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Workshop ‘Racism and Xenophobia: Key Issues, Mechanisms and Policy Opportunities’ European Commission, Brussels 5-6th April, 2001 Ideas for Multicultural Citizenship In Europe Gerard Delanty (University of Liverpool) Discussion Paper For Phase IV ‘Constructing Pluralist, Tolerant, Democratic Societies’. (Please note this is a draft document for discussion/background to my presentation and is not for quotation or to be regarded as complete) Introduction One of the main challenges facing the European Union today is the question of cultural identity. The older goal of social equality is being challenged by the problem of cultural difference. The existing conception of citizenship as codified by the Maastricht treaty – which presupposes nationality - may be unable to cope with the challenges facing the EU in the 21st century, as the Union moves slowing eastwards, gradually incorporating new groups of peoples. The existing dynamics, former largely in terms of reconciling the south with the north, will give way to new ones emerging from the encroachment into postcommunist space and the gradual incorporation of Europe’s borderlands. Three major kinds of demands will be made on citizenship: polynational rights (for the many national members and different kinds of membership), polyethnic rights (for large scale national and transnational minorities) and special representation rights (for non-ethnic groups). The discussion paper addresses the question of the prospects and limits of multiculturalism for Europe. I outline (1) the main problems with multiculturalism, (2) the principal national models (3) the basic ingredients of an alternative model for Europe. This is followed by (4) a broader conceptualization of a differentiated and graduated model of postnational citizenship. 1. The Limits of Multiculturalism for Contemporary European Societies To begin, it is not evident that multiculturalism is a desirable approach. It has been much criticized and its relevance for today is questionable. Firstly, then, let us set out the main problems with multiculturalism. • Multiculturalism was a model of containment rather rather than of integration. Western multiculturalism, particularly in western Europe, was always based on the assumption of liberal tolerance rather than of participation in citizenship. • It was constructed on the assumption that there was a dominant cultural identity in the society to which ethnic groups had to adjust but to whom certain concessions could be made. • Today diversity has penetrated the cultural identity as a whole. Cultural pluralization and the growing diffusness of all social groups in contemporary society are undermining the presuppositions of multiculturalism. Integration today is individual, not group specific. This would appear to allow for more social integration than is often thought. • On the cultural level, the boundaries between social groups are more diffuse than previously. The implication for multiculturalism is that it is more and more difficult to demarcate ethnic groups and the boundary between ethnic groups and the dominatn culture is not always so clearly defined. Models of Multiculturalism: An Analysis of a Contested Concept Multiculturalism is an essentially contested term. In the following discussion nine models of multiculturalism are outlined and discussed. These are (1) monoculturalism, (2) republican multiculturalism, (3) pillarization (4) liberal multiculturalism, (5) communitarian multiculturalism, (6) liberal communitarian multiculturalism, (7) interculturalism, (8) radical multiculturalism (9) critical multiculturalism. See Diagram 1 for a summary. The first three are strictly speaking not models of multiculturalism but of cultural management strategies and generally held to be no longer relevant. The purpose in outline these models is to provide a basis for thinking about the assumptions that might shape a model of multiculturalism appropriate to contemporary European societies. Diagram 1 Ten Models of Multiculturalism Models of multiculturalism 1. Monoculturalism Policy objective (traditional German, Japanese models) 2.Republican Multiculturalism (The French model multiculturalism is confined to the private sphere/ marginalization) – 3. Pillarization (Classic Dutch model) 4. Liberal Multiculturalism (The historical American model – the ‘melting pot’) 5. Communitarian Multiculturalism (Canada, Belgium) Preservation of differences 6. Liberal communitarian multiculturalism (The British, Australian models) 7. Interculturalism Postethnic Multiculturalism (soft cosmopolitanism) 8. Radical ‘Strong’ Multiculturalism New American multiculturalism 9. Critical Multiculturalism (postethnic multiculturalism) 1. Coercive integration (Official ethnic group/ethic majoritarianism/marginalization of others) Partial/temporary citizenship Coercive assimilation (Shared public culture in the republican national state/no official recognition of cultural diversity) Universal/republican citizenship Aim: the duties of citizenship (loyalty, obedience) Official/corporate pluralism Balancing of large