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Band-Aids and Bullhorns: Why California’s Drug Policy Is Failing and What We Can Do to Fix It Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) 108–135 © 2012 SAGE Publications Reprints and permission: http://www. sagepub.com/journalsPermissions.nav DOI: 10.1177/0887403410397185 http://cjp.sagepub.com Christine Gardiner,1 Darren Urada,2 and M. Douglas Anglin2 Abstract California voters had high hopes when they passed the Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000 (SACPA, a.k.a. Proposition 36). The law, one of the most extensive diversion-to-treatment laws to date, was intended to divert and treat 36,000 drug offenders annually. Unfortunately the law has not lived up to voter or practitioner expectations. Insufficient funding derailed the legislation by making it impossible to provide offenders either appropriate substance abuse treatment or adequate probation supervision. Stakeholders expressed consternation with aspects of the legislation that, in their view, led to SACPA being less successful than it could have been. Specifically, the universal application of the treatment-in-lieu-of-incarceration law forced stakeholders to accommodate offenders unmotivated-to-change and unsuitable for many treatment settings; and prohibiting shock incarceration removed a deterrent to violating program rules. Based on information gathered through stakeholder surveys and interviews, four policy recommendations are offered to improve the effectiveness of SACPA. Keywords Proposition 36, SACPA, drug policy, diversion to treatment, drug offender sentencing 1 California State University, Fullerton University of California, Los Angeles 2 Corresponding Author: Christine Gardiner, California State University, Fullerton, 800 N. State College Blvd., Fullerton, CA 92887 Email: [email protected] Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 109 Gardiner et al. The Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA) of 2000, commonly known as “Proposition 36,” mandates that adults convicted of nonviolent drug-possession offenses in California be offered drug treatment in the community in lieu of traditional sentencing. It applies to all adults convicted of a nonviolent drug-possession offense, including probationers and parolees, who are not disqualified by prior criminal history or by a concurrent offense. It is one of the largest drug offender diversion programs in the nation—almost 50,000 drug offenders participate annually1 (Evans, Hunter, & Urada, 2009a). This California law is one of many diversion-to-treatment laws recently passed in the United States (Rinaldo & Kelly-Thomas, 2005; VanderWaal, Chriqui, Bishop, McBride, & Longshore, 2006). From 1996 to 2004, 14 states passed diversion-totreatment laws, including the following states: Alabama, Arizona, California, Connecticut, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Indiana, Kansas, Maryland, Massachusetts, Missouri, Texas, and Washington State (VanderWaal et al., 2006). Although the provisions of each law vary, what makes some of these laws unique from earlier diversion laws is their broad scope and near-universal applicability. Whereas these laws are spreading quickly throughout the nation, our knowledge of their impact is very limited. This article adds to the literature by describing stakeholders’ criticisms of SACPA and suggesting improvements. Diversion-To-Treatment Diversion-to-treatment (a.k.a. treatment in lieu of incarceration) laws are not new— they have existed (in one form or another) since at least the 1960s (Klein, 1976; Marlowe, 2003). Historically, these diversion laws have taken the form of prosecutorinitiated pretrial diversion for first time, nonviolent offenders (VanderWaal et al., 2006). For example, California’s PC 1000 and Michigan’s MCL 333.7411 allow for dismissal of charges pending successful completion of treatment. Postconviction diversion laws are another popular option—these laws require a guilty plea prior to and as a requirement for diversion. Drug courts, as well as the new genre of diversionto-treatment laws typically utilize this postconviction model. Treatment Alternatives to Street Crime (TASC) and drug court are examples of treatment in lieu of incarceration programs offered throughout the United States. TASC, which has existed since the 1970s, is a criminal justice-treatment system collaboration that incorporates community-based drug treatment into (or in lieu of) criminal justice imposed sanctions. The drug court model, begun in 1989, features a collaborative team of practitioners focused on helping convicted drug offenders reduce their reliance on drugs in a therapeutic judicial setting (Wenzel, Longshore, Turner, & Ridgely, 2001). Like most diversion-to-treatment laws, TASC and drug court models have eligibility criteria which vary by jurisdiction to screen offenders and limit participation. SACPA and many other new diversion-to-treatment laws are distinctive because they apply to almost all low-level drug offenders (regardless of amenability to treatment). This is Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 110 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) important, as SACPA has demonstrated that who participates can determine program success and practitioner support (Urada & Evans, 2008b). In California, three diversion options are available for drug offenders: PC1000, Prop36 (SACPA), and drug courts. PC1000 allows drug offenders to attend treatment in lieu of jail for their first drug offense, provided they have no felony arrests in the prior five years. Offenders eligible for PC1000 generally accept it because it is the least onerous of all drug diversion programs. In addition, most counties operate collaborative drug courts. Eligibility and suitability requirements vary by county but all require a significant level of commitment by drug offenders to treatment and the drug court program. Prior to SACPA, if an offender was not eligible for PC1000 or drug court (which was the case for most offenders), they were most often sentenced to 30, 60, or 90 days in jail and 3 years on probation. Now most of these offenders are sentenced to probation with treatment but without jail time. Essentially, offenders traded 30 to 90 days in jail for community-based drug treatment. Unlike drug courts which require participants to meet both eligibility and suitability criteria, SACPA is available to all offenders convicted of a drug-possession offense and not disqualified due to prior criminal history or concurrent crimes, regardless of desire for treatment. Research shows that substance abuse treatment offered through the criminal justice system can be effective in reducing drug usage and criminal behavior; however, it also indicates that the collaborative relationships required for effective diversionto-treatment models can be difficult to establish and maintain (Anglin, Longshore, & Turner, 1999; Bull, 2005;Peyton & Gossweiler, 2001; U.S. Office of Drug Court Programs, 1997). Common barriers that exist in developing these multiparty linkages include the following: Funding limitations, staffing shortages, coordinating management information systems, and sharing information between agencies (Wenzel, Turner, & Ridgely, 2004). Components of Successful Treatment Programs Treatments that are the most effective at reducing drug use are also the most effective at reducing future criminal activity (California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs 1992/2000; Longshore et al., 2005). Effective treatment programs have four things in common, they (a) occur in the community, (b) reward successful completion of treatment by removing criminal justice imposed sanctions (such as imprisonment or conviction), (c) include close monitoring and supervision of offenders, including drug testing and regular progress reports, and (d) include swift and certain punishments for noncompliance that do not require additional, formal hearings (Marlowe, 2003). Placing a client into the most appropriate treatment program initially improves outcomes and is less costly in the long run because it decreases treatment duration and the number of treatment episodes (Sharon et al., 2003). Not surprisingly, research finds that individuals with dual diagnosis (mental health and substance abuse), those with more severe addictions, and those with little social support do best in residential Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 111 Gardiner et al. treatment facilities (Gastfriend & McLellan, 1997; Magura et al., 2003; McLellan, Woody, Luborsky, O’Brien, & Druley, 1983). Undertreating these clients increases their dropout rates and worsens their outcomes (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007; Gastfriend, 2003). SACPA Each year, approximately 50,000 drug offenders in California