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CONCORD REVIEW
I am simply one who loves the past and is diligent in investigating it.
K’ung-fu-tzu (551-479 BC) The Analects
George Ripley
Elizabeth Twomey
The Italian State
Antonia Woodford
Isidore Newman School, New Orleans, Louisiana
Horace Mann School, Bronx, New York
Theodore Roosevelt
Lucia A. Randall
Montclair Kimberley Academy, Montclair, New Jersey
Kim Dae Jung
Sinn Féin
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Perkiomen School, Pennsburg, Pennsylvania
Simeon R. Burke
Lincoln Park High School, Chicago, Illinois
Battle of Gettysburg
Robert D. Hogan
Glastonbury High School, Glastonbury, Connecticut
Sakhalin Koreans
Yeon Woo Lee
Daewon Foreign Language High School, Seoul, Korea
May Fourth Movement
Caroline W. Tan
Lynbrook High School, San Jose, California
The Land Ironclads
Cody E. Nager
Lodges vs. Kennedys
Matthew C. Weinstein
North Salem High School, North Salem, New York
Belmont Hill School, Belmont, Massachusetts
Louis vs. Schmeling
Appleby College, Oakville, Ontario, Canada
Kevin Liu
A Quarterly Review of Essays by Students of History
Volume 21, Number Two
Winter 2010
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Will Fitzhugh
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The Winter 2010 issue of The Concord Review
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THE CONCORD REVIEW
Volume Twenty-One, Number Two
1
Winter 2010
Elizabeth Twomey
George Ripley and Transcendentalism
23
Antonia Woodford
The Italian State
49 Lucia A. Randall
Theodore Roosevelt as NYC Police Commissioner
83
Youngkwon Yu
Kim Dae Jung
129
Simeon R. Burke
The Factions of Sinn Féin
151
Robert D. Hogan
Battle of Gettysburg
167
Yeon Woo Lee
Sakhalin Koreans
195
Caroline W. Tan
Woodrow Wilson and the May Fourth Movement
227
Cody E. Nager
The Land Ironclads
245
Matthew C. Weinstein
Lodges vs. Kennedys in 1952
285
Kevin Liu
Joe Louis vs. Max Schmeling
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September 15, 2010
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Notes on Contributors
Elizabeth Twomey (George Ripley) is a Senior at the Isidore
Newman School in New Orleans, Louisiana, where she received
the Yale Book Award and was named a Warren G. Moses Scholar.
She is co-editor of the school literary magazine, The Pioneer, and
plans a biology major in college.
Antonia Woodford (Italian State) is in her first year at Yale. At
the Horace Mann School in Riverdale, New York, she was captain
of the cross-country and indoor track teams, and a board member
of the Model UN Team. Her earlier paper on Italian Fascism was
published in The Concord Review.
Lucia A. Randall (Theodore Roosevelt) is a Senior at the
Montclair Kimberley Academy in Montclair, New Jersey, where she
was honored as a Faculty Scholar and won High Research Distinction
for this paper. Before her Junior year she was homeschooled
and she swims year-round. She plays the clarinet and works as an
aquatics instructor and lifeguard.
Youngkwon Yu (Kim Dae Jung) is a Senior at the Perkiomen
School in Pennsburg, Pennsylvania, where is captain of the Model
UN Team, and has been class president. He plays on the varsity
soccer team and is a member of the swim team. He plays the
saxophone in the school orchestra and is a member of the Math
and Economics Clubs.
Simeon R. Burke (Sinn Féin) is in his first year at St. Andrews
University in Scotland. He was born in Wales, spent most of his
childhood in Ireland, and two years in Fiji, and then graduated
from Lincoln Park High School in Chicago, Illinois, where he
earned the IB Diploma. At school he played drums in the band
and was on the soccer team.
Robert D. Hogan (Battle of Gettysburg) is a Senior at
Glastonbury High School in Glastonbury, Connecticut, where
he was on the ski racing team. He has been class tresurer for four
years and is a peer educator. He is in the top 1% of his class of 510,
and he was recognized by the College Board as an AP Scholar.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Yeon Woo Lee (Sakhalin Koreans) is a senior at the Daewon
Foreign Language High School in Seoul, Korea, where he has an
English major and a Chinese minor. He is the editor of Harbinger,
the school newspaper and has worked in the Associated Press
Seoul bureau.
Caroline W. Tan (May Fourth Movement) is at Yale. She
graduated from Lynbrook High School in San Jose, California,
where she was president of the Speech and Debate Team (ranked
3rd nationally) and was an AP Scholar with Distinction. In the Ivy
Scholars Progam she won the Dr. Ted Broman Award for the best
written Marshall Policy Brief.
Cody E. Nager (Land Ironclads) is a Junior at North Salem
High School in North Salem, New York, where he won first place
in the George S. & Stella McKnight essay contest. He is a research
assistant at the John Jay Homestead Historic Site, and is active in
4-H at local, state and national levels.
Matthew C. Weinstein (Lodges vs. Kennedys) is a Senior at
the Belmont Hill School in Belmont, Massachusetts, where he is
editor of The Panel, the school newspaper, and won the Monaco
American History Prize. He has placed maxima or summa cum laude
on the National Latin Exam each year, and he is a member of the
varsity crew, cross-country, and squash teams.
Kevin Liu (Louis vs. Schmeling) is a Senior at Appleby
College in Toronto, Ontario, where he volunteers as a tour guide
at the Thomas House Museum, and has been a history buff for as
long as he can remember. He plans a history major at university.
ccccc
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Elizabeth Twomey
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
GEORGE RIPLEY: A TRANSCENDENT LIFE
IN THOUGHT, WORDS AND DEEDS
Elizabeth Twomey
G
eorge Ripley was an American philosopher known
for his leadership in the Transcendentalist movement and Brook
Farm—the experimental Utopian community he established.
Along with important historical figures such as his cousin Ralph
Waldo Emerson, Bronson Alcott, Theodore Parker, Henry David
Thoreau, and Margaret Fuller, Ripley was at the center of the New
England intellectual community during the 1830s and 1840s. The
conversations among these individuals were the foundation for
the American Transcendentalist movement, which was influenced
by German philosophers such as Immanuel Kant, and focused on
the importance of self-reliance and a critical evaluation of society.
While often linked to Emerson and his July 15, 1838 address to the
senior class of the Harvard Divinity School (in which he issued an
“inspirational call to arms” by criticizing various accepted church
doctrines and encouraging the students to find the true teachings
of God in nature),1 Ripley’s views and career show that the Transcendental movement was more complex and even contradictory.
Ripley was insightful, deeply religious, and as complex as the
Transcendental movement itself. He was a man who felt it was his
responsibility to find a perfect lifestyle for mankind and preserve
Elizabeth Twomey is a Senior at the Isidore Newman School in New
Orleans, Louisiana, where she wrote this paper for Dr. Sheets’ AP United
States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
11
it. He was a natural leader and very outspoken. Everything he approached, he approached with the notion that he could make it
succeed. He pushed his fellow Transcendentalists to take risks and
turn their words into actions. To him, it was not sufficient to sit
around a room and discuss how the world could be better; people
had to take initiative and act on their beliefs. Beginning around
1840, Ripley moved beyond general Transcendentalist concepts
and created Brook Farm to do just that. Brook Farm was a community that emphasized an individual’s physical and intellectual
contributions to society and the equality of men (and women).
The experiment at Brook Farm was short-lived and its failure left
Ripley in debt. Despite his failure, however, for the rest of his life
Ripley remained committed to the principles on which Brook
Farm was based.
Thoughts
George Ripley’s early years did not foreshadow his eventual
conversion to radical ideology. He was born October 3, 1802, in
Greenfield, Massachusetts, one of ten children.2 He attended Harvard College and, during his years there, became involved with the
Unitarian movement.3 Unitarians were Christians who believed,
among other things, (1) that, to be Christian, people should seek
to understand the Bible rather than wait for an “emotional conversion experience” and (2) that Jesus Christ represented a “unitary
God” (that is, the Bible should not be interpreted as describing
a “Trinitarian deity—Father, Son, and Holy Spirit”).4 While at
Harvard, Ripley studied under Andrews Norton, chairman of
the Divinity School and an enthusiastic Unitarian who frequently
engaged in public arguments with Trinitarians and others with
whom he disagreed (including, eventually, Ripley).5 After Ripley
graduated from the Harvard Divinity School, he became a minister
of the Unitarian Purchase Street Church in Boston, Massachusetts.6
Ripley served at the Purchase Street Church from 1826 to
1841. During his time at Purchase Street, he became disillusioned
12
Elizabeth Twomey
by the country’s focus on wealth and his congregation’s apparent indifference to those who were less fortunate.7 Through his
sermons, Ripley encouraged his congregation to become more
engaged in social reforms, but they failed to do so. Frustrated by
his inability to motivate his church, Ripley eventually decided to
resign. In his final sermon at Purchase Street, Ripley described
himself as a “‘peace man, a temperance man, an abolitionist, a
transcendentalist, [and] a friend of radical reform’ in social institutions, but [noted that] his flock was not following him down these
paths as far as he wished.”8 By the time he left Purchase Street in
1841, Ripley had turned his back on the Unitarians and embraced
the teachings of the Transcendentalists, a movement which had
begun around 1830 in the town of Concord, Massachusetts.9
Ripley’s involvement with the Transcendentalists began
in 1836, after Ripley and a few other men attended Harvard’s
bicentennial celebration. Following the celebration, they began a
discussion of philosophy and literature. After that initial discussion,
Ripley proposed having regular, scheduled meetings to discuss
what he considered “serious” topics at his house.10 On September
19, 1836, Ralph Waldo Emerson, Frederic Henry Hedge, Bronson
Alcott, James Freeman Clarke, and Convers Francis met at Ripley’s home for the first meeting of the Transcendentalist Club.11
The group discussed a wide range of topics, including “Wonder
and Worship, Innocence and Guilt, Emerson’s Journals, Property,
Harvard College, Law, Truth, Individuality, Personality, God,
Revelation, Inspiration, and many more.”12 As Ripley immersed
himself in Transcendentalism, he drifted away from Unitarianism.
Ripley’s discontent with Unitarianism played out in the most
public manner. Between 1836 and 1840, he engaged in a series of
debates with Unitarian theologians through the medium of the
Boston newspapers. According to Charles Crowe, a historian and
university professor, the split between the Unitarians and Transcendentalists was in part due to the dissatisfaction with “a wide
range of subjects from church ceremonies to educational practices
and literary loyalties.”13 One of the more important differences
between the groups was the so-called “miracles controversy.” In
THE CONCORD REVIEW
13
his article on the subject, Harvard professor Irving J. Rein summarizes the Transcendentalist position: “The central point of
the transcendentalist thesis was that Christianity rested not upon
scholarship, but on universal moral truths…[whose] demonstration did not depend upon miracles or mundane evidences…Men
came to believe in religious truths because they were immanent.
The existence of God, the assurance of immortality, were given
in human nature…[It] confirmed spontaneity, emotion, instinct,
ecstasy, imagination.”14 One of the main theological points of
Transcendentalism, according to Irving, is the idea that everyone
can interpret Scripture and that miracles are not the sole basis for
the Christian faith.15
In analyzing an essay by Unitarian James Martineau in
1836, Ripley rejected the idea that miracles were “the essential
foundation of the Christian faith, or the ultimate test of Christian character.”16 According to Ripley, “it was the truth which
Jesus Christ announced rather than the wonderful works that he
wrought, that called forth the faith of his disciples.”17 He also
went further, stating, “The power of the soul, by which it gains
the intuitive perception of spiritual truth, is the original inspiration that forms the common endowment of human nature,” and
suggesting, according to Stone, “that Reason, or intuition, allows
each human, regardless of education, gender, class, or religious
training, to perceive ‘Divine Truths.’”18
Ripley strongly believed human beings were made in
God’s image and, therefore, had the power to distinguish right
from wrong and true from false. To him, humans were created to
be examples of perfection that held a responsibility.19 Ripley also
asserted that humans were made in God’s image because they are
capable of caring about others without being romantically interested. They did good deeds for others because they cared about
them, not because they wanted to be recognized. Finally, Ripley
stated humans were constantly seeking perfection because they
fully wanted to emulate God. Ripley believed his critical review
of Unitarianism were an appropriate exercise of his duties as a
man of faith and reason. Prominent members of Unitarianism,
14
Elizabeth Twomey
however, saw his discussions and ideas concerning the religion as
dangerous, and some even went so far as to call him a heretic—
including Norton, his former mentor at Harvard.20
In November 1836, Norton publicly launched a personal
attack on Ripley in the Boston Daily Advertiser.21 In the article,
Norton wrote, “[George Ripley’s views are] vitally injurious to
the cause of religion.”22 The schism between Norton and the
“radicals” as Ripley and his colleagues were referred to, centered
on the question of whether a person could interpret the word of
God himself without the aid of a clergyman; Norton believed a lay
person needed guidance, while Ripley and his colleagues believed
a person did not.23
The attack and insult maddened Ripley, and he immediately began writing a reply. Four days later, his response was
published in the Advertiser.24 Ripley described Norton’s argument
as “superficial, irreligious and false in its primary elements.”25 He
also went further, stating, “The power of the soul, by which it gains
the intuitive perception of spiritual truth, is the original inspiration that forms the common endowment of human nature,” and
suggesting, according to Stone, “that Reason, or intuition, allows
each human, regardless of education, gender, class, or religious
training, to perceive ‘Divine Truths.’”26 What angered Ripley most
was not so much the insult as the fact that Norton had advised
Ripley, from then on, to submit his work “to more mature individuals, such as Norton, before publishing them,” because many
of his ideas and beliefs were heretical and he was corrupting the
young and innocent with them.27 Ripley, of course, felt he had the
right to share his ideas with the public and that his writings were
causing harm to no one.
Nine days after his response to Norton, Ripley compiled six
essays together into a book which he titled Discourses on the Philosophy
of Religion.28 In it, Ripley laid out “the case for Transcendentalism.”29
He argued that the key to perceiving God was to be connected with
nature. He explained in his discourse: “To one, perhaps, whose
heart is tuned to the praises of his Maker, everything suggests the
presence of Divine Wisdom and Love. The voice of God is heard
THE CONCORD REVIEW
15
in the rushings of the wind and the whisperings of the breeze,
in the roar of the thunder and the fall of the rain; His hand is
visible in the glories of the midnight sky and the splendor of the
opening morn, in the fierce majesty and might of winter, and in
the greenness and beauty of the returning spring; every object is
an image of the goodness and beauty of God; every sound, a call
for His adoration; every spot a hallowed temple for His praise.”30
To Ripley, every little sound or movement was a sign from God.
In his discourse, Ripley also discussed human nature and the idea
that we were created in God’s image. He wrote, “Consider then,
my friends, these four principles of human nature, the power of
perceiving Truth–of recognizing moral distinctions–of exercising
disinterested love–and of aspiring after illimitable perfection,
and tell me, if were not made to become partakers of the Divine
Nature?”31
Ripley’s differences with the Unitarian’s theology were
profound. Within four years of the publication of his Discourses,
Ripley had decided to leave Purchase Street, and did so the following year. This chapter in Ripley’s life demonstrated his willingness
to defend his beliefs in any forum, against any foe. As for Norton,
he criticized not only the Transcendentalists, but also those of his
Unitarian peers whom Norton viewed as too tolerant: “By the end
of his participation in the transcendental controversy, Norton
had identified two ‘parties’ threatening the religious and social
stability of New England: the transcendental ‘mystagogues’ like
Ripley, [Orestes] Brownson, and Elizabeth Peabody and the ‘new
party’ of Unitarian ministers like Dr. [William] Channing and [Dr.
James] Walker who countenanced the Transcendental views.”32
Words
In September 1839, the Transcendentalist Club members
decided to publish a new magazine, which they would call The Dial
(a title Alcott suggested because it was what he called his personal
journal).33 One of the primary reasons the group supported a
16
Elizabeth Twomey
new magazine was the refusal of other established publications
to print articles on Transcendentalist topics.34 The group agreed
that the general subject matter of the new magazine would be
Transcendentalist philosophy. According to Emerson, “[The Dial
should] contain the best advice on the topics of Government,
Temperance, Abolition, Trade, and Domestic Life, [not] a mere
literary journal.”35 Those involved with the preliminary work for
the magazine were Ripley, Emerson, and Margaret Fuller. Margaret Fuller served as first editor of the magazine, and Ripley was in
charge of the business arrangements.36
In April of 1840, the first issue of The Dial was published.37
Unfortunately, the issue was not particularly successful. The main
complaint about the magazine concerned its content. Many
readers believed the magazine focused too much on religious
and moral issues “at the expense of belles letters.”38 Ripley himself
was not satisfied with the periodical as he believed it failed to address adequately the important issues of the Transcendentalist
movement. While some of its readers, including moderates in the
Unitarian ministry, enjoyed it, The Dial was not as widely read as
Ripley, Fuller, and others had hoped it would be.39 According to
Emerson, The Dial “enjoyed its obscurity for four years.”40 Ripley
left The Dial in 1841 and the magazine published its last edition
in 1844.41
Deeds
While Ripley was involved with The Dial, he discovered
the ideas of Charles Fourier. Fourier was a French socialist who
believed “that work necessary to support a community could be
distributed in such a way as to match people’s tasks with their
individual desires and ability to do them.”42 Based on Fourier’s
The Social Destiny of Man, Ripley wanted to create a community
in which there would be a combination of “intellectual, manual,
and managerial labor in a harmonious social system.”43 During a Transcendentalist Club meeting in October 1840, Ripley
introduced his plans for a community he called Brook Farm.44
THE CONCORD REVIEW
17
The members of the Club were genuinely interested, but no one
would commit to joining this experimental community.45 Ripley’s
biggest recruiting disappointment was Emerson’s decision not to
join because Emerson was a prominent figure in the movement
and many looked to him for guidance.46 If Emerson had joined
Brook Farm, then many other Transcendentalists also might have
done so.
In early spring of 1841, Ripley resigned as the minister of
the Purchase Street Church and in April, he and his wife arrived
at Brook Farm in West Roxbury, Massachusetts.47 Ripley intended
for Brook Farm to be a place where there was a balance between
physical work and intellectual endeavors. It attracted a diverse
group, from intellectuals, as Frothingham refers to them, to “unintellectuals.”48 By the spring of 1842, the community consisted
of a school with thirty pupils and about one hundred adults who
“constituted the working contingent, those who actually lived and
worked at Brook Farm for more than one season.”49 On any given
day, Ripley could be seen milking cows, teaching classes, gardening,
or engaging in any other task that needed to be accomplished.
At the end of the first summer, the community seemed to be doing well financially and Ripley was able to turn his attention from
his daily tasks to begin to focus on marketing activities. Although
the community was stable, it desperately needed new members.50
Up to that point, Ripley had relied on magazines to send Brook
Farm’s message. For example, The Dial and The Democratic Review
(another magazine being printed at the time) usually printed
favorable reviews about Ripley’s community. In September 1841,
Ripley began working on various marketing activities such as writing a new constitution and creating an “economic conditions”
report with the hope that more people would come live at Brook
Farm.51
Members of the Brook Farm community did not have a
single, unified vision of what the community really was. According
to Crowe, “The community was many things to many people: an
enterprise of communitarians vaguely connected to a Christian
socialist past, a society of nineteenth-century ‘Utopian’ socialists
18
Elizabeth Twomey
who drew inspiration from Charles Fourier and other European
writers; a Transcendentalist venture; and, finally, a community of
sentimental memoirs about a life both serious and charming.”52
Some authors conclude that Ripley and others believed John
Winthrop’s “A City upon a Hill,” reference53 applied to Brook
Farm. For example, Charles Crowe argues that many people
perceived Brook Farm as “a beacon to the world.”54 In a letter to
a prospective member, Ripley described the community, writing:
“[W]e are seekers of universal truth…We are striving to establish
a mode of life which shall combine the enchantments of poetry
with the facts of daily experience…We are not in the interest of
any sect, party, or coterie; we have faith in the soul of man, in the
universal soul of things.”55 He believed that what he and his colleagues were doing at Brook Farm was unique and being done
for spiritual reasons. He wanted the people to feel a spiritual and
harmonious connection between nature, intellect, and labor while
living at the community. Philip McFarland, an historian who has
written extensively about New England historical figures (including the author Nathaniel Hawthorne) writes that one of the goals
of the community was “to help save the world by setting a good
example.”56
Not everyone viewed Brook Farm as serving a higher purpose. To Nathaniel Hawthorne, Brook Farm was merely a place
where he could live cheaply and write frequently.57 One critic of
the community wrote in The Dial that the community consisted of
“[a] few individuals who, unknown to each other, under different
disciplines of life, reacting from different social evils, but aiming at
the same object—of being wholly true to their natures as men and
women—have been made acquainted with one another, and have
determined to become the faculty of the embryo university.”58 This
critic suggested that the community was made up of people who
wanted to achieve different goals. These people, in his opinion,
were not held together by anything other than the desire to have
a different life at Brook Farm.
According to Emerson, Brook Farm was “a noble and
generous movement in the projectors, to try an experiment of
THE CONCORD REVIEW
19
better living. They had the feeling that our ways of living were
too conventional and expensive, not allowing each to do what he
had a talent for, and not permitting men to combine cultivation
of mind and heart with a reasonable amount of daily labor. At the
same time, it was an attempt to lift others with themselves, and to
share the advantages they should attain, with others now deprived
of them.”59 Emerson believed Ripley’s experimental community
was created with good intentions but was a radically different community which expressed its ideas. Emerson also did not believe
there was order in the society because it lacked someone who
directed and was in charge of the entire community. To him, it
appeared everyone was responsible only for his own actions. In
what may have been the most cutting criticism, Emerson described
the members of Brook Farm as, “happy, hapless anarchists.”60
They enjoyed what they did and how they lived, including the
opportunity to express new and radical ideas.
According to Henry Golemba, Brook Farm was a community in which “many gathered, the young and the old, the
zealous and the confused, ‘[and, according to Emerson, Brook
Farmers were] madmen, madwomen, men with beards, Dunkers,
Muggletonians, Come-outers, Groaners, Agrarians…Abolitionists,
Calvinists, Unitarians,’ whose commonality was that they ‘were in
search of something better and more satisfying than a vote or a
definition.’”61
During his time at Brook Farm, Ripley struggled with
obtaining a balance between collective living and individualism.
He wrote in a letter, “The evils arising from trade and money, it
appears to me, grow out of the defects of our social organization,
not from an intrinsic vice in the things themselves; and the abolition
of private property, I fear, would so far destroy the independence
of the individual as to interfere with the greatest object of all social
reforms; namely, the development of humanity, the substitution of
a race of free, noble, holy men and women instead of the dwarfish
and mutilated specimens which now cover the earth. The great
problem is to guarantee individualism against the masses on the
one hand, and the masses against the individual on the other.”62
20
Elizabeth Twomey
Ripley believed in order to create a perfect independent
society, it had to be self-sufficient. Therefore, he believed, the evils
of the outside world (such as materialism) would be eliminated
and a perfect, sustainable society would arise. However, though
the economy was centralized, Ripley still believed private property
was essential to foster independence. While trying to balance
the needs of individuals with the needs of the community, Ripley
leaned toward the community, which led him away from Transcendentalism and further towards the ideals of Charles Fourier
and Fourierism.63
Fourierism may have appealed to Ripley because of the
similarity between Fourier’s character and his own. Both men could
be described as possessing at an early age certain traits that defined
them later on in life. For Ripley, these traits were “group effort,
criticism of society’s ills, and faith in a better life.”64 For Fourier,
they were “firmness of will…integrity and freedom of thought…
independence of traditional errors and social prejudice.”65 In the
years between 1844 and 1847, Ripley wrote a lecture on Fourier,
which was never published. He described Fourier, writing, “In
boldness, acuteness, and depth of thought … in the almost fearful
power of intellect, with which he [Fourier] penetrated into the
mysteries of nature, he stands, unrivalled and unapproached on
the records of scientific investigation. The results of his thought
…apply directly to the most important institutions of mankind,
to the practical organization of the social state, and to the fulfillment of human destiny on earth.”66 Ripley believed Fourier was
an intellectual genius who knew how to organize a community
and make it efficient.
This shift in emphasis became clear with the adoption of
a new constitution. In January of 1844, he replaced the original
constitution of the Brook Farm community with one which was
mainly based on Fourierite ideals.67 Once the constitution was
written and accepted, Ripley decided to implement as many of
Fourier’s ideals into his community as possible. One of his key
ideas was to provide “a wide choice of employment” for individuals
with different skills.68 This structure, Ripley believed, would help
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21
the community become more efficient. In March 1845, Ripley
decided to reorganize the community under a third new constitution.69 He concluded that, under the first Fourierite constitution,
the community lacked order and structure because there was little
attempt to ensure that the needs of the community matched the
work each member chose to perform. Through the reorganization,
Ripley sought “to create a greater ‘unity of design’ throughout
the phalanx” by providing some centralized guidance to the work
efforts.70
With the adoption of the third constitution, the name of the
community changed to the Brook Farm Phalanx71 (previously the
official name of the community was the Brook Farm Association),
and, as Ripley focused more intently on Fourier’s teachings, the
community’s visitors also gradually changed. After Brook Farm
adopted Fourierite programs and ideals, Transcendentalist visitors
were less frequent because they felt the community was becoming
more socialist, which conflicted with their views of independence
and self-reliance. They believed the spiritual experience was being overshadowed by a need to become systematic and create a
truly equal society. However, people who supported socialist ideals
approved of the direction in which Ripley was guiding the community, and it was these individuals who began to flock to Brook
Farm.72
Within the community, the new ideals were accepted and
the morale increased. Members took it upon themselves to use
their leisure time to raise money for the construction of the Phalanx.73 For the first time, Ripley “instituted regular study hours
and fairly detailed rules” in the school.74 Instead of discussing
Kant in his Saturday afternoon lectures, Ripley began to speak
about Fourier and his ideals.75 Kant had been a regular subject of
lectures because his ideas were influential to the Transcendentalist movement. However, once the community adopted Fourierite
ideals, Ripley found it more useful to discuss the relevant points
of Fourierism rather than those ideals which lay at the center of
Transcendentalism.
22
Elizabeth Twomey
During December of 1845, “the first [full] year under
Fourierism,” there was general optimism due to “diversification
of industry, incorporation by state charter in March, 1845, an increase of invested capital by ten thousand dollars, and the laying
of foundation for a great communal center, the Phalanstery,” such
that Brook Farm actually ended the year with a cash surplus.76 This
fact increased the optimism in the community and, for the first
two months, it seemed as if nothing could go wrong. However,
on March 1, 1846, a fire struck the Phalanstery and the newly
completed building was destroyed.77 The fire left the community
in financial troubles.78 The time between the fire and the end of
Brook Farm was a trying one for everyone involved in the community, and in September of 1847, the Brook Farm experiment
came to an end. The ending of the community was caused mainly
by the fact there were no finances left to sustain the community.
It went into debt and was unable to persuade people either to stay
or join after the fire. The debts mounted to such an extent that
Brook Farm was forced to disband.
The end of Brook Farm had a profound effect on Ripley.
According to Octavius Frothingham (a contemporary of Ripley
and the author of a sympathetic biography), the end of Brook
Farm left Ripley feeling bitter. Frothingham writes, “How bitter
is evident from the fact that he [Ripley] never referred to Brook
Farm except in intimate conversation with his old comrades, or
with one to whom he could unbosom his soul. At times he spoke
of it in terms of banter such as one may use to conceal deep feelings; at other times, though this was rare, he dwelt with solemnity
on the aims which sent him thither and kept him there doing the
work he did for so many years. His faith in the principles remained
with him through his life.”79 It was after the failure of Brook Farm
that Ripley wrote the poem entitled “The Angels of the Past,” in
which he described his sorrow:
My buried days!—in bitter tears
I sit beside your tomb,
And ghostly forms of vanished years
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Flit through my spirit’s gloom.
In throngs around my soul they press,
They fill my dreamy sight
With visions of past loveliness
And shapes of lost delight.
Like angles of the Lord they move
Each on his mystic way,—
These blessed messengers of love,
These heralds of the day.
And as they pass, the conscious air
Is stirred to music round,
And a murmur of harmonious prayer
Is breathed along the ground.
And sorrow dies from out my heart
In exhalations sweet,
And the bands of life, which she did part,
In blessed union meet.
The past and future o’er my head
Their sacred grasp entwine,
And the eyes of all the holy dead
Around, before me, shine.
And I rise to life and duty,
From nights of fear and death,
With a deeper sense of beauty
And fuller strength of faith.80
23
24
Elizabeth Twomey
In this poem, Ripley reminisced about his life before and during
Brook Farm when all of his endeavors seemed to be succeeding.
Once the community was dissolved, Ripley did not know what he
was going to do to pay off the numerous debts accumulated from
Brook Farm. In his mind, the events of the past and the events of
the future were connected; therefore, he needed to learn from
his mistakes and move on rather than dwell on the past. In his
poem, he realized the next few months or years were going to be
difficult, but this time would give him a greater understanding of
life, faith, purpose, and commitment.
After the closure of Brook Farm, Ripley decided to take
a position with Horace Greeley’s New York Tribune.81 Ripley took
this job in order to pay off the Brook Farm debts, and because
he also was in personal financial trouble. Everything he had was
put into sustaining Brook Farm, so when it collapsed, he was left
with almost nothing. He also co-edited The Cyclopedia, a widely
acclaimed reference book published in 1862.82 Ripley was seventyseven when he died on July 4, 1880.
In Retrospect
George Ripley should be remembered as a thoughtful
idealist who made sincere efforts to improve society, and many of
his principles can be found in society today. He believed that all
activities, whether physical or intellectual, should be approached
with purpose. He put all of his energy into whatever he did, whether
it was pushing a congregation to help their fellow men, defending Transcendentalism from attacks by Unitarians, or creating an
entirely new community. He was a true leader who spoke his mind
and was critical of other people’s work as well as his own. Over the
course of his life, Ripley searched for the right set of ideals and
worked to implement them.
Ripley was a man who was dedicated to making this world a
better place. He started Brook Farm in an attempt to demonstrate
how mankind should live. Although most of the prominent Tran-
THE CONCORD REVIEW
25
scendentalist figures declined to join his experiment (Emerson,
Fuller, etc), Ripley was never shaken in his beliefs. Moreover,
Ripley was a hard worker who invested almost all of his life to
helping others and trying to change mankind. Ripley was devoted
to his work and beliefs for the rest of his life and the closure of
Brook Farm, for him, was devastating. Clearly, he felt responsible
for how well the experiment went and how it was perceived by
others. When it ended, Ripley felt as if he had somehow failed.
However, it seems to me that he succeeded. He wanted to teach
the world what Transcendentalists believed through example,
which is more efficient than any essay. Emerson argued in 1838
that the graduating class from Harvard’s Divinity School could not
communicate with their future congregations without the benefit
of personal experiences. Ripley certainly embodied Emerson’s ideals. Through his experimental community, he did what no other
Transcendentalist had succeeded in doing before—he opened
the minds of the people he was able to reach to Transcendentalist
thoughts, ideals, and beliefs.
26
Elizabeth Twomey
Endnotes
1
Philip F. Gura, American Transcendentalism (New York:
Hill and Wang, 2007) p. 105
2
Ibid., p. 79
3
David Robinson, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Unitarian
and Universalist Biographies, Unitarian Universalist Historical
Society, http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/
georgeripley.html (accessed October 11, 2009)
4
Gura, p. 23
5
Ibid., pp. 33-34
6
Octavius Frothingham, Transcendentalism in New
England (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959) p. 323
7
Gura, pp. 141-142
8
Ibid., p. 144 (paraphrasing Ripley)
9
Richard G. Geldard, The Essential Transcendentalists
(New York: Penguin Group, 2005) p. 6
10
Charles Crowe, George Ripley: Transcendentalist and
Utopian Socialist (Doraville, GA: Foote & Davies, 1967) p. 82
11
Susan M. Stone, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Literary
Biography Vol. 235: The American Renaissance in New
England, Third Series (Detroit: Gale Group, 2001) p. 360
12
Crowe, p. 84
13
Ibid., p. 62
14
Irving J. Rein, “The New England Transcendentalists:
Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 1.2 (1968)
p. 103
15
Ibid., p. 103
16
Robinson
17
Gura, p. 82 (quoting Ripley)
18
Stone, p. 360 (quoting Ripley)
19
George Ripley, “Discourses on the Philosophy of
Religion,” The Transcendentalists–The Classic Anthology, ed.
Perry Miller (New York: MJF Books, 1950) p. 140
20
Henry L. Golemba, George Ripley (Boston: G.K. Hall &
Co, 1977) pp. 38-39
21
Ibid., p. 39
22
Robinson
23
Golemba, p. 40
24
Ibid., p. 39
25
Robinson
26
Stone, p. 360 (quoting Ripley)
27
Golemba, p. 39
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Ibid., p. 42
Ripley, p. 132
30
Ibid., p. 136
31
Ibid., p. 140
32
Robert D. Habich, “Emerson’s Reluctant Foe: Andrews
Norton and the Transcendental Controversy” The New
England Quarterly 65.2 (1992) p. 237
33
Crowe, p. 86
34
Golemba, p. 58
35
Lawrence C. Porter, “Transcendentalism: A Self-Portrait.”
The New England Quarterly 35.1 (1962) pp. 42-43 (quoting
Emerson)
36
Crowe, p. 87
37
Ibid., p. 89
38
Ibid., p. 90
39
Gura, p. 225
40
Ralph W. Emerson, “Historic Notes of Life and Letters
in New England,” Lectures and Biographical Sketches, ed. J.E.
Cabot (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883) p. 343
41
Golemba, p. 60
42
Robinson
43
Crowe, p. 137
44
Golemba, p. 64
45
Stone, p. 362
46
Golemba, p. 66
47
Stone, p. 362
48
Frothingham, Transcendentalism p. 165
49
Golemba, p. 82
50
Crowe, p. 145
51
Ibid., p. 145
52
Ibid., p. 146
53
John Winthrop, in 1630, referred to the Massachusetts
Bay Colony as “A City upon a Hill” because he believed God
had a special mission for the settlers of the colony.
54
Crowe, p. 144
55
Octavius Frothingham, George Ripley (Boston:
Houghton, 1882) p. 144
56
Philip McFarland, Hawthorne in Concord (New York:
Grove, 2004) p. 82
57
Ibid., p. 84
58
Frothingham, Ripley p. 122
59
Emerson, p. 360
60
Ibid., p. 368
28
29
27
28
Elizabeth Twomey
Golemba, p. 65 (quoting Emerson)
Frothingham, Ripley p. 147 (quoting Ripley)
63
Crowe, p. 167
64
Golemba, p. 16
65
David A. Zonderman, “George Ripley’s Unpublished
Lecture on Charles Fourier,” Studies in the American
Renaissance (1982) p. 189
66
Ibid., p. 189
67
Gura, p. 165
68
Crowe, p. 176
69
Gura, p. 167
70
Crowe, p. 177
71
According to Fourier, “Each ‘phalanx,’ the group who
lived in a phalanstery, was thus comprised of a variety of
individuals in terms of backgrounds and skills, all of whose
basic needs were supplied in common…because of the
increased production incumbent on cooperative labor, even as
different jobs yielded different dividends, depending on their
difficulty and desirability.” Gura, p. 162
72
Crowe, p. 179
73
Ibid., p. 177
74
Ibid., p. 179
75
Ibid., pp. 179-180
76
Ibid., p. 184
77
Golemba, p. 95
78
Gura, p. 168
79
Frothingham, Ripley p. 356
80
Ibid., pp. 197-198
81
Golemba, p. 116
82
Ibid., p. 114
61
62
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Bibliography
Crowe, Charles, George Ripley: Transcendentalist and
Utopian Socialist, Doraville, Georgia: Foote & Davies, 1967
Emerson, Ralph W., “Historic Notes of Life and Letters in
New England,” Lectures and Biographical Sketches. Edited by
J.E. Cabot, Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 1883
Frothingham, Octavius, George Ripley, Boston: Houghton,
1882
. Transcendentalism in New England,
New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 1959
Geldard, Richard G., The Essential Transcendentalists.
New York: Penguin Group, 2005
Golemba, Henry L., George Ripley, Boston: G.K. Hall &
Co., 1977
Gura, Philip F., American Transcendentalism, New York:
Hill and Wang, 2007
Habich, Robert D., “Emerson’s Reluctant Foe: Andrews
Norton and the Transcendental Controversy,” The New England
Quarterly 65.2 (1992) pp. 208-237
McFarland, Philip, Hawthorne in Concord, New York:
Grove, 2004
Porter, Lawrence C., “Transcendentalism: A Self-Portrait,”
The New England Quarterly 35.1 (1962) pp. 27-47
Rein, Irving J., “The New England Transcendentalists:
Philosophy and Rhetoric,” Philosophy & Rhetoric 1.2 (1968)
pp. 103-117
Ripley, George, “Discourses on the Philosophy of Religion,”
The Transcendentalists: the Classic Anthology, Ed. Perry
Miller, New York: MJF Books, 1950, pp. 132-140
29
30
Elizabeth Twomey
Robinson, David, “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Unitarian
and Universalist Biographies, Unitarian Universalist Historical
Society. http://www25.uua.org/uuhs/duub/articles/
georgeripley.html (accessed October 11, 2009)
Stone, Susan M., “George Ripley,” Dictionary of Literary
Biography, Vol. 235: The American Renaissance in New
England, Third Series, Detroit: Gale Group, 2001
Zonderman, David A., “George Ripley’s Unpublished
Lecture on Charles Fourier,” Studies in the American
Renaissance (1982) pp. 185-208
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Thus for sixteen days I saw from my window a hundred men at
work like busy husbandmen, with teams and horses and apparently
all the implements of farming, such a picture as we see on the first
page of the almanac; and as often as I looked out I was reminded
of the fable of the lark and the reapers, or the parable of the sower,
and the like; and now they are all gone, and in thirty days more,
probably, I shall look from the same window on the pure sea-green
Walden water there, reflecting the clouds and trees, and sending up
its evaporations in solitude, and no traces will appear that a man
has ever stood there. Perhaps I shall hear a solitary loon laugh as
he dives and plumes himself, or shall see a lonely fisher in his boat,
like a floating leaf, beholding his form reflected in the waves, where
lately a hundred men securely labored.
Thus it appears that the sweltering inhabitants of Charleston
and New Orleans, of Madras and Bombay and Calcutta, drink at
my well. In the morning I bathe my intellect in the stupendous
and cosmogonal philosophy of the Bhagavad-Gita, since whose
composition years of the gods have elapsed, and in comparison
with which our modern world and its literature seem puny and
trivial; and I doubt if that philosophy is not to be referred to a
previous state of existence, so remote is its sublimity from our
conceptions. I lay down the book and go to my well for water, and
lo! there I meet the servant of the Brahmin, priest of Brahma and
Vishnu and Indra, who still sits in his temple on the Ganges reading
the Vedas, or dwells at the root of a tree with his crust and water
jug. I meet his servant come to draw water for his master, and our
buckets as it were grate together in the same well. The pure Walden
water is mingled with the sacred water of the Ganges. With favoring
winds it is wafted past the site of the fabulous islands of Atlantis
and the Hesperides, makes the periplus of Hanno, and, floating by
Ternate and Tidore and the mouth of the Persian Gulf, melts in
the tropic gales of the Indian seas, and is landed in ports of which
Alexander only heard the names.
Henry David Thoreau, Walden
(New York: Bantam Books, 1962) pp. 324-325
31
THE
REVIEW
Copyright 2010, by
The CONCORD
Concord Review,
Inc., all rights reserved 23
FASCISTS, TERRORISTS, AND MAFIOSI:
CHALLENGES TO THE ITALIAN STATE
IN THE TWENTIETH CENTURY
Antonia Woodford
T
he Christian Democratic politician Aldo Moro once
described Italy as a “difficult democracy”: a state beset by unstable
government coalitions and by a populace profoundly distrustful of those in power.1 Ever since Italian unification in 1861, a
government perceived as inefficient, ineffective, or even hostile
to its people has spawned a gap between citizen and state that
invites challenges to the political establishment. In the twentieth
century, Fascists, terrorists, and mafiosi each threatened political
legitimacy. These groups, all violent, posed as remedies for certain
government ills, yet they diverged in their relationships to the state.
Mussolini maneuvered to take over the state, while terrorists in the
Red Brigades plotted the state’s destruction. The Mafia chose to
cohabit with the state, exploiting it from within without causing
its dissolution. The nature of each group’s relationship with the
state would ultimately determine that group’s fate: its demise or
survival.
The danger of these groups to the government lay most
visibly in their use of violence. As Max Weber wrote, the ability to
“monopolize the use of force” is “essential” to a functioning state.2
Antonia Woodford is at Yale. She wrote this paper at the Horace Mann
School in Riverdale, New York, as an independent study for Dr. Elisa
Milkes in the 2009/2010 academic year.
24
Antonia Woodford
As soon as other institutions claim the authority to use violence, the
legitimacy of the state suffers. Through overt displays of violence,
Fascists in the 1920s, terrorists in the 1970s, and Mafia members
in the last half of the century demonstrated the state’s incapacity
to monopolize force. Only in the case of terrorism were these
violent acts directed against the state itself, but they all nevertheless undercut state power.
In the early 1920s, Mussolini’s willingness to use violence
against socialists catapulted him and his National Fascist Party
into the national spotlight. Italy had experienced a biennio rosso
from 1919 to 1920, a “red two years” of intense labor agitation.
Widespread factory occupations and calls for socialist revolution
inspired panic among conservatives, yet the liberal government
preferred not to intervene. Mussolini decided to exercise force
where the state would not, and in so doing he assumed the state’s
role as the arbiter of violence. In Italy’s northeastern Po Valley,
where socialist Labor Exchanges controlled the labor pool and
forced concessions from landowners, Fascist gang members
began mounting nightly attacks on socialist offices. In the first
half of 1921 alone, these squadristi “destroyed 17 newspapers and
printing works, 59 Peoples’ Houses (socialist headquarters), 119
Chambers of Labor (socialist employment offices), 107 cooperatives, 83 Peasants’ Leagues, 151 socialist clubs, and 151 cultural
organizations.”3 Such violence not only secured Mussolini the
support of landowners, but also caught the attention of national
politicians. His “de facto power” in the countryside, established
through physical force, made him impossible to ignore.4
Further undermining the state was that Mussolini exercised
violence with seeming impunity. Local law enforcement officials
were complicit in the squadristi’s expeditions, lending trucks and
weapons and conveniently neglecting to interfere with Fascist
acts of violence. Magistrates looked more favorably upon Fascist
violence than socialist violence, and some police officers even
participated in the squadristi’s raids.5 In the 1921 parliamentary
elections, politicians such as liberal Prime Minister Giovanni Giolitti welcomed Mussolini into their antisocialist coalition; with 35
THE CONCORD REVIEW
25
representatives elected to parliament, the Fascist party of thugs
suddenly appeared respectable.6
Fascist violence, however, was selective. Mussolini was careful to ensure that powerful elites—the people he would rely on to
acquire power—never felt that Fascist violence would turn against
them. Liberals like Giolitti supported Fascism with the assumption
that the movement would eventually “normalize,” ceasing to be
violent once it had achieved stability. They also reasoned that if
Fascism was an unpleasant alternative, surely Communism would
be worse. Cleverly, Mussolini stirred up additional disorder with his
squadristi and then presented himself as the only person capable
of restoring calm, of both quashing socialism and restraining his
own Fascist aggressors.7
Mafia violence, too, tended not to attack the government
directly. While Mafia bosses did order the murders of politicians
and state employees such as magistrates, the killings were meant
to eliminate specific individuals seen as threats to Mafia families;
the Mafia never desired the overthrow of the state. Yet compared
to the Fascists, mafiosi targeted a much broader range of victims
and used their violence for a multiplicity of goals. Mafia violence
functioned to regulate Mafia clan dynamics, to give the Mafia an
edge in business deals, and to solidify clans’ “political dominion”
in a given territory.8 In addition, sometimes the Mafia was violent
simply because it could be without suffering any consequences.
Roberto Saviano narrates how members of the Neapolitan Camorra,
an organized crime group similar to the Sicilian Mafia, tested out
new assault rifles by firing into shops’ bulletproof glass windows.
And often, motives for violence were interrelated. Firing at the
windows rather than the open countryside came with “a side benefit: the local glass companies with the best prices on replacement
windows are all related to the clan; the more broken glass, the
more money they make.”9
Within Mafia families, violence served to reinforce or uproot
clan hierarchies and to enforce codes of secrecy. As described by
mafiosi who collaborated with the police, each clan had a strict
hierarchy. The capofamiglia, literally the “family head,” held the
26
Antonia Woodford
most authority, followed by a few counselors (consiglieri) and then
lower-ranking members. Though theoretically elected by the rest
of their clan, family heads frequently imposed their leadership
by force. Since Mafia power rested on the “capacity to personally
employ or command violence,” it was acceptable for a lower-level
mafioso to shoot the capofamiglia and assume his place.10 Regardless of how they came to power, family heads subsequently used
violence to monitor clan affairs. They ordained the killing of
mafiosi who violated the traditional code of secrecy (omertà) and
of any members of rival clans who encroached on their territory.11
Unlike Mussolini’s attacks on socialists, the goal of Mafia
violence was more commercial. It sprung from the will to acquire profits and power, and as such it did not discriminate by
ideology. When pursuing business interests—in everything from
construction and trash disposal to trafficking in arms, drugs, and
cigarettes—mafiosi were “pleased to take whatever they can get by
force and fraud,” Letizia Paoli writes.12 Whether they were dealing
with fellow mafiosi, Mafia affiliates, or regular business owners,
Mafia members applied force to further their own interests. Paoli
recounts how in the 1980s, the heyday of Mafia drug trafficking,
two mafiosi racked up a large debt to Turkish heroin suppliers and
finally killed the Turks rather than paying them. Mafia groups also
required all enterprises operating in their areas to pay the pizzo,
an extortion tax. Mafia bosses intimidated business owners who
refused to comply by progressively extreme measures, warning
them with a phone call, perhaps strangling their pets or smashing
their windows, and ultimately killing the most stubborn resisters.13
In essence, Mafia violence aimed to punish anyone seen
as a threat to a Mafia clan. Mafia family heads often entered alliances with politicians, guaranteeing votes from districts their
clans controlled in exchange for legal protection.14 When the
state intensified its antimafia efforts in the mid-1980s and again
in 1992, the Mafia lashed out against formerly friendly politicians
who had “failed” to defend Mafia interests. After 342 people were
convicted of mafia-type association or mafia-related crimes in the
“maxi-trial” of 1986-1987, the Mafia retaliated swiftly and brutally
THE CONCORD REVIEW
27
against those it deemed culpable. Mafiosi assassinated not only
major judges and prosecutors involved in the case—men who were
clearly never Mafia affiliates—but also politicians like Salvo Lima,
a Sicilian reputed to have Mafia sympathies. The maxi-trial verdicts
were challenged in Italy’s appeals courts, and mafiosi expected
Lima to influence the Supreme Court to rule in the Mafia’s favor.
But after the court affirmed the verdicts in 1992, “Lima was killed
because he did not uphold, or couldn’t uphold, the commitments
he had made,” former mafioso Gaspare Mutolo testified.15 The
Mafia even went so far as to murder priests who dared to speak
out against it.16 Its killings were calculated to protect the Mafia
organization, regardless of moral scruples.
The Red Brigades also struck a wide variety of targets,
including factory managers, industrialists, politicians, policemen,
lawyers, judges, and journalists. However, in contrast to the Mafia,
the terrorist violence of the Red Brigades was just ideological.
And unlike both Fascists and mafiosi, brigatisti sought nothing
less than the complete overthrow of the state. If both Fascist and
Mafia violence intended to enhance their practitioners’ own power,
Red Brigade violence had the external goal of revolutionizing
society. The brigatisti identified themselves with Marxist-Leninism
and conceived of the state as the “absolute enemy.”17 From their
founding in 1970 to their decline in the early 1980s, the Red
Brigades ratcheted up the intensity and scope of their violence
as they waged a “war” on the Italian government.18
According to Luigi Manconi, the spark for the Red Brigades’
militancy was lit in December 1969, when neo-fascist extremists
planted a bomb in Milan’s Piazza Fontana that killed 17 people
and wounded 88. The police arrested two left-wing anarchists for
the crime, one of whom “fell out” of a police station window while
under interrogation and died, and they continued to prosecute
the surviving anarchist even as his innocence became apparent.
Future brigatisti considered the Piazza Fontana incident a “state
massacre,” and it permanently shook their faith in the state.19
They became convinced that the state was an enemy intent on
repressing the people, and they took up arms initially as a defensive mechanism.
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From 1970 to 1974, the Red Brigades concentrated their
activities in factories in Milan and Turin, seeking to mobilize the
working masses. They strove to liberate workers from exploitation
at the hands of factory owners, a struggle that encapsulated their
fight against the state itself. In this period the Red Brigades avoided
excessive violence so as not to alienate workers: until 1972, they
directed their violence exclusively against property, often using
arson. From 1972 to 1974 they raided factory headquarters and
vandalized the cars of factory personnel managers. Always, they
supplemented these acts with elaborate justifications, in manifestos and communiqués, for why the people they “punished” were
guilty, whereas neither Fascists nor mafiosi felt a comparable need
to validate their actions.20
But the Red Brigades’ relative restraint was short-lived.
After 1974 they began attacking political figures, often from the
Christian Democratic party that symbolized Italy’s political status
quo. They progressed from using guns for intimidation to using
them to maim and kill, from kidnapping and releasing victims to
kidnappings that ended in murder. By this point, the brigatisti’s
struggle had left the factories behind. No longer content to punish
certain individuals or expose corruption in the political system, the
Red Brigades aspired to bring the entire state to its knees. They
transitioned from a more defensive strategy (claiming to defend
themselves against state repression) to one of open attack. Their
goals of unleashing a latent “civil war” and assailing “the heart of
the state” required that they randomly attack executives at all levels
in industrial firms, not bothering to justify each one’s supposed
crimes.21 While the Fascists had been violent at the outset and then
toned it down, the Red Brigades tried to attract attention through
increased radicalization. The brigatisti’s actions degenerated from
violence against symbolic targets­­—prominent politicians, such as
Moro, and corporate executives—to indiscriminate violence simply
meant to perpetuate disorder. But if Mafia violence was purely
practical and Fascist violence was both practical and political or
ideological, Red Brigade violence was political to the extreme and
hopelessly impractical. The brigatisti presumed the masses would
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share their vision of violent revolution when, in reality, the public
was appalled.22
In varying ways, all three groups were inspired by, and
sought to address, public dissatisfaction with the state. They either
shared or recognized grievances people had with the government,
and they drew support by succeeding where the state had not.
The Red Brigades were the least successful because they failed to
provide an attractive alternative to the state: even working-class
Italians in the 1970s preferred to live under the current system than
to embrace the Red Brigades’ anarchic vision. Yet the emergence
of the Red Brigades still revealed a gap between citizen and state,
because the brigatisti were responding to their own disillusionment
with the Italian political and legal system. The Piazza Fontana
bombing made them profoundly distrustful of a state that would
deliberately prosecute the wrong victims and seemed to condone
right-wing, neo-fascist action. Until their violence became too
extreme, the Red Brigades did enjoy many leftists’ sympathies.
The Fascists and the Mafia achieved success with a much
broader segment of the population. Mussolini, despite being a
former socialist, first capitalized on Italians’ fears in 1920 that
the government could not halt the tide of socialism. His Fascist
squads reined in socialist opposition at a time when the liberal
state seemed on the verge of disaster. As Mark Robson writes, for
conservative elites “a ‘Bolshevik’ seizure of power seemed imminent
and, to their disgust, the government appeared to be doing nothing to meet the threat.”23 When 500,000 laborers seized control of
their workplaces in Milan, Turin, and Genoa that fall, then-prime
minister Francesco Nitti encouraged employers to grant workers
concessions; industrialists in turn concluded that the state would
no longer protect them.24 Landowners in the Po Valley, too, felt
besieged, and with his anti-socialist violence Mussolini became
their savior.
Mussolini similarly took advantage of the disconnect
between the state and Italian nationalists. After World War I, nationalists and war veterans decried Italy’s “mutilated victory” in
the war, claiming that the Paris peace conference had denied Italy
30
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territory it deserved. As the war veteran and Fascist leader Italo
Balbo wrote, “When I returned from the war, just like so many
others, I hated politics and politicians who, in my opinion, had
betrayed the hopes of soldiers, reducing Italy to a shameful peace
and to a systematic humiliation.”25 Mussolini’s aggressive foreign
policy and his promise to strengthen italianità, or “Italian-ness,”
around the globe appealed to Italians frustrated by their state’s
humiliating disappointments.26
Perhaps most importantly, Mussolini won over the Catholic
establishment, which had been estranged from the state since Italian unification. Since 1870 the Vatican had refused to surrender
its temporal power over the Papal States or to acknowledge the
Kingdom of Italy. The Church had practically removed itself from
Italian political life and, as a result, devout Catholics had little
allegiance to the government. Anticipating the political might of
the untapped Catholic electorate, in 1922 Mussolini began making overtures to the Church. He reinstituted religious teaching in
elementary schools, shut down anti-clerical journals, and allocated
3 million lire to repair churches, among other measures. In 1929,
he finally settled the “Roman question” of papal sovereignty by
signing the Lateran Pacts.27 With Pope Pius XI hailing him as
“the man sent by Providence,” Mussolini gained a legitimacy and
popularity among Catholics that the previous state had never possessed.28
In the case of the Mafia, citizens’ lack of trust in the state
to provide employment options allowed the Mafia to attain legitimacy. Mafia groups established themselves in the southern Italian
countryside in the mid-nineteenth century. Back then, the state
had little to no official presence in rural areas, and the Mafia
played a quasi-judicial and protective role. Mafiosi would settle
village disputes and guard the lands of property owners.29 By the
twentieth century, the Mafia was an accepted part of daily life in
Sicily, even as it became more interested in extracting money from
the community than in community improvement. However, an
enduring gulf between Sicilians and the government hampered
antimafia efforts. Sicily had long been poorer and less developed
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31
than northern Italy, and after the state ended the Cassa per il Mezzogiorno, or Development Fund for the South, in 1992, Sicilians
felt even more neglected.30 When the state also took steps to curtail Mafia-infiltrated industries, many working-class citizens felt
their livelihoods menaced. With unemployment at 35% in 1991,
residents of Palermo feared that eradicating the Mafia would
only worsen the economy.31 They did not trust the government
to provide new economic opportunities, and so they supported
the Mafia. The same way that conservatives tolerated Fascism as
the “less bad” alternative to socialism, Palermitans tolerated Mafia extortion and violence because of the jobs the Mafia created.
The Mafia-dominated construction industry encompassed 48%
of the area’s firms in 1999, therefore supplying most of the jobs.32
Working-class families interviewed by Jane and Peter Schneider
in the mid-1990’s attested that “the mafia gave us work” and “the
mafia put food on the table.”33 In the words of Borsellino, one of
the top antimafia magistrates at the maxi-trial, the Mafia in Italy
was “not the price of poverty, but the cost of distrust.”34 Borsellino made an important distinction: Sicilians turned to the Mafia
because they lacked faith in the state’s ability to help them get
out of poverty, not because of poverty per se.
Failures of the state also influenced the attitudes that
Fascists, brigatisti, and mafiosi held towards the state, and the relationships they formed with it. After gaining the premiership in
1922, Mussolini steadily moved to replace the liberal state with a
fascist one. It was one of his opponents who invented the adjective
totalitaria to criticize Mussolini’s policy; Mussolini apparently liked
the term and voiced his ambitions for totalitarismo, or totalitarianism.35 Mussolini envisioned a state where the private melted into
the public, and where all citizens subordinated their wills and
individual rights to him and the Fascist party.36 His goal reserved
no place for the former state: the Fascist party would become
the state and then transform it. In the process of consolidating
control, Mussolini set up a number of “parallel structures,” such
as the party police, to usurp the functions of government bodies.37
One can imagine Fascism beginning as a parallel state, with its
own organizations that carried out tasks similar to those of official
32
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state agencies. Gradually, the Fascist “parallel structures” took on
more power, and exercised greater control, than the official agencies that they had duplicated. Thus, from being a parallel state,
Fascism became the state itself.
The Red Brigades also sought a societal transformation, yet
they aspired to annihilate the state altogether. In this sense they were
an anti-state, the state’s antithesis. They pitted themselves squarely
against the state, with their rhetoric about an “armed struggle,”
“unleashing civil war,” and “dislocation of the apparatus.”38 They
never captured the public’s imagination largely because they could
not articulate what would follow the revolution; overthrowing the
state was their be-all and end-all. Interestingly, the brigatisti did
define an “alternative law” which they believed should supersede
the official justice system.39 The Piazza Fontana bombing was one
of many incidents that proved to them the state’s injustice, and
so they tried to establish a “proletarian justice” to oppose it.40
The Red Brigades exercised their system of “justice” at the same
time as they carried out their attacks—hence the justifications for
their actions and their interrogation of kidnapped politicians in
a “People’s Prison.” When they kidnapped Aldo Moro in 1978,
their biggest claim to fame, they said they were putting him on
trial for the Christian Democrats’ “crimes.”41 A justice system alone,
however, does not make a state.
Both the Fascists and the Red Brigades had fairly straightforward relationships with the state. For members of Mafia families,
the situation was more convoluted. If Fascism was an alternate
state and the Red Brigades were an anti-state, the Mafia operated,
in the words of Alison Jamieson, as a “state-within-a-state.”42 Mussolini took over the state, brigatisti aimed to destroy the state, and
mafiosi instead exploited it from within. As mentioned above,
Mafia bosses long enjoyed a symbiotic relationship with many
politicians. This relationship broke down somewhat after the
murder of Lima in 1992 for the maxi-trial verdicts, which revealed
the Mafia’s willingness to kill not only its “outspoken enemies” but
also its former allies.43 But despite its coziness with politicians, the
Mafia acted as a parasite to the state as a whole. It drew strength
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33
from the state’s weaknesses—such as its inability to provide jobs
or to monopolize force—and then exacerbated those problems.
In certain ways it was also a “parallel state”; in some Sicilian neighborhoods, residents would report thefts to the local capofamiglia
rather than the police. Even though mafiosi in his clan had likely
stolen the goods, the capofamiglia might return them in exchange
for a bribe, while police searches regularly turned up nothing.44
The Mafia’s infiltration of both licit and illicit sectors of
society further complicated its relationship to the state. The Mafia eludes classification as a simple criminal enterprise, because
it often took illegally-made profits and invested them in legal
industries. It was also involved in businesses that seemed legal on
the surface, such as construction and waste disposal, but which
it then subverted. In what is known as “the sack of Palermo,” in
the 1960s the Mafia illegally built hundreds of apartments and
condominiums on expanses of land meant to be left untouched.45
At other times the Mafia funneled public relief funds into speculative investments that in turn channeled enormous profits its way.46
Saviano describes how the Camorra in Naples unsafely disposed
of millions of tons of toxic waste from the whole Italian peninsula—thus implicating even the north in what was considered a
“southern problem.”47
Many historians connect the Mafia’s relationship to the
state to the imperfect process of state formation in Italy. Charles
Tilly writes that the Mafia “grew up precisely because national
systems of power expanded without obliterating local systems of
power.”48 Paoli draws from Tilly’s description of “a continuum running from anarchy to banditry to mafia to routine government”
to characterize Mafia families as “small proto-states” which exist
within the Italian state but are not developed enough to supplant
it.49 Neither the Mafia nor the state monopolized force completely,
and so they continued to exist and progress side-by-side. Antimafia reformers highlighted citizens’ distrust of the state to explain
why the Mafia persisted. Giovanni Falcone, the major antimafia
magistrate in the maxi-trial alongside Borsellino, called the Mafia
“nothing more than a need for order and therefore for a state.”50
34
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Sicilians did not trust the state to protect their social and economic
well-being, the same way that conservatives in 1920 did not trust
the state to stop socialism. In both eras, what Falcone termed the
“lack of a sense of State” allowed alternate powers to step in.51
These groups’ relationship to the Catholic Church also
seemed to influence the extent to which the state could overcome
their challenges. Mussolini depended first on the Church’s neutrality and after 1929 on its explicit support. Before the Lateran Pacts,
Catholic support for Fascism occurred mostly on an individual,
rather than an institutional, basis. Mussolini won over a group of
Catholic conservative elites, known the Clerico-Fascists, whom he
used to dismantle the one Catholic political party (the Italian People’s Party, or PPI) and to campaign for the Fascist parliamentary
ticket. Once the PPI disintegrated, Mussolini could court Catholic
voters. The Clerico-Fascists also served as intermediaries between
the Church and Fascist leaders when negotiations began for the
Lateran agreements.52 But even though the Clerico-Fascists did
not act on the Church’s behalf, the Vatican’s stance toward Mussolini in mid-1920s was one of “benevolent neutrality.”53 In 1924,
for example, men associated with Mussolini murdered Giacomo
Matteotti, secretary of the Italian Socialist Party, after he had
denounced Fascist corruption before Parliament. Though it was
unclear if Mussolini had ordered the murder, the event rekindled
doubts about his regime’s legitimacy. The Church’s response was
to remind Catholics to obey the budding Fascist government, and
not to voice any concerns.54 Since Italy was, and still remains, a
predominantly Catholic country, a neutral attitude by the Church
could easily amount to a condonation.
The Mafia, too, benefited from the Church’s lack of an
institutional stance against it. Individual priests’ relationships to
the Mafia ranged from collusion to passive acceptance to moderate
criticism to opposition. A small number were obviously corrupt,
acting as cash handlers for mafiosi or participating in kidnapping
schemes.55 More commonly, they were neutral, not actively aiding
Mafia members but not denying them Church marriages, baptisms,
or communions either. Those few who did venture to speak out
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35
strongly against the Mafia were often murdered—a shocking fact,
given that mafiosi considered themselves good Christians. In the
words of Saviano, mafiosi reconciled their violent activities with
their Christian faith thus: “Killing is a sin that Christ will understand
and forgive in the name of necessity,” with “necessity” meaning
the self-interest of their clan.56 Amazingly, mafiosi could commit
murder with indifference and turn drug-dealing into a pursuit
worthy of Christian praise. In Camorra drug labs in Scampia,
“bricks of hashish are often cut thirty-three at a time—like Christ’s
age,” Saviano relates. “Then they halt work for thirty-three minutes, make the sign of the cross, and start up again.”57 So when
certain priests dared to contest the Christian dimension of Mafia
conduct, Mafia bosses felt incredibly threatened. They realized
that a religious, moral appeal against them could be more damning in the eyes of the people than any antimafia state effort.58
Unfortunately for antimafia crusaders, for a long time the
Church withheld institutional condemnations of the Mafia. The
result was that the few brave, vocal priests were killed, their messages silenced, while the Church failed to exert its institutional
power. In 1992, the Diocese of Agrigento reproached the Sicilian
Church for “not us[ing] all the means at its disposal to oppose
the consolidation of the Mafia phenomenon either at a cultural
level…or at a political level…or at the pastoral level.”59 Pope John
Paul II was the first pope to publicly pronounce the term “Mafia”
in 1981; the next time he spoke about it was ten years later. The
Church did not make an official doctrinal statement about the
Mafia until late 1992, when it said that mafiosi should be refused
the sacraments but not excommunicated.60 In a largely Catholic
country, the dearth of Church intervention against Fascists and
later the Mafia certainly contributed to those groups’ abilities to
survive, thorns in the side of the Italian state. (In the case of the
Red Brigades, who were atheists and sought no relation to the
Church, the issue is irrelevant.)
Discussion of the problems Fascists, brigatisti, and the Mafia
all posed to the state begs the following question: what did the
state do to combat them, and what methods succeeded? Once
36
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Mussolini cemented his regime, the Fascist party was the state,
and it took the end of World War II to restore liberalism. During Mussolini’s tenure, clearly the government could not attack
itself. But state responses to the Red Brigades and the Mafia are
much more interesting. The government transplanted several of
its anti-terrorist measures to the antimafia struggle in the 1980s
and 1990s, and debates arose both times about how firm the state
should be in dealing with the people who challenged it.
For most of the 1970s, the state’s anti-terrorist measures
yielded mixed results. By 1976 almost all the original Red Brigades
leaders were in jail, yet a “second wave” of militants soon took their
place.61 Police investigations were disorganized and untimely; just
hours after Moro’s kidnapping, security around the crime scene
was so low that the Red Brigades returned the car they had transported him in without being caught.62 A turning point came in
1980, with the ad hoc approval of a so-called pentiti (“penitents”)
law that reduced prison sentences for brigatisti who turned state’s
witness. The Red Brigades already suffered from factionalism,
and encouraged by the law a steady stream of members defected.