scale religious groups. Aim: autonomy, federalism Assimilation (overcoming marginalization/official recognition of cultural/ethnic diversity but without formal rights) Assimilation through meritocratic individualism Group differentiated rights for organized groups (Official Recognition of ethic minorities or large scale culturally defined groups/ social rights). Also: corporate multiculturalism (organized groups). Aim: the preservation of identity Pluralism of groups and tolerance of difference (co-existence/integration of groups within a majoritarian framework/tolerance of diversity/precedence of individual rights over group rights) ‘the salad bowl’. Organized subnationally. Aim: social citizenship/civic commitment/regionalism Diversity as a cultural value for all groups (promotion of cultural programmes, culturalism awareness/the new Japanese internationalism, educational policy making, new consumerism, peace, cultural) Aim: understanding Affirmative action (group differentiated rights for organized cultural groups/quotas) Aim: to make institutions representative of their social environment. Group differentiated rights for smaller socially defined groups (empowerment, overcoming social disadvantages/injustice) Aim: enhancement of participation in society Monoculturalism Monoculturalism privileges the cultural identity of the majority, making political identity coeval with a dominant ethnic cultural identity. Japanese citizenship is still very much based on this equation of ethnicity with nationality as a qualification for citizenship. A more pertinent European example might be illustrated by Germany where only one cultural identity has official recognition, for the national identity is coeval with an ethnic identity based on German descent. Thus, in Germany citizenship generally rests on German ethnicity, rather than being born in Germany. In the case of monocultural societies, cultural diversity can exist only at the margins of society. In such societies the aim of multiculturalism can only be integration rather than assimilation. However, it is important to say that few countries that are officially monocultural do not have ways of promoting other kinds of multiculturalism, though this is unlikely to extend beyond partial citizenship. In Japan interculturalism (see below) has official existence and in Germany, despite the jus sanguinis, communitarian multiculturalism is well established at regional levels, as is evidence by the work of Daniel Cohen-Bendit in Frankfurt. 2. The Republican Multiculturalism The paradigmatic model of this is the French republican reduction of multiculturalism to the private sphere. In this model, as in the American (see point 4 below), there can be no public recognition of cultural differences in the public domain of civil society which is supposed to be a domain of equality. The culture-blind model of multiculturalism assumes the absolute separation of cultural and political identity. Whereas the American model of assimilation discussed below, sees the eventual aim of multicultural policy to be the creation of a common way of life, this classic republican policy (which may be called the ‘salad bowl’ model as opposed to the American ‘melting pot’ model) accepts the reality of diversity at the prepolitical level, seeking only a shared political identity. In France this comes from the republican ideology that there is only one political identity – the republican values of the constitution and guaranteed by the absolute neutrality of the state with respect to culture and all forms of ethnicity, be they those of the dominant groups in society or those of recent immigrants. Thus the kind of assimilation that it demands is a coercive one, for minority groups must deny their cultural traditions and effectively become French (Wieviorka, 1998). In France where the Republican ethos is most apparent, the multicultural society – as we know from the ‘headscarves affair’ - quite literally ends at the school gates – for once the shared public domain of the state and its institutions is approached there can be no tolerance of diversity. However, it must be added that this model, like the previous one, is rarely as inflexible as it is often claimed to be. In reality, as is witnessed by the ruling of the French Constitutional Court on the headscarves case, the state will recognise the claims of a cultural group, although generally in a highly qualified way. But there is no denying the reality that the classic republican model has been in practice diluted by the interest of the state to move closer to a pluralist model of integration (Schain, 2000). In general, the view is that multiculturalism primarily resides in the private sphere. That is, the prepolitical sphere of ethnic privatism or, as more recent developments might indicate, in the sphere of consumption in which the middle classes of the dominant groups participate in the multicultural society. In this sense, most western European countries are multicultural. But this is a prepolitical culturalism that was originally seen to reside in tolerance of ethnic groups. In time, with the incorporation of ethnic groups into society, multiculturalism came to be an expression of a society that had come to terms with multiple cultural identities and the key marker of multiculturalism resided in new patterns of consumption. Indeed many societies – ones as different as Ireland and Japan for instance – became multicultural through consumption rather than through ethnicity (in this case the kind of multiculturalism that is implied is closer to interculturalism, see below). 