agree to participate in SACPA (Evans et al., 2009b). Of these, approximately 70% to 75% actually begin treatment (Evans et al., 2009b). Of those who enter treatment, approximately one third complete their prescribed treatment (Evans et al., 2009b). This is similar to treatment completion rates of other programs, including drug court (Urada & Evans, 2008b). Clients who enter treatment are predominately young (70% are between ages 26 and 35) males (75%), of which 44% are non-Hispanic White, 32% are Hispanic, and 16% are African American (Urada & Evans, 2008a). In addition, more than half of SACPA clients are long-time users (have used their primary drug for more than 10 years), more than 50% are methamphetamine users, and at least half report that they are entering treatment for the first time (Urada & Evans, 2008a). The population is much more severely addicted than was originally anticipated and has presented many challenges for practitioners (Longshore et al., 2003). SACPA evaluations have found that 37% of residential clients and 45% of outpatient clients received at least 90 days of treatment (Urada & Evans, 2008b). More, offenders who completed treatment were much less likely to be rearrested during follow-up periods (which ranged from 12 months to 6 years posttreatment; Urada, Fan, & Anglin, 2009). Studies that tracked offenders over 30- and 42-month follow-up periods found that SACPA saved US$2.50 (US$4 for treatment completers) for every US$1 spent, mainly because of reduced incarceration costs (Hawken, Longshore, Urada, Fan, & Anglin, 2008; Longshore, Hawken, Urada, & Anglin, 2006). Method The current multimodal research incorporates data collected from two parallel studies of the implementation of Proposition 36 (SACPA). The first study, conducted by UCLA researchers as part of the statewide evaluation, surveyed stakeholders2 throughout the state about their perceptions of the law, responses to budget cuts, and suggestions for improvement. The second study, conducted by the first author, interviewed criminal justice practitioners in one focus county (Orange County [OC]) about their experiences implementing and adapting to the law and their suggestions for improvement. Both studies utilized open-ended questions as a means to explore practitioners’ thoughts about the law and/or implementation of the legislation and ascertain any shared views. Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 112 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) Study 1: UCLA Survey Data3 Sample and procedure. Using separate survey instruments, county administrators, criminal justice practitioners, and treatment professionals were solicited for their opinions. Surveys included a variety of open-ended questions, of which this article will address responses to two questions: (a) stakeholder adaptations to recent budget cuts, and (b) suggestions for improvement. The county stakeholder survey was emailed to lead agencies4 in all 58 counties on December 19, 2008; lead agencies then distributed the surveys to the appropriate criminal justice practitioners (court, probation, district attorney, public defender) in the county. The treatment professional survey was mailed to a random selection of 105 treatment program directors on December 18, 2008. A simple random sample selection procedure was utilized to choose the programs from all treatment programs that served more than five SACPA clients in the most recently available statewide treatment data at the time of selection.5 Response rate. County administrators and criminal justice practitioners from 41 counties (out of 58) returned completed or partially completed surveys. These 41 counties represent approximately 90% of the state population and roughly the same proportion of SACPA participants. The response rate varied by agency, with the largest number coming from lead agencies (39 counties responded), followed by probation (22), court administrators (21), public defenders (14), and district attorneys (10). The 17 counties that did not respond, by and large, have small populations and had very little to report because their SACPA programs are quite small. Of the treatment providers, 67 out of 105 responded (63.8%). Four treatment professionals responded that they no longer provide services for SACPA clients. Therefore, results are based on 63 surveys from treatment providers in 25 counties and 106 surveys from county administrators and practitioners in 41 counties.6 Study 2: Focus County Interview Data7 Sample—Agencies. Every criminal justice agency in Orange County, California (the focus county) that has sole responsibility for carrying out a specific criminal justice function at the county level was identified and asked to be part of the research (probation, court, city and district attorneys, public defender, jail, and parole). Also all local law enforcement agencies were identified; and based on the size and demographics of the population served, size of the department, and geographic location within the county, nine law enforcement agencies (out of 20) were purposively selected to participate in the study. These nine agencies which combined, serve 77% of county residents, represent small, medium, and large departments from all regions of the county (north, south, central, and coastal) and provide services to a wide variety of demographic populations. Every agency agreed to participate, except the District Attorney’s Office. In all 14 agencies, representing every stage of the criminal justice system, participated. Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 113 Gardiner et al. Table 1. Number of Interviews Conducted in Focus County by Agency Law enforcement Agency 1 Agency 2 Agency 3 Agency 4 Agency 5 Agency 6 Agency 7 Agency 8 Agency 9 Total Interviews conducted Court 7 4 3 8 4 3 1 5 4 39 Judges Public defender City attorney Total Interviews conducted 5 1 1 7 Corrections Probation Parole Jail Total Interviews conducted 7 4 3 14 Sample—Practitioners. A variety of methods were employed to identify appropriate practitioners to interview. To begin, purposive sampling was used to identify and interview those practitioners that had a key role in implementing Proposition 36 or had specific knowledge of SACPA due to work assignment (such as probation officers assigned to Prop36 caseloads). Snowball sampling was used to identify practitioners with special knowledge of Prop36.8 For example, one person from the Orange County Probation Department who had a significant role in the planning stage identified other key players in the planning process. Most practitioners were chosen by the researcher to be interviewed due to their current assignment (for example, supervisor of the narcotics unit; judge of Prop36 court); some practitioners volunteered to be interviewed when asked (parole and police in particular), and yet others (usually patrol officers) were chosen simply because they (a) were on duty, (b) had a beat partner (or someone to cover their area in their absence), and (c) were not on a call at the time the researcher was ready to interview someone. Every person approached to be part of the study agreed to be interviewed. Results are based on semistructured interviews with 60 criminal justice practitioners from 14 different criminal justice agencies in Orange County (see Table 1). As with any research that relies on a sample, there is the potential for sampling bias in this study. The possibility of sampling bias was decreased by seizing opportunities to engage numerous criminal justice practitioners (mainly police officers and parole agents) who were not part of the study in informal discussions about the law. The viewpoints expressed in informal discussions echoed the opinions reported during interviews; thus increasing the reliability and external validity of the study. Instruments and interviews. Grounded theory guided the development of interview instruments as well as the interview and analysis processes (Glaser and Strauss, 1967/2006; Glaser, 1978; Strauss, 1987; Strauss and Corbin, 1990). Interviews, which were audio recorded then transcribed, lasted between 33 min and 2 hr and 13 min, most lasted 50 min. Interview instruments contained between 22 and 44 open-ended Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 114 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) questions specifically designed to encourage practitioners to describe their understanding and experience with the law. At the conclusion of the interview, interviewees were asked for their personal opinions about the effectiveness of SACPA and what changes they felt would be beneficial and would make it more effective. The current project pulls together responses from (a) 169 statewide stakeholders (treatment providers, county administrators, and criminal justice practitioners) to openended survey questions posed by