These pentiti provided key information about the location of Red
Brigade hideouts, greatly increasing the number of police arrests
and dampening morale within the organization.63 By 1983, the Red
Brigades had self-destructed. A second innovation of the terrorist
period was the anti-terrorism “pool,” a group of magistrates who
pooled knowledge gleaned from anti-terrorist investigations. The
idea was that if one of the judges in the pool was assassinated, the
others would be able to continue his chain of investigation.64
Both pentiti and the judicial “pool” became useful in the
antimafia fight. After the state granted similar concessions to
mafiosi-turned-collaborators, Mafia members offered invaluable
testimony about the structure and operations of Mafia families.
Judges’ understanding about clan hierarchies, for example, stems
directly from the statements of former mafiosi. The testimony
of Tommaso Buscetta in 1984 certified that the Mafia truly was
a criminal organization, not simply a Sicilian attitude or way of
life as some had averred. The “Buscetta theorem,” his revelation
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37
that a Mafia Commission directed the clans’ activities in Sicily,
allowed judges to prosecute Mafia bosses for crimes they had not
personally committed.65 After legislation on state’s witnesses was
officially passed in 1991, the number of collaborators skyrocketed.
Increased severity of the state’s prison regime further propelled
cooperation. By 1997, pentiti accounted for an estimated 6.6% of
the Mafia’s total membership.66 In fact, by the early 2000s the state
encountered logistical problems as it labored to accommodate all
the pentiti and their families in its witness protection system. According to the Schneiders, by that point the pentiti had outlived
their usefulness, yet they were critical in the earliest stages of antimafia investigation.67 As for the technique of judicial teamwork,
magistrate Rocco Chinnici created an antimafia pool in Palermo
in the 1980s. The pool included Falcone and Borsellino, both assassinated by the Mafia in 1992 for their work on the maxi-trial.
Anti-terrorism and antimafia judges alike faced enormous risk
during their inquiries, and being able to pass on information to
their colleagues was essential. And even though the antimafia team
had scant resources at its inception, it successfully promoted the
use of pentiti.68
The state’s commitment to both anti-terrorist and antimafia
actions fluctuated over time. Only after “emergency” situations did
the state allocate significant resources, at least temporarily, to meeting these threats. When the police failed to recover the kidnapped
Moro and the Red Brigades killed him after 54 days of captivity,
public outcry led to new laws, such as the one on pentitismo, and a
greater police presence. Antimafia efforts, occurring over a much
longer period, underwent multiple upswings and downswings. The
first parliamentary Antimafia Commission was established only
in 1962, after a Mafia-planted car bomb, intended to eliminate
a rival mafioso, detonated and killed seven policemen.69 Mafia
violence declined after 1963, and in the 1970s the government
focused mostly on the terrorist threat. But in 1982, the murders
of Pio La Torre, who had proposed an antimafia law, and of Carlo
Alberto Dalla Chiesa, a police chief sent to curb Mafia violence
in Palermo, again galvanized legislators. The Rognoni-La Torre
law of that year defined Mafia membership in itself as a crime,
38
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enabling judges to convict people for “Mafia association” in addition to particular crimes. The law revolutionized investigators’
approach to Mafia cases, as they “no longer concentrated on ‘the
crimes of the Mafia’ but on ‘the Mafia as a form of criminality,’”
Jamieson writes.70
Antimafia political action peaked in the mid-1980s. The
Rognoni-La Torre law, combined with the testimony of collaborators such as Buscetta, empowered Falcone and Borsellino to
bring 475 Mafia members to trial in 1986. The maxi-trial resulted
in 342 convictions, a verdict that invited criticism but which the
Supreme Court upheld in 1992.71 The Mafia assassinated Falcone
and Borsellino after the Supreme Court ruling, triggering another
wave of public outrage and state antimafia action. Post-1992 laws
increased investigators’ capacities for asset confiscation and wiretapping, specified policies for pentiti and witness protection programs, eliminated benefits for imprisoned mafiosi, and disbanded
Mafia-infiltrated municipal councils. Italy’s antimafia police force,
the Direzione Inveistigativa Antimafia, and its antimafia prosecution
service, the Direzione Nazionale Antimafia, acquired greater authority, and troops were sent to Sicily to relieve the duties of police
involved in antimafia work.72
All this political and legislative action, however, spurred
a popular backlash. The state enacted these measures when the
public thought it was doing too little, yet some citizens feared it
had gone too far. The maxi-trial, though a tremendous victory
for the prosecution, unsettled people in how it sentenced mass
numbers of suspects in one swoop. Critics questioned whether
the trial violated civil liberties and called into doubt the pentiti’s
testimony. Some Sicilians accused antimafia reformers from the
north of trying to discredit their region.73 When Palermo elected
a staunchly antimafia mayor, Leoluca Orlando, in 1985, a new
debate arose. Orlando advocated spaccatura, or “breaking,” with
the Mafia, a policy of no tolerance towards institutions or individuals affiliated with the Mafia. The approach proved controversial
even among antimafia activists.74 Was it fair to condemn the entire
“gray area” of people who had dealt with mafiosi, but were not
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criminals themselves? How could one distinguish between businesses that paid the pizzo willingly and those that the Mafia muscled
into consent? Might spaccatura not actually hurt the poorest, most
vulnerable members of society?
Pierluigi Cervellati, the architect whom Orlando hired
to rebuild Palermo’s city center, represents spaccatura in action.
Cervellati wanted northern Italian companies to implement his
plan of urban renewal, thus avoiding the “disgusting old relations
of money, power, and the mafia.”75 Since the Mafia had tainted
Sicilian-based firms, Cervellati preferred to sidestep them altogether and hire northern firms instead. Working-class Sicilians
naturally opposed his idea. In 1988, labor unions marched in
protest of his proposal, bearing signs with slogans such as “With
the mafia we work, without it, no!” A union member in the crowd
proclaimed, “If struggling for the workers signifies being mafiosi,
then viva la mafia!”76 As discussed previously, economic concerns
were the most pressing reason for antimafia resistance. Reformers
who opposed spaccatura favored a more conciliatory approach,
one that would account for working-class needs.77
During Moro’s kidnapping, politicians engaged in a comparable debate about how unbending the state should be against
terrorists. In letters written from the People’s Prison, Moro asked
that his party negotiate with the Red Brigades for his release. Proponents of trattativa, or “negotiation,” thought saving a human
life necessitated such compromise. Then-prime minister Giulio
Andreotti, by contrast, espoused a policy of “firmness,” or fermezza.
Andreotti maintained that the state should not negotiate as a matter of principle. Despite Moro’s pleas, the Christian Democrats
ultimately held firm; with no use left for their prisoner, the brigatisti
shot him to death.78 In both the fermezza-trattativa and the spaccatura debates, politicians and reformers had to weigh intellectual,
rational arguments with empathetic, moral ones. The spaccatura
debate still waits to be resolved, and historians continue to debate
whether trattativa would have altered the outcome of the Moro
affair.
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In addition to state-directed action, grassroots movements
were important in the antimafia fight, perhaps because the Mafia
was so interlaced with the state. There were no equivalent movements against the Red Brigades, but the brigatisti never garnered
much public support to begin with. In the case of the Mafia,
grassroots activism became especially significant in light of the
controversies over the maxi-trial and new legislation. To borrow
a metaphor of Orlando’s, the antimafia process was “a cart with
two wheels” one wheel being social reform and the other being
police and judicial reform.79 Social centers, for example, supplied
recreational outlets and “cultural re-education” for children in poor
neighborhoods. The goal was to wean younger generations away
from the pervasive Mafia mentality. Children would be taught to
avoid fights, to report crimes to the police, and so forth: to have
faith in the law, as so many Italians did not. Various community
groups also formed in response to jarring events like the murders
of Falcone and Borsellino. Several women formed the Committee
of the Sheets, named for their practice of hanging sheets with antimafia slogans from their balconies. The Committee, comprised
of 20 women and 6 men, published a pamphlet of “Nine uncomfortable guidelines for the citizen who wants to fight the Mafia,”
urging citizens to reclaim their rights by denouncing corruption,
demanding transparency, avoiding Mafia business, and educating
their children for legality.80 Such initiatives helped alleviate the
Mafia problem, though, as Orlando’s metaphor states, grassroots
work alone could not eradicate the Mafia.
Compared with Fascists and brigatisti, the Mafia arguably
posed the greatest challenge to the state. In the spectrum of relationships each of these groups had to the state, the Mafia was the
most inextricable. Mussolini never achieved his totalitarian goal;
under Fascism the army, businesses, and the Catholic Church
maintained a degree of autonomy from Fascist influence.81 The
Red Brigades did not achieve their goal either; Richard Drake
writes that they discredited not only themselves but the entire Left
in Italy.82 But the Mafia managed to infiltrate so many aspects of
Sicilian life that it remains alive and well. Precisely because it is
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41
so intertwined with the state, the Mafia cannot easily be removed.
As some reformers in Palermo feared, complete spaccatura might
be fatal. Even people in the north of Italy, with its smaller organized crime presence, accept Mafia control of businesses such as
waste disposal. Borsellino once commented, “The solution to the
problem of the Mafia is to make the State work.”83 Can the Italian
state work, and can its citizens learn to trust it? The answer is a
work in progress, a formidable task left to those idealistic enough
to conceive of it.
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Endnotes
Frederic Spotts and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult
Democracy (New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986) p. ix
2
Max Weber, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, trans. A. R. Henderson and Talcott Parsons
(London: William Hodge and Company Limited, 1947) p. 143
3
Robert Paxton, The Anatomy of Fascism (New York:
Random House, 2004) p. 61
4
Ibid., p. 64
5
Ibid., p. 60; John Pollard, The Fascist Experience in Italy
(New York: Routledge, 1998) pp. 40-41
6
Paxton, p. 64
7
Paxton; Mark Robson, Italy: Liberalism and Fascism, 18701945 (London: Hoddern & Stoughton, 1992) pp. 50-51
8
Letizia Paoli, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime,
Italian Style (New York: Oxford University Press, 2003)
9
Roberto Saviano, Gomorrah: A Personal Journey into
the Violent International Empire of Naples’ Organized Crime
System, trans. Virginia Jewiss (New York: Picador, 2007) p. 160
10
Paoli, p. 43
11
Ibid., pp. 40-46, 108-110
12
Ibid., p. 154
13
Ibid., p. 154
14
Ibid., p. 191
15
Alison Jamieson, The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against
Organized Crime (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000) p. 56
16
Ibid., p. 141; Saviano, pp. 229-240
17
Luigi Manconi, “The political ideology of the Red
Brigades,” in The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in
Italy, ed. Raimondo Catanzaro (New York: St. Martin’s Press,
1991) p. 115
18
Ibid., p. 115
19
Ibid., p. 119
20
Gian Carlo Caselli and Donatella della Porta, “The history
of the Red Brigades: organizational structures and strategies
of action (1970-82),” in The Red Brigades and Left-wing
Terrorism in Italy, ed. Raimondo Catanzaro (New York: St.
Martin’s Press, 1991) pp. 75-78
21
Ibid., p. 90
22
Caselli; Robert C. Meade, Red Brigades: The Story of
Italian Terrorism (London: Macmillan, 1990)
23
Robson, p. 45
1
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Ibid., p. 45
Ibid., p. 30
26
Paxton, p. 63; Alan Cassels, Fascist Italy, 2nd ed (Illinois:
Harlan Davidson, 1985) p. 27
27
Adrian Lyttelton, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in
Italy, 1919-1929, rev. ed. (New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 417;
Philip Morgan, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. (New York:
Palgrave Macmillan, 2004), 254; John Pollard, “Conservative
Catholics and Italian fascism: the Clerico-Fascists,” in Fascists
and Conservatives: the radical right and the establishment
in twentieth-century Europe, ed. Martin Blinkhorn (Boston:
Unwin Hyman, 1990), 41; Pollard, The Fascist Experience in
Italy, p. 48
28
Martin Clark, Modern Italy, 1871-1995, 2nd ed. (New York:
Longman, 1996) p. 255
29
Paoli, pp. 178-188
30
Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible Destiny: Mafia,
Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo (Berkeley, University
of California Press, 2003) p. 232
31
Ibid., p. 233
32
Ibid., p. 232
33
Ibid., pp. 281, 314
34
Jamieson, p. xxi
35
Paxton, p. 211
36
Ibid., pp. 142-144
37
Ibid., p. 85
38
Caselli, p. 90; Manconi, p. 118
39
Manconi, p. 127
40
Ibid., p. 127
41
Leonardo Sciascia, L’Affaire Moro (Milan: Adelphi, 1994)
42
Jamieson, p. xxi
43
Alexander Stille, Excellent Cadavers (New York:
Pantheon, 1995) p. 351
44
Jamieson, p. xxi; Paoli, pp. 160-161
45
Schneider, 14-16, p. 253
46
Ibid., p. 236
47
Saviano, pp. 282-295
48
Jamieson, p. xxi
49
Paoli, p. 172
50
Jamieson, p. xvi
51
Ibid., p. xvi
52
Pollard, “Conservative Catholics and Italian fascism: the
Clerico-Fascists,” pp. 35, 36, 39, 43; Lyttelton, p. 131
24
25
43
44
Antonia Woodford
Lyttelton, p. 417
Paxton, pp. 109-110; Lyttelton, p. 417
55
Jamieson, p. 135
56
Saviano, p. 226
57
Ibid., p. 227
58
Ibid., p. 222
59
Jamieson, p. 138
60
Ibid., p. 139
61
Caselli, p. 89
62
Sciascia, p. 174
63
Caselli, p. 99; Paul Ginsborg, A History of Contemporary
Italy: Society and Politics, 1943-1988 (New York: Penguin, 1990)
385-386
64
Jamieson, p. 29
65
Schneider, p. 139
66
Jamieson, p. 104
67
Schneider, pp. 291-292
68
Jamieson, p. 29; Schneider, pp. 131-132
69
Ibid., p. 16
70
Ibid., pp. 18, 28-29
71
Ibid., p. 3
72
Ibid., pp. 42-70, 75, 102-125
73
Schneider, pp. 194-195
74
Ibid., pp. 204, 219-222, 234
75
Ibid., p. 242
76
Ibid., p. 188
77
Ibid., p. 187
78
Sciascia, p. 174
79
Schneider, p. 160
80
Jamieson, p. 131; Schneider, pp. 207-209
81
Paxton, p. 153
82
Richard Drake, The Aldo Moro Murder Case (Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995) p. 253
83
Jamieson, p. xvi
53
54
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Bibliography
Blinkhorn, Martin, ed. Fascists and Conservatives: The
radical right and the establishment in twentieth-century
Europe, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990
Bosworth, R. J. B., Mussolini’s Italy: Life Under the Fascist
Dictatorship, 1915-1945, New York: Penguin, 2006
Caselli, Gian Carlo and Donatella della Porta, “The history
of the Red Brigades: organizational structures and strategies
of action (1970-82),” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing
Terrorism in Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro. New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1991
Cassels, Alan, Fascist Italy, 2nd ed. Illinois: Harlan Davidson,
1985
Catanzaro, Raimondo, ed., The Red Brigades and Left-wing
Terrorism in Italy, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1991
Clark, Martin, Modern Italy, 1871-1995, 2nd ed. New York:
Longman, 1996
De Grand, Alexander, Italian Fascism: Its Origins and
Development, 2nd ed. Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press,
1989
Drake, Richard, The Aldo Moro Murder Case, Cambridge:
Harvard University Press, 1995
Drake, Richard, “The Aldo Moro Murder Case as Politics.”
In Playing Politics with Terrorism, edited by George Kassimeris,
New York: Columbia University Press, 2008
Fijnaut, Cyrille and Letizia Paoli, eds., Organized Crime
in Europe: Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the
European Union and Beyond, Dordrecht: Springer, 2004
Fulvetti, Gianluca, “The Mafia and the ‘Problem of the
Mafia’: Organized Crime in Italy, 1820-1970” In Organized
Crime in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in
the European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and
Letizia Paoli Dordrecht: Springer, 2004
Ginsborg, Paul, A History of Contemporary Italy: Society
and Politics, 1943-1988, New York: Penguin, 1990
Ginsborg, Paul, Italy and Its Discontents: Family, Civil
Society, State: 1980-2001, New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2003
Hilwig, Stuart J., “‘Are You Calling Me a Fascist?’: A
Contribution to the Oral History of the 1968 Student
Rebellion,” Journal of Contemporary History 36, no. 4 (2001)
pp. 581-597, http://www.jstor.org/stable/3180774 (accessed
February 2, 2010)
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Hilwig, Stuart J., “The Revolt Against the Establishment:
Students Versus the Press in West Germany and Italy,” In 1968:
The World Transformed, edited by Carole Fink, Philipp Gassert, and Detlef Junker, Washington, D.C.: Cambridge
University Press, 1998
Horn, Gerd-Rainer, The Spirit of ’68: Rebellion in Western
Europe and North America, 1956-1976, New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007
Jamieson, Alison, The Antimafia: Italy’s Fight Against
Organized Crime, New York: St. Martin’s Press, 2000
Jamieson, Alison, “Mafiosi and Terrorists: Italian Women in
Violent Organizations,” SAIS Review 20, no. 2 (2000) pp. 51-64 http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/sais_review/v020/20.2jamieson.
html (accessed April 30, 2010)
Klimke, Martin, and Joachim Scharloth, eds., 1968 in
Europe: A History of Protest and Activism, 1956-1977, New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2008
La Spina, Antonio, “The Paradox of Effectiveness: Growth,
Institutionalisation and Evaluation of Anti-Mafia Policies in
Italy,” In Organized Crime in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the European Union and Beyond, edited by
Cyrille Fijnaut and Letizia Paoli, Dordrecht: Springer, 2004
Lyttelton, Adrian, ed., Liberal and Fascist Italy, New York:
Oxford University Press, 2002
Lyttelton, Adrian, The Seizure of Power: Fascism in Italy,
1919-1929, Rev. ed. New York: Routledge, 2004
Manconi, Luigi, “The political ideology of the Red
Brigades,” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing Terrorism in
Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro, New York: St. Martin’s
Press, 1991
Marwick, Arthur, The Sixties: Cultural Revolution in Britain,
France, Italy, and the United States, c.1958-c.1974, New York:
Oxford University Press, 1998
Meade, Robert C., Red Brigades: The Story of Italian
Terrorism, London: Macmillan, 1990
Morgan, Philip, Italian Fascism, 1915-1945, 2nd ed. New
York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004
Paoli, Letizia, Mafia Brotherhoods: Organized Crime, Italian
Style, New York: Oxford University Press, 2003
Paoli, Letizia, “Organized Crime in Italy: Mafia and Illegal
Markets—Exception and Normality,” In Organized Crime
in Europe Concepts, Patterns and Control Policies in the
European Union and Beyond, edited by Cyrille Fijnaut and
Letizia Paoli Dordrecht: Springer, 2004
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Paxton, Robert O., The Anatomy of Fascism, New York:
Random House, 2004
Paxton, Robert O., Interviewed by Antonia Woodford, New
York, New York, November 20, 2009
Pollard, John, “Conservative Catholics and Italian fascism:
the Clerico-Fascists,” In Fascists and Conservatives: The radical
right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe,
edited by Martin Blinkhorn, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990
Pollard, John, The Fascist Experience in Italy, New York:
Routledge, 1998
Robson, Mark, Italy: Liberalism and Fascism, 1870-1945,
London: Hoddern & Stoughton, 1992
Sarti, Roland, ed., The Ax Within: Italian Fascism in Action,
New York: Franklin Watts, 1974
Sarti, Roland, “Italian fascism: radical politics and
conservative goals,” In Fascists and Conservatives: The radical
right and the establishment in twentieth-century Europe, edited by Martin Blinkhorn, Boston: Unwin Hyman, 1990
Saviano, Roberto, Gomorrah: A Personal Journey into the
Violent International Empire of Naples’ Organized Crime
System, Translated by Virginia Jewiss, New York: Picador, 2007
Sbordone, Argia, Interviewed by Antonia Woodford, New
York, New York, February 20, 2010
Schneider, Jane C. and Peter T. Schneider, Reversible
Destiny: Mafia, Antimafia, and the Struggle for Palermo,
Berkeley: University of California Press, 2003
Sciascia, Leonardo, L’Affaire Moro Milan: Adelphi, 1994
Sciascia, Leonardo, Il giorno della civetta, Milan: Adelphi,
1993
Spotts, Frederic and Theodor Wieser, Italy: A Difficult
Democracy, New York: Cambridge University Press, 1986
Stille, Alexander, Excellent Cadavers, New York: Pantheon,
1995
Tarrow, Sidney, Democracy and Disorder: Protest and
Politics in Italy, 1965-1975, New York: Oxford University Press,
1989
Tarrow, Sidney, “Violence and institutionalization after
the Italian protest cycle,” In The Red Brigades and Left-wing
Terrorism in Italy, edited by Raimondo Catanzaro, New York:
St. Martin’s Press, 1991
Thompson, Doug, State control in Fascist Italy: Culture and
conformity, 1925-1943, New York: Manchester University Press,
1991
47
48
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Weber, Max, The Theory of Social and Economic
Organization, Translated by A. R. Henderson and Talcott
Parsons, London: William Hodge and Company Limited, 1947
Whittam, John, Fascist Italy, New York: Manchester
University Press, 1995
Special thanks to Drs. Jane and Peter Schneider, who
provided me with an updated version of the final chapter of
their book, Reversible Destiny. The chapter was an English
translation from the more recently published Italian edition.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
49
THE RISE OF PROGRESSIVISM: THEODORE ROOSEVELT
AS NEW YORK CITY POLICE COMMISSIONER
Lucia A. Randall
N
ew York City, 1895: A place of political turmoil where
secret, corrupt operations were concealed behind the efficient,
powerful veneer of the Machine Boss. Patronage, vice, and bribery gripped city politics, in both the Republican Machine and
the Democratic Machine, which was known as Tammany Hall.
Fraud and graft were particularly rampant in the New York City
Police Department, where Tammany Democrats’ hand-picked
men, acting as puppets to Tammany interests, held positions of
authority. Corruption within the Police Department left New York
City virtually unprotected, but many citizens were ignorant of the
full extent of the extortion and patronage.
In 1892, however, muckrakers, crusading journalists who
revealed crime, disease, and injustice in modern American cities,
began to make an impact in New York City, setting the scene for
the Progressive Movement. Reverend Charles Parkhurst, partnering with muckrakers to spread his cause, exposed corruption
within the Police Department through thunderous, provocative
speeches in the city. Horrified citizens demanded change and
called on Theodore Roosevelt, the Civil Service Commissioner
in Washington D.C., to lead the Police Board in overhauling the
Lucia A. Randall is a Senior at the Montclair Kimberley Academy in
Montclair, New Jersey, where she wrote this paper for Dr. Louise Maxwell’s
Modern United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
50
Lucia A. Randall
NYPD. Roosevelt’s term marked the rise of Progressivism and attention to civil service in New York City. As Police Commissioner
of New York City, Theodore Roosevelt harnessed his Progressive
instincts to transform what was considered by many the most corrupt organization in the city in hopes of establishing a politically
impartial and just legacy within the NYPD and improving the lives
of citizens.
Born into a wealthy family on New York’s Upper East
Side in 1858, young Theodore was taught by his father’s example
to contribute to the improvement of American life. Theodore
Roosevelt Sr. was a prominent philanthropist who established the
New York City’s Children Aid Society, the Metropolitan Museum
of Art, the American Museum of Natural History, and the New
York Children’s Orthopedic Hospital.1 Theodore Sr. instilled a
capacity for helping others in his four children: Bamie, Theodore,
Elliot, and Corrine. Young Theodore especially, who idolized his
father, strove to follow this calling of serving others throughout
his life in his various roles in reform and civil service. Theodore
Sr., however, had also made a deeply personal impression on his
son in his early years. Theodore Sr. was a loving, entertaining, and
empathetic father; yet young Theodore realized his father’s wrath
and power after Theodore Jr. bit his older sister at the tender age
of four.2 Although the biting incident was the first and last time
Theodore Sr. physically chastised his son, his father’s disappointment in his bad behavior made a far greater impact on young
Theodore than the brief spanking. The shame and humiliation
that young Theodore had experienced was a lasting sensation,
and Theodore envisioned his father’s hypothetical reaction before
making future decisions. In his autobiography fifty-one years later,
in which he described the biting episode in detail, Theodore Jr.
spoke of his father as “the best man I ever knew…but the only
man of whom I was ever really afraid.”3
The lessons of his father combined with emerging initiatives of the Progressive Movement established Roosevelt as the
most capable man to transform the Police Department. The sparks
of the Progressive Movement began to fly during this time, and
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51
Roosevelt had proven himself a qualified candidate for reform in
his work as Civil Service Commissioner in Washington D.C. from
1889-1895.4 Though nationwide efforts were made to improve
the standard of city life and decrease corruption, Roosevelt was
successful and unique in that he had a genuine interest in the
welfare of New York City citizens and strove to improve city life
without being influenced solely by his own political agenda.
From 1860 to 1890, America was reacting to a massive
influx of immigrants in densely concentrated urban areas. As a
result of the unsanitary living conditions that resulted from this
flood of immigrants, and the nativist sentiment thus inspired in
the hearts of “rooted” citizens, American cities all over the country
experienced upheaval and political volatility during this period:
St. Louis, Minneapolis, Pittsburgh, Philadelphia, and Chicago, as
well as New York.5 Poverty arose from employers’ exploitation of
immigrants as a means of cheap unskilled labor, and many immigrant families relied on several incomes for survival. Consequently,
most immigrants gratefully accepted the help of aspiring urban
bosses, who ingratiated themselves with immigrants by assisting
with rent or buying groceries.6 As election time approached, these
immigrants happily cast their votes for the benevolent-seeming
urban bosses, only to discover that the bosses, once in power,
reneged on their promises and managed the city in a new era of
the political machine.
Out of the political and social turbulence of this era rose
Progressivism. In the words of a historian, “the class and status conflicts of the late-nineteenth century formed the driving forces that
made men become reformers.”7 The Progressive political agenda
rested on the principle that society needed improvement, and
that government could be a force for good. Progressives typically
challenged the largely corrupt machines and bosses that resided
at the top of urban politics. Progressives endeavored to replace
these dishonest systems with honest officials that would presumably
remain untainted by political corruption. The Progressive cause,
however, was by no means utopian; like any other political initiative, Progressivism was sometimes driven by the personal agendas
52
Lucia A. Randall
of reform politicians seeking power in their own right. Roosevelt,
however, strove to maintain a more altruistic outlook in his work,
and risked his blossoming political career to preserve integrity
during his term as Police Commissioner. One scholar said that
“He became the animating symbol of urban reform during his
lifetime and in the years that followed the reforming impulse in
the older cities of America sprang from sources rooted firmly on
his life and times.”8 His term as Police Commissioner propelled
Roosevelt to the national political arena as an honest reform
politician and characterized him as one of the earliest and most
groundbreaking progressives.
Long before Theodore Roosevelt made his debut on the
New York City political scene, however, Tammany Hall, “the embodiment of corruption,” as muckraker Lincoln Steffens referred
to it, had established itself as the dominant force in city politics.9
Tammany Hall had rapidly ascended to power in the 1860s under
the leadership of William Magear “Boss” Tweed.10 Tweed was the
recently elected boss of Tammany Hall in 1862, when the New
York City draft riots broke out. The rioters, mostly immigrants
(who made up three-fifths of the city’s population), protested
the $300 fee that the wealthy could pay to avoid service in the
Civil War.11 Hostility radiated from the general public towards
the rioters; a New York Times article from 1863 described them as
“the malignant originators of the disturbance.”12 Tweed, however,
realized that the equal treatment of the rich and the poor was
crucial in order to carry out the necessary draft. Relieving the
pressure on President Lincoln to raise troops, Tweed concocted a
plan to compensate poor workers who couldn’t afford the fee with
government-sponsored gratuities, thus appeasing the rioters and
lessening class tension nationwide.13 Additionally, Tweed aligned
himself with the Union cause for the next two years; he became
“a hero in New York City.”14
Once in power, however, Tweed instituted a policy of political patronage, voting fraud, and bribery, thus beginning the
corrupt legacy of Tammany Hall. Tweed became a ubiquitous
symbol for the graft and greed of machine politics in America.
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53
Although Tweed was eventually arrested, Tammany Hall remained
at the apex of New York City’s politics, prevailing in every election
until 1894. Though Tammany’s grip on elections seemed secure, a
Republican rival, Thomas Collier Platt, known as “The Easy Boss”15
to some and “The Devil” to others, was working behind the scenes
in the New York State Legislature, rallying support for a future
election.16 Despite Platt’s courteous and respectable veneer, his
Republican Machine equaled Tammany Hall in dishonesty. Even
Platt’s political friend Lemuel Ely Quigg admitted that “This man’s
conceded power was built on the use of money and patronage…”17
Tammany boss Richard Croker recognized the threat Platt posed
and tried to appease the Republican machine by handing out
“political plums” to Platt’s henchmen in the early 1890s.18 Nowhere was the corruption of both the Republican and
Democratic machines as prevalent as in the New York Police Department. In Tweed’s time, the head Police Commissioner was Hank
Smith, a Republican who worked closely with Tweed in pilfering
government funds, eliciting money from legitimate businesses
through extortion, enforcing Tammany initiatives, and immunizing
members of the Tammany ring from legal prosecution. Satirical
cartoonist Thomas Nast captured Smith’s dishonesty in a cartoon,
entitled “The Guardian Angel of the Poor People’s Money: Does
it ‘Take a Thief to Catch a Thief?,’” of a rotund Smith standing
in front of a bankrupt Bowling Green Savings Bank with specific
descriptions of Smith’s fraud written in the windows.19 Though
Smith’s use of patronage and graft exposed the Tweed ring to the
public, the current Chief of Police, Thomas Byrnes, seemed the
picture of efficiency.
The police force was nominally controlled by a Bi-Partisan
Board, which consisted of two commissioners from each party.
The commissioners essentially acted as the puppets of Platt and
Croker, introducing a system of political patronage and graft. The
livelihood and job security of police officials was dependent upon
the whims and desires of the machine. A former police commissioner of New York testified that, “As the policeman is in office
for life, he very logically looked past both the Mayor and me and
54
Lucia A. Randall
made his alliances and took his orders from the only permanent
influence concerned—the politician.”20 The system of corruption
was reinforced by Byrnes, who, as the Chief of Police, interacted
with his officers on an everyday basis. Byrnes, who to many reporters seemed an “awe-inspiring figure…a master of men…a
manhandler of criminals,” generated a perfectly efficient, almost
overwhelming, public persona that matched his imposing figure
and loud Irish brogue.21 Byrnes, however, instituted a policy of
patronage within his force; a historian stated that “appointment
to the New York police force was predicated only upon payment
of $300 to Tammany Hall!”22 Ruled by what Roosevelt described
as “an elaborate system of blackmail,” the police force selectively
enforced laws; those with money or influence evaded the law while
honest citizens were penalized financially.23 A longstanding illegal
policy of “police protection” existed between the police force and
business owners; greengrocers forked up a dollar or two daily for
permission to sell fruit on the sidewalks.24 However, the police
treated powerful business owners, proprietors of “gambling houses,
saloons, and brothels,” with respect and almost awe.25 Many of
these proprietors had substantial power and means; the police
force condoned illegal violations of statutes in exchange for a fee.
The Reverend Dr. Charles H. Parkhurst exposed the
previously undetected corruption of Byrnes’ administration on
February 14, 1892 in a sermon at the Gothic brownstone church.26
An outraged Parkhurst attacked Tammany Hall and the Police
Department, calling it “a lying, perjured, rum-soaked and libidinous lot.”27 Parkhurst announced that the time had come to oust
“the official and administrative criminality that is filthifying our
entire municipal life, making New York a very hotbed of knavery,
debauchery, and bestiality.”28 Croker, Byrnes, and other Tammany
leaders dismissed Parkhurst as “plain crazy,” but Platt, angered by
Tammany resistance to a bill that he had proposed, authorized a
commission to investigate Parkhurst’s allegations.29
The Lexow Committee, led by Senator Clarence Lexow,
commenced investigation on March 9, 1894.30 The committee
questioned citizens and policemen about brutal treatment and
THE CONCORD REVIEW
55
arrest of suspected criminals, illegal monitoring of voting booths,
police intimidation towards voters, and police soliciting during
elections.31 The evidence the committee found created what Platt
described as “a popular revolt” in New York among citizens previously oblivious to the corruption rampant in the department. As
Avery Andrews, Roosevelt’s fellow Police Commissioner said later,
“The city, and indeed the entire country, was shocked, horrified,
and nauseated by its disclosures of graft, corruption, inefficiency
and crime, and the close relations between Tammany politicians,
the police, and the underworld.”32 The nationwide disbelief and
anger over the Lexow findings signified the beginning of attention to the central issue of political reform that would mark the
Progressive Era.
On September 6, 1894, the Council of Good Government
Clubs, an early Progressive organization, met at Madison Square
Garden to discuss the findings of the Lexow Committee.33 United
by a desire to eradicate the long and corrupt reign of Tammany,
the council selected a “Committee of Seventy” to organize a nonpartisan reform ticket for the November mayoral election.34 William
Strong, an ironically-named and irresolute but “honest” merchant
with absolutely no political experience, was selected as the mayoral
candidate and endorsed by Platt.35 Sworn in on January 1, 1895,
Strong’s first objective was to remove the corrupt Police Board
members, Commissioners Murray, Kerwin, and Stanton, and find
suitable replacements.36 Platt, however, had not anticipated the
loss of Republican Commissioners Murray and Kerwin, his connections to the inner workings of the Police Department. The
Easy Boss had overlooked the newly passed (January 1895) Power
of Removal Act, which authorized Mayor Strong to discharge city
officials without the consent of the New York State Assembly or
any other government administrator.37 Thus Platt viewed Roosevelt, Strong’s preference for the leader of the Police Board, as
a hindrance to his objectives and an unwelcome replacement of
Murray and Kerwin. Platt loathed the new commissioner from the
beginning, creating a long-lasting, cutthroat rivalry in the political
sphere.
56
Lucia A. Randall
Theodore Roosevelt, known for his work in Washington
D.C. as Civil Service Commissioner, was the first choice of many
New Yorkers for President of the Board. As the headline of the
New York Times rhetorically stated, “If Not Mr. Roosevelt, Who?”38
Jacob Riis, leader of the muckraking journalism movement and
later a close friend of Roosevelt, declared “Theodore Roosevelt
is the man for president of the police board…..I don’t care who
the other commissioners are. T.R. is enough.”39 Although he was
clearly wanted in New York, Roosevelt debated accepting the position for weeks. He immensely enjoyed his work as Civil Service
Commissioner, but Roosevelt felt that he could make a bigger
impact in his native city. The Parkhurst allegations had appeared
in newspapers nationwide, portraying New York City as the ideal
setting for groundbreaking reform. Roosevelt, who always enjoyed
a challenge, was inspired by the prospect of revamping the most
corrupt law-enforcing body in the United States. In addition to
his more altruistic reasons for accepting the position, the appointment, if successful, could establish Roosevelt as one of the
premier American reform politicians. After much consideration,
Roosevelt, uncertain but excited, accepted the offer from Mayor
Strong. Though he felt that accepting the job would be “taking
chances,”40 he was eager to go “back to my own city, to stay among
my own people.”­41
The characteristically optimistic Roosevelt was dismayed
upon arriving in New York City and finding the police department in shambles. He quickly regained his previous confidence,
however, by planning out a specific set of goals. Roosevelt resolved
to thoroughly inspect the current force, dismissing the corrupt
officers and encouraging a broader applicant pool of men to fill
the empty positions. He raised admissions standards on the force
and implemented new technology to maximize efficiency.42 In addition, an inimitable aspect that Roosevelt unknowingly brought
to New York, as he brought to every other position, was his ability
to captivate both the press and the public with his eloquence and
vitality. Unlike his counterparts, he determined to speak to the
public honestly and deliver on his promises. Roosevelt’s central,
THE CONCORD REVIEW
57
and perhaps most important, objective was to eliminate patronage and install a system based on merit and justice, applicable to
both selecting new officers and consistently enforcing laws without
being dissuaded by offers of wealth or power.43 With the usual
Roosevelt gusto, he resolved to “smash corruption” and “keep
politics absolutely out of the force.”44
And so “Mulberry Street’s Golden Age,” in the words of
Jacob Riis, began.45 Also serving on the Board were Republican
Frederick D. Grant, son of former president Ulysses S. Grant, and
Democrats Avery Andrews, and Andrew Parker, a well-known attorney.46 Though it was nominally a bi-partisan board, the other
members, as well as the entire city, recognized Roosevelt as the
real leader; “rumors of his incorruptibility, his daring courage, and
his independence” spread throughout the city.47 Andrew Parker
grumbled, “Thinks he’s the whole board,” but on the whole, the
other commissioners seemed willing to follow Roosevelt’s lead.48
Roosevelt soon realized the difficulty of his task. In a letter
to his sister, Anna “Bamie” Roosevelt Cowles, Roosevelt wrote,
I have never worked harder than during the last two weeks; the
actual work is hard; but far harder is the intense sham. I have the
most important, and the most corrupt, department in New York on
my hands; I shall speedily assail some of the ablest, shrewdest men
in this city, who will be fighting for their lives, and I know well how
hard the task ahead of me is.49
Roosevelt’s preliminary initiatives were briefly hampered. The BiPartisan Act, passed by Mayor Strong in May 1895, decreed that
decisions must be unanimously agreed upon by all four commissioners, or three commissioners and the Chief of Police, therefore
limiting the power Roosevelt possessed as President of the Board.50
For Roosevelt, who firmly believed that “the ‘division of powers’
theory works unmitigated mischief,” the Bi-Partisan Act would be
a constant tribulation.52
Roosevelt faced another dilemma with Chief of Police
Thomas Byrnes, who one historian described as “the personification of the police department.”53 Byrnes seemed an immovable
obstacle to Roosevelt’s initiatives from their first meeting. Refer-
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ring to the corrupt machine politics that ruled the police force,
Byrnes greeted Roosevelt with, “It will break you. You will yield. You
are but human.”53 In response, Roosevelt confided his strategy to
Henry Cabot Lodge, writing, “I think I shall move against Byrnes
at once. I thoroughly distrust him, and cannot do any thorough
work while he remains.”54 He recognized that introducing new
policies through the force would be unattainable with Byrnes
hindering change from a position of authority. After asking him
several times to leave, Roosevelt threatened Byrnes with a public
investigation of fraudulent finances in the force. Despite reports
that he “will not retire in the face of charges,” Byrnes handed in
his resignation a few days later.55 Byrnes was replaced by Peter
Conlin, a quiet, unassuming man. Byrnes’ resignation was coupled
with the discharge of Inspector “Clubber Williams,” notorious for
brutally beating victims into unconsciousness.56 These replacements marked a significant turning point in Roosevelt’s reform;
without the constant, adverse presences of Byrnes and Williams,
the main representatives of political patronage within the force,
Roosevelt was free to install new policies without resistance.
Roosevelt sought to uncover the corruption and negligence
of duty in the force by nightly tramps through the streets of the
city. One headline declared, “Police Caught Napping: President
Roosevelt Makes an Early Morning Tour.”57 Newspapers warned
policemen to “be prepared for trouble whenever teeth and spectacles come out of the darkness.”58 Though Roosevelt enjoyed the
press coverage of his nightly treks and called them “great fun,”
they also had a more serious aspect.59 Roosevelt wanted to see
firsthand the actual activities of his force; negligent officers were
summoned to Roosevelt’s office the following morning, subjected
to an intense interrogation, and often discharged, thereby leaving
an opening. Roosevelt’s treks were groundbreaking; never before
in city politics had an authority figure been so directly involved
in the work of his subordinates. An excerpt from the Recorder in
1895 stated that:
No Police Commissioner has ever before tromped up and down the
streets in the hours between midnight and sunrise in order to ascertain for himself who of the guardians of the peace were at their posts
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59
and who were not. The result of his investigation can be summed up
in a few words: He found policemen where they should not be, and
did not find policemen where they should be.60
Roosevelt’s nightly missions additionally exposed him to the miserable living and working conditions of immigrants. His friendship with Jacob Riis, a Danish immigrant and the author of the
muckraking exposé How the Other Half Lives, further opened his
eyes. “Roosevelt wanted to know the city by night, and the true
inwardness of some of the problems he was struggling with as
Commissioner…He wanted to understand it all, the smallest with
the greatest, and sometimes the information he brought out was
unique, to put it mildly.”61 As a pioneer of the Progressive movement and the quintessential reformer, Roosevelt adopted the
task of immigrant’s advocate. Outraged at the deplorable, filthy
conditions of tenements, Roosevelt, who as a municipal officer
also served on the Board of Health, fought in “the battle of the
slum,” destroying the worst tenements and creating better living
conditions for immigrants.62 He personally supervised the demolition of several particularly contaminated tenements, and oversaw
the construction of more sanitary living conditions. Jacob Riis,
who, like many immigrants, struggled to find shelter when first
coming to America, often found protection in lodging-houses.
Riis described New York City’s lodging houses, tenement-like
structures that offered nightly shelter to immigrants and vagrants,
as “jammed with a foul and stewing crowd of tramps.”63 Together,
Riis and Roosevelt “tore down unfit tenements, lighted dark halls,
forced the opening of parks and playgrounds…”64 In his crusade
for better living conditions, Roosevelt was committed to the usual
Progressive issues, such as tenement and lodging-house remodeling, as well as reforming the NYPD.
To fill the empty positions after nightly dismissals, Roosevelt encouraged all men to apply for jobs on the police force. A
variety of applicants came from all over New York to apply. In a
statement that was radical during this time of nativist sentiment
and political patronage, Roosevelt announced that not only was
discrimination with regard to race, religion, or political preferences prohibited in the force, stating a connection to an ethnic,
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religious, or political group could actually work against the applicant: “The endorsement of an applicant by political or religious
body on the ground of membership will not be considered. Such
endorsement will, however, prove detrimental to the applicant.”65
Before Roosevelt’s term, the overwhelming majority of the force
had been of Irish and German descent to the exclusion of other
ethnicities. Roosevelt’s statement was noteworthy in that it opened
police positions to men of different nationalities, and allowed each
man to escape ethnic stereotypes and attain a position based on
his character and ability.
Roosevelt, though refreshingly open-minded about diversity, upheld high standards in his “severe mental, physical,
and moral” admissions exams.66 With so many jobs handed out
to unqualified machine supporters, the police force had not administered entrance exams. Henry Pringle noted, albeit harshly,
that “the patrolman of the day was usually abnormally fat and
usually abnormally stupid. He could barely read and write. His
convenient conscience made strict obedience to the commands of
his political sponsor easy.”67 Avery D. Andrews, Roosevelt’s fellow
commissioner, commented that the “great majority of the rank
and file of the New York Police were honest and efficient. They
had given and would give excellent service with the right kind of
leadership. But with so many of the senior officers proven to have
engaged in blackmail and acquisition of illicit wealth, the breakdown and demoralization of the force was complete.”68 Roosevelt
personally thought that “there were a few honorable and highminded Tammany officials…but the corruption had become so
widespread as seriously to impair the work of administration and
to bring us back within measurable distance of the days of Tweed.”
He determined that entrance exams were necessary to uphold
high standards in daily police work.69 These entirely merit-based
exams included new height, weight, and age requirements; basic
spelling, penmanship, writing, arithmetic, and United States history and government exams; strength and agility athletic tests;
and thorough background checks.70 Less than a year after Roosevelt became Commissioner, three thousand, one hundred and
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61
seventy candidates for patrolmen had been examined; fifty-five
percent were rejected from the physical exam and thirty percent
were rejected from the mental exam, leaving only fifteen percent
as eligible applicants.71 Roosevelt was well ahead of the times; admissions standards were not adopted within police departments
nationwide until the 1940s.72
After Roosevelt had whittled down the applicant pool and
welcomed new members to the force, he focused on improving
efficiency, enforcement, and morale within the force. Roosevelt
clearly outlined the goals for the force, as described by Avery
Andrews: “Police officers were sternly reminded that they were
the servants and not the masters of the public, and that while all
necessary force must be used in dealing with criminals, peaceful citizens must be treated with courtesy, and aided whenever
possible.”73 To prepare for criminal encounters, Roosevelt held
mandatory training sessions for his force and opened the New
York Police Department School of Pistol Practice in 1895, the only
training school of its kind in the country with the exception of
the Cincinnati Police Department’s School of Instruction at the
time.74 The foundation of the police school was coupled with the
distribution of a police manual, which included all the rules and
regulations. The printing of this manual was notable in that the
distribution of formal rules and regulations via manual did not
become common practice in American law enforcement until the
1970s.­75
Roosevelt recognized innovations produced during the
Industrial Revolution as ways to generate efficiency and technological advance within the force. He installed the Bertillon system,
invented by Alphonse Bertillon, the chief of the identification
bureau of the Paris Prefecture of Police.76 The system was designed
to identify criminals based on body measurements, creating a
systematic way to uncover criminals based on recent (later discredited) scientific advancements. The police department made
forays in transportation with the purchase of several horse-drawn
wagons and new “lightweight naptha-powered launches” to replace
the dingy rowboats that were used to navigate New York City’s
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complex waterways.77 The most innovative and successful use of
technology within the force, however, was the Bicycle Squad.
The Bicycle Squad arose out of an urgent traffic problem
that threatened the daily safety of industrial urban life: “Not only
were there no traffic rules or traffic lights, but there was no traffic
squad, no traffic court, nor even a traffic ‘cop’, now so generally
seen at busy intersections.”78 When Avery Andrews proposed the
idea of a bicycle unit to the Board, Roosevelt was the only member
who took him seriously, and the two men collaborated to set up a
temporary bicycle squad to regulate traffic. Though the Bicycle
Squad originated as a provisional unit, the members of the squad
soon became the darlings of New York; in the Police Parade of
1896, the Bicycle Squad was commended as “the Finest of the Finest, the corps d’elite of the Department.”79 The normally reserved
Chief of Police Peter Conlin publicly hailed the Bicycle Squad’s
performance: “…it has much increased the efficiency of police
service on the thoroughfares…and has been instrumental in the
accomplishment of police work that could not possibly be so well
accomplished under the conditions of the police service existing
along the bicycle posts prior to the organization of the bicycle
squad.”80 The Bicycle Squad regulated traffic patterns, increased
the safety of pedestrians, and provided comfort to citizens with
regular appearances on the streets of New York.
The new standards and methods that Roosevelt implemented within the force strengthened the policemen’s resolve.
As Jacob Riis wrote, “Did the police hate Roosevelt for making
them do their duty? No, they loved him.”81 Raising expectations
increased the personal commitment that policemen brought to
work. Roosevelt rewarded exceptional performance with life-saving
medals and promotions, and each policeman felt that he had a
fair chance to achieve recognition.82 Avery Andrews wrote that
“I am myself convinced that the greatest work done by Roosevelt
in the Police Department was that of building up its morale and
re-establishing discipline.”83 For the honest policemen who had
tried in vain to maintain integrity under Byrnes, the standards and
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63
merit-based promotions of Roosevelt’s term were inspirational
and invigorating.
The story of Edward J. Bourke, a retired captain of the New
York Police who served as a patrolman under Roosevelt, reflects
the uplifting personal impact that Roosevelt made on the members
of the force. Bourke recalled that under Byrnes, “I had brought
down the wrath of some of my superiors by arresting a man who
was supposed to enjoy complete immunity.”84 Byrnes had punished
him and ordered him to allow those with political pull to evade
the law. Under Roosevelt, a similar incident happened; Bourke
had inadvertently arrested “King” Callahan, a saloonkeeper with
strong ties to Tammany, and the arrest had climaxed in what Lincoln Steffens described as a “boozy, bloody battle” between Bourke
and Callahan.85 Roosevelt, rather than obsequiously exonerating
Callahan, rewarded Bourke for admirable police work, telling him
that “You performed your duty, and that’s what I want the men
on the police force to do…Don’t worry about this. I’ll stand by
you to the end.”86 Roosevelt’s support made a lasting and deeply
personal impression on Bourke, who was promoted to a roundsman and later became a captain: “It was my mournful duty to lead
the mounted escort in Roosevelt’s funeral, and I was not the only
man in this country who shed tears that day. He was a man, one
of the biggest this country has ever produced.”87
In addition to winning the support and love of the force,
Roosevelt captivated the press with his nightly escapades and
vivacious personality. The advantageous use of the press to gain
support was a technique that many Progressives would adapt,
though few enthralled Americans as Roosevelt did. The average readership of American newspapers doubled between 1880
and 1900; one historian remarked that “Roosevelt responded in
just the right way to take advantage of an upheaval in American
journalism.”88 Roosevelt succeeded in using the inclinations of
contemporary journalism, which generally displayed Progressive
tendencies, due to the exposés of muckrakers. In New York, he
captured the attention of the press with his “extraordinary gusto
and enthusiasm”; one critic begrudgingly wrote that Roosevelt
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“has the knack of doing things, and doing them noisily, clamorously; while he is in the neighborhood the public can no more
look the other way than the small boy can turn his head away
from a circus parade followed by a steam calliope.”89 Newspaper
headings portrayed Roosevelt as a swashbuckling hero fighting
crime in the grimy, base streets of New York, as exemplified in
the titles of the New York Times 1895 articles “A Montana Man on
Theodore Roosevelt: He Admires Him Greatly as a Pacifier of Bad
Men and Bears,”90 “Police Board’s Crusade,”91 and “Roosevelt in
Action.”92 After the lack of progress under the Byrnes force which
was exposed in the Lexow Investigation, the public was relieved
to see such vigorous activity and happily embraced Roosevelt’s
energetic, almost frenetic, image.
Despite the good rapport Roosevelt developed with the
press and the public, he encountered a series of difficulties in the
second year of his term that tested his integrity and compromised
his political career. The first was the Excise Law, a law prohibiting
the sale of liquor on Sundays in “side-door saloons.”93 Tammany
officers used the Excise Law as a bribing pawn in gaining money
from saloonkeepers. Roosevelt, however, would not permit such
selective enforcement of laws, and publicly stated his fundamental
position as a law enforcer. As one reporter stated, “Neither Mr.
Roosevelt himself nor Mayor Strong is a teetotaler. They do not
approve of the Sunday closing law as it stands, and would welcome
some relaxation of its provisions. But Mr. Roosevelt has determined
that while the law is on the statute-book it shall be enforced, and
enforced against all parties without fear or favor.”94 In June 1895,
newspapers announced “the ‘dryest’ Sunday to-morrow New
York has ever known,” much to the dismay of the city’s large and
politically active German-American population, who collectively
preferred the selective, if corrupt, interpretation of the Excise
Law.95 Roosevelt countered, saying “When they criticize us and say
our action is severe and unintelligent, they merely mean that our
action is not corrupt.” As the November elections approached,
Republican leaders, including Mayor Strong, urged Roosevelt
to ease up on the enforcement of the Excise Law in an effort to
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65
appease the German-American population, who usually voted Republican. Edward Lauterbach, chairman of the Republican party,
publicly stated that he “was not in any way responsible for Rooseveltism.”97 A determined Roosevelt wrote to Henry Cabot Lodge
in October that “I shall not alter my course one handbreadth.”98
In the elections, Republicans triumphed elsewhere in New York,
but Tammany overwhelmingly prevailed within New York City,
prompting angry citizens to send letter bombs to Roosevelt,99 and
an anonymous verbatim telegram saying, “You are the deadest
duck that ever died in a political pond.”100
Boss Platt, after the Tammany victories, and infuriated with
the lack of cooperation from Roosevelt, dispatched his carefully
anticipated plan to combine Old New York (Manhattan and the
Bronx) with Brooklyn, Queens, and Staten Island into the metropolis of Greater New York, which would eliminate the current Police
Department and restore the “side-door saloons” on the account
of the Republican Party.101 In reaction, Roosevelt revealed Platt’s
plan during an address to the New York Methodist Ministers’
Association, a group that was sympathetic to the enforcement of
the Excise Law. Convinced that Roosevelt was their champion in
abolishing the evils of alcohol, the ministers condemned Platt’s
gerrymandering plot from pulpits all over the city.102 Much like
the Parkhurst allegations and the investigation that followed, the
Platt exposure provoked much public outrage. The New York Times
charged in Roosevelt’s defense that “political cowards and assassins would strike him down for his honesty and courage,”103 and
denounced the “cowardly attempt to restore sneaking side-door
selling.”104 As a result, Platt’s plan was thwarted. Humiliated by the
incident, he resolved more than ever to ruin Roosevelt’s political
career. Though Roosevelt’s future in New York was compromised
by his honest enforcement of the Excise Law, it established Roosevelt as a politician with integrity, a refreshing change for many
American citizens during the era of the archetypal machine.
While an encounter with Platt had seemed inevitable from
the moment he entered New York, Roosevelt never suspected an
enemy from within the Board. Soon after the gerrymandering plot
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was revealed, however, Roosevelt’s fellow Commissioner, Andrew
Parker, began to disappear from Board meetings and resist new
reforms. Parker, “an utterly untrustworthy and lying schemer” in
Roosevelt’s view, enlisted the help of both Commissioner Grant
and Chief Conlin in his sudden effort against reform, thus bringing action of the Board to an utter standstill by the Bi-Partisan Act.
The situation worsened when Platt, seizing a possible opportunity
to shatter the career of his rival, joined in the campaign against
reform in the department. The conflict grew to a head when a
simmering Roosevelt exploded at a complacent Parker at a New
York State Senate meeting in Albany.105 As the New York Sun summarized, “no love was lost between Messrs. Roosevelt and Parker.”106
Roosevelt, a man who had always believed in the “strenuous
life,” was dejected to see the NYPD regress to inactivity after his
painstaking efforts to reform.107 It was becoming quite apparent
that Roosevelt’s continuing endeavors would be fruitless. Thus,
when President McKinley offered the post of Assistant Secretary
of the Navy to Roosevelt, he again felt the call to public service
and accepted McKinley’s offer. Though he was reluctant to leave
the NYPD, Roosevelt was equally eager to serve in a place where
his goals could be fulfilled and appreciated. In his resignation
letter to Mayor Strong on April 17, 1897, Roosevelt highlighted
the positive side of his administration and accredited the force, as
well as his own leadership: “You have in the police force a body of
admirable men, brave, able and zealous; under proper leadership
they can at any time be depended upon to do the best possible
work.”108 Despite the impediments at the end, Roosevelt viewed
his term as Police Commissioner, which had not lasted two years,
as triumphant, in that he had taken “the police out of politics,”
as he had resolved to do in September 1895.109
As Roosevelt’s political career rapidly soared, climaxing
with the Presidency six years after his term as Police Commissioner,
the NYPD was never far from his thoughts. The New York Post declared that “his spirit, Rooseveltism, will not die out.”110 Indeed,
from his post as Assistant Secretary of the Navy in Washington,
Roosevelt, through a profuse correspondence with Commissioner
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67
Avery D. Andrews, maintained a keen interest in police happenings, coupled with a steady stream of advice: “Of course I don’t
wish to seem to dictate or interfere in any way, but…”­111 In addition, Roosevelt continued to advise other members of the NYPD.
“Honest John” McCullagh, an officer under Roosevelt, replaced
Peter Conlin as Chief of Police in August 1897. In a lengthy letter
to McCullagh, Roosevelt remained a mentor figure: “The Chief
of Police of Greater New York is the foremost police officer in the
entire world…your place is assured. Now, on the other hand, it
is a place of great temptation—political, and worse than political,
temptation…I have the foremost confidence in you.”112 Roosevelt is honored today in Police Departments nationwide with
the Theodore Roosevelt Police Award, which honors Roosevelt’s
valiant commitment to honest police work and public service.113
Roosevelt also left a permanent, tangible legacy in American police and detective work with the creation, during his presidency,
of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), in 1908, to facilitate
detective work, an aspect of policing that he had felt was lacking
during his time in New York.114
Though the recalcitrance of Parker, Grant, and Platt
stopped progressive reform in the NYPD, Roosevelt’s work improved the lives of American citizens, especially New Yorkers, in
the long run. Roosevelt became a nationally recognized symbol
of “reform in the best sense,” restoring the faith in the American
political system that had been lost during the pre-Progressive era
of political machines, patronage, and urban squalor.115 Within
New York City, Roosevelt left an enduring mark; an acclaimed
Roosevelt historian noted that:
Few could deny that his record as Commissioner was impressive…
He had proved that it was possible to enforce an unpopular law, and,
by enforcing it, had taught the doctrine of respect for the law. He
had given New York City its first honest election in living memory.
In less than two years, Roosevelt had depoliticized and deethnicized
the force, making it once more a neutral arm of government. He had
broken its connections with the underworld, toughened the policetrial system, and largely eliminated corruption in the ranks…During
the reform Board’s administration, he had personally brought about
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the closure of a hundred of the worst tenement slums seen on his
famous night patrols.116
Perhaps, however, Roosevelt’s greatest long-term accomplishment
on the lives of Americans was his ability to encourage citizens to
fight for social justice. With Roosevelt as their inspiration, New
Yorkers crusaded to eliminate tenements and orphanages, fight
corruption in city politics, and stand up for the rights of underrepresented citizens. Citing Roosevelt as the primary impetus
behind the newfound change in the attitudes of New Yorkers, a
New York Times article stated shortly before Roosevelt’s departure,
“…there will be in the future a larger body of citizens united for
action than anything we know of at present. We are becoming a
vast body of men, and are beginning to understand that nothing
can be done for good government except by a persistent attack
on the present methods of government. There will be no compromise.”117 By motivating citizens to fight for reform, Roosevelt
ensured that his advancements in the NYPD and within New York
City would never be completely effaced.
Roosevelt’s impact on the NYPD and the Progressive
movement as a whole is undeniable; his work in New York City
exposed corruption and brought a favorable public opinion of the
Progressive values. Though action within the Police Department
was eventually brought to a standstill, the positives of Roosevelt’s
administration far overshadowed the negative. His largely successful attempts to keep the police out of politics propelled Roosevelt
to the forefront of national politics; he became President only
six years after leaving the Police Commissionership. Roosevelt’s
vibrant, larger-than life personality captured the attention of
both the press and the public, and his speeches, which appealed
to both the wealthy and immigrants alike for their all-American
values, were peppered with eloquent and persuasive language.
Ultimately, though, it was Roosevelt’s actions that established him
as the quintessential Progressive; he was a refreshingly honest
politician who set ambitious goals and followed up on his word.
Roosevelt resolved to develop a force based on merit rather than
patronage, and in doing so, uplifted the morale of the force.
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69
Roosevelt created the modern police force with modern scientific
and technological innovations. Through his commitment to public
service within the NYPD, Roosevelt rid the police of patronage
and corruption, increased their confidence and efficiency, and
pioneered the Progressive movement as a dynamic force for positive change.
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1 David McCullough, Mornings on Horseback (Simon &
Schuster, 1981; reprint, Simon & Schuster Paperbacks, 2003)
pp. 28-30
2
Theodore Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore
Roosevelt (Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1913; reprint, Seven
Treasures Publications, 2009) p. 11
3
Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt,
p. 11
4
http://theodoreroosevelt.org
5
Lincoln Steffens, The Shame of the Cities (New York:
McClure, Phillips & Co., 1904; reprint: Mineola, New York:
Dover Publications Inc., 2004)
6
Kenneth D. Ackerman, Boss Tweed: The Rise and Fall of
the Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of Modern New York
(New York: Carroll & Graf Publishers, 2005) p. 21
7
David P. Thelen, “Social Tensions and the Origins of
Progressivism” The Journal of American History (September,
1969) p. 323, http://www.jstor.org
8
Kenneth Conboy, “The Reforming Impulse: Theodore
Roosevelt and the New York City Police” (Master’s Thesis,
Columbia University), Found in The Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
9
Steffens, The Shame of the Cities, p. 203
10
Ackerman, p. 17
11
Ibid., p. 39
12
“The Reign of the Rabble,” New York Times, 15 July 1863,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
13
Ackerman, pp. 26-28
14
Ibid., p. 29
15
Edmund Morris, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt 2d ed.,
(New York: The Modern Library, 1979) p. 534
16
Owen Wister, Roosevelt: The Story of a Friendship (New
York: Macmillan Company, 1930) p. 70
17
Lemuel Ely Quigg, “Thomas Platt” The North American
Review (May 1910) p. 670, http://www.jstor.org
18
Eric H. Monkkonen, History of Urban Police: Crime and
Justice, (1992) p. 552, http://www.jstor.org
19
Thomas Nast, “The Guardian Angel of the Poor People’s
Money” Harper’s Weekly 16 March 1872, http://www.
harpweek.com
20
V.O. Key, Jr., “Police Graft” The University of Chicago
Press (March 1935) p. 633
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Lincoln Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens
(New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) p. 201
22
Jay Stuart Berman, Police Administration and Progressive
Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New
York (Greenwood Press, 1987) p. 71
23
Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals: AdministrationCivil Service (New York: P.F. Collier & Son, Publishers, 1897)
p. 204
24
Morris, p. 409
25
Kathleen M. Dalton, Reviewed Works: “Police
Administration and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as
Police Commissioner of New York by Jay Stuart Berman” The
Journal of American History, (March 1989) p. 1348
26
H. Paul Jeffers, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of
Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897
(John Wiley & Sons, Inc., 1994) p. 5
27
Selwyn Raab, “Taking on Tammany, 100 Years Ago”
New York Times, 14 February 1992, Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
28
Raab, “Taking on Tammany, 100 Years Ago” New York
Times, 14 February 1992, Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
29
Steffens, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens, p. 215
30
Berman, p. 27
31
Ibid., p. 27
32
Compiled and edited by Louis J. Lang, The
Autobiography of Thomas Collier Platt (New York: B.W. Dodge
& Company, 1910) p. 268, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
33
Avery Delano Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt: Police
Commissioner (Unpublished), Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University. Cambridge,
Massachusetts, p. 10
34
Berman, p. 29
35
Ibid., 30
36
Jacob A. Riis, The Making of An American (New York:
The Macmillan Company: 1901) p. 211
37
Jeffers, p. 56
38
Berman, pp. 35-36
21
71
72
Lucia A. Randall
39
1895
“If Not Mr. Roosevelt, Who?” New York Times, 3 April
Steffens, p. 257
Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 14 April
1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
42
Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 21 April
1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
43
Berman, p. 59
44
Roosevelt, The Autobiography of Theodore Roosevelt, p. 97
45
Roosevelt, pp. 96-97
46
Riis, The Making of an American, p. 210
47
Berman, p. 46
48
Henry F. Pringle, Theodore Roosevelt (New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931) p. 135
49
Steffens, p. 258
50
Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 19 May
1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
51
Berman, pp. 35-36
52
Roosevelt, p. 96
53
Berman, p. 51
54
Jacob A. Riis, Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, (New
York: The Outlook Company, 1903, reprint, New York: The
Outlook Company, 1904) p. 130
55
Selected and edited by Elting E. Morison, The Letters
of Theodore Roosevelt: The Years of Preparation: 1868-1898
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951)
p. 456
56
“Byrnes May Soon Retire” New York Times 26 May 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
57
Steffens, p. 208
58
“Police Caught Napping” New York Times 8 June 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
59
Berman, p. 57
60
Theodore Roosevelt, to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 23 June
1895, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore
40
41
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
61
Recorder (8 June 1895), found in Theodore Roosevelt:
Police Commissioner (Unpublished) by Avery D. Andrews,
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
62
Riis, Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, p. 144
63
Ibid., p. 151
64
Riis, The Making of An American, p. 44
65
Ibid., p. 223
66
Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 46
67
Ibid., p. 56
68
Pringle, p. 134
69
Andrews, p. 21
70
Theodore Roosevelt, American Ideals, pp. 203-204
71
Berman, pp. 69-74
72
Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 59
73
“Book Reviews: Theodore Roosevelt as Police
Commissioner” Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal
(Spring 1988) p. 17
74
Andrews, p. 47
75
“Book Reviews: Theodore Roosevelt as Police
Commissioner,” p. 17
76
Berman, 80.
77
Berman, 84.
78
Berman, 88.