3 Pillarization Like the previous two models this is also a historical model but one that has ceased to exist today. In The Netherlands it was the official means of accommodating the two religious traditions within the polity. In the Netherlands the principle of the equality of the religion was accepted since the early nineteenth century. However, state support for Catholic schools was not granted until 1917, when the system know as pillarization was formally adopted as a means of organizing education into the Catholic and Protestant denominations and for much of the twentieth century it was the official means of dealing with cultural pluralism. Originally this referred to the two main denominations, but from 1983, with the recognition that The Netherlands was a multicultural society, this principle was extended to the other religious traditions, such as the Jewish and Hindu groups. However, the model was limited because it was deemed to apply only to religious groups, not ethnic groups as such (Nederveen Pieterse, 1997, pp. 177-200). Moreover, as the term suggests, it was intended to be a means of negotiating the main ‘pillars’ of the society – i.e. the main churches - and thus was ineffective in dealing with groups with lesser influence. Today, as a result of growing numbers of ethnic groups who are not primarily defined by religion, it is no longer regarded as an appropriate model for multiculturalism in what is also a predominantly secular society. It may be noted in passing that the Ottoman ‘millet system’ by which certain non-Muslim minorities were officially recognised by the state and allowed to govern themselves (Eisenberg, 1999, pp. 390-1). In the USSR there was also a similar policy of instituting ethnic citizenship within the federal republics. To an extent, Switzerland may be cited as a contemporary example of this kind of multiculturalism. However, in this case the groups in question are not minorities but subnational groups. 4. Liberal Multiculturalism This is the constitutional American paradigm, which has also been called the ‘melting pot’ model. The basis of this is the view that all immigrants will become assimilated into the one society. This model is not, strictly speaking, a model of ‘multi-culturalism’ since the aim is to have a common way of life – ‘the American way of life’ – and not the preservation of differences. Though often seen as the paradigmatic expression of multiculturalism, this model of multiculturalism is, in fact, very specific to the United States and rested on a curious teleology: American multiculturalism is based on the fact of diversity on the level of cultural identity and an absolute commitment to the neutrality of the shared public culture of the political domain. Liberalism in political identity and multiculturalism in ethnic identities was seen to provide the structures for the formation of a uniquely American way of life. For in time, it was believed, the mix of cultures would create a common way of life. The neutrality of the political sphere of the state and the fact that, culturally, the United States was a society of immigrants made such a utopia possible (at least if we ignore the fact that the Anglo-Saxon immigrants occupied the key positions in the society). While the circumstances peculiar to the United States – largely that it was a society of immigrants and one that did not have a native ruling elite or the remnants of a feudal order – made this a reasonable expectation, the dream ultimately rested on the ability of the social structure to deliver the promise of a new society, and in this it was judged a failure by many (while being defended by many others) (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Hall and Lindholm, 1999; Schlesinger, 1992). In any case the widespread belief was that the mixing of cultures along with the core ideology of American society – meritocratic individualism – would led to common ground. The assumption of assimilation in the American tradition differs from the French policy in that it is less coercive and less based on the constitutional state. It may be observed that while the American model had its roots in a modern society of immigrants, this republican model arose in a premodern Enlightenment society when religion, as the principal marker of cultural identity, was relegated to the private sphere. It is still in the mould of Enlightenment anticlericalism that multiculturalism is still cast as far as the constitutional national state is concerned. However, exactly where the divide between multiculturalism as a process of assimilation and cultural diversity lies is not easy to specify. Ultimately liberal