Download Country Risk Analysis and Managing Crises: Tower Associates

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October 21, 2007
F. John Mathis
Paul Keat
John O’Connell
Country Risk Analysis and Managing
Crises: Tower Associates
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Susan Brédé got up earlier than usual, with her mind churning over a decision she had to make before
week’s end, and it was already Wednesday. Susan was a senior partner for a large private equity firm,
Tower Associates, which wanted to expand overseas into emerging markets. Tower had about $27 billion in assets under management. Its primary investment base was the United States and Canada, but
over the past five years it had expanded into Europe. Now, Tower wanted to diversify its investment
portfolio and reduce risk, but also grow its business in rapidly expanding markets with greater opportunities than in the traditional industrialized countries.
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The first step in this process was to identify which emerging markets offered the greatest profit
potential over a 5–7-year time horizon. Tower’s intention was to acquire local companies, restructure
them, inject new money to rapidly expand their revenue and net income, and then sell them at a
significant gain. However, Susan was well aware of the potential pitfalls and economic crises that lurked
overseas, especially in emerging markets, and she wanted to minimize and manage the risk to Tower
Associates before making an investment recommendation. Her first step was to determine which markets in which countries would make the best investment targets.
To do this, Susan had to establish a list of characteristics that was important to Tower Associates
from a business perspective, and then match them with characteristics from various potential investment target markets and countries.
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Top among the desired characteristics were political and economic stability. Running a close second were well-functioning legal and accounting systems. The selected country or countries also needed
to have a favorable entrepreneurship environment, a supportive attitude toward foreign investment,
and some form of developed internal financial market. Applying these criteria would greatly narrow the
number of countries that could be considered viable investment prospects at the present time.
The primary target markets identified were in Asia, Latin America, and the former Soviet republics. Within these areas, the countries with the best investment potential were those referred to as the
BRIC and the N-11 countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China in the first group, and Bangladesh,
Egypt, Indonesia, Iran, Korea, Mexico, Nigeria, Pakistan, Philippines, Turkey, and Vietnam in the
second).
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Following several weeks of intense internal discussions and debate, Susan identified four countries
(from among the BRIC and N-11 countries) as optimal potential investment targets for Tower Associates. Specific performance information about these countries was assembled and is presented in the
Copyright © 2007 Thunderbird School of Global Management. All rights reserved. This case was prepared by Professors
F. John Mathis, Paul Keat, and John O’Connell, for the purpose of classroom discussion only, and not to indicate either
effective or ineffective management. Michele Schrader, research associate, prepared the data tables used in the case.
This document is authorized for use only by Malgorzata Zieba until November 2011. Copying or posting is an
infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860.
Historical Review of Country Crises
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attached tables, with countries identified only by letter. The names of the countries were withheld in
order to prevent bias in the analysis.
Going global requires understanding the possibility that a country in which a company is invested may
experience some form of financial crisis. Most countries have been through one or more crises, and
some have been subject to repeated crises because of mismanagement. Several books and detailed studies provide a good understanding of these crises and their causes.1
There are four major types of crises that have an impact on the economy of a country: currency,
financial, foreign debt, and banking crises.
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1. Currency crisis occurs when a speculative attack on the exchange value of a currency results in a
devaluation or sharp depreciation of the currency. A currency crisis often forces the government to
defend the currency by expending large volumes of international reserves and/or by sharply raising
interest rates. Since World War II, there have been several major currency crises, including:
• 1971—the U. S. suspended gold convertibility because its foreign dollar liabilities exceeded its
gold holdings
• 1973—the U.S. devalued the dollar and then floated it
• 1992-93—after a period of currency turbulence in Europe, the European Economic Union
was established, and a common currency, the euro, eliminated the former currencies of each
member country
2. Financial crisis is a severe disruption in financial markets that, by impairing a market’s ability to
function effectively, may result in significant adverse effects on economic activity. Major examples
include:
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• 1980s—the U.S. changed the way it managed monetary policy from targeting interest rates to
targeting money supply growth, causing U.S. interest rates to rise sharply
• 1997—a financial crisis in Southeast Asia caused strong capital outflows
• 2000s—early in the decade, the technology stock market bubble in the U.S. burst, affecting
overseas economies
• 2007—a real estate crisis in the U.S., centered on the sub-prime mortgage industry, spread to
global investors who had purchased the mortgage debts
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3. Foreign debt crisis occurs when a country cannot service its foreign debt, whether sovereign or
private. Two benchmark examples include:
• 1982-84—most of the rapidly growing emerging market economies could not make their foreign
debt service payments, causing major foreign debt defaults and bank loan write-offs, loan
restructurings, and foreign debt swaps
• 1997—the Asian financial crisis resulted in foreign debt restructurings
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4. Banking crisis results when actual or potential bank runs or failures cause banks to suspend the
internal convertibility of their liabilities, compelling the government to intervene to prevent this by
extending large-scale assistance.2 Two landmark examples include:
1
Charles P. Kindleberger, Manias, Panics, and Crashes: A History of Financial Crises, Basic Books, 1978 IMF, World
Economic Outlook, May 1998, Section IV.