79
Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 99
80
Ibid., p. 101
81
“Bicycles a Great Help” New York Times 7 March 1896,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
82
Riis, Theodore Roosevelt, p. 145
83
Avery Delano Andrews, “Theodore Roosevelt as Police
Commissioner,” The New-York Historical Society Quarterly
(April 1958) p. 124, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
84
Avery Delano Andrews, Theodore Roosevelt as Police
Commissioner, p. 124
85
Edward J. Bourke, “The Roosevelt the Police Knew,”
New York Herald Tribune 12 October 1958, Article originally
published on 12 November 1921, Found in the Subject Files,
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Masschusetts
73
74
Lucia A. Randall
Jeffers, p. 120
Edward J. Bourke, “The Roosevelt the Police Knew”,
New York Herald Tribune, 12 October 1958, Article originally
published on 12 November 1921, Found in the Subject Files,
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
88
Ibid.
89
George Juergens, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press,”
The MIT Press on behalf of American Academy of Arts &
Sciences (Fall 1982) pp. 114-115, http://www.jstor.org
90
Juergens, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press” pp. 120121, http://www.jstor.org
91
“A Montana Man on Theodore Roosevelt,” New York
Times, 27 July 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com
92
“Police Board’s Crusade” New York Times, 18 July 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
93
“Roosevelt in Action” New York Times, 21 July 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
94
Morris, p. 537
95
Unknown Article The New York Times, 10 August
1895 Clipping found in the Theodore Roosevelt Scrapbooks,
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massacchusetts
96
“Look for a Dry Sunday” New York Times, 27 June 1895
97
“Roosevelt on Excise Law” New York Sun, 11 October
1895
98
Morris, p. 529
99
Morison, p. 490
100
“To Scare Roosevelt” Washington Post, 6 August 1895
101
Anonymous telegram, reprinted in Avery Delano
Andrews’ Theodore Roosevelt: Police Commissioner
(Unpublished) p. 93, Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
102
Morris, p. 537
103
Ibid., p. 539
104
“The Republican Plot to Oust Roosevelt” New York Times
23 January 1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com
105
“Plot of Platt Men Widely Condemned,” New York Times
24 January 1896, Article found in the Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
86
87
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Theodore Roosevelt to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 19 April
1896, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
107
Morris, p. 548
108
“An Unpleasant Police Board Incident” New York
Sun, 27 May 1897, Article found in the Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
109
Theodore Roosevelt, The Strenuous Life: Essays and
Addresses, (New York: Review of Reviews Company, 1899,
reprint, Mineola, New York: Dover Publications, 2009) p. 1
110
Morison, p. 595
111
“Duty Owned by Citizens” New York Times, 6 September
1895
112
Unknown Title New York Post 10 April 1897, Clipping
found in Theodore Roosevelt scrapbook, Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
113
Theodore Roosevelt to Avery Delano Andrews, 14
September 1899, transcript in the hand of Theodore Roosevelt.
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
114
Letter reprinted in Avery D. Andrews’ Theodore
Roosevelt: Police Commissioner (Unpublished) pp. 172,
188-189, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
115
http://theodoreroosevelt.org/association
116
Kathleen Dalton, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life,
(New York: Vintage Books, 2002) p. 342
117
New York Sun (New York: April 26, 1895), Clipping
found in scrapbook in the Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
118
Morris, pp. 584-585
119
“Municipal Reform Work” New York Times, 4 April 1897,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
106
75
76
Lucia A. Randall
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the Corrupt Pol Who Conceived the Soul of Modern New York,
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Andrews, Avery D., “Theodore Roosevelt as Police
Commissioner.” The New-York Historical Society Quarterly,
Vol. 42, No. 2, (April 1958) pp. 117-142, Found in the
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Andrews, Avery D., Theodore Roosevelt: Police
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Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
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Andrews, Avery D., “Witness to History: Theodore Roosevelt
and the State Trust Company,” The Business History Review,
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jstor.org
“An Unpleasant Police Board Incident,” New York Sun,
27 May 1897, Found in Theodore Roosevelt Scrapbooks,
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Berman, Jay Stuart, Police Administration and Progressive
Reform: Theodore Roosevelt as Police Commissioner of New
York, Greenwood Press, 1987
“Bicycles a Great Help,” New York Times, 7 March 1896,
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Bishop, Joseph Bucklin, Theodore Roosevelt and His
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“Book Reviews: Theodore Roosevelt as Police
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14, No. 2, (Spring 1988) pp. 17-18
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Bourke, Edward J., “The Roosevelt the Police Knew,” New
York Herald Tribune, 12 November 1921, Theodore Roosevelt
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“Byrnes May Soon Retire,” New York Times, 26 May 1895
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“Byrnes Now to Investigate,” New York Times, 6 June 1894
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“Byrnes’s Men Not Afraid,” New York Times, 24 September
1894, http://hn.bigchalk.com.
Conboy, Kenneth, “The Reforming Impulse: Theodore
Roosevelt and the New York Police,” Unpublished, Master’s
Essay, Columbia University, Found in the Theodore Roosevelt
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Cowles, Anna Roosevelt, Letters from Theodore Roosevelt
to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 1870-1918, Scribner, 1924,
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University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Dalton, Kathleen M, “Review: Police Administration
and Progressive Reform: Theodore Roosevlt as Police
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Vo. 75, No. 4, (March 1989) p. 1348, http://www.jstor.org
Dalton, Kathleen, Theodore Roosevelt: A Strenuous Life,
New York: Vintage Books, 2002
“Duties of American Citizens,” New York Times, 18 February
1894, http://hn.bigchalk.com.
“Duty Owned by Citizens,” New York Times, 6 September
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Garland, Hamlin, “My Neighbor, Theodore Roosevelt,”
Everybody’s Magazine, Vol. 41, No. 4, (October 1919),
Theodore Roosevelt Subject Files, Theodore Roosevelt
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Massachusetts
Hart, Albert Bushnell, and Herbert Ronald Ferleger,
“Theodore Roosevelt Cyclopedia,” Theodore Roosevelt
Association Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3, (Summer 2007) pp. 435-437
Homberger, Eric, Scenes from the Life of a City: Corruption
and Conscience in Old New York, Ann Arbor, Michigan:
Edwards Brothers, 1994
http://www.theodoreroosevelt.org
“If Not Mr. Roosevelt, Who?” New York Times, 3 April 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Jeffers, H. Paul, Commissioner Roosevelt: The Story of
Theodore Roosevelt and the New York City Police, 1895-1897,
John Wiley & Sons, 1994
Juergens, George, “Theodore Roosevelt and the Press.” The
MIT Press on Behalf of American Academy of Arts & Sciences,
Vol. 111, No. 4, (Fall, 1982) pp. 113-133, http://www.jstor.org.
Key, Jr., V.O., “Police Graft,” The American Journal of
Sociology, Vol, 40, No. 5, (March 1935) pp. 624-636, http://
www.jstor.org.
Lodge, Henry Cabot, Selections from the Correspondence
of Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge, 1884-1918,
Scribner, 1925, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton
Library, Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
“Look for a Dry Sunday,” New York Times, 27 June 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Mandelbaum, Seymour J., Boss Tweed’s New York, John
Wiley & Sons, 1965, Reprint: Chicago: Elephant Paperbacks,
1990
McCullough, David, Mornings on Horseback, Simon &
Schuster, 1981, Reprint: 2003
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Monkkonen, Eric H, “History of Urban Police,” Crime and
Justice, Vol. 15, Modern Policing, (1992) pp. 547-580, http://
www.jstor.org
“A Montana Man on Theodore Roosevelt,” New York Times,
27 July 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com
Morison, Elting E., The Letters of Theodore Roosevelt:
Volume I: The Years of Preparation: 1868-1898, Cambridge,
Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1951
Morris, Edmund, The Rise of Theodore Roosevelt, New
York: The Modern Library, 1979, Reprint: The Modern Library,
2001
“Municipal Reform Work,” New York Times, 4 April 1897,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
“Murray and Kerwin to Go,” New York Times, 4 May 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Nast, Thomas, “The Brains,” Harper’s Weekly, 12 October
1871, http://www.cartoons.osu.ed
Nast, Thomas, “The Guardian Angel of the Poor People’s
Money,” Harper’s Weekly, 16 March 1872, http://www.
harpweek.com
Naylor, Natalie A., Douglas Brinkley, and John Allen Gable.
Theodore Roosevelt: Many-Sided American, Interlaken, New
York: Heart of the Lakes Publishing Under the Auspices of
Hofstra University, 1992
“No Politics for Police,” New York Times, 4 June 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Platt, Thomas C., The Autobiography of Thomas Collier
Platt, Compiled and edited by Louis J. Lang, New York: B.W.
Dodge & Company, 1910, Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
79
80
Lucia A. Randall
“Plot of Platt Men Widely Condemned,” New York Times,
24 January 1896, Found in Theodore Roosevelt Scrapbooks,
Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard
University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
“Police Board’s Crusade,” New York Times, 18 July 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
“Police Caught Napping,” New York Times, 8 June 1895,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Pringle, Henry F., Theodore Roosevelt, New York:
Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931, Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Quigg, Lemuel Ely, “Thomas Platt,” The North American
Review, Vol. 191, No. 654, (May 1910) pp. 668-677, http://www.
jstor.org
Raab, Selwyn, “Taking on Tammany, 100 Years Ago,” New
York Times, 14 February 1992, Theodore Roosevelt Subject
Files, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
“The Reign of the Rabble,” New York Times, 15 July 1863,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
“The Republican Plot to Oust Roosevelt,” New York Times,
23 January 1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com
“The Rights of the Poor,” New York Times, 29 November
1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com.
Riis, Jacob A., The Making of an American, New York: The
Macmillan Company, 1901
Riis, Jacob A., Theodore Roosevelt: The Citizen, New York,
New York: Outlook Books, 1903, Reprint: Outlook Books, 1904
Robinson, Corinne Roosevelt, My Brother Theodore
Roosevelt, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1921, Theodore
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University,
Cambridge, Massachusetts
“Roosevelt in Action,” New York Times, 21 July 1895
http://hn.bigchalk.com
“Roosevelt on Excise Law,” New York Sun, 11 October 1895,
Found in Theodore Roosevelt Scrapbooks, Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Roosevelt, Theodore, American Ideals: Administration,
Civil Service, New York: P.F. Collier & Son, 1897
Roosevelt, Theodore, “Handwritten Entries from Roosevelt’s
diary, 1895-1897,” Found in the Theodore Roosevelt Subject
Files, Theodore Roosevelt Collection, Houghton Library,
Harvard University, Cambridge, Massachusetts
Roosevelt, Theodore, “Roosevelt Scrapbooks (newspaper
clippings, photographs, etc), 1895-1897,” Theodore Roosevelt
Collection, Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Roosevelt, Theodore, “Letters from Theodore Roosevelt
to Anna Roosevelt Cowles, 1895-1897,” Written in the hand
of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
Houghton Library, Harvard University, Cambridge,
Massachusetts
Roosevelt, Theodore, “Letters from Theodore Roosevelt
to Avery D. Andrews, 1895-1900,” Written in the hand
of Theodore Roosevelt, Theodore Roosevelt Collection,
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Massachusetts
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Roosevelt, Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1919, Reprint: Seven
Treasures Publications, 2009
Roosevelt, Theodore, “The Roll of Honor of the New York
Police,” The Century Magazine, Vol. 54, No. 6, (October 1897)
pp. 803-814
81
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Addresses, The Century Company, 1899, Reprint: Mineola,
New York: Dover Publications, 2009
“Shakeup in the Police Board,” The Washington Post,
2 April 1895, http://hn.bigchalk.com
Steffens, Lincoln, The Autobiography of Lincoln Steffens.
New York: Harcourt, Brace and Company, 1931
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York: McClure, Phillips & Co., 1904, Reprint: Mineola, New
York: Dover Publications, 2004
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Theodore Roosevelt Association Journal, Vol. 28, No. 3.
(Summer 2007) pp. 10-22
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1896, http://hn.bigchalk.com
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THE CONCORD REVIEW
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
83
KIM DAE JUNG: AN EVALUATION OF HIS PRACTICES
FOR DEMOCRATIZATION IN THE CONTEXT
OF KOREAN POLITICAL HISTORY
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
K
im Dae Jung was born in January 1924 in Haui-Do, a
small island of Korea. He led a tumultuous political career: the
politician of the opposition party, a condemned prisoner, the president of a republic, and a Nobel Peace Prize laureate. He ended
his life at the age of 86 on August 18, 2009. After his death, critics,
historians, and supporters have begun to evaluate Kim Dae Jung’s
role in Korean political history. Some conservatives, like Gab Je
Cho and Man Won Ji, labeled Kim as “a black shadow of Korean
modern history,” “power of darkness,” and “incarnation of false
demagogy and forceful unification.”1 Another critic even stated
that “all he accomplished are lies and frauds.”2 On the other hand,
others were much more generous. Young Sook Park described
him as “a true democratic fighter, who did not compromise with
injustice even when his life was at stake.”3 Who is the real Kim Dae
Jung? Why is he a historical figure who receives such conflicting
evaluations? How is he a ‘hero’ and a ‘demagogue’ at the same
time?
To evaluate Kim Dae Jung, one needs to understand his
career in the context of modern Korean history and politics. The
modern history of Korea, which starts in 1948 with the establishYoungkwon “Noah” Yu is a Senior at the Perkiomen School in Pennsburg,
Pennsylvania, where he wrote this independent study for Dr. Lisa Smart
in the 2009/2010 academic year.
84
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
ment of the Republic of Korea, was built upon the legacies of the
Japanese colonial period as well as the U.S. military government.
The interests, philosophies, principles, and desires of the various
parties and politicians from 1948 need to be examined thoroughly
in order for us to understand how Kim Dae Jung resisted, as well as
shaped, the system. In this regard, a well-known Korean historian
said, “Kim Dae Jung IS history.”4
Although many citizens and critics agree that he was at the
forefront of the democratization movement in Korea, his ideas and
practices have not been analyzed from a dispassionate perspective. Because Korean politics is so bound up with partisanship and
regionalism, most views on Kim Dae Jung have been biased and
emotional. For this reason, this work is aimed at performing an
objective analysis of Kim Dae Jung’s role within Korean politics,
especially regarding his struggle for the democratization of Korea.
With this purpose in mind, this essay will narrate the key changes
in Korean political history and Kim Dae Jung’s role within these
changes, specifically focusing on his goal of democratization.
This essay hopes to provide insight on the accomplishments and
limitations of Kim’s career.
Introduction
While the institution of democracy is a hotly contested
issue in many parts of the world, this was not an issue since the
establishment of the Republic of Korea in 1948—at least on paper.
The Constitution, written and enacted in August 1948, clearly
supports democracy. Article 1, Clause 1 of the Constitution states
that “the Republic of Korea shall be a democratic republic.”5 The
assumption of this clause is the acceptance of a republican and
parliamentary form of government. The Constitution goes on
to delineate other democratic forms of practice to be instituted
in Korea. For example, Article 1, Clause 2 of the Constitution
states that “the sovereignty of the Republic of Korea resides in
the people, and all state authority emanates from the people.”6
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85
Korean history, unfortunately, unfolded in a way much different
from such prescriptions of the Constitution. For decades after the
institution of the Constitution, the people’s will was not consulted
or accepted. Too often, it has been neglected and worse, crushed.
Thus, in Korea, democratization meant that people would regain
their sovereign power from the authorities who took power away
through illegitimate means.
From this perspective, what Kim Dae Jung did was not
controversial, unConstitutional, partisan, radical, or illegitimate,
as many have labeled his career. What Kim did has an absolute
value, the legitimacy of which is fully supported by the Constitution. I argue that an evaluation of Kim Dae Jung’s democratization
work needs to start with the acknowledgement that his efforts
were thoroughly legitimate. His vision of democratization pulled
Korean history in the direction of the original Constitution.
Liberation, Syngman Rhee, and Kim Dae Jung
Born in 1924 in Haui Do, Kim Dae Jung began to build his
political career when the Korean peninsula was developing into
a physical and ideological battlefield of the Cold War. On August
15th, 1945, when Kim was 21, Korea was liberated from Japanese
domination and was consumed by the forces of the Cold War even
before the celebration of the liberation had ended. The liberation was one “given” and determined by the Allies, rather than
one achieved through the independent power of the people.7
The military governments of the U.S. and the Soviet Union were
established in the Korean peninsula with the “liberation,” the
former mentoring the right-wing Korean groups and the latter
taking the left-wing Korean groups under its tutelage. This way, the
Cold War was beginning to connect with the domestic politics of
Korea. When all parties refused to compromise in their efforts to
build a unified Korean government, Syngman Rhee, the leader of
the right-wing group, established the Republic of Korea with the
endorsement of the U.S. military government stationed in South
86
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Korea. Kim Il Sung welcomed this “separate peace,” establishing
a Communist state, the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea
in the North.
Syngman Rhee’s authoritarian government was problematic from its very beginning. Not only did his regime have a weak
connection with the public, but it also observed several practices
that offended the public.8 First of all, the Rhee government failed
to deliver appropriate punishment for the groups that had collaborated with the Japanese imperial forces during the 35-year
period of the Japanese occupation of Korea. These pro-Japanese
groups facilitated the Japanese suppression of ordinary Koreans
during the occupation period. Additionally, Rhee’s authoritarian
government increasingly included the ultra right-wingers, excluding more moderate politicians from participating in the government. Furthermore, Rhee’s government arrested the members
of the opposition party under all kinds of political accusations.
The National Security Law was enacted to suppress the opposing
voices.9 These characteristics made the South Korean government
an unpopular government that was truly undemocratic in nature.
There was nothing “democratic” about this regime, despite its
formal designation.
The most notably oppressive ideological tool of the Rhee
regime, however, was anti-Communism. The fact that the South
and the North were waging a violent Cold War battle made the
South Korean public vulnerable to anti-Communist propaganda.
The outbreak of the Korean War on June 25, 1950 also served
to fuel the apparent legitimacy of anti-Communism. The Communist propaganda of North Korea­—the aggressor that began
the war—also further justified Rhee’s anti-Communist language.
In this backdrop, Rhee increasingly strengthened and relied on
anti-Communist ideology as a weapon to eliminate progressive
politicians and political opponents and to suppress fundamental
human rights. The hot environment of the “Cold” War provided
the opportunity for Rhee and his Liberal party to abuse national
power and to fortify its dictatorial ruling.10 In these historical contexts, Rhee’s regime destroyed the liberal and democratic form of
legislative politics, which formed the foundation of democracy.11
THE CONCORD REVIEW
87
These political and social conditions provoked Kim Dae
Jung to enter politics. Kim recounted: “The conflict between the
left and right and the corruption of the state after the liberation
were manifest in all kinds of ways. This influenced me to enter
politics.”12
Kim Dae Jung’s initial efforts to participate in the legislative
system, however, were crushed under Rhee’s anti-Communism.
In 1954, Kim Dae Jung ran for the 3rd Lower House election in
Mok Po, where he attended high school. At that time, the Labor
Union, which controlled elections in Mok Po, endorsed Kim Dae
Jung. However, Rhee’s Liberal party pressured the police to arrest
all union leaders, creating an election environment favorable for
the ruling party.13 As a result, Kim Dae Jung was defeated.
A similar interruption by the Liberal party took place
four years later, in 1958, when Kim decided to run for elections
in Injae, Kang Won Do. As the ruling Liberal Party interfered
with Kim’s registration for candidacy, Kim could not even run for
the election. Kim sued the elected candidate of Liberal Party for
violating the election law. In March 1959, Kim won the case, and
the elected candidate was force to resign.14 Kim ran in the special
election for the vacant seat, but a group of soldiers controlled by
the Liberal Party accused him of being a “commie” and created a
fearful election atmosphere. The soldiers themselves installed and
conducted the ballot, and again, Kim Dae Jung was defeated.15
These severe political conditions, in addition to the general
atmosphere of indifference to politics, served as an unequivocal
limitation for Kim Dae Jung, who had no social influence. But
they also posed a number of directions for Kim. First, Kim Dae
Jung performed legal protests against the Liberal Party, focusing
on his local constituencies. In this process, he educated the local
citizens about the democratic process of representation and election. Also, Kim brought the citizens’ attention to political reforms
by questioning the legitimacy of Rhee’s government. This way,
Kim Dae Jung began his work for democratization, which would
continue for the next 40 years.
88
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
The public’s rebellion against Rhee’s government on April
19, 1960 changed the course of politics and seemed to open some
doors for Kim Dae Jung. During this incident, also known as the
“4.19 Revolution,” Rhee was pressured to step down. This event
marked the first democratic accomplishment achieved by Koreans.
As the historian Chung put it, this was “a process of moving away
from the condition of exclusive political power and the domination of authoritarian rule that it engenders.”16
Kim Dae Jung as a critic of the Chung Hee Park regime
Thanks to the optimism set off by the 4.19 Revolution, Kim
could secure a seat in the National Assembly at In Jae, Kang Won
Do, where he had lost elections three times previously.17 However,
this triumph did not last long because on May 16, two days after
Kim was elected, General Chung Hee Park staged a military coup.
Park justified his coup as an effective way of dealing with the “social disorder and unstable politics arising from an incompetent
interim government.”18 The coup leaders, who had obtained
power through military force, established the Supreme Council
for National Reconstruction, constructed a military cabinet, and
initiated a full-scale military government.19 They proclaimed that
they would return to the “original and revolutionary” goals by
strengthening the anti-Communism system, fortifying Korea’s ties
with U.S., establishing an independent economy, and wiping out
corruption, among other “revolutionary pledges.”20
Kim Dae Jung criticized the 5.16 military coup with the following
statement:
Unrealistic argument on Coup d’etat is the issue. [Park and his supporters] claimed that the reason for the rebellion is corruption and
incompetence of [the Chang Myun Cabinet]. However, the conspiracy
for the coup started only thirteen days after the beginning of the Chang
Myun Cabinet. Park criticized the corrupt nature of the Chang Myun
government and opened a court-martial only after thirteen days. Of
course, they couldn’t convict any of Chang’s cabinet members. [Park]
THE CONCORD REVIEW
89
also argued that because of the endless demonstrations by college
students, this country would eventually be in the hands of communists. This is a contrived statement. If you review the newspapers of
that period, demonstrations no longer took place. The main motive
for the coup was simple, blind pursuit of power.21
As Kim Dae Jung continued to point out during this period, the
military government was established and operated by soldiers,
not by the representatives of the people who are elected through
the representative system. Park’s military government also denied
parliamentary democracy by dispersing the National Assembly and
persecuting the opposition politicians. Moreover, Park abolished
another system of democracy—the local self-government system.
This system, which is based on the fundamental principle that
people handle their local matters themselves, was abolished in 1961
through the coup. The system would only be recovered through
Kim Dae Jung in 1995, 34 years after its abolition.
Kim Dae Jung was deprived of his seat in the National
assembly as the military government announced the dissolution
of the National Assembly. For the following six years, he was not
allowed to engage in politics with the enactment of the Refinement
of Political Activities Act and was continuously offered the invitation to become a member of the military party, the DemocraticRepublican party. Although his continuous refusal put him on
Park’s black list, in 1963, he was released from the constraints as
Park loosened the restriction on political activities as a gesture of
goodwill during the presidential election campaign of 1963.22
As soon as he was freed from the ban, Kim Dae Jung focused on the presidential campaign, siding with the Democratic
Party—the opposition party to which Kim belonged before the
coup. Kim emerged as the trusted spokesman of this party. For
the presidential election of 1963, Chung Hee Park ran as the
candidate from the Democratic-Republican Party, and Yoon Bo
Sun, of the Democratic Party, competed with Park.
As a spokesman of an opposition party, Kim Dae Jung gave
the citizens the opportunity to evaluate Chung Hee Park. The
main standard under which Kim criticized Park was democracy:
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Kim highlighted the undemocratic nature of Park’s military government. He pointed out that Park had come to power through
a coup instead of a fair, democratic election and accused Park of
failing to keep the promise that he would transform his military
regime into civilian rule.23 In this regard, he encouraged the Korean voters to take democracy as a yardstick, a role that no other
politician played during this time. However, in the end, Chung
Hee Park won the election over Bo Sun Yoon by a slight margin
of 150,000 votes. Park assumed the presidency.24 Despite Kim’s
criticism, Park did not abandon military power and continued to
violate the democratic and Constitutional principle of the neutrality of the military.
Although the presidential election showed clear limits
to Kim and his party, the years immediately following the election were productive ones for Kim. First, Kim was elected to the
6th National Assembly from his homeland, Mok Po. This was
an unlikely feat for Kim since the citizens of his province, Jeolla
(one of the five provinces of South Korea), favored Park and his
Democratic-Republican Party.25 Considering the nine years of
hardship and the four defeated elections that Park endured, this
election was a victory. Second, during the 6th Assembly years, Kim
focused primarily on parliamentary government activities.26 He
went to the National Assembly library every day to collect data on
parliamentary government activities. His examination and study
served to check the prime minister and cabinet members.27 Park
did not take Kim lightly; Park considered the alternative policy
plans that Kim Dae Jung proposed and submitted, accepting his
influence. This way, Kim Dae Jung gradually gained a reputation
in political circles and grew into an influential politician.
Kim Dae Jung’s resistance to the Constitutional amendment for
the president’s third term
The 1966 election campaign set Young Sam Kim and
Chung Hee Park as clear oppositional forces. The main issue
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91
of contention was the Constitutional amendment to modify the
maximum number of terms that a president can serve. Park and
his party justified the change of presidential terms from two to
three by emphasizing the economic development that he directed
during his first and second terms as the president. Chung Hee
Park argued that a prolonged rule would enable him to finalize
his economic guidance of the nation.28
On the one hand, Park’s contribution to national economic
growth in the first eight years of his rule was unambiguous. On
the other hand, his desire to rule South Korea for four more
years would involve the violation of one of the most fundamental
principles of Constitution and democracy—the principle that the
rules of the nation should not be modified by interpretation of
an individual or a specific group. Regardless of Park’s economic
achievement, modifying the Constitution for the reelection of a
president was a sign of a prolonged dictatorship.
For president Chung Hee Park to serve a third term, the
existing Constitution had to be modified. This modification could
occur only when the ruling Democratic-Republican party obtained
more than two-thirds of the National Assembly seats in the next
general election; only with this majority, the bill for Constitutional
amendment could be passed. Thus, Park approached the general
election of 1967 as a ‘war.’29
From 1963 to 1966, while Kim served a member of the
6th National Assembly, Park started to watch Kim closely. As the
spokesman of the opposition party and chairman of the Policy
Council of the Assembly, Kim criticized Park’s dictatorship and
sometimes offered alternative policies to his administration. Because Park preferred a military-style command and control, he
increasingly resented Kim’s pointed criticism.30 In particular, Park
monitored Kim’s campaign activities in Mok Po, where Kim was
running for an election.31 Park ordered the Korean Central Intelligence Agency (KCIA) to prevent Kim from getting elected and
stated that he would not mind whether this meant the sacrifice
of ten or twenty members of the ruling party.32 Also, to support
Kim’s opponent in Mok Po, Park went to Mok Po twice during
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the election campaign and promised the residents that he would
invigorate the economy of Mok Po.33 In addition, under Chung
Hee Park’s command, the Republican Party worked on creating
twenty thousand “bogus voters.”34
Observing Park’s obsessive monitoring, Kim realized how
desperately Park wanted the Constitutional amendment. In one of
his public campaigns, Kim asked whether the ruling party’s main
interest in gaining seats in the Assembly is to modify the Constitution.35 In response, Park accused Kim of forging a political plot
and declared that he did not wish to modify the Constitution for
the purpose of obtaining a third term.36 Kim’s pointed criticism of
Park during his campaign showcases how he effectively checked
Park from indulging in his dictatorship. In the end, despite Park’s
active support of the ruling party’s candidate in Mok Po, Kim Dae
Jung secured the support of the local citizens and was elected.
Through this victory, Kim Dae Jung became a nationally-recognized
politician, much more prominent than he had been during his
term in the 6th National Assembly.
Yet, the 7th general election was a controversial one. The
ruling Republican party won 130 seats nationally, and the opposition parties only won 44 seats. Thus, in spite of Kim Dae Jung’s
victory, the opposition could not control the number of seats that
could prevent passage of the Constitutional amendment.37 Many
members of the opposition party discovered symptoms of corruption during the ballot process; consequently, they announced the
election invalid. They requested a re-election and refused to attend
the National Assembly until this demand was met.38 Park and the
Republicans, who knew too well that the former administration
of Syngman Rhee collapsed on the account of a fraudulent election in 1960, apologized and promised to resign 20 seats.39 If the
opposition party accepted this offer, the third-term amendment
would not have passed, since the number of Republicans would
not have been enough to pass the amendment.40
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Kim Dae Jung at that time was pleased by the Republicans’
attitude and stated the following:
[The opposition party] cannot continue with the refusal to attend
the Assembly. [The chairman of the opposition party] insists on a
reelection of the members of the National Assembly, but realistically
speaking, isn’t that impossible? The president’s concession alone
would prevent the chance for a third-term presidency, which is the
crucial issue. Thus this proposition has to be accepted. What we need
to do is to accept Park’s proposition and demand a change in the
local government system, which would straighten out corruption in
the election processes. In other words, we need a compromise now.41
However, the members of the opposition party were uncompromising. They insisted on the reelection to the end. Eventually,
they lost valid justification for delaying Assembly attendance. As a
result, they came back to the Assembly in 169 days, only to listen
to Park’s apology.42
On this self-defeating and futile development of the opposition
party, Kim commented:
We did not gain anything. We could not gain the assurance that Park
would not modify the Constitution or that the local government would
be strengthened. We retreated and simply refused to compromise. I
think the opposition party is also partly responsible for corrupting
the politics and engendering dictatorship.43
Not withstanding Park’s efforts, the Constitutional amendment justifying the presidential third term passed through a number
of illegal procedures. Until 1968, Park openly announced that he
had no interest in amending the Constitution for his third term.
However, in July 1969, one year after his announcement, Park
justified the importance of passing the amendment by arguing
that he could not leave office when the opposition party was attacking him. To the shock of the opposition party, in the morning of
September 14, 1968, Republican members entered the Assembly
building, hiding from the members of opposition party who were
participating in a sit-in demonstration on the platform of the
chamber to stop the amendment. They rushed the bill through
in 25 minutes in the third wing of the National Assembly.44 The
Constitutional amendment was passed by a 65% of the vote. It is
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
estimated that the Park government spent about $1.5 million in
buying votes.45
These incidents leading to the amendment of the Constitution were the ultimate undemocratic change that Park and
the Republicans carried out. The democratic process of election
became meaningless as one man’s pursuit of power changed the
law unilaterally. Observing this development, Kim Dae Jung commented:
History was surely progressing towards the direction that was truly
painful enough in a way that I was anxious and concerned about.46
Face-off: Kim and Park in the 1971 election
The presidential election in 1971, which followed the
third-term amendment, was not only important to the people in
positions of power but also to up-and-coming politicians in the
opposition party. In the New Democratic Party, the biggest opposition party, Young Sam Kim, a young politician in his forties,
insisted that politicians in their forties should be appointed as the
candidates of the upcoming presidential election. This argument
gained much support from the members of the New Democratic
Party at the time and both Young Sam Kim and Kim Dae Jung
entered the presidential primary for the New Democratic Party.
Although Kim Dae Jung was no match for Young Sam Kim in the
beginning, Kim Dae Jung could mobilize considerable support
within his party with his relentless election campaign.47 As a result, Kim Dae Jung was nominated by his party as the presidential
candidate for the New Democratic Party at the age of 45.
Fearing the potential that Kim had, Park charged the KCIA
with a very important mission: to make himself the president for
the third time. To meet this end, the KCIA instigated anticommunist feelings by seizing the press and leaking false information.
For example, they identified several college students as “spies
from the North” and punished them, creating an environment
of fear. In line with this political method, they identified Kim Dae
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95
Jung as a “commie.” Soldiers also created fear among people by
threatening the voters that there would be tanks from the North
in the streets of Seoul if Kim Dae Jung were elected. 48 The conflict
between the KCIA and Kim was so intense that one figure described
the presidential election of 1971 as a confrontation between Kim
Dae Jung and KCIA, rather than competition between the ruling
Republican pary and the New Democratic party.49
Another political tool that Park used to win the election
was to instigate sectionalism. Based on the fact that Park was from
Gyeongsang Province and Kim was from Jeolla Province, Park incited hostile feelings between the provinces. Inciting sectionalism
worked in Park’s favor since Gyeongsang Province had a larger
population. One of the catch phrases that the Republican Party
and the KCIA used for this purpose was: “if a president is elected
from Jeolla Province, all people of Kyungsang Province will drown
and die in the ocean.”50 This political strategy proved to have lasting consequences for the South Korean politics as it continued
into the custom of tying the candidates with the regions they
come from. This served to taint the democratic electoral system
as the candidates’ political platforms and causes became largely
irrelevant.
Despite the conspiracies of the KCIA, Kim Dae Jung’s
election campaign created a huge sensation.51 Although Kim
criticized the legitimacy of Park’s regime in his campaigns, he
did not focus solely on such criticism. Rather, Kim presented his
new domestic policies to his constituencies. The key point of his
platform involved the policy of reunification between North and
South Korea. Ironically, the support for the cultural affiliation
between North and South gave the Park government motive to
denounce Kim as a communist. Yet, Kim’s reunification policy
gained strong support from the intellectuals of the time, both
nationally and internationally.52 Furthermore, Kim insisted that
voting for Park would perpetuate the likelihood of illegitimate
seizure of power in the future.53 Thus, in several ways, the public
opinion was swaying in favor of Kim Dae Jung.
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
The presidential election of 1971 also gave Kim the chance
to emerge as an international figure. Until the election, Kim was
largely unknown in the international arena despite his victory in the
7th general election in Mok Po and the presidential primary of the
New Democratic Party. As he prepared himself for the presidential
election, Kim visited Japan and the U.S. Kim proposed solutions
for building a cooperative system with these two powerful nations
and asked these countries to play a role in preventing the Park
government from conducting another fraudulent election.54 Kim
Dae Jung was welcomed by a number of American politicians and
scholars. He engaged in discussions with them and gave a speech
titled “The Reality and Direction of the Korean Opposition Party”
at the National Press Club in Washington D.C.55
This international campaign of 1971 served as a tipping
point for Kim Dae Jung since he adopted international diplomacy
as the means of restraining the undemocratic rule of Korea. He
used the pressure of the international society as a method to fight
against Chung Hee Park’s military government, a system too powerful to be overturned by the opposition party alone. It was not
easy for American politicians to take part in the internal affairs
of Korea because they supported the sovereignty of each nation;
however, Kim used the opportunity to let the world know of his
desire for democratization.56 In his attempt to create democracy,
Kim was particularly interested in creating a positive relationship
with the United States, a powerful ally that the Park government
was most fearful of.
Nevertheless, the result of the election was disappointing
to Kim and his supporters. With the help of the press, the KCIA,
and a campaign fund of 60 billion Won (10% of national budget),57 Park won 6.34 million votes (53.3%) and his third term. In
contrast, Kim Dae Jung, who did not have even one-hundredth of
Park’s campaign fund, won 5.38 million votes (45.3%).58 Despite his
victory, Park only secured the province of his birth (Gyeongsang
Province) while all other provinces voted for Kim. Many scholars
charged that the election involved undue regional conflicts and
fraud.59
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The victory of Chung Hee Park in 1971 had a number
of truly adverse influences on the prospect of democracy in Korea. It not only fortified the legitimacy of one-man rule, but also
rooted anticommunist ideas deeply into the society. After having
witnessed the election in 1971, Kim Dae Jung announced that he
was more concerned about the hopeless future of democracy in
Korea than about his defeat in the election.60
Although the defeat in the presidential election would
have been enough to demoralize him, Kim had to embark on a
new task right after the election: campaigning for his opposition
party on a national level for the 8th general election. The tension
was high during this election campaign as university students
and the public protested the fraudulent election and endorsed a
boycott of the general election.61 Yet, the opposition party once
again failed to associate itself with the public effectively, and the
boycott lost its drive as the opposition party was plagued with
internal division. 62
In this context, Kim’s goal was to prevent another Constitutional amendment that would perpetuate Park’s power. For
this purpose, he strengthened his campaign for the opposition
party, visiting many regions within Korea. He insisted that the
public should not turn a blind eye on Park’s political schemes
to revise the Constitution for a permanent rule.63 As a result, the
Republican Party won 113 seats and the New Democratic Party
won 89 seats, which meant that the number of Republican seats
was insufficient to pass a Constitutional amendment.64
The members of the opposition party who were newly
elected to the 8th National Assembly were positioned to successfully
check the power of the ruling party. With stronger leverage, the
opposition party positioned itself at the frontline of the struggle
for democratization. It also received great support from the public. Now, the Republicans could no longer dictate. Because of this
pressure, Park promised he would not run for a fourth term during the presidential election campaign of 1971. He also promised
that he would wipe out corruption if he was elected for the third
term. This pledge gave hope to the citizens, who believed that the
pledge would be kept.65
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Park’s Revitalizing Reforms and Kim’s international campaign
Once again, the public was disappointed with Park. They
did not see reforms that Park promised, and the students staged
a series of protests. The public and the students demanded the
closure of the KCIA, which interfered with the press and the freedom to hold rallies.66 Park enforced the Garrison Act in October
of 1971 to suppress the protests, which involved about a thousand
students.67 Moreover, Park declared a State of National Emergency
in December.68 Such harsh response was possible because the Park
administration had the support of six hundred thousand soldiers.69
Park’s “October Revitalizing Reform,” pronounced on
October 17, 1972, culminated in his quest for perpetual power.
On this day, Park declared national martial law, dispersed the
National Assembly, and prohibited political activities.70 Beginning
on this day, Park arrested and tortured the opposition members
who raised objections to the reform. The vital elements of democracy were denied as well: the Constitution of Republic of Korea,
the political party system, and the parliamentary politics.71 In
declaring this reform, Park used changing Cold War politics as a
rubric.72 The administration argued that the Reform was crucial
to overcoming the domestic and foreign disorder at the time and
that western-style democracy did not fit Korea.73
Ten days into the reign of terror, other harsh news hit the
country: the Park administration announced a Constitutional
amendment for a lifetime presidency, which passed with 91.5% of
the votes in favor of the amendment.74 Under the new Constitution, the “Constitution for Revitalizing Reform,” the president was
elected by indirect election by the members of the Reunification
of National Convention. The representatives of the Reunification
of National Convention comprised 73 members of the National
Assembly who were appointed by the president.75 Moreover, according to this new Constitution, the president could disperse the
National Assembly, but the National Assembly no longer had the
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authority to impeach the president. Furthermore, the judiciary
branch was subordinated to the executive branch since the president had absolute authority to appoint all the judges.76 With these
developments, democracy was boldly crushed. Article 1, Clause
2 of the Constitution, which states that all power comes from the
people, became an irrelevant and powerless phrase.
Kim Dae Jung and the leaders of Korean democratization
denounced the Revitalization Reform. Kim Dae Jung, who was in
Japan for medical treatment when the Reform was announced,
knew that he could not participate in politics even if he returned
to Korea. Therefore, he decided to start a political asylum abroad
to fight Park’s dictatorship.77 On October 18th, 1972, the day after
the announcement of the Revitalizing Reform, Kim contacted the
news media in Japan, held press conferences, and declared his
opposition to the Revitalizing:78
I pledge that I will continue to struggle against President Park’s
decisions. Park broke his promise with his people and crushed the
democratic spirit of the nation and the Constitution. I am certain
that the people of our country, who love freedom, will not lose the
chance to cast judgment on Park.79
In response to the Constitutional amendment announced on
October 27, Kim Dae Jung gave a statement criticizing the Reform’s denial of the core principles of parliamentary democracy
and separation of powers. He pointed out that the Reform was
merely an expression of Park’s ambition for dictatorship. Kim
then relocated to Washington D.C., where he could exert political
influence. However, since American congressmen did not have
much interest in Korea, Kim left the U.S. and returned to Japan
in November 1973. He consolidated his activities in Japan where
more people were interested in Park’s dictatorship and the Revitalizing Reform.80 Through these activities, Kim strengthened
his relationship with foreign politicians and sought to pressure
Chung Hee Park with his diplomatic influence.
On July 6, 1973, Kim Dae Jung organized the U.S. branch
of the Korean Congress for Democracy and Unification in Washington, and on July 10, he returned to Japan to organize another
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
branch. The Korean Congress for Democracy and Unification
sought to combat the dictatorship of Chung Hee Park from abroad
and to move the direction of the country towards a democratic
system.81 It proceeded with the view that a recovery of democracy
in Korea would lead to the overthrow of the Park government.
Koreans residing in America and Japan were some of the key
members of this organization.
Although the Park regime could oppress the opposition
party within the nation to some degree, it regarded Kim’s antigovernment movement in the United States and Japan, two of the
strongest countries in the world, as a threat.82 Park made attempts
to stop Kim’s international anti-government movement through
force. An act of violation occurred while Kim was visiting Japan to
establish the Japan branch of the Korean Congress for Democracy
and Unification. On August 8, 1973, a group of five to six men
kidnapped Kim; he was physically beaten and led to a car, which
ran toward the seashore. From there, an airplane picked him up
and moved him to the Korean coast. When he was moved to a
building by a car, a young man questioned Kim why he struggled
against his country in foreign countries. Kim answered that it is
Park’s regime that he is against, not the country. Blindfolded,
Kim was at last released in front of his house.83 No longer than
an hour after Kim Dae Jung arrived at his house, many reporters
and cameramen gathered in front of his house.
On the day after this incident, the South Korean government released a statement that it had no relation to the incident.
But the response of the international community was surprisingly
accusatory and suspicious of Park’s regime. The American ambassador in Korea at that time, Philip Habib, presented a letter of
objection to President Park.84 Japan proceeded with its own investigation, and a Japanese newspaper released a report alleging
that the fingerprint of Dong Woon Kim, a member of the KCIA,
was discovered at the scene of the abduction. One of the Korean
newspapers in Japan also criticized the Korean government.
In response, Park banned this newspaper, aggravating Korea’s
conflict with the Japanese government. As a result, the Japanese
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101
government indefinitely postponed the ministerial meeting,
which was scheduled for October. In addition, the North Korean
co-chairman of the South-North Coordinating Committee refused
to continue his relationship with Hoo Rak Lee, the South Korean
co-chairman of this committee. He argued that the communication between the South and the North could not continue since
the abduction of Kim Dae Jung was an act of the KCIA. Kim’s
abduction incident increased the pressure on the Park regime,
as it publicized the undemocratic and violent character of Park’s
regime internationally. With this change, Park had no choice but
to change the Revitalization Reform.
Kim Dae Jung as the leader of the democratization movement
and the collapse of the Revitalizing Reform
Even after Kim’s release, Park declared it illegal for Kim
to pursue political activities opposed to the Revitalizing Reform.
Yet, Kim’s abduction incident had spurred a series of grassroots
activities opposing the Restoration. For example, in December
1973, university students developed the National Federation of
Democratic Youth and planned national protests, although their
demonstrations resulted in the arrest of a thousand members and
the execution of eight. 85 This massive crackdown only served to
amplify the grassroots democratization movement. Eventually,
these grassroots groups announced the “March 1st Declaration
of Democratic National Salvation,” which demanded the elimination of emergency measures, the release of imprisoned citizens
and students, the restoration of the parliamentary government,
and the independence of the judicial branch. In sum, it was the
direct challenge to the Park regime on a nation-wide level. This
document was co-signed by Kim Dae Jung, the opposition party
leader, a renowned priest, a university professor, a female lawyer,
and other high-profile figures of the democratization movement.86
Kim Dae Jung, who wrote the first draft of this declaration, said
he would not mind getting imprisoned if this would motivate
citizens to support democratization. The number and the social
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
positions of the signatories were formidable, and the foreign press
covered this incident as a significant development with regard to
democratization in Korea.
Park’s government announced that the March 1st Declaration of Democratic National Salvation was an illegal attempt to
destroy the Constitutional order. With this argument, Park arrested
the co-signers of the declaration. During his trial, Kim Dae Jung
criticized the illegitimacy of Park regime. Consequently, Kim and
other co-signers were sentenced to about five years in prison. In
prison, Kim built close relationships with the prominent figures
of the democratization movement. On Dec 27, 1978, two years
and nine months into his imprisonment, Kim was pardoned by
Chung Hee Park, shortly after he was elected as the 9th president
through the National Convention for Reunification.87 Kim Dae
Jung was ordered to be confined to his residence.
The 10th General Election reflected the widespread support
for democratization and forecast the collapse of the Revitalizing
Reforms. In this election, the opposition party, the New Democratic Party, received 32.8% of the vote, and the ruling party, the
Republican Party, received 31.7%. For the first time under the Revitalizing Reforms system, the New Democratic Party had received
more votes than the Republican Party. The results indicated that
the people used the most accessible way to voice their dissatisfaction with Park’s regime.88
During the fall months of 1979, discontent with Park
seemed to explode on all fronts. During September 1979, Young
Sam Kim, the chairman of the New Democratic Party, announced
a “pan-national struggle” to overthrow Park’s regime. The Park
administration took Young Sam Kim’s name off the list of assemblymen on Oct 4. To express the opposition to such measure, every
one of the 66 members of the New Democratic Party submitted a
waiver for his or her seat.89 More than 50,000 residents of Pusan,
Young Sam Kim’s hometown, joined the opposition party on Oct.
16, 1979. They went on a strike and chanted political goals, such as
“the abolition of Revitalizing Reforms,” “freedom of speech,” and
“release Young Sam Kim.” On the 18th, Park proclaimed emergency
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martial law in Pusan, but protest in Pusan expanded to Masan, a
neighboring city. The Pusan-Masan uprising was meaningful in that
ordinary citizens formed the center of the protest, unlike prior
movements, which were largely driven by intellectuals. Through
the uprising, the people showed their will to change the reality
through active resistance.90
A surprising incident that took place 10 days after the
Pusan-Masan Uprising ended the Revitalizing Reforms. On October 26, Jae Kyu Kim, the director of the KCIA, assassinated Park.
Many critics and scholars point out that this assassination would
not have happened without the explosion of the citizens’ objection to Park’s dictatorship.91 In this sense, the Park regime created the possibilities for its own collapse through political, social,
and economical contradictions.92 The environment of resistance
among the citizenry would not have been formed if it were not for
Kim’s personal sacrifice, diplomatic tactics abroad, and delivery
of the March 1st Declaration of Democratic National Salvation.
These accomplishments strengthened the citizens’ consciousness
of democracy and gave them the courage to join the voice of opposition.
Spring of Seoul and the lost opportunity for democratization
A wave of hopeful optimism swept over the population
when the 18-year old Revitalization Reforms ended. The citizens
expected that democratization would soon follow.93 After the assassination, the official government power was handed over to
Kyu Ha Choi, the prime minister under Park. Watching this development, many citizens expected a direct presidential election
immediately, but Kyu Ha Choi insisted on finishing his term and
on continuing the use of the National Convention for Reunification for presidential election.94
Kim Dae Jung, who was confined to his home during this
period, was far from happy when he heard about Park’s assassination. He watched people’s early optimism with concern as he knew
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Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
that democratization was not an easy process.95 Kim Dae Jung did
not attend the rally put forth by the National Union for Democracy
and Unification although he was its co-chair; rather, he argued
quietly but strongly that there would be a state of anarchy if the
prime minister Choi resigned before the December Presidential
Election through the National Convention for Reunification. Thus,
he argued that a Constitutional amendment should provide for
a direct election under Choi’s strong guidance; otherwise, a new
military regime would emerge.96
In line with Kim’s prediction, the shadow of dictatorship
and violence was everywhere, making the citizens’ optimism appear naïve. Doo Hwan Chun, the Head Security Commander
of the time, declared martial law throughout the nation. Chun
arrested the members of the National Union for Democracy and
Unification when they insisted on the establishment of a neutral cabinet and objected to electing the president through the
National Convention for Reunification.97 Chun announced that
they were an “illegal gathering of greedy people who were misusing the circumstances to seize power and play politics.” With the
tough response of the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters,
the National Union for Democracy and Unification had no option
but to modify their demand from “the establishment of a neutral
cabinet” to “the removal of martial law.”98
Doo Hwan Chun began to seize power gradually despite
the election of Choi as the 10th president by the National Convention for Reunification on December 6, 1979. Only two days later,
a significant event took place that determined the fate of the
1980s. The Security of Capital Headquarters and Doo Hwan Chun,
who was in charge of investigating Park’s assassination, charged
Seung Haw Chung, the army Chief of Staff and the Chief Martial
Law administrator, with conspiring to assassinate the president.
With this event, Doo Hwan Chun took away Seung Hwa Chung’s
military power and seized complete power over the military.99
Regardless of this coup within the military on December
12, the proponents of democratization did not doubt that democracy was fast becoming a reality. Many members of the New
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Democratic Party dismissed Kim Dae Jung’s concerns, arguing that
his apprehension came from a lack of firm conviction; instead of
worrying, they went on writing the Constitutional amendments.100
Young Sam Kim, the chairman of the New Democratic Party at the
time, was convinced that there would be political opportunities
for him in the upcoming era. Young Sam Kim argued that the
promotion of the New Democratic Party was the law of history.101
These demonstrated that the forces of democratization were celebrating an early victory and becoming too interested in obtaining
political power in the “democratic era,” which everyone believed
was coming soon.
On the other hand, Kim Dae Jung was much more reserved.
Having been released from house arrest on February 29, 1980,
he held meetings around the nation and expressed his concern
about the new military authorities, especially Doo Hwan Chun.
Kim questioned why Chun and his organization continued to
police the press with the excuse of emergency martial law and
why they delayed the complete release of democratization activists.102 Kim also warned the citizens that if they become caught
up in the forces of chaos, “[they] will give a golden chance for
those in power who use the chaos as an excuse to attain power.”103
Because Kim feared this aspect of chaos, he went around to many
universities in May of 1980 to ask the students to restrain their
anti-government demonstrations.
To address the potential chaos and the potential return
of dictatorship, Kim Dae Jung sought to strengthen the New
Democratic Party. On April 4, 1980, Kim met the chairman of the
party, Young Sam Kim, to attempt a negotiation for the purpose of
consolidating the party. With this attempt, Kim sought to buttress
the democratic force within the parliamentary system. However,
on April 7, Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim announced a “negotiation breakdown.”
The problem with the breakdown between the two Kims
was a deep-rooted rivalry. They had a history of rivalry, starting
from the party primary for the 1971 presidential election. Also,
regional antipathy ran high between the two. Kim Dae Jung was
106
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
from Jeolla Province and Young Sam Kim was from Kyungsang
Province, so their support bases were different. More fundamentally, Young Sam Kim, who was the less persecuted of the two,
tried to make a full use of institutional advantages, which Kim
lacked. Kim Dae Jung disapproved Young Sam Kim’s move as
unfair competition. In this context, the mistrust between them
caused efforts for democratization to founder. The breakdown
symbolized the failure of the two most powerful forces to create
a democratic government through cooperation, which in turn
facilitated the new military force to seize political power.
In the middle of this breakdown, a tragedy befell South
Korea. On May 15, 1980, when more than 100,000 students and
citizens were returning home after protesting in front of the
Seoul Train Station, the military authorities led by Chun proclaimed a national emergency and martial law. That evening, they
started arresting 26 leaders of the democratization movement.
Soldiers infiltrated Kim Dae Jung ‘s house and relocated him to
the basement of the KCIA building at gunpoint.104 The next day,
the military authority executed 150 people participating in the
Kwangju democratization uprising. With these events, it became
clear that the reintroduction of the military government ended
the so-called “Spring of Seoul,” the transitional period following
the collapse of the Revitalizing Reforms. Once again, the military
power overthrew the lawful government of the nation, and the
soldiers staged an unstoppable revolt.
Kim Dae Jung’s activities during the Spring of Seoul were
two-fold. First, he demonstrated clear political insight as he consistently warned the New Democratic Party that the removal of the
martial law should be their priority. He also predicted that Chun’s
military power would use protests and social chaos as justifications
for their accession to power. It was unfortunate that the forces of
democracy failed to listen to Kim’s accurate predictions.
However, Kim’s activities during the Spring of Seoul were
not entirely positive. Kim Dae Jung could not overcome personal
desires and sense of rivalry for the democratization of the country.
His failure to compromise with Young Sam Kim was his critical mis-
THE CONCORD REVIEW
107
take since Young Sam Kim had more leverage within the National
Assembly. Finally, had Kim Dae Jung engaged more directly with
the National Assembly, he could have exerted more influence to
prevent the emergence of the military government.
Do Hwan Chun’s persecution of Kim Dae Jung
After Chun grasped power, the KCIA accused Kim Dae
Jung of conducting a range of illicit political activities. Initially, he
was accused of creating a conspiracy for rebellion and leading an
anti-state organization. To support this accusation, the KCIA arrested 37 people, under the accusation of conspiracy for rebellion.
Then, Kim was accused of giving money to a returning student of
Jeonnam University, Dong Nyun Jung, to start the Kwangju riot.105
On July 4, the Martial Law Enforcement Headquarters announced
that “Kim Dae Jung and his followers tried to stir up university
students, with returning students as their activists. They tried to
rally the masses, cause people to revolt, and ultimately overthrow
the government in order to form an interim government headed
by Kim Dae Jung.”106 Additionally, the Martial Law Enforcement
Headquarters claimed that “Kim Dae Jung was an active communist, who was involved in the left-wing activities immediately
after Korea’s independence from Japan and that he established
the Recovering Democracy and Promoting Unification Congress
of Korea, an antinational group that conformed to the orders of
North Korea”107 It was evident that Chun set his mind on eliminating Kim, a symbolic figure of democratization who posed a dire
threat to Chun.
The KCIA also attempted a combination of a threat and an
offer. A month after the KCIA interrogation, a man came to see
Kim Dae Jung. He told Kim that he would grant Kim any position
other than the presidency if he cooperated with the new military
authorities; but if Kim did not cooperate, there would be no option but to kill him. He also let it be known that the upcoming
trial was just an excuse to kill Kim Dae Jung.
108
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
As Kim Dae Jung consistently refused to compromise with
the military government, the authorities finalized two charges:
conspiracy and anti-state organization. To support these two
crimes, the new military authorities tortured 26 figures of democratization and reporters, extracting false confessions. Since
the harshest penalty for conspiracy was life imprisonment, the
military authorities prioritized the charge of leading an anti-state
organization, punishable by death. This way, Kim was sentenced
with the death penalty on September 17, 1980. Kim prepared his
final will, in which he stated that democracy would be recovered
in the 1980s, and that he did not wish for any political retaliation
in the future.108
The death penalty on Kim aroused great interest abroad.
The foreign minister of West Germany, Genscher, proposed that
the European Union Member States jointly complain to the Korean
government. Edward Muskie, the Secretary of State of the U.S.,
stated that “the U.S. government is greatly concerned about the
extreme, far-fetched punishment on [Kim Dae Jung].” Also, the
Japanese government, which was already frustrated with Kim’s
abduction in Japan, declared that there would be constraints on
various assistance.109 Moreover, President Reagan proposed that
Doo Hwan Chun reduce Kim’s penalty as the condition of Chun’s
visit to America. On January 23, 1981, in response to the diplomatic
pressure from abroad, Doo Hwan Chun reduced Kim Dae Jung’s
sentence from capital punishment to life imprisonment. Within
days, the military government changed its decision and recommended that Kim Dae Jung leave for the U.S. On December 23,
1981, Kim Dae Jung was deported to America, with the reinstatement of political prisoners as the condition for his departure.110
Kim’s refusal to cooperate with the military government, coupled
with the interest that his sentence provoked in the international
community, further transformed him into a symbol of democratization.
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109
Political exile, coalition with Young Sam Kim, and return to Korea
During his political exile in the U.S., Kim Dae Jung worked
on collaborating with Young Sam Kim, a problem for which he
was rightly criticized. While he led his own independent effort for
the democratization of Korea—for example, opening the Korean
Institute for Human Rights in Washington D.C.—he also joined
Young Sam Kim’s demonstration efforts in Korea. On May 18,
1983, Young Sam Kim began a highly publicized fast, demanding
the release of all political prisoners, the reinstatement of dismissed
professors and laborers, and the freedom of speech. Kim Dae Jung
created a “National Emergency Countermeasure Committee for
the Hunger Strike of Young Sam Kim” in Washington D.C. After
the establishment of this committee, Kim released various public
statements in support of the hunger strike and agreed to construct a common front with Young Sam Kim. Kim and Kim made
a joint declaration, named “Kim Dae Jung—Young Sam Kim 8.15
Declaration,” which held that the struggle for democratization is
a struggle for the independence and liberation of Korea. In this
declaration, they acknowledged that they were responsible for
impeding the construction of a common front of democratization. They founded the “National Council of Democratization,”
through which they promised cooperation and unity.111 The alliance
between Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim—the two pillars of
South Korea’s struggle for democratization—was a turning point
for the movement of democratization in Korea as well as for the
decline of Chun’s military government.
On February 8, 1985, Kim Dae Jung decided to go back to
Korea, ending his two-year career as a tough expatriate critic of
the Chun regime. The Korean government communicated to Kim
Dae Jung that they could not guarantee his safety if he returned
home. In response, the American government demanded that the
Korean government guarantee his safety as a condition of Chun’s
visit to the U.S.112 A coterie of internally renowned figures went
aboard with Kim Dae Jung for his safe return: congressmen Edward Feighan and Thomas Foglietta, the Carter administration’s
110
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Assistant Secretary of State, Patricia Derian, the former ambassador to Korea, Thomas White, Reverend Chris J. Harvey, a retired
navy captain, the president of World Lawyers’ Association, and a
popular singer.113
What awaited Kim Dae Jung’s return were 300,000 people
at the airport and the election of the 12th National Assembly, scheduled to be held four days later. Before returning home, Kim Dae
Jung formed the New Korean Democratic Party with Young Sam
Kim. His timely return had a great impact on the outcome of the
election. The New Korean Democratic Party became the leading
opposition party among an array of opposition parties aiming to
abolish the military government.114
The democratic movement and Kim Dae Jung’s position on the
presidential election
The positive results of the 12th general election that followed
Kim Dae Jung’s return unified the forces of democratization and
renewed people’s interest in democratization. From February to
March of 1985, two of the most powerful social movements—the
Democratic Movement Council of People and the Democratic
Unification Committee of People—integrated into the Democratic
Unification Movement Council.115 Moreover, the Democratization
Promotion Council, an organization established with Young Sam
Kim’s hunger strike in 1983, successfully secured the endorsement of ten million people for direct election of the president in
February 1986.116
Yet, Kim Dae Jung was once again forced to political isolation. He was under house arrest after he returned to Korea. He
could not hold press conferences or attend key political events,
including the founding event for the newly organized Democratic
Reunification Party in 1987. Approximately 3,000 policemen
guarded Kim Dae Jung’s residence, prohibiting his communication
with Young Sam Kim and the members of the opposition party.
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111
The Doo Hwan Chun regime also continued to confront
the forces of democratization with an iron fist.117 This was especially
evident during a rally of university students at Kon Kuk University
on Oct 28, 1986. The policemen denounced the rally participants
as “Pro-North Korean Communist Revolutionaries,” and by the
third day of the rally, a police force comprised of 8,500 men arrested 1,290 students. This made the record for the number of
arrests made in a single day.118
In the middle of this heated atmosphere, Cardinal Soo
Hwan Kim, a leader of Korean democratization who had a close
relationship with Kim Dae Jung, made an important announcement; he first reminded the citizens that the presidency of Chun
was nearing its end: Chun, who took power in 1980, promised
that he would finish his presidency after a seven-year term. The
Cardinal warned that in order to avoid repeating the past mistake,
Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim must cooperate.119
On November 5, 1986, in response to Cardinal Soo Hwan
Kim’s statement, Kim Dae Jung announced his noncandidacy for
the upcoming presidential election:
The confusion created by violent power struggle has made everyone
anxious… I feel frustrated that I am not able to perform any specific
role for the democratization of this country because of various limitations in my position. I, too, am watching the political situation with
distress and anxiety…… My heart broke into thousands of pieces
when I watched a massive number of our young men getting crushed
during the KonKuk University incident and when I think that such
a situation may happen again in the future. The way to handle this
crisis is a direct presidential election, which the majority of people
are asking for. Democratization is the only way for national salvation,
security, and safety. The Chun regime should follow this road [of
democratization] to stop the misfortune. If I am in the way of Chun
regime following this road, I will gladly sacrifice myself. If the Chun
regime accepts the Constitutional amendment for direct election, I
declare my decision not to run for the presidential election, even
after the reinstatement of my political career.120
The response of the other pillar of Korean democratization,
Young Sam Kim, was equally inspirational and modest. When
Young Sam Kim heard the news that Kim Dae Jung was not run-
112
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
ning for the election on his way to West Germany, he first urged
the government to accept the proposal. Then, he stated that if
Kim Dae Jung is reinstated, he would support Kim Dae Jung as
the candidate of the presidential election. He acknowledged that
their rivalry played a role in ushering the new military government
in the 1980s and assured everyone that he would not repeat the
same mistake. He said that like Kim Dae Jung, he was willing to
sacrifice anything for democratization.121 Kim Dae Jung’s speech
also had an effect on President Doo Hwan Chun. Kim’s speech
was given two days before Chun planned to enact the Contingency
Response and martial law proclamation that he had drafted some
time ago. Chun acknowledged that Kim’s speech played a role
in his deciding against this drastic measure and considering the
amendment for direct presidential election.122
Doo Hwan Chun’s harsh dictatorship began to wane following another series of events. Political demonstration during
this period became much more widespread and intense. People
protested in 22 cities across Korea on June 10, 1987, when Chun
nominated Tae Woo Roh as the candidate of his Democratic Justice Party for the presidential election. Media around the world
distinguished protests during that time from other protests, calling them ‘the revolt of the middle class.’ Along with the students
or labor workers, who normally participated in anti-government
demonstrations, the general population including employers and
office workers also joined these demonstrations. Simultaneously,
the U.S. government, which actually helped Chun’s ascendance
to power, made it clear this time that it opposed any military intervention to suppress the resistance movement.123 Consequently, as a
way of dealing with the anti-government protests and the response
from the American government, Tae Woo Roh, the presidential
candidate of the Democratic Justice Party, proposed a series of
compromises: an amendment for direct presidential election,
rehabilitation of Kim Dae Jung, release of political criminals,
freedom of speech, improvement of the fundamental rights of
citizens, and enforcement of the local government system. On
July 1, Doo Hwan Chun accepted Roh’s proposal which became
known as 6.29 Proposition.
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113
Collapse of the Kim-Kim coalition and the extended military regime
As Doo Hwan Chun accepted Roh’s 6.29 Proposition, the
citizens were wild with excitement. Indeed, the revision of the
Constitution for direct presidential election, passed on October
27, 1987, was no small feat. In an important way, it was Korea’s
first step toward democratization. The absence of such a system
allowed a series of dictators to seize and maintain power through
illegitimate methods. For example, the indirect election of the
president through the National Conference for Unification, which
was instituted as part of Chung Hee Park’s Revitalizing Reforms,
assured Park’s power for two decades.
After the celebratory mood waned, the citizens focused on
the issue of who would run as the presidential candidate for the
Democratic Reunification Party. Initially, the two Kims stated that
they would unify and sacrifice their personal political desire for
the goal of democratization. However, the relationship between
the two proved to be disastrous, to the disappointment of the
citizens.
After being reinstated, Kim Dae Jung explained that he
would refrain from a run for the presidency only if President Chun
voluntarily accepted the direct-presidential-election amendment,
but since this amendment was attained by the citizens’ pressure,
he was not tied to his previous pledge.124 After this announcement, Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim deliberated on the
issue of candidacy for the presidential election but did not reach
an agreement. Kim Dae Jung’s visit to the city of Kwangju in Jeolla Province shortly after his talks with Young Sam Kim showed
his desire to run as a presidential candidate. The supporters of
Young Sam Kim argued that Kim Dae Jung’s presidency would
be a disaster because the military authority would disapprove of
it.125 This conflict soon gave way to intense regionalism. Citizens
of Gyeongsang Province, Young Sam Kim’s hometown, supported
Young Sam Kim avidly, and citizens of Jeolla Province, Kim Dae
Jung’s hometown, supported Kim Dae Jung without compromise.
The intensity of regionalism mirrored the feelings created dur-
114
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
ing the presidential election of 1971, when Gyeongsang Province
endorsed Chung Hee Park and Jeolla Province promoted Kim.
