunni elite and the British aurhonty chose to Limit rhe Shi'is' political pwers.
Sunni Iraqi nationalists were most often found in opposition to the govemment and
many played important roles the Iraqi m i d i a movement Yusuf al-Suwaidi and Ali aiBazïrgan were among Iraq's earliest patriots. signatones of the Baghdad~petition, memben
of Haras al-Istiqlal, and activisîs in the Iraqi revolt Al-Suwaidi was appcnnted president of
the first Iraqi senate in 1925. Sayyd A M al-Muhsin Sa'dun. a Muntafiq shaikh, sewed as
a
d t a r y aide to Sultan Abdulhamd II and, during the mandate. four temis as pnme
minister of Iraq. Yasin al-Hashimt was a distinguished OItoman officer and Onanan
loyalist who served two tenns as pnme minister of Iraq. Al-Hashimi was an Aiab
nationaikt and an I r q et-
who led the pariiament in opposition to both British and
Sharifiaa mnml. Many Sunni cabmet ministers were favound members of King Faisal's
"inner circle" who conaibuted to t
k achieving of Iraqi independence. Most notable were
the powerfui Sunni Arab exdhadian officers who had fought agatnst the û ü ~ m a nin~the
Arab revoit, such as Nuri al-Said, Jafar al-Askan, Ali Jaw&t ai-Ayyubi. Jamil ai-Midfa'i,
and Mawlud Mukhlis. In fact, it was Nuri al-Said who, as prune minister of Iraq in 1932.
accepted Iraq's memberstiip in t&e League of Nations. the symbol of indepndence.
Dunnp the Arab conquest religon Kas the symbol of uni5 and victory. This c m o t
be said of religion dunng the mandate era. although it played a major role in the nationalist
movernent Religion per se was not a unifying factor in the stniggle for independence. nor
was it in die name of relipon that independenœ was
finaily achieved. The religious leader
of the Sunm Arab comrnuiuty in Baghdad deplored the unification of the Sunni and Shfi
sects. Funherrnore. the politically powerful Shi'i religious hierarchy fought for Shi*i q u a i
representation in Iraq's formative years knowing the overwhelming rano of the Shi'a to the
Sunni would soon overume exclusive Sunni leadership. However, xnne of Iraq's m a t
ardent nahonalists were Shi'is and Sunnis who sought the emancipation of the Iraqi people.
Iraqi naaonalists who formed political pmes during the man-
era worked in unison and
went to great lengths to undermine British influence and the Bri tish-sponsored government.
It was the opposition of such Imqi nationalists which won independence fur Iraq.
Power-shanng between Shfis and Sunnis was not an option between 1918 and
1932, in facf the power of the onhodox Arab etite was contingent upon the continuation of
the Shi'i-Sunni dichotorny. In spite of undeniable self-interest, rhese Sunnis held positions
of power W s e l y because of their wiilingness to work within the mandatory system to
gain Iraq its independence; an opportunity which many Shi'i narionalists refused. ïhere
were Arab nationalists among the dite. however they were not wanting in Iraqi sentiment
and engageû in the nationai stniggle to transfomi Iraq from a mandat#l territory
a
sovereign state. Ths is not to say tbat Iraq nationalists of both sec& did not amtnbue 0
the evennial independence of
Iraq.
(ni the contrary, despite Hitical
and secman obstacle^.
the cumbined and independeut efforts of Sh'i and Sunni nationaiists contnbuted to the
emergence of the Iraq state and the tennination of the British mandatedate
Both maja
religious sects of islam. the Sunni and Shiva, played major roles in the nahmht
movement in Iraq and in the bartle to end aliai politicai -011
of centuries.
Select Bibliography
Abdulghani, Jasim M. h a and Iran: The Years of Crisis. London: Croom Helm Ltd..
1984.
Ahmad, Feroz. The Young Turks: The Cornmittee of Union and Proeress in Turkish
Politics 1908 - 1914. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1969.
Al-Famqi, Ismail Rozi and David E. Sopha, eds. Historical Atlas of Religions of the
World. New York: Macmillan, 1974.
Al-Husri, Sati. "Muslim Unity and Arab Unity." Ln Arab Nationalism: An Antholom
ed. by Sylvia G. Haim. Berkeley: University of California Press, 1962: 147- 153.
Al-Khalil, Sarnir. Republic of Fear The Politics of Modem Iraq. Los Angeles: University
of California Press, 1989.
Al-Azmeh, Aziz. "Nationalism and the Arabs." Arab Studies Quarterlv f 7 (Winter 1995)
: 1-17.