2
Michael D. Bordo, “Financial Crises, Banking Crises, Stock Market Crashes, and the Money Supply: Some
International Evidence, 1870-1933,” in Forrest Capie and Geoffrey Wood, eds., Financial Crises and the World
Banking System, St. Martin’s Press, 1985.
2
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• 1980s—U.S. interest rates rose sharply, causing the failure of about one-third of the banks in
the United States
• 1990s—the Japanese government was forced to rescue Japanese banks by purchasing their
substantial nonperforming loans
The International Monetary Fund (IMF) published a landmark study of global crises in its World
Economic Outlook in 1979. This exhaustive study documented 158 currency crises—including 55
currency crashes and 54 banking crises between 1975 and 1979. It recognized that banking crises are
significantly worse than currency crises because they last longer, and it typically takes at least three years
or longer before real GDP returns to its normal rate of growth.
Understanding the Birth and Life Cycle of Crises
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A change in political or economic conditions inside or outside a country can precipitate a crisis. Countries with a history of political instability are more likely to suffer an economic crisis that will overwhelm any potential for high investment returns. Thus, the countries that investors focus on tend to be
those with a record of political stability. Any investment analysis, therefore, should examine how well a
government manages economic conditions and how effective its policy actions are. Domestic economic
conditions may change suddenly because of internal events and/or because of unexpected external economic shocks. Since it is often very difficult to predict these events, most analysts focus on how well a
government responds to and neutralizes these shocks. This type of analysis requires examining the
immediate or short-term effectiveness and consequence of government policy changes, as well as the
long-term implications of these actions for the economy.
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Some countries are more prone to market or economic shocks than others and, therefore, it is
important to assess a country’s vulnerabilities. For example, an economy dominated by a single industry
or with a high dependence on one export product may be more sensitive to sudden changes if commodity prices rise or fall, or if demand increases or decreases. Thus, more diversified economies tend to be
less vulnerable to unexpected internally or externally originated events. Additional factors that may
increase certain countries’ vulnerability to crises include fluctuations in commodity prices, interest rate
changes, environmental issues, and contagion.
Since an investor’s objective is a timely return on investment as defined by the terms and conditions of an agreement, it is important to understand a country’s sources and uses of funds or, more
specifically, convertible currencies. A country can obtain convertible currencies in several ways:
by exporting goods or services
by earning fees from overseas workers or investments
from dividends or income invested in convertible currency assets
from foreign direct investment
from foreign portfolio investments if there is a financial market
by using its accumulation of international reserves of convertible currencies.
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•
•
•
•
•
•
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If these sources of funds are insufficient, then the country must pursue foreign borrowing. Loans
from investors or the sales of bonds to foreigners carry a foreign debt servicing requirement. However,
if the country has a viable equity market that attracts foreign capital, the country may not have to
borrow, thereby avoiding a debt service obligation.
The indicators of a potential crisis may be divided into short-term (within one year) and longerterm (within one to five years).3 The most commonly used short-term early warning indicators of a
crisis in a country include variations or changes in stock market prices, real estate prices, real interest
rates, and real exchange rates. In most instances, when these indicators follow a certain pattern, they
3
IMF, World Economic Outlook, May 1998, Section IV.
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foretell a foreign exchange or financial crisis within the next six to nine months. The pattern is a very
sharp rise (50% or more within a one-year period), followed by a sudden (20% or larger) decline. The
crisis occurs within six to nine months of the turning point. This represents what is commonly referred
to as a “bubble in prices,” which then bursts.