UCLA researchers and (b) 60 criminal justice practitioners in Orange County, California to open-ended interview questions about SACPA. The inductive research style used in both studies was intentional, as it afforded practitioners the opportunity to identify the significant issues, as they saw them. Results Three major themes emerged from practitioner surveys and interviews. First, insufficient funding resulted in treatment gaps and inadequate supervision. Second, prohibiting short-term incarceration for noncompliance inadvertently led many offenders to shirk their treatment program. Third, the universal application of SACPA to all drug offenders, regardless of amenability to treatment, posed a challenge to treatment providers and criminal justice professionals alike. Each of these issues will be explored in detail below. The themes were echoed by practitioners throughout the state, and at least one illustrative quote is presented from a county other than Orange County for each theme. Insufficient Funding Insufficient funding has plagued SACPA since the law’s inception. The ballot measure required that US$120 million from the state’s general fund be allocated annually (for 5 years)9 to California’s 58 counties to cover SACPA expenses. This amount proved problematic from the beginning; as there were more offenders than expected and the offenders’ addictions were much more severe than anyone had anticipated or planned for (Longshore et al., 2004; Urada et al., 2009). The budget shortfall was felt most severely by probation departments tasked with supervising offenders, and health care agencies obligated to provide treatment. Although surveys and interviews were open ended, 54% of survey respondents and 72% of nonpolice interviewees10 mentioned insufficient funding as a major problem.11 In the words of one practitioner, Proposition 36 funding for agency and treatment provider participants has never been sufficient. Every year, the budget has been reduced and the court, probation and other justice agency partners have never been compensated for the additional workload that the intensive court monitoring requires. Budget reductions have also dramatically changed the type and amount of treatment and [drug] testing that is available for the defendants, which decreases the success rate of the program. (Court Practitioner [UCLA survey]) Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 115 Gardiner et al. SACPA was vague in terms of how the program should run. Consequently stakeholders in each county designed their own infrastructure for processing SACPA offenders, established their own treatment requirements, and allocated SACPA funds between the relevant agencies in their county. Hence, treatment and supervision duration and intensity varied by county. Surveys and interviews revealed that almost all counties had service delivery problems due to inadequate funding, but that the extent and scope of the problems was not always identical. For example, one respondent suggested that some counties had more issues because they were more idealistic in their treatment and/or supervision plans. Treatment gap. Practitioners throughout the state (one third of survey respondents12 and two thirds of nonpolice interviewees) complained that inadequate funding limited the availability of residential treatment, decreased treatment duration, and created a situation in which offenders were undertreated for their addictions. Scarce resources resulted in a mismatch between the level of treatment that an offender needed and the level of treatment the offender received. Specifically, practitioners reported they had to place highly addicted offenders in outpatient treatment instead of in residential treatment because that was all their county could afford; previous UCLA analyses confirm this (Hawken, 2008a, 2008b). Case in point, Orange County chose to provide clients with treatment for the maximum duration allowed by law, one year plus aftercare treatment. According to managementlevel probation officers involved in implementation, this decision was grounded in best practices research that found the longer a person was in treatment, the better the outcomes. Toward this end, Orange County created a menu of treatment options that would apply to the vast majority of clients they expected to encounter. Unfortunately, Orange County (like many counties) found itself dealing disproportionately with offenders with severe addictions and other co-occurring disorders. As a result, treatment durations were shortened because the county could not afford to provide offenders with the appropriate level of treatment. For example, Level 1 outpatient treatment was originally 6 months long but was reduced to 4 months, Level 2 was reduced from 9 to 6 months, and Level 3 was reduced from 12 to 9 months. “We realized that if we funded those people for all that time, we’re going to run out of money” (DAK,13 OC Probation Officer). What we didn’t anticipate was how many people needed residential (treatment). We expected it to be kind of like a bell curve, so the levels and the way the providers were selected was [sic] kind of designed around that idea—that the majority of the people would be in the middle. Really, the number of people that needed residential surpassed what we expected. (DAK, OC Probation Officer) Despite the desire to provide clients with the most appropriate treatment for their addiction need, Orange County was not able to do so consistently due to budget and system limitations. The number of clients requiring residential treatment severely constrained the system. Triaging strategies were utilized to provide services to those with Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 116 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) the greatest need. This story was repeated throughout the state and hit a critical point in 2008 when California Governor Schwarzenegger reduced the statewide SACPA allocation from US$120 million (2007-2008) to US$108 million (2008-2009). Stakeholders throughout California said that they dealt with the 2008-2009 budget cuts by further decreasing treatment duration and reducing residential/sober living beds, eliminating staff positions; increasing caseloads, and instituting waiting lists.14 Practitioners that responded to UCLA’s survey expressed that the treatment system is severely strained and that SACPA is essentially a shell of a program with little substance left. We are now limited to providing only a small percentage of Prop36 clientele with services and have a very long waiting list. (Lead Agency/Treatment Provider [LA/TP; UCLA]) It made a 6 month program into 90 days, 90 days isn’t enough time! (LA/TP [UCLA]) Quality of care has dropped/decreased due to high case loads. (LA/TP [UCLA]) We are under-treating clients and do not have enough treatment spaces for those who are eligible. Treatment is shorter than the needs of the clients. (Public Defender [UCLA]) Inadequate treatment is a major concern because prior research has found that it can have significant adverse outcome consequences, including increased relapse and recidivism rates (Marlowe, 2003). Furthermore, inadequate treatment costs more in the long run due to increased treatment duration and the need for repeated episodes (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007 and Hawken, Urada, Anglin, & Longshore, 2007). Thus, undertreating clients to save money in the short term is actually more costly in the long term. Inadequate supervision. Sixty one percent of OC court and corrections practitioners and several survey respondents stated that offender supervision and monitoring need to be improved. All offenders sentenced to SACPA are on probation, yet only a fraction of the money was allocated for supervision. On average, counties commit 79% of SACPA funds to treatment and only 21% to criminal justice activities (Ford, Brookes, & Houser, 2005). Like other probation departments across the state Orange County Probation Department’s (OCPD) ability to process and supervise SACPA offenders was severely constrained by an inadequate budget and an unanticipated large number of SACPA offenders (Gardiner, 2008). SACPA almost doubled the number of new offenders OCPD was accustomed to handling each month. The single most significant impact of SACPA on the probation department was the effect it had on individual probation officers’ caseloads. Because the nuances of the law (e. g., treatment requirements, reporting requirements, special rules regarding violations) obligated the probation department to have specially trained Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 117 Gardiner et al. staff supervise SACPA clients, “one-quarter of the officers in the department were supervising one-half of all the cases” (DLJ, OC Probation Officer). The problem was exacerbated because the Orange County CEO refused to allow the probation department to spend county funds on SACPA-related expenses. Thus, officers accustomed to supervising 100 cases prior to the law had caseloads of up to 300 offenders after the law. This unmanageable caseload prohibited officers from going into the field to check on their clients or providing any meaningful services (or supervision). As a result, the department instituted many triaging strategies to relieve caseload pressure, including establishing field monitored caseloads (Gardiner, 2008).15 According to one probation officer, banking offenders “became a necessary survival tool” (DAK, OC Probation Officer). The county wouldn’t fund any more officers to supervise Prop36 clients outside what’s provided by the state. We were funded, when I was there, for 18 officers. 