When the two Kims met again on October 22, further
conflict arose: Young Sam Kim wanted to conduct a party primary,
but Kim Dae Jung opposed this suggestion as he (Jung) lacked a
history of parliamentary political activities due to his long-term
house arrest. On October 30, Kim Dae Jung made the last move of
separation: he withdrew from the Democratic Reunification party,
formed the Peace Democratic party, and declared his candidacy
for the presidential election. These events surrounding the 13th
presidential election demonstrated Kim’s weakness: his failure
to collaborate with Young Sam Kim. In favoring his own political
interest over the goal of democratization, he showed that he was
all too human.
The division between Kim Dae Jung and Young Sam Kim
proved to be catastrophic once again. The ballot gave power to
Chun’s Democratic Justice party: Tae Woo Roh received 36.6% of
the vote, with Young Sam Kim receiving 28.0%, and Kim Dae Jung
27.1%. In other words, by dividing the constituency that would
have otherwise voted for a single candidate from the opposition
party, Young Sam Kim and Kim Dae Jung paved the way for Roh’s
ascendance.
Although Roh’s ascendance to presidency was thoroughly
democratic and legitimate, his political genealogy was problematic in several ways. Roh was a central figure in Chun’s military
government, and as such, he had no background in democratic
parliamentary politics. An army general, Roh played a key role in
Chun’s coup and suppression of protests. Ironically, although Roh
came to power through a direct election, his presidency meant
an extension of the military regime.
Kim Dae Jung’s speech on the presidential election of 1987
ten years later in 1997 expressed his deepest regrets regarding
the 13th presidential election. Kim stated that he was the cause of
the problem; he was not being cool-headed because he was overwhelmed by the support of his constituency. He acknowledged
that he should have made concessions for the people.126 However,
THE CONCORD REVIEW
115
this was a belated regret as his failure to unify with Young Sam
Kim delayed the election of a president with a background in
democracy for five years.
The minority parliamentary situation, the merging of the three
parties, and the activation of the local government system
The 13th general election, held in April 1988 after the
presidential election of 1987, was meaningful in that it was the first
time that the Korean national assembly had a minority parliament.
In this election, Kim Dae Jung’s Democratic Peace Party gained
70 seats, Roh’s Democratic Justice Party gained 125, Young Sam
Kim’s Democratic Party gained 59, and Jong Pil Kim’s Republican
Party gained 35 seats. This minority parliament was a key issue in
the Roh administration while serving as an ideal political environment for Kim Dae Jung.
Exerting pressure within this environment, Kim Dae Jung,
who became the chairman of the largest opposition party, declared
that the public had the right to know how Chun’s former regime
had abused its power during the Kwangju Uprising.127 As a result,
the congress held a hearing for Doo Hwan Chun and his former
military supporters. Through this act, Chun’s corruption and
abuse of power was revealed, and the newly discovered facts about
the Kwangju Uprising surprised citizens and the foreign media,
many of whom were oblivious to this incident despite the violence
experienced by the rioters.128 The assessment of and reflection
on a shockingly undemocratic chapter of Korean history played
a role in preventing a further collapse of democracy. Kim Dae
Jung’s leading role in organizing the hearing was another of his
achievements regarding democratization.
Believing in the advantages of a minority parliament situation, Young Sam Kim had refused Roh’s previous proposal to
unify the parties. This refusal was an obstacle for Roh until the
leaders of other minority parties consented to the proposal: on
January 22, 1990, Young Sam Kim, the leader of the Democratic
116
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Reunification Party, and Jong Pil Kim, the leader of the Republican Party, merged with President Roh’s Democratic Justice Party,
marking the merger of three political parties. The public was not
suspicious of Jong Pil Kim’s decision since he was related to the
conservative/military families by marriage, specifically, Chung
Hee Park’s family. However, Young Sam Kim’s decision was unexpected since Kim struggled for Korean democratization with Kim
Dae Jung for nearly 30 years. It was difficult for the public to see
Young Sam Kim working hand in hand with the military ruling
power, which had delayed Korea’s democratization for decades.
In comparison, Kim Dae Jung refused to compromise with the
legacies of the military government, despite Roh’s plea that the
merger was necessary to accelerate national reunification and
the growth of the national economy. In response to Roh’s appeal,
Kim Dae Jung argued that a minority parliament system better
represents the citizens’ will.129
Above all, during the 13th National Assembly, Kim Dae
Jung pressed for the activation of the local government system,
one of the four basic democratic institutions that did not get addressed by the parliament. Having a strong conviction that a true
democracy cannot be completed without the sovereignty of the
local government, Kim Dae Jung insisted on advocating the local
government system to other opposition parties and the ruling
party before they merged in January of 1990.130 When the ruling
party refused to take this proposal seriously after its power grew
through the merger, Kim Dae Jung decided to resort to a hunger
strike.131 Young Sam Kim, who knew about the political effect of
hunger strikes, promised Kim that the ruling party would execute
the local government system. The strike ended on the 13th day,
and with this accomplishment, the Republic of Korea came much
closer to attaining democratization in four aspects: parliamentary
system, party system, electoral system, and the local government
system. This accomplishment was one of Kim’s most important
legacies for democratization.
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117
Political retirement, political comeback, and the presidential
election of 1992
The presidential election of 1992 once again pitted Kim
Dae Jung against Young Sam Kim. During this election, Kim Dae
Jung had clear disadvantages. Although the two Kims had usually
fought the ruling party on the same side of liberal democratization, during this election, Young Sam Kim ran as the ruling party’s
candidate, representing the conservative democratic force. Young
Sam Kim benefitted from Roh’s tight grip on the press and funding, two elements that Kim Dae Jung lacked.132 The ruling party
also misrepresented Kim Dae Jung as a pro-communist by asserting that Il Sung Kim of North Korea supported Kim Dae Jung.133
Moreover, because Young Sam Kim refused to appear in a televised
debate for presidential candidates, Kim Dae Jung did not have
much opportunity to show promise as a future president. Another
disadvantage was regionalism. The population of Kim Dae Jung’s
hometown, Jeolla Province, was smaller than that of Young Sam
Kim’s hometown, Gyeongsang Province, by two million people.
The results of the election clearly matched this difference in the
population.134
Kim Dae Jung announced his political retirement immediately after his defeat in the presidential election. He accepted
his defeat, congratulated Young Sam Kim on his election, but
said that he felt sad that the people did not choose him the
third time he ran for the presidency.135 He retired stating that
he would leave the evaluation of himself to history and that he
would return to peaceful civil life. After retiring from politics, he
continued his education at Cambridge University from January
1993 and lectured on democratization and reunification of Korea
in numerous European countries.136 On July 4, 1994, he returned
to Korea. Upon return, Kim Dae Jung established the Asia Pacific
Peace Foundation, a research organization devoted to the goal of
reunifying North and South Korea.137
However, to the surprise, and the disappointment, of political circles, Kim Dae Jung announced that he would come back
118
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
to the political scene immediately after the local election on June
27. On September 5, he established an opposition party, the New
Political Congress of the People with 65 assemblymen, with himself as the chairman. Criticism on Kim Dae Jung’s re-entrance to
Korean politics became vocal. Many called him a “liar sick with the
desire for presidency” and accused him of dividing the progressive
Democratic Party by establishing the New Political Congress Party
of the People.138 Kim Dae Jung, of course, expected this criticism.
He defended himself as follows:
Some call me a liar because I returned to politics after I retired in
1992. However, they are defining the term ‘liar’ incorrectly. If people
make a promise with the knowledge that they are not capable to
keep the promise, then it is a lie. However, if people try to keep the
promise but cannot because of unexpected circumstances, then that
is not a lie. I actually made the promise to retire from politics because
I actually thought that I could keep the promise. And I kept it for
quite some time. To say my conclusion first, I came back because I
concluded that I had to be there.
Kim Dae Jung argued that the problems of the Young Sam Kim
administration were making people’s lives difficult and that the
Democratic Party that he himself established was not performing the role of the opposition party correctly. He asserted that
the opposition party was not providing a vision to the people by
suggesting alternatives to the ruling party’s policies.139 He said
that he wanted to play a role in building a firm and healthy opposition party. Despite these claims, the reversal of his retirement
announcement was an act of breaking promise with the people.
Since the public connects politicians’ promises with faith and
credibility, some of Kim’s constituencies lost faith in Kim.
The presidential election of 1997 and the democratic transition
of power
In the Presidential election of 1997, the ruling party
peacefully transferred power to a democratically elected opposition victor for the first time in Korean history. In May 1997, Kim
THE CONCORD REVIEW
119
Dae Jung, who was running for the presidential election for the
fourth time, was nominated as the candidate by the New Political
Congress of the People. His victory was facilitated by the merger of
the New Political Congress of the People and the United Liberal
Democrats. On December 18, 1997, Kim won 10,326,275 votes,
40.3% of the total vote. He defeated his rival Hoi Chang Lee of
ruling party, who won 38.7% of the vote, 9,935,718 votes.
This peaceful and horizontal transition of power in 1997
meant that procedural democracy was finally executed successfully
in the Republic of Korea. Before the presidential election of 1997,
the four elements of a democratic system, the parliamentary system,
the electoral system, the party system, and the local government
system, were already established in Korea. However, the peaceful transition of power to an opposition victor had never been
accomplished since the establishment of the Republic of Korea
in 1948. Usually, transition of power was conducted by military
force, rigged elections, assassination, massacre, or propaganda.
The election of 1997 showed that the power of citizens was the
core source of power in Korea.
Therefore, despite the criticisms coming from the reversal of his decision to retire, Kim was able to advance the political
democratization of Korea to the next step, a goal that he held
throughout his life. In retrospect, his ‘lie’ was more an ‘insight’
than ‘fraud.’ The peaceful transition of power in 1997 was symbolic in that it showed that democracy was becoming mature in
Korea. Reflecting this, Kim Dae Jung was honored with the following statement when he received the Nobel Peace Prize: “Korea
decisively joined the ranks in democratic countries of the world
with Kim Dae Jung’s election in 1997.”
Conclusion
By the time Kim Dae Jung was elected as president in 1997,
Korea had undergone a degree of democratization that satisfied
his vision, a vision that he pursued throughout five death threats,
120
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
many trials, and persecutions, but also a vision that he himself
delayed due to his own personal political interest.
Kim Dae Jung’s effort for the political democratization of
Korea started with his legal protest to the way the Rhee regime
interfered with the opposition party candidacy laws. During
Chung Hee Park’s military regime, Kim Dae Jung checked the
dictatorship through the parliamentary system and later by leading the anti-Reform movement abroad. He led the movement of
democratization under the Doo Hwan Chun regime, but at several
points, he was responsible for delaying democratization by refusing to collaborate with the other opposition leaders. During the
Roh era, he instituted the local government system by sacrificing
himself. Finally, after his defeat in the 1992 election, his resignation, and his political return, he accomplished the first peaceful
transition of power to an opponent victor in Korean history.
The Kim Dae Jung administration after 1997 was characterized by several meaningful accomplishments. He safely led the
country out of the International Monetary Fund financial crisis,
and in 2000, he received the Nobel Peace Prize for initiating the
first-ever Inter-Korean Summit, in addition to his past efforts in
democratization. After retirement, he stepped down from political life and pursued ways to develop inter-Korean relations. On
August 19, 2009, he ended his 86 years of turbulent life in YonSei
Severance Hospital of Seoul.
On August 23, 2009, Kim Dae Jung’s funeral was held in
front of the National Assembly Building in Yeoui-Do, Seoul—the
symbol of Korean democracy. The current president, Myung Bak
Lee, praised Kim Dae Jung’s achievements in democratization
and his efforts to reunify the North and the South, although Lee
is known for holding very different perspectives from Kim. This
state-sponsored funeral for a former president was a first in Korean history. For President Lee, a leading conservative, to make
this decision was a meaningful gesture to transcend the mistrust
between the conservative and progressive forces. At this juncture
in Korean history, Kim Dae Jung not only symbolizes democratization, but also the possibility for partisan interests to unite and
cooperate towards a better future for all citizens.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
121
Endnotes
Gab Je Cho, The True Character of Kim Dae Jung:
the Dark Shadow of Korean Modern History (Seoul:
Chogabjedotcom, 2006) pp. 5, 330
2
Ibid., pp. 5, 330
3
Young Sook Park, “Kim Dae Jung: Left behind
Reconciliation and Integration,” Hangyerae Daily (23 August
2009) p. 1
4
Wook Kim, The Unfinished Story of Kim Dae Jung
(Seoul: People and Thought, 2005) p. 56
5
Jong Sub Jung, Let’s Read the Constitution of the
Republic of Korea (Seoul: Ilbit Publishing, 2002) p. 17
6
Ibid., p. 17
7
Institute of Historical Studies, Contemporary Korean
History (Seoul: Seohae Munjib, 2004) p. 253
8
Ibid., p. 301
9
Ibid., pp. 302-303
10
Ibid., p. 314
11
Joo Shin Chung, Korea’s Democratization and the
Resignation of the Military Regime (Daejun: Primabooks,
2009) p. 90
12
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way (Seoul: Sanha, 1997)
p. 66
13
Ibid., p. 83
14
Ibid., p. 84
15
Ibid., p. 84
16
Chung, p. 91
17
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 90
18
Institute of Historical Studies, p. 344
19
Ibid., p. 345
20
Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1960’s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the
Constitution Vol. I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004), pp. 266267
21
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way pp. 93-94
22
Ibid., p. 106
23
Ibid., p. 106
24
Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1960s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the
Constitution Vol. II (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004) p. 234
25
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 108
26
Ibid., p. 109
1
122
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Ibid, p. 110
Moon Kim, General’s Memorandum: the Story of the
Generals who Led a Turbulent Modern History (Seoul:
Byulbang, 1998) p. 63
29
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 150
30
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang
Kim Dae Jung: Dictatorship and My Struggle (Seoul:
Jungsimseowon, 1993) p. 88
31
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 151
32
Choog Shik Kim, “Directors of Headquarters for Political
Maneuver at Nam Mountain,” Dong-a Daily (15 September
1992) pp. 137-138
33
Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the
Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung (Seoul: Indong, 1999
pp. 200-201
34
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 151
35
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 94
36
Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the
Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung pp. 201-202
37
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 153
38
Ibid., p. 153
39
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 95
40
Ibid., p. 95
41
Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the autobiography
of Kim Dae Jung, pp. 213-214
42
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 155
43
Kim Dae Jung, With History and Time: the
Autobiography of Kim Dae Jung, p. 215
44
Kang, 1960s, Vol. III, p. 329
45
Jung Won Kim, Military Government and the Third
Republic: 1961-1971 (Seoul: Georum, 1984) p. 199
46
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 138
47
Hui Ho Lee, Accompany (Seoul: Woongjin Wisdom
House, 2008) pp. 98-101
48
Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1970’s: from 8.15 Pyungwha Market to the Goonjung Dong Vol.
I (Seoul: People and Thought, 2004) p. 132
49
Choog Shik Kim, p. 249
50
Ibid., p. 142
51
Ibid., p. 134
27
28
THE CONCORD REVIEW
123
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 107
53
Lee, p. 107
54
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 150
55
Lee, p. 103
56
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 118
57
Choog Shik Kim, p. 296
58
Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade, 1970s Vol. I
p. 135
59
Ibid., pp. 138-141
60
Lee, p. 110
61
Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 145
62
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 219
63
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 162
64
Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 147
65
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 137
66
Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 189
67
Ibid., p. 190
68
Ibid., p. 191
69
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 142
70
Ibid., p. 224
71
Chung, p. 125
72
Kang, 1970s, Vol. I, p. 211
73
Institute of Historical Studies, p. 374
74
Kang, 1970s, Vol. II, p. 230
75
Chung, p. 126
76
Ibid., p. 231
77
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 171
78
Kang, 1970s, Vol. II, p. 78
79
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang Kim
Dae Jung p. 53
80
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 177
81
Ibid., p. 194
82
Ibid., p. 195
83
Ibid., p. 198
84
Lee, p. 140
85
Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, p. 25
86
Ibid., p. 26
52
124
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 222
Institute of Historical Studies, p. 407
88
Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, p. 239
90
Institute of Historical Studies, p. 410
91
Chung, p. 147
92
Ibid., p. 149
93
Ibid., p. 150
94
Institute of Historical Studies, p. 415
95
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 222
96
Kang, 1970s, Vol. III, pp. 297-298
97
Ibid., p. 293
98
Ibid., p. 297
99
Ibid., p. 300
100
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 228
101
Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1980s: From Kwangju Massacre to Seoul Olympic Vol. I (Seoul:
People and Thought, 2004), p. 62 102
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 230
103
Kim Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang
Kim Dae Jung p. 88
104
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 237
105
Ibid., p. 241
106
Lee, p. 203
107
Kang, 1980s, Vol. I, p. 115
108
Ibid., p. 19
109
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 22
110
Ibid., p. 249
111
Kang, 1980s, Vol. II, pp. 147-148
112
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 263
113
Lee, p. 252
114
Kang, 1980s, Vol. II, p. 224
115
Ibid., p. 225
116
Kang, 1980s, Vol. III, p. 26
117
Ibid., p. 18
118
Ibid., p. 91
119
Ibid., p. 101
120
Ibid., p. 103
121
Ibid., p. 104
122
Ibid., p. 106
123
Ibid., p. 167
124
Ibid., p. 209
125
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 268
126
Ibid., p. 270
87
88
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Ibid., p. 273
Lee, p. 289
129
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 279
130
Lee, p. 294
131
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 304
132
Joon Man Kang, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1990’s: From Three Parties’ Merge to Starbucks Vol. I (Seoul:
People and Thought, 2004) p. 163
133
Ibid., p. 168
134
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 172
135
Ibid., p. 288
136
Lee, p. 304
137
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 307
138
Lee, p. 310
139
Kim Dae Jung, My Life, My Way p. 125
127
128
125
126
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Bibliography
Cho, Gab Je, The True Character of Kim Dae Jung:
the Dark Shadow of Korean Modern History Seoul:
Chogabjedotcom, 2006
Chung, Joo Shin, Korea’s Democratization and the
Resignation of the Military Regime Daejun: Primabooks, 2009
Institute of Historical Studies, Contemporary Korean
History Seoul: Seohae Munjib, 2004
Jung, Jong Sub, Let’s Read the Constitution of the
Republic of Korea Seoul: Ilbit Publishing, 2002
Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1960’s: from 4.19 Revolution to the Third Amendment of the
Constitution Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)
Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1970’s: from 8.15 Pyungwha Market to the Goonjung Dong
Seoul: People and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)
Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1980s: from Kwangju Massacre to Seoul Olympic Seoul: People
and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)
Kang, Joon Man, Korean Modern History Promenade,
1990’s: from Three Parties’ Merge to Starbucks Seoul: People
and Thought, 2004 (Vol. I, II, III)
Kim, Choog Shik, “Directors of Headquarters for Political
Maneuver at Nam Mountain,” Dong-a Daily 15 September
1992, pp. 137-138
Kim, Dae Jung, My Life, My Way Seoul: Sanha, 1997
Kim, Dae Jung, The Complete Collection of Hukwang
Kim Dae Jung: Dictatorship and My Struggle Seoul:
Jungsimseowon, 1993
THE CONCORD REVIEW
127
Kim, Dae Jung With History and Time: the Autobiography
of Kim Dae Jung Seoul: Indong, 1999
Kim, Jung Won, Military Government and the Third
Republic: 1961-1971 Seoul: Georum, 1984
Kim, Moon, General’s Memorandum: the Story of
the Generals who Led a Turbulent Modern History Seoul:
Byulbang, 1998
Kim, Wook, The Unfinished Story of Kim Dae Jung Seoul:
People and Thought, 2005
Lee, Hui Ho Lee, Accompany Seoul: Woongjin Wisdom
House, 2008
Park, Young Sook, “Kim Dae Jung, Left behind
Reconciliation and Integration,” Hangyerae Daily 23 August
2009, p. 1
128
Youngkwon “Noah” Yu
Edward Gibbon
The Decline and Fall of the Roman Empire
New York: Everyman’s Library, 1993, Volume III, pp. 77-78 [383A.D.]
The fame of Gratian, before he had accomplished the twentieth year
of his age, was equal to that of the most celebrated princes. His gentle and
amiable disposition endeared him to his private friends, the graceful affability
of his manners engaged the affection of the people; the men of letters, who
enjoyed the liberality, acknowledged the taste and eloquence, of their sovereign;
his valour and dexterity in arms were equally applauded by the soldiers;
and the clergy considered the humble piety of Gratian as the first and more
useful of his virtues. The victory of Colmar had delivered the West from a
formidable invasion, and the grateful provinces of the East ascribed the merits
of Theodosius to the author of his greatness and of the public safety. Gratian
survived those memorable events only four or five years, but he survived
his reputation, and, before he fell victim to rebellion, he had lost, in a great
measure, the respect and confidence of the Roman world.
The remarkable alteration of his character or conduct may not be
imputed to the arts of flattery, which had besieged the son of Valentinian from
his infancy, nor to the headstrong passion which that gentle youth appears to
have escaped. A more attentive view of the life of Gratian may perhaps suggest
the true cause of the disappointment of the public hopes. His apparent virtues,
instead of being the hardy productions of experience and adversity, were the
premature and artificial fruits of a royal education. The anxious tenderness of
his father was continually employed to bestow on him those advantages which
he might perhaps esteem the more highly as he himself had been deprived
of them, and the most skilful masters of every science and of every art had
laboured to form the mind and body of the young prince. The knowledge
which they painfully communicated was displayed with ostentation and
celebrated with lavish praise. His soft and tractable disposition received the
fair impression of their judicious precepts, and the absence of passion might
easily be mistaken for the strength of reason. His preceptors gradually rose to
the rank and consequence of ministers of state, and, as they wisely dissembled
their secret authority, he seemed to act with firmness, with propriety, and
with judgment on the most important occasions of his life and reign. But the
influence of this elaborate instruction did not penetrate beyond the surface,
and the skilful preceptors, who so accurately guided the steps of their royal
pupil, could not infuse into his feeble and indolent character the vigorous and
independent principle of action which renders the laborious pursuit of glory
essentially necessary to the happiness and almost the existence of the hero...
THE CONCORD REVIEW
129
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
SINN FÉIN SEVERED: ANALYSING THE CAUSES OF THE
1922 DIVISION OF THE IRISH REPUBLICAN MOVEMENT
Simeon R. Burke
Introduction
Posing the Question
I
n 1921, representatives of the Irish parliament met with
a British delegation to negotiate the terms of a treaty that would
dictate the future relationship between Ireland and Britain.
On 6th December 1921 the Anglo-Irish Treaty was signed. To a
man, the Irish negotiators were members of the Sinn Féin party,
which at the time was the embodiment of Irish nationalism and
had dominated the political scene since the Easter Rebellion of
1916. Moreover, the Irish parliament that the delegation sought
to represent was also made up exclusively of Sinn Féin members.
Remarkably just six years later, in the wake of the treaty debates
of 1922, this unity was shattered, leaving Sinn Féin a shadow of
what it once was. This investigation, therefore, seeks to analyse
the extent to which the Anglo-Irish Treaty was responsible for the
division of the Sinn Féin party.
Simeon R. Burke is at the University of St. Andrews in Scotland. He wrote
this IB Extended Essay at Lincoln Park High School in Chicago, Illinois,
for Mr. Richard Sauer in the 2009/2010 academic year.
130
Simeon R. Burke
Historical Context and Significance
The Irish nationalist movement at the turn of the 20th
century was a chaotic, discordant conglomerate. The leading
party at the time was the Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP), whose
raison d’être was securing Home Rule for Ireland. Doing so would
provide Ireland with its own parliament, and a measure of self
government. On the other side of the political spectrum was the
Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB), a party committed to the
goal of an independent republic, and rigidly opposed to Home
Rule. In this atmosphere of contention emerged the Sinn Féin
party, an umbrella organisation composed of figures from the two
aforementioned parties. Its founder, Arthur Griffith, epitomized
this conglomeration of ideas and implemented an intentionally
loose agenda. Initially an avid parliamentarian, Griffith became
a member of the IRB.1 Despite steering Sinn Féin away from the
IRB’s infiltration, his party was “on the rocks” by 1908, due to the
success of Home Rule.2 It was not until the 1916 Easter Rebellion
that Sinn Féin finally came of age, a result of being wrongly blamed
for the Rising.3 Exploding on to the national scene, Sinn Féin unified nationalist Ireland behind the banner of an Irish Republic.
The party was the manifestation of a united movement; irresistible in victory, unparalleled in opposition, it was quite simply the
“nation organized.”4
How was it then that in 1922, just six years later, this unity
dissolved? What made a movement, albeit mismatched, split into
two warring factions and fight a bloody civil conflict? In answering
these questions the impact of the division on Irish and Northern
Irish politics and the Republican movement will be examined.
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131
Method of Investigation
In order to trace the division of Sinn Féin, this essay will
explore three avenues of investigation. From its conception in
1905, the conflict between the moderates and republicans over the
status of a future Irish state created explosive division. This essay
will firstly examine the ideology of Sinn Féin’s founder, Arthur
Griffith, and the irreconcilable principles upon which the party was
established. Secondly, the transformation the party underwent as
a result of the Easter Rebellion of 1916 will be examined. Despite
catapulting the party to new peaks of popularity, the Rebellion also
led to Sinn Féin assuming a more republican leadership. While
the moderates now formed a minority, their continued presence
within the party sustained the dispute over the nature of an Irish
state. Finally, the role of the Anglo Irish Treaty of 1921 in dividing
Sinn Féin will be investigated. The Treaty played some part in the
division of Sinn Féin and will be examined in terms of its nature
and the ways in which it divided the party.
While historians argue that the debates over the Anglo
Irish Treaty ultimately divided the Sinn Féin party, it will be argued
that the nature of the Treaty was not primarily at fault. Rather the
party’s disparate front and its incompatible, opposing objectives
concerning the status of a future Irish state precipitated the split
in 1922, resulting in a contentious Irish Republican movement.
As a Protestant citizen of Northern Ireland living in the
United States of America, this topic is one of personal significance.
The irrational hatred and immoderate rigidity that was showcased
during the treaty debates of 1922, continue to be practiced in
Northern Ireland and, sadly, international politics to this day. The
resulting Irish Civil War reminds us that the result of such stringency can often be bloodshed. The wounds of that embroiling
conflict are still visible today; perhaps their scars will warn future
generations.
132
Simeon R. Burke
Sinn Féin’s Early Goals
Sinn Féin, or “Ourselves Alone” as it is translated from
Gaelic, was previously a way of thinking that encapsulated the desire of the Irish people to be independent from all things British.5
It was only in 1905 that the phrase “Sinn Féin” took on political
overtones, when Arthur Griffith created the Sinn Féin Party. The
very nature of the party from its conception foreshadowed the
future separation of the party. A study of Arthur Griffith’s ideology and the principles upon which he founded the party foretell
this imminent division.
Arthur Griffith’s ideology was subject to constant change.
He was initially an admirer of Charles Stuart Parnell’s Irish Parliamentary Party (IPP) whose main objective was Home Rule.
Parliamentarians like Parnell were known to be more moderate6
in their views, favouring a limited self-government for Ireland
subordinated to the British Crown.7 Following Parnell’s death in
1891, and the failure of several Home Rule Bills, Griffith grew
disillusioned and reverted to a more hard-line stance. As a result,
Griffith’s connections with radical Republican groups such as the
Irish Republican Brotherhood (IRB) began to grow. The IRB
was composed of separatists, or republicans, committed to ending British rule in Ireland by any means possible.8 While Griffith
did rub shoulders with republicans, he distinguished himself by
holding staunchly to non-violence, preferring passive resistance
to the British Crown.9 At this point it is clear to see that Griffith
held a variety of views. He was clearly an Irish nationalist, meaning he believed in an Ireland that was in all ways distinct from
Britain. Moderates and radicals alike would have found common
footing with this view. The danger lay in the murky coexistence
of Griffith’s objectives. For example, while he possessed radical
sympathies concerning separatism, he was equally adamant that
Ireland should remain a distinct entity under the jurisdiction
of a British monarch. Moderates shared this latter belief, while
Republicans held fast to an Ireland severed from all British ties.
Simply put, Griffith sought to combine elements of separatism
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133
with the objectives of Parnell. This diversity within Griffith’s own
ideology would soon reflect itself in the diverse composition of
Sinn Féin and its objectives.
In 1902 Griffith began mapping out an “alternative strategy” for Ireland, drawing heavily on the Austro-Hungarian model
of a dual monarchy.10 His solution was to have the same monarch
for both islands, but separate parliaments for both Britain and
Ireland.11 In this way Griffith believed Ireland would be “self
governing equal players” with Britain.12 In his publication The
Resurrection of Hungary: a Parallel for Ireland, Griffith alternately
discussed the policy of abstention. This called for an Irish parliament that ran independent of Britain, controlling the affairs of
the state and allowing smooth and swift passage of law. This was
to be accomplished by symbolically “abstaining” from taking seats
in the British parliament. The importance of highlighting the
objectives of abstention and dual monarchy is not only to reveal
the stark difference between the two, but the division Griffith
created between republicans and moderates, or parliamentarians.
His doctrine of Dual Monarchy was well received by parliamentarians who welcomed it as a step up from Home Rule. Republicans,
however, felt alienated and saw Dual Monarchy as an objective that
served to “perpetuate the English connection” instead of sever
it.13 Separatists therefore preferred to focus on abstention.14
It was clear that the newly formed Sinn Féin party was in
danger of collapsing before it had even begun, as there was no
general consensus on what the party line was to be. Ultimately,
the decision was made to keep the movement as “broad a church
as possible,” meaning moderates and separatists were both welcome.15 Griffith wrote that Sinn Féin would welcome all those
who believed in “Irish independence” regardless of whether they
were Republicans [separatists] or moderates [Dual Monarchists];
“it is the thing [an Irish government] itself, regardless of its form,
Ireland wants.”16 Little did Griffith know that such a “disparate
front” would have important repercussions for Sinn Féin in later
years.17 Griffith must be credited with uniting diverse elements
under one party. His recruitment of members who held these con-
134
Simeon R. Burke
trasting views, however, proved to be a precarious ploy. He must
bear responsibility for conveniently side-stepping a solid stance for
Sinn Féin. Feeney argues that his decision to do so “carried the
seeds of many future battles.”18 Historian Laffan agrees, writing,
“here in miniature, can be seen the divisions which were to tear
nationalist Ireland apart sixteen years later.”
Platform of a Republic: Easter Rising Diversification (1916)
The Easter Rising of 1916 marked the start of the period
most historians refer to as the Irish Revolution. On Easter Monday 1916, IRB leaders, Patrick Pearse and James Connolly20 led
insurgents as they claimed public buildings across Dublin, declaring the establishment of a republic.21 Despite their bravery and
resourcefulness, the insurgents were defeated, with more than 400
casualties. An error in British intelligence meant that Sinn Féin
was wrongly blamed for leading the Rebellion.22 Initially the Irish
people condemned the violent uprising, but with the execution
of fifteen insurgent leaders the public rallied behind the new
movement.23
While the transformation and diversification Sinn Féin
experienced as a result of Easter 1916 catapulted the party to a
new peak of popularity, it also exacerbated the divisions that had
been building since 1905.24 Historians, such as Feeney and Laffan, contend that Sinn Féin and its objectives were consolidated.
However, it will be argued that the persistent presence of moderate
and Republican groups caused the re-emergence of old debates.25
Sinn Féin was both transformed and diversified by the
events of the Easter Rising of 1916. Firstly, the party became much
more acquainted with groups that had participated in the use of
force against Britain during the week of the rebellion. Consequently a new, even more radical separatist wing emerged out of
the returning heroes of 1916.26 Secondly, Sinn Féin elected a new
leader, Eamon de Valera, the senior surviving commander of the
1916 Rebels.27 Like Griffith, de Valera provided Sinn Féin with
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135
an increasingly broad and unified nationalist front made up of
moderates and republicans.28 Thirdly, and most importantly, the
party outlined a new programme that committed itself to the goal
of establishing a Republic.29 In 1918, the party declared; “Sinn Féin
aims at securing the establishment of that Republic” by pursuing
abstention, and creating a parliamentary body.30 Historian Thomas
Hennessy argues that this transformation resulted once more in
the “diversification” of Sinn Féin. 31 Despite its initial diversity,
Sinn Féin had fallen into moderate hands in 1910 after witnessing
a mass exodus of its former IRB members.32 Consequently, the
party that emerged after the Rebellion restored this multiplicity,
creating a “blend of… politicians and…soldiers.”33
Outwardly Sinn Féin appeared a unified party in 1916.
Historians Brian Feeney and Michael Laffan both point to the 1917
annual meeting as evidence of Sinn Féin’s consolidation of power.
Despite the opposing viewpoints of the moderate minority and
republicans, the two sides were able to formulate a compromise:
Sinn Féin would continue to pursue a republic and only once
freedom was attained would the people vote for either a republic
or a dual monarchy.34 Both historians argue that accepting the
compromise was a testament to Sinn Féin’s unity. As a result, the
new Sinn Féin objective became the establishment of a sovereign
republic.35 United behind one goal, Sinn Féin utilized its diversity
to win the 1918 election, gaining an unprecedented 73 out of 105
seats.36 IPP leader John Dillon praised his opponents for their
“most perfect organization,” a compliment that portrayed Sinn
Féin’s outward cohesiveness.37 Michael Laffan adds that throughout its history, Sinn Féin’s primary achievement was “combining
so effectively its different (and at times still mutually suspicious)
component parts.”38 Sinn Féin became so successful, Laffan argues, because it relied on the “soldiers” (Republicans) to provide
the “energy” for a Republic, and the “politicians” (moderates) to
supply the practicality and pragmatism.39
While it must be acknowledged, as is stated by the historians above, that Sinn Féin’s diversification aided its swift success,
it was equally important in rekindling old disputes and hastening
136
Simeon R. Burke
its fragmentation. The unity that existed in 1916 was tenuous and
superficial. Underneath the façade of a banner of a republic, debate
was still brewing over the future status of an Irish State. Despite
controlling the party, the republican element had to contend with
a moderate minority whose agenda differed greatly from their
own.40 Republicans continued to hold uncompromisingly to the
goal of a Republic, while the old moderate remnant, led by Griffith,
asserted that the decision to fight for a republic would fail, resulting in a harsher British stance. 41 It was their belief that Sinn Féin
should commit itself to self-government rather than end up with no
government.42 To hold unswervingly to a republic would make an
“agreement with Britain more difficult—if not impossible.”43 The
British, they rightly assumed, would only accept an Irish republic
after they were beaten on the battlefield.44 The compromise that
was devised therefore was a farce because, as Laffan highlights,
the moderates had no objections to the idea of a republic; they
merely “doubted the wisdom of demanding it or the possibility of
achieving it.”45 Laffan argues that the debate in 1917 represented
the “final clash” between “rival elements in the Sinn Féin movement.” Instead, the compromise arrived at merely suppressed the
arguments and provided a tenuous solution to a problem calling
for a lasting response. Furthermore, the election of Arthur Griffith
to vice president consolidated the moderate remnant within Sinn
Féin, prolonging the debates over the status of an Irish state. Sinn
Féin soared to the heights of political popularity in Ireland, but
only as a result of suppressing the debates over the status of an
Irish state. The debates of 1917 were quickly forgotten, but they
would continue to lurk under the surface and ultimately explode
in the treaty debates of 1922, fracturing the Sinn Féin party.
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137
The Treaty
Introduction to the Treaty
Between the rise of Sinn Féin in 1917 and the ratification
of the Anglo Irish Treaty in 1922 the party continued its ascent
as the 26 southern counties46 seemed unified behind the banner
of a republic. As historian David Fitzpatrick writes, there was a
“wonderful sense of oneness which pervaded Irish politics.”47 Following victory in the 1918 election, Sinn Féin held true to their
word, abstained from Westminster and formed the Dail Eireann or
Irish Parliament.48 Britain stood in fierce opposition to Sinn Féin’s
goal of a republic.49 In this contentious atmosphere, conflict was
inevitable and in January 1919 the War of Independence officially
began.50
After two inconclusive years of fighting, a truce was signed in
1921 and it was decided that a delegation of Irish plenipotentiaries
would visit London to discuss various issues, chief among them
the relationship Ireland would hold to the British Crown.51 The
Irish committee was made up exclusively of Sinn Féin members,
among them its founder Arthur Griffith and IRB leader Michael
Collins. British Prime Minister David Lloyd George led the British
panel. After much discussion and debate the Anglo Irish Treaty52
was signed by both delegations on December 6th 1921. The treaty
created a new nation, called the Irish Free State, out of the 26
Southern counties. Before the Treaty could be ratified however, it
had to be approved by the Dail Eireann. It was following the course
of these debates that Sinn Féin physically split into two factions,
the pro-treaty and anti-treaty sides.
138
Simeon R. Burke
The Treaty Analysed
While the Anglo-Irish Treaty did ultimately divide the
party, it raised the contentious debates between moderates and
Republicans that had been threatening to spill over for decades.
These arguments centered on Ireland’s connection to Britain,
and the form of government an Irish State should take.
The Anglo-Irish Treaty was met with overwhelming approval
by the Dail and the people. The Irish Free State had achieved a
significant, unprecedented measure of independence and secured
a full, working, legal parliament. Many, therefore, viewed Sinn
Féin’s work as complete, in the sense that its role as the “unchallenged mouthpiece” of Ireland had come to an end.53 There was,
however, a minority led by President de Valera which believed the
Irish Free State fell short of a sovereign, Irish Republic. The ‘treaty
debates’ began, focusing on the following two questions: Did the
treaty really make Ireland free from Britain? Secondly, was the
oath of allegiance a betrayal of the idea of a republic?54 In respect
of the former, de Valera firmly believed that Ireland should never
have expressed even “fidelity” to the British Crown.55 In respect
of the latter, anti-treatyites believed that the Independent Ireland
Sinn Féin had fought for and declared in 1916 had been “sold.”56
Pro-treatyites responded that for the meantime the treaty was the
“best that could be done” for Ireland.57 While Ireland was not completely free from Britain, Michael Collins insisted that the treaty
nevertheless gave Ireland “freedom—not ultimate freedom…but
freedom to achieve it.”58Arthur Griffith added that the oath was
one that could be taken with “honour,” because “after 700 years”
the Irish Free State now stood as “free and equal partners with
England.”59
Earlier historians such as J.C Beckett have recognized the
Treaty as the main cause for the split of Sinn Féin. He writes that
in 1922 “Sinn Féin was breaking into the pro-treaty and anti-treaty
sections.”60 As an example of earlier 20th century historians, Beckett
fails to mention the make-up of Sinn Féin. Modern scholarship,
however, offers a more reasoned approach, demonstrating that
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139
the issue is far more complex. While the treaty, and, in particular,
the oath clause, were extremely contentious, and did ultimately
split the party, they merely caused the resurfacing of decade-old
debates. The divisions that were so apparent within Sinn Féin in
1922 were present at the party’s inception. Brian Feeney recognises the dissension the treaty created, but argues that from the
beginning a popular front ensured a discordant Sinn Féin party in
the future. Arthur Griffith’s “broad church” kept the party afloat,
but meant that the republicans and moderates within it were sure
to clash heads at some point in time. Dual monarchy and republicanism were such incompatible views that conflict seemed imminent. There was deep-seated suspicion between the two groups.
Moderates were concerned that the party’s IRB contingent would
convert the party to abstention, which would all but ensure its
demise. Republicans on the other hand saw dual monarchy as
the “lowering of an ideal,” and feared that Griffith was attempting to transform a republican party into one that would accept a
monarch.61 The fact that the party stayed together for so long is
a miracle, owing much to the aptitude of Arthur Griffith. And yet
the merging of republicans and moderates became a powder keg
waiting to explode.62 The Anglo-Irish Treaty was merely the spark
that ignited this powder keg, and split Sinn Féin over an issue it
had been contending with, perhaps even suppressing, ever since
1905.
The answer to this question aids historians in understanding the Irish Republican movement today. As Brian Feeney
writes: “The manner in which the various components split within
themselves is vitally important for understanding the ‘theology’
for want of a better word, of the republican movement for the
rest of its existence.”63 The Sinn Féin party, while still in existence
in both Northern Ireland and the Republic of Ireland today, has
never quite recovered from the split of 1922. There have been
attempts to unify the movement, but members of the party have
come to realize that there is no magic formula for a unified movement.64 Later reincarnations have tried but failed, while others
have refused to learn the lessons of history, fracturing Sinn Féin,
and the Republican movement further.65 Fianna Fail, once the
140
Simeon R. Burke
anti-treaty party and Fine Gael, at a time made up of pro-treaty
members, are at present the two leading parties in the Republic
of Ireland. It is in Northern Ireland, however, that the Sinn Féin
Party has experienced a complete transformation.66 In 2007, leaders of Sinn Féin and the Democratic Unionist Party67 brokered a
deal that now sees a power-sharing government assume control
in Northern Ireland. The causes of the breakup of Sinn Féin also
aid in our understanding of the resulting Civil War and thus the
present political landscape of Ireland. Historian David Fitzgerald
writes that the acrimony and divisions within Irish politics ensured
the disfigurement of Irish politics for years to come.68
Conclusion
The split of the Sinn Féin Party in 1922 still has profound
repercussions on Irish politics to this day. While historians such as
Beckett have placed the brunt of the responsibility on the treaty
itself, recent scholarship maintains that the reasons for the separation are not monocausal. Most historians now recognize that
the treaty did play a role in dividing the party, but the diverse
make-up of the Sinn Féin Party itself ensured its demise. It has
been proposed that from its inception the party was a powder keg,
composed of competing and opposing political objectives. Because
of Griffith’s integration of both moderate Dual Monarchists as
well as Republicans into the party’s ranks, conflict and division
were to some extent inevitable. While Griffith ensured Sinn Féin’s
survival, he set off a ticking time bomb that exploded in the wake
of the treaty debates. Despite the integration of a more radical
contingent following the Easter Rising of 1916, the moderates
continued as a minority. While historians have argued that this
reemerging diversity, and the so called, ‘consolidation’ Sinn Féin
experienced, aided in its sudden success, it has been argued that
this diversity laid the foundation for future conflict. In both 1905
and 1917 Sinn Féin threatened to split, but compromise kept the
party together, at the same time allowing incompatible viewpoints
to coexist. Thus, it was Sinn Féin’s role as an umbrella for a con-
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141
glomerate of incompatible ideology that brought its ultimate
downfall. When it came time for the treaty debates, the divisions
were already discernible—it was a simple case of the spark, or the
treaty, igniting a tinder box of political debate that Sinn Féin’s
leaders had been purposefully suppressing. As Michael Collins
said during the treaty debates, “it was not today or yesterday” the
arguments had begun.69 The divisions that had “lain dormant”
could no longer be held back, but instead exploded leaving the
party in fragments.70
Due to the focus of this essay, other factors which contributed to the split of Sinn Féin were not analysed to the extent
desired. However these factors, such as the loyalty of the IRB
members of Sinn Féin to the IRB itself, are inherently part of the
argument that has been proposed. The IRB men, like later republicans, never accepted Sinn Féin’s objective of a Dual Monarchy,
but merely viewed the party as an instrument to gain a Republic.71
The limitations on this essay meant that it was not possible to analyse fully the surprising reversal of roles between Collins and de
Valera, and the profound role individual decision-making played
in the break-up.72 Collins, although prominent among radicals,
was above all else a pragmatist, demonstrated by his decision to
accept a treaty that was perhaps an imperfect agreement.73 De
Valera, by all accounts considered a moderate, surprised many
historians and colleagues alike by his new rigidity. His shift from
a compromising politician, to one who stringently and indeed
rather stubbornly refused the treaty, highlights the importance
that individual political decisions and philosophy played in the
Treaty Debates and the ensuing carnage of the Irish Civil War.74 It
was possible, nonetheless, to examine both Griffith and de Valera’s
decision to create a popular front and compromise. For both men,
this decision ensured short-term stability, but tragically resulted
in the violent division of the Sinn Féin Party and the Republican
Movement. Therefore, the most salient details were explored, and
support the conclusion that it was the makeup itself of Sinn Féin
that ultimately divided the party.
142
Simeon R. Burke
Endnotes
Brian Feeney, Sinn Féin A Hundred Turbulent Years
(History of Ireland & the Irish Diaspora). (New York:
University of Wisconsin, 2003) p. 23. While this source proves
indispensable in the study of Sinn Féin’s history, the reader
should keep in mind that this historian was once a member of
the Social Democrat and Labour Party of Northern Ireland,
the Sinn Féin’s main opposition. The SDLP is traditionally
the more moderate of the nationalist parties (those favouring
a United Ireland) in Northern Ireland and differs from
Sinn Féin in its uncompromising condemnation of violence.
Feeney’s analysis may contain a bias, as he was a member of
Sinn Féin’s political opponents, and was directly involved in
Northern Irish politics. Conversely, it could be argued that
Feeney’s involvement in Irish politics also aids him in his
writing, since he knows the nuances of Irish Republicanism. It
is certain that Feeney does possess the advantage of hindsight,
and has far more sources to rely on than an historian had
earlier in the twentieth century.
2
Michael Laffan, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn
Féin Party, 1916-1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1999) p. 70. Michael Laffan, a professor at University
College Dublin, is an academic historian who writes primarily
on the Irish Revolution (1916-1923). Laffan’s account is more
objective than Feeney’s, because he is not involved in the affairs
or politics of Northern Ireland. Because Laffan is also gifted
with hindsight, writing after the events of the early 20th century,
his account is more reasoned and valid, again due to the wider
availability of sources.
3
Laffan, p. 69
4
Feeney, p. 126
5
Laffan, p. 20. Laffan also provides additional instances
of the earlier use of the term Sinn Féin. The phrase was in
use as far back as 1882 when Tom Cleary entitled his play
concerning Irish Nationalism, Shin Fain, starring ‘The Spirit
of Self-Reliance’ as one of its main characters. Tim Healy also
used ‘Sinn Féin’ as a slogan in 1892, at a time when the Home
Rule Bill was being bitterly discussed at Westminster. Again its
use was to promote both self reliance and also separation from
the Liberal Party who at the time were supporters of the Home
Rule bill.
1
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143
The terms Parliamentarians, Dual Monarchists and
moderates are used interchangeably in this essay, as are
Republicans, radicals and separatists.
7
Feeney, p. 25
8
Ibid., p. 23
9
“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Profile of Arthur
Griffith,” British Broadcasting Company: History, http://www.
bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/profiles/po07.shtml.
10
Ibid.
11
Feeney, p. 31, Feeney writes that although Griffith
described himself as a separatist, he recognized that
republicans were in the minority, and therefore dual monarchy
was a fair compromise for the “majority.”
12
“BBC History: 1916”
13
Feeney, p. 37
14
Ibid., p. 33
15
Ibid., p. 41, The reason for this tactic, Feeney states, was
an innate fear on Griffith’s part that the IRB would define Sinn
Féin’s policy exclusively, allowing only radicals to join and thus
turning Sinn Féin into another fringe organization.
16
Ibid., p. 43
17
Ibid., p. 42
18
Ibid., p. 42
19
Laffan, p. 24
20
A total of seven men signed the document known as ‘The
Proclamation of the Irish Republic.’ Within the document the
revolutionaries emphasized their independence, highlighting
their desire for an Irish State that was to “be sovereign and
indefeasible.”
21
Tim Pat Coogan, Eamon de Valera: The Man Who Was
Ireland (New York: Perennial, 1996) p. 65
22
British Prime Minister Lloyd George went on to call the
Easter Rebellion the “Sinn Féin Rising.”
23
Coogan, de Valera, 15 and Beckett, J.C., The Making
of Modern Ireland: 1603-1923 (London: Faber, 1969) p.
441. The late J.C Beckett was a former lecturer at Queens
University Belfast, during the years 1945-1975. During these
years, Queens University was predominantly Protestant in its
student body and faculty. As a Protestant, he may be biased in
that he views Sinn Féin as a Catholic extremist organization.
Beckett also writes forty years after the treaty and the Sinn
Féin split and so does not possess the same breadth of sources
as modern-day historians. Beckett does however provide a
6
144
Simeon R. Burke
necessary and opposing viewpoint to Feeney and Laffan, who
are both Catholic writers.
24
Feeney, p. 45
25
Laffan, p. 118 and Feeney, p. 69
26
Feeney, p. 61
27
John Coakley and Michael Gallagher, ed., Politics in the
Republic of Ireland (New York: Routledge, 2004) p. 16
28
Laffan, p. 120
29
“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Aftermath and the
rise of Sinn Féin.” British Broadcasting Corporation: History,
http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/
af03.shtml.
30
Murphy, Audrey, “The 1918 Manifesto of Sinn Féin as
prepared for circulation for the General Election of December,
1918.” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www.
ucc.ie/celt/published/E900009/index.html
31
Thomas Hennessey, Dividing Ireland: World War One
and Partition (New York: Routledge, 1998) p. 167
32
Feeney, p. 54
33
Laffan, p. 33
34
Ibid., p. 118
35
Feeney, p. 69
36
Laffan, p. 164
37
­ Ibid., p. 168
38
Ibid., p. 168
39
Ibid., p. 33
40
It is important to note that both the moderates and
republicans believed in an Irish republic. The moderates
differed from the republicans in that they believed in its
gradual establishment. In other words, they were prepared
to come under British rule for a time, if that was the means
to procure absolute sovereignty. The Republicans believed
in the immediate establishment of a republic, denouncing
the moderates’ “stepping-stone” method as a betrayal of the
Republican doctrine that soldiers so bravely fought and died
for in the Easter Rebellion of 1916.
41
Mike Cronin, A History of Ireland (London: Palgrave,
2004) p. 203
42
Ibid., p. 203, Cronin explains that what the moderate
leaders, such as Collins and Griffith, meant by this was that
since the likelihood of defeating the British in battle was slim,
diplomatic attempts should be made in order to secure selfgovernment for Ireland. Cronin writes that this choice was
THE CONCORD REVIEW
145
informed by Collins’ (President of the Irish Republican Army
and later the IRB) belief that the IRA could not sustain any
struggle against the British for much longer.
43
Laffan, p. 117
44
Ibid., p. 117
45
Ibid., p. 118
46
In 1920, a year before the Anglo-Irish Treaty was
signed, there were efforts made to create peace. The Better
Government of Ireland Act (1920) extended Home Rule to
the 6 Unionist (loyal to the crown) counties in the North
and the 26 Southern counties (this Act is thus known as the
Fourth Home Rule Act). Belfast, in the North accepted, and
Northern Ireland was created, but the Dail vehemently rejected
the Act due to the limited government it offered as well as the
sustained ties with Britain. The Better Government of Ireland
Act shattered the dreams of many Republicans who clung to
the hope of a 32-county Irish Republic.
47
David Fitzpatrick, Politics and Irish life, 1913-1921
provincial experience of war and revolution (Cork: Cork
University Press, 1998) p. 119
48
Cronin, p. 199
49
Among many reasons, the British had to contend with
their loyal subjects in Northern Ireland and their overseas
colonies; concessions made to Ireland would surely weaken
Britain in the eyes of their satellites.
50
Cronin, p. 199. Fighting was vicious, and although Britain
lost more men, Ireland suffered tremendous damage to its
infrastructure. It was no surprise, then, that both sides were
looking for a way to end the conflict.
51
Phil Chapple, “‘Dev’: The Career of Eamon De Valera,”
History Review 53 (2005) pp. 28-33
52
Otherwise known as the “Articles of Agreement for
a Treaty Between Great Britain and Ireland,” the AngloIrish Treaty created the Irish Free State, which was to be a
Dominion of the British Empire, much like Canada. Among
other things, it was given a parliament and a limited army. The
British established that they would control ‘treaty ports’, and
maintained that each member of the Dail was to take an oath
swearing to be “faithful to H.M King George V.” A Governor
General was to be appointed in the interests of the Crown,
and the British Imperial Forces would retain control of coastal
defense. British troops were evacuated, something the new Irish
Free State had not witnessed in decades.
146
Simeon R. Burke
Feeney, p. 125
Cronin, p. 205
55
R.F Foster, ed., The Oxford History of Ireland (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989) p. 209
56
Donnchadh Ó Corráin, “Debate on the Treaty between
Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on the 6th
December 1921: Sessions 14 December 1921 to 10 January
1922.” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www.
ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-001/index.html. Sean O’Kelly,
an anti-treatyite, sums up both these views, stating that “I am
opposed to this declaration of fidelity to an alien King because
it is an outrage on the memory of our martyred comrades.”
57
Ibid.
58
Michael Collins, The Path to Freedom (Boulder, Colo:
Roberts Rinehart, 1996) p. 29
59
Ó Corráin, “The Treaty Debates” illustrate that the
arguments went back and forth, both sides declaring that they
held the interests of the people of Ireland at the forefront
of their minds and hearts. Griffith and his cohorts were not
prepared to let young Irishmen continue to die over what
they saw as a “quibble.” One deputy stated that it was the “love
of my country that made me fight” and now that the treaty
brought “freedom worth dying for” Ireland was truly free. De
Valera’s argument was equally persuasive, when he argued that
the treaty made liars out of Sinn Féin, alluding to the party’s
unfulfilled promises to secure a republic.
60
Beckett, p. 456
61
Laffan, p. 24
62
Feeney, p. 42
63
Ibid., p. 127
64
Ibid., p. 9
65
In 1970 for example, Sinn Féin split over the issue of
abstention, resulting in a small minority group known as
Provisional Sinn Féin.
66
Feeney, p. 13
67
Just as Sinn Féin are referred to as extreme republicans,
as opposed to the Social Democrat and Labour Party (SDLP),
the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP) are extreme loyalists
(loyal to the British Crown) and profess a deep desire to keep
Northern Ireland separate from the Republic of Ireland. It is
amazing then, that two parties on the complete opposite ends
of the political spectrum should have compromised—this
attests to the transformation that both the DUP and Sinn Féin
53
54
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147
have made, and represents a true shift in the political paradigm
of Northern Ireland.
68
Foster, p. 205. A study of recent politics in Northern
Ireland, particularly the Troubles (1969-1998), provides
evidence of this “disfigurement.” The republican movement
itself experienced severe division, prior to its rise to national
prominence in Northern Ireland. Despite the division
and fractioning that threatened the legitimacy of the Irish
Republican movement, Sinn Féin has fashioned a unified
movement which now plays a key role in governing Northern
Ireland.
69
Ó Corráin
70
Laffan, p. 361
71
Feeney, p. 43
72
Jason Knirck, Imagining Ireland’s Independence:
the Debate over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921 (Lanham,
Maryland: Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2006) p. 120. This
provides an excellent assessment of the role of personal conflict
and the power struggle between Collins and de Valera. Knirck
provides an analysis of the “personality types” (namely Collins,
Griffith and de Valera) and how these “elite actors” contributed
to the split. This adds another layer of complexity to the
reasons for the disintegration of Sinn Féin.
73
Cronin, p. 203
74
Laffan, p. 361
148
Simeon R. Burke
Bibliography:
“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Aftermath and the rise of
Sinn Féin,” British Broadcasting Corporation: History, http://
www.bbc.co.uk/history/british/easterrising/aftermath/af03.
shtml (accessed August 24, 2009)
“BBC History: 1916 Easter Rising Profile of Arthur Griffith.”
British Broadcasting Company: History, http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/british/easterrising/profiles/po07.shtml (accessed
August 24th, 2009)
Beckett, J.C., The Making of Modern Ireland: 1603-1923
London: Faber, 1969
Chapple, Phil, “‘Dev’: The Career of Eamon de Valera”
History Review 53 (2005) pp. 28-33
Coakley, John and Michael Gallagher, ed., Politics in the
Republic of Ireland, New York: Routledge, 2004
Collins, Michael, The Path to Freedom, Boulder, Colorado:
Roberts Rinehart, 1996
Coogan, Tim Pat, Eamon De Valera: The Man Who Was
Ireland, New York: Perennial, 1996
Cronin, Mike, A History of Ireland, London: Palgrave, 2004
Feeney, Brian, Sinn Féin A Hundred Turbulent Years
(History of Ireland & the Irish Diaspora) New York: University
of Wisconsin, 2003
Fitzpatrick, David, Politics and Irish life 1913-1921
Provincial Experience of War and Revolution, Dublin: Gill and
Macmillan, 1977
Foster, R.F., ed., The Oxford History of Ireland, Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 1989
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Hennessey, Thomas, Dividing Ireland: World War One and
Partition, 1st ed. New York: Routledge, 1998
Knirck, Jason, Imagining Ireland’s Independence: the
Debates over the Anglo-Irish Treaty of 1921, Rowman &
Littlefield Publishers, Inc., Lanham, Maryland, 2006
Laffan, Michael, The Resurrection of Ireland: The Sinn
Féin Party, 1916-1923, New York: Cambridge University Press,
1999
Murphy, Audrey, “The Manifesto of Sinn Féin as prepared
for circulation for the General Election of December, 1918”
Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www.ucc.ie/
celt/published/E900009/index.html (accessed October 16,
2009)
Ó Corráin, Donnchadh, “Debate on the Treaty between
Great Britain and Ireland signed in London on the 6th
December 1921: Sessions 14 December 1921 to 10 January
1922,” Corpus of Electronic Texts (CELT) UCC, http://www.
ucc.ie/celt/published/E900003-001/index.html (accessed
September 6, 2009)
O’Day, Alan and John Stevenson, eds., Irish Historical
Documents since 1800, Dublin: Gill and Macmillan, 1992
149
150
Simeon R. Burke
Edmund Burke
Reflections on the Revolution in France 1790
Oxford World Classics, 1999, pp. 124-125
When all the frauds, impostures, violences, rapines, burnings,
murders, confiscations, compulsory paper currencies, and every description of
tyranny and cruelty employed to bring about and to uphold this revolution,
have their natural effect, that is, to shock the moral sentiments of all virtuous
and sober minds, the abettors of this philosophic system immediately strain
their throats in a declamation against the old, monarchical government of
France. When they have rendered that deposed power sufficiently black, they
then proceed in argument, as if all those who disapprove of their new abuses,
must of course be partizans of the old; that those who reprobate their crude
and violent schemes of liberty ought to be treated as advocates for servitude.
I admit that their necessities do compel them to this base and contemptible
fraud. Nothing can reconcile men to their proceedings and projects but the
supposition that there is no third option between them, and some tyranny
as odious as can be furnished by the records of history, or by the invention
of poets. This prattling of theirs hardly deserves the name of sophistry. It is
nothing but plain impudence. Have these gentlemen never heard, in the whole
circle of the worlds of theory and practice, of any thing between the despotism
of the monarch and the despotism of the multitude? Have they never heard of
a monarchy directed by laws, controlled and balanced by the great hereditary
wealth and hereditary dignity of a nation; and both again controlled by a
judicious check from the reason and feeling of the people at large acting by a
suitable and permanent organ? Is it then impossible that a man may be found
who, without criminal ill intention, or pitiable absurdity, shall prefer such
a mixed and tempered government to either of the extremes; and who may
repute that nation to be destitute of all wisdom and of all virtue, which, having
in its choice to obtain such a government with ease, or rather to confirm it
when actually possessed, thought proper to commit a thousand crimes, and
to subject their country to a thousand evils, in order to avoid it? Is it then a
truth so universally acknowledged, that a pure democracy is the only tolerable
form into which human society can be thrown, that a man is not permitted
to hesitate about its merits, without the suspicion of being a friend to tyranny,
that is, of being a foe to mankind?
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151
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
A TRAGEDY OF ERRORS:
WHY THE SOUTH LOST THE BATTLE OF GETTYSBURG
Robert D. Hogan
G
iven the success of the Confederacy in the eastern
theater of operations for the first two years of the Civil War, there
was little reason to believe that the South would not continue that
success when it engaged the Union forces at Gettysburg in early
July 1863. The rebels had not lost a major battle to that point under
General Robert E. Lee, and the Union Army was in the middle
of yet another command change, this time with Major General
George G. Meade replacing Major General Joseph Hooker after
the Army of the Potomac’s crushing defeat at Chancellorsville a
little more than a month earlier. So why, then, did the South lose
the Battle of Gettysburg? This epic battle has been dissected by
military historians for over a century and many conflicting opinions have been documented. However, evidence points to several
key failures by the Confederate commanders, especially Lee, as
critical causes of the South’s defeat at Gettysburg.
Robert E. Lee took command of the Confederate Army
in the spring of 1862 when General Joseph Johnston was seriously wounded at the battle of Seven Pines outside of Richmond,
Virginia.1 Lee immediately renamed his forces “the Army of
Robert D. Hogan is a Senior at Glastonbury High School in Glastonbury,
Connecticut, where he wrote this paper for Mr. John Cooper’s AP United
States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
152
Robert D. Hogan
Northern Virginia.” From the spring of 1862 through May 1863,
this army won a series of improbable “victories against seemingly
insurmountable odds.”2 It was “always outnumbered, out-gunned,
and often in a poor position to attack or defend,” yet Lee racked
up victory after victory.3 After the victory at Chancellorsville in
May 1863, the prowess of the Army of Northern Virginia had become a great source of national pride in the Confederacy among
both the military and the civilian populace.4 Entering the Battle
of Gettysburg, the Army of Northern Virginia had never known
defeat under Lee’s command. Because of its decisive victories up
to and including Chancellorsville, “a sense of invincibility had
grown throughout the Confederate army.”5 British observer Arthur
Freemantle wrote that “the universal feeling in the [Confederate]
army was one of profound contempt for an enemy whom they
had beaten so constantly, and under so many disadvantages.”6 Lee
shared in this belief that his army could not be beaten, and this
overconfidence was a key reason that the South lost at Gettysburg.
Lee was brimming with confidence after Chancellorsville,
where he won a brilliant victory after finding himself caught between two enemy forces.7 In that battle, the Confederate Army
had captured a large number of Union rifles so that at Gettysburg,
more than 90% of Lee’s infantry now had rifles.8 Since the Army
of Northern Virginia had been winning battles using a preponderance of less accurate smoothbore rifles to this point in the war,
acquiring and equipping his infantry with such a large preponderance of rifled musketry added to Lee’s overconfidence in his
army.9 Despite the fact that his supply lines were thin and his men
tired and often shoeless, Lee decided to invade the North in late
June 1863. Lee’s ultimate purpose in marching into Pennsylvania
was to attack Harrisburg and possibly Philadelphia, according
to Lee’s personal papers.10 According to an 1869 New York Times
article entitled “Lee at Gettysburg,” this was “a stretch of audacity far beyond what was supposed to have been entertained by
the Confederate commander.”11 Yet Lee pressed on, crossing the
Potomac into Pennsylvania.
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153
Once in Pennsylvania, Lee looked for an opportunity to
engage the North in battle. When he found out on June 28 that
the Union Army was near, Lee was not panicked, in large part
because of the confidence he had in his soldiers.12 After Chancellorsville, Lee wrote in a private letter: “There never were such men
in any Army before and there never can be better in any Army
again. If properly led, they will go anywhere and never falter at
the work before them.”13 Despite the fact that the South had won
many of its battles to this point using defensive tactics, Lee was
predisposed to carry the battle to the Union Army. When General
James Longstreet, Lee’s trusted confidant and corps commander,
suggested that Lee take up a defensive position between the Union
Army and Washington, then turn and march on Washington after
defeating the North using defensive tactics, Lee replied, “No, the
enemy is there [Gettysburg] and I am going to attack him there.”14
This apparent bravado was rooted in Lee’s overconfidence, and
would lead to disaster.