Factors which can cause a run up in asset prices tend to be the drivers of liquidity in an economy.
These variables include money supply growth and domestic credit expansion in both real and nominal
terms. These factors may not only signal foreign exchange and/or financial crises, but may also be
leading indicators of banking crises. Foreign capital inflows from foreign direct investment, portfolio
inflows, or a sudden jump in inflows as recorded by “errors and omissions” in the balance of payments
may also cause excessive liquidity problems. Most emerging markets have a “limited” capital absorptive
capacity as constrained by the stage of development of the country’s infrastructure. Because infrastructure is not created quickly, but normally takes several years to build, unsustainable economic imbalances
aggravated by or resulting from unsustainable macroeconomic policies can precipitate crises.
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Taking a longer-term perspective of the causes of crises, several indicators of foreign debt service
capacity have traditionally been useful. These measures include:
• the debt service ratio which tracks the percent of export earnings used to pay principal and
interest payments on the foreign debt
• short-term debt as a percent of total debt
• variable rate debt as a percent of total debt
• total foreign debt as a percent of GDP
• the merchandise trade balance or current account balance as a percent of GDP
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Trigger points have been determined based on past experience. For example, if the foreign debt
service ratio exceeds 30%, it is a warning signal of a foreign debt crisis; if it is close to or above 50%, a
crisis becomes almost certain unless economic policy is changed. The same percentages apply for shortterm debt or variable rate debt as a percent of total foreign debt. Similarly, when the trade or current
account deficits approach 6% of GDP, this is a crisis trigger point indicating a high probability of a
crisis.
Another useful indicator is the amount of convertible currency a country is holding as part of its
international reserves as measured in terms of months of imports covered. International reserves equal
to three months of imports are considered safe. Below this level, the country has no convertible currency savings account or cushion of savings to protect itself from a crisis.
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The Challenge
Susan’s challenge was to analyze the country data in the tables and determine which country offered the
best opportunity for strong real growth. At the same time, she had to identify which country was most
likely to experience some form of country risk crisis. Her forecast period was the next three to five years.
The recommendations had to be clearly justified with supporting arguments based on the data provided.
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The Countries
Country A is a large advanced, developing country that had its share of economic problems in the
1980s, but since then has been performing relatively well. Economic growth is strongly supported by
the government in terms of spending as a percent of GDP and as measured by the deficit in the fiscal
budget. Domestic private investment as a percent of GDP, on the other hand, is not strong. Although
money supply growth has been modest, inflation remains high. The currency floats more or less freely.
4
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Country B is a large industrial economy that has experienced volatile performance during the past
decade. It has vast resources including energy resources to support continued transition to a more
diversified competitive economy. Private business investment has been growing as a percent of GDP
while the role played by the government has been declining. During the upcoming year some significant
changes are expected in the political leadership of the country which could impact growth prospects.
The country could have great potential depending on the outcome of this transition.
Country C is a large developing country, well-endowed with natural resources but lacking sufficiently
developed infrastructure to allow it to utilize them effectively in support of GDP growth. The economy
is not yet a market economy, but is moving in that direction as the government has gradually liberalized
its control. It continues to influence consumer prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate in order to
prevent deterioration in living standards for most of the population. The economy continues to gain
momentum as it expands its economic infrastructure.
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Country D is a large developing economy, well-endowed with natural resources but lacking the economic infrastructure needed to capitalize on its wealth efficiently. The economy is moving in the direction of a market economy and is very entrepreneurial with wide disparity in income distribution. Consumption represents only one-third of GDP. The government continues to cautiously manage consumer prices, interest rates, and the exchange rate to keep the economy on its rapid growth path.
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Country A
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Table 1
2003
2004
2005
2006
58.04%
19.76%
20.13%
13.10%
10.79%
460,838
1,346,028
745,000
56.74%
19.76%
19.90%
14.45%
10.06%
505,732
1,556,182
749,200
55.20%
21.32%
18.81%
15.97%
16.46%
603,948
1,766,621
786,200
57.00%
20.59%
18.60%
14.80%
9.71%
799,413
1,946,092
805,200
60.37%
16.80%
19.93%
12.88%
8.98%
1,067,706
1,215,762
831,600
2007
est.