18 officers had to deal with whatever amount of cases they had. . . . It was a complete mess. I sat down with the other supervisor and we tried to brainstorm a way . . . to manage this flood of cases that are coming in every month. . . . We decided we can have ten officers doing actual field supervision with 100 cases each. The rest of them we’ll put on a monitored caseload. That’s the overflow that we just can’t handle. (DLJ, OC Probation Officer) The decision to bank offenders parallels similar efforts by treatment providers throughout the state to triage offenders according to need. Based on UCLA stakeholder surveys and conversations with practitioners involved in implementation, large numbers of highly addicted offenders and budget problems were typical but not universal around the state. In Orange County, we made a commitment to supervise these [SACPA] cases, to try to supervise these cases. Some counties didn’t, they just banked them and played strictly an administrative role from their probation standpoint. We made a decision to try and actually provide supervision to them, which exacerbated our problems because the numbers were such that we couldn’t effectively supervise them in the same way that we had other cases. (DDA, OC Probation Officer) Although it would be instructive to ascertain the local practices that either exacerbated or minimized fiscal problems at the county level, the current data do not allow for such an analysis. What we do know is that 7 years later, probation caseloads across California were still high; averaging over 200 in 2007-2008 according to the most recent UCLA survey. Furthermore, there is a large range of average caseload sizes; from 41 in a small, rural county to 773 in a large county that banks (field monitors) all of its cases. Thus, how an offender experiences SACPA probation varies widely based on the commitment county. As a result of 2008-2009 budget cuts, “Probation has been phasing out their involvement in the program based on budgetary problems. So over the last few months testing Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 118 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) by probation and supervision has stopped” (District Attorney, UCLA survey). Moreover, anecdotal evidence suggests that widespread banking of offenders is becoming a common practice throughout the state due to the drastic budget cuts for 2009-2010. Monitoring the effect that very large caseloads has on offender outcomes is important, as research demonstrates that (a) close monitoring and supervision are important components of successful drug programs (Marlowe, 2003) and (b) large probation caseloads are associated with higher property crime rates (Worrall, Schram, Hays, & Newmann, 2004). Noncompliance Goes Unpunished SACPA prohibits the use of short-term jail sentences as a response to treatment noncompliance, despite research that indicates that the best substance abuse programs include swift and certain punishment for noncompliance (Marlowe, 2003). Some criminal justice practitioners and treatment providers stated that the lack of a proverbial “stick” led to a large segment of SACPA probationers’ not taking probation or treatment seriously and increased the failure rate (and practitioner dissatisfaction with SACPA). Both survey respondents and interviewees argued for more flexibility in sanctioning noncompliance to hold offenders accountable and encourage program participation. According to probation officers, their inability to sanction offenders led to more offenders not showing up to meetings with their probation officer and/or treatment and not taking probation seriously. Judges and treatment professionals in Orange County agreed that offenders’ behavior was negatively affected by the common knowledge that jail sanctions were not permitted in SACPA. [There were] higher numbers of drug addicts that didn’t take probation seriously. That was an absolute effect and I personally believe that that was a function of the fact that we couldn’t take them into custody, we couldn’t arrest them and things, and they learned that very quickly. (DDA, OC Probation Officer) [P]eople were going into Prop36 thinking it was a joke, they would say, “oh, well” to the officers on the street, . . . so they went in with this mindset, knowing they couldn’t go into custody, knowing there were no repercussions for their conduct so naturally when you go in with a mindset like that and you’re already an addict, you’re not gonna [sic] do well and they didn’t. (EBQ, OC Judge) Criminal justice practitioners were not the only ones who wanted to institute shock incarceration for recalcitrant offenders—treatment providers also wanted brief jail sanctions incorporated into the program. In fact, 77% of treatment providers that responded to the 2007 UCLA survey agreed that “jail sanctions for treatment noncompliance would improve treatment completion rates.” In the words of one treatment provider (UCLA survey), “Flash incarcerations promote program compliance and motivate change.” Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 119 Gardiner et al. “Jail sanctions are essential.” (Court Practitioner [UCLA survey]) That’s probably the single most important thing that they should be doing is sanctioning . . . I think short-term custody, we call it “dunking,” dunking them back in to give them a taste of the loss of freedom again. . . . They have to lose something in order to get the message they can’t continue to do what they’ve been doing. (TAL, OC Treatment Provider) Treatment Providers Must Accommodate Unsuitable Offenders One of the common complaints of practitioners at every stage of the criminal justice system was that sophisticated career criminals are being allowed to enroll in SACPA, despite being disqualified due to their past criminal history.16 Every law enforcement officer and 94% of OC court and corrections practitioners brought up the universal application of Prop36 and expressed dismay that criminals are benefitting from Prop36. Judges (as well as treatment professionals and probation officers) in Orange County stated that these offenders are not suitable for SACPA and furthermore that their presence negatively impacts the noncriminally sophisticated users enrolled in SACPA. This population causes problems for other offenders as well as some practitioners. Well when you mix those kind of people [violent offenders] with the PC1000 fallout people, it’s not a good match. It’s not a good match at all. And the health care people were complaining and still do that those worn prison people come in there and basically swear and cuss and have a bad attitude and it’s like a bad apple in the Prop36 barrel that the public had no idea was going to be there. And that’s another problem I mean, for starters to clean this thing up they need to get rid of all of those violent people. They don’t belong in that program [Prop36]. (EBQ, OC Judge) Prop36, you can have gang members and [people with] gang ties . . . as long as they qualify and that’s a huge difference [from drug court] ‘cause [sic] that kind of mentality should not be in your therapy sessions. (ECV, OC Judge) Practitioners complained that offenders want to get out of jail, but that many do not really want treatment. Probation officers, judges, attorneys, and treatment professionals complained that SACPA is wasted on some offenders unmotivated to rehabilitate. These individuals are taking services away from the people that want treatment and, according to probation officers, motivated offenders are the ones losing out because of what they called “the fatal flaw in the law.” SACPA “assumes that everybody eligible for the program wants to kick their addiction, and that’s simply not the case” (DLJ, OC Probation Officer). Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 120 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) It’s become a revolving door. Participants not interested in recovery are just using it to stay out of jail—doing their time in [treatment] instead of jail. (Treatment Provider [UCLA survey]) Many individuals seeking Prop 36 are doing so to avoid immediate punishment— they simply want to get out of custody and delay their cases as long as possible. . . . Amenability is a true issue that should be looked at carefully in every case so that we don’t waste our precious resources on those who are insincere in their efforts. (District Attorney [UCLA survey]) I think those who are not eligible for Prop 36 should be properly screened in court and not allowed into the Prop 36 program. I don’t believe Prop 36 was initially intended for drug dealers and those with violent crimes in their past. They often require more supervision and time of the probation officer, diverting from those probationers who seek to change and require assistance.(Probation Officer [UCLA survey]) It became apparent we weren’t dealing with the college-age kid who had a little bit of meth in his pocket who didn’t have a drug-addiction problem. You were talking about the dumpster-diving, motel-hopping, ID-thieving person, that’s their whole life. They’re not interested, I shouldn’t say all but, a vast majority of them aren’t interested in rehabilitation or kicking their habit. They’re interested in getting out of jail. We had any number [who] would come into the office and tell the officer, “Now I have three chances to blow this program before I go to jail, right?” We used to get that. You were faced with that mentality. (DLJ, OC Probation Officer) Survey respondents and interviewees argued that amenability to treatment is a legitimate concern that should be incorporated as criteria for participation. Research supports this contention, and has found that motivation to change and treatment engagement are important factors in program success (Sung, 2010; Wanberg & Milkman, 1998). However, research also has found that coerced drug treatment can work (Belenko, 1990; Hepburn & Harvey, 2007). Discussion and Policy Recommendations SACPA is broken, but not irreparable. The funding provided by the state has been insufficient to provide a larger-than-expected number of severely addicted participants with either adequate treatment or supervision, and the prohibition of incapacitative sanctions has made achieving success difficult, at best. Synthesizing practitioners’ critiques and best practices research, we propose the following four solutions to Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 121 Gardiner et al. improve the program:17 (a) allocate more money to provide appropriate treatment and adequate supervision; (b) strengthen treatment component; (c) allow graduated sanctions, including short-term jail sanctions; and (d) allow judicial discretion regarding participation. An Orange County Grand Jury report (2003) found that insufficient funding was a large problem in Orange County and that agencies tasked with implementing SACPA had to absorb additional costs associated with the program. Based on responses to UCLA stakeholder surveys as well as earlier UCLA reports (Longshore et al., 2003), many other counties experienced the same fiscal issues which adversely affected both supervision and treatment, and with that, the overall success of SACPA. The authors of the legislation asked for US$120 million for statewide implementation of SACPA. This amount was not based on an estimate of the projected costs to provide treatment and supervision to the 36,000 offenders expected to be diverted each year; but rather represented the amount that, based on public opinion polls, the sponsors of the bill believed voters would be willing to support (Zimmerman, 2005). Sponsors of the legislation contend that they were surprised by the level of addiction severity displayed by SACPA clients and underestimated the funding required to treat and supervise these offenders (Zimmerman, 2005). The accounts that this population was a complete surprise to all interested parties (except law enforcement) confound one of the authors. Regardless, one thing is certain—without proper funding, failure is guaranteed (the deinstitutionalization of mental hospitals in the 1970s without allocating appropriate funds for community care taught us that). Increase Funding to Provide Appropriate Treatment and Adequate Supervision The other reason that Prop36 is so negative is that people read what a failure it is and they think that rehab is a failure. Rehab isn’t a failure. It’s this program that is a failure. (EBQ, OC Judge) Although it is true that SACPA has increased the treatment spots available throughout the state (Longshore et al., 2003; Percival, 2004), it is also true that addicts are being undertreated for their addictions due to insufficient funding (Hawken, Urada, Anglin, & Longshore, 2007.) Additional resources are absolutely necessary to enhance supervision, increase the number of residential treatment beds and improve the quality of treatment provided. Many high-quality treatment facilities are not willing to take SACPA clients because the compensation is insufficient. SACPA clients are “never going to get what they need there because there’s not enough money to pay for the right treatment” (TAL, OC Treatment Provider). Insufficient resources set participants Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 122 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) up for failure, increase recidivism rates, decrease program success, and damage the perception of rehabilitation and the reputation of SACPA. I feel clients are placed in [outpatient drug free] when residential treatment is needed due to there not being enough residential treatment beds contracted. Programs such as mine would be willing to provide more residential treatment but funding is not available. (Treatment Provider [UCLA Survey]) In addition to making more money available for residential treatment, practitioners need access to money that can be used to serve individuals with mental health disorders. As it currently stands, SACPA funds cannot be used to treat mental illness and this creates a barrier to properly serving clients with co-occurring disorders and ultimately lowers their success rates. . . . Channeling of other funds . . . to mesh specifically with Prop 36 and OTP [Offender Treatment Program] funding. It is virtually impossible for [the alcohol and other drug treatment agency] to induce any other division or department of county government to share resources for the purpose of helping addicts, much less addicts in the criminal justice system. That kind of assistance only happens if the State directs it. (Lead Agency [UCLA survey]) Potential funding sources. Although challenging, a dedicated funding source to increase (and stabilize) SACPA funding would likely be helpful, as the state general fund has proven to be neither an adequate nor predictable funding source. One option, although highly unlikely to garner support during the current budget crisis, is a dedicated SACPA tax such as Proposition 63 (which taxes wealthy Californians an additional 1% to support mental health services). Another option that has intuitive appeal and that was proposed by California Governor Schwarzenegger is a tax or fee on alcoholic beverages (Schwarzenegger, 2009). Although it failed to gain legislative support, such a tax could pay for treatment for alcohol-dependent clients, and thus free up existing treatment funds to be used for SACPA offenders. An additional proposal, suggested by treatment providers, is to allow defendants to use their private health insurance to cover treatment expenses. There is much confusion about whether this is currently an option. It appears to vary by county. Depending on how many participants have private health insurance; this could potentially augment treatment coffers appreciably.18 Californians are flirting with the idea of taxing marijuana, which if done could provide extra money for treatment. Although Californians recently voted down the “Regulate, Control, and Tax Cannabis Act” (RCTCA) in November 2010, proponents of the legislation stated that they plan to place another, similar referendum before California voters in 2012 (Hoeffel, 2010). Should such a proposition pass, it could generate funds that could be used for substance abuse treatment. Also, AB390 an unconnected bill introduced in the state assembly that would place a flat tax on marijuana Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 123 Gardiner et al. purchases could be passed by the legislature in 2010-2011. Though of questionable accuracy, the California State Board of Equalization (2009) estimates that AB390 could generate state revenue of US$1.4 billion annually for use “exclusively for drug education, awareness, and rehabilitation programs.” Alternatively, one could reallocate state funds earmarked for other purposes to SACPA. Strengthen Treatment Component I would increase the resources