Having decided to attack the Union at Gettysburg, Lee’s
overconfidence cost him dearly during the battle. Specifically,
Lee’s daring was exacerbated by the isolated successes the South
had on the first two days of the Battle of Gettysburg, which emboldened him to order Pickett’s Charge on Day 3.15 Lee assumed
that the center of the Union position had been weakened during
the fighting on Day 2; Phil Andrade describes the successes of the
Army of Northern Virginia on Day 2 of the Battle of Gettysburg
in his article “The Mistake of All Mistakes” as follows:
On Day 2 on the Confederate right, eleven brigades had attacked in
echelon style and practically demolished Sickle’s corps, and inflicted
great damage on Sykes’s and Hancock’s corps. A Georgia brigade
from Anderson’s division actually advanced up Cemetery Ridge and
pierced the Union centre, and was only ejected by a suicidal counter
attack in which a Federal regiment from Minnesota was almost literally
annihilated. The North lost 8,738 men on Day 2 of the battle while
the South lost just 6,679, a highly unusual result that the attacker lost
fewer men than the defender.16
Lee knew that he had only a 2-to-1 manpower advantage when ordering Pickett’s Charge on Day 3 of the Battle of Gettysburg when
154
Robert D. Hogan
the conventional wisdom of the day held that a 3-to-1 advantage
was needed for a frontal assault against dug-in troops.17 But the
overconfident Lee believed that his men had overcome greater
odds at the Battles of Gaines Mill, Sharpsburg, and Chancellorsville, and the previous two days of combat had convinced him that
his troops were still unconquerable.18 Lee therefore gambled one
more time against the odds, attempting to end the war with an
audacious offensive in Pennsylvania. His gamble, stoked by his
unwavering faith in his beloved Army of Northern Virginia, did
not pay off, and because of this, Lee ended up turning the tide
of the war to the Union.19
Not only did Lee’s overconfidence contribute to the South’s
defeat at Gettysburg, but Lee’s failure to adapt his leadership style
to meet the needs of his subordinate commanders also played a
role. Lee was “notoriously secretive” with his battle plans and tended
to be vague in giving orders.20 This leadership style was effective
in dealing with Longstreet and Stonewall Jackson, Lee’s two corps
commanders through the battle of Chancellorsville, for Longstreet
and Jackson had both shown themselves quite capable of carrying
out Lee’s will without a lot of guidance or clarification from him.21
However, with Jackson’s untimely death at Chancellorsville, Lee
had put in place new, inexperienced corps commanders who required much more detailed instruction and tighter management
than Longstreet and Jackson, and Lee’s failure to recognize this
need proved costly at Gettysburg.22
After Chancellorsville, Lee decided to break his two corps
into three, and appointed two of Jackson’s division commanders,
Richard Ewell and A.P. Hill, to command these two new corps
alongside Longstreet.23 Unfortunately for the Confederates, neither of these new corps commanders was of the same caliber as
Jackson. Ewell was known to be “a bit cautious and a big worrier,”
and Hill, while a superior general to Ewell, was “impulsive and
hotheaded.”24 But more importantly, neither man was capable of
translating Lee’s intent into proper action at Gettysburg.
General Ewell was not an audacious commander who
seized the initiative on the battlefield, but rather, he required very
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155
specific instructions from his superiors prior to taking action.25
Lee was apparently well aware of this, as upon appointing Ewell
to corps command, Lee spoke “long and earnestly” with Ewell
about his “want of decision.”26 Despite his apparent awareness of
Ewell’s indecisiveness, Lee nevertheless sent Ewell one of his typically ambiguous orders on the afternoon of Day 1 of the battle,
requesting that Ewell take the high ground on Cemetery Hill “if
practicable,” orders “that left open the widest possible range of
interpretation.”27 Lee could have gotten away with such ambiguity
with Jackson, whose aggressive nature and ability to translate Lee’s
imprecise orders into decisive action would have driven him to
take the high ground.28 But Ewell was no Jackson, and given the
loophole Lee provided, he decided not to attack because he felt
that his troops were exhausted, his artillery could not be positioned
effectively to support an attack, and also because he was missing
one of his divisions.29
Whether Ewell would have been able take both Cemetery
Hill and Culp’s Hill after receiving Lee’s orders on the afternoon
of Day 1 is a point of contention for historians; one of the most
credible accounts is given by Colonel Edward Porter Alexander,
who was chief of artillery for Longstreet’s corps at Gettysburg.
Alexander believed that the Federal position on Cemetery Hill
was well fortified by late afternoon and would have been difficult
to win.30 However, Alexander continues, Culp’s Hill was lightly
defended, and had Ewell attacked, he likely would have been
able to take that hill and secure at least some key terrain for the
Confederacy at the end of Day 1.31 Unfortunately, because Lee was
not more directive with his new corps commander, Ewell failed
to seize any advantage for the South after the initial fighting on
Day 1, which allowed the North to secure the high ground around
Gettysburg.32 This turned out to be a key reason that the Union
won the battle, because that evening and all night long, Union
forces streamed into the Gettysburg area, fortifying Cemetery Hill
and Culp’s Hill and extending along the entire ridgeline into a
fishhook-shaped defensive position that the South tried in vain
to penetrate over the next two days.33
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Robert D. Hogan
Similarly, Lee’s lack of ability to control Hill and prevent
him from escalating the battle on Day 1 had dire consequences.
Lee had told his corps commanders on June 30, the day before
the battle began, that they were to avoid direct contact with the
enemy until the Army was concentrated and ready to deploy for
battle.34 Lee took it for granted that his generals understood that
his orders of June 30 not to take on a general battle extended to
July 1 as well, for Lee wanted his entire army, including Longstreet’s
Corps, together before engaging the Union.35 Unfortunately, Lee
did not emphasize this sufficiently to Hill, nor did he respond to
Hill’s dispatch on the evening of June 30 announcing his “intention to advance the next morning and discover what was in my
(Hill’s) front.”36 Upon receiving this message, Lee should have
recognized that the hotheaded Hill might be spoiling for a fight
and reinforced his “no engagement” directive to his new corps
commander. At a minimum, Lee should have asked Hill for clarification of his announced intent for his planned advance on July
1. However, Hill’s emotional nature made it so that he was not the
kind of general with whom Lee could consult for guidance, as he
could with Longstreet (and with Jackson before his death), and
Lee was clearly not yet comfortable in dealing with Hill directly.37
Hill, it turns out, was anxious to engage the North, despite
Lee’s “no engagement” order. He had resolved in his mind on
the evening of June 30 that his corps’ expedition to Gettysburg
on July 1 “was not going to be a halfhearted affair.”38 He sent
two divisions, 15,000 men strong, into Gettysburg on a “reconnaissance mission.”39 Although Hill did tell his lead division
commander, Henry Heth, not to bring on a full-blown engagement, the large size of this force and the nature of the troops he
assigned (infantry and artillery instead of the usual cavalry used
for scouting missions) made it almost impossible to imagine that
general fighting would not break out if they encountered Union
troops, which they did upon entering Gettysburg the morning of
July 1.40 Lee had afforded Hill the same free reign he afforded
Longstreet and Jackson, rather than amending his style to take
tighter control of the actions of his inexperienced subordinate.
As a result, Hill’s corps “blundered into a firefight” with Buford’s
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157
cavalry and engaged the North before Lee could properly array
his three divisions for battle.41 To his dismay, Lee arrived in the
vicinity of Gettysburg in midafternoon of the first day to find his
units fully engaged, and was not able to organize his army well
enough to launch a coordinated attack before nightfall.42
While Lee’s mistakes were critical contributors in the
South’s defeat at Gettysburg, he was certainly not solely responsible. There was plenty of blame to go around resulting from the
actions (or inactions) of his subordinate commanders. The aforementioned indecisiveness of Ewell not taking the high ground late
on Day 1 and the premature escalation of the battle by Hill were
certainly factors in the South’s failure. Other notable miscues
by Lee’s subordinates were Longstreet’s hesitation to engage on
Day 2, which kept his troops on the sidelines through most of the
day while the battle raged, and cavalry commander J.E.B. Stuart’s
absence for several days leading up to the battle until the middle
of Day 2, which blinded Lee as to the Union army’s disposition,
location, and strength.
Longstreet’s contribution to the South’s failure at Gettysburg has been hotly contested by historians. This is because much
of the history of the Civil War, especially from the South’s point
of view, has been influenced by the “Lost Cause of the Confederacy” authors. The “Lost Cause” authors portrayed the South’s
struggle as noble, its military leaders as chivalrous and superior to
their Northern counterparts, and its ultimate defeat as being due
to overwhelming numbers of Northern troops, not the Union’s
leadership.43 One of the largest beneficiaries of the Lost Cause
viewpoint’s influence on history was Lee, who emerged as the
greatest hero of the Confederacy.44 On the other hand, these same
writers made Longstreet the evil villain of the Confederate Army,
largely because of his friendship with Union Army commander
and later United States President Ulysses S. Grant and his proReconstruction stance after the war (the Lost Cause authors were
anti-Reconstruction, as they wanted to preserve the antebellum
Southern way of life).45 In response to the Lost Cause authors, a
number of pro-Longstreet writers emerged to defend “Old Pete,”
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Robert D. Hogan
as Longstreet was called. Longstreet’s delay in entering the Day 2
battle until 4PM has been called by Lost Cause historians an “act
of insubordination” and by pro-Longstreet historians as “justified
caution.”46 In the final analysis, however, while Longstreet’s actions
were not the sole cause of the South’s defeat at Gettysburg as the
Lost Cause authors have implied, his delay in joining the battle
until late in the afternoon of Day 2 did hinder the Confederate
Army’s ability to achieve a breakthrough of the Union defenses,
and thus was a contributing factor.
Lee wanted the attack on Day 2 to begin as early as possible; at 11 that morning, Lee ordered two of Longstreet’s divisions to attack the Federal left flank.47 However, Longstreet did
not begin his assault until 4PM, by which time Meade’s army had
dug into fortified positions. Longstreet “wasted much of the day
countermarching in the hot summer sun to avoid detection,” which
not only kept him from supporting Lee’s other two corps on the
battlefield, but also greatly fatigued his soldiers.48 Therefore, by
the time he launched the attack, it was too late to be effective,
both from a tactical and a soldiers’ capability standpoint.49 Jubal
Early, one of Ewell’s division commanders at Gettysburg and a
leading member of the Lost Cause school of interpretation, wrote
that “the position attacked by Longstreet was not occupied by the
enemy until late in the afternoon, and Round Top Hill, which
commanded the enemy’s position, could have been taken in the
morning without a struggle.”50 Whether this is a valid tactical
analysis or Lost Cause Longstreet-bashing is not clear, but what
is clear is that Longstreet delayed his attack for five hours, which
gave Meade time to fortify his defenses.
Many historians believe that Longstreet’s disagreement
with Lee on how to conduct the battle on the second day affected
his conduct. Civil War historian G. Moxley Sorrel, who was an officer in Longstreet’s corps (and is not considered a “Lost Cause”
author), recalled that at Gettysburg, “there was apparent apathy
in his (Longstreet’s) movements…they lacked the fire and point
of his usual bearing on the battlefield.”51 Lost Cause authors have
accused Longstreet of “sulking” after his disagreement with Lee
about battle tactics.52 Whatever his frame of mind, the fact remains
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159
that Longstreet delayed his engagement; even Longstreet admitted as much in his memoirs, writing that on the afternoon of Day
2, “under the conduct of the reconnoitering officer, our march
seemed slow—there were some halts and countermarches.”53
Another of Lee’s subordinates’ blunders was J.E.B. Stuart’s
absence from the battlefield until the middle of Day 2. Stuart was
vain and a bit of a showman who loved to take his cavalry and go
on individual raiding sorties.54 Up through the Battle of Chancellorsville, Stuart had enjoyed great success. However just weeks
after that battle, on June 9, 1863, Federal cavalry caught Stuart
by surprise at Brandy Station, Virginia; as the “eyes and ears” of
an army, cavalry is supposed to employ surprise, not be caught
unawares.55 This was an embarrassment for Stuart’s troops, shattered the Confederate cavalry’s belief that it was unbeatable, and
gave the Union cavalry a huge confidence boost.56
Vilified in the Southern press for being caught off guard
at Brandy Station, Stuart was determined to regain his prominent
reputation.57 So when Lee gave him orders on June 24 saying
that “if General Hooker’s army remains inactive” Stuart could
withdraw three cavalry brigades and “pass around their army…
doing all the damage [he] can” as long as he did not encounter
any “hindrance” from the enemy forces, Stuart saw this as a golden
opportunity.58 Despite that this set of orders was somewhat vague,
as was Lee’s norm, and in some cases contradicted earlier orders
that Lee had given Stuart, Stuart chose to interpret Lee’s latest
set of unclear orders as a green light for a glorious cavalry raid
behind Union lines rather than seek clarification from Lee.59
When Stuart discovered the very next day that the Union Army
was not inactive and was in fact moving northward, and despite
one of his scouting parties running into a roadblock which led
to a limited engagement with Northern troops, which could be
considered a “hindrance,” Stuart nevertheless pressed on with his
plan to ride around the Union army rather than directly report
back to Lee that the North was on the move.60 As a result, on the
way north into Pennsylvania, Lee was placed under great stress
by his apprehension over Stuart’s absence.61
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Robert D. Hogan
To make matters worse, Stuart decided to take his three best
brigade commanders (Hampton, Fitzhugh Lee, and Chambliss)
on his raid to the Union rear, leaving his two most incompetent
commanders, Robertson and Jones, with Lee to provide intelligence
about the Union maneuvers.62 The officers Stuart left behind in
charge of his cavalry while Lee began his dangerous invasion of
the North were not up to the task; for some reason, neither Jones
nor Robertson notified Lee that the Union army had broken camp
although Stuart had informed them of this after the meeting
engagement on June 25.63 Lee’s firsthand account of the battle
makes it clear that he thought up until June 28 that the Union
Army was far away, for he was relying on Stuart’s cavalry to keep
him up to date on the Union locations.64 Without Stuart’s cavalry,
Lee struggled to ascertain the location of the Union Army during
the march into Pennsylvania. Lee’s ignorance of the location of the
Union Army prior to Gettysburg was a result of Stuart’s hubris in
deciding to raid behind Northern lines, even after the conditions
of Lee’s orders were not met, and Stuart’s poor decision-making
regarding who he left in charge of his cavalry co-located with Lee’s
forces.65
Lee relied heavily on Stuart for intelligence on the enemy,
and prior to Gettysburg, Stuart’s absence left Lee blind. In an
account of the events leading up to battle, Lee wrote that “in the
absence of the cavalry, it was impossible to determine Hooker’s
intentions,” so he decided to stay and fight near Gettysburg,
with fateful results.66 As it turned out, Hooker had maneuvered
his entire army between Stuart’s cavalry and Lee’s army, which
delayed Stuart’s return to Lee’s side once the battle began. This
delay proved costly for the South; on July 2, Stuart’s three brigades
could have provided invaluable reconnaissance of the Union
left flank and opened up more opportunities for Lee to attack.67
Stuart’s failings at Gettysburg, along with those of many of Lee’s
other subordinate commanders, were more significant reasons
for the South’s defeat.
Of course, some credit must be given to Union commander
General George Meade and his subordinate commanders, who
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161
skillfully executed superior command and control during the
battle, expertly shifting their forces as needed to thwart repeated
rebel attacks. Meade had reluctantly taken command of the Army
of the Potomac just a few days before the battle and was really no
better than any of the generals who had preceded him.68 However,
under his command, the Union turned the tide of the war in the
eastern theater in its favor at Gettysburg. The Union Army enjoyed
significant advantages at the Battle of Gettysburg which were key
factors in its success: control of the high ground, superior interior
lines of communication, more troops, and more artillery (140 guns
to 69).69 However, the North had enjoyed battlefield advantages
before, most recently at Chancellorsville, and had come up short
against Lee. Reflecting on Meade’s performance after Day 2 of
the fighting, Confederate Colonel Edward Porter Alexander wrote
that it was “...perhaps the best example which the war produced
of active supervision and efficient handling of a large force on
the defensive...”70 Alexander went on to praise the fighting skills
of the Union soldiers when he said, “...whether from discipline or
from the inspiration of home, the fighting done by the Federal
brigades was of the best type...”71 And giving credit where credit
is due, General George Pickett, whose fabled charge against the
Union center on Day 3 turned into a suicide mission, when asked
years after the battle why the South lost at Gettysburg, remarked,
“I think the Yankees had something to do with it.”72
While Pickett’s remark has merit, the preponderance of the
historical record points to the blunders by Southern commanders, most notably Lee, as the root cause of the South’s defeat at
Gettysburg. Ewell, Hill, Longstreet, and Stuart all made contributory mistakes, but Lee, as overall commander of the Army of the
Potomac, bears ultimate responsibility for the defeat, especially
since his own mistakes were so egregious. Lee was clearly not at
his best at Gettysburg. His overconfidence and failure to properly
instruct and lead his subordinates, especially his new, inexperienced
corps commanders, were fatal to the South’s chances. Had Lee
recognized the limitations of his tired, often shoeless army and
of his subordinate commanders, and adapted his leadership style
and strategies accordingly, he might have met with more success at
162
Robert D. Hogan
Gettysburg. But he did not, and his failure at Gettysburg turned the
tide of the war. The Union army gained confidence that it could
defeat the legendary Lee, and the once-indefatigable morale of
the Confederate army and its confidence in its commander were
badly damaged. The Rebels lost their feeling of invincibility and
for the first time saw losing the war as a real possibility, which they
did, surrendering at Appomattox twenty-one months later.73
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163
John Heiser, “Biography of General Robert E. Lee,”
National Park Service (September 1998), accessed January 28,
2010, http://www.nps.gov/archive/gett/getttour/sidebar/
leebio.htm.
2
Ibid.
3
Ibid.
4
Joseph T. Glatthaar, General Lee’s Army (New York: Free
Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2008) p. 257
5
Gary H. Gallagher, ed., The Second Day at Gettysburg
(Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1992) p. 30
6
Ibid., p. 31
7
Tom Carhart, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg
and Why it Failed (New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005) p. 105
8
Phil Andrade, “The Mistake of All Mistakes,” Military
History Online (November, 2003), accessed January 15, 2010,
http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/articles/
mistakeofallmistakes.aspx.
9
Ibid.
10
“Lee at Gettysburg,” New York Times (February 26, 1869);
Proquest Historical Newspapers, accessed January 27, 2010,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
11
Ibid.
12
William Garrett Piston, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant:
James Longstreet and His Place in Southern History (Athens,
Georgia: The University of Georgia Press, 1987) p. 47
13
Ibid., p. 47
14
Arthur C. Danto, “Gettysburg,” Grand Street 6, no. 3
(Spring, 1986) JSTOR: p. 107, accessed January 27, 2010,
http://www.jstor.org/logon.
15
Andrade
16
Ibid.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
19
Ibid.
20
Carhart, p. 246
21
Ibid., p. 246
22
Ibid., p. 246
23
Glatthaar, p. 256
24
Ibid., p. 257
25
Stewart Sifakis, “Richard Stoddert Ewell,” Civil War
Biographies (March, 2010), accessed March 29, 2010, http://
www.civilwarhome.com/ewellbio.htm
1
164
Robert D. Hogan
Stephen W. Sears, Gettysburg (New York: HoughtonMifflin Company, 2003) p. 503
27
David J. Eicher, The Longest Night: A Military History of
the Civil War (New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001) p. 517
28
Ibid., p. 517
29
Ibid., p. 517
30
Sears, p. 233
31
Ibid., p. 233
32
Piston, p. 48
33
Ibid., p. 48
34
James M. McPherson, Hallowed Ground (New York:
Crown Publishers, 2003) p. 36
35
Sears, p. 160
36
Ibid., p. 161
37
Clifford Dowdey, Lee (Toronto: Little, Brown & Company,
1965) p. 495
38
Noah Andre Trudeau, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage
(New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2002) p. 153
39
Ibid., p. 153
40
Ibid., p. 153
41
Sears, p. 161; McPherson, p. 36
42
Glatthaar, p. 275
43
Gary H. Gallagher, Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and
Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy (Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1995) p. 5
44
Gary H. Gallagher and Alan T. Nolan, eds., The Myth of
the Lost Cause and Civil War History (Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000) p. 2
45
Ibid., p. 6
46
Dowdey, p. 383
47
Glatthaar, p. 277
48
Ibid., p. 277
49
Ibid., p. 277
50
Gallagher, Second Day, p. 6
51
Gallagher and Nolan, p. 134
52
Ibid., p. 134
53
James Longstreet, From Manassas to Appomattox:
Memoirs of the Civil War in America (Philadelphia: Da Capo
Press, 1896) p. 366
54
Daniel Zimmerman, “J.E.B. Stuart: Gettysburg
Scapegoat?” Historynet.com (September, 1998), accessed
February 1, 2010, http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuartgettysburg-scapegoat-may-98-americas-civil-war-feature.htm
26
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Glatthaar, p. 268
Ibid., p. 268
57
Zimmerman
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Ibid.
61
Dowdey, p. 381
62
Zimmerman
63
Ibid.
64
“Lee at Gettysburg”
65
Zimmerman
66
“Lee at Gettysburg”
67
Glatthaar, p. 279
68
Carhart, p. 3
69
Andrade
70
Ibid.
71
Ibid.
72
Ibid.
73
Glatthaar, p. 285
55
56
Bibliography
Andrade, Phil, “The Mistake of All Mistakes,” Military
History Online, November, 2003. Accessed January 15,
2010, http://www.militaryhistoryonline.com/gettysburg/
articles/
mistakeofallmistakes.aspx
Carhart, Tom, Lost Triumph: Lee’s Real Plan at Gettysburg
and Why it Failed, New York: G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 2005
Danto, Arthur C., “Gettysburg,” Grand Street 6, no. 3
(Spring, 1986) pp. 98-116, JSTOR, Accessed January 27, 2010.
http://www.jstor.org/logon
Dowdey, Clifford, Lee, Toronto: Little, Brown & Company,
1965
Eicher, David J., The Longest Night: A Military History of
the Civil War, New York: Simon & Schuster, 2001
Gallagher, Gary H., Jubal A. Early, the Lost Cause, and
Civil War History: A Persistent Legacy, Milwaukee: Marquette
University Press, 1995
165
166
Robert D. Hogan
Gallagher, Gary H., ed. The Second Day at Gettysburg,
Kent, Ohio: The Kent State University Press, 1992
Gallagher, Gary H. and Nolan, Alan T., editors The Myth of
the Lost Cause and Civil War History, Bloomington: Indiana
University Press, 2000
Glatthaar, Joseph T., General Lee’s Army, New York: Free
Press, A Division of Simon & Schuster, Inc., 2008
Heiser, John. “Biography of General Robert E. Lee,”
National Park Service (September, 1998), Accessed January
28, 2010. http://www.nps.gov/archive/gett/getttour/sidebar/
leebio.htm
“Lee at Gettysburg” New York Times, February 26, 1869
Proquest Historical Newspapers, Accessed January 27, 2010,
http://hn.bigchalk.com
Longstreet, James, From Manassas to Appomattox: Memoirs
of the Civil War in America, Philadelphia: Da Capo Press, 1896
McPherson, James M., Hallowed Ground, New York: Crown
Publishers, 2003
Piston, William Garrett, Lee’s Tarnished Lieutenant: James
Longstreet and His Place in Southern History, Athens: The
University of Georgia Press, 1987
Sears, Stephen W., Gettysburg, New York: Houghton-Mifflin
Company, 2003
Sifakis, Stewart, “Richard Stoddert Ewell” Civil War
Biographies (March, 2010) Accessed March 29, 2010, http://
www.civilwarhome.com/ewellbio.htm
Trudeau, Noah Andre, Gettysburg: A Testing of Courage,
New York: HarperCollins Publishers, Inc., 2002
Zimmerman, Daniel. “J.E.B. Stuart: Gettysburg Scapegoat?”
Historynet.com (September, 1998) Accessed February 1, 2010,
http://www.historynet.com/jeb-stuart-gettysburg-scapegoatmay-98-americas-civil-war-feature.htm
THE CONCORD REVIEW
167
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
THE FORGOTTEN PEOPLE:
WHY SAKHALIN KOREANS
COULDN’T RETURN TO KOREA
Yeon Woo Lee
Abstract
This paper will analyze why Sakhalin Koreans, the
Korean descendants living in the Russian territory of Sakhalin,
couldn’t return to Korea after they were either willingly moved or
unwillingly drafted as forced laborers to Sakhalin mainly during
the 1930s and 1940s. The scope of this paper is generally from
1945 to 1975, and the nations in concern are the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics/the Russian Federation, Japan, North Korea,
and South Korea. International treaties, statements from government officials, and law codes are analyzed to support the thesis.
The thesis proposed here is that Sakhalin Koreans couldn’t return
to Korea because of the four countries’ neglect of the Sakhalin
Koreans that resulted from sovereignty disputes, the undeclared
official policy on the refugees, and the Cold War tension.
Yeon Woo Lee is a Senior at the Daewon Foreign Language High School
in Seoul, Korea, where he wrote this paper as an independent study
during the 2009/2010 academic year.
168
Yeon Woo Lee
Brief History of the Sakhalin Koreans
The Sakhalin Koreans are Korean descendents living in
Sakhalin, the far east island of Russia, who moved from Korea to
Sakhalin, predominantly as coal miners, loggers, and war industry
workers for the Japanese colonial government near the end of
World War II.
Although a large percentage of the Sakhalin Koreans
were forced to move by the Japanese colonial government before
1945, the history of Sakhalin Koreans actually started in 1861
when farmers suffering from years of famine and poor harvest
emigrated to Sakhalin, at that time the territory of the Russian
Empire. Although Emperor Gojong of the Choson Dynasty, the
Korean dynasty that lasted until 1910, requested Russia to stop
accepting Korean migrants, more and more Koreans moved to
Russia, including Sakhalin, because of higher wage rates in Russia.1
After the Japanese Empire won the Russo-Japanese War
and took a part of Sakhalin (below 50° North) by the Treaty of
Portsmouth in 1905, Sakhalin was governed by the Karafuto Prefecture of Japan.2 Under the Japanese rule, more Koreans crossed
the East Sea to Sakhalin, most of whom were poor farmers hoping to get higher wages in Sakhalin. Most of these immigrants
willingly moved, largely from agricultural towns of Jeolla-do and
Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Korea, with their whole
families.3
The forced conscription by the Japanese colonial government started from September 1939, under the name of the
National Service Draft Ordinance, a law that gave the Japanese
colonial government the power to recruit civil workers as laborers
for war industries. The central government assigned a quota for
conscription workers to each town, and regional governors either
accepted volunteers or forcefully recruited men.4 Interviews with
Sakhalin Koreans confirmed that some degrees of coercion and
deception were involved in the conscription, although to different
extents in different provinces. The following interview with Jang
Yang-ok, 76, describes the systematic mechanism of the forced
conscription.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
169
When Japan became weaker and weaker, Japanese people sent lots
of young men to Karafuto (Japanese name of Sakhalin). When the
Japanese people ordered conscription, regional governors—usually
local Koreans—made the roster. If your name was written, you had
to go [to Sakhalin]. As for my town, we had to send 10 people, so the
governor went around asking for volunteers. At first, if you didn’t want
to go, the governor didn’t force you. But because our town was short
of the quota, the governor started to write down names randomly.5
Conscription became more prevalent and forceful as the
Greater East Asia War broke out in 1941. In 1942, the Japanese
government founded the Choson Labor Association and conscripted Korean men systemically as Sakhalin laborers.6
The forceful nature of the conscription is illustrated in
the Japanese newspaper The Asahi Simbun’s article of 1982. The
article described the forced labor law enforced in 1944 in Korea.
Special teams of ten to fifteen policemen were dispatched to Korea
from Japan. Armed with billies, the police besieged towns and recruited Korean men. The police chose sturdy men in their twenties
to forties, pushed them into cargos, and shipped them from Korea.7
The Japanese colonial government in Korea estimated that 16,113
Koreans were conscripted and sent to Sakhalin from 1939 to 1943.8
However, the Soviet census shows that there were 43,000 Koreans
in Sakhalin in 1947.9 Other unofficial statistics on the number of
the Sakhalin Koreans show gaps in numbers.10 The exact number
of the conscripted Sakhalin Koreans is not known.
Once arrived in Sakhalin, most South Koreans worked in
coal mines or at war industries. According to the interviews with
the surviving Sakhalin Koreans, Japanese factory owners didn’t pay
Koreans as promised, often deducting expenses for foods, gloves,
shoes, and other necessary tools from their wages. Yeo Jeongryeol, a Sakhalin Korean who worked on the Horouchiho airfield
in Sakhalin, testified that from the promised 2.50 won of wages,
0.80 won and other miscellaneous expenses were automatically
deducted every month.11 At the work place, unmarried workers
slept in dormitories called harmonica houses, and married workers with children lived in separate houses.12 Another example that
reflects the Sakhalin Koreans’ life is the 630 Koreans who were
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sent to Naibuti mine near Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk on April 25, 1943.13
They built roads in heavy snow, working in teams of six people.
78 out of 630 Koreans died two weeks after they arrived.14
The forced labor continued until August 1945, when the
Japanese Empire surrendered to the Allies, effectively ending the
World War II. The USSR estimated that 43,000 Koreans were in
Sakhalin after the end of war in 1947.15
The fate of the Koreans in Sakhalin remained unclear.
The Japanese government withdrew its people quickly after the
surrender: 292,590 Japanese returned to Japan according to the
US-USSR Provisional Agreement on November 27, 1946, and all
the remaining Japanese were returned by the Soviet-Japanese Joint
Declaration of 1956, according to the statistics from the Japanese
Ministry of Health, Labor and Welfare.16 However, because of the
political situations in the Soviet Union, Japan, North Korea, and
South Korea, most Sakhalin Koreans couldn’t return to Korea.
Where does Sakhalin belong?
This paper first analyzes the legal standing of Sakhalin.
Whether Sakhalin belongs to the Russian Federation, as commonly acepted, or belongs to nobody, is a crucial problem, since
the answer to this question is contingent on the legal standing of
the Sakhalin Koreans.
Although Sakhalin Island was integrated as a part of the
Russian Federation on January 2, 1947, the owner of southern
Sakhalin is not clear.
When the Russian Empire lost the Russo-Japanese War
on September 5, 1905, it ceded to Japan “in perpetuity and full
sovereignty the southern portion of the Island of Sakhalin and
all the islands adjacent thereto and the public works and properties thereon,” the northernmost boundary of the ceded territory
being 50° North, according to the Treaty of Portsmouth’s Article
IX.17 Thus, the Japanese Empire governed southern Sakhalin from
1905.
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However, Japan lost its control over Sakhalin when it lost
WWII. The Treaty of San Francisco of September 8, 1951, between
Japan and the Allies of WWII, eliminated the Japanese Empire’s
imperial power over its colonies, including Sakhalin Island. According to the treaty’s article 2(c), “Japan renounces all right, title and
claim to the Kurile Islands, and to that portion of Sakhalin and the
islands adjacent to it over which Japan acquired sovereignty as a
consequence of the Treaty of Portsmouth of 5 September 1905.”18
That is, Japan gave up its sovereignty over southern Sakhalin, but
the recipient of the islands was not stated.
The Soviet Union refused to sign the Treaty of San
Francisco. One of the reasons for the refusal was related to the
territorial problems. It can be seen that the Soviet Union was
discontented with the San Francisco Treaty from the telegram
that the Soviet Foreign Ministry sent to N. B. Roshchin, the Soviet
ambassador in Beijing. “. . . the Soviet government has decided to
send its delegation to the September 4 San Francisco conference
on a peace treaty with Japan. The Soviet Union considers that it
would be difficult for the Soviet Union to refuse to participate in
the indicated conference since such a refusal could be assessed
by public opinion as the unwillingness of the Soviet Union to
have normal relations with Japan. The Soviet representatives will
take part in the San Francisco conference and will strive for the
proposals of the Soviet Union to be adopted.”19 Here, we can see
that the Soviet Union was unhappy with the San Francisco Treaty
and wrote its own version of the treaty.
The Soviet Union did propose a revised version of the treaty
during the conference. The article that reflected Soviet discontent
over the territorial problems was Article 7: “Japan recognizes the
full sovereignty of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics to the
southern part of Sakhalin with all islands belonging to it and to
the Kurile Islands and renounces all rights, legal foundations,
and pretensions to these territories.”20 The Soviets wanted the
San Francisco Treaty to explicitly recognize that Japan ceded
southern Sakhalin to the Soviet Union. However, by the end of
the peace conference, the participants decided not to adopt the
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Soviet draft. Consequently, the Soviet Union refused to sign the
final version of the San Francisco Peace Treaty.21
Two points can be concluded in a legal sense: A. that from
April 28, 1952, southern Sakhalin was no longer the territory of
Japan and, B. the San Francisco Peace Treaty didn’t indicate who
would receive southern Sakhalin.
After the San Francisco Treaty went into effect, many
nations did not acknowledge that southern Sakhalin was legally
Soviet territory. The U.S. State Department published a report
in June 1954 saying that the San Francisco Treaty did not yield
southern Sakhalin or the Kuril Islands to the Soviets and that the
Soviet Union cannot incorporate those territories, according to
the Potsdam Declaration.22
The U.S. Senate Resolution of Ratification of March 20,
1952, also supports that southern Sakhalin doesn’t legally belong
to the Soviet Union. The resolution states that nothing the San
Francisco Treaty contains “is deemed to diminish or prejudice, in
favor of the Soviet Union, the right, title, and interest of Japan, or
the Allied Powers as denied in said treaty, in and to South Sakhalin
and its adjacent islands, the Kurile Islands . . . or any other territory, rights, or interests possessed by Japan on December 7, 1941,
or to confer any right, title, or benefit therein or thereto on the
Soviet Union.”23
However, Sakhalin is actually under Russian military control. On August 8, 1945, seven days before the Japanese Empire
surrendered to the Allies, the Soviet Union declared war against
the Japanese Empire, advanced its military to the south, and occupied southern Sakhalin within days.24 The Russian Federation
incorporated Sakhalin on January 2, 1947.25 But the Soviet military
occupation of southern Sakhalin, rather than a legal occupation,
continues a state of war, which doesn’t automatically grant Russia
legitimate possession of the island. Thus, Russia’s occupation of
Sakhalin isn’t legal, but is basically military rule.
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The Soviet Union/the Russian Federation
The Soviet Union’s policy on Sakhalin Koreans hasn’t been
consistent, probably because Sakhalin Koreans were relatively few
compared to other ethnic minorities and lacked massive ethnic
movements, such as protests or lany arge-scale demand for returning sovereignty to Korea.
The main policy of the Soviet government over the Sakhalin
Koreans seems to have been “Let well enough alone.”
Right after the end of WWII, the Soviet Union focused more
on using Sakhalin Koreans to restore post-war Sakhalin. Because
Sakhalin was one of the few industrially-developed regions that
had a military infrastructure built during the Japanese occupation,
the Soviet Union used Sakhalin Koreans to operate factories and
mines. In fact, Igarashi Gozo, a member of the Japanese House
of Representatives, pointed out during 1991’s budget committee
meeting that after Japan retreated, the Soviets must have needed
Sakhalin Koreans to operate paper factories or coal mines, because
of a severe labor supply shortage.26
But the Soviet Union didn’t handle the problem of Sakhalin
Koreans’ citizenship with great attention. After the end of WWII,
the Soviet government took a census and assigned Japanese people
in Sakhalin as Japanese, but assigned Koreans as stateless.27 In the
Soviet point of view, Koreans were no longer Japanese citizens,
because of the Potsdam Declaration of July 26, 1945, the declaration that was issued by the United States, the United Kingdom,
and the Republic of China and approved by the Soviet Union. This
Declaration summarized the terms of surrender of Japan. The
most relevant part of the declaration is, “The terms of the Cairo
Declaration shall be carried out and Japanese sovereignty shall
be limited to the islands of Honshu, Hokkaido, Kyushu, Shikoku
and such minor islands as we determine.”28 Here, the declaration
limited the sovereignty of Japan to its four main islands, stripping
Japan of its colonial territories including the Korean peninsula.
The Cairo Declaration mentioned above in the Potsdam Declaration argued that Korea “in due course shall become free and
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independent.”29 Since Japan accepted the Potsdam Declaration in
1945 when it surrendered to the Allies, it gave up its sovereignty
over the Korean peninsula. From the Soviet point of view, the
Sakhalin Koreans were no longer under Japanese control, hence
were not Japanese citizens.
Also, according to the 1938 Soviet citizenship law, those
who lived in the Soviet Union but did not have a document that
proved their relationship with a foreign country were considered
as stateless.30
Although the Soviets initially described Koreans as stateless,
it changed the policy on September 9, 1948, when North Korea
was founded. The Russian government started to recommend
Sakhalin Koreans getting citizenships—either Soviet or North
Korean.31 According to the interview of Lee Chang-hee with the
DongA Ilbo, the Soviet government allowed North Korean ambassadors to try to persuade Sakhalin Koreans into acquiring North
Korean citizenships. Although most of the Sakhalin Koreans were
from Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Korea, “many people became North Korean citizens in the hope that
they could even walk back to home when the two Koreas reunify.”
This fact that North Korean ambassadors persuaded Sakhalin
Koreans to get North Korean citizenships was also confirmed by
researcher Jung Nam Cho, who collected extensive information
about North Korea’s political activity in Sakhalin.32
According to the Soviet census, by 1957, 6,891 were North
Korean citizens, which amounts to 22.8% among 30,183 Sakhalin
Koreans. Also by 1959, 12,352 were North Korean citizens, which
was 22% among 42,337 Sakhalin Koreas.33 Over the two years,
Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenship almost doubled.
The unusual aspect of this citizenship policy was that
Sakhalin Koreans were allowed to get North Korean citizenship in
the Soviet Union. The Russian government not only opened up its
citizenship to the Sakhalin Koreans but also another regime’s. It
allowed North Korea to persuade Sakhalin Koreans into acquiring
another citizenship, when most of them weren’t even from North
Korean regions.
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Perhaps this policy aimed at wiping out potential troubles
related to Sakhalin Koreans by making them either Soviet or North
Korean citizens. North Korea and the Soviet Union were close in
the 1940s. The Soviets looked after newly-founded North Korea
as a fellow Communist nation. North Korea, in turn, aided the
Soviet Union in various ways. A good example that shows North
Korea and the Soviet Union’s close relationship is when North
Korea dispatched more than 20,000 laborers to Sakhalin from 1946
to 1947. The Soviet Union needed a large number of laborers to
restore the economy in Sakhalin and requested the North Korean
Supreme People’s Assembly to send aid workers. Kim Il-sung, the
North Korean ruler of the time, recruited young workers and sent
them with family to Sakhalin, even though North Korea was also
short of labor supply.34
Considering the fact that North Korea and the Soviet
Union maintained this favorable relationship and that the Soviets
and South Korea established diplomatic relationships much later
on June 4, 1990 during the détente, the Soviet Union’s policy on
Sakhalin Korean citizenship seems to have been aimed at quelling any potential problem with the Sakhalin Koreans. By making
them either the citizens of the Soviet Union or of North Korea, the
Soviet government exerted its power over the Sakhalin Koreans.
George Ginsburg, a Soviet law expert, also supports this
analysis. He interpreted that the Soviet Union recorded Sakhalin
Koreans as North Korean nationals to “internalize” the problem
by reducing it to a private matter between the Soviet Union and
North Korea.35 In short, the Soviets made the problem domestic by
making Sakhalin Koreans their citizens or those of North Korea.
While trying to “internalize” the problem of the Sakhalin
Koreans, the Soviet government was quick to quell any events that
seemed potentially harmful to stability in Sakhalin.
One illustrative example would be the Choson Communist
Party movement (Choson refers to Korea). Founded secretly in
1950 by Choson People’s Academy’s educators Shin Jung-woo, Kim
Young-gab, and Shin Bo-gyun, the Choson Communist Party set
up its manifesto saying, “Sakhalin Koreans were slaves under the
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Japanese Empire and are beggars under the Soviet Communist
system. The only way to escape this abject poverty is by returning
to our home country.” The party’s existence was reported to the
Ministry of State Security (MGB), which regarded the party as
illegal and potentially disruptive. MGB arrested Shin Jung-woo
at the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk train station in August 1950 and other
founding members subsequently. December 1950’s court convicted all of the arrested members for violating the Article 58 of
the Criminal Law and imprisoned them in a gulag for six years.
The inference from this incident is that Soviet policy for
the Sakhalin Koreans aimed at suppressing any potential cause
of trouble. The goal of the Choson Communist Party was returning to their the home country: “Sakhalin Koreans should return
to Korea; the Soviets should acknowledge Koreans’ free will; and
the specific course of action of return should be decided by the
Sakhalin Koreans,” its declaration said. The Soviet government
interpreted this declaration as implying more than a desire to
return to Korea. The fact that the party was established by educated Koreans as well as that it wasn’t an authorized party might
also have contributed to the Soviet government’s suspicion and
antagonism to this party. In fact, during the 1950s, Sakhalin Koreans were often arrested for attempting to cross the Soviet-North
Korea borders to visit their hometowns. The idea of a group of
Koreans aspiring for returning to home must have been deemed
“radical” by the Soviet government.36
In short, the Soviet government seemed to have focused
most on preventing potential problems with the Sakhalin Koreans
by persuading them to be either Soviet or North Korean citizens
and by nipping collective movements in the bud.
Japan
Although Japan caused most of the Sakhalin Koreans to
end up in Sakhalin, the Japanese government played a passive
role in returning Sakhalin Koreans to their hometowns. The following analysis of the Japanese government’s policies shows that
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Japan does not want to take the full responsibility for the Sakhalin
Korean problem.
The Japanese government quickly withdrew all Japanese
people from Sakhalin after its surrender in 1945. By the US-USSR
Provisional Agreement on November 27, 1946, 292,590 Japanese
people returned to Japan from December 5 to July 22, 1949. Because this agreement was applicable only to Japanese prisoners of
war and civilians, Koreans in Sakhalin couldn’t return either to
Japan or Korea.37 During this time, Japan did not have diplomatic
rights and were under the military administration of the Allies, so
taking care of the Sakhalin Koreans wasn’t under Japan’s direct
control. However, the Japanese government strongly demanded
the return of Japanese people to the Supreme Commander for
the Allied Powers (SCAP) while it didn’t argue on behalf of the
Sakhalin Koreans.
All the remaining Sakhalin Japanese returned home by the
Soviet-Japanese Joint Declaration of October 19, 1956. At this time,
1,541 Koreans who were married to Japanese people also moved
to Japan. The return of these few Koreans was allowed under the
new Japanese law that stated, “Koreans who are accompanied by
Japanese spouses and who have lived in Sakhalin before the end
of the war are applicable to the civil law code 126-2-6 and are allowed to land on Japan.”38
766 Japanese people returned to Japan, and 1,541 Korean
husbands and their children also moved to Japan through this law.
Only a few Japanese people who the Soviet government deemed
to possess valuable skills were detained in Sakhalin by the end of
1957, whereas most of the Koreans were left on the island.39
What has been the Japanese government’s stance on the
Sakhalin Koreans after most of its people returned to Japan? The
Japanese government’s attitude can be viewed from the Japanese
court’s 1976 statement. Eom Su-gab, a Korean living in the Sakhalin port city of Korsakov, and four other Sakhalin Koreans sued
the Japanese government in December 1975 at the High Court in
Tokyo. The plaintiffs argued that the Japanese government had the
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responsibility of returning the four accusers to their hometowns.
Starting in January 1976, the trial continued for 30 sessions.40
The case was eventually dismissed, however. The Tokyo
High Court ruled that: A. because Japan gave up its dominion
over its colonies by the San Francisco Peace Treaty, the Sakhalin
Koreans had lost Japanese citizenship, hence weren’t allowed to
appeal to the Japanese judiciary, and B. because the problem was
a matter for the administration, not the judiciary, it was thus not
appropriate for the Japanese court to handle.41
The Japanese court’s final statement shows that the government’s stance relies on the San Francisco Peace Treaty that
deprived Imperial Japan of all its colonies. The court decided that
a loss of sovereignty over a region means the loss of the sovereignty
over the regional people. Since Japan gave up southern Sakhalin,
Sakhalin Koreans automatically lost their Japanese citizenship.
Japan actually decided the problem of its colonial people’s
citizenship within its law. Nine days before the San Francisco treaty
went into effect, the Japanese Ministry of Justice distributed Civil
Case number 438 to the ministers of the central and local courts.
The civil case stated, “Koreans, Taiwanese, and Japanese who were
excluded from the Japanese family register by marrying or being
adopted by Koreans or Taiwanese lose Japanese citizenship.”42 Furthermore, the Japanese Supreme Court ruled this administrative
policy constitutional in 1961.43 With the San Francisco Treaty and
Civil Case 438 as shields, the Japanese government has argued that
it does not have complete responsibility for the Sakhalin Korans.
The fact that Japanese government was unwilling to take
full responsibility for the Sakhalin Koreans can also be seen from
the late 1980s’ Japan-South Korea-USSR negotiation.
In 1965, Sojee Heo, a Sakhalin Korean from Korsakov,
negotiated with the Yuzhno-Sakhalinsk police and argued that
the Soviets should send him to Japan. He finally received a reply
from the Russian government that: “If Japan permits entrance,
the Soviet Union permits departure. Contact Japanese Embassy in
USSR to get Japan’s official stance,” on January 4. The reply was
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announced to be applicable to every Sakhalin Korean, and many
applied for departure to Tokyo. Until June 1996, 1,576 applied
for permanent residence in Japan, and 5,348 for permanent residence in Korea—a total of 6,924 people. The Soviet government
submitted the roster to Japan in August 1969.44
The Japanese government answered, “If the Korean
government is willing to pay all the expense of sending Sakhalin
Koreans who wish permanent residence in Korea, the Japanese
government is willing to negotiate with the Soviet government”
and notified this policy to the Korean government. This policy was
confirmed in Japan when Prime Minister Tanaka Kakuei answered
the question of House of Representatives member Funa Tanaka
about the Sakhalin Koreans on July 12, 1972.45
In the above policy, Japan focused mainly on the issue of
money—that the Korean government should pay for the Sakhalin
Koreans who want to live in Korea and that Japanese government
pays for the Sakhalin Koreans who want to live in Japan. The issue
is more of who holds the responsibility of the Sakhalin Korean
problem than of the money. The interpretation of Japan’s stance
is that although Japan holds some responsibility for returning
Sakhalin Koreans to their home towns, it was unwilling to take
the full responsibility, probably because Sakhalin Koreans were no
longer Japanese citizens and/or because the Japanese government
was negotiating with the USSR in South Korea’s stead. (South
Korea didn’t establish diplomatic relation with the Soviet Union
until June 4, 1990.)
The Korean government refused to pay the expense, on
the grounds that Japan had the full responsibility for the Sakhalin
Koreans.46 After the negotiation with South Korea ended up in nothing, the Japanese government changed its stance in August 1975.
It issued 2,000 voyage certificates that allowed Sakhalin Koreans
to land in Japan. Also, the Japanese Embassy in the USSR issued
voyage applications to Sakhalin Koreans who brought necessary
documents, including a statement of purpose, three identification
pictures, and an invitation letter from a guardian. As a result, 35
people received voyage certificates and entry permits to Japan
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and 376 people received entry permits to South Korea. But only
2 people—Kim Hwa-chun from Chekhovo and Jang Jeon-du from
Dolinsk—left to Japan, and one person, Choi Jung-sik, could return to South Korea, while rest of the certificate recipient weren’t
allowed to leave by the Soviet Union.47
Based on Japan’s treatment of its people and the 1960s’
negotiation process, the Japanese government’s stance on the
Sakhalin Korean problem can be summarized as “we take some
responsibility for the Sakhalin Korean problem, but only partially.”
North Korea
North Korea maintained a favorable relationship with
the Soviet Union from its foundation. According to the General
Headquarters (GHQ) report on November 7, 1947, the Soviet
Union transferred some North Koreans to fill the labor vacancy
when Japanese people left Sakhalin. Also, as mentioned above,
Kim Il-sung, the North Korean president of the time, agreed to
the Soviets’ request for back-up laborers and sent North Koreans
to Sakhalin from 1946 to 1947, even though North Korea was also
suffering from short labor supply.48
The North Korean government’s policy toward the Sakhalin
Koreans has been consistent. It tried to make Sakhalin Koreans
acquire North Korean citizenships or hinder Sakhalin Koreans
from being sent back to Japan or South Korea. The basic stance
was that Sakhalin Koreans were all potential North Korean citizens.
North Korea’s project to have Sakhalin Koreans obtain
North Korean citizenship started from 1958, when the chief ambassador of Choson Embassy in Nakhodka, USSR, started to engage
in Sakhalin Koreans’ daily life. According to many interviews with
Sakhalin Koreans who permanently settled in South Korea, many
of them didn’t acquire Soviet or North Korean citizenship at first
in the hope that returning to their home town might one day come
true. But when some Koreans with Japanese spouses returned to
Japan from 1957 to 1959, many Sakhalin Koreans started to hope
again that this time, they might be allowed to return home.49 Under
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these circumstances, the ambassador started to contact Sakhalin
Koreans—both the people who were forcefully sent to Sakhalin
during the Japanese colonization and the people who were sent
by the North Korean government as aid workers.
It can be inferred from the campaigns that the goal of
the North Korean ambassadors was first to encourage Sakhalin
Koreans to acquire North Korean citizenship and then to send
them to North Korea. First, based on North Korea’s Communist
philosophy, the ambassador persuaded Sakhalin Koreans that
becoming North Korean eventually meant returning to South
Korea:
My friends, your mother nation is Choson (Choson is what North
Korean people call their country). The division of Korean peninsula
is temporary, and it will soon be reunified. According to our constitution, the capital of the republic is Seoul. Reunification is only a matter
of time, and the burden of constructing a Communist nation in the
southern part of Korea lies on you, because you, my friends, came
from South Korea. My fellow friends, you are living in the prosperous nation of the Soviet Union, so you should learn everything from
your Soviet fellows and should work as pioneers in every field. I can
understand that you are worried about your families in South Korea.
You will definitely meet them when the countries reunify. Remember
that you are the proud citizens of Choson, and I would like to help
you do the remarkable works.50
Considering the fact that most of the Sakhalin Koreans were from
Jeolla-do and Gyeongsang-do, the southern provinces of Korea, this
speech might have persuaded them effectively. They might have
believed that although their home town was in South Korea, becoming North Korean might help them returning to their home towns
if the peninsula would reunify soon, as the ambassador contended.
Also, because North Korea was a fellow Communist country of the
Soviet Union, while South Korea was an enemy nation, Sakhalin
Koreans might have thought that North Korean citizens would be
given priority in returning to their home town.51 According to the
Soviet census, by 1959, 12,352 acquired North Korean citizenships,
which was 22% among 42,337 Sakhalin Koreans.52
The second goal of the North Korean ambassadors seemed
to have been sending Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizen-
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ships to North Korea. Under the Nakhodka ambassador’s guidance,
Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenships studied about
North Korea for 2 to 3 hours a week. In conjunction with the Choson
People’s Academy, they studied about North Korean government,
the Workers’ Party of Korea, the Communist Party of the Soviet
Union, and current issues in North Korea. This comprehensive
study seemed to have ben planned as a preliminary project for
inculcating North Korean ideology into Sakhalin Koreans to fit
the ideological taste of the North Korean government. After this
comprehensive study, some Sakhalin Koreans moved/were sent
to North Korea between 1959 and 1961, including graduates of
the Choson People’s Academy who matriculated to North Korean
universities.53
Besides persuading Sakhalin Koreans, North Korea also
implemented indirect policies to send Sakhalin Koreans to North
Korea. The indirect policies focused on making Sakhalin Koreans
discontented by segregating them from mainstream Soviet society and make them want to move from Sakhalin to North Korea.
In 1970, the ambassador visited Leonid Brezhnev, the General
Secretary of the Soviet Communist Party, and requested that the
Soviets “gather North Korean citizens in Sakhalin into one place
for communal living and exclude North Korean citizens from receiving the advanced labor-technician recognition.” The advanced
labor-technician recognition referred to the honors given during
November 7’s Great October Socialist Revolution Day and May
1’s International Labor Day, when factories recognized workers
of superior skills with certificates and prize money.54
This policy aimed at segregating Sakhalin Koreans with
North Korean citizenship from the rest of Soviet society. The
advanced labor-technician recognition was not a simple paper of
certificate. The recognitions boosted the chance of becoming first
or secondary managers in factories. They also helped recipients’
children get into the Communist Youth League and be employed.55
In response to the ambassador’s request, Brezhnev strongly
objected to gathering Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenship into one place, but agreed to excluding Sakhalin Koreans
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from receiving the advanced labor-technician recognitions. From
then on, Sakhalin Koreans with North Korean citizenships actually were discriminated against in work places. Sakhalin Koreans
who permanently returned to South Korea said that the pictures
of Sakhalin Korean advanced labor-technicians disappeared on
the boards in factories and that no Sakhalin Koreans received the
recognition.56
Why did North Korea want Sakhalin Koreans? The reason
seems to lie in the acute labor shortage in North Korea. According to the Sakhalin National Library, there were 23,498 Sakhalin
Koreans by July of 1946 and 42,337 Sakhalin Koreas by 1959.57 This
large number of Koreans in Sakhalin would have been a welcomed
labor supply for North Korea, although sufficient ideological
education would have been required.
A further analysis of the North Korean citizenship law also
supports the above inference that the North Korean government
deemed Sakhalin Koreans a potential labor supply. On October
9, 1963, the North Korean regime enacted the legislation of citizenship law. It declared that the citizens of North Korea were:
1) those who had Korean citizenship before the establishment
of North Korea and had retained it up to the day of publication
of the 1963 statute, and their children; and, 2) foreigners who
acquired the citizenship of North Korea in accordance with legal
procedure.58 The line between “who had Korean citizenship before
the establishment of North Korea” and who had not is fuzzy. Until
August 15, 1945, when the Korean peninsula was liberated from
the Japanese Empire, all Koreans were considered subjects of the
Emperor of Japan. After the liberation, Japan gave up all rights
on its colonies. Therefore, people who lived at the northern part
of Korea became North Koreans when the DPRK was established
in September, 1948 and those who lived at the southern part of
Korea became South Koreans when the Republic of Korea was
established in August, 1948. Thus any Koreans—whether North
Koreans or South Koreans—are “those who had Korean citizenship before the establishment of North Korea.” In addition, the
Koreans who remained in foreign countries, including Sakhalin,
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could also be seen as having had Korean citizenship before the
establishment of North Korea. DPRK’s citizenship law demonstrates that North Korea included all Koreans in and out of the
Korean peninsula as potential citizens of North Korea. However,
it should be remembered that although this citizenship law allows
some room for the inference that North Korea deemed Sakhalin
Koreans as potential citizens, the official stance of the North Korean government on this issue is not announced.
The active effort of the North Korean ambassador seemed
effective—some of the Sakhalin Koreans moved to North Korea
as university students or workers. However, in the mid 1970s, the
Japanese government started to engage in the problem of Sakhalin
Koreans. Tanaka Kakuei, the prime minister of Japan, requested
Leonid Brezhnev, the leader of the USSR, to facilitate the process
of returning Sakhalin Koreans to their hometowns, during the
Japan-USSR summit meeting on October 7, 1973.59 North Korea
expressed strong opposition to sending Sakhalin Koreans to South
Korea from the Japan-USSR the summit meeting, as shown in
Rodong Sinmun, the national newspaper of North Korea:
The problem of Sakhalin Koreans should be handled by the DPRK.
Japan does not have any right or qualification to engage in the problem
of Sakhalin Koreans. The machination of the Japanese government to
send Sakhalin Koreans to South Choson reflects Japan’s antagonism
toward DPRK. This kind of political conspiracy is not more than a
wild delusion.60 (South Choson is the North Korean way of referring
to South Korea.)
The strong opposition of North Korea put the Soviet Union in an
awkward position. For the Soviets, North Korea was an ally nation
and the Soviet Union didn’t even have a diplomatic relationship
with South Korea. Therefore, when the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested a conference on specific policies regarding
the Sakhalin Koreans in December 1973, the Soviets stepped back
and answered, “This is not a problem to be discussed between
Japan and the Soviet Union.” Also in foreign minister discussions
in 1975 and 1976 between Japan’s Kichi Miyazawa and the Soviet
Union’s Andrei Gromyko, the Soviet stance on the Sakhalin Korean problem didn’t change.61
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However, North Korea soon found that it was losing its
superiority over the Sakhalin Korean problem in the late 1980s
and early 1990s. The Soviet Union itself started to change dramatically, during the détente. Some Sakhalin Koreans also started
to visit South Korea—in 1988, 15 Sakhalin Koreans visited South
Korea via Japan, and in October 1988, Japan legislated a policy
that allowed Sakhalin Koreans to stay in Japan up to one year.
Since Sakhalin Koreans could renew their license for residence
continuously, they technically could stay permanently in Japan.62
With these breakthroughs, North Korea soon became indifferent
and less responsive to the Sakhalin Koran problem.
Although North Korea tried hard to either move Sakhalin Koreans to North Korea or stop them from moving to South
Korea, North Korea remains indifferent to the Sakhalin Korean
problem now.
South Korea
After the end of WWII and the liberation of the Korean
peninsula in 1945, the Korean peninsula underwent dramatic political and social change. Busy taking care of the problems inside
the Korean peninsula, the South Korean government didn’t give
enough attention to the Sakhalin Koreans.
The first time the South Korean government was officially informed of the Sakhalin Korean problem was in October
1947—it wasn’t the Korean Provisional government officials but
the General Headquarters (GHQ) that thoroughly inspected
the Sakhalin Korean problem. The GHQ discussed the problem
of Koreans who were left in Sakhalin and asked for the official
stance of the South Korean government. During that time, the
Korean peninsula was divided by the 38° North, the northern part
under the rule of the Soviet Civil Authority and the southern part
under the United States. Because most of the Sakhalin Korean
were from the southern provinces, the U.S. government of South
Korea or the Provisional government should have accepted them
if they returned to their home towns. However, South Korea had
already accepted approximately 1,500,000 people who returned
186
Yeon Woo Lee
from Japan. To compound the situation, food and housing supplies were extremely short, even with the help from international
relief organizations.63 The South Korean government didn’t do
much to help the Sakhalin Koreans.
The South Korean government didn’t have direct contact
with either the Soviet Union or Japan—the only way to discuss
the Sakhalin Korean problem was through the GHQ. Although
bringing Sakhalin Koreans back to Korea was an understandably
difficult quest, South Korea neglected the thousands of Sakhalin
Koreans after the end of war as shown above.
The process to help Sakhalin Koreans return to their home
towns started a few years after the diplomatic relationship between
South Korea and Japan was established in June 1965. The South
Korean government demanded that the Japanese government
take responsibility for returning Sakhalin Koreans to their home
towns. In response, the Japanese government said that it was willing
to negotiate with the Soviet government on the Sakhalin Korean
issue if the Korean government funded some of the expense for
the return of the people. This stance is similar to Japan’s response
in 1969, which stated that “If the Korean government is willing to
pay all the expense of sending Sakhalin Koreans who wish permanent residence in Korea, the Japanese government is willing
to negotiate with the Soviet government.”64 However, the Korean
government refused to pay the money, stating that Japan had the
full responsibility to take care of the Sakhalin Koreans for three
reasons: first, the Sakhalin Koreans were Japanese citizens during
the forced conscription and were detained even after the war that
Japan started; second, according to the Treaty on Basic Relations
between Japan and the Republic of Korea of 1965, Sakhalin Koreans who wish to live in Japan should be given equal rights with
the Koreans living in Japan; third, the Korean government will
accept the Sakhalin Koreans wishing to return to Korea.65
The breakthrough on solving the Sakhalin Korean problem
took place in late 1980s, when Japan invited Sakhalin Koreans
and their families to Japan for family reunions. In June of 1989,
the South Korean legislature’s reunification diplomats officially
THE CONCORD REVIEW
187
visited Sakhalin for the first time, making the state of the Sakhalin
Koreans exactly known to the South Korean government.66
South Korea allowed 65 Sakhalin Koreans to permanently
reside in South Korea if their family members with financial means
applied for the Sakhalin Koreans from 1988 to 1991, which restricted the homecoming for lots of Sakhalin Koreans. But on July
1, 1992, the South Korean government announced that Sakhalin
Koreans with no family in South Korea would be able to return
to South Korea. Thus in September 9, 1992, 77 Sakhalin Koreans
settled in Chuncheon Sarang House. Also 119 people settled in
Gwanglim Senior Nursing Home in March 20, 1993.67
In 1998, the Red Cross of Japan donated 3,200 million
yen, which was used to build Sakhalin Korean institutions in
Incheon and Ansan and to bring Sakhalin Koreans back to South
Korea. Currently, there are apartment complexes built to accommodate Sakhalin Koreans in Gyeongsangnma-do Yangsam,
Chungcheongbuk-do Eumseung, Gyeonggi-do Osan, Gyeonggido Paju, Chungcheongnam-do Jochiwon, Incheon Community
Social Welfare Center, and Ansan Gohyang Village. 3,785 Sakhalin
Koreans have returned to South Korea.68
Conclusion
During the chaotic aftermath of WWII, the Soviet Union,
Japan, North Korea, and South Korea avoided taking responsibility
for the Sakhalin Korean problem. Left on an island that legally
belonged to no nation, the Sakhalin Koreans lived as stateless
people, until North Korea came to include them as North Korean
citizens. Sakhalin Koreans who didn’t give up the hope of returning to their home towns negotiated with the Soviet and Japanese
governments several times, but their efforts were in vain when
the South Korean government refused to cooperate until Japan
acknowledged its full responsibility for the problem. Their hope
for homecoming finally came true on 1992 with the help of the
Japanese and the Korean Red Cross.
188
Yeon Woo Lee
Sakhalin Koreans could return to South Korea 47 years
after the end of the war. Based on the analysis provided above,
the reason for this delayed return seems to have stemmed from
the neglect and lack of willingness of the four nations to take
responsibility for the problems they made during the war. The
Soviet Union focused most on concealing the Sakhalin Korean
problem; Japan, using international treaties and law codes, argued
that it didn’t bear the full responsibility; North Korea tried to draw
Sakhalin Koreans to its country; and South Korea refused to take
care of its citizens until Japan took the initiative.