61.76%
17.21%
19.16%
11.52%
8.18%
1,177,706
1,269,810
860,000
2.85%
-1.08%
-3.95%
0.52%
-1.66%
0.09%
3.06%
-1.11%
-2.72%
-0.85%
-2.41%
8.18%
4.90%
-0.98%
-3.59%
0.57%
0.83%
0.10%
1.96%
1.05%
-3.01%
-0.03%
0.89%
9.71%
5.57%
-0.77%
-3.40%
0.54%
1.94%
0.06%
1.44%
-0.79%
-1.09%
-0.55%
1.45%
8.73%
5.60%
-1.02%
-1.02%
0.44%
1.78%
0.08%
1.59%
0.61%
-0.47%
1.73%
3.59%
6.70%
3.66%
-0.73%
-0.89%
0.38%
1.33%
0.08%
0.54%
-0.13%
0.53%
0.97%
2.38%
10.70%
2.95%
-0.75%
-1.97%
0.34%
1.16%
0.07%
2.89%
3.16%
1.39%
0.93%
2.16%
12.61%
9.1
11.59
6.37
8.28
10.71
12.56
3.533
2.888
2.654
2.340
2.137
2.221
9.21%
16.75%
21.66%
13.98%
17.04%
11.90%
19.57%
15.82%
18.86%
22.06%
2.23%
4.02%
Interest and Inflation Rates
Lending Rate (annual)
Money Market Rate (annual)
Consumer Prices (year 2000 = 100)
62.88%
19.11%
115.9
67.08%
23.37%
132.9
54.93%
16.24%
141.7
55.38%
19.12%
151.4
50.81%
15.28%
157.8
47.20%
12.93%
161.9
Government Finances (% of GDP)
Revenues
Expenditures
Balance
27.44%
25.11%
2.32%
23.83%
23.63%
0.21%
24.70%
23.62%
1.08%
25.51%
23.05%
2.46%
42.85%
36.49%
6.36%
45.48%
52.82%
-7.34%
Balance of Payments (% of GDP)
Trade Balance
Net Services
Net Factor Payments
Net Transfers
Current Account
Capital Account
Net Foreign Direct Investment
Net Portfolio Investment
Other Capital Inflows
Financial Balance
Overall Balance
Reserves, minus gold (% of GDP)
Months of Imports Covered by Int’l
Reserves
No
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Exchange Rate and Money Supply
Exchange Rate (LC/US$, end period)
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Money + Quasi-money (growth)
Domestic Credit (growth)
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2002
National Accounts (% of GDP)
Consumption
Investment
Government
Exports
Imports
GDP (US$ millions)
GDP (LC millions)
Real GDP ( LC millions,1990 prices)
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LC = Local Currency
6
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Country B
2002
2003
National Accounts (% of GDP)
Consumption
51.08%
50.55%
Investment
20.03%
20.80%
Government
17.65%
17.60%
Exports
31.06%
31.50%
Imports
19.41%
19.39%
GDP (US$ millions)
345,488
431,488
GDP (LC millions)
10,830,535
13,243,240
Real GDP (LC millions, 2003 prices)
12,348,000
13,243,000
13.41%
13.87%
Balance of Payments (% of GDP)
Net Services
Net Factor Payments
Net Transfers
Current Account
Capital Account
Net Foreign Direct Investment
Net Portfolio Investment
Other Capital Inflows
Financial Balance
Overall Balance
Reserves, minus gold (% of GDP)
2004
2005
2006
2007
48.87%
47.93%
48.73%
51.48%
16.47%
15.96%
17.87%
18.93%
16.47%
15.96%
17.56%
17.16%
31.04%
31.80%
30.92%
33.05%
18.15%
17.99%
18.30%
22.82%
590,287
765,968
985,000
1,183,000
17,008,388
21,664,978
26,781,000
30,757,000
14,197,000
15,105,000
16,117,000
17,190,000
14.54%
15.45%
14.14%
9.92%
-2.27%
-1.94%
-1.52%
-1.22%
-3.05%
-2.16%
-2.46%
-2.90%
-1.77%
-0.09%
-0.11%
-0.11%
-0.13%
-0.14%
8.43%
8.21%
10.00%
10.95%
9.59%
6.79%
2.18%
0.14%
0.15%
0.09%
0.10%
N/A
-0.02%
-0.41%
0.28%
0.00%
1.09%
0.93%
0.86%
-1.04%
-0.10%
-1.56%
1.77%
-1.21%
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Trade Balance
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Table 2
Months of Imports Covered by Int'l Reserves
-2.86%
-2.52%
-1.91%
-0.22%
-0.45%
2.13%
-1.05%
1.88%
-1.63%
-5.07%
0.39%
0.82%