available to give people the treatment that they actually need and not what we can afford. (AFT, OC Public Defender) Some practitioners (29% of survey respondents19 and 61% of nonpolice interviewees) believe that SACPA is not firm enough and want to see the treatment component strengthened. They complained that offenders are frequently provided outpatient treatment when residential treatment would be more suitable and argued that the success of SACPA is dependent on increasing funding to provide appropriate treatment. For example, an Orange County Grand Jury report (2003) found that there were only 106 funded residential treatment beds in the entire county in 2003. More than 3,000 offenders annually were sentenced to SACPA in Orange County, 80% of who reported their drug use was a “serious disruption” to their life (Gardiner, 2008), and according to this report only 412 could get into residential treatment! Counties throughout the state had the same problem—residential treatment supply could not keep pace with demand; as a result SACPA lowered the percentage of criminal justice–involved clients who received residential treatment (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007). To comply with best practices research, improve outcomes, and decrease the cost of repeated treatment episodes (Sharon et al., 2003), the “outpatient first” mentality must give way to an “indicated need” practice. Add secure confinement treatment facility. In concert with increasing the number of residential treatment beds, the state should consider sentencing some offenders with serious addiction problems to a secure confinement treatment facility for the first 30 days. Primarily, this would serve a detoxification function for high-risk offenders with high needs. One of the negative repercussions of eliminating jail sentences all together for drug-addicted offenders on SACPA is that some offenders actually benefit from the 30 or 60 or 90 days they spend incarcerated. Law enforcement officers and jail deputies describe the physical transformation that many drug offenders make in jail. Officers and deputies contend that many offenders gain weight, look much better, and are significantly more coherent after some time in jail (not using drugs and getting three regular meals a day). Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 124 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) They [drug offenders] don’t look the same today as when we put them in jail. There is absolutely no doubt that helps the vast majority of them. That is definitely a dry out, by putting them in custody. We don’t see people coming out of jail after an extended period of time looking like they are strung out. (MAY, OC Police Officer) It seems like a few days after they’re here they really start to make the biggest change and then it seems like the longer they’re here, the better they get . . . more polite, I want to say more coherent, more respectful of the rules, more understanding of the ramifications if they violate the jail rules. [. . .] Personally, I think I see a big difference. (FJA, OC Jail Deputy) Recent research supports deputies’ contentions. According to brain researchers studying addiction, it takes the brain 90 days to reset after consuming illicit substances and in some cases of heavy, long-term usage, it can take years before the brain functions normally (if ever; Lemonick, 2007; National Institute on Drug Abuse, 2007). That is why the standard jail sentence helps to break some of the unhealthy habits and patterns formed over months or years of drug use, and allows addicts to gain some clarity on their situation after being drug-free for a period of time. It is likely that many SACPA clients would benefit from such a facility given that most are heavy, long-term users who are entering treatment for the first time (Urada & Evans, 2008a). The forced detoxification time prescribed by this option would allow addicts to enter treatment clean, and with a higher chance of success. Offenders would be housed in rooms, not cells, and would be expected to participate in meetings and other activities throughout the day. Facilities would not mimic jails; rather they would be modeled on similar existing facilities that successfully cater to juvenile delinquents with addiction problems in California (such as the Orange County Youth Guidance Center) and that subscribe to evidence-based practices shown to work with drug-using offenders. Facilities could be administered by probation departments throughout the state and each would include treatment professionals to coordinate and run the treatment programs. As part of the intake process, probation officers, treatment professionals, and mental health professionals (if necessary) would assess each offender’s treatment needs and motivation to change, along with their various skills. From there, a successful recovery plan would be developed with the offender’s input, and would include the level and expected duration of treatment required, as well as the inclusion of other services that would improve the offender’s chance of success (high school equivalency program, like skills program, employment services, personal/family counseling, and so on.). The goal would be to get each offender ready to fully participate in their recovery; which would require (a) getting the offender’s attention so that they could recognize that they need to take SACPA seriously and (b) detoxifying the offender so that they would be Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 125 Gardiner et al. coherent and could make good decisions about their recovery plan. An absolutely critical part of the program would be to make a successful transition to a community-based treatment center for the purposes of continuing care after the offender has been released from the secure facility. Offenders sentenced to this type of facility would start treatment meetings immediately. This is a significant improvement over the current method which can take weeks or months to get enrolled. This is very important as motivation decreases over time, particularly for individuals coerced into taking action. Research indicates that starting treatment within 14 days improves outcomes (McCorry, Garnick, Bartlett, Corren, Chalti, 2000). Such a facility would likely decrease the early warrant rate for no shows, as offenders would be in a secure confinement facility with all the resources they need (probation officer and treatment and mental health professionals) on-site.20 Deciding on the proper confinement time should be open for discussion between addiction treatment professionals, probation officers, parole agents, judges, attorneys, jail deputies, and possibly law enforcement officers. Defining who gets this intensive treatment will be tough. It might be based on a short risk/needs assessment and motivational interviewing conducted at or prior to sentencing with severity of addiction taking precedence. It will be a balancing act between helping those in need of detoxification or intense treatment versus causing additional harm to others who are productive citizens, with stable, prosocial support systems, and not in need of this level of treatment. Fairness to all will be an important issue that will need to take center stage, so as to not further privilege high-income offenders or punish low-income offenders. Continuing care will be critical, as research has shown that it increases treatment success (Pelissier, Jones, & Cadigan, 2007) and reduces offenders’ return to custody probability (Burdon, Messina, & Prendergast, 2004). Importantly, because SACPA specifies “The terms ‘drug treatment program’ or ‘drug treatment’ shall not include drug treatment programs offered in a prison or jail facility” (Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act of 2000) this plan may, without a change in the law, run into court challenges. Given this, there are two options. One option is to rewrite the law to allow treatment to occur within a secure confinement treatment facility during the first 30 days. Another alternative to consider is to offer these services in a “residential treatment with intensive supervision and monitoring” setting, in lieu of an institutional setting. Although such intensive initial treatment would require additional funding, it could potentially pay for itself in improved success rates. UCLA studies confirm that heavyusing SACPA clients did significantly better in residential treatment than they did in outpatient treatment. Whereas only 19% of heavy users assigned to outpatient treatment successfully completed the program, 40% of heavy users assigned to residential treatment successfully completed the program (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007). Similarly, SACPA clients who were daily methamphetamine users at program entry and who participated