Could all Sakhalin Koreans return to their home towns
someday? This question remains to be solved since Red Cross
Korea and the South Korean legislature started to budget money
to accommodate more Sakhalin Koreans. But the homecoming
project should be finished soon—those who moved/were sent to
Sakhalin in the 1940s are already in their eighties. The second
generation Sakhalin Koreans are much more accustomed to a Russian lifestyle and lead satisfactory lives in Sakhalin. “My children
and grandchildren were born in Russia,” said Han Moon-hyeong,
a 76-year-old Sakhalin Korean who resides in Seoul now, “They use
Russian everyday at workplace and school, and they are treated
equally as Russian citizens there. They have no reason to come
here to Korea.” Sakhalin Koreans’ homecoming will soon be an
anachronism.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
189
Yeonsoo Kim, “The History of Sakhalin Koreans,”
Prospect (1990) p. 42
2
Sun Hyung Lee, Sakhalin Returnees (Seoul: Seoul
University Publications, 2002) p. 44
3
Jonghuk Choi, Studies on Quality Evaluation (Seoul:
Cheongmok Publishing, 2002) p. 379
4­
Lee, p. 22
5
Ibid., p. 44
6
Ibid., p. 3
7
Kim, p. 43
8
Korea University Asian Studies Department, Sakhalin
Korean Questions and Japanese Politics (Seoul: Korean
University Publication, 1994) pp. 45-46
9
Jung Nam Cho, “North Korea’s Policy on Sakhalin
Koreans,” Korean Studies 8 ((2001) p. 187
10
Tokyo University professor Onuma Yasuyaki estimated
that about 32,000 Koreans were drafted to Sakhalin. Onuma
Yasuyaki, Abandoned Sakhalin Koreans (Tokyo: ChokoronShimsha, 1992)
11
Mita Hideyaki, Forty Years of Nostalgia (Seoul: Sungjeong
Publishing, 1983) p. 51
12
Ibid., p. 51
13
Kim, p. 42
14
Ibid, p. 45
15
Hyang-ju Park, Report from Sakhalin—The History and
Thoughts of the Choson People (Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo,
1998) p. 72
16
Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has
the Responsibility: A Report,” Prospect 4 (1990) p. 139
17
Seokwoo Lee, Towards a Framework for the Resolution
of the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile Islands (Durham:
International Boundaries Research Unit, 2001) p. 4
18
Kimie Hara, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific
Region: Divided Territories in the San Francisco System
(London: Taylor & Francis, 2007) p. 13
19
Gilbert Rozman, Japan and Russia, the Tortuous Path
to Normalization, 1949-1999 (New York: Palgrave Macmillan,
2000) p. 43
20­
Ibid., p. 43
21
Ibid., p. 43
22
James E. Goodby et al. “Northern Territories' and
Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Prespectives (Santa
Barbara, Calfiornia: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995) pp.
xxii-xxiii
1
190
Yeon Woo Lee
American Society of International Law, The American
Journal of International Law XLVI (Washington, DC: American
Society of International Law, 1952) p. 96
24
Jae-sik Bae, “Ways to Protect Human Rights: Questions on
Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4 (1990) pp. 115-120
25
Kim, p. 43
26
Taesik Jeon, “Japan Should Take Legal and Political
Responsibility,” North Korea Shinmun (Sakhalin, Russia)
August 21, 2009, first edition
27
Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has
the Responsibility,” p. 141
28
Hara, p. 76
29
Dorothy Perkins, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of
Japanese Military Expansion from the Meiji Era to the Attack
on Pearl Harbor, 1868-1941, (Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing,
1997) p. 184
30
Jeon, “Legal and Political Responsibility”
31
Japanese Lawyer Association, pp. 137-141
32
Cho, p. 194
33
Jeon
34
Cho, p. 186
35
Ginsburg, The Citizenship Law of the USSR (Boston:
Brill, 1983) p. 319
36
Cho, pp. 187-197
37
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 139
38
Ibid., p. 139
39
Ibid., p. 139
40
Hisaya Shirai, “State of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4,
1990, p. 129
41
Shirai, p. 129
42
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 142
43
Jeong Hwa Oh, Korean Culture Seen From Immigrants’
Culture (Seoul: Ewha Women’s University Publication, 2007)
p. 121
44
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140
45
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140
46
Bae, p. 117
47
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140
48
Cho, p. 186
49
Ingeun Hong, “Soviet Sailor Says Sakhalin Koreans Took
North Korean Citizenship,” DongA Ilbo (Seoul) May 14, 1979
50
Park, p. 58
51
Cho, p. 186
23
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Jeon
Park, p. 62
54
Ibid., p. 190
55
Ibid., p. 178
56
Ibid., p. 190
57
Jeon
58
Ginsburg, p. 319
59
Korea University Asian Studies Department, pp. 45-46
60
Tsunoda Husako, The Island of Grief (Tokyo:
Shinchosha, 1994) pp. 53-54
61
Ibid., p. 84
62
Jonghuk Choi, Studies on Quality Evaluation (Seoul:
Cheongmok Publishing, 2002) p. 389
63
Bae, p. 120
64
Japanese Lawyer Association, p. 140
65
Bae, p. 120
66
Choi, p. 389
67
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Release: Sakhalin
Korean Aid Project” October 29, 2008
68
Choi, p. 389
69
Interview with Han Moon-hyeong at his house in
Gangseo-gu, Seoul, South Korea
52
53
Bibliography
American Society of International Law, The American
Journal of International Law XLVI Washington, DC: American
Society of International Law, 1952
Bae, Jae-sik, “Ways to Protect Human Rights: Questions on
Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4, 1990
Cho, Jung Nam Cho, “North Korea’s Policy on Sakhalin
Koreans,” Korean Studies 8, 2001
Choi, Gil-sung, Sakhalin, the Land of Abandonment, Seoul:
Minsokwon, 1983
Choi, Jonghuk, Studies on Quality Evaluation Seoul:
Cheongmok Publishing, 2002
191
192
Yeon Woo Lee
Ginsburg, George, The Citizenship Law of the USSR
Boston: Brill, 1983
Goodby, James E., Vladimir I. Ivanov, Nobuo Shimotomai,
and the United States Institute of Peace, “Northern Territories”
and Beyond: Russian, Japanese, and American Perspectives
Santa Barbara, California: Greenwood Publishing Group, 1995
Hara, Kimie, Cold War Frontiers in the Asia-Pacific Region:
Divided Territories in The San Francisco System London:
Taylor & Francis, 2007
Hideyaki, Mita Forty Years of Nostalgia Seoul: Sungjeong
Publishing, 1983
Hong, Ingeun, “Soviet Sailor says Sakhalin Koreans Took
North Korean Citizenship,” DongA Ilbo Seoul: May 14, 1979
Husaka, Tsunoda, The Island of Grief Tokyo: Shinchosha,
1994
Japanese Lawyer Association, “Japanese Government Has
the Responsibility: A Report,” Prospect 4, 1990
Jeon, Taesik, “Japan Should Take Legal and Political
Responsibility” New Korean Shinmun Sakhalin, Russia: August
21, 2009, first edition
Kang, Jung-ha, “Korea-USSR-Japan Negotiations on Sakhalin
Koreans” PhD thesis, Chuncheon University, Chucheon, 2001
Kim, Yeonsoo, “The History of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect
4, 1990
Korea University Asian Studies Department, Sakhalin
Korean Questions and Japanese Policies Seoul: Korean
University Publications, 1994
Lee, Seokwoo, Shelagh Furness, Clive H. Schofield, and
Internatinal Boundaries Research Unit, Towards a Framework
for the Resolution of the Territorial Dispute over the Kurile
Islands Durham: International Boundaries Research Unit, 2001
THE CONCORD REVIEW
193
Lee, Sun Hyung, Sakhalin Returnees Seoul: Seoul University
Publication, 2004
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, “Press Release: Sakhalin Korean
Aid Project,” October 29, 2008
Oh, Jeong Hwa, Korean Culture Seen From Immigrants’
Culture, Seoul: Ewha Women’s University Publication, 2007
Park, Hyang-ju, Report from Sakhalin—The History and
Thoughts of the Choson People Tokyo: Ochanomizu Shobo,
1998
Perkins, Dorothy, Japan Goes to War: A Chronology of
Japanese Military Expansion from the Meiji Era to the Attack
on Pearl Harbor, 1868-1941, Pennsylvania: Diane Publishing,
1997
Rosman, Gilbert, Japan and Russia: the Tortuous Path to
Normalization, 1949-1999 New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2000
Shirai, Hisaya, “State of Sakhalin Koreans,” Prospect 4, 1990
Yasuyaki, Onuma, Abandoned Sakhalin Koreans Tokyo:
Chuokoron-Shinsha, 1992
194
Yeon Woo Lee
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Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
FROM FOURTEEN TO FOUR: EVALUATING THE
INFLUENCE OF WOODROW WILSON’S FOURTEEN
POINTS ON THE 1919 MAY FOURTH
MOVEMENT IN CHINA
“The May Fourth Movement of 1919 was an epochal event in modern
Chinese history. It marked the beginning of China’s modern revolutionary era, and a new stage after the Republican Revolution of
1911. It was both anti-imperialist and anti-warlord, and represented
the reaction of the Chinese people to the turbulent new forces unleashed by the First World War.”1 Joseph T. Chen, 1970
Caroline W. Tan
Introduction
I
n the early 1900s, China was on its back. A series of mili
tary defeats and unequal treaties at the hands of Western nations
and Japan left the once militarily powerful “Middle Kingdom”
with the status of a minority nation. Not technically a colony or
a protectorate, it could exercise no control over international
trade coming through its ports or any of its territories that imperial powers such as Japan, Germany, and France wanted to seize.
However, once heavily exposed to the intoxicating rhetoric of
“self-determination” and “autonomy” of U.S. President Woodrow
Wilson during World War I and its aftermath, China was determined to free itself from the shackles of imperial influence. At
the Paris Peace Conference, when it became clear that the terms
of the Versailles Treaty (a document that left few satisfied) would
Caroline W. Tan is at Yale. She is a graduate of Lynbrook High School in
San Jose, California, where she wrote this paper for Mr. Kyle Howden’s
AP United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
196
Caroline W. Tan
allow for no such thing, China’s disappointment led to action. If
the nation could not wait for the Big Three to grant it back its
independence, it would seize it for itself, a determination that
would culminate in the May Fourth Movement.
The 1919 May Fourth Movement was a cultural phenomenon that culminated in a mass, student-led demonstration held
at Tiananmen Square in Beijing, China, soon after the ratification
of the Versailles Peace Treaty. Thousands of university students
and a sizable portion of the intellectual population denounced the
incumbent Chinese government and the terms of the Versailles
Treaty, calling instead for the establishment of self-determination
in the region and for increased political power for the people.
Leaders of the Movement hoped that Western ideals of democracy
and individual freedom would eventually supersede traditional
Confucian principles of hierarchy and familial order, achieving
a change in political, social, and intellectual thought.
The May Fourth Movement gradually westernized the
Chinese political system, encompassing not only the historic student demonstration that took place on May 4, 1919, but also the
literary revolution, merchants’ and workers’ strikes, the boycott
against Japan, and a series of political and social activities headed
by Chinese intellectuals.2 It spearheaded a revolutionary fervor
for cultural change and an autonomous Chinese nation that
transformed the nature of the Chinese government.3
Despite its age, the May Fourth Movement continues to
hold both historical and political significance, as it was one of
the most influential mass demonstrations of the 20th century and
helped the concept of self-determination to reverberate around
the world. Through a detailed analysis of the historical context
surrounding the May Fourth Movement as well as its relationship
to President Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points, a proposal that
advocated for the principle of self-determination, this paper seeks
to evaluate the influence that Wilson’s Fourteen Points had on
the historic Movement, keeping in consideration the diplomatic
exchanges between China, the United States, Europe, and Japan.
Such diplomatic exchanges helped establish important precedents
THE CONCORD REVIEW
197
for China’s political and economic relationship to the world and
its reaction to Woodrow Wilson’s historic proposal. This paper will
argue that foreign competition over access to Chinese markets,
European and Japanese imperialism, and staunch American propaganda inextricably attached the Chinese populace to Woodrow
Wilson’s Fourteen Points. When the self-determination proposal
codified within the Fourteen Points would, despite heavy enthusiasm, fail to materialize, the Chinese population’s disappointment
would eventually manifest itself in the historic demonstration
known as the May Fourth Movement.
The Fourteen Points
“What we seek is the reign of law, based upon the consent of the
governed and sustained by the organized opinion of mankind.”4
President Woodrow Wilson, 1918
On January 8, 1918, United States President Woodrow
Wilson entered the Capitol Building in Washington DC, where he
would deliver his historic “Fourteen Points” speech to a joint session of Congress and thus outline his vision for the postwar world,5
one with an established set of principles that would foster international peace and guide future global interactions.6 Addressing the
65th Congress, Wilson opened by saying that “we entered this war
because violations of right had occurred which touched us to the
quick and made the life of our own people impossible unless they
were corrected and the world secured once for all against their
recurrence.”7 Wilson then continued to enumerate the fourteen
principles which he believed would deliver such an outcome,
advocating for, among other things, open diplomacy, freedom of
the seas, reduction of armaments, removal of economic barriers,
and territorial sovereignty in various European nations.8 His Fourteen Points went further, as Wilson also proposed establishing an
international organization “for the purpose of affording mutual
guarantees of political independence and territorial integrity to
great and small states alike,”9 which would manifest itself as the
League of Nations. Yet regardless of the many significant and
198
Caroline W. Tan
historic suggestions offered in Wilson’s Fourteen Points, the most
influential principle outlined in the speech was undoubtedly the
principle of self-determination, a concept that would allow the
population of various nations to determine the political future
of their state without external coercion or pressure and thus was
heavily supported in various platforms based on his proposal.
What made the self-determination principle so notable
was that it was introduced in an age of foreign imperialism and
economic competition, where the world’s most hegemonic nations
continuously exploited the developing ones for economic gains
and increased access to lucrative markets,10—a radical viewpoint
on the nature of international relations for its time. Point V of
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points stated that:
a free, open-minded, and absolutely impartial adjustment of all
colonial claims, based upon a strict observance of the principle that
in determining all such questions of sovereignty the interests of the
populations concerned must have equal weight with the equitable
claims of the government whose title is to be determined.11
Point V made it clear that the government and people of former
colonies should have an equal say in determining the sovereignty
of the colony in question, laying down the foundation for selfdetermination by valuing the opinion and input of the people.
President Wilson further elaborates on the idea of self-determination through Points X, XII, and XIII of his Fourteen Points plan.
Point X states that,
The peoples of Austria-Hungary, whose place among the nations we
wish to see safeguarded and assured, should be accorded the freest
opportunity to autonomous development.12
The tenth clause argues that the people of Austria-Hungary should
be permitted to take part in the development of their autonomous
nation, further contributing to the idea of self-determination by
empowering the populace and allowing them to determine the
political fate of their own nation.
Wilson’s influence in the international sphere was undeniable; his dogged determination to expand self-determination and
make the world “safe for democracy”13 became a pivotal platform
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199
of the Allied cause during World War I, reinforcing the moral
justification for American intervention in the war. Continuously
upholding such a policy became a necessity for the Allied powers,
whose support from moderates and liberals for the war depended
on the moral justifications for the Allied powers’ initial entry.14
When British Prime Minister Lloyd George feared that the “Allied
position [was] in danger of fraying both at home and abroad…
[he] decided to make a declaration of war aims that would regain
the diplomatic initiative for the Allies…to rally labor and liberals.”15 George’s declaration declared that the “postwar territorial
settlement…must respect ‘the right of self-determination or the
consent of the governed,’” using Wilson’s own rhetoric of selfdetermination and indicating the global support from world leaders for his proposal. The Caxton Hall speech was a fundamental
moment in the establishment of self-determination as one of the
most distinguished principles of the postwar settlement, reinvigorating Wilson’s enthusiasm for the principle.
Yet although the enthusiasm Wilson displayed for the
concept of self-determination was at first mirrored in a number of
colonial territories, that enthusiasm would soon wear away upon
evidence that Wilson had never intended for self-determination to
apply to non-European nations. Lloyd George himself would later
claim in his memoirs that he and Wilson’s “statements supporting
the right to self-determination had pertained only to Europe and
the non-Turkish portions of the Ottoman Empire.”16 Moreover,
Wilson, during his address to Congress where he initially introduced the Fourteen Points, was predominantly referring to the
issue in Europe, with little thought of colonized nations elsewhere
in the world. Self-determination was, to him, a privilege; if certain groups weren’t sufficiently “modern” or “enlightened,” they
could be excluded from the concept for the time being.17 In fact,
Woodrow Wilson’s own Secretary of State, Robert Lansing, later
wrote that “the principle of self-determination clearly did not apply to “races, peoples, or communities whose state of barbarism or
ignorance deprive[s] them of the capacity to choose intelligently
their political affiliations.”18
200
Caroline W. Tan
In Wilson’s mind, then, nations he considered not developed enough weren’t entitled to the principle of self-determination
that he otherwise so vehemently supported. Among the nations
Wilson placed under that category was China, a “barbarous and
ignorant”19 nation whose poor image in Wilson’s eyes stemmed
from his disparaging attitude towards non-Europeans in general,
an attitude born out of his childhood environment.
As a Caucasian male born in antebellum Virginia in 1856,
Wilson grew up in an environment where Caucasians were seen
as superior to other ethnic groups.20 As a result, he tended to
harbor a white-supremacist attitude typical of the time period21
and shared assumptions on racial discrimination that he never
appeared to have seriously challenged.22 His racially-prejudiced
opinion on Chinese development, then, can be understood as
a result of his childhood; regardless, it influenced his belief that
China, as a “backwards” nation, was incapable of self-government
and instead still needed the protection of the United States and
other foreign powers.
Wilson’s real intentions regarding self-determination, however, weren’t known during his powerful Fourteen Points address.
Thus, he still generated enthusiastic support from European and
non-European nations alike and stimulated heavy interest in the
Paris Peace Conference as delegates from all over the world arrived, anticipating global self-determination. Nations such as China
would eagerly attend the conference, expecting to be treated as
equals and anticipating the implementation of self-determination,
only to be disappointed when Wilson’s prejudice would allow him
to compromise the principle in favor of other goals. 23 Yet all of
this would occur later; for the time being, Wilson was revered as a
crusader for democracy and the global moral authority, enjoying
immense popularity around the world.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
201
Foreign Affairs
“The earth is too small, the portion of it they occupy is too big and
rich, and the intercourse of nations is now too intimate, to permit
the Chinese keeping China to themselves.”24
British Colonel Francis Younghusband
Before going into detail regarding the Fourteen Points and
its direct relationship with the May Fourth Movement, it is essential
to understand the background history in the international sphere
during the 20th Century, as such history eventually set the stage for
many of the events which would later transpire and lead to the May
Fourth Revolution. Although China was, in theory, an autonomous
kingdom, its military vulnerability forced itself to abdicate much.
It was no protectorate like the British Empire’s India, but it was
just as much as a crown jewel to be divided and quartered, more
subtly, by imperial powers. We will examine this loss of autonomy
and China’s status as a pawn in an international game for control
over Asian economic markets through three spheres: diplomatic
relations between China and the United States, between China
and Europe, and between China and Japan.
A. China-US Relations
Diplomatic relations between China and the United States
were characterized primarily by the US desire to access Chinese
and other international markets, a goal that served as the driving
force behind most U.S. foreign policy initiatives at the time.
In 1899, U.S. Secretary of State John Hayes dispatched a
note, known as the Open Door Note, to the major powers at the
time (France, Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, Japan, and
Russia), asking all nations to recognize equal trading rights and
to uphold Chinese territorial integrity. He wrote that:
First…[interested powers] will in no way interfere with any treaty
port or any vested interest within any so-called ‘spheres of interest’
or leased territory it may have in China.
Second. That the Chinese treaty tariff of the time being shall apply
to all merchandise landed or shipped to all such ports…
202
Caroline W. Tan
[and] Third. That it will levy no higher harbor dues on vessels of another nationality…than shall be levied on vessels of its own nationality,
and no higher railroad charges over lines built ..than shall be levied
on similar merchandise belong to its own nationals…25
The note established an “open door” policy in China, essentially
giving all countries involved an equal claim to economic advantages
in China and mitigating the power of nations that had already
established spheres of influence in the area. The United States’
motive for proposing the Open Door Policy was clear: it wanted
to prevent losing lucrative trading relationships with the Chinese
populace.26 At the time of the Open Door Note, although extensively
involved in trade with China, the U.S. failed to hold any spheres
of influences there. Therefore, if other countries decided to partition China, the U.S. would likely have little trading influence and
risk losing its economic advantage in the region.27 Establishing
equal trading rights in the area would continue to ensure U.S.
trade and its ability to access Asian markets for economic gain,
protecting both American businessmen and investors from economic liabilities. This policy, however, subjugated China for the
benefit of imperial nations, a treatment that would later explain
the strength of the Chinese people’s resolve for independence
and freedom from imperialist control after the disappointment
suffered from the Paris Peace Conference.
Another aspect of the relationship between China and
the United States had further political implications, namely the
American propaganda that widely pervaded Chinese media. During the final months of World War I, President Woodrow Wilson
established the Committee on Public Information (CPI), an organization whose purpose was to increase support for American
involvement the war through various propaganda tactics.28 The
committee initially concentrated its efforts in the United States;
however, after the U.S. minister to Beijing, Paul S. Reinsch, complained to Washington that “all the news about the United States
was coming to China through the British agency Reuters … [whose]
reporting…did not sufficiently highlight the President’s vision for
the postwar world,” the American government established a CPI
branch in China as well, appointing former muckraking journalist
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Carl Crow to lead the effort as the Committee’s Chairperson.29
Rather than setting up a Chinese-language paper to publicize
American war news, Crow decided to “translate American news
dispatches and offer them to the Chinese press. [By] charging a
nominal fee for the service…[he] would help present [the translations] as ‘real’ news rather than propaganda.” 30 The results were
immediate. Crow boasted,
American news…now predominates in the Chinese papers … [and]
is now supplying the bulk of foreign news and comment published
in the Chinese press.31
With the help of Carl Crow and the CPI, 700 new periodicals were
created between 1915 and 1923, indicating the widespread and
far-reaching control that the CPI had on the Chinese press.32 By
dominating the major trusted news agencies in China, such as
the Zhong-Mei News Agency, Crow could incorporate American
ideals of self-determination and autonomy into Chinese war news
and thus successfully disseminate the ideals stated in Woodrow
Wilson’s Fourteen Points. However, these ideals were not meant
to inspire the Chinese to yearn for their own self-determined independence from Western empires. Wilson and Crow were simply
employing the propaganda to muster support for the Allied cause.
Nonetheless, their convincing, widely-proliferated “news stories”
had unintended consequences and helped set the stage for the
later mass demonstration.
Moreover, new inventions that vastly facilitated global
communication systems helped deliver Wilson’s increasingly
powerful rhetoric to audiences around the world in record time.
The telegraph, first popularly used in Europe and North America
in the 1840s, began to spread to other areas around the world.
In China during the 1860s, following European influence in
the area as the Qing dynasty began to collapse, telegraph lines
flourished,33 enormously decreasing the amount of time it took
for information to travel across continents and oceans. News that
previously would have taken weeks, even months, to travel from
one continent to another could now arrive in a matter of hours.34
Easier dissemination of news made Crow’s propaganda efforts
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more fruitful, as publicizing excerpts from Wilson’s speeches or
distributing ideas from his vision for the postwar world occurred
more quickly and reached far more people.
Crow’s efforts with newspaper agencies were clearly seen
as the Chinese press often published President Wilson’s most important speeches, often verbatim, and a dominant Shanghai daily
newspaper reproduced a translated, full-text version of Woodrow
Wilson’s Fourteen Points,35 exciting Chinese intellectuals who
made up the bulk of the literate population and were particularly
pleased with the prospect of self-determination. Hollington K.
Tong, a venerated Chinese journalist, extolled Wilson as,
a wonderful man, [with] a firm grasp of the world situation and [the
knowledge on] exactly how to deal with it. That is why he is to-day
heading the movement to make the world safe for democracy…he
is spiritual, fair-minded, and firm in his determination.36
Crow’s efforts were not, however, limited to control of newspaper
agencies and telegraph operations. With the help of the CPI, Crow
also requested approximately twenty thousand large photographs
of Wilson to display in various institutions, and distributed a variety
of buttons and engravings with Wilson’s image.37 Furthermore,
Crow assembled hundreds of volunteers, many of whom helped
him circulate CPI news summaries, newsreels, posters, pamphlets,
maps, and other materials. They plastered wall posters onto the
windows and walls of American companies, churches, and schools.38
Crow himself also sent articles and pamphlets extolling Wilson
and the progress of American society to some twenty-five thousand
prominent Chinese citizens, further depicting the United States
in a positive light within the Chinese environment.39 Such extensive propaganda supporting Wilson’s peace efforts and American
involvement in the war attempted to gather Chinese support of
American goals; undoubtedly, the endeavor was successful. By
placing Woodrow Wilson in such high esteem, a natural result of
the constant exposure to Wilson’s wartime speeches, the Chinese
populace had become accustomed to the idea of the “consent of
the governed,” making them even more upset when the Versailles
Treaty would fail to uphold that standard for them.
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The excitement of Chinese intellectuals for the prospect of
self-determination, as well as the end of the economic exploitation
they faced through the Open Door Policy, characterized China-US
relations, and set the scene for the future May Fourth Movement
by providing the Chinese population with a determination to gain
the right to self-determination and to free themselves from the
economic exploitation of the Western powers.
B. China-Europe Relations
Chinese-European relations were dominated by European
imperialistic motives. A number of European nations held spheres
of influence within China and even claimed direct control of various Chinese cities themselves.
Early in the 19th century, China faced a series of internal
struggles propelled by the sale of foreign opium into the country.40
Growing opium in India, the British-held East India Company
began to ship tons of opium into the Chinese Guandong41 port,
trading the drug for Chinese manufactured goods and tea.42
Although the Manchu regime banned the substance in 1836,
English traders would generously bribe port officials in order to
keep the opium traffic flowing.43 The effects of such a trade were
devastating to Chinese society; the enormous nation was, quite
literally, filled with drug addicts, many of whom were no longer
able to work due to the harmful effects of opium addiction. Such
behavior dramatically reduced the efficiency of the Chinese labor
force and greatly alarmed the government, who appointed Lin
Zixu as the Imperial Commissioner at Guandong in order to try
to block further importation of opium.44
Lin Zixu took over the Guandong port in March of 1839,
and began quickly to eradicate opium traffic into the nation as
well as all existing stores of opium.45 He proactively attempted to
cut off the opium trade at its root by weeding out corrupt officials
and heavily policing British trade of the drug.46 His most notable
effort in fighting the drug trade, however, came from a 1839 letter he wrote to Queen Victoria of England, requesting that the
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British cease all efforts to continue the opium trade in China. His
letter implored that,
…there are barbarian ships that strive to come here for trade for
the purpose of making a great profit. The wealth of China is used to
profit the barbarians…by what right do they then in return use the
poisonous drug to injure the Chinese people?…Let us ask, where
is your conscience? I have heard that the smoking of opium is very
strictly forbidden by your country, that is because the harm caused by
opium is clearly understood…how can you bear to go further, selling
products injurious to others in order to fulfill your insatiable desire?47
In his eloquent letter to Queen Victoria, Lin Zixu argued that trade
should be beneficial to all nations and that England couldn’t justify
its exportation of opium into China when it itself had banned the
drug in its country.
Nonetheless, England refused to accede to Lin’s requests,
primarily as a result of the disagreement between the British and
the Chinese over the proper way to handle foreigners accused
of crimes in China.48 While the British refused to hand over
British citizens who had violated Chinese laws, Chinese officials
demanded the sole right to deal with lawbreakers in their nation,
regardless of the lawbreakers’ nationality or crime committed.49
This dispute, coupled with the extraordinarily lucrative nature
of the opium trade, served as the primary reason for the British
refusal to discontinue the drug trade in China and their decision
to resume importing the addicting drug into the nation.50
In response to Britain’s continued importation, Lin threatened to cut off all trade with England and expel the British from
access to Chinese markets and China itself. When Chinese junks51
attempted to counter English merchant vessels in November of
1839, England responded by sending warships to the area in June
of 1840, initiating a conflict between the two nations that would
become known as the First Opium War.52 China was no match
for the British, who had superior military technology and gunships; in 1842, the Chinese were coerced into signing the Treaty
of Nanjing, the first “unequal treaty”53 with the British. Article II
of the Treaty of Nanjing stipulated that,
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His Majesty the Emperor of China agrees that British Subjects, with
their families and establishments, shall be allowed to reside, for the
purpose of carrying on their Mercantile pursuits, without molestation
or restraint at the Cities and Towns of Canton, Amoy, Foochow-fu,
Ningpo, and Shanghai, and Her Majesty the Queen of Great Britain,
etc., will appoint Superintendents or Consular Officers, to reside at
each of the above-named Cities or Towns, to be the medium of communication between the Chinese Authorities and the said Merchants …54
This segment of the Treaty forced China to open five ports, those
of Canton, Shanghai, Foochow, Ningpo, and Amoy, to British trade.
Moreover, the Treaty of Nanjing granted British subjects living in
China “extraterritoriality” status (meaning they did not have to
obey Chinese laws and could not be tried for crimes committed
in China), coerced China to cede control of the Island of Hong
Kong, and made Great Britain a “most favored nation,” a move
that forced China to indiscriminately offer Great Britain any trading benefits that it offered to other nations.55
Unsurprisingly, the Treaty of Nanjing was enormously
unpopular among the Chinese people, as the Treaty allowed
England to gain economic dominance by bringing opium into
China.56 Because no restrictions were placed on British trade,
opium circulation in China more than doubled in the next three
decades, further weakening the already crumbling empire.57 As
China’s weakness became more pronounced, Chinese officials
were made to sign a second set of treaties that provided for the
complete legalization of opium and the unrestricted proliferation
of Christianity in all areas of China.58
That the majority of the terms dictated in the Treaty of
Nanjing were focused primarily on securing trade with the Chinese only shows the extent to which the British were motivated
by economics. It could have demanded that China make Christianity its national religion, as Great Britain had been interested
in proselytizing other nations at the time, yet it focused its initial
relationship with China as a purely market-based one with primarily economic, albeit some political, gains. By subjecting China
to a series of unequal guarantees that would strengthen British
influence in the area, Great Britain made China a pawn in its
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international game for access to East Asian markets, and, given
that such imperialism lasted up until World War I, only fueled
China’s desire to emancipate itself from Great Britain.
Chinese response to British imperialism was predictably
outraged; in fact, the Treaty of Nanjing helped instigate the violent,
anti-foreign, anti-Christian Boxer Uprising, a conflict organized
by the Society of Righteous and Harmonious Fists, “Boxers”59 that
sought to drive out the British from China. Although the effort
ended in failure as the Chinese Emperor fled while French and
British troops marched to Beijing, burning the Summer Palace to
the ground, the Boxer Uprising was a manifestation of Chinese
sentiment towards British imperialism, indicating the lengths that
the Chinese populace would go to for autonomy and providing a
precedent for future acts of civil disobedience.60
C. China-Japan Relations
During the 1868 Meiji Restoration, a modernization campaign led by then-Emperor Meiji, Japan rapidly began to adopt
Western science and engineering techniques, allowing the nation to begin to match its Western rivals in military and scientific
achievements.61 In only a few years, Japan had transformed itself
from a feudal society into a modernized, industrial state. This was
due in part to its practice of sending Japanese students to Europe
in order to learn from Western arts and sciences, helping the
nation to elude foreign domination as well as to compete on an
equal playing field with Western powers.62
While Japan enjoyed its technological advancements
and newfound influence, China suffered from the stipulations
proposed in the Treaty of Nanjing. Great Britain took control of
Burma63 in 1852 while the French secured a protectorate over
both Tonkin and Annan64 in 1885. Moreover, China slowly lost
control over its satellite nations, further weakening the already
debilitated state.65 The Japanese, however, would soon be one of
the more formidable threats against the Qing Dynasty in China; by
1878, Japan had prevented the king of the Loochoo Islands from
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paying tribute to the Middle Kingdom and was already looking
eagerly to taking over China’s control of Korea.66
Naturally, then, when Korea faced difficulties in suppressing an internal rebellion, both China and Japan sent troops into
the nation to defeat the rebels; however, by the time both nations
arrived in Korea, the rebel troops had already been suppressed,
giving both China and Japan a pretext to turn onto each other as
Japan wanted Chinese territories and China wanted to prevent
further Japanese interference.67
The conflict between the two nations became known as the
Sino-Japanese War, a dispute that lasted from 1894 to 1895 and
pitted Japan against the Middle Kingdom. The Japanese had the
upper hand; not only did it command a navy modeled after the
British Royal Navy, but it led an army modeled after the German
army, the most formidable army at the time. China, on the other
hand, suffered from widespread corruption and low morale, a
result of the prevalence of opium in the Chinese society.68 Its army
was unpaid, poorly fed, poorly trained, and poorly armed: only
three-fifths of the Chinese soldiers had rifles while the other forty
percent had to fight with pikes, swords, and spears, all of which
were by then outdated technology.69 Moreover, China had already
been facing internal disunity as a result of British imperialism and
control over its foreign trade, further weakening the Chinese as
they prepared for war against Japan.70
Unsurprisingly, the Sino-Japanese War ended in Japan’s
favor with the Treaty of Shimonoseki [1895]. The terms of the
Treaty dictated that China cede the Liaodong Peninsula, Formosa,71 and the Penghu Islands to Japan, as well as pay a massive
war indemnity. Article 1 of the Treaty required China to:
“recognize definitively the full and complete independence and autonomy of Korea, and, in consequence, the payment of tribute and
the performance of ceremonies and formalities by Korea to China,
in derogation of such independence and autonomy, shall wholly
cease for the future.”72
China, then, was forced to cede influence in Korea to the Japanese, who also required that four further river ports to be opened
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up to foreign trade.73 China’s defeat by the Japanese led to what
Lord Salisbury, British Prime Minister, described as the “Battle of
Concessions,” when France won concessions in Kwangchouwan,
Germany and Britain obtained Weihaiwei.74 It seemed, therefore,
that the partition of China was imminent, with both European
and Asian nations now vying for various economic opportunities
in the region.75
China’s defeat in the Sino-Japanese War had further repercussions, leading to the die Gelbe Gefahr­—“the Yellow Peril,” a
German-coined term that reflected the westward fear of the “Land
of the Rising Sun” and other Asian nations.76 European nations
began to fear an armed, ambitious Asia rising up to occupy Western territories, a fear that translated to widespread hatred of not
only the Japanese population, but also the Chinese.77 In 1898,
London publisher M. P. Shiel published The Yellow Danger, a book
that depicted the Chinese and other Asian races as conspirators
attempting to break Britain’s power in the Far East. The book uses
terms such as “fiendish love of cruelty” and “devilish cunning,”78
many of which were reproduced in letters of foreigners in Beijing
as well as articles of the international press to describe the Oriental
population. One character in the book is even quoted as saying,
“what appalling fate would be that of Europe if the yellow races
[referring to the Asian peoples] in their hundreds of millions
organized a westward march is beyond the imagination of man
to conceive.”79 Hatred of the Chinese wasn’t limited to Europe;
in 1882, the United States banned Chinese immigration into the
country, passing the Chinese Exclusion Act to protect American
labor and keep out the Chinese.80
Antagonistic attitudes towards the Chinese as well as the
gradual decline of Chinese power stemmed from a number of
economic and territorial concessions China had to make to the
United States, Great Britain, and Japan. Although China’s wars
with Western nations did greatly weaken its empire, it was the
Sino-Japanese war that solidified China’s waning power, as it
demonstrated China’s military inferiority in the face of not only
Western nations, which was expected, but also Eastern ones, which
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was devastating. China, a once-powerful kingdom and empire in its
own right, was humiliated by outsiders, surrendering its ability to
regulate trade at home and defend itself. Eventually, this decline
in China’s power at the hands of foreign influences would translate to an increased and unmatched desire for national autonomy,
which, when not attained at the Paris Peace Conference, would
spark a disappointment in the Chinese population that would
manifest itself in the May Fourth Movement demonstration.
Paris Peace Conference
When I was received at the White House, President Wilson in reply to
my question confirmed the sympathetic attitude of the U.S. towards
China’s desiderata. He was delighted that I was going to Paris and he
hoped that I would keep in touch with the U.S. delegation … he talked
at length about his hopes in the Conference and he reiterated what
he had already stated in his famous Fourteen Points; if the world was
to have permanent peace, he said there must be a new order.81
Chinese Diplomat Wellington Koo, 1918
When the Allied leaders met for the Paris Peace Conference on January 18, 1919, to determine the peace settlements that
would end the First Great War, they each came with a different
goal in mind; Italian Premier Vittorio Orlando wanted to increase
Italy’s territorial possessions, British Prime Minister David Lloyd
George hoped to reaffirm Britain’s naval dominance, French
Premier Georges Clemeneceau aimed to cripple Germany permanently and regain the highly-coveted Alsace-Lorraine region,
and American President Woodrow Wilson focused on securing the
passage of his “Fourteen Points,” a proposition that was intended
not only to resolve the major conflicts that spurred the First Great
War but also to establish a lasting peace and lay down the rules
for future global interactions.82
Although delegates of the “Big Four” powers­—the United
States, Great Britain, France, Italy—wielded the most influence
and power at the Conference, they were only a minority of the
delegate population.83 Representatives from countries such as
Japan, China, Brazil, Cuba, Belgium, Greece, Haiti, and Peru
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attended the Paris Peace Conference with the hopes of securing
greater rights and freedom for their nation. Beyond the members
of the official delegations were journalists, representatives of
non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and long retinues of
advisers, experts, and secretarial staff, all of whom were counted
among the thousands of people who streamed into Paris in 1918
for the Paris Peace Conference.84
Attendance, however, wasn’t always guaranteed. Fearing
that China would be excluded from the general peace conference,
Chinese diplomats initially considered proposing a separate conference that would deal specifically with the Far Eastern questions;
however, when it became clear that President Wilson would attend
and dominate the peace conference, Chinese hopes for successful negotiations increased considerably, and talks of a separate
conference evaporated.85 Instead, in preparation for the global
conference, Chinese diplomats drafted far-reaching goals that
referenced Wilson’s ideals of self-determination and its application
to China, including a proposal for the nullification of all unequal
treaties that reduced Chinese sovereignty, phasing out the system
of extraterritorial jurisdiction, and asking for a return of foreign
concessions (namely Chinese railroads, mines, and communication systems).86 These delegates brought such high-minded goals
and enthusiastic determination to see them implemented to the
Conference, hoping and expecting that with Wilson’s support,
they would be enacted, making the Chinese nation a more equal
participant in international society.87
Notable among the Conference attendees was the Chinese delegation in Paris, a large commission composed of five
plenipotentiary representatives and several dozen support staff,
all of whom enthusiastically arrived in Paris with the hopes of
gaining the right to self-determination. Leading the delegation
was Beijing’s foreign minister, M. Lou Tsengtsiang, a veteran diplomat who was fluent in French and fervently believed in China’s
need to modernize in order to join the family of nations.88 Other
delegates included V. K. Wellington Koo (the Chinese minister
to Washington), Chengting Thomas Wang (a close ally of the
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Kuomintang government), Sao-Ke Alfred Sze (the Chinese minister to London), and Suntchou Wei (the minister in Brussels),
all of whom had extensive experience in foreign diplomacy and
were well-versed in Western traditions and languages.89 They came
to the Paris Peace Conference confident in Wilson’s ability to
represent the interest of the Chinese people and of subjugated
territories around the world; Koo and Wang, who coauthored a
pamphlet entitled China and the League of Nations, described the
faith that the Chinese people had in Wilson’s ability to enact positive change in China, saying that “[Wilson’s] ideals and principles
have survived him from generation to generation, and had been
deeply inculcated on the minds of the Chinese people.”90
Chinese support and enthusiasm for the Conference was
enormous. Delegates at the international conference faced constant external pressures from Chinese civic groups to recognize
Chinese independence and its influence in the global arena, often
citing Wilson’s principles and advocating for their implementation
in China. Chinese activist groups produced a series of petitions and
pamphlets that explained China’s position and championed the
application of self-determination to it.91 At one point, delegates
produced and circulated a pamphlet that compiled hundreds
of notices and messages from Chinese organizations all over the
world, indicating the enormous amounts of attention that Chinese
citizens were paying to the Paris Peace Conference. Activist groups,
such as the Students of China and the League of Nations Society,
argued that “it is now axiomatic that the final peace treaty shall
be framed so as to give the world, as far as is humanly possible, a
just settlement.”92
Chinese aspirations, however, were bitterly disappointed
as the Paris Peace Conference progressed. From the outset, the
great powers decided that China would have a status as a minority power, being allowed to seat only two representatives at the
conference plenary and participating only in sessions that dealt
specifically with its nation.93 Although the issue was pragmatically
insignificant, as the big four powers would be making all of the
decisions anyway, it held symbolic importance as it indicated that
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China would remain inferior at a forum that they hoped would
recognize their equality on an international stage.94 Before any
substantive decision had been reached, China’s aspirations for the
Paris Peace Conference were already impeded, fueling discontent
among the Chinese populace who still held hopes of being treated
as an equal in the international arena.
Thus, Chinese hopes of a readjustment of China’s international status were put on hold for the time being. Instead, the
delegates focused on whether or not to reaffirm Chinese control
over the Shandong Province,95 a previously German-controlled
territory that was seized by Japan. In January 1915, Japan then
issued an ultimatum requiring China to recognize Japan as the
rightful heir of German rights in the area; due to coercive forces,
Chinese President Yuan Shikai accepted the terms.96 Nevertheless,
the Chinese populace still believed that the Shandong Province
rightfully belonged to China, as it held economic, strategic, and
symbolic significance.
Wellington Koo, one of the Chinese delegates, spoke
on behalf of China regarding the Shandong Province territorial issue. In fluent English, he argued that although China was
grateful for the services of the Japanese and Allied militaries in
freeing the Province from German control, it did not believe that
“selling the birthright of [its] countrymen”97 was the proper way
to express thanks. Koo’s logical presentation, in contrast with
Japanese delegate Makino Nobukai’s less eloquent one, symbolized to the Chinese that China would no longer submit to the
will of the great powers but would instead stand up for its own
demands.98 Believing that Great Britain would follow the United
States in adhering to the Fourteen Points and blocking Japanese
ambitions in China, the Chinese delegates as well as the populace
were convinced that China would eventually win acceptance into
the international forum as an equal member of the global community and the rightful owner of the Shandong Province.99 Their
hopes weren’t unfounded, since the U.S. delegation often helped
Chinese representatives draft their memoranda and petitions
to the peace conference.100 Secretary of State Lansing and East
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Asian Affairs expert Williams, for instance, reassured the Chinese
delegates of U.S. support, understanding the strategic importance
of maintaining friendly relations with China and stifling Japanese
imperialism. Paul S. Reinsch, the American minister in Beijing,
warned Wilson of this necessity, writing,
The eager attention which has been paid to your words, the trust and
confidence which the Chinese feel in your policies and aims, are evidence of a spontaneous desire to follow along the path of American
action and aspiration which you have made so clear to the world. If
China should be disappointed in her confidence at the present time,
the consequences of such disillusionment on her moral and political
development would be disastrous, and we, instead of looking across
the Pacific towards a Chinese Nation sympathetic to our ideals would
be confronted with a vast materialistic military organization under
ruthless control.101
Williams, one of Wilson’s major experts on Far Eastern relations,
warned that the United States was bound both morally and legally
to support China in its struggle against Japan; Japan’s claim for
the Shandong concessions, he said, held no merit as they were
based upon coercion and conquest. China had been “encouraged
by [U.S.] attitude”102 to expect the United States’ support in this
issue, and “to disappoint her [would] mean irreparable injury to
our good name in the Far East and [would instill] in the hearts of
the Chinese a burning sense of wrong endured which will make
impossible any lasting peace.”103
In principle, Wilson agreed with Williams and the Chinese
delegates’ arguments, believing that Shandong rightfully belonged
to the Chinese nation. However, after rejecting the equality clause
that Japan had proposed in the League of Nations charter, Wilson
feared that a further clash with Japan over the Shandong question
would cause unnecessary tension with Japan and influence it to
withdraw from the Conference.104 Moreover, the Beijing government had already signed secret wartime agreements with Japan
recognizing Japanese claims to the Province, making Chinese calls
for independence in that area more difficult to grant.105 Nevertheless, the Chinese delegates argued that concessions made under
coercion were illegitimate, especially if such concessions under-
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mined Chinese culture and sovereignty.106 Colonel Edward House,
one of Wilson’s advisers, advised Wilson to relent on the Shandong
issue and cede to Japanese demands, knowing that China was the
weaker power in the diplomatic struggle and therefore harbored
interests that were more easily ignored by the major powers.107
After discussing the question for the last time on April 30,
the Big Three (by this time, Italy had left the Conference) agreed
to accept the Japanese claim for the former German concessions
in Shandong in return for a verbal agreement that Japan would
restore these territories to China at some point in the future.108
This announcement came as a stunning blow to the Chinese,
who had long expected Wilson and his principles to come to
their side on the Shandong issue and were so confident in the
power of the Fourteen Points to back up their hopes that they
hadn’t expected international politics to get in the way. American diplomats were also stunned. Williams wrote that “the worst
possible has happened.”109 He said that the decision violated the
fundamental principles that the United States had come to Paris
to stand for, including those of antimilitarism, self-determination,
and no annexations.110 Williams feared that as a consequence of
Wilson’s failure to uphold such principles, U.S. prestige in Paris,
which had been at an all-time high, would have fallen to an alltime low.111 Reinsch wrote that people and officials in China were
“deeply depressed” and felt “utterly helpless”112 by the rejection of
Chinese claim towards the Shandong Province, especially given
their complete faith in Woodrow Wilson and his Fourteen Points,
whose advocacy for self-determination, they believed, would grant
Chinese full autonomy over all national territory.113
Chinese disappointment continued for the next few days.
Reinsch further described the discontent in China, writing that
the decision caused “a revulsion of feeling against America” not
because it was more to blame than the other nations, but because
“the Chinese had entertained a deeper belief in [U.S.] power,
influence, and loyalty to principle, than in those of any of the
other major powers at the Conference.”114
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Students in Beijing who had idolized Wilson only six
months previously now wrote that,
When the news of the Paris Peace Conference finally reached us
we were greatly shocked. We at once awoke to the fact that foreign
nations were still selfish and militaristic and that they were all great
liars. I remember that in the evening of May 2nd [only two days before
the mass student demonstration] very few of us slept. We came to the
conclusion that…we could no longer depend upon the principles of
any so-called great leader like Woodrow Wilson…we couldn’t help
feel that we must struggle!115
Chinese students felt that the failure of Woodrow Wilson to
grant China its right to the Shandong Province violated the selfdetermination principles that Wilson himself had embodied in
his Fourteen Points. Previously, China had been treated primarily as an imperial cash cow; events such as the Open Door Note,
the Boxer Rebellion, and the Sino-Japanese War only showed the
extent to which this was true. Therefore, to the Chinese people,
who had resented this treatment as a violation of sovereignty,
looked upon the Paris Peace Conference and Wilson’s presence
there as a beacon of light that would free their nation from the
control of imperialistic influences. When such a beacon would be
extinguished, however, despite Wilson’s continuous advocacy for
the self-determination principle, the Chinese people’s disappointment would be catastrophic. Historian Erez Manela of Harvard
University summarized the Chinese sentiment well, writing that
“[The Chinese in 1919] had envisioned the coming of a new era
of self-determination and equality in international relations, and
though their faith in Wilson crumbled when he failed to apply
his principles to China, the experience left its mark.”116 In fact,
Dr. Sun Yat-sen, a leader of Chinese nationalism, helped define
that “mark,” writing that,
Wilson’s proposals … stirred [the smaller nations] with a great, new
consciousness; [when] they saw how completely they had been deceived by the Great Powers’ advocacy of self determination, … [they]
began independently and separately to carry out the principle of the
‘self determination of peoples.’117
When the Chinese populace saw that they could no longer rely
on the major powers and Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points to
218
Caroline W. Tan
grant them the autonomy and independence that they desired,
they chose to carry out the essence of self-determination on their
own. By staging the May Fourth protest, therefore, the Chinese students demonstrated their intent on achieving self-determination,
continuing forth with the way they perceived would be the most
effective to independently carry out such a concept.
Conclusion
“When President Wilson … voiced the sentiment of all mankind in
his address to Congress, embodying the famous fourteen principles
… power politics was adjourned, for justice, justice that knew not the
weak nor the strong was to be the guiding principle in international
relations …People hitherto submerged under the domination and
oppression of an alien power were promised the right to self-determination. [People] were inspired … to believe that, at least – The
New Order Cometh.
The New Order does not come to China, however. The principles
enunciated are admittedly sound, but up to the present all that China
has received is the vibration of the sound but not the application of
the principles.”118
Chinese Patriotic Committee, 1919
The May Fourth demonstration, the pinnacle event in the
overarching May Fourth Movement, can thus be traced back to
the Wilson’s Fourteen Points. The goals in the Fourteen Points
set Chinese goals undeniably high in terms of achieving selfdetermination; when such goals would fail to be achieved, the
agonizing disappointment that followed would eventually influence
Chinese students and intellectuals to organize a mass movement
in order to publicize their disappointment and anger to the world.
China’s anger was only fueled by its status as a colonized nation
and treatment as a minority country.
While the link between the Shandong decision and the
May Fourth Movement has often been examined, few historians
have analyzed the influence of Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points
on the historic event, something that, given the foreign policy surrounding China prior to 1919 as well as the events that occurred
THE CONCORD REVIEW
219
at the Paris Peace Conference, undoubtedly played an important
role in prompting the eventual May Fourth student demonstration.
The effects of such a movement were momentous; the event
in Tiananmen Square on May 4th, 1919, initiated a widespread
cultural movement that spread to other cities, garnering support
from both the working class as well as the intellectual population
and culminating in a general strike in Shanghai that devastated
the Chinese economy.119 Not only did the May Fourth Movement
hold significant cultural importance during its time, but it also set
an important precedent that, 80 years later, would be repeated in
the historic Tiananmen Square Protests of 1989, when students
and intellectuals would again converge in Tiananmen Square to
protest the Communist regime in China. Although the particular
circumstances of the protest may have differed from those in 1919,
the concept of mass demonstration set by the May Fourth Movement demonstrates its influence not only in international relations,
but also in the spirit of democracy and individual autonomy that
Woodrow Wilson’s Fourteen Points aimed to uphold.
220
Caroline W. Tan
Joseph T. Chen, “The May Fourth Movement Redefined,”
Modern Asian Studies, 4 no. 1 (1970) pp. 63-81
2
Pao Tsun-p’eng, chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung shih,
Taipei, 1954, p.119
3
Jeffrey S. Wasserstrom, “Chinese Students and AntiJapanese Protests, Past and Present,” World Policy Journal, 22
no. 2
4
Address at Mount Vernon, 4 July 1918, PWW, 48: pp. 516517
5
Thomas A. Bailey, Lizabeth Cohen, and David M.
Kennedy, The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 1
no. 12 (Lexington: Heath and Company, 1971) p. 690
6
Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, Yale University
Avalon Project, http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/
wilson14.asp (February 27, 2009) [Original Source: President
Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1918]
7
Wilson, Fourteen Points
8
Ibid.
9
Ibid.
10
Ibid.
11
Ibid.
12
Ibid.
13
Woodrow Wilson, Wilson’s War Message to Congress, BYU
Library, http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/Wilson%27s_War_
Message_to_Congress (February 29, 2009). [Original Source:
President Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1917]
14
Erez Manela, The Wilsonian Moment (New York: Oxford
University Press, 2007) p. 39
15
Ibid., p. 24
16
Ibid., p. 24
17
Ibid., p. 24
18
Ibid., p. 24
19
Ibid., p. 24
20
John A. Garraty, Woodrow Wilson (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966) p. 3
21
Manela, p. 26
22
Ibid., p. 26
23
Ibid., p. 99
24
Quoted in Diana Preston, The Boxer Rebellion, (New
York: Walker Publishing Inc., 2000)
25
John Hay, “The First ‘Open Door Note,’” Brigham Young
University Library, http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/the_
First_‘Open_Door_Note’ (March 3, 2009) [Original Source:
1
THE CONCORD REVIEW
John Hay to Andrew D. White, Papers relating to the Foreign
Relations of the United States, 2899, pp. 129-130]
26
Ssuyu Teng and John Fairbank, China’s response to the
West (Cambridge MA: Harvard University Press, 1954) repr. in
Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World History, Volume II,
(New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers, 1995) pp. 266-69
27
Ibid., p. 267
28
Manela, p. 100
29
Ibid., p. 100
30
George Creel, as quoted in Manela, p. 51
31
Chow Tse-tung, Research Guide to the May Fourth
Movement (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 1963) p. 16
32
Manela, p. 25
33
Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 19181920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery (Oxford: St.
Anthony’s/Macmillan, 1911) pp. 15-38
34
Manela, p. 101
35
Ibid., p. 101
36
Ibid., p. 101
37
Ibid., p. 102
38
Ibid., p. 102
39
Ibid., p. 99
40
Hollington K. Tong, “What Can President Wilson do for
China?” Millard’s Review (November 1918) p. 431
41
Guandong is also known as Canton.
42
R. Hooker, (1999, July 14), Retrieved January 9, 2010
43
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
44
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
45
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
46
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
47
Letter, Tang and Fairbank
48
R. Hooker, (1999, July 14)
49
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
50
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
51
A junk is a Chinese sailboat design developed during the
Han Dynasty that is still in use today.
52
R. Hooker, (1999, July 14)
53
Treaty of Nanjing, http://www.international.ucla/edu/
asia/article.asp?parentid=18421
54
Treaties between China and Foreign State, Second
Edition (Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of
Customs, 1917) vol. 2: pp. 590-596
55
Columbia University Asia for Educators. http://afe.easia.
columbia.edu/special/china_1750_mayfourth.htm
221
222
Caroline W. Tan
R. Hooker, (1999, July 14)
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
58
Ibid., (1999, July 14)
59
Preston, p. 13
60
Ibid., p. 13
61
Ibid., p. xix
62
Marius B. Jansen, the Making of Modern Japan
(Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002), p. 335
63
Burma is now known as Myanmar.
64
Annan is now known as Vietnam.
65
Preston, p. 13
66
Ibid., p. 15
67
Ibid., p. 13
68
Ibid., p. 13
69
Ibid., p. 13
70
Ibid., p. 13
71
Formosa is now known as Taiwan.
72
Treaties between China and Foreign States, Second
Edition (Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of
Customs, 1917) vol. 2: pp. 590-596
73
Preston, p. 13
74
Ibid., p. 15
75
Ibid., p. 13
76
Ibid., p. 13
77
Bailey, p. 690
78
M.P. Shiel, The Yellow Danger (London: Grant Richards,
1898) p. 29
79
Shiel, p. 29
80
Bailey, p. 690
81
Wellington Koo, as quoted in Manela, p. 177
82
Bailey, p. 691
83
U.S. Department of State http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/
time/wwi/89875.htm
84
Manela, p. 59
85
Ibid., p. 59
86
Ibid., p. 112
87
Ibid., p. 112
88
Ibid., p. 113
89
Ibid., p. 113
90
V.K. Wellington Koo and Cheng-ting T. Wang, China and
the League of Nations (London: Allen & Unwin, 1919)
91
Manela, p. 105
92
Enclosed in Jordan to Curzon, 7 May 1919, NAUK, FO
608/210, fol. pp. 443-444
56
57
THE CONCORD REVIEW
223
Manela, p. 115
Ibid., p. 115
95
The Shandong Province is also known as the Shantung
Province.
96
F. Gilbert Chan, “The American Revolution and the
Rise of Afro-Asian Nationalism, with Special Reference to
Sun Yat-Sen and the Chinese Experience,” Asian Profile 10:3
(1982) pp. 209-219; Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special
Relationship: the United States and China to 1914 (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983) pp. 258-266
97
Manela, p. 179
98
Ibid., p. 179
99
Ibid. p. 180
100
Ibid., p. 179
101
Ibid., pp. 111-112
102
Hans Schmidt, “Democracy for China: American
Propaganda and the May Fourth Movement,” Diplomatic
History 22 (Winter 1998) pp. 11-12
103
Ibid., p. 11
104
Manela, p. 181
105
Ibid., p. 182
106
Ibid., p. 182
107
House to Wilson, 29 April 1919, PWW, 58: pp. 228-229.
108
Jonathan D. Spence, The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The
Chinese and Their Revolution 1895-1890 (New York: Viking)
p. 198
109
Manela, p. 183
110
Ibid., p. 183
111
Chan, p. 209
112
Manela, p. 186
113
Ibid., p. 186
114
Schmidt, p. 11
115
Zhenchang Tang, Cai Yuanpei Zhuan [The Biography of
Cai Yuanpei] (Shangha renmin chubanshe, 1985) p. 159
116
Manela, p. 216
117
Shibao, January 11, 1918
118
Chinese Patriotic Committee in New York City, Might or
Right? The Fourteen Points and the Disposition of Kiao-Chau
(May 1919)
119
Wasserstrom, par. 22 Joseph T. Chen, “The May Fourth
Movement Redefined,” Modern Asian Studies, 4 no. 1 (1970)
pp. 63-81, Pao Tsun-p’eng, chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung
shih, Taipei, 1954, p.119 Wasserstrom, Jeffrey S, “Chinese
93
94
224
Caroline W. Tan
Students and Anti-Japanese Protests, Past and Present,” World
Policy Journal, 22 no.
Bibliography
Address at Mount Vernon, 4 July 1918, PWW, 48: 516-517
Bailey, Thomas A., Lizabeth Cohen, and David M. Kennedy,
The American Pageant: A History of the Republic, 1 no. 12,
Lexington: Heath and Company, 1971, p. 690
Chan, F. Gilbert, “The American Revolution and the Rise
of Afro-Asian Nationalism, with Special Reference to Sun
Yat-Sen and the Chinese Experience,” Asian Profile 10:3
(1982) pp. 209-219; Michael H. Hunt, The Making of a Special
Relationship: the United States and China to 1914 New York:
Columbia University Press, 1983, pp. 258-266
Chinese Patriotic Committee in New York City, Might or
Right? The Fourteen Points and the Disposition of Kiao-Chau
(May 1919)
Columbia University Asia for Educators, http://afe.easia.
columbia.edu/special/china_1750_mayfourth.htm
Creel, “How We Advertised America,” 362-363; Jerry Israel,
Progressivism and the Open Door: America and China, 19051921, Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania: University of Pittsburgh Press,
1971, pp. 157-160
Enclosed in Jordan to Curzon, 7 May 1919, NAUK, FO
608/210, fol. pp. 443-444
Garraty, John A., Woodrow Wilson, New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1966, pp. 3-5
Hay, John, The First ‘Open Door Note,’ BYU Library,
http://www.lib.byu.edu/index.php/the_First_‘Open_Door_
Note’ (March 3, 2009). [Original Source: John Hay to Andrew
D. White, Papers relating to the Foreign Relations of the
United States, 2899, pp. 129-130]
Hooker, R., (1999, July 14), Retrieved January 9, 2010
House to Wilson, 29 April 1919, PWW, 58: pp. 228-229
Jansen, Marius B., The Making of Modern Japan,
Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002
Koo, V.K. Wellington, and Cheng-ting T. Wang, China and
the League of Nations, London: Allen & Unwin, 1919
Manela, Erez, The Wilsonian Moment. 1st ed. New York:
Oxford University Press, 2009
McCormick, John, Comparative Politics in Transition,
Belmont, California: Thomson Higher Education, 2007
THE CONCORD REVIEW
225
Pao Tsun-p’eng, Chung-kuo ch’ing-nien yun-tung shih,
Taipei, 1954, p. 119
Preston, Diana, The Boxer Rebellion, New York: Walker
Publishing, Inc., 2000
Schmidt, Hans, “Democracy for China: American
Propaganda and the May Fourth Movement,” Diplomatic
History 22, Winter 1998: pp. 11-12
Shibao, January 11, 1918
Shiel, M. P., The Yellow Danger, London: Grant Richards,
1898.
Spence, Jonathan D., The Gate of Heavenly Peace: The
Chinese and Their Revolution, 1895-1890 (New York: Viking,
p. 198)
Teng Ssuyu and John Fairbank, China’s response to the
West, (Cambridge Massachusetts: Harvard University Press,
1954) repr. In Mark A. Kishlansky, ed., Sources of World
History, Volume II, New York: HarperCollins CollegePublishers,
1995, pp. 266-669
Tang Zhenchang, Cai Yuanpei Zhuan [The Biography of
Cai Yuanpei] Shanghai: Shanghai renmin chubanshe, 1985,
p. 159
Tong, Hollington K., “What Can President Wilson do for
China?” Millard’s Review, November 16, 1918, pp. 431-434
Treaties between China and Foreign States, Second Edition
Shanghai: by order of the Inspector General of Customs, 1917,
vol. 2: pp. 590-596
Treaty of Nanjing, http://www.international.ucla.edu/asia/
article.asp?parentid=18421
Tse-tung, Chow, Research Guide to the May Fourth
Movement, Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University
Press, 1963
U.S. Department of State, http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/
time/wwi/89875.htm
Wasserstrom, Jeffrey S., “Chinese Students and AntiJapanese Protests, Past and Present,” World Policy Journal
22.2: 21 pars. 27 February 2009 <http://www.worldpolicy.org/
journal/articles/wpj05-2/wasserstrom.html>
Woodrow Wilson, Fourteen Points, Yale University Avalon
Project, http://www.avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/
wilson14.asp (February 27, 2009) [Original Source: President
Woodrow Wilson, U.S. Congress, 1918]
Zhang Yongjin, China in the International System, 19181920: The Middle Kingdom at the Periphery Oxford: St.
Anthony’s/Macmillan, 1911, pp. 15-38
226
Copernicus
Caroline
W. Tan
William Manchester, A World Lit Only By Fire
New York: Little, Brown, 1993, pp. 89-90
Among the masses, for example, it continued to be an article of faith that
the world was an immovable disk around which the sun revolved, and that the rest
of the cosmos comprised heaven, which lay dreamily above the skies, inhabited by
cherubs, and hell, flaming deep beneath the European soil. Everyone believed, indeed
knew, that.
Everyone, that is, except Mikolj Kopernik, a Polish physician and astronomer,
whose name had been Latinized, as was the custom, to Nicolas Copernicus. After years
of observing the skies and consulting mathematical tables which he had copied at the
University of Kraków, Copernicus reached the conclusion—which at first seemed
absurd, even to him—that the earth was actually moving. In 1514 he showed friends
a short manuscript, De hypothesibus motuum coelestium a se constitutis commentariolus
(Little Commentary), challenging the ancient Ptolemaic assumptions, and this was
followed by the fuller De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (On the Revolutions of the
Celestial Orbs), in which he concluded that the earth, far from being at the center of
the universe, merely rotated on its own axis and orbited around a stationary sun once
a year...the astronomer’s work was not widely circulated until after his death, and his
peers were divided into those who laughed at him and those who denounced him.
The offended included some of the brightest and most independent men
on the Continent. Martin Luther wrote: “People give ear to an upstart astrologer
who strove to show that the earth revolves, not the heavens or the firmament, the sun
and the moon...This fool wishes to reverse the entire scheme of astrology; but sacred
Scripture tells us that Joshua commanded the sun to stand still, not the earth.” John
Calvin quoted the Ninety-third Psalm, “The world also is stabilized, that it cannot be
moved,” and asked, “Who will venture to place the authority of Copernicus above
that of the Holy Spirit?”
When Copernicus’s chief protégé tried to get his mentor’s paper printed
in Nuremberg, Luther used his influence to suppress it. According to (Will) Durant,
even Andreas Osiander of Nuremberg, who finally agreed to assist with its publication,
insisted on an introduction explaining that the concept of a solar system was being
presented solely as a hypothesis, useful for the computation of the movements of
heavenly bodies. As long as it was so represented, Rome remained mute, but when
the philosopher Giordano Bruno published his Italian dialogues, declaring a rotating, orbiting earth to be an unassailable fact—carrying his astronomical speculations
for beyond those of Copernicus—the Roman Inquisition brought him to trial. He
was convicted of being the worst kind of heretic, a pantheist who held that God was
immanent in creation, rather than the external creator. Then they burned him at
the stake. Catholics were forbidden to read Copernicus’s De revolutionibus until the
deletion of the nine sentences, which had asserted it to be more than a theory. The
ban was not lifted until 1828.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
227
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
BREAKING THE STALEMATE:
THE DEVELOPMENT OF THE TANK
Cody E. Nager
T
he year was 1915 and the situation was critical. World
War One was at a stalemate, a useless back and forth over just a
few hundred yards of terrain. Barbed wire, artillery-pockmarked
wastelands, machine guns and trenches caused the war to devolve
into a useless bloodbath. The development of the tank broke the
deadlock and restored movement to the battlefield. The tank,
which was a long time in development, represented the peak of
mobility, firepower, and armor. Through this combination, the
tank was able to dominate the battlefield and change the course
of the war.
“It is impossible to say that this or that man invented the
1
tank.” These were the words of Winston Churchill, later the British Prime Minister, but at the time the First Lord of the Admiralty.
He was speaking to the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors
which was established in 1919 to determine the legal inventor of
the tank. Churchill’s observation captures the whole history of
armored warfare which stretches back to the legions of Rome. The
tank represented the application of the industrial age technology
to the race for increased range of movement, weapons capabilities
Cody E. Nager is a Junior at North Salem High School, in North Salem,
New York, where he wrote this paper for Mr. Christopher Regan’s Military
History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
228
Cody E. Nager
and durability. The horse cavalry, introduced as early as 1400 BC
by the Mesopotamians, was rendered obsolete.
At their roots, there are two approaches to armor. One is
based in defense. This consisted of a metal or wood sheet used
to deflect incoming attacks. The prime example is the Roman
legion and the “Testudo” or tortoise formation which involved
each soldier on the outside holding his shield to one of the sides
and the inner legionaries holding their shields above their head
to form a shell. 2
Speed was the second approach to armor, which consisted
of dodging incoming attacks or moving too fast to be targeted.
This method was exemplified in early decades of the 13th century
by the Mongol horse archers whose fast movement with light armor allowed them to survive.3 As early as 1400 BC, the peoples of
Mesopotamia had used cavalry in battle.4 Cavalry had the mobility
to outmaneuver any opposing forces on the battlefield. They also
had the firepower necessary to break enemy lines.
By the 19th century, warfare advances had caused a reduction in the cavalry’s value. The introduction of the machine gun,
barbed wire and trenches confirmed how useless cavalry had
become. The approach towards cavalry had not changed much
since its introduction, while infantrymen adapted and were able
to kill a cavalryman more easily. The tank’s beginnings sprang
from soldiers’ needs for different methods from the old ways of
the horsemen.
The first recognized use of a tank-like vehicle in combat
was during the Hussite Rebellion of 1419. Rebel leader Jan Ziska
took wagons with cannons in them and hooked them together to
form a movable fighting fort. Jan and his men would wait in the
fort until the enemy was tired and then sally forth and destroy
them.5 The only problem with the wagons was, “Offensive tactics
were inconceivable with the heavy horse-drawn wagons and by its
very nature the wagon-laager was compelled to adhere to defensive
tactics.”6
The first drawing of a tank is attributed to Italian genius
Leonardo da Vinci in 1487. According to da Vinci, “I am build-
THE CONCORD REVIEW
229
ing secure and covered chariots which are invulnerable, and
when they advance with their guns into the midst of the foe even
the largest of enemy masses must retreat, and behind them the
infantry can follow in safety and without opposition.”7 Da Vinci’s
tank was a conical wooden top placed on a set of four wheels.