Amos. Deborah. Lines in the Sand. New York: Simon & Schuster, 1992.
Anderson. Ewan W. and Khalil H. Rashidian. Iraq and the Continuhg Middle East
Crisis. London: Pinter Publishers, 1991
Batatu, Hanna. "Iraq's Underground Shia Movements: Characteristics, Cause and
Prospects." The Middle East Journal 35 (Autumn 1981) : 578-594.
The Old Social Classes and Revolutionary Movernents of Iraq. Princeton:
Princeton University Press, 1979.
Bergman, Hermas J. "The Diplornatic Missionary: John Van Ess in Iraq." The Muslirn
World 72 ( 1982): 180- 196.
Birdwood, Lord. Nuri as-Said: A Study in Arab Leadership. London: Cassel1 &
Company Ltd., 1959.
Bodley, Ronaid Victor. Gertrude Beil. New York: Macmillan. 1940.
The Messeneer:
The Life of Mohammed. New York: Doubleday & Company, Inc..
1946.
Brown, Malcolm E. The Letters of T. E. Lawrence. London: Oxford University Press.
1991.
Bulloch, John and Harvey Moms. Saddam's Wax The Orkins of the Kuwait Conflict and
the International Res~onse.London: Faber and Faber, 1991.
Busch, Briton Cooper. Britain. India. and the Arabs: 1914- 1921. Berkeley: University of
California Press, 1971.
Cleveland, William L. A Historv of the Modem Middle East. Boulder: Westview Press.
1994.
The Makinp of an Arab Nationalist: Ottomanism and Arabism in the Life and
Thoueht of Sati al-Husri. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1971.
Cohen, Stuart A. British Policy in Mesowtarnia 1903-19 14. London: lthaca Press, 1976.
Daghir, As'ad. Mudhakirati. Qahirah: Dar al-Qahirah lil-t-tibaàh, 1953.
Darwin, John. Britain. Ewpt. and the Arabs: Imuerial Policv in the Aftermath of War
19 18- 1922. Oxford: St. Martin's Press, 1993.
Davison, Roderic H. "The Advent of the Principle of Representation in the Government of
the Ottoman Empire." In Beeinnines of Modemization in the Middle East, ed. by
William R. Polk and Richard L. Chambers. Chicago: The University of Chicago
Press, 1968: 93- 108.
Turkev: A Short H i s t o ~ .Cambridge: The Eothen Press. 1988.
Dawn, C. Emest. From Ottomanism to Arabisrn: Essavs on the Ongins of Arab
Nationalisrn. Chicago: University of Illinois Press. 1973.
De Gaury, Gerald. Three Kings in Baghdad. London: Hutchison & Co. (hblishers) Ltd..
1961.
Deringil, Selim. 'The Struggle Against Shi'ism in Hamidian h q : A Study in Ottoman
Counter-Propaganda." Die Welt des Islams 30 ( 1990): 45-62.
Erskine, Mrs. Steuart. Kine Faisal of Iraq. London: Hutchison & Co.Publishers, 1933.
Esposito, John L. and John O. Voll. Islam and Democracy. New York: Oxford University
Press, 1996.
Farah, Tawfk E. Pan-Arabism and Arab Nationalisrn: The Conûnuing Debate. Boulder:
Westview Press, Inc., 1987.
Farouk-Sluglett, Marion and Peter Sluglett. 'The Historiography of Modem Iraq."
Amencan Historical Review 96 (December 1991) : 1408-1421.
Irao Since 1958: From Revolution to dicta tors hi^.
London: KPI Lirnited. 1987.
Fromkin, David. A Peace to End AU Peace: Creatine the Modem Middle East 1914- 1922.
New York: Henry Holt and Company, 1989.
Gelvin, James L. "The League of Nations and the Question of National Identity in the
Fertile Crescent." World Affairs 158 ( 1995): 35-39.
Ghassernlou. Abdul Rahman. Kurdistan and the Kurds. London: Collets Holdings
Ltd., 1965.
Gibb. H. A. R. "Ali b. Abi Talib." In Encvciooaedia of Isiam. vol. 1, London: Luzac &
CO., 1960 : 381-386.
Glubb, Jonn Bagot. The Life and Times of Muhammad. London: Hodder and Stoughton
Lirnited, 1970.
Haddad, Mahmud. "Iraq Before World War 1: A Case Of Anti-European Arab
Ottomanism." In The Orieins of Arab Nationalism, ed. by Rashid Khalidi et al
New York: Columbia University Press, 1991: 120- 150.