in residential treatment had fewer arrests (18% fewer felony arrests and 17% fewer misdemeanor arrests) during a 30-month follow-up period than Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 126 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) did similar clients who participated in outpatient treatment (Hawken, Anglin, & Connor, 2007). These findings support the need for expanding the residential treatment supply and including a secure confinement treatment facility (or residential treatment with intensive supervision and monitoring program) among the options. Expand narcotic replacement therapy. Only 14% of SACPA opiate users received Narcotic Replacement Therapy (NRT), despite the fact that NRT is considered the standard of care for opiate addicts. This was in comparison to 84% of noncriminal justice–involved clients that received publicly funded NRT (Hawken et al., 2007). UCLA studies concluded that SACPA clients placed in NRT had significantly fewer arrests (13% fewer) and higher treatment completion rates (71% vs. 52%) than did clients who did not receive NRT (Hawken et al., 2007). Although controversial, NRT is considered the standard of care for opiate addicts and should be available for all opiate-using SACPA participants who would benefit (Connor, 2008; National Institutes of Health Consensus Development Program, 1997). Allow Graduated Sanctions Its an easy program, too easy—clients get 3 chances to succeed. (Treatment Provider [UCLA survey]) As might be expected, both samples of practitioners (11% of survey respondents21 and 72% of nonpolice interviewees) suggested graduated sanctions for probation violations as a method to improve program compliance for SACPA defendants. Their position is based on experience with this population and the belief that graduated sanctions (including but not limited to the use of shock incarceration) are necessary to encourage sobriety and persuade offenders to comply with program rules. Best practices research on substance abuse treatment with criminal justice–involved individuals supports this contention (Marlowe, 2003). It is a complete waste of time and money unless provisions are made to impose sanctions for non-compliance and additional funding is provided. We do our best but it is inherently ineffective by design and intent. (Court practitioner [UCLA survey]) If you’re going to force somebody to do something against their will, there’s got to be a consequence for not doing it. If the judge and court is the ultimate authority, but you don’t give them any authority to do anything, then what’s the point? (DLJ, OC Probation Officer) Practitioners are so adamant about the utility of graduated sanctions that many actively circumvent the intent of the law and find ways to institute short jail stays Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 127 Gardiner et al. when they feel it is necessary. Even though SACPA offenders cannot be incarcerated for treatment noncompliance, courts routinely jail offenders who are failing in treatment using at least three tactics: (a) scheduling a hearing, then jailing the offender for failure to appear (Gardiner, 2008); (b) jailing a probationer for violations on a separate nondrug case (Burns & Peyrot, 2008); and 3) imposing jail “by stipulation” if all parties (including the defendant) agree to this in lieu of filing a violation of probation (Burns & Peyrot, 2008). Current survey data indicate that circumvention is relatively widespread. Besides the 77% of treatment providers that support the use of flash incarceration for SACPA clients, 40% of court responders (8 out of 20) stated that they “often” use short jail sanctions in response to noncompliance by SACPA offenders. A growing body of research indicates that short jail stays and other sanctions for program noncompliance can increase drug offender motivation and improve outcomes, provided they are consistently applied (Hawken & Poe, 2008; Marlowe, 2003; Taxman, 1999). However, given the indirect methods used to administer shock incarceration, it is likely that these sanctions are employed in a manner that is inconsistent with the swift and certain principle established by best practices research (Marlowe, 2003; Taxman, 1999). Allow More Discretion Regarding Participation Judges and other practitioners want more discretion as to who is allowed to participate. Not only do practitioners want criminally sophisticated offenders with long rap sheets who are unsuitable for treatment out of the program, they also want the ability to keep offenders in the program beyond the third violation if they are making progress. All parolees (and almost all offenders) with serious or violent felonies (“strikes”) are already ineligible for SACPA; however practitioners also want the ability to exclude offenders who have several past convictions, especially those who have served time in prison. More than 60% of nonpolice interviewees from Orange County suggested additional restrictions on the criminal history component. For example, some suggested that SACPA should only be offered in special cases to offenders who have served more than one prison term. These offenders would need to articulate to the court a strong desire to participate in treatment and a willingness to work the program. Furthermore, treatment providers want the flexibility to remove problematic clients sooner than is currently allowed. If these changes resulted in a smaller, more appropriate, and more responsive population of drug offenders, it could decrease the amount of funding required to treat and supervise participants and also improve other outcomes (Urada & Evans, 2008b). Sometimes the folks who have a large history are the people who finally wake up and go, “I just wasted the last four years of my life and I need help.” I don’t want to disqualify that person that has that attitude. . . . How do you benefit as many people that actually want the help and disqualify the folks that don’t want the help? (DXJ, OC Probation Officer) Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 128 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) As with any study, this one has limitations. Unfortunately, one limitation of using an open-ended question format is that it hinders researchers’ abilities to quantify findings. Thus, although the themes that emerged were apparent, quantifying individual responses was sometimes difficult due to the ambiguity inherent in such data. Future research should ask closed-ended questions about the themes that emerged in this study to identify the breadth and depth of these issues for counties statewide. Research is also needed to identify any local factors that have an impact on successful implementation (e.g., Evans, Anglin, Urada, & Yang, 2011). It would also be instructive if future research could identify successful programs, strategies, and/or policies in use throughout the state that could serve as models. Conclusion SACPA and other recently implemented diversion-to-treatment laws dramatically altered how criminal justice systems across the United States processes nonviolent drug offenders. These laws essentially changed the sentencing focus from retribution to rehabilitation. Research shows that SACPA has achieved positive outcomes for drug addicted offenders and has saved the state of California money in the process (US$4 for every treatment completer and US$2.50 for every participant; Hawken et al., 2008). SACPA, however, is at a crossroads, severely racked by insufficient financial and practitioner support. The law and its funding provisions desperately need to be revised.22 SACPA’s authors admit that changes are necessary to improve the success of the program (Appel, Backes, & Robbins, 2006). The overarching problem is that inadequate funding since inception has rendered SACPA hollow and undereffective. Practitioners circumvent the intent of the law with “workarounds” attempting to improve program outcomes. Many California practitioners never truly “bought into” SACPA, in large part because it was thrust on them—there was no dialogue about best drug-treatment practices, or discussions of essential components for stakeholder support; just a ballot measure put before the voters by well-financed drug policy advocates that needed to be implemented by the same practitioners that opposed it. The most sensible approach for improving SACPA and achieving stakeholder buyin would be to assemble an oversight group with representatives from all stakeholder groups to design an improved version of SACPA, one that is inline with stakeholders’ visions. Law enforcement, probation, parole, district attorneys, public defenders, judges, treatment and mental health providers, and researchers should be invited to the table. There are several areas of broad stakeholder agreement that should serve as a starting point; including the