constitutional democracy and multiculturalism are not compatible, since the former is based on equality and the latter on diversity. In any case, American multiculturalism today has little in common with the constitutional tradition, which has become, in the words of Daniel Lazare ‘frozen’: the model of the ‘melting pot’ has been superceded by radical multiculturalism and various kinds of communitarianism which do have as their overriding objective universality (Lazare, 1996). This is because the question today is no longer immigrants but race and the need to make social institutions more representative of their environment (see point 8 below). Moreover, many indigenous groups have won the right of self-government despite the culture-blindness of the American constitution, a fact that exemplifies the contemporary relevance of the constitutional tradition, in the view of James Tully (1995). 5. Communitarian Multiculturalism Communitarianism is best represented by Canada, whose constitutional tradition is not based on classical liberal democracy. The accommodation of cultural diversity and democracy are not antithetical as they are in the republican constitutional traditions, as in France and the United States. This is a relatively recent conception of multiculturalism, although there have been historical cases of group differentiated citizenship, as for example rights the Amish community have won in the United States. In Canada, unlike the United States, immigration has played a more central role in the formation of the society in the latter half of the twentieth century. The Canadian federal state grants public recognition to different groups who are encouraged to retain their differences and will receive state support and recognition. This can take at least three forms: federal autonomy in the form of self-government (e.g. for French speakers, Aboriginal peoples), polyethnic rights for the various ethnic minorities, and special representation rights for various disadvantaged groups (Kymlicka, 1996). Thus all that is required is only a minimal commitment to the shared political culture of the public domain. There is clearly a delicate balance between maintaining integration and divisiveness, as is strikingly evident in the case of Belgium, or even secession as in the case of more overt expressions of nationalism such as in Ireland (O’ Mahony and Delanty, 1998). The communitarian model is quite a departure from American constitutional liberal model in that groups are encouraged to retain their cultural identity. It differs from liberal model in that it recognizes that the neutrality of the state must be comprised in order to maximize inclusion on the social level. It differs furthermore from the American liberal model in that it does not believe that social integration will be achieved as a result of the mutual mixing of cultures. In short, the state must take an active role in bringing about social integration. This model of multiculturalism can be cast in the terms of the communitarian ‘politics of recognition’, to use Charles Taylor’s characterization of what constitutes a multicultural society (Taylor, 1994). Taylor is opposed to the classic liberal stance (the model of assimilation) in that for him the state must recognise cultural identity, for political identity must rest on a particular cultural identity. What this translates into is a plea for collective rights for culturally defined group. This stance is what makes communitarian multicultural distinctive, as well as highly controversial (Bauböck, 2000; Offe, 1998). While the former models were products of an industrial society that was still shaped by Enlightenment civil society, the communitarian model is a product of the postindustrial society; it is an expression of a society in which immigrant groups can organize themselves in quasi-corporate orders and gain access to a form of political organization that is more regulatory than liberal in its fundamental assumptions. It may also be noted that this model is seen as primarily concerned with access to social and cultural citizenship. It has not been dominant in cases of political disputes concerning fundamental questions of group identity. In such cases the radical multicultural model has been more prevalent. 6. Liberal Communitarian Multiculturalism This is often to be found at the sub-national level and can co-exist with other more official finds of governmental multiculturalism. British multiculturalism takes this form which is one of pluralism, and derives from colonial history and the Commonwealth. The emphasis is on co-operation and peaceful co-existence rather than a formal policy of containment. It may be termed ‘liberal communitarian’ in that there is official recognition of diversity but measures stop short of positive programmes to empower groups. It is a liberalism that has been modified by communitarianism. Unlike the stronger Canadian model, ethnic groups are not seen as being on equal footing with the dominant cultural group in the society (for instance, there is generally the assumption that immigrants will learn the language of the majority). The