-0.69%
0.35%
1.19%
-5.36%
11.00%
9.17%
9.45%
11.38%
10.88%
11.43%
12.75%
16.96%
20.47%
22.96%
30.01%
25.86%
7.88
10.49
13.53
15.31
19.68
13.59
31.780
29.450
27.748
28.782
26.331
25.816
tC
Exchange Rate and Money Supply
Exchange Rate (LC/USD, end period)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (year 2000 = 100)
123.5
127.3
137.3
149.3
163.5
170.2
Money + Quasi-money (growth)
33.77%
38.53%
33.75%
36.27%
40.52%
0.28%
Domestic Credit (growth)
26.53%
26.49%
18.68%
2.65%
28.40%
-3.75%
15.71%
12.98%
11.40%
10.68%
10.46%
9.90%
8.19%
3.77%
3.33%
2.68%
3.43%
3.80%
140.6
159.9
177.3
199.7
219.1
231.1
Revenues
20.49%
19.47%
20.32%
23.72%
15.82%
22.00%
Expenses
18.84%
17.09%
15.47%
16.23%
14.29%
19.00%
Balance
1.65%
2.37%
4.86%
7.49%
8.44%
3.00%
Interest and Inflation Rates
Lending Rate (annual)
No
Money Market Rate (annual)
Consumer Prices (year 2000 = 100)
Government Finances (% of GDP)
Do
LC = Local Currency
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Country C
2002
2003
2004
2005
2006
64.30%
22.65%
11.84%
10.09%
-10.79%
506,749
24,633,240
22,163,000
63.83%
23.03%
11.31%
10.28%
-11.49%
592,493
27,600,250
24,012,300
60.58%
27.20%
11.26%
11.32%
-13.87%
688,803
31,214,140
26,022,000
63.78%
23.54%
11.90%
12.76%
-16.82%
800,783
35,314,510
28,525,000
56.40%
29.51%
11.34%
13.36%
-20.00%
922,000
41,257,000
31,084,000
2007
est.
56.74%
31.66%
11.72%
12.78%
-19.91%
1,128,000
46,410,000
33,692,000
Balance of Payments (% of GDP)
Trade Balance
Net Services
Net Factor Payments
Net Transfers
Current Account
Capital Account
Net Foreign Direct Investment
Net Portfolio Investment
Other Capital Inflows
Financial Balance
Overall Balance
Reserves, minus gold (% of GDP)
Months of Imports Covered by Int’l Reserves
-0.70%
-0.31%
-0.77%
3.18%
0.21%
0.02%
0.78%
0.20%
1.36%
2.34%
4.29%
13.35%
14.84
-1.50%
-0.39%
-0.75%
3.80%
1.16%
0.65%
0.55%
1.39%
0.56%
2.49%
5.86%
16.70%
17.44
-2.47%
0.38%
-0.59%
2.87%
0.11%
2.52%
0.52%
4.59%
1.39%
3.23%
5.30%
18.38%
15.90
-4.06%
0.98%
-0.80%
2.90%
-0.98%
3.58%
0.52%
4.46%
0.66%
2.70%
6.92%
16.47%
11.75
-6.64%
3.15%
-0.47%
2.83%
-1.13%
2.63%
0.92%
4.46%
-0.08%
5.42%
6.73%
18.52%
11.11
-7.13%
3.42%
-0.47%
2.83%
-1.36%
2.63%
0.62%
4.46%
0.11%
5.46%
2.57%
16.64%
10.03
Exchange Rate and Money Supply
Exchange Rate (LC/USD, end period)
Real Effective Exchange Rate
Money + Quasi-money (growth)
Domestic Credit (growth)
48.030
104.6
16.76%
15.99%
45.605
103.1
13.03%
9.53%
43.585
102.4
16.73%
18.00%
45.065
106.4
15.60%
15.45%
44.245
106.2
21.65%
22.62%
40.755
115.6
21.20%
21.20%
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Table 3
11.92%
6.25%
108.2
11.46%
6.00%
112.4
10.92%
6.00%
116.6
10.75%
6.00%
121.5
11.19%
6.00%
128.6
12.50%
6.00%
133.9
10.90%
16.80%
-5.90%
12.50%
17.10%
-4.60%
12.00%
15.90%
-4.00%
10.10%
14.20%
-4.10%
14.10%
10.70%
-3.50%
16.30%
13.00%
-3.30%
Interest and Inflation Rates
Lending Rate (annual)
Bank Rate (annual)
Consumer Prices (year 2000 = 100)
Government Finances (% of GDP)
Revenues
Expenses
Balance
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National Accounts (% of GDP)
Consumption
Investment
Government
Exports
Imports
GDP (US$ millions)
GDP (LC millions)
Real GDP (LC millions,1999 prices)
Do
No
LC = Local Currency
8
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infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860.