Haldane, Lieutenant-General Sir Aylmer L. The Insurrection in Mesoootamia. London: W.
Blackwood and Sons. 1922.
Heller. Mark. "Politics and the Military in kaq and Jordan, 1920-1958: The British
Influence." Amed Forces and Society 4 ( 1977): 75-99.
Hodgkin, E. C. "Lionei Smith on Education in Iraq". Middle Eastern Studies 19 ( 1983)
: 253-260.
Hopwood, Derek. "Social Structures and the New State 1921-1958." In Iraa: Power and
Society. ed. by Derek Hopwood. Oxford: Ithaca Press, 1993: 1- 17.
Hourani, Albert. A History of the Arab Peoales. Cambridge: The Belknap Press of
Harvard University Press, L 99 1.
Ireland, Philip W. h a : A Studv in Political Develooment. New York: Russell & Russell.
1970.
Issawi. Charles. The Fertile Crescent: 1 800- 1914. New York: Oxford University Press.
1988.
Jawad. Sa'ad. Iraa and the Kurdish Ouestion: 1958 - 1970. London: Ithaca Press, 1981.
Jordac, George. The Voice of Human Justice. h:
Ansariyan Publications, 1990.
Kazerni-Moussavi. Ahmad. "The Struggle for Authority in the Nineteenth Century Shi'ite
Cornmunity: The Emergence of the Institution of Marja-i-Taqlid." Ph. D.
dissertation, McGill University, 1992.
Keddie, Nikki. Reiijzion and Rebellion: The Tobacco Protest of 1891 - 1892. London:
Frank Cass, 1966.
Kedourie, EIie, W i c Political Memoirs and Other Studies. London: Frank Cass. 1974.
The Chatham House Version and Other Middle Eastern Studies. London:
Wiedenfeld and Nicolson, 1970.
England
and the Middle East: The Destruction of the Ottoman Em~ire.1914- 1921.
London: Bowes and Bowes, 1956.
Nationalisrn. London: Hutchison' s University Library, 1960.
folitics in the Middle East- Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.
Kelidar. Abbas. ed. The I n t e ~ t i o nof Modem Iraq. London: Croom Helm Ltd.. 1979.
Kendal, pseud. "The Kurds under the Ottoman Empire." In People Without a Countrv: The
Kurds and Kurdistan, ed. by Gerard Chaliand. London: Zed Press, 1980: 19-46.
Khalidi, Rashid. "Arab Nationalism: Historical Problerns in Literature." American
Historical Review. 96 (December 1991): 1363- 1373.
The Orieins
of Arab Nationalism. New York: Columbia University Press. 1991.
Kielmansegg, Peter Graf. Deutschland und der Erste Weltkreig Frankfun am Main:
Akadamische Verlagsgeseilschaft Athenaion, 1975.
Klieman, Aaron S. Foundations of British Policv in the Arab World. Baltimore: The
Johns Hopkins Press. IWO.
Kohn, Hans. The Aee of Nationalism: The First Global History. New York: Harper &
Brothers hblishers. 1962.
Histoxv of Nationalism in the East. London: George Routledge & Sons, 1929.
Nationalisrn and Imperialisrn in the Hither East. London: George Routledge &
Sons, 1932.
Reflections on Modem Historv: The Historian and Human Responsibility
Connecticut: Greenwood Press Publishers, 1963.
Lawrence, Thomas Edward. Revolt in the Desen. London: Jonathan Cape, 1927.
Lewin, Evans. The German Road to the East. London: William Heinemann, 1916.
Lewis, Bernard. The Arabs in Historv. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1993.
The Emereence of Modem Turkev. London: Oxford University Press, 1975.
Longrigg, Stephen Helmsley. Four Centuries of Modem Iraq. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
1925.
Iraa. 1900 to 1950: A Political. Social and Econornic Historv. London: Oxford
University Press, 1953.
Main, Emest. uiio from Mandate to Independence.
Press, 1935.
Norman: University of Oklahoma
M m , Phebe Ann. 'The Development of a Nationalist Ideology in Iraq: 1920- 1941."
Muslim World Lxxv (April 1985): 85- 101.
a
The Modem History of Iraa. Boulder: Westview Press, 1985.
"Yasin al-Hashimi: The Rise and Fa11 of a Nationalist." Ph.D. dissertation. Harvard
University, 1966.
Nakash, Yitzhak. The Shi'ah of Iraq. Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1994.