liberal component is strong in that there is a tacit recognition of a dominant cultural group but within an ethos of tolerance. The metaphor of ‘the salad bowl’ rather than the ‘melting pot’ best captures this kind of multiculturalism, which is one of the most prevalent traditions in western Europe and in much of the rest of the world. Such an understanding of multiculturalism has received a theoretical formulation in the recent work of Alain Touraine who argues for a reconciliation of liberalism and communitarianism (Touraine, 2000). It is also the basis of Habermas’s notion of multiculturalism within the limits of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1998). In this context there is also the question of the different status of immigrants and indigenous peoples, as Kylimcka argues (1995). Defending the application of group-differentiated rights to indigeneous, colonized peoples who have suffered a historical grievance, he questions its application to immigrant ethic groups who have willfully joined the society in order to benefit from it. In many countries, for instance the US and Australia, liberal communitarianism has been used to justify selfgovernment for indigenous peoples. In the UK, while a form of devolution based on differential rights has been seen as the solution for Northern Ireland and for Scotland. However, liberal communitarism does not demand a wider conception group rights. In sum, this model is largely a strategy to accommodate within a broadly liberal framework the reality of cultural diversity. It is a supplementary rather than innovating and frequently it is indistinguishable from intercultural tokenism. 7. Interculturalism This is a more recent kind of soft kind of multiculturalism that seeks to promote cultural difference as a positive virtue (see Watson, 2000, p. 51). It is expressed in programmes of cultural awarness and seeks to encourage tolerance but also knowledge of other cultures. Most countries today have educational policies designed to promote cultural understanding. It is a kind of multiculturalism that has resonances in particular kinds of consumerism and in advertising. Since the mid-1990s it has an official status as internationalism in Japan, where other forms of multiculturalism do not exist. 8. Radical Multiculturalism This is the view that disadvantaged groups must be privileged in order to empower them against the dominant groups. In this more radical or ‘strong’ conception of multiculturalism, the state must actively intervene in granting recognition to marginal groups. This is the main form that multiculturalism takes in the United States today, where the melting pot model has ceased to have any relevance. This is because the main issues today are framed in the language of race, rather than of immigrants. It is a question of making institutions more representative of their social environment rather than the shaping of a common way of life, or even of accommoding cultural identity. The form that it takes is that of affirmative action, since multiculturalism is now a matter of positive programmes in particular in education and in jobs. Unlike in Europe, where multiculturalism is mostly addressed to first and second generation immigrants and refugees, the American debate today is largely about the diversity of the society’s native population (Glazer, 2000). It has found controversial expression in debates about the curriculum and has fueled the culture wars in higher education (Delanty, 2001). In the view of many critics it has been more divisive than integrative. In the view of many critics, radical multiculturalism is racist in conception since its key element is the proposition of essential difference (which is exactly in contradiction with human rights philosophy which posits sameness or equality). 9. Critical Multiculturalism This idea of multiculturalism is close to the communitarian model discussed above but is more radical in that it is ultimately a theory of cultural plurality that goes beyond all traditional understandings of multiculturalism (see Goldberg, 1994). It differs from radical multiculturalism in one respect: the groups in question are largely ‘postethnic’ – they can be found as much in the dominant cultural groups as in ethnic groups – and the state is expected to be proactive, as opposed to reactive, in promoting citizenship (Hollinger, 1995). For critical multiculturalism differences within ethic groups is emphasized and ultimately it is a conception of multiculturalism that recognises the pluralization of all group identities. Iris Young’s conception of a strong communitarianism fits into this model group differentiated rights around issues of bilingual education, women’s rights, rights for disadvantaged groups such as disabled people (Young, 1989; 1990. See also Guttman, 1993; O’ Neill, 1994, 1997). Feminists and cultural pluralists who advocate group differentiated citizenship (Benhabib, 1996; Parekh, 1994, 1995, 1997), see identity as contested and therefore always open to definition. Critical multiculturalism model highlights the conflict of collective rights for groups and individual