following: Strengthening the treatment component, incorporating brief jail sanctions, and expanding discretion regarding offender participation. Because SACPA was initially passed as a ballot measure, any attempt to improve it (for example, by changing eligibility criteria or treatment options, allowing for graduated sanctions, allocating more money, or assigning a dedicated funding stream) should be put before the voters as a measure to directly replace SACPA.23 Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 129 Gardiner et al. One of the enduring lessons of California’s experience with SACPA is that adequate funding and stakeholder buy-in are crucial for any diversion-to-treatment law to be effective. Voter initiatives are very difficult to change, but the alternative (which is to allow the law to fail due to lack of fiscal resources and stakeholder support) is far more damaging in the long run. In spite of its faults, from 2001 to 2010 SACPA provided treatment for and diverted from possible incarceration more than 250,000 offenders; approximately 85,000 of whom have completed treatment. Authors’ Note An earlier version of this article was presented at the annual meeting of the American Society of Criminology in November, 2009. Declaration of Conflicting Interests The author(s) declared that they had no conflicts of interest with respect to their authorship or the publication of this article. Funding The author(s) disclosed that they received the following support for their research and/or authorship of this article: This research was partially funded by National Institute of Justice Dissertation Research Grant, 2007-IJ-CX-0031. Notes 1. A total of 50,000 offenders accept SACPA diversion and are referred to treatment each year, approximately 36,000 (72%) enroll in treatment each year. 2. In this article, we use the term stakeholder to mean county administrators, criminal justice practitioners, and treatment professionals whose job entails working with SACPA funding, agencies, or clients on a regular basis. 3. Survey methods are described in more detail in Urada, Gardiner, and Anglin (2011). 4. As part of the law, every county in the state had to designate a “lead agency” to administer Proposition 36 funds and coordinate implementation within the county. Most counties chose the county health agency overseeing treatment of substance use disorders (e.g., health and human services, behavioral health, public health) to be the lead agency. 5. Fiscal Year 2006-2007 data from the California Department of Alcohol and Drug Programs California Outcomes Measurement System were used for treatment provider selection purposes. 6.A comprehensive list of all comments can be found at http://www.uclaisap.org/Prop36/ html/reports.html 7. Study methods are described in much greater detail in Gardiner (2008). 8. Snowball sampling is an effective sampling method to locate and gain access to a small set of participants with particular knowledge, in this case implementing Proposition 36 in Orange County. Although their views may not generalize to all practitioners, it is expected that their experiences may be instructive and somewhat similar to key practitioners involved in SACPA implementation throughout the state. Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 130 Criminal Justice Policy Review 23(1) 9. When combined with other statewide sources of funding used for SACPA treatment and supervision (Offender Treatment Program, Byrne Justice Assistance Grant), this amount has fluctuated and ranged from US$145 million in FY 2006-2007 to US$62.5 million in FY 2009-2010. The Governor’s proposed funding for 2010-2011 has been reduced to zero from all statewide sources. 10. Police officers are excluded from the analysis because they have no involvement in actual implementation and are unlikely to know about the sufficiency of funding, adequacy of treatment, or program compliance. 11. Participants in the UCLA survey are referred to as “survey respondents” and participants in the Orange County focus study are referred to as “interviewees.” 12. As the UCLA survey asked specific questions about county responses to reduced funding, it is possible that some respondents did not add the need for more treatment funding to their “additional comment” response because they felt they had already weighed in on the topic. 13. To ensure anonymity, interviewees were assigned arbitrary three letter codes for identification purposes. 14. Funding was drastically reduced in 2009-2010 (from US$108 million in 2008-09 to US$62.5 million—an amount that was cobbled together through state Offender Treatment Program funds and Federal Byrne Justice Assistance Grants). No data yet exist on how practitioners have responded to the radical reduction of funding in 2009-2010. Funding has been completely eliminated (from all sources) for 2010-2011. 15. Offenders placed on a “field monitored” (a.k.a. “banked”) receive minimal supervision. In Orange County, filed monitored probationers meet with their Probation Officer once during an initial visit to review the terms and conditions of their probation but do not report in person beyond that. They still have treatment requirements and all of the customary conditions, but are not required to report to their probation officer on a regular basis. Instead, contact between probation officer and probationer is maintained through the telephone or mail and the probation officer verifies treatment progress through the shared database. 16. In Orange County, this happened for two reasons: (a) some judges had such strong protreatment feelings that they ignored disqualifying criteria, and (b) some judges were unaware of the disqualifying criteria (Gardiner, 2008). 17. This list represents the major changes that need to be made if SACPA is going to be successful. For a comprehensive list of additional recommended changes, see Urada et al. (2011). 18. Interestingly, if the national health care reform bill survives as currently written, starting in 2014 most offenders substance abuse treatment will be covered; as “substance use disorders treatment” is on the law’s list of essential benefits to be covered by both Medi-Cal and private health insurance. 19. It is likely that the existence of previous questions on the survey pertaining to funding and treatment limited the number of respondents who felt compelled to reiterate their feelings in the final “other comments” question at the end of the survey, from which this statistic is derived. 20.One other benefit this has is that it would likely increase the perceived severity of the sanction in criminal justice practitioners’ eyes. This, however, it not a legitimate reason to remove an individual’s freedom. Denying an individual’s freedom for the purpose of Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016 131 Gardiner et al. someone else’s satisfaction, although currently popular (e.g., retribution), is not a legitimate reason to impose a custodial sanction on low-level drug offenders. 21.It is likely that the existence of previous questions on the survey pertaining to sanctions limited the number of respondents who felt compelled to reiterate their feelings in the final “other comments” question at the end of the survey, from which this statistic is derived. As noted earlier, 77% of treatment provider respondents indicated in a closed-ended question that making sanctions available would increase completion rates. 22.SACPA is currently an unfunded mandate, as the state terminated all financial support for the law in early 2010. Thus, all monies to support SACPA must come from counties directly. 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The 2005 International Drug Policy Reform Conference. Retrieved from http://www.drugpolicy.org/docUploads/DPA_Conference_2005_ Program.pdf Bios Christine Gardiner, PhD. is an assistant professor of criminal justice at California State University, Fullerton. Her doctoral dissertation investigated the effects of SACPA on the case processing and sentencing of drug offenders in Orange County, California. She also has experience as a sheriff’s department crime analyst and probation officer. Darren Urada, PhD. is a researcher at the UCLA Integrated Substance Abuse Programs (UCLA ISAP) and Principal Investigator on a contract with the State of California to evaluate California’s Substance Abuse and Crime Prevention Act (SACPA). Dr. Urada has been evaluating this law since its passage in 2001. M. Douglas Anglin, PhD. was the founding Director of the UCLA Drug Abuse Research Center and is currently Associate Director of UCLA ISAP and a UCLA Professor-in-Residence. He has been Principal Investigator on more than 25 federal funded studies and involved with UCLA’s SACPA evaluation since the law’s passage. Downloaded from cjp.sagepub.com at PENNSYLVANIA STATE UNIV on September 17, 2016