Leonardo’s tank had a flip-up wooden shield to cover the gun
port. It was supposed to carry one cannon. Unfortunately, like
many of Leonardo’s ideas, it was never built. 8
These early attempts at mobile armor all had one aspect
in common that caused them to fail. The armor used horses as
their power sources and these animals were unable to push the
machines from behind a protective barrier. Instead, the horses were
forced to pull in the full line of fire of the enemy.9 The Industrial
Revolution, with its creation of mobile mechanical engines, and
powerful mounted weapons, sparked the development of a useful
tank.
In 1899, a Polish banker named I.S. Bloch stated that any
future war between European powers would be a stalemate. He
published a book entitled The Future of War in which he claimed
that the incredible power of two industrial age inventions, barbed
wire and the machine gun, rendered the offensive ineffective. He
predicted that any war would last far longer than it was expected
to and lead to thousands of casualties.10 A New York Times article
published in 1916, was subtitled, “Ivan S. Bloch, who wrote 17
years ago, foresaw ‘stalemate’ like that on the Western Front today,
and made many more excellent guesses.” 11 Bloch’s book was not
widely known until the British science fiction writer, H. G. Wells,
read it and incorporated it into his own work.
Bloch’s book led H.G. Wells to publish a short story in
1903 in Strand magazine entitled, “The Land Ironclads.” In this
story, two young British soldiers were sitting in a trench across
from the enemy until a “land ironclad” attacks. Wells describes
the ironclad as, “It might have been from eighty to a hundred feet
long­—it was about two hundred and fifty yards away—its vertical
side was about ten feet high or so, smooth for that height, and
then with a complex patterning under the eaves of its turtle cover.
230
Cody E. Nager
This patterning was a close interlacing of portholes, rifle barrels,
and telescope tubes.” 12 Wells’ story offers a prophetic glimpse of
World War One. Just 11 years later, both trench warfare and British tanks would be a reality.
In 1905, the Russians and Japanese fought the RussoJapanese War, which was arguably the first fully modern war and
featured many similarities to the upcoming World War One.
Trench warfare, the use of machine guns and use of barbed wire
were commonplace. One Russian General complained that the
lack of barbed wire would doom Port Arthur.13 Indeed, the Japanese ended up victorious. The war was of minor interest to many
European powers who were too embroiled in their own problems
closer to home. One of the more dedicated followers of this
conflict was a Colonel Ernest Swinton, who the British Inventors
Commission would later identify as one of the main creators of
the tank. Swinton was tasked with preparing the official history
of the Russo-Japanese War for the War Office in London. He
found this assignment rewarding, “That campaign furnished two
outstanding lessons in the tactical and technical side of warfare.
The first was the possibility of employing very heavy ordinance in
both siege and field operations…The second was the immense
power in defense of the machine gun.”14
From his study, Swinton clearly placed himself in the
camp that said that the cavalry was obsolete. His close friend,
Sir Arthur Conan Doyle, more widely known as the creator of
Sherlock Holmes, stated the position quite well, “In the opinion
of many, the tendency of the future will be to convert the whole
force [cavalry] into mounted infantry…a little training…would
give us a formidable force of twenty thousand men who would do
all that our cavalry does and more beside.”15 However, convincing
the higher level military officials of this was going to be a difficult
task. In 1904, the army council debated whether to designate the
rifle as the cavalry’s primary weapon. They decided to keep the
sword as the primary weapon because, “All spirit and élan would
go with this new departure, and if engaged in a European war
such an organization might be fatal.”16
THE CONCORD REVIEW
231
Swinton had served during 1900 in South Africa during
the Second Anglo-Boer War. While there, he had the opportunity to familiarize himself with the machine gun by watching its
use during a Boer assault on June 13, 1900 against British forces
holding a railway bridge.17 Indeed, in 1908, he was asked to edit
a book, by a Captain Applin of the 14th Hussars, entitled Machine
Gun Tactics, “Owing to the pressure of other work I was unable
to do this, but I had the privilege of reading what an expert with
practical experience and vision had to say on the subject and it
confirmed my own non-expert views.”18 Swinton had also read H.
G. Wells story “The Ironclads.” 19
In 1912, Lancelot de Mole, an Australian army Colonel,
submitted designs for a tracked armored vehicle with mounted
machine guns to the War Office in London. De Mole had gotten
the idea when he was working on mining projects in the outback
of Western Australia.20 The War Office took his designs and filed
them away with all the other inventions that they had received.
Later in 1912, the only company in Europe that had any experience building tracked machines, Richard Hornsby & Sons of
Grantham, Lincolnshire, sold out their patents and trademarks
to the Holt Tractor Company, then based in Stockton, California.
The Holt Company eventually became the world leader in tracked
equipment. It moved its headquarters to Peoria, Illinois, and later
changed its name to the Caterpillar Tractor Company.21
In 1913, the War Office sent a rejection note to de Mole
saying that his ideas were not practical.22 Indeed, the War Office
did such a good job losing Mr. de Mole’s proposal that Swinton
said in his memoir, “I make no mention of Mr. L.E. de Mole…I
knew nothing [of de Mole’s proposal] at the time I am describing
nor, indeed, till the facts were revealed before the Royal Commission on Awards to Inventors, which sat in November, 1919.”23
In 1914, Swinton received a letter from a Mr. Hugh Marriott,
a South African mining engineer. Mr. Marriott needed a machine
to haul supplies to remote mining camps. After a long search, Mr.
Marriott chose a Holt Caterpillar Tractor which he described in
his letter. A Holt Caterpillar Tractor was a tracked vehicle of about
232
Cody E. Nager
two tons and 70 horsepower. Mr. Marriott thought that the Holt
Caterpillar Tractor could be of some use to the military. Swinton
brought the Holt Caterpillar Tractor idea to the Committee on
Imperial Defense, the War Office, and the government representative on the board of the Anglo-Persian oil company.24 Mr.
Marriott’s letter was also forgotten.
As Mr. de Mole was proposing his tank design in Britain,
a German man named Herr Goebel was trying to do the same in
Germany. He attempted to give a demonstration of his war machine
in 1914, after 3 years of work. Unfortunately, at a demonstration
in Berlin, his tank stalled on the first obstacle and did not restart.
He then disappeared from Germany in shame.25
On June 28, 1914, Archduke Franz-Ferdinand of the
Austro-Hungarian Empire was shot in the streets of Sarajevo. This
assassination pulled a complex web of alliances into effect and propelled all of Europe into World War One. The British and French
managed to stop the German advance. The German army dug in
along what became known as the Western Front. Thus began the
stalemate predicted by Bloch and the root of the problem that
precipitated the creation of modern armored warfare.
Most of the fighting on the Western Front took place in
between the two opposing trenches. This area was referred to
as “No Man’s Land,” a term coined by Colonel Swinton. This
wasteland was ripped up from artillery bombardments and strung
with a barbed wire hedge. This hedge slowed the infantrymen’s
movement near the trench allowing more time for the machine
guns to kill them. Massive artillery barrages did nothing against
the barbed wire because the shells simply caused the wire to sway.
The battlefield had become impassable to most wheeled vehicles
and horses.26 The combatants needed something to drive across
the broken ground and crush the barbed wire.
This problem led to many creative and improbable solutions. Winston Churchill, First Lord of the Admiralty and a
former cavalryman from the 1898 Sudan Battle of Omdurman,
was a proponent of bullet-proof shields on wheels pushed by the
troops hiding behind it.27 One patriotic British citizen suggested
THE CONCORD REVIEW
233
that the British army use high powered water jets to smash the
enemies’ trench. The idea was put into a trial run in Scotland
and Prime Minster Henry Asquith received a full report the next
morning. The idea was rejected in a report written by Colonel
Swinton because the long lengths of pipe that were required were
vulnerable to artillery fire and the 3,000 horsepower engines were
too heavy.28
Since Swinton had written a short story called The Defense
of Duffer’s Drift, he was sent in 1914 over to France to serve as official war correspondent or “Eyewitness.” While Swinton was in
France, he saw the uselessness of the current tactics. Machine
guns combined with barbed wire made an almost unstoppable
pair. “Our efforts to advance were in most cases frustrated by
machine guns, frequently in combination with an obstacle hastily
made from rabbit wire or fencing.”29 On October 19, 1914, the
idea came to him of armoring a caterpillar tractor to crush the
barbed wire and drive over the trenches. Or as he put it in his
memoir, “…my vague idea of an armored vehicle had definitely
crystallized in the form of a power-driven, bullet-proof, armed engine capable of destroying machine guns, of crossing country and
trenches.”30 On October 20th, Swinton met with Captain Maurice
Hankey, the Assistant Secretary for the Committee on Imperial
Defense. Swinton described his idea for a machine gun destroyer
and received instructions to talk to British General Headquarters
(GHQ) in France.
In November of 1914, wing commander Boothby of the
Royal Naval Air Service (RNAS) wrote a letter concerning tracked
vehicles to London. The letter described the inherent benefits
of tracks for crossing broken ground and pulling heavy loads.
Although Boothby was writing in the context of using tracked
vehicles as artillery haulers, the letter bore much influence and
prompted the War office to order four Holt Tractors.31
On Christmas day, 1914 Captain Hankey wrote a memorandum that summarized conditions on the Western Front and the
necessary action needed to overcome them. He then sent copies
to British Prime Minister Herbert Asquith and Lord Kitchener,
Secretary of State for War.32
234
Cody E. Nager
At GHQ in France, Swinton learned that the War Office had
taken delivery of four caterpillar tractors for transport purposes.
On January 2, 1915, Swinton returned to England only to find out
that Lord Kitchener, Secretary of State for War, had rejected his
machine gun destroyer proposal. So Swinton went to the head of
the Royal Engineers, General Scott-Moncrieff and described his
idea to him. General Scott-Moncrieff liked the idea and promised
to consider it. 33 On January 9, 1915 Swinton left for France again.
In January of 1915, Winston Churchill received a copy of
Captain Hankey’s memo to Prime Minister Asquith. Churchill
found the idea interesting and decided to act on it. On January
5th, Churchill wrote a letter to the Prime Minster Asquith stating,
“It would be quite easy in a short time to fit up a number of steam
tractors with small armored shelters, in which men and machine
guns could be placed, which would be bullet proof.”34 In February
of 1915, Churchill, under the auspices of the Royal Navy, started
the political maneuvers necessary to get the tank project up and
running. On February 16th, he inspected a track design for the
machine. On February 20th, Churchill set up the Landships Committee to study the usefulness of the proposed plan of the tank. 35
The Landships Committee was set up to study and design
vehicles to crush barbed wire and assault enemy trenches. Their
leader was Mr. Eustace Tennyson d’Eyncourt, director of naval
construction. The engineering know-how was provided by Colonel
Rookes Evelyn Bell Crompton and Lieutenant Walter Wilson. The
rest of the committee were Royal Naval Air Service officers who
had some sort of special experience with armored cars, engines,
or tracks.
The committee set to work on modifying the American
Killen-Strait tractor with a naval net cutter on its front and a
demonstration was given on June 30, 1915. The point of the demonstration was to justify the money being spent by the Landships
Committee. Churchill had given the committee £70,000 worth
of financing without informing the Board of the Admiralty, the
War Office, the Department of the Master General of Ordinance,
or the Treasury.36 Lord Kitchener, David Lloyd George (later a
THE CONCORD REVIEW
235
British Prime Minister but at the time Director of the Ministry
of Munitions), Winston Churchill and other officials were all invited. The tractor sheared through the barbed wire but was not
effective at crossing trenches. David Lloyd George who attended
the demonstration, was impressed with the tractor but was, “…
surprised to find that these experiments were being conducted by
naval men, mostly temporary officers and ratings of the armoured
car division of the Royal Naval Air Force.”37 The time and money
put into changing the American tractor was a disappointment
because although it disabled the barbed wire, it was not able to
cross trenches.
So, the committee fired Col. Crompton and replaced him
with a civilian engineer from William Fosters & Co named William Tritton. Mr. Tritton ordered two specially extended tracks to
be built by the American firm of Bullock Co. which was based in
Chicago. When the tracks arrived in early August, the committee
designed and built a hasty prototype named Number One Lincoln Machine. When the vehicle was tested at Cross-o-Cliffe Hill
in Lincoln, the tracks hung off the rims when passing over the
trench. So Tritton and Wilson checked into the White Hart Hotel
in London and designed a new track system.38 The new system
included tracks that hooked into grooves on the wheels so that
they would stay on when crossing over a trench. Many considered
this new system to be the defining development of the tank’s creation. Without the new tracks, the tank would have been next to
useless.39 The Number One Lincoln Machine equipped with the
modified tracks was ready to be tested again on November 30th.
Nicknamed “Little Willie,” this design worked.
The word “Landship” was thought to be too descriptive of
the purpose of the committee, so they cast about for a new name.
One member of the committee suggested “water carrier” because
of the proposed vehicle’s similarity to one. Even better, this implied
that the invention had to deal with the Mesopotamian theater of
the war and was therefore of little consequence to the Germans.
“Water carrier” was rejected because the committee didn’t want
to be known as the “Water Carrier Committee.” The committee
236
Cody E. Nager
finally decided on the non-descript word “tank,” after finding all
possible synonyms for water carrier.40 The first official report using
the new name was written on December 24, 1915.
The War Office had known of the existence of the Landships Committee since May, 1915, but had considered it peripheral
to the war effort. However, the success of “Little Willie” prompted
the War Office to become involved in the tank project. The War
Office took control of the project in December of 1915 on the
pretense that since tanks were meant to be used on land the War
Office should at least have a say in the their development. The
War Office demanded that the vehicle be able to climb a 4ft 6
inch parapet and cross an 8ft wide trench. These demands sent
Tritton back to the drawing board. Lt. Wilson, one of the original
designers, finally came up with the idea of a rhombus with tracks
running around the edges. They had to eliminate the turret that
was supposed to go on the original design because it raised the
center of gravity too far up.41 Two six-pounder guns of the type
first used by the Royal Navy in 1885 were hung off of either side.
These guns were chosen because the Royal Navy had a large surplus of them available.42 When the new tank was completed, it was
named “Mother.”
On January 29, 1916, “Mother” was taken to Hatfield Park,
the estate of Lord Salisbury. The Lord had donated his golf course
to be turned into a battlefield complete with shell holes and 9
foot wide trenches.43 On February 2nd, a demonstration was held
for the military and government officials. “Mother” succeeded in
impressing everyone except Lord Kitchener and former designer
Crompton. David Lloyd George wrote this in his memoir, “And
I can recall the feeling of delighted amazement with which I saw
for the first time the ungainly monster, bearing the inscription
“H.M.S. Centipede” on its breast, plough through thick entanglements, wallow through deep mud, and heave its huge bulk over
parapets and across trenches. At last, I thought, we have the
answer to the German machine-guns and wire.”44 Lloyd George
also remembered Lord Kitchener’s reaction as, “[he] scoffed as
the huge, clumsy creature lumbered and tumbled about, though
THE CONCORD REVIEW
237
always moving forward, and expressed the opinion that it would
be very quickly knocked out by artillery.”45 This insight was the
exact way that the Germans would later combat the tanks. Winston
Churchill also realized that the methods of warfare were profoundly
changed. Writing after the war, Churchill said of the High Command’s lack of faith: “There is a melancholy comfort in reflecting
that if the British and French commands were short-sighted, the
ablest soldier in Germany was blind. In truth these high military
experts all belong to the same school. [Field Marshal Douglas]
Haig at least moved faster and farther along the new path, and
in consequence, doubtingly and tardily, he reaped in the end a
generous reward.”46
After the Hatfield demonstration, an order for 100 tanks
was placed with the Metropolitan Carriage, Wagon, and Finance
Company of Birmingham. Foster’s of Lincoln was to build 25.
However, during the building process, the Royal Navy ran out of
six-pounder guns to give the companies. This led to the development of the “female” tank, which mounted Vickers water-cooled
machine guns in the sponsons.47 A training area was secured near
the town of Elveden and recruits began arriving to learn how to fight
with the new tanks. At first, the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch
had a hard time recruiting, “The development of this new arm of
the service was so secret that the words Heavy Branch were omitted
from the official announcements in the London gazette…”48 Most
of the recruits came from the Royal Army Service Corps, the supply arm of the army. Many of the most promising recruits, those
from the Royal Naval Air Service, did not join because the pay in
the new Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch was three times less
than what the Royal Navy was paying them.49 Many soldiers with
technical or engineering skill joined the service. One member of
the Machine Gun Corps Heavy Branch was D.E. Hickey. Hickey
said in his memoir that he joined the Machine Gun Corps Heavy
Branch because, “Machinery had always fascinated me. The tanks
fired my imagination, and I was eager to transfer into them.”50
The first tank that most recruits ever saw was “Mother,”
the demonstration tank from Hatfield Park. A new British tank
238
Cody E. Nager
was, “... weighing 30 tons, and having a maximum speed of only
three or four miles an hour. When closed a tank was pitch black
inside…everything was so fitted that nothing was dislodged when
the tank was in motion.”51 The tank’s design also greatly limited
the visibility of the driver. In action, the driver had to rely on tiny
O-shaped peepholes to guide the tank.52
Swinton was appointed to command the newly formed
Tank Corps and immediately set out to develop a comprehensive
attack strategy. When his plan was competed, Swinton’s troops
were sent over to France with their newly built tanks named the
“Mark One.” The tanks participated in the assault on the German
lines during the Somme offensive on September 15, 1916.
The assault was intended to breach the German lines near
the town of Flers in the Somme. This battle had the distinction
of being the first engagement ever to use a tank. There were 32
Mark One tanks involved in the assault. The understood tank
tactic was, “…that they should be employed in subsections of two
or three machines against strongpoints.”53 The tanks advanced
out of a bombardment and began to assault the German line.
One of the British tank fighters, Lt. A.E. Arnold, described the
enemy reaction as, “A row of German heads appeared above the
Parapet and looked—no doubt some in amazement—at what was
approaching out of the murk of the bombardment.”54
The battle was a minor victory, with the British gaining
just under 5 kilometers. However, it revealed the weaknesses in
the Mark One model. The most notable was the large amount
of exertion required to turn one of the tanks. According to one
commander, “It was a hard job to turn one of these early tanks.
It needed four of the crew to work the levers, and they took their
orders by signal…Zig-zagging was, therefore, a slow and complicated business.”55 This battle caused a redesign of the tanks which
eliminated the rear wheel assembly meant to help with steering.
The largest and most important tank battle during World
War One was the British surprise attack on Cambrai on November 20, 1917. The Tank Corps (renamed from the Machine Gun
Corps Heavy Branch) committed three-hundred-seventy-eight
THE CONCORD REVIEW
239
recently built “Mark IV” tanks to this assault. The Germans had
realized how to neutralize a tank. They “concealed tank traps on
the model of elephant-pits, formidable double-traversed trenches,
a branch of special anti-tank artillery, heavily reinforced concrete
stockades, and an elaborate system of land mines.”56 However, the
only practical way to destroy a tank was a direct hit with an artillery shell. Hence the worry of the British section commander of
Company H, “There was another ridge to be crossed before we
reached Fontaine, and since we’d already seen the mess that one
enemy gun had made of tanks as they topped a ridge we didn’t
feel too comfortable about it—especially as the enemy was now
prepared for tanks.”57
The Cambrai battle ended with a British victory. “The attack was a stupendous success…the whole German trench system
had been penetrated on a front of six miles, 10,000 prisoners and
200 guns captured without the loss of more than 1,500 British
soldiers.”58 The Tank Corps still celebrates this victory as one of
their greatest.
The Armistice and the end of the First World War did not
spell the end for the tanks. The British Mark series tanks were
handed out as prizes to the towns that raised the most money
during the war bonds campaign. Other Mark series were used as
target practice for the newer generations of tanks. The British light
tanks, the medium series, nicknamed the “Whippet” series, were
used for policing purposes, especially in Scotland. Some others
with historical significance were dragged to a lot in Bovington,
where they sat and eventually formed the nucleus of the collection
of the Tank Museum in Bovington.59
The end of the war did raise the issue for the British of
who had actually invented this machine. Since the tank had many
claimants, the British Government set up a Royal Commission in
1919 to investigate the matter. On October 6, 1919, the Commission met at Lincoln Inn.60 The main claimants were Col. Ernest
Swinton, Commodore Sueter on the behalf of the Royal Naval
Air Service, Col. Crompton, and the engineer Tritton. Australian
army Colonel de Mole also arrived to give testimony. The chief
240
Cody E. Nager
witness was Winston Churchill. The Commission interviewed all
concerned and on November 27, 1919 issued its verdict. Swinton
received £1,000, Tritton £7,500, and Sueter, de Mole and Crompton
all collected nothing.61 The Commission’s findings didn’t end the
quarrel however. In 1941, H.G. Wells was claiming that he invented
the tank and that Swinton was a buffoon. Wells cited his 1903
story “The Land Ironclads,” as the basis for his claim. Swinton
sued Wells for libel. They eventually settled out of court.62
No matter who gets credit for inventing the tank, its
importance in revolutionizing warfare cannot be overstated. As
David Lloyd George wrote in his memoir, “British in conception,
design and manufacture, the Tank was the one outstanding and
dramatic innovation brought forth by the War in the sphere of
mechanical aids to warfare. It was the ultimate British reply to the
machine-guns and heavily fortified trench systems of the German
army, and there is no doubt whatever that it played a very important part in helping the Allies to victory.” 63
The development of the tank made cavalry obsolete. The
horse, after nearly 3,400 years of battlefield use, was relegated to
ceremonial purposes. The tank became the tip of the spear, used
in many military situations to lead the attack. It was used most
effectively by the German World War Two Panzer divisions in the
deadly and effective blitzkriegs, their “lightning-strike” attacks. The
tank was technology of the industrial age being applied to warfare,
which made manpower advantages negligible, called for new tactics
and restored movement to the battlefield. In 1920, Major J.F.C.
Fuller, the renowned military strategist, won the Gold Prize from
the Royal United Services Institute for his paper on the effects of
tanks on the future of war. Fuller stated that “The change in the
art of war effected by the introduction of the petrol engine to the
battlefield…has opened a new era in the history of war to which
we can find no parallel in land fighting.”64 Warfare had changed
forever.
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241
Endnotes
“Tank Evolved from 18 Machines,” New York Times
(9 October 1919) p. 1
2
A. J. Smithers, A New Excalibur (London: Leo Cooper,
1986) p. 3
3
Ibid., p. 3
4
Robert Cowley and Parker Geoffrey, eds., The Readers’s
Companion to Military History (New York: Houghton, 1996)
p. 74
5
John H. Batchelor, Tank: A History of the Armoured
Fighting Vehicle (New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970)
p. 6
6
Richard M. Ogorkiewicz, Armor (London: Steven & Sons,
1960) p. 454
7
Arch Whitehouse, Tank: The Story of Their Battles and
the Men Who Drove Them from Their First Use in World War
One to Korea (Garden City: Doubleday, 1960) p. 35
8
Patrick Wright, Tank: The Life and Times of a ‘Wonder
Weapon (BBC-History, BBC Online, 5 November 2009)
<http://www.bbc.co.uk/history/worldwars/wwone/gallery_
tank_01.shtml>
9
Smithers, p. 4
10
Ivan Stanislavovich Bloch, The Future of War in its
Technical, Economic, and Political Relations; Is War Now
Impossible? (New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1899) p. 345
11
“Prophet of Trench Deadlock Vindicated,” New York
Times, (23 January 1916) p. 1
12
H. G. Wells, The Land Ironclads, (Strand, December
1903) p. 506
13
Smithers, p. 6
14
Ernest Swinton, Eyewitness: Being Personal
Reminiscences of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including
the Genesis of the Tank (Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1933)
p. 8
15
Smithers, p. 7
16
John Glanfield, The Devil’s Chariots (Phoenix Mill:
Sutton, 2006) p. 17
17
Swinton, p. 5
18
Ibid., p. 8
19
Ibid., p. 152
20
Ken Wright, The Design Was Not Passed On, (Brigham
Young University World War One Document Archive Online,
1
242
Cody E. Nager
2006), <http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/DeMole/
designnotpassedon.htm>
21
Glanfield, p. 14
22
Wright, <http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/
DeMole/designnotpassedon.htm>
23
Swinton, p. 152
24
Ibid., p. 12
25
Smithers, p. 11
26
Ibid., p. 42
27
Winston Churchill, The World Crisis (New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1931) p. 314
28
Glanfield, p. 3
29
Swinton, p. 43
30
Ibid., p. 57
31
David Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-1919 (Wiltshire:
Crowood, 2001) p. 23
32
Swinton, p. 77
33
Ibid., p. 77
34
Churchill, p. 313
35
Ibid., p. 316
36
Ibid., p. 316
37
David Lloyd George, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1933) p. 381
38
David Fletcher, Landships (London: Crown, 1984) p. 11
39
David Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916 (Oxford:
Osprey, 2004) p. 5
40
David Fletcher, Landships, p. 46
41
Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916, p. 6
42
Ibid., p. 8
43
David Fletcher, Landships, p. 13
44
George, p. 382
45
Ibid., p. 383
46
Churchill, p. 321
47
Fletcher, British Mark One Tank 1916, p. 12
48
D. E. Hickey, Rolling into Action (London: Hutchinson,
1932) p. 26
49
Whitehouse, p. 35
50
Hickey, p. 26
51
Ibid., p. 48
52
Clough Williams-Ellis and A. Williams-Ellis, The Tank
Corps (London: Country Life, 1919) p. 3
53
David Fletcher, ed., Tanks and Trenches (London: Sutton,
1996) p. 3
THE CONCORD REVIEW
243
Ibid., p.11
Fletcher, The British Tanks 1915-19, p. 87
56
Williams-Ellis, p. 3
57
Fletcher, Tanks and Trenches, p. 83
58
Churchill, p. 743
59
Fletcher, The British Tanks, p. 190
60
Christy Campbell, Band of Brigands (London: Harper
Perennial, 2008) p. 400
61
Fletcher, The British Tanks, p. 187
62
Campbell, p. xxvii
63
George, p. 381
64
J. P. Harris, Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military
Thought and Armoured Forces,1903-1939 (Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995) p. 204
54
55
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Bloch, Ivan Stanislavovich, The Future of War in its
Technical, Economic, and Political Relations; Is War Now
Impossible?, New York: Doubleday & McClure, 1899
Churchill, Winston, The World Crisis, New York: Charles
Scribner’s Sons, 1931
“Eleven Inventors Claim Tanks,” New York Times, 7 October
1919
George, David Lloyd, War Memoirs of David Lloyd George,
Boston: Little, Brown, 1933
Hickey, D. E., Rolling into Action, London: Hutchinson,
1932
“Prophet of Trench Deadlock Vindicated,” New York Times,
23 January 1916
Swinton, Ernest, Eyewitness: Being Personal Reminiscences
of Certain Phases of the Great War, Including the Genesis of
the Tank, Garden City: Doubleday, Doran, 1933
“Tank Evolved from 18 Machines,” New York Times, 8
October 1919
Wells, H. G., The Land Ironclads, Strand, December 1903
Williams-Ellis, Clough, and A. Williams-Ellis, The Tank
Corps, London: Country Life, 1919
244
Cody E. Nager
Secondary Sources
Batchelor, John H., Tank: A History of the Armoured
Fighting Vehicle, New York: Charles Scribner’s Sons, 1970
Caddick-Adams, Peter, Ninety Years of the Tank, BBCNews, BBC Online, < http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/uk_news/
magazine/5339280.stm> 13 September 2006
Campbell, Christy, Band of Brigands, London: Harper
Perennial, 2008
Cowley, Robert, and Geoffrey Parker, eds., The Readers’s
Companion to Military History, New York: Houghton, 1996
Fletcher, David, Landships, London: Crown, 1984
Fletcher, David, ed., Tanks and Trenches, London: Sutton,
1996
Fletcher, David, The British Tanks 1915-19, Wiltshire:
Crowood, 2001
Fletcher, David. British Mark One Tank 1916, Oxford:
Osprey, 2004
Ford, Roger, The World’s Greatest Tanks: From 1916 until
Present Day, London: Barnes & Noble, 1997
Glanfield, John, The Devil’s Chariots, Phoenix Mill: Sutton,
2006
Harris, J. P., Men, Ideas, and Tanks: British Military
Thought and Armoured Forces, 1903-1939, Manchester:
Manchester University Press, 1995
Ogorkiewicz, Richard M., Armor, London: Steven & Sons,
1960
Smithers, A. J., A New Excalibur, London: Leo Cooper, 1986
Whitehouse, Arch, Tank: The Story of Their Battles and the
Men Who Drove Them from Their First Use in World War One
to Korea, Garden City: Doubleday, 1960
Wright, Ken, The Design Was Not Passed On, Brigham
Young University World War One Document Archive, Online,
<http://net.lib.byu.edu/estu/wwi/comment/DeMole/
designnotpassedon.htm>, 2006
Wright, Patrick, Tank: The Life and Times of a Wonder
Weapon, BBC-History BBC, Online, < http://www.bbc.co.uk/
history/worldwars/wwone/gallery_tank_01.shtml> 5 November
2009
THE CONCORD REVIEW
245
Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
THE POLITICAL TIPPING POINT:
HOW THE KENNEDY FAMILY
DEFEATED THE LODGES IN THE 1952
UNITED STATES SENATE ELECTION IN MASSACHUSETTS
Matthew C. Weinstein
T
he 1952 United States Senate campaign was unlike
any political race Massachusetts had seen before. The election
pitted the state’s longstanding political and social aristocracy
against the rising class of assimilated immigrants.1 Beyond the race
between two highly qualified individual candidates, incumbent
Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. (sometimes called, “Lodge”) and
11th District Congressman, John Fitzgerald Kennedy (sometimes
called, “JFK”), voters witnessed a broader battle between the two
prominent Massachusetts political dynasties of the twentieth century.2 When JFK defeated Lodge on November 4, 1952 by a mere
seventy thousand votes, or three percent of votes cast, he ended
the more than 150-year “Lodge dynasty” in Massachusetts politics
and began the “Kennedy dynasty,” which would continue into the
twenty-first century with the late Senator Edward M. Kennedy.3
JFK’s Senate victory, only the third by a Massachusetts
Democrat since the initial election of the United States Senate in
1789, marked the end of Massachusetts as a Republican-dominated
state.4 Since 1952, only two non-incumbent Republican United
Matthew C. Weinstein is a Senior at the Belmont Hill School in Belmont,
Massachusetts, where he wrote this paper for Mr. Christos Kolovos’ AP
United States History course in the 2009/2010 academic year.
246
Matthew C. Weinstein
States Senators have been elected in Massachusetts.5 Lodge, a
three-term Republican Senator, represented traditional Protestant Yankee beliefs. Meanwhile, JFK, the great-grandson of Irish
American immigrants, personified the Irish Catholic ascent in
post World War II American culture.6 JFK, only thirty-five years old
on Election Day, also represented a new breed of Massachusetts
politicians.7 Using new technologies, such as television, and innovative campaign strategies, including personal gatherings with
voters, the Kennedy campaign infused an extraordinary level of
energy into the Senate race.8 This epic battle between old and
new, fueled by Kennedy’s novel campaign strategies, drove an
unprecedented 90.94 percent of eligible voters to the polls to vote
for either tradition or change, an increase of more than seventeen
percent from Lodge’s 1946 election.9
The 1952 campaign marked a crossroads of political careers for two politicians and their respective families. While Lodge
was a well-established politician in his own right by 1952, he also
represented the long lineage of Lodge family politicians.10 Prior
to his 1952 defeat, Lodge was the prominent national leader of
moderate Senate Republicans and served as Dwight D. Eisenhower’s
campaign manager during the future President’s successful 1952
campaign.11 However, following his 1952 Senate defeat, neither
Lodge, nor any of his relatives, ever held elected office again.12
In contrast, JFK was the first of several family members elected to
federal office.13 JFK’s 1952 election elevated the young politician
to national prominence and served as a launching pad for his
1960 Presidential campaign.14 Many strategies which Kennedy
developed and perfected in his 1952 campaign were redeployed
with success during his 1960 Presidential run.15
However, the future President did not defeat Lodge
singlehandedly. Only by concentrating all of the Kennedy family’s
resources and influence toward the campaign was JFK able to win
over Massachusetts voters with his charm, energy, and fresh ideas.16
Without the zealous contributions of JFK’s parents, siblings, and
cousins to his campaign, JFK, young and relatively unknown prior
to 1952, might have lost to Lodge in a landslide.17 The mobilization of substantial Kennedy family resources to support John F.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
247
Kennedy’s Senate campaign enabled the young congressman to
defeat the incumbent, Senator Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr.
The Cabot Lodges
The Cabot Lodge family has been intertwined in American political history almost since the federal government began.
Lodge’s great-great-great grandfather, George Cabot, served one
term as United States Senator from Massachusetts, from 1791 to
1796.18 Cabot’s seat was the same Senate seat which Lodge and
JFK battled over in 1952, more than 150 years later.19 George
Cabot, a member of the Federalist Party, also served as President
of the Hartford Convention, a conference of New England states
which met from December 15, 1814 to January 5, 1815 to discuss
regional grievances with the federal government during the War
of 1812.20 Two great-great grandfathers of Lodge also served in
the United States Senate.21 Elijah H. Mills served for one term,
from 1820 to 1827, and John Davis served two non-consecutive
terms, from 1835 to 1841 and from 1845 to 1853.22
Henry Cabot Lodge, Sr. (sometimes called, “Lodge Sr.”)
picked up the family’s political tradition in 1892.23 Lodge Sr. was
elected six times to the United States Senate by Massachusetts
voters, serving from 1893 until his death in 1924 in the same seat
as both his great-grandfather and grandson.24 Lodge Sr. was one
of the most powerful Republican Senators of his time. During
his tenure, Lodge Sr. served as President Pro Tempore of the
Senate from 1911 to 1913.25 However, Lodge Sr. is most widely
known for his role as chairman of the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee.26 As chairman, Lodge Sr. led a group of isolationist
Republican Senators who amassed enough Senate supporters to
block ratification of President Wilson’s Treaty of Versailles.27
The son of Lodge Sr., George Cabot Lodge, was a poet who
married Mathilda Elizabeth Frelinghuysen Davis.28 The couple
gave birth to Lodge on July 5, 1902.29 Tragically, George Cabot
Lodge died from a heart attack when his son was only seven years
old.30 As a result, Lodge Sr. served as Lodge’s father and mentor
throughout most of the younger Lodge’s childhood.31
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From an early age, Lodge Sr. inspired his grandson to
maintain the family’s tradition of public service. Looking back
on his grandfather’s mentorship years later, Lodge remarked,
The discussion of political topics was one of the first things I can remember. A haze of cigar smoke and the emphatic utterance of such
words as ‘caucus’ ‘committee’ or ‘campaign’—words which were then
incomprehensible to me—are vividly impressed on my mind…..It was
his hope that I might carry on in this field.32
Lodge continued the Cabot Lodge political dynasty. Beginning his
political career in 1932, Lodge was elected to the Massachusetts
House of Representatives from the conservative and wealthy town
of Beverly.33 Four years later, in 1936, Lodge, then only thirtyfour years old, ran for and won the open United States Senate
seat, soundly defeating his Democratic opponent, Massachusetts
Governor James Michael Curley, by 135,409 votes, or seven and a
half percent of the votes cast.34 Lodge served in the Senate until
1944, when, feeling he was not making adequate contributions
to the country’s World War II efforts, he enlisted in the United
States Army, becoming the first active United States Senator to
relinquish his seat to join the military since the Civil War.35 After
the war, Lodge’s yearning for public service led him, in 1946, to
challenge and defeat five-term incumbent Democrat Senator, David
Walsh, to regain a United States Senate seat from Massachusetts.36
By 1952, Lodge, then the second most senior Republican in the
Senate, was an extremely powerful legislator, holding seats on the
Senate Foreign Relations and Armed Services committees.37 These
committees were especially influential given the predominance
of military issues following World War II and the beginning of
the Cold War.
The Fitzgerald Kennedys
Following their immigration to the United States, the
Fitzgerald Kennedy family quickly climbed the necessary economic
and social ladders to gain affluence and power. All four of JFK’s
great-grandparents were Irish immigrants, who came to America
in the 1840s to escape Ireland’s devastating potato famine38 The
family was introduced to politics when JFK’s maternal grandfather,
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John “Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald, a Democrat, served as mayor of Boston from 1896 to 1914.39 The first of four elections between the
Lodge and Kennedy families occurred in November, 1916, when
“Honey Fitz” Fitzgerald challenged incumbent Senator Henry
Cabot Lodge, Sr. for the United States Senate.40 In this opening
contest between the two families, Lodge Sr. defeated Fitzgerald
by approximately six percent of votes cast.41 The Fitzgerald and
Kennedy families merged when “Honey Fitz’s” daughter, Rose
Fitzgerald, married Joseph P. Kennedy in 1914.42 Approximately
three years later, on May 29, 1917, Rose gave birth to John Fitzgerald Kennedy, her second of nine children.
The political history on the paternal side of the Kennedy
family begins with JFK’s father, Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr., an influential self-made multi-millionaire.43 Joseph Kennedy earned his
fortune with successful stock investments in the largely unregulated
markets of the early 1920s.44 In 1926, Kennedy Sr. traveled to Hollywood and increased his fortune by producing low-budget movies
featuring prominent stars, such as Gloria Swanson, promoted by
frequent public print advertising.45 Through movie production and
promotion, Kennedy came to understand fundamental marketing concepts and developed contacts in the advertising and video
industries that he would later use to aid his sons’ campaigns.46
In 1932, Joseph Kennedy supported then New York Governor Franklin D. Roosevelt’s first campaign for President, raising
200,000 dollars for Roosevelt.47 In 1935, Roosevelt appointed Joseph
Kennedy as the first chairman of the newly created Securities and
Exchange Commission, designed to regulate the securities markets
Kennedy had mastered.48 Always ambitious, in 1938 a national poll
ranked Joseph Kennedy as the fifth most likely person to succeed
Roosevelt as President.49 In his autobiography, Senator Ted Kennedy
recalled his father’s ambition to become the first Irish Catholic
President saying, “As I learned much later, my father’s name was
among those being prominently considered as Roosevelt’s successor.”50 In 1938, President Roosevelt appointed Joseph Kennedy the
Ambassador to England.51 Kennedy was an isolationist, reluctant to
see the United States enter the war against Germany.52 In a Boston
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Globe article on November 10, 1940, Ambassador Kennedy shared
his opinion that, “Democracy is finished in England. It may be
here.”53 His controversial views made national news and alienated
him from President Roosevelt and the Democratic Party.54
The Globe interview and resulting public outrage ended
Joseph Kennedy’s aspirations for elected political office.55 Like a
Hollywood actor, no longer able to stand in front of the camera,
Joseph Kennedy was pushed to the background, where he worked
tirelessly as the producer, director, banker, and marketer for the
political careers of his sons.56 The senior Kennedy transferred his
ambition to be the first Irish Catholic President of the United States
to his sons, one of whom he imagined would someday become
that President.57 After Kennedy’s eldest son, Joseph P. Kennedy,
Jr. died during a World War II air force mission over the English
Channel in 1944, that goal was passed onto the shoulders of JFK.58
Following his father’s desires, JFK began his political career soon after his brother’s death. Initially, JFK set sights on the
1946 race for the United States House of Representatives from
the 11th District of Massachusetts.59 Foreshadowing the 1952 Senate campaign, Joseph Kennedy’s influence and wealth facilitated
JFK’s victory. Joseph Kennedy was so determined to improve his
son’s chances to win, he paid Democrat incumbent James Michael
Curley 100,000 dollars in return for Curley’s promise not to seek
reelection.60 In addition, the Kennedy campaign, heavily funded
by Joseph Kennedy, spent 300,000 dollars on the election, an
unprecedented amount of money for a congressional race at that
time.61 With his father’s aid, JFK won the open House seat, where
he served three terms, from 1947 to 1953.62 This district, which
included many of Boston’s nearby suburbs, such as Cambridge,
Charlestown, and Somerville, was largely comprised of working
class Irish and Italian voters.63
By one key measure, attendance, JFK was not particularly effective as their Representative, missing nearly half of the
House’s floor votes.64 Early in his career, JFK suffered from Addison’s disease, an illness of the adrenal glands, which drew him
away from Capitol Hill for treatment and rest.65 In later years as a
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Representative, JFK often skipped votes to campaign for the 1952
Senate election.66 However, despite these absences, JFK remained
popular due to the Irish Catholic demographics of his district.67
Approaching the 1952 campaign, JFK enjoyed the support of the
growing number of Catholics and Irish in Massachusetts.68 However, he lacked the name recognition that Lodge and his family
had built over several generations.69 JFK was forced to rely upon
creative and tireless campaigning to challenge the long-standing
incumbent successfully.70
With the determined, coordinated assistance of his large
family, JFK defeated Lodge. Many Kennedy family members played
vital roles in the campaign, but none contributed more broadly
and influentially than JFK’s father. The wealthy Joseph Kennedy,
Sr. provided financial backing for the Senate contest. In addition,
his experience with public communications and connections with
the nascent television and more established movie industries were
arguably his most helpful contributions.
Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr.: Media, Money, and Influence
Joseph P. Kennedy, Sr. maintained close contacts with television producers he met in the 1930s, when he produced movies
in Hollywood.71 During the 1952 race, the Kennedy campaign
marshaled these resources to their advantage. For example, the
elder Kennedy hired Hollywood newsreel cameramen to film JFK
campaigning on the streets of Boston.72 This footage was later used
in an advertisement that portrayed JFK’s personable style and
showed his interest in meeting face-to-face with voters and answering their questions.73 Joseph Kennedy also used his influence in
the television industry when, at JFK’s request, he convinced the
NBC network to send to Boston from New York technologically
advanced television broadcast equipment for use by the Kennedy
campaign.74 Prior to Joseph Kennedy’s overtures, NBC network
executives had declined the campaign’s requests to borrow such
equipment.75
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The most important media contact which Joseph Kennedy
provided to the campaign was Batten, Barton, Durstine & Osborn
(BBD&O), a nationally recognized television advertising agency.76
In a February 1952 letter to Joseph Kennedy, Mark J. Dalton, a
close aide of JFK, suggested that Joseph Kennedy intervene to secure a series of television advertisement segments from BBD&O.77
Joseph Kennedy quickly acted upon Dalton’s request, and, within
ten days, connected his son with agents from BBD&O who helped
the candidate advertise on television.78 During his meeting with
two BBD&O employees, Wicklifpe Crider and John Elliott, JFK
learned how to communicate messages effectively on television
with personal, intimate facial expressions and by looking directly
into the cameras.79 John Galvin, another JFK aide, also present
at the meeting, commented that, “the successful commercial TV
programs are the ones marked by informality and action.”80 JFK’s
ability to appear both engaging and informal on this powerful,
new communication medium was one of his biggest campaign
assets.81
With help from Joseph Kennedy’s connections at BBD&O
and NBC, JFK campaigned much more effectively and frequently
on television than Lodge. In the campaign’s final month, JFK appeared on CBS and ABC Boston affiliates a combined thirty-three
times, appearing fifteen times on CBS and eighteen times on ABC.82
In contrast, Lodge made only eighteen television appearances on
two affiliates, six times on CBS and twelve times on ABC.83 JFK’s 480
minutes on air during the last month of the race trumped Lodge’s
260 minutes of television coverage.84 Outside the greater Boston
television market, Kennedy made a dozen five-minute television
spots at notable sites across Massachusetts.85 Each spot focused
on a specific campaign issue. For example, JFK filmed and aired
one advertisement at a local fish pier where he discussed the New
England fishing industry, and another advertisement at a local shoe
factory, where he discussed the importance of the traditional shoe
industry.86 Also, JFK appeared on the national political talk-show,
Meet the Press, two separate times, once during the Senate campaign
and another immediately following the election.87 In his first appearance, in December 1951, JFK attempted to increase both his
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local and national name recognition by discussing national and
foreign affairs.88 His second appearance on the show, November
9, 1952, featured his recent victory over Lodge.89
The sharp difference in how the two candidates made
use of television was due to their different levels of competence
and comfort with exploiting this new medium to market their
personalities, styles, and ideas. JFK, groomed by his father and the
BBD&O professionals, had, in the opinion of Camman Newberry,
a close Kennedy aide, “a marvelous quality of making you feel
that you were his special friend.”90 Lodge, in contrast, struggled
to portray himself in an appealing light on television. According
to Gene Wyckoff, a television producer who worked with Lodge,
When [Lodge Jr.] opened his mouth and when he interacted with
people on television, there was something not so attractive—something in his demeanor, a touch of hauteur, arrogance, aloofness, or
condescension perhaps. His characterization did not ring true.91
Lodge seemed to understand his disadvantage when it came to
television marketing and, as a result, he refused JFK’s request to
debate on the political discussion show, The American Forum of the
Air.92 When the candidates finally debated live on television on
September 17th, most analysts concluded that JFK connected with
the television audience more effectively than Lodge.93 In a review
of the debate, the Lynn Telegraph News reported that Kennedy’s
“manner was unrestrained, and his poise never left him.”94 In
contrast, Lodge failed to connect with his audience, frequently
coming across as uptight and often failing to look directly into
the camera when speaking.95
JFK’s most successful television programs were two thirtyminute segments, entitled “Coffee with the Kennedys.” Airing on
October 15th and November 1st 1952, these programs were broadcast
on ABC and CBS, respectively, in the greater Boston area.96 However, JFK reached voters throughout Massachusetts because these
programs were simulcast on radio across the state.97 During these
televised family gatherings, JFK’s mother and two sisters, Patricia
and Eunice, accompanied the candidate on screen. The campaign
sought to motivate female voters and arranged for women to call
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into the program to ask JFK and his family questions.98 In a highly
coordinated and organized effort, the campaign also encouraged
women across Massachusetts to host tea parties during the show
for their neighbors. As a result of Kennedy’s intense promotion
of the program, more than five thousand women across Massachusetts hosted their neighbors for the first show.99 These women
served coffee and tea to their predominately female guests as
they watched JFK on television.100 The second program, which
aired two weeks later, was conducted in the same format.101 For
this November program, JFK was joined by his youngest sister,
Jean, in addition to Eunice, Patricia, and Rose.102 The November
program was more popular than the first, as nearly ten thousand
women throughout Massachusetts served as hosts.103 Ed Wagner,
Kennedy’s campaign press aide, promoted the second program
more broadly than the first, assuring the press that teas would take
place in every city and town across Massachusetts.104
In addition to the television marketing campaign, Joseph
Kennedy helped JFK’s print advertising campaign. With experience
gained from marketing Hollywood movies, Kennedy developed
novel media strategies. For example, he envisioned a cartoon book
to emphasize JFK’s historical Massachusetts ties.105 Throughout
the cartoon, some of which featured images of JFK’s father and
maternal grandfather, the campaign illustrated the long history
of Kennedy Fitzgerald families in Massachusetts politics.106
More important than cartoons, the elder Kennedy helped
to secure traditional print newspaper support with the Boston Post’s
endorsement of JFK over Lodge.­107 This endorsement was crucial
for JFK and a blow to Lodge, who was disadvantaged among Boston voters due to his Anglo Protestant background, and sought
the Post’s endorsement to salvage a respectable performance
within Boston.108 In 1952, the Post boasted more than 300,000
daily readers, the majority of whom were located within Boston’s
Irish Catholic neighborhoods.109 According to Lodge campaign
estimates, the Post’s endorsement would have yielded 40,000 additional votes within Boston.110 The Post’s editor at the time, John
Fox, was unsure whom he would endorse, waiting until October
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25th, a mere ten days before Election Day, to endorse JFK.111 However, Fox may have not supported JFK solely for the candidate’s
political attributes. Just prior to the Post’s formal endorsement,
Joseph Kennedy, echoing tactics from his son’s 1946 congressional
race, loaned 500,000 dollars to Fox to pay off deficits of the newspaper.112 While Fox eventually repaid the loan, Joseph Kennedy’s
financial influence over Fox may have given JFK an advantage at a
key point in the campaign.113 The 1952 election results for Boston
gave JFK a two-to-one margin over Lodge, winning by 119,393
votes.114 By comparison, Lodge beat Walsh in their 1946 Senate
race by six percent.115 In 1952, among all Massachusetts voters
located outside of Boston, Lodge beat JFK by 48,656 votes, or 2.4
percent.116 However, JFK’s large Boston lead overcame Lodge’s
advantage elsewhere and tipped the race to JFK.117 Joseph’s Kennedy’s financial support of the Boston Post,
similar to his third-party contributions during JFK’s 1946 campaign,
demonstrate that, as one of the world’s most wealthy men, he
was in a position to use his money to influence the 1952 election.
Joseph Kennedy raised and spent hundreds of thousands of dollars on JFK’s Senate race.118 For example, according to Abraham
Glovsky, a Beverly lawyer and close friend of Lodge, Joseph Kennedy would, during the 1952 campaign, “Go into a community
that wanted to build a church…or some other communal thing,
and they would put up X thousands of dollars….”119 Since this
money came directly from Joseph Kennedy and was dedicated to
public or charitable purposes, it was not, technically, a political
campaign expenditure, but nonetheless garnered political support
for JFK.120 The entire Kennedy family, including in-laws, officially
donated more than 70,000 dollars to JFK’s campaign.121 Lodge’s
entire campaign raised 58,266 dollars.122 By contrast, the Kennedy campaign reported official spending of 349,646 dollars.123
Kennedy’s ability to raise this substantial amount of money was
helped by Joseph Kennedy’s circle of wealthy acquaintances.124
Finally, Joseph Kennedy used his national political influence to aid JFK’s campaign by convincing powerful Wisconsin
Republican Senator, Joe McCarthy, the now infamous but then the
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extremely popular Communist-hunter, to remain neutral and not
campaign for his fellow Republican, Lodge.125 If Senator McCarthy, an Irish Catholic, had campaigned for Lodge, he would have
diminished JFK’s core voting bloc and might have swayed enough
voters to tip the election towards Lodge.126 In fact, McCarthy was
certain that, had he campaigned for Lodge, the Republican would
have defeated JFK.127 However, while McCarthy belonged to the
same party as Lodge, he enjoyed a longtime friendship with the
Kennedy family.128 His relationship with the Kennedys began during World War II, when McCarthy and JFK were both stationed
on the Solomon Islands in the South Pacific.129 Following the war,
McCarthy befriended Eunice and Patricia Kennedy, even dating
Patricia for a short time.130 McCarthy and Joseph Kennedy were
also close friends. The elder Kennedy frequently invited McCarthy to his summer house in Hyannis Port, Massachusetts.131 As a
result of such close ties to the Kennedys, together with a recent
contribution of 5,000 dollars by Joseph Kennedy to McCarthy’s
campaign fund, the influential Republican Senator did not openly
campaign for Lodge, helping JFK to dominate the populous Irish
and Catholic precincts around Boston on Election Day.132
The Kennedy Women: The French Connection and Tea Parties
As Joseph Kennedy, Sr. worked behind the scenes, the
Kennedy women played successful public roles in promoting JFK’s
election. Each of the Kennedy women, Rose, Eunice, Patricia, Jean,
and Rose’s cousin, Polly, found her own niche in the campaign.
Kennedy’s mother, Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, sixty-two years old
at the time, was the most active.133 Rose was especially valuable in
cultivating French American voters. In the early 1900s, FrenchCanadians immigrated to work in textile factories of Massachusetts mill towns.134 As early as 1900, Worcester’s 15,300 FrenchCanadians comprised 13 percent of its population.135 From 1915
to 1940, French-Canadians were the largest ethnic group in the
Blackstone River Valley region.136 In 1950, three of the six most
populous Massachusetts cities were located in this region.137 This
French-speaking population read news from dedicated FrancoAmerican newspapers.138
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Since Rose was fluent in French, the Kennedy campaign
planned several short speeches for her in French across Massachusetts.139 Speaking to groups which sometimes exceeded 800
people, Rose’s remarks were specifically aimed to attract the votes of
French women.140 All of her speeches followed a similar pattern.141
Rose emphasized her connections to France and the importance
of French culture to Rose and her family.142 For example, speaking
to a French women’s group in Boston, she said, “France means a
great deal to me because I am a wife and a mother and a woman,
who above all desires to make her home comfortable and beautiful for her husband and children.”143 In fact, Rose had never lived
in France, but learned the language during annual vacations to
Paris.144 Her appeals to French women frequently included jokes
about the latest French clothing designs, but never a discussion
of serious issues.145 Rose concluded her speeches by assuring her
audience that her son shared the same fond feelings for France
as she.146
Rose campaigned energetically in French venues. For example, on Bastille Day, July 14th, 1952, Rose attended a Memorial
Service for French soldiers in Boston, then met diplomats at the
French Consulate, and ended her day with dinner at the French
Society.147 For her tireless efforts with the French community, Rose
was honored on October 24th, 1952 by the French Women’s Committee of Springfield for “her work in promoting French values”
during the campaign.148 The Kennedy campaign identified French
women as an important demographic constituency for Rose to
court because many French women neither watched television
nor attend the tea gatherings which the Kennedys sponsored.149
Accordingly, Rose’s speeches filled the communication gap. The
campaign used her fluency with the French language to create
the false impression among French voters that the entire family,
especially JFK, could speak French.150 Rose’s efforts helped JFK
carry French-Canadian strongholds in the Blackstone River Valley,
including the city of Worcester and all Worcester County, which
Lodge easily won in his 1946 Senate race, as well as convincing
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While Rose focused her energy on winning the French vote,
her daughters, Eunice, Patricia, and Jean, actively campaigned
across Massachusetts, from the western cities of Lenox and Holyoke to the Cape Cod town of Barnstable.152 Rose’s daughters spent
many days during the late summer and early fall of 1952 traveling door-to-door, handing out campaign paraphernalia, such as
bumper stickers and pins, and generally encouraging voters to
elect JFK.153 All three of JFK’s sisters concentrated on generating
support for JFK among their peer group, women voters. In one
memorable day in early September, Eunice and Patricia traveled
the streets of Salem, meeting more than 1,000 women.154 Patricia
also served as chair of Kennedy’s women’s committee.155 In this
role, she promoted several mid-morning radio and television programs featuring JFK which aired in October.156 Similar to midday
television shows popular among twenty-first-century women, Kennedy’s programs were directed away from thorny foreign policy
issues and towards women and their interests, such as Kennedy’s
family values.­157 In addition, all three sisters promoted the two
highly successful “Coffee with the Kennedys” television shows,
encouraging other women to watch and host teas.158
The campaign’s most effective strategy to cultivate the
women’s vote was a series of tea parties, separate from teas associated with the “Coffee with the Kennedys” programs. During the
months leading up Election Day, the Kennedy women organized
thirty-three informal tea gatherings in towns across Massachusetts,
from North Adams to South Attleboro.159 The teas were marketed
by the campaign’s press aide, Ed Wagner, as “an opportunity for
the women to meet the Kennedy family socially and talk with Kennedy, the individual, rather than Kennedy, the candidate.”160 The
teas were held in local homes or local hotels.161 First, the Kennedy
women charmed their mostly female audience with light conversation.162 Then, JFK appeared towards the end of the gathering.163
The women flocked to JFK, a highly attractive bachelor.164 After
meeting attendees, JFK usually made a short speech, focusing on
lighter domestic matters, judged more appealing to female voters
than foreign policy.165 Finally, as each woman left, she received
several pieces of campaign literature.166 JFK often wrote thank
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you letters to women who hosted the gatherings.167 Rose’s first
cousin, Polly Fitzgerald, was the leading organizer of the teas.168
However, despite Polly’s broad leadership, the teas somewhat
resembled a grassroots movement, whereby local women took
charge of planning the logistics and spreading news of the event
by word of mouth.169 While the campaign sent out invitations to
prominent community members, the Kennedys were very inclusive,
allowing anyone, specifically invited or not, to attend the teas.170
By working at these local levels, the Kennedy campaign motivated
an estimated 75,000 women to attend one of the teas.171
Through these informal tea parties, JFK engaged women
from a variety of social and ethnic backgrounds. Several teas
were designed to appeal to specific ethnic groups. For example,
the Kennedys hosted a tea reception at the Somerset Hotel in
Boston in honor of Rose Kennedy on October 30th, targeted to
attract Canadian Bostonians.172 These teas afforded JFK a forum
to display his appealing and outgoing personality, charm and
charisma. Through these teas, some in conjunction with the television programs, Kennedy energized the women’s voting bloc.173
On Election Day, the Boston American reported,
Everywhere there was evidence that women for the first time were
taking complete advantage of their political emancipation more
than [thirty] years ago. They were turning out en masse, with babes
in arms, in many cases.174
Kennedy’s unprecedented ability to motivate the previously untapped potential of women, who comprised approximately half of
the state’s voters, helped drive a record 90.94 percent of eligible
voters to the polls in November, 1952, a 17.2 percent increase
from Lodge’s 1946 Senate campaign against incumbent Democrat, David Walsh.175 The 1952 turnout was also 4.2 percent higher
than the 86.7 percent Massachusetts voter turnout for the 1948
Presidential-cycle election.176 The increased turnout of women
voters was especially pronounced in large cities where the Kennedys held teas, such as Brockton, up 17.9 percent, and Lowell, up
13.1 percent.177 After conceding the election, Lodge was quick to
blame “those dammed tea parties.”178 Indeed, Lodge was fighting
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a new type of highly organized, closely-knit political machine, one
comprised almost entirely of family members and which appealed
to voters who had previously been neglected.
Robert F. Kennedy: The Organizer
While JFK’s sisters were visible at tea parties and on the
campaign trail, his brother Robert F. Kennedy served as the overall
campaign manager. Robert’s organizational skill and tireless work
behind the scenes was critical to JFK’s victory. Robert became campaign manager late in the spring of 1952.179 Seeking to distance
themselves from the customary leadership of the Massachusetts
Democratic Party, the Kennedys sought a campaign manager
whom the family could completely trust.180 Joseph Kennedy urged
JFK to entrust the organization to his younger brother, Robert.181
Throughout the campaign, John’s youngest brother, Edward “Ted”
Kennedy, was serving in the United States Army in France and
Germany.182 Robert was available, but only twenty-six years old at
the time and had never worked on a political campaign before.183
Initially, Robert was timid when dealing with older, more
powerful politicians, but he matured over the course of the campaign.184 Robert often performed the less glamorous, nitty-gritty
campaign tasks of organizing workers and negotiating with opponents.185 For example, one day during the campaign, Robert had
to be restrained from physically assaulting a state representative
who slandered JFK.186 This near scuffle demonstrated that Robert
ran the campaign according to his belief that, “They don’t have
to like me, I only want them to like [John].”187 Unlike his sisters,
Robert did not generally participate in door-to-door campaigning.
Instead, he was the campaign’s chief coordinator and served as the
buffer between JFK and campaign staff.188 As the organizational
leader, all campaign workers, except JFK’s personal secretary, reported to him.189 Robert created Kennedy support organizations
in each precinct across Massachusetts.190 Although Robert did not
often appear in the public spotlight that his sisters and mother
occupied, his organizational skills enabled the Kennedy family to
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reach voters through a carefully coordinated strategy that targeted
specific voting groups.
The Strategic Focus: Ethnic and Religious Voting Groups
JFK’s ethnic background and his family’s Catholic faith
were as important as his charm and charisma. By 1952, more than
sixty percent of Massachusetts residents, and seventy-five percent
of Bostonians, were Catholic.191 This Catholic majority represented
a sharp increase from historical Massachusetts demographics.192
During the early twentieth century, many Irish, Italian, and French
immigrants settled in Massachusetts and, by 1952, assimilated into
American culture, climbing social ladders and earning positions of
power. As a result, ethnic groups developed resources to organize
political blocs to further their ethnic interests.193 While French
and Italian immigrants represented significant voter groups, by
the 1950’s, forty-two percent of Massachusetts’ residents were
Irish Americans, a large plurality among ethnic groups.194 The
demographic trends indicated that most of these new immigrants
were Catholic.195 Many immigrants supported the Democratic
Party policies of social welfare, which President Franklin Roosevelt
championed following the 1929 stock market crash.196 For these
reasons, Irish Catholic and many other immigrant voters were
drawn to JFK, an Irish Catholic and third-generation American
immigrant.
While JFK’s family background attracted ethnic and religious based voters, Lodge’s traditional Episcopalian and AngloSaxon lineage hindered his appeal to the changing pool of voters.
By 1952, Anglo-Saxons had declined to 35 percent of Massachusetts
voters and only about twenty-five percent of registered voters were
Protestant.197 Therefore, Lodge found himself in the minority, with
changing religious and ethnic trends, while JFK personified the
aspirations of rising classes of Massachusetts immigrants.
In addition to carrying his own ethnic and religious
groups, JFK used his family’s high social standing to win support
among other minority groups. JFK worked hard to cultivate the
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Jewish vote. Prior to the campaign, many Jews perceived JFK as
anti-Semitic, primarily due to anti-Semitic comments JFK’s father
made as Ambassador to the United Kingdom.198 While Joseph
Kennedy generally played a positive role in JFK’s campaign, these
comments created an obstacle for his son.199 Phil David Fine, a
Kennedy campaign worker, observed, “Many of the sins of the
father were visited on the son; and if you talked to some of the
[Jewish] leaders, they would generally talk to you in negative
terms.”200 At the beginning of the campaign, JFK was also hurt
by an historical distrust between two of Massachusetts’ largest
immigrant communities, the Irish and the Jews.201 Nevertheless,
JFK overcame these obstacles and won the Massachusetts Jewish community’s support. JFK launched a concerted advertising
campaign to garner support among Jews, publishing five different
advertisements in countless local papers across Massachusetts,
including many Jewish newspapers such as the Jewish Civil Leader
and Jewish Advocate.202 All five of these advertisements praised JFK
as a “Champion of Human Rights!”203 In addition, repeating the
previously discussed tactic of influential charitable contributions
by JFK’s father, the Joseph P. Kennedy, Jr. Foundation, of which
JFK was president, made a significant charitable donation of
50,000 dollars to Associated Jewish Philanthropies shortly before
the start of Kennedy’s campaign.204 Finally, in the fall of 1952, on
the Jewish New Year, Kennedy bought full page advertisements in
several Jewish newspapers to wish the Jewish community a happy,
healthy, and sweet New Year.205
JFK won support from other historically underrepresented
minorities. For example, the Albanian American Citizens Committee, in a letter to its members, proclaimed support for JFK,
saying,
We urge you to vote and elect Congressman John F. Kennedy to the
United States Senate….Kennedy’s record shows that he has great
sympathy and understanding of the problems of smaller nations and
has a deep hatred for atheistic Communism.206
JFK also gained significant support from the Armenian, Greek,
Syrian, and Polish communities by expressing his opposition to
THE CONCORD REVIEW
263
the McCarran bill, which lowered immigration quotas for many
small countries.207 In the words of M.S. Abourjaily, leader of the
Armenian, Syrian, Greek Committee for Kennedy, these communities saw Kennedy as “champion of the racial groups.”208 Kennedy
effectively used his Irish immigrant roots to appeal more broadly
to the growing number of other, primarily European, immigrant
voting sectors.
Responses of the Lodge Campaign
Confronted with Kennedy’s effective strategies of using his
large family to cultivate ethnic, religious and women voters and
using teas and television to communicate his engaging personality,
the Lodge campaign attempted to respond by adopting similar
methods. For example, as Lodge realized the positive impact of
Kennedy’s tea parties, he organized his own social gatherings, some
serving coffee.209 However, unlike the personable JFK, Lodge was
uncomfortable at informal social meetings with potential voters.210
According to Lodge’s campaign aide, James Sullivan,
He [Lodge] wasn’t the type of person you approached too easily.
He had a gracious manner, a certain remoteness….He wouldn’t put
his arm around you and say, ‘Let’s go out for a beer,’ or something
like that. No way.211
Further hampering Lodge’s ability to counteract the Kennedy
machine was that, unlike the Kennedys, Lodge lacked an extensive network of current family members to meaningfully assist
his campaign. His famous grandfather had passed away twenty
eight years earlier.212 In addition, Lodge’s wife, Emily Sears, was
an extremely reserved woman, unwilling to campaign publicly for
her husband.213 Nevertheless, Lodge received assistance from his
brother, John Lodge, Governor of Connecticut at the time.214 The
Governor spoke in Massachusetts on behalf of his brother twice
in the weeks leading up to Election Day, in Boston on October
26th, and in Everett on November 1st.215 Governor Lodge’s wife,
Francesca Braggiotti Lodge, also made several speeches on behalf
of her brother-in-law.216 Mrs. Lodge, an attractive and moderately
successful actress, was born in Florence, Italy.217 Emphasizing her
264
Matthew C. Weinstein
Italian roots, many of her speeches were directed towards the Italian voting bloc, and she delivered several speeches in Italian.218
Beyond family support, other notable Republicans campaigned for Lodge in Massachusetts. In response to appearances
in support of Kennedy by Democratic Vice President Alben W.