Country D
2002
2003
45.30%
38.85%
12.90%
24.98%
22.64%
1,303,590
10,789,760
11,298,000
11.43%
42.15%
12.16%
29.80%
28.07%
1,470,699
12,173,030
12,430,000
Balance of Payments (% of GDP)
Trade Balance
Net Services
Net Factor Payments
Net Transfers
Current Account
Capital Account
Net Foreign Direct Investment
Net Portfolio Investment
Other Capital Inflows
Financial Balance
Overall Balance
Reserves, minus gold (% of GDP)
Months of Imports Covered by Int’l Reserves
3.39%
-0.52%
0.93%
1.00%
2.72%
-0.19%
3.59%
-0.79%
-0.31%
2.48%
5.01%
22.33%
11.84
3.04%
-0.58%
3.55%
1.20%
3.12%
0.01%
3.21%
0.78%
-0.40%
3.59%
6.72%
27.75%
11.87
Exchange Rate and Money Supply
Exchange Rate (LC/USD, end period)
Real Effective Exchange Rate (year 2000 = 100)
Money + Quasi-money (growth)
Domestic Credit (growth)
8.277
101.89
18.28%
27.99%
Interest and Inflation Rates
Lending Rate (annual)
Money Market Rate (annual)
Consumer Prices (year 2000 = 100)
Government Finances (% of GDP)
Revenues
Expenses
Balance
2004
2005
2006
41.43%
43.79%
11.55%
34.49%
32.62%
1,720,401
14,239,420
13,683,000
25.56%
41.59%
12.20%
38.45%
33.30%
1,981,648
16,238,250
15,106,000
37.40%
42.12%
14.07%
36.06%
29.45%
2,688,100
20,940,700
16,782,000
2007
est.
35.88%
42.15%
13.42%
39.49%
31.14%
3,320,300
25,300,000
18,698,000
3.43%
-0.56%
4.64%
1.33%
3.99%
-0.10%
3.09%
1.14%
2.20%
6.44%
10.32%
35.72%
13.14
6.77%
-0.47%
8.26%
1.28%
8.12%
-0.57%
3.42%
-0.25%
-0.20%
2.97%
10.52%
41.46%
14.94
8.10%
-0.33%
0.44%
1.09%
9.30%
0.15%
2.24%
-2.51%
0.50%
0.22%
9.67%
39.75%
16.20
9.30%
-0.30%
0.72%
1.02%
1.08%
0.15%
1.73%
1.00%
0.50%
3.22%
4.45%
34.92%
13.45
8.277
95.20
19.58%
19.50%
8.277
92.69
14.39%
8.79%
8.070
92.48
17.91%
10.67%
7.809
94.41
15.99%
16.25%
7.616
97.64
3.89%
2.73%
5.31%
1.98%
99.9
5.31%
1.98%
101.1
5.58%
2.25%
105.0
5.58%
2.25%
106.8
6.12%
2.52%
108.9
6.39%
2.79%
111.6
17.77%
20.64%
-2.87%
18.01%
20.40%
-2.40%
18.54%
20.01%
-1.47%
19.46%
20.86%
-1.40%
19.11%
13.95%
5.16%
20.65%
14.09%
6.56%
tC
op
yo
National Accounts (% of GDP)
Consumption
Investment
Government
Exports
Imports
GDP (US$ millions)
GDP (LC millions)
Real GDP (LC millions,1990 prices)
rP
os
t
Table 4
Do
No
LC = Local Currency
TB0087
This document is authorized for use only by Malgorzata Zieba until November 2011. Copying or posting is an
infringement of copyright. [email protected] or 617.783.7860.
9