Olson, Robert W. The Emer~enceof Kurdish Nationalism and the Shaikh Said Rebellion.
1880- 1925. Austin: University of Texas Press, 1989.
The Siege of Mosul and Ottoman-Persian Relation: 17 1 8- 1743. Bloornington:
indiana University Publication, 1975.
Pelletiere, Stephen C. The Kurds: An Unstable Element in the Gulf. Boulder: Westview
Press, 1984.
Penrose, Edith and E.F. h a : International Relations and National Development. London:
Ernest Benn Limited, 1978.
Polk, William R. The Arab World. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1980.
Ramsaur, Ernest Edrnonston Jr. The Young Turks: Prelude to the Revolution of 1908.
New York: Russell & Russell, 1970.
Sachar, Howard Morley. The Emereence of the Middle East: 1914-1924.
Harmondsworth: Penguin, 1970.
Schmitt, Bernadotte E. and Harold C. Vedeler. The World in the Crucible: 1914- 1919.
New York: Harper and Row, hblishers, 1984.
Shaw, Stanford J. and Ezel K u r d Shaw. Historv of the Ottoman E m ~ i r eand Modem
Turkey. Vol. 2, Reform. Revolution. and Reoubiic: The Rise of Modem Turkey.
1808- 1975. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1977.
Shikara, Ahmad A. R. iraai Politics 1921- 1941: The Interaction Between Domestic Politics
and Foreim Policv. London: LAAM Ltd., 1987.
Silverfarb, Daniel. Britain's Informal Empire in the Middle East. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1986.
of Arab Nationalism.
Simon, Reeva. 'The Education of an Lraqi Officer." In The Orieins
ed. by Rashid Khalidi et al New York: Columbia University Press, 1991: 151- 166.
h a Between the Two World Wars: The Creation and Im~lementationof a
Nationalist Ideolow. New York: Columbia University Press. 1986.
Simons, Geoffrey L. [nu From Sumer to Saddam. London: The Macmillan Press Ltd..
1994.
Sluglett, Peter. Britain in Inq 19 14- 1932. London: Ithaca Press, 1976.
Sluglen, Peter and Marion Farouk-Sluglett. 'The Application of the 1858 Land Code in
Greater Syria: Some Preliminary Observations." In Land Tenure in the Middle East
and Nonh Africa. Beirut: Amencan University of Beirut, 1984: 409-42 1.
"Sunnis and Shi'is Revisited: Sectarianism and Ethnicity in Authontarian Iraq." In
Iraa: Power and S o c i e ~ .edited by Derek Hopwood. Oxford: Ithaca Press. 1993:
75-90.
Tarbush, Mohammad A. The Role of the Military in Politics: A Case Study of Iraa to 194 1.
London: Kegan Paul International Ltd., 1982.
Tauber, Eliezer. The Emereence of Arab Movements in World War 1. London: Frank Cass
and Co., Ltd., 1993.
The Formation of Modem Svria and Iraq. Essex, England: Frank Cass and Co.,
Ltd., 1995.
.
Taylor, A.J.P. Enelish History 1914- 1945. London: Oxford University Press, 1965.
Tibi, Bassarn. Arab Nationalism: A Critical Inauiry Trans. by Marion Farouk and Peter
Sluglen. London: The Macmillan Press, 1981.
Trumpener, Ulrich. Germanv and the Ottoman Emoire: 1914- 19 18. Princeton: Princeton
University Press, 1968.
Vanly, Ismet Sherif. "Kurdistan in Iraq." People Without a Countrv: The Kurds and
Kurdistan, ed. by Gerard Chaliand. London: Zed Press, 1980: 153-710.
Warriner, Doreen. Land and Povertv in the Middle East. London: Royal Institute of
International Affairs. 1948.
Watt, W. Montgomery. Muhammad: Proohet and Statesman. London: Oxford University
Press, 1961.
Wiet, Gaston. Baghdad: Metropolis of the Abbasid Cali hate. Norman: Univenity of
Oklahoma Press, 1971.
Wilson, Arnold T. Lovalties: Mesopotamia 1914- 1917. London: Oxford University
Press, 1930.
Zarrinkub, Abd al-Husain. "The Arab Conquest of Iran." In Cambridge History of Iran.
Vol. 4, The Penod from the Arab Invasion to the Saliuas. Cambridge: Cambridge
University Press, 1975: 3 18-322.
Zeine, Zeine N. Arab-Turkish Relations and the Emer~enceof Arab Nationdism. Beirut:
Khayat's. 1958.