Barkley, John A. Roosevelt, the Republican youngest son of popular
former President Franklin D. Roosevelt, delivered several speeches
on Lodge’s behalf during the final weeks of October. In Springfield, a pro-Lodge group named “Volunteers for Lodge” tried to
counter Kennedy’s tea parties by organizing eight “coffee hour”
receptions to support Lodge.219 These informal receptions, held
on consecutive days during the waning days of the race, attempted
to inform voters of the “true facts” that compelled Lodge’s reelection.220 At these receptions, distinguished speakers, such as Stuart
G. Waite, chairman of Springfield’s Republican City Committee,
discussed where Lodge and JFK stood on particular election issues.221 However, Lodge did not attend these meetings and the
turnout was much lower than at the Kennedy teas.222 Unfortunately
for Lodge, these last-minute efforts by family and close supporters
were far too little and much too late to stop the wide-reaching,
strategically-focused, media-savvy, and extremely well-financed
and well-organized political machine of the Kennedy family.
The Tipping Point
JFK’s victory over Lodge in the 1952 United States Senate
race in Massachusetts resulted from coordinated efforts by the
closely-knit Kennedy family, driving to win, with effective organization, new strategies and old fashioned influence. In hindsight,
this election represented a major tipping point in Massachusetts
politics. Until 1952, Republicans dominated Massachusetts politics. Since 1952, only two non-incumbent Republicans, Edward
Brooke in 1966 and Scott Brown in 2010, have won Senate races
in Massachusetts.223 In the 1952 election, Massachusetts Republicans won the Governorship, the majority of United States House
of Representatives seats, and the majority of the popular vote for
future President Eisenhower.224 Eisenhower carried Massachusetts
THE CONCORD REVIEW
265
by an 8.8 percent margin over Democrat Adlai Stevenson.225 However, despite this strong Republican performance, the underdog
Democrat, JFK, narrowly defeated incumbent Republican Lodge
by the narrow margin of 70,737 votes, or three percent.226
The 1952 Senate race was more than a battle between two
individual candidates. Lodge, with support and name recognition
built on his family’s longstanding political successes, campaigned
against the entire Kennedy family. Robert Kennedy worked hard
to organize each committee and precinct organization affiliated
with the Kennedy campaign. Meanwhile, Joseph Kennedy bankrolled a large portion of JFK’s campaign, and influenced support
for JFK with contributions to ethnic-based charities and a timely
loan to the Boston Post, which subsequently endorsed his son.227
Joseph Kennedy helped JFK effectively promote his candidacy with
the new medium of television, including coaching techniques to
project his telegenic personality to the masses. In contrast, Lodge
struggled to connect with voters through television, often coming
across as uptight and cold.228
While the Kennedy men worked behind the scenes, the
Kennedy women stood in the public eye. Through creative events,
including teas, “Coffee with the Kennedys,” and door-to-door
campaigning, Rose and her daughters expanded the market of
interested voters and helped drive turnout to unprecedented high
levels.229 The Kennedys effectively appealed to women, FrenchCanadian immigrants, and other groups historically neglected by
Massachusetts politicians.230 By incorporating these minority blocs
into his strong Irish Catholic base, JFK captured enough votes,
with a particularly strong showing in Boston, to defeat Lodge’s
diminished Anglo-Saxon and Protestant blocs. JFK’s image and
background touched the emotional roots of many immigrants.
His brother, Robert, later reflected, “There was a great spirit in
the campaign that I don’t think existed to that time in the state
of Massachusetts.”231 JFK was a grandchild of immigrants and
his wealth, high social standing and education personified the
American Dream for many immigrant voters.
266
Matthew C. Weinstein
JFK’s election tipped the course of Massachusetts politics
in another way, as the 1952 election ushered into office another
Massachusetts Democrat who went on to influence the state and
the country. On the same day JFK beat Lodge, Tip O’Neill won
JFK’s former congressional seat.232 O’Neill held this seat for thirtyfour years, until his death, serving as Speaker of the United States
House for the final ten years of his life.233
Eight years after he defeated Lodge, JFK defeated the
Republican ticket of Senator Richard M. Nixon and his Vice
Presidential candidate, Lodge, to win the 1960 Presidential election.234 During this national campaign, JFK won with many of the
same strategies he developed in the 1952 Massachusetts contest.
For example, JFK’s success with television was repeated during
the famous September 22, 1960 televised debate against Nixon,
when JFK’s easygoing charm contrasted with Nixon’s stiff and
gruff demeanor.235 Similar to 1952, JFK’s Presidential campaign
held several tea and coffee gatherings in local houses in the swing
states of Wisconsin and West Virginia.236 The final election between
the Kennedy and Lodge families occurred two years after JFK’s
Presidential victory, when John’s youngest brother, Ted, defeated
Lodge’s son, George Cabot Lodge II, by over an eight percent margin, to win the same Senate seat which the two families contested
both in 1916 and 1952.237 While these other Lodge-Kennedy elections cannot be overlooked, the 1952 campaign was extraordinary
for how effectively the Kennedy family mobilized their wealth,
experiences, resources, and influence to support JFK’s run. In the
words of biographer Doris Kearns Goodwin, the Kennedys “were
like a warrior force, combining in all their persons, one person’s
goals.”238 When Henry Cabot Lodge, Jr. conceded the 1952 Senate
race, it was not just JFK, but the entire Kennedy family that had
won.
THE CONCORD REVIEW
“The Biographical Directory of the United States
Congress,” The Congressional Biographical Directory, http://
bioguide.congress.gov/biosearch/ biosearch.asp (accessed
April 10, 2010)
2
Thomas J. Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge (Boston:
Northeastern University Press, 2000) p. 7
3
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum, “The
Election of 1952,” John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and
Museum, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/
Archives/Reference+Desk/ The+Election+of+1952.htm
(accessed December 29, 2009)
4
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
5
Ibid.
6
Thomas J. Whalen, interview by author, Boston
University, March 24, 2010
7
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
8
Whalen, Interview
9
Whalen, p. 159
10
Alden Hatch, The Lodges of Massachusetts (New York:
Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973) p. 258
11
Whalen, p. 74
12
Ibid., p. 5
13
Ibid., pp. 7-11
14
Ibid., p. 4
15
Polly Fitzgerald, Oral History of the Life of Polly
Fitzgerald, 1967, The Oral History Project, The John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston
16
Whalen, Interview
17
Ibid.
18
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
19
Ibid.
20
Albert E Van Dusen, “The Hartford Convention,”
Connecticut’s Heritage Gateway, http://www.ctheritage.org/
encyclopedia/ct1763_1818/hartconv.htm (accessed May 15,
2010)
21
Ibid.
22
Ibid.
23
Ibid.
24
Whalen, p. 35
1
267
268
Matthew C. Weinstein
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
26
Ibid.
27
David M. Kennedy, Lizabeth Cohen, and Thomas
A. Bailey, The American Pageant, 14th ed. (United States:
Wadsworth Cengage Learning, 2010) p. 766
28
Article II Section II Paragraph II of the US Constitution
requires the Senate to approve any treaty by a two-thirds
majority. In two separate votes, of 55 nays to 39 yeas and
35 nays to 49 yeas, the Senate failed to amass the required
supermajority.
29­
Whalen, p. 34
30
Ibid., p. 34
31
Ibid., p. 34
32
Ibid, pp. 34-35
33
Ibid, p. 35
34
Ibid, p. 38
35
Ibid, p. 42
36
Ibid, p. 49
37
Ibid, p. 52
38
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
39
Whalen, p. 7
40
The Kennedys, “The Senator,” PBS, December 29, 2009
(originally aired May 14, 2009), WGBH American Experience
Series, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/americanexperience/
kennedys/ (accessed December 29, 2009)
41
Whalen, p. 11
42
“MA US Senate,” Our Campaigns, http://www.
ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail.html?RaceID=267998 (accessed
April 10, 2010)
43
Whalen, p. 11
44
Ibid, p. 12
45
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
46
Ibid.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
“SEC Historical Summary of Chairman and
Commissioners,” The Securities and Exchange Commission,
http://www.sec.gov/about/sechistoricalsummary.htm
(accessed April 10, 2010)
50
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
25
THE CONCORD REVIEW
269
Edward M. Kennedy, True Compass (New York: Twelve,
2009) p. 55
52
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
53
Ibid.
54
Ibid.
55
Whalen, p. 10
56
Ibid., p. 10
57
Whalen, Boston University.
58
Ibid.
59
Ibid.
60
Whalen, p. 21
61
Ibid, p. 22
62
Ibid, p. 24
63
Ibid, pp. 24-29
64
Ibid, p. 21
65
Whalen, Interview
66
Whalen, p. 26
67
Ibid., p. 26
68
During their September 16, 1952 debate, Lodge attacked
JFK for missing House votes, saying, “[The Senate] is a full time
job, and one third of a Senator is no good.”
69
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
70
Whalen, Interview
71
Ibid.
72
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
73
Mark J. Dalton to Joseph P. Kennedy, February 20, 1952,
Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Correspondences 1/52-6/52 “ The
Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
74
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
75
Ibid.
76
John Galvin to John F. Kennedy, July 29, 1952, Series 4.2,
Box 106, Folder “Television,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
77
Ibid.
78
Mark J. Dalton to Joseph P. Kennedy, March 3, 1952,
Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Correspondences 1/52-6/52” The
Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
79
Gloria Negri, “Mark Dalton, 89; Kennedy Aide, Noted
Lawyer Had Key Role in D-Day Landing,” The Boston Globe,
May 4, 2004, http://www.boston.com/news/globe/obituaries/
articles/2004/05/04/mark_dalton_89_kennedy_aide_noted_
lawyer_had_key_role_in_d_day_landing/(accessed February
28, 2010)
51
270
Matthew C. Weinstein
Dalton to Kennedy, March 3, 1952
Galvin to Kennedy, July 29, 1952
82
Ibid.
83
Whalen, p. 146
84
Kennedy and Lodge Television Schedules, chart
(Boston, 1952)
85
Ibid.
86
Ibid.
87
The Kennedy Headquarters, “TV: 5 Minute Spots,”
1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Television-Radio” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
88
Ibid.
89
Transcripts from John F. Kennedy’s two appearances
on Meet the Press, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Meet
the Press” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
90
Ibid.
91
Ibid.
92
Whalen, p. 7
93
Ibid, p. 150
94
The Boston Herald, “Lodge Declines N.Y. Video Role
with Kennedy, Asks Debates Here,” September 11, 1952
95
The Boston Herald, “Kennedy Distinguishes Self in
Debating Lodge,” September 17, 1952
96
The Lynn Telegram-News, October 8, 1952
97
Whalen, p. 151
98
Kennedy and Lodge Television Schedules, chart
(Boston, 1952)
99
Ibid.
100
Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters
describing “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 16, 1952, Series
4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/2/1952 – 10/19/1952”
The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston
101
Ibid.
102
Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 12,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/2/1952–
10/19/1952” The Pre-Presidential Paper, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
103
Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters,
October 16, 1952
104
Ibid.
80
81
THE CONCORD REVIEW
271
Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys” October 31,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952 –
10/31/1952, The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
106
Ibid.
107
Dalton to Kennedy, March 3, 1952
108
Ibid.
109
Whalen, p. 130
110
Ibid, p. 127
111
Ibid., p. 127
112
Ibid., p. 127
113
Ibid., p. 130
114
Ibid., p. 130
115
Ibid., p. 131
116
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by
Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) p. 356, http://archives.
lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full (accessed May
15, 2010)
117
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1946), by
Frederic W. Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1946) p. 258, http://archives.
lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43438?show=full (accessed May
15, 2010)
118
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics : The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by
Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) pp. 38, 356–357,
http://archives.lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full
(accessed May 15, 2010)
119
Ibid.
120
Whalen, Interview
121
Hatch, The Lodges of Massachusetts, p. 258
122
Ibid., p. 258
123
Whalen, p. 163
124
Hatch, p. 258
125
Ibid., p. 258
126
Ibid., p. 258
127
Michael O’Brien, Rethinking Kennedy: An Interpretive
Biography (Chicago: Ivan R. Dree, 2009) p. 72
105
272
Matthew C. Weinstein
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
Ibid.
130
O’Brien, pp. 72-73
131
Whalen, p. 140
132
O’Brien, p. 73
133
Whalen, p. 141
134
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
135
“Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy,” The John F. Kennedy
Library, http://www.jfklibrary.org/Historical+Resources/
Biographies+ and+Profiles/Biographies/Rose+Fitzgerald+
Kennedy.htm (accessed April 11, 2010)
136
Assumption College, “History and Mission,” Assumption
College–French Institute, http://www1.assumption.edu/dept/
Institutes/Frinstitute.html (accessed May 15, 2010)
137
Ibid.
138
Massachusetts Department of Conservation and
Recreation, Regional Historic Context: Quinebaug-Shetucket
and John H. Chafee Blackstone River Valley National Heritage
Corridors, 32-33, http://www.mass.gov/dcr/stewardship/
histland/Regional%20Historic%20Context.pdf (accessed May
15, 2010)
139
Commonwealth of Massachusetts Office of
the Secretary, Annual Report on the Vital Statistics of
Massachusetts : Births, Marriages, Divorces and Deaths (Year
Ending December 31, 1952), by Edward J Cronin, Public
Document 1 (Boston: Secretary of the Commonwealth,
Division of Vital Statistics, 1952) p. 321, http://archives.lib.
state.ma.us/handle/2452/43813?show=full (accessed May 15,
2010)
140
These three cities, totaling over nine percent of the
state’s population were: Worcester, population 203,486; Fall
River, population 111,963; and New Bedford, population
109,189.
141
Gerard J. Brault, The French-Canadian Heritage in New
England (Hanover, New Hampshire: University Press of New
England, 1986) p. 104 142
Textile mill towns that supported Franco-American
newspapers included: Lowell, L’Etoile; Fall River,
L’Indépendant; Holyoke, La Justice; Fitchburg, La Liberte; and
Worcester, La Travailleur.
143
B. Pauline to Robert Francis Kennedy, memorandum,
September 8, 1852, Series 4.2, Box 108, Folder “Relations with
French” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
128
129
THE CONCORD REVIEW
273
The Springfield Daily News, September 25, 1952
Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy (speech by Mrs. Kennedy in
French to French voters (translated)
146
Ibid.
147
Ibid.
148
Ibid.
149
Ibid.
150
Ibid.
151
Maurice R. Cartier, “Report of Maurice R. Cartier
for Week of July 14,1952,” July 21, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 109,
Folder French (POF), The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston
152
Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising an upcoming gathering of the French Women’s
Committee for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 23, 1952,
Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952–10/
31/1952” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
153
Pauline to Kennedy, September 8, 1952
154
Ibid.
155
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1946), by
Frederic W. Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1946) p. 258, http://archives.
lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43438?show=full (accessed May
15, 2010)
156
Reception Schedule, chart (Boston, 1952)
157
Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” August 18,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
158
Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” September 2,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion Pieces” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
159
John F. Kennedy to Sally King, June 17, 1952, Series
4.2, Box 106, Folder “Receptions (POF)” The Pre-Presidential
Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
160
Kennedy Headquarters, “Campaign Talk,” September 2,
1952
161
Ibid.
162
Ibid.
163
Reception Schedule, chart (Boston, 1952)
164
Ed Wagner, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October
27, 1952
144
145
274
Matthew C. Weinstein
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
Time magazine, “THE STATES: Big Battles,”
August 18, 1952, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,816677,00.html (accessed December 27, 2009)
167
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
168
Ibid.
169
Ibid.
170
Ibid.
171
John F. Kennedy to Mrs. Anthony Perreira, June 16,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Receptions (POF)” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
172
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
173
Wagner, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October 27,
1952
174
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
175
Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge, p. 158
176
Ed Wagner, Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising a tea gathering of Boston-Canadians for Rose
Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 27, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105,
Folder “Press Releases: 10/20/1952—10/31/1952, The
Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
177
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
178
The Boston American, November 4, 1952
179
Whalen, p. 159
180
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1948), by
Frederic W Cook, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1948), 35, http://archives.lib.
state.ma.us/handle/2452/43440?show=full (accessed May 15,
2010)
181
Whalen, p. 183
182
Ibid, p. 158
183
Whalen, Kennedy versus Lodge, pp. 61-62 184
Mark Dalton, JFK’s original campaign manager,
abandoned that position following multiple verbal
confrontations with Joseph Kennedy.
185
Whalen, Interview
186
Ibid.
187
Whalen, p. 82
188
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
189
Whalen, pp. 63-64
190
Whalen, Interview
191
Whalen, p. 65
165
166
THE CONCORD REVIEW
Ibid.
Joseph Corish, “General Observations of Campaign
Organization,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Joseph
R. Corish Report on Campaign Organization” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
194
Ibid.
195
Whalen, p. 68
196
The Kennedy Headquarters, “Massachusetts Is
Democratic,” September 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder
“Press Releases: 9/4/1952—9/30/1952,” The Pre-Presidential
Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
197
Ibid.
198
Ibid.
199
Ibid.
200
Ibid.
201
Whalen, p. 165
202
The Kennedy Headquarters, “Massachusetts Is
Democratic,” September 1952
203
Whalen, pp. 93-94 204
Ambassador Kennedy, commenting on Germany’s
aggression leading up to World War II, said, “[The Jews] only
have themselves to blame, they brought it on themselves.”
205
Ibid.
207
Ibid.
208
Ibid.
209
The Kennedy Headquarters, “Nationality Groups–
Jewish,” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 109, Folder “Jewish: Undated &
Articles” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
210
Ibid.
211
Whalen, p. 95
212
Whalen, Interview
213
Michell Kolsti to Members of the Massachusetts
Albanian Community, Fall 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder
“Campaign Letters to Special Groups,” The Pre-Presidential
Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
214
Ibid.
215
M.S. Abourjaily to Members of the Massachusetts
Armenian, Syrian, Greek Communities, October 29, 1952,
Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Campaign Letters to
Special Groups,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston
192
193
275
276
Matthew C. Weinstein
The Springfield Republican, “Volunteers for Lodge to
Hold Reception Here,” October 26, 1952
217
Whalen, p. 146
218
Ibid., p. 7
219
Hatch, p. 153
220
Whalen, Interview
221
The Associated Press, “Gov. Lodge Plans to Aid Brother
in Senate Fight,” The Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, October
16, 1952
222
Ibid.
223
The Leominister Daily Enterprise, “Mrs. John Lodge to
Speak Here Sunday Night,” October 24, 1952
224
Ibid.
225
Ibid.
226
The Springfield Republican, October 26, 1952
227
Ibid.
228
Ibid.
229
Ibid.
230
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
231
John H. Fenton, “Lodge a ‘Casualty’ in Massachusetts,”
New York Times, November 6, 1952
232
Commission on Administration and Finance, Election
Statistics: The Commonwealth of Massachusetts (1952), by
Edward J. Cronin, Public Document 43 (Boston: Office of
Secretary of the Commonwealth, 1952) p. 317, http://archives.
lib.state.ma.us/handle/2452/43444?show=full (accessed May
15, 2010)
233
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum,
“The Election of 1952”
234
Whalen, p. 130
235
Ibid,, 150
236
Whalen, p. 159
237
Ibid., p. 165
238
Ibid., p. 68
239
The Congressional Biographical Directory, “The
Biographical Directory of the United States Congress”
240
Ibid.
241
Kennedy, Cohen, and Bailey, p. 965
242
Ibid., p. 964
243
Polly Fitzgerald, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
216
THE CONCORD REVIEW
“MA US Senate–Special Election,” Our Campaigns,
http://www.ourcampaigns.com/RaceDetail/html? Race
ID=21231 (accessed April 10, 2010)
245
The Kennedys, PBS, December 29, 2009
244
Bibliography
Primary Sources
Abourjaily, M.S., M.S. Abourjaily to Members of the
Massachusetts Armenian, Syrian, Greek Communities, October
29, 1952 Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Campaign Letters to
Special Groups,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston
Associated Press, “Gov. Lodge Plans to Aid Brother in
Senate Fight,” The Holyoke Transcript-Telegram, October 16,
1952
Associated Press, “Kennedy to Oppose Lodge,” New York
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1952 Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder “Correspondences,” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
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4.2, Box 106, Folder “Television–Radio,” The Pre-Presidential
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———. John F. Kennedy to Mrs. Anthony Perreira, June 16,
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French to French voters (translated)
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“Promotion Pieces,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F.
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Folder “Television-Radio,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
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103, Folder “Campaign Letters to Special Groups,” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
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October 4, 1952, pp. 297-298
Mullins, W.E., “This Is How I See It: Lodge-Kennedy
Campaign Strategies a Problem; No Wide Difference between
Them in Major Issues,” The Boston Herald, April 11, 1952
Murchison, Carl, Carl Murchison to Henry Cabot Lodge
Junior, July 29, 1952 Series 4.2, Box 106, Folder “Promotion
Pieces.” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
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Nelson, George A., “A Vote for Kennedy Means Strength
for Honest Government!” 1952, Series 4.2, Box 103, Folder
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O’Donnell, John, “Ike Sure of Only 3 States,” The New York
Daily News, September 2, 1952
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Francis Kennedy, memorandum, September 8, 1952, Series 4.2,
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Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
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com////,9171,935732-2,00.html (accessed December 27,
2009)
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18, 1952, http://www.time.com////,9171,816677,00.html
(accessed December 27, 2009)
Transcripts from John F. Kennedy’s two appearances on
Meet the Press, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Meet the
Press,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy
Library, Boston
Wagner, Ed, The Belmont-Watertown Herald, October 27,
1952
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October 20, 1952. October 1952. Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder
“Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F.
Kennedy Library, Boston
———. The Lowell Sun, September 27, 1952
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising an upcoming gathering of the French Women’s
Committee for Rose Fitzgerald Kennedy. October 23,
1952. Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases,” The PrePresidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising a tea gathering of Boston-Canadians for Rose
Fitzgerald Kennedy, October 27, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105,
Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John
F. Kennedy Library, Boston
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters
advertising upcoming “Coffee with the Kennedys,” October 12,
1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10//– 10//”.
The Pre-Presidential Paper. The John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters
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1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press Releases: 10//– 10//.
The Pre-Presidential Papers, The John F. Kennedy Library,
Boston
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters describing
“Coffee with the Kennedys,” October 16, 1952, Series 4.2, Box
105, Folder “Press Releases,” The Pre-Presidential Papers, The
John F. Kennedy Library, Boston
———. Press release from Kennedy headquarters
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family. September 23, 1952, Series 4.2, Box 105, Folder “Press
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Brault, Gerard J., The French-Canadian Heritage in New
England. Hanover New Hampshire: University Press of New
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Hawthorn Books, Inc., 1973
John F. Kennedy Presidential Library and Museum. “The
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tion+of+1952.htm (accessed December 29, 2009)
Kennedy, David M., Lizabeth Cohen, and Thomas A. Bailey,
The American Pageant, 14th ed. United States: Wadsworth
Cengage Learning, 2010
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Massachusetts Department of Conservation and Recreation,
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(accessed May 15, 2010)
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(accessed February 28, 2010)
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Biography. Chicago: Ivan R. Dree, 2009
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March 24, 2010
———. Kennedy versus Lodge, Boston: Northeastern
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284
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In a June 3, 1990 column in The New York Times, Albert Shanker, President of
the American Federation of Teachers, wrote: “...It is also worth thinking about as we consider how to reform
our education system. As we’ve known for a long time, factory workers who
never saw the completed product and worked on only a small part of it soon
became bored and demoralized, But when they were allowed to see the whole
process—or better yet become involved in it—productivity and morale
improved. Students are no different. When we chop up the work they do into
little bits—history facts and vocabulary and grammar rules to be learned—
it’s no wonder that they are bored and disengaged. The achievement of The
Concord Review’s authors offers a different model of learning. Maybe it’s time
for us to take it seriously.”
=======================
In a June 1993 letter to the MacArthur Foundation, Albert Shanker, President
of the American Federation of Teachers, wrote: “...Equally important, the published essays can let youngsters see
what other students their own age are capable of and what they themselves can
aspire to. The Review also has a vital message for teachers. American education
suffers from an impoverishment of standards at all levels. We see that when we
look at what is expected of students in other industrialized nations and at what
they achieve. Could American students achieve at that level? Of course, but
our teachers often have a hard time knowing exactly what they can expect of
their students or even what a first-rate essay looks like. The Concord Review sets
a high but realistic standard; and it could be invaluable for teachers trying to
recalibrate their own standards of excellence.”
...Let me say that I think The Concord Review could be especially
useful to poor and disadvantaged children and their teachers. Last year,
I was privileged to hear John Jacob, the president of the National Urban
League, talk about how poor black children, in particular, need to be held
up to higher academic standards. Jacob believes that, instead of lowering
our sights, we must raise them and demand high academic performance.
Among the specific standards he suggested was that every African-American
child—and in fact every American child—write a 25-page paper in order to
graduate from high school. I think Jacob is right. I also think The Concord
Review could be a vehicle for raising the sights of disadvantaged children and
their teachers. And I plan to work with leaders in one or more of the American
Federation of Teachers’ urban locals to help set up special issues of The Concord
Review for their cities similar to the special International Baccalaureate issue
the Review recently published.”
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Copyright 2010, by The Concord Review, Inc., all rights reserved
LOUIS VS. SCHMELING:
POLITICS AND RACE IN THE RING
Kevin Liu
Introduction O
n July 22, 1938, New York City was buzzing with excitement as more than 70,000 people made their way to Yankee
Stadium. All were present to witness what some observers described
as “the most important sporting event in history.” When boxers
Joe Louis and Max Schmeling stepped into the stadium that night,
there was much more at stake than merely the world heavyweight
boxing championship. The world was on the brink of war and
both fighters were held up as symbols of the opposing countries.
Joe Louis of Alabama, U.S.A, represented democracy and moral
ideals while Germany’s Max Schmeling was seen as an emblem of
Aryan dominance and even Adolf Hitler himself. A combination
of the popularity of boxing, each fighter’s astounding skill set, and
the differences of their backgrounds made Louis and Schmeling
heroes of their generation. The Joe Louis versus Max Schmeling
rivalry is a historic relationship that was freighted with incredible
symbolic significance to the important social and political issues
of the 1930s.
Kevin Liu is a Senior at Appleby College in Oakville, Ontario, where he
wrote this paper for Dr. Patrick Carter’s United States History course in
the 2009/2010 academic year.
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Boxing was a unique sport that crystallized the racial and
political tensions that most other sports attempted to steer clear
from. Time magazine’s coverage of the fight referred to the challenger as “German Max Schmeling” and the champion as “Negro
Joe Louis.” Thus even to the most experienced boxing enthusiast
the fight held a vitality that was utterly unprecedented. This bout
was between a twenty-four-year-old black American and a German
nine years his senior. It was between the world heavyweight champion and the only man who had ever beaten him. This fight was not
merely between black and white—which would have been furious
enough—but also between youth and age, talent and experience,
freedom and fascism, and even the minority population against
Adolf Hitler. Everyone held a belief and a hope, and despite the
popularity, no one could make any confident assumption on
what was about to happen. In one of the greatest upsets in sports
history two years earlier, Max Schmeling had knocked out the
previously undefeated and seemingly invincible Joe Louis. Since
that moment, a potential rematch had ben scrutinized from every
possible angle. So popular was the 1938 rematch that it became
known simply as “The Fight.”
By the time the rematch was announced, both fighters
showed confidence, and the public was clamoring wildly for a
showdown. In a society still affected by the Great Depression,
about one million dollars was spent in tickets. Such sales were
a rarity at the time in professional boxing. “Judges and lawyers,
Representatives and Senators, Governors and Mayors, bankers
and brokers, merchant princes and industrial giants, doctors,
artists, writers, figures of prominence in various fields of sports,
champions of the past and present in the ring, stars of the stage
and screen—everybody, it seems,” would be close to or at ringside
that evening, the New York Times predicted.
The publicity, political influence, and social significance
of this fight demonstrated to everyone that there had never been
a sporting event like this one, and there might never be anything
like it again. Under the bright lights of a looming war and the
hopes and dreams of millions, two men would battle for much
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more than a typical prizefight. What made this sport and these
men so special? What are the circumstances that gave a single
sporting event so much social and political clout?
Boxing and Society
Only boxers could have acquired the status and significance
of Max Schmeling or Joe Louis. Boxing was America’s most popular sport, and boxers were the most celebrated athletes of their
day. Joe Louis Jr., the son of Joe Louis, was able to recall how “the
most powerful individual in the world was also the heavyweight
boxing champion of the world.” Young children analyzed photos
from The Ring and fathers spent what little money they had to see
boxing matches at local arenas and enormous outdoor stadiums.
Some spent 25 cents to view bouts they could not see in person at
the movie house. Movie houses also played many melodramas that
showcased boxing in which the leading man played a boxer, such
as The Prizefighter and the Lady, The Champ, and The Golden Boy. In
1935, the year before Max Schmeling fought Joe Louis for the first
time, the New York Yankees averaged 8,886 fans, playing practically in an empty stadium. That fall though, more than 100,000
people packed into Yankee Stadium to see Joe Louis fight Max
Baer in a non-title bout. For Joe Louis and Max Schmeling, two of
the top ranked boxers in the world, the limits of popularity were
boundless. As Jeremy Schaap, author of Cinderella Man, eloquently
stated “Baseball was America’s pastime but boxing was America’s
passion.”
Background: Joe Louis
To understand the upbringing of one of the most celebrated
athletes in history, one must rewind about two decades prior to
“The Fight.” The onset of the Great War meant that millions of
Americans and European immigrants were called off to war. Many
of these soldiers had previously been the foundation of American
labor by manning the country’s foundries, factories, and mills.
Underprivileged southerners and blacks were attracted by labor
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agents who described Henry Ford’s five-dollar-day and even more
were influenced by postcards and stories illustrating the wonders
of electricity and moving pictures. Consequently, thousands of
African-Americans abandoned the South and ventured northward
in search of prosperity. Detroit’s population grew by six hundred
percent during the First World War. It was in this mass movement
that Joe Louis entered the training grounds that made him one
of the greatest boxers in the world. His origins are vital as they
provided a means by which people could later portray him as an
athlete who embodied American democracy.
Sometime at the beginning of the twentieth century,
Munroe Barrow and Lillie Reese came together to begin a life in
Chambers County in eastern Alabama, at the foot of the Buckalew Mountains. Both Munroe and Lillie Barrow were imposing
physical specimens. Munroe Barrow stood at about six feet tall
and weighed two hundred pounds while Lillie Reese Marrow was
about five-foot-six and 170 pounds. They dedicated their lives to
sharecropping, an economic system of racism and inequality that
was not far removed from the slave-and-master system of their
parents’ era.
Lillie Barrow was a dedicated mother who raised her children to respect their elders, to have faith, and always to embrace
morals. Lillie Barrow was known for declaring “I’m not whipping
you for what you did, I’m whipping you for lying about it.” All of her
eight children, Susie, Emmarell, Alvanious, Ponce deLeon, Alonzo,
Eulalia, Joe, and Vunies, were born in about a twelve-year period
ending in 1916. A mixture of white, black, and Native-American
blood was in the family. Joseph Louis Barrow was number seven
and he first tipped the scales on May 13th, 1914, at eleven pounds.
Life was arduous for the Barrows. Sharecropping meant
that Munroe had to share his crop with the landowner, as well as
pay for the rent of a horse, plow, and other essentials. Munroe
was also prone to spells of mental instability and often required
intermittent stays at the Searcy Hospital for the Negro Insane in
Mount Vernon. By the time Joe was two, his father was permanently
institutionalized in an asylum and the man who filled the role of
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father was Pat Brooks, a widower with nine children of his own.
The two families eventually merged and moved to a large
house near Camp Hill, in the Buckalew Mountains. Joe’s schooling
was irregular and he was known to use any excuse to miss lessons.
He did not talk properly until he was six years old and even then
he spoke with a speech impediment. This was the major cause
for his distinctive shy personality. He was a big and healthy boy,
but was also lazy and enjoyed nothing more than a sound sleep.
This was another habit that would stay with him for the rest of his
life. Despite the blatant racism of the era, Louis’s childhood was
often known as a “racially benign existence” in the settled way of
the segregated South.
Pat Brooks was soon visited by his relatives from Detroit,
who told grand stories of the industrial boom in the Motor City.
Inspired by the news, Louis’s family joined the historic northward
migration of blacks into Detroit when Joe was twelve years old.
There, the Barrows saw their first flushing toilets, electric lights,
and the hustle and bustle of a large and growing city. Louis was
still finding traditional schoolwork too onerous, and joined a vocational school by the age of fourteen. He earned spare change
by delivering ice, hauling sixty-pound blocks up several flights of
stairs every day after school, building upon his already impressive
physique. After sampling activities such as the violin and baseball,
Louis finally discovered boxing. He had his first amateur match
in the spring of 1932 at age eighteen against Johnny Miller. Miller
was getting ready to fight for the United States Olympic team later
that year and knocked Louis down seven times en route to an easy
victory.
Louis became discouraged and avoided the gym for a
time. But he soon returned to the ring at the local Brewster Center. With newfound experience and training Louis knocked out
thirteen straight amateur opponents.While he became considered
a top prospect, it should be noted that he was no more so than
the other fighters he trained with. After all, “he used to struggle
to win our club championship,” recalled Eddie Futch, a former
boxer in the lightweight class at Brewster Center. However, what
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made Louis stand out from the crowd was his constant persistence
and passion. Futch remembered how he “never knew anybody so
persistent. If you had an apple, [Louis] would beg and beg for a
bite until you gave him a bite. So he always got me into the ring
to spar with him.” When word began to spread of how he dented
a punching bag, Joe had his first experience of notoriety. Local
boxing fans began to take notice of him on the streets and in the
club.
After his first year as an amateur, Louis found himself in
the local light-heavyweight championships in the novice class.
He began his Golden Gloves debut on January 11, 1933. Before
long, Joe had six straight knockouts as a Golden Glover which
earned him the light-heavyweight title. Despite his crowd-pleasing
knockouts and toughness, Joe was not considered invincible yet.
Joe steadily progressed through the amateur ranks, and he became
an increasingly popular choice for various fight cards. His ferocity
in the ring and gym always belied a remarkably even personality.
Many local fans loved him for his shy sweetness and remarkable
diffidence.
Louis began his professional career on the night of September 11th, 1934, in front of a large group of friends and family.
The fight was nothing more than a local fight in Windsor, Ontario.
However, Louis’s poise and aggressiveness in the ring that night
would foreshadow the rest of his career. After merely five months,
Louis’s professional record was 11 wins and 0 losses. Within another
year, Louis was considered one of the top heavyweights, and his
popularity was growing by the fight.
Background: Max Schmeling
In the same period that the Barrows were contemplating
a new life in Detroit, a dark-haired fifteen-year-old stood outside a
newspaper office in Cologne listening to the radio. He was hunched
with a group of men, all of whom possessed furrowed brows and
looks of intense absorption. The boy was named Max Siegfried
Adolph Otto Schmeling and he was completely engrossed in an
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account of Jack Dempsey’s famed fight with Frenchman Georges
Carpentier. After the fight, Schmeling spent his meager earnings
watching the same fight in a local theatre. He then convinced his
father to pay for some boxing lessons. Soon, young Max saved
enough to buy old boxing gloves and hung them over his bed. A
burning passion had been ignited.
Max Schmeling was born on September 28th, 1905 in Klein
Luckow, a small town eighty miles north of Berlin. Schmeling
grew up in Hamburg; he left school early and worked at various
odd jobs. He was always physically fit, and although he flirted with
soccer at a young age, he was soon drawn to boxing. The pugilistic
world was previously underground and illegal in Germany before
World War I. However, interest in the sport had recently exploded.
German soldiers had learned it as prisoners of war in Britain and
America, and brought it back to Germany. In Weimar Germany,
the sport evolved to become a great passion of the working class,
artists, and intellectuals alike.
First in Dusseldorf, then in Cologne, Schmeling spent
most of his spare time in boxing clubs. In Cologne, he honed his
distinctive skills and fighting style. Schmeling was known to be
methodical, scientific, and patient. He was a fighter well-versed in
the basics of footwork, body movement, and defense. He would
become famous for his distinctive calculating style. In addition to
his physical development, Schmeling’s personal life had always
been extremely regimented. He was on a careful diet with no
alcohol, no tobacco, and regular training hours.
Schmeling’s training soon propelled him to the professional fight scene in 1924. Schmeling won nine of his first ten
fights and became the German heavyweight boxing champion in
1928. With his success, Schmeling gained entry into elite German
intellectual circles amongst novelists, filmmakers, and artists. His
physical appeal and charming personality also allowed him to
connect with the German public. German magazines called him
“our greatest hope” and extolled his “cold, sure eye, technique,
brain and general ability.” Sports columnists soon encouraged
Schmeling to venture across the Atlantic. A notable example was
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Paul Gallico, a prominent sports columnist for the New York Daily
News, who spoke German and read German newspapers. Gallico
and other journalists began urging Schmeling to test the waters of
pugilism in the United States. Once in New York, Schmeling met
Joe Jacobs, a notable Jewish fight manager. Their relationship was
one of sport’s most incongruous partnerships. Jacobs was a short,
fast-talking Jewish New Yorker while Schmeling was a muscular
German who would be used to embody Nazi ideals. According to
Time magazine, Jacobs, the manger, was physically “puny” but in
character he was “generous, gregarious, and made good copy.”
With Jacobs managing his career, Schmeling won two difficult fights in a row in February 1929, and many people were already
beginning to predict he would become the world heavyweight
champion. In fact, Boxing Sport declared that American public
opinion toward Germany had warmed up for the first time since
the armistice. This demonstrates the significance of boxing and
its prizefighters to public opinion and political strife. After more
victories against top contenders, Schmeling’s rise and publicity
were unmatched. Jacobs wrote a seventeen-part series on Schmeling for the New York American. The New York Times declared that
“all of Berlin was frantic with joy.” In barely a year since he arrived
in America, Schmeling’s purses topped 95,000 dollars, the fastest
start for a boxer ever. Schmeling was connecting with American
fight fans but his newfound publicity and success made him one
of Germany’s most precious exports. When Schmeling stepped in
the ring to fight Jack Sharkey for the heavyweight crown on June
12, 1930, the fight received widespread media attention from all
national and local papers. The front page of the Olean Times bore
the headline “Expect 70,000 Fans to Witness World Title Contest”
and dedicated its front page spreads to pictures of Sharkey and
Schmeling. Schmeling would never back down from his image as
Germany’s prodigal child; his trunks bore the German national
colors and he was introduced as “the fighting son of the Fatherland.”
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Schmeling started the bout slowly, and lost the first two
rounds. By the third round, Sharkey felt like he would be able
to knock out Schmeling at will. In the fourth round, Sharkey
saw an opening to Schmeling’s body positioned himself for an
attack with full power. Precisely where the punch landed will
forever be unknown. However, Schmeling doubled over in pain,
and Joe Jacobs began to berate the referee for what he thought
was an obvious below-the-belt foul. The entire ring erupted in
pandemonium. The befuddled referee declared Schmeling the
winner, and he became the first and only heavyweight champion
to win on a foul. The manner in which he won the championship
stained Schmeling’s accomplishment to the extent that even his
extremely loyal German fan base criticized his victory. American
newspapers were even more unforgiving in their accounts. The
Baltimore Post declared that Sharkey had “had out-classed Schmeling
in every way” and “no one among that vast throng which packed
every nook and cranny of the towering Yankee Stadium last night
left with any doubt that Jack Sharkey was the better man.”
The negative publicity clouded Schmeling’s reign as
heavyweight champion. In late January 1931, he began a forty-city
exhibition tour, designed to cash in on his championship status.
The tour was poorly attended, and Schmeling was often rudely
received. In January of 1932, he finally agreed to a rematch with
Sharkey that following June. Schmeling met Sharkey again on
June 21st at the Madison Square Garden Bowl in Long Island City
in front of 70,000 fans. Schmeling appeared to have dominated
the somewhat dull fight from beginning to end. Astonishingly,
the result was a split decision, and Sharkey was declared the winner. Joe Jacobs earned sport’s immortality by famously seizing
the microphone to scream, “We wuz robbed!” Paul Gallico of the
New York Daily News declared that “The great Schmeling-Sharkey
controversy now stands at one steal apiece.” Despite Schmeling’s
loss, he was a much bigger star than he had ever been as the
heavyweight champion.
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The Risen and the Redeemed
After losing the title in 1932, Schmeling lost again to Max
Baer in 1933 and to Steve Hamas in 1934. Ike Gellis of the New
York Evening Post described Schmeling as “pathetic” and even
Paul Gallico conceded that he thought Schmeling’s career was
over. While Joe Louis began making headlines with his knockout
prowess in the United States, the former champion’s only hope
was to quietly rehabilitate his image in Europe. Beginning in Germany in a thrilling fight against Walter Neusel in August of 1934,
Schmeling began his comeback. Schmeling went on to beat two
more top contenders, Steve Hamas and Paulino Uzcudan. With
the victories his handlers announced that Schmeling was ready
to be considered for the championship. However, Schmeling’s
redemption run coincided with Joe Louis’s meteoritic rise to
stardom.
Joe Louis had won his first twenty-three professional
fights, with all but four being knockouts. His victories against top
contenders and former champions gave him an unprecedented
reputation for invincibility. Louis was already being proclaimed as
one of the greatest fighters of all time. Destiny was moving Louis
and Schmeling closer to a showdown when they both closed out
1935 with victories against the same opponent, Paolino Uzcudun.
When Schmeling was scheduled to fight Louis for the first time in
1936, Louis held an unnerving aura of invincibility. Schmeling,
on the other hand, was looking forward to his thirty-first birthday, and attempting to rebound off of several stark losses. He was
considered over the hill by journalists and fans alike.
Joe Louis was beginning to connect with the American
public, including people of all races. In an era long before political correctness or racial equality came into light, many writers
exaggerated Louis’s unsophisticated speech. Sportswriters of the
day were even blatantly racist in their drawings and columns.
Coverage of a Max Schmeling fight against Max Baer, who is of
Jewish origin, in Time magazine featured the headline, “Sport:
Jew vs. German.” Despite racism, there was also a growing acceptance of Louis’s popularity with the general public. Most
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writers agreed that his spectacular skill was combined with great
modesty, behavior, and sportsmanship. Nat Fleischer wrote, “The
Ring welcomes Louis among America’s fighting men. Regardless
of color, boxing needs good talent and in the Detroiter it has the
type of gladiator for whom the sport has been looking.” Louis’s
popularity marks a largely unprecedented social achievement for
an African-American athlete and would set the foundation for
Louis’s reputation as “white America’s first black hero.”
Although not on the same scale, Max Schmeling was
also receiving admiring praise from American sportswriters for
his determination and fearlessness. Schmeling is quoted as stating decisively that “I have been hit before and I did not like it, I
admit. But I was not scared then and I will not be scared when
Louis hits me.” Coincidentally, it was the German politicians and
sportswriters who were criticizing him most. The Nazis thought
his defeat would be inevitable at the hands of Louis and believed
Schmeling would reflect badly on the dogma of Aryan superiority. The party’s official Reich Sport Journal observed that there was
“not much enthusiasm” for the fight. Only one low-ranked Nazi
correspondent travelled with Schmeling to cover the fight. It was
as though his own nation had officially written him off after his
previous losses.
The unofficial betting odds showed that Schmeling was
an 8 to 1 underdog at the start of the fight. Nonetheless, as he
promised, Schmeling maintained his unperturbed demeanor.
Most were ready for a quick and exciting knockout for the undefeated and virtually unassailable Louis. However, most were also
unaware of Schmeling’s meticulous planning and fight strategy.
He had spent countless hours studying films of Louis’s previous
fights, probing for any sign of a weakness. Schmeling himself described his research as the “thorough, systematic observation of
a scientist.” It did not take long for Schmeling to notice that Joe
tended to drop his left hand after delivering a punch, thus leaving himself open to a right-hand counterpunch. It was also the
case that a short, straight right hand attack was the best weapon
in Schmeling’s arsenal. Most of the knockouts in his career came
from his powerful and deadly-accurate right hand.
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Kevin Liu
The fight opened quietly, and Louis easily won the first few
rounds. It seemed that he was indeed on his way to an easy win.
However, Schmeling never deserted his fight strategy and patiently
waited for Louis to drop his left hand and completely open himself
to a Schmeling counterpunch. Schmeling had long ago decided
to sacrifice a few rounds and absorb some hard Louis punches to
get his chance at landing his right-hand attack. Of the first few
rounds, he declared “I could have avoided those punches, but that
would have meant moving out of the range from which I could
land my right.” Schmeling then found that opportunity for which
he had been preparing for. He unloaded the perfect punch which
he had honed for his entire career. According to Schmeling, he
had “thrown [his] entire body weight behind it, and it was hard
and sharp.” All of a sudden, Louis went from cool and collected to
staggered and foggy. His knees became unsteady and Schmeling
sent him tumbling to the canvas for the first time in his career.
Nat Fleischer of The Ring described how Louis “seemed not only
to be wobbly, but in a daze.” Fleischer went on to declare how “the
idol who replaced Jack Dempsey as the magnet was nearing the
end of his reign.” Schmeling kept finding openings for his right
and when he knocked out Louis in the twelfth round, journalists
called it the “upset of the century.”
Merely hours before Schmeling sat in his locker room,
exhausted but victorious, Germany had wanted to forget him.
Suddenly, Schmeling became the new darling of the Third Reich.
Joseph Goebbels cabled immediately after hearing the result,
declaring “I know you won it for Germany. We are proud of you.”
Adolf Hitler soon followed with his own message, and even sent
Schmeling’s wife flowers. A week after the fight, Schmeling was
invited to fly home on the Hindenburg zeppelin. After Schmeling
arrived in Germany, he was whisked off to Berlin for a private reception with Adolf Hitler. The two viewed footage of Schmeling’s
victory and Hitler demanded that footage of the fight be expanded
into a full-length feature called Max Schmeling’s Victory, A German
Victory.
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In Louis’s locker room, Joe could be seen weeping long
and hard. His face had been bludgeoned blue, purple, and yellow.
Given Louis’s lofty status amongst American blacks, his mauling
was perceived as a symbolic defeat for the entire race. There were
even scattered reports of black-on-white violence. The American
press, found completely off the mark in its prediction of an easy
knockout for Louis, searched frantically for excuses. The final
conclusion was practically unanimous in the belief that Louis had
gone into the fight unprepared, both mentally and physically. Louis
had entered boxing as a teenager largely influenced by his family,
his religion, and the poverty of his upbringing. The fact was Joe
Louis had grown up. By the time of the Schmeling fight, he had
become a confident young man swayed by fame and fortune. He
had his own opinions and influences and was not influenced by the
well-meaning advice of friends and family. His trainers lamented
about Louis’s preparation for the Schmeling fight; when he was
not spending time chasing women, he was playing golf.
While many in America debated Louis’s astounding fall,
he responded with a stout heart and yearned to resume training as soon as possible. In an interview he said that “I had been
humiliated, and I had to prove to everybody that I was the best
heavyweight around.” Prior to the bout, Louis symbolized racial
progress in black America. More than just a top prospect, he was
considered untouchable. According to journalists, Schmeling’s
victory was tantamount to realigning the stars in the universe.
Walter Wendall of the Boston Chronicle wrote about the streets of
Harlem just after the fight and how “not even the worst days of
the Depression could achieve such blanket sadness.” Even for the
citizens who were not boxing fans, who were few and far between,
Louis’s defeat had an astounding impact.
Although originally disconsolate after the defeat, Louis
returned to his winning ways just eight weeks after his loss to
Schmeling. He knocked out Joe Sharkey just three rounds in.
Then, in September of that year, he knocked out Al Ettore.
Neither Schmeling nor Louis held the world heavyweight
championship at this point. The current champion was James
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J. Braddock, a man journalist Damon Runyon anointed as “the
Cinderella Man” for his surprising rise. Both Louis and Schmeling
were considered better prospects than Braddock and a race began
to see who would come to hold the title. It was a significant social
and political fear for many Americans that Schmeling would beat
Braddock and consequently take the title back to Germany and
keep it there. Thus, even though Louis had lost his bout against
Max Schmeling, promoters had cleverly argued a championship
fight against Braddock in his favor. On the evening of June 22,
1937, the champion and the challenger made their ways to the
ring pitched outside in Comiskey Park. Joe was considered a much
superior fighter, and a 2-to-1 favourite. When Joe knocked Braddock down in the eighth round he knew he was the first black
heavyweight champion in an entire generation and the youngest
titleholder ever. Louis had managed to climb his way back to
the top of the world after his damaging loss to Schmeling. The
response was both exuberant and immediate. The New York Sun
featured a headline that said “Harlem Holds Maddest Revel.”
Within a half-hour of the fight’s conclusion, newsboys
were hawking fight extras. Once again the stars in the universe
had seemed to realign and praise for Louis resumed. However, in
the emotional dressing room he sat exhausted and quiet. When
he finally spoke, he declared that “I don’t want nobody to call
me champ until I beat that Schmeling.” Up until that point, both
Schmeling and Louis were larger than life. After those words, their
rivalry and forthcoming rematch were too.
“The Fight”
It was September 3rd, 1937, and Mike Jacobs, boxing promoter
at Madison Square Garden, was practically prancing around his
office with delight. This was of little surprise as Jacobs had just
received word that Max Schmeling agreed to fight Joe Louis for
the World’s Heavyweight Boxing Championship. “I can see all
those senators, governors, and mayors chasing me for a crack
at the bout,” Jacobs anticipated. “They’ll be in a line from here
to San Francisco.” The so-called “Fight of the Century” was now
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scheduled, and fans would have to wait just 10 months for the most
famous boxing showdown in history. During this long interval,
press and world events would help create the most politicized and
publicized fight build-up in sports history.
Both fighters attempted to concentrate on the task ahead
without becoming distracted with the ever-present political spin.
However, neither could fail to recognize the significance of their
fight. Over the winter and spring of 1937-1938, Adolf Hitler had
increased the pace of German rearmament and territorial expansion, eventually setting his voracious gaze upon Czechoslovakia.
Political tensions were high, and the war became a real fear for
the general public.
Consequently, the enormous wave of pre-fight publicity in
1938 saw both men exploited by their respective countries in an
effort to try to shape a patriotic consciousness. President Franklin
D. Roosevelt was worried about how America would respond to
growing fascist power in Europe. In 1937, Roosevelt was voicing
his concerns that “the epidemic of world lawlessness is spreading.”
Further, by the start of Roosevelt’s re-election campaign for the
presidency in 1940, America was only beginning to recover from
the after-effects of the Great Depression and was in desperate
need of a hero. Joe Louis seemed to be a prime candidate. Prior
to Louis’s fight against Max Schmeling, Roosevelt invited Louis to
the White House for dinner. After touching Louis’s arm, Roosevelt
declared “Joe, we need muscles like yours to beat Germany.” Herr
Hitler looked upon Max Schmeling as a perfect propaganda tool.
Blessed with an able body, broad shoulders, and a stiff right jab,
Germans saw Max Schmeling as a “superman.” The Nazis became
incredibly fond of Schmeling as a charismatic symbol to whom
they could attach their political ideology. Chris Mead, author of
Champion Joe Louis described how “World events made it increasingly difficult for Americans to disassociate Max Schmeling from
his fascist homeland. The swastika hugged Schmeling like flypaper.”
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Kevin Liu
Schmeling himself explained the political importance of the fight
and how
1938 saw Hitler at the height of his popularity. But as great as was
the celebration, so was the rest of the world put ill at east. I felt the
shift in public opinion when I arrived in New York in early spring to
start training for the Louis fight. Even as the Bremen pulled into New
York harbor, there were people yelling and carrying signs, apparently
waiting for none other than myself. The posters that they held over
their heads called me an ‘Aryan Show Horse’ and a representative
of the ‘master race,’ while they shook their fists at me.
Schmeling was not the only competitor affected by the fight’s political ambience. Just before stepping into the ring, the American
nation heard Louis’s views on the event: “Tonight I not only fight
the battle of my life to revenge the lone blot on my record, but I
fight for America against the challenge of a foreign invader, Max
Schmeling. This isn’t just one man against another or Joe Louis
boxing Max Schmeling—it’s the good old U.S.A. versus Germany.”
As June 22, fight night, drew nearer, fight talk and war talk
were virtually interchangeable. Groups like the Anti-Nazi League
and American Jewish Committee picketed Mike Jacobs’s office in
an effort to slow ticket sales. Further, it was rumored that Hitler
had offered Schmeling the minister of sport position for the Third
Reich if he won. Another rumor spread that Schmeling’s trainer,
Max Machon, had a full Nazi uniform hanging in his closet.
“The Fight” also had important social consequences. Most
notable was Joe Louis’s great impact on racial equality for AfricanAmericans. Louis became the first African-American to achieve
lasting popularity and universal fame in the 20th century. In an age
when African Americans were subject to lynching, segregation,
and oppression, Louis inspired hope. Malcolm X recalled that
“every Negro boy old enough to walk wanted to be the next “Brown
Bomber” (Louis’s nickname).” Louis was the first African-American
to receive a hero’s worship that had previously been reserved for
white men only. According to Joe Louis, Jr. “What my father did
was enable white America to think of him as an American, not as
a black. By winning, he became white America’s first black hero.”
Louis was black America’s most significant source of pride and
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301
a win against Schmeling would mean triumph against the most
brutal racism directed at people.
The Joe Louis and Max Schmeling rivalry also had a significant impact on society that superseded individual races. Both
national governments were grooming their fighter to appear as
the invincible champion. A win would boost morale, promote
public confidence, and reflect positively on the government. As
Louis stated, “I knew I had to get Schmeling good. I had my own
personal reasons and the whole damned country was depending
on me.” In a time of war and foreign policy struggle, public confidence is considered vital. Given the importance of boxing, no
single event could have more of an effect on public confidence
than a Max Schmeling versus Joe Louis championship bout. A loss
for Schmeling would mean inferiority of the Nazi race, while a
loss for Louis would mean a nod in favor of Hitler’s racist beliefs.
As the second fight drew nearer everyone from former
champions to fans alike voiced their predictions. The experts
almost unanimously favored Louis. Many past champions, including Braddock, Sharkey, Willard, and Jefferies agreed. However,
the official betting odds were only 2:1 in favor of Louis, whereas
the 1936 fight had at times come close to 20:1. Despite his apparent advantages, Louis astonished fans with his own prediction
of a knockout in the second round. Schmeling could recall the
excitement leading up to the fight and how “the whole world
eagerly awaited the fight. People were arriving from all over. All
of Hollywood came.”
At 8:25 pm the ring lights in Yankee Stadium turned on.
Twelve minutes later, the first preliminary fights began. A hundred
Western Union wires had been installed for the fight but were
still ineffective in managing traffic on international phone lines.
At precisely 10:08pm, the bell rang, signaling the start of the first
round. A reporter for the Philadelphia Tribune described how “a
silence, like the calm of Heaven, prevailed over Harlem.” Those
who could not afford to come to the fight listened to the radio at
home. Those too poor to own a radio visited public facilities to
hear the fight.
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Kevin Liu
At the sound of the bell, Louis quickly bounded out of
his corner, meeting Schmeling three-quarters of the way across
the ring. The two fighters parried for only seven seconds before
Louis began to land combinations of lefts and rights. Schmeling
was soon bewildered, trying desperately to maintain his defense.
He managed to throw just two punches the entire fight. Before
the round reached two minutes, Schmeling was down on the
canvas, trying to maintain mental clarity. Then, two minutes and
four seconds after the opening bell, the referee stopped the fight.
Louis had knocked Schmeling unconscious. Bedlam broke out
instantly. Jews, blacks, Americans, whites, and Nazis alike were all
shouting, celebrating, or crying.
Schmeling soon recovered enough to make his way across
the ring and throw his arm around Louis’s shoulders. Then, he
slowly returned to his corner and began to cry. The Daily News
reported that “he wept slowly at first, then his whole body shook.”
In the weeks following the fight, Schmeling lay resting in the
hospital. In his autobiography he reported that Joseph Goebels
was spreading the story that Louis had wrapped lead in his gloves
and threw illegal punches. Schmeling also lamented that there
“was something that I already knew—after this defeat, I no longer
existed for Hitler and Goebbels. The time for receptions in the
Reich Chancellery and Daggers of Honor was over.”
The fight immediately became a cultural touchstone. Everyone could remember where they were the night Joe Louis beat
Max Schmeling. Sportswriters and journalists in America focused
on Louis’s victory and its expected social and political outcomes.
Firstly, Americans were confronted with the acceptance of a hero
who was not of white skin. According to Bud Shaver of the Detroit
Times, “there is no place for prejudice or politics in sports here,
and to me Joe Louis is an American kid who has fought honestly
and fairly to a high place. I know he has white, Indian, and Negro blood in him, and to me that is all good American blood.”
Further, America’s communities erupted with celebration and
revival. Detroiters even asked police to cordon off an entire city
section to celebrate. People in every American city reveled in the
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303
radiance of Louis’s win. “Had you been in Harlem Wednesday
night,” the Courier reported afterward, “you might have thought
another World War had just ended. Joy was simply unconfined.”
Many other stories centered on the fight’s symbolism, which served
to strengthen America’s resolve. In many cities, banners flew that
declared “Joe Louis Knocked Out Hitler.”
The celebrations soon died down as both countries prepared for war. Schmeling and Louis would both fight in World
War II. Further, both America and Germany would again depend
on the fighters for propaganda purposes and public appeal. The
Angriff declared that “as an athlete, Schmeling is a role model for
ambitious youth, even more so today than earlier, because now he
wears the gray coat of the Wehrmacht.” In 1940, Louis registered
for army service as well. It was reported that he would often lace
up boxing gloves and fight with eager soldiers, working hard to
boost morale. Even as the war drew to a close and both fighters
aged, their rivalry and consequent appeal would serve as an inspiration to an entire generation.
Joe Louis and Max Schmeling rose to prominence through
the grit of their own determination and the public’s need for
heroes. As a result both were transformed into living symbols of
their respective races and countries. The most basic and simple
duel, a fistfight, had somehow turned into an international incident between two opposite parts of a world destined for war. Every
punch was thrown from across the Atlantic Ocean. Thus, the Max
Schmeling and Joe Louis rivalry had a great impact on society in
the mid-late 1930s. The fight was used for political propaganda,
the promotion of racial equality, and to bolster public morale. But
it must be understood that despite all of the fame and tension,
at the heart of this rivalry were merely two men working hard at
something they loved. The authenticity of their passion, sweat,
and years of labour was both irresistible and unforgettable. “The
Fight” affected the world past the realms of sports and entertainment; it helped shape a society and its influence continues to live
on in the annals of sports history.
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Kevin Liu
National Public Radio, “The Fight of the Century: Louis
vs. Schmeling,” November 26, 2006, http://www.npr.org/
templates/story/story.php?storyId=6515548
2
Time magazine, Sport: “Fireworks: Joe Louis Beats Max
Schmeling,” October 5, 1938, http://www.time.com/time/
magazine/article/0,9171,952148,00.html (accessed July 21,
2010)
3
David Margolick, Beyond Glory, Toronto: Random
House of Canada Limited, 2005
4
National Public Radio, (accessed April 25, 2010)
5
Jeremy Schaap, “Cinderella Man,” In Cinderella Man, by
Jeremy Schaap, Houghton Mifflin Harcourt, 2005
6
Schaap, p. 3
7
Ibid., p. 3
8
Ibid., p. 4
9
Ibid., p. 6
10
Richard Bak, Joe Louis : The Great Black Hope, Dallas:
First Da Capo Press, 1998, pp. 2-3
11
Patrick Carter, Fiorella Finelli, Derek Grant, and David
Nagy, American History, Toronto : Edmond Montgomery
Publications Limited, 2008, p. 313
12
Bak, p. 4
13
Ibid., p. 4
14
Ibid., p. 5
15
Ibid., p. 6
16
Patrick Myler, Ring of Hate, New York: Arcard
Publishing, Inc., 2005, p. 6
17
Ibid., p. 6
18
Ibid., p. 6
19
Ibid., p. 6
20
Ibid., p. 6
21
Ibid., p. 6
22
Ibid., p. 6
23
Margolick, p. 60
24
Ibid., p. 60
25
Ibid., p. 60
26
Ibid., p. 60
27
Ibid., p. 60
28
Bak, p. 33
29
Ibid., p. 34
30
Ibid., p. 35
31
Ibid., p. 36
32
Ibid., p. 36
1
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305
Ibid., p. 79
Ibid., p. 90
35
Margolick, p. 18
36
Ibid., p. 18
37
Schmeling, p. 75
38
Ibid., p. 18
39
Kasia Boddy, Boxing: A Cultural History, Reaktion
Books, 2009
40
Ibid.
41
Margolick, p. 18
42
Ibid., p. 18
43
Ibid., p. 19
44
Ibid., p. 19
45
Time magazine, Sport: “We Wuz Robbed,”
May 6, 1940, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,763952,00.html (accessed May 6, 2010)
46
Margolick, p. 22
47
Ibid., p. 22
48
Ibid., p. 23
49
Ibid., p. 25
50
Ibid., p. 23
51
Olean Evening Times, “Expect 70,000 Fans to
Witness World Title Bout,” June 11, 1930, http://www.
newspaperarchive.com/PdfViewerTags.aspx?img=38743457&fir
stvisit=true&src=search&currentResult=3&currentPage=0&fpo=
False (accessed August 17, 2010)
52
Margolick, p. 23
53
Bak, p. 83
54
Baltimore Post, “Schmeling, Beaten, Wins on Foul,” June
13, 1930, http://www.boxinggyms.com/news/schmeling1930/
schmeling-sharkey1930.htm (accessed August 17, 2010)
55
Margolick, p. 26
56
Ibid., p. 27
57
Ibid., p. 27
58
Ibid., p. 27
59
Ibid., p. 27
60
Ibid., p. 44
61
Bak, p. 114
62
Myler, p. 74
63
Ibid., p. 70
64
Time Magazine, Sport: “Jew vs. German,” June
19, 1933, http://www.time.com/time/magazine/
article/0,9171,789370,00.html (accessed July 8 , 2010)
33
34
306
Kevin Liu
Margolick, p. 67
Larry Schwartz, ‘“Brown Bomber’ was a hero
to all,” Uknown, http://espn.go.com/sportscentury/
features/00157501.html (accessed April 24, 2010)
67
Myler, p. 78
68
Ibid., p. 78
69
Margolick, p. 70
70
Max Schmeling, Max Schmeling: An Autobiography,
Chicago: Bonus Books, 1977, pp. 144-145
71
Myler, p. 75
72
Schmeling, p. 120
73
Ibid., p. 122
74
Nat Fleischer, The Ring, 1936, pp. 12-14
75
Bak, p. 120
76
Myler, p. 86
77
Bak, p. 121
78
Ibid., p. 120
79
Myler, p. 89
80
Ibid., p. 89
81
Ibid., p. 91
82
Margolick, p. 170
83
Bak, p. 124
84
Myler, p. 97
85
Bak, p. 132
87
New York Sun, “Harlem Holds Maddest Revel,” June
1938
88
Bak, p. 150
89
Myler, p. 117
90
Ibid., p. 117
91
Myler, p. 118
92
Patrick Carter, Fiorella Finelli, Derek Grant, and David
Nagy, American History, Toronto: Edmond Montgomery
Publications Limited, 2008
93
Schwartz, p. 1
94
Schmeling, p. 152
95
Myler, p. 138
96
Bak, p. 160
97
Ibid., p. 160
98
Ibid., p. 160
99
Schwartz, p. 5
100
Ibid., p. 3
65
66
THE CONCORD REVIEW
PBS Home Programs, More about the Film: The Fight,
September 22, 2004, http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/amex/fight/
filmmore/index.html (accessed April 24 , 2010)
102
Schmeling, p. 152
103
Margolick, p. 265
104
Schmeling, p. 152
105
Margolick, p. 288
106
Ibid., p. 288
107
Ibid., p. 289
108
Damon Runyon, Evening Standard: “Louis Was Truly
Great,” June 23, 1938, http://www.boxinggyms.com/news/
louis_schmeling1938/standard_cover.htm (accessed May 6,
2010)
109
Ibid. 110
Margolick, p. 301
111
Ibid., p. 305
112
Schmeling, p. 156
113
Bak, p. 166
114
Ibid., p. 167
115
Margolick, p. 314
116
Bak, p. 167
117
Margolick, p. 338
118
Myler, p. 172
101
307
308
Kevin Liu
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THE CONCORD REVIEW
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309
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