rights, i.e. the right of the individual to dissent from the ethic group. Thus the emphasis here is less on multiculturalism in the sense of cultures in the plural than of the pluralization of culture. It must be mentioned that this model is largely philosophical, with resonances in debates about postmodernization, and cannot be so easily related to particular kinds of policies (Delanty, 2000a). At this point we have reached the limits of multiculturalism. In communitarian theories as well as the older liberal conceptions, group identity was taken for granted as something fixed and belonging either to the private domain or reducible to a public notion of the common good. The four models of multiculturalism discussed until now are commonly regarded as unacceptable and are in fact contrary to international law (and can even entail severe violations of human rights if they were implemented). The latter models of multiculturalism suggest a move beyond some of the assumptions of these older models, which presuppose the national democratic state as the operative framework. Whether it is the constitution or the curriculum, multiculturalism has irreversibly politicized citizenship, albeit to the point of bringing into question the very possibility of social integration. The question that remains to be answered is whether there is any value left in the term for democratic and cosmopolitan politics. Is a cosmopolitan multiculturalism possible for Europe? 2. An Alternative Conception of Multiculturalism For Europe Given the reality of cultural diversity as a result of immigrant, ethnic, various subcultural, and postmodernized identities, how much common ground is there in European societies? Can the emergent reality of a European society give expression to a different kind of multiculturalism? What criteria do we use to define a group? Does multiculturalism sustain social integration or is it divisive? Lessons from the North American Experience There is no doubt that the liberal or republican multiculturalism no longer caries any weight. The American model is now widely believed to be a failure, or at least politically exhausted, at least if we follow communitarian and liberal critiques (Lazare, 1996; Schlesinger, 1992). Many critics argue assimilation has been possible only at the cost of ghettozization and new forms of social exclusion have emerged (Byrne, 1999; Wacquant, 1993, 1996, Wacquant and Wilson, 1989). However, this is not to deny the relative success of American multiculturalism, since there has been considerable assimilation and the term has been normalized (Glazer, 1997. See also Smelser and Alexander, 1999; Patterson, 1997). What is apparent however is that this model may have reached its limits. A new radical multiculturalism has emerged – though whether this is as a result of the failure of assimilation or not is an open question – seeking to empower positively groups through collective rights and the repoliticization of cultural identity. Radical multiculuralism is possibly relevant as a temporary kind of policy, but not as a long term solution. Strong commuitarianism is pertinent on the transnational level of the European Union as a means of guaranteeing the survival of national cultures. Communitarian and radical multiculturalism has generally been a response to either the problem of indigeneous populations or to race. In Europe, which does not have indigeneous populations of substantial significance, polyethnicity is the major issue and the problems its poses are less divisive for the population as a whole. There is however one lesson for Europe to draw from the Canadian debate. The Canadian model has much to offer European transnationalism, namely the need to separate three domains of group rights: national determination, rights for national minorities and special representations rights. Only by divising a multi-tiered citizenship that is capable of responding to these three realities, will a genuinely democratic multiculturalism be possible. But beyond this the US and Canadian experience is limited. What Kind if Values Should European Multiculturalism be Based On? •Residence rather than birth or descent •Flexible citizenship (with multiple paths to citizenship) is important. Concretely, in this respect what is important is mobility for migrants. The over-riding priority is no longer political rights (ie. voting rights). •Multicultural citizenship must be transnational. This is important in the case of de-territorial groups, such as the gypsy population. The way forward for Europe is to build on common ties rather than to create policies that can be divisive. •Multiculturalism can no longer be posed exclusively in terms of migrants but must address all minority groups, including nonethnic groups such as religious groups, linguistic groups and groups defined by social disadvnatages (such as the elderly, the disabled). •common ground is to be found less on the level of culture – or even on the level of the political than on the level of the social. Examples of this might be found in the wide acceptance of the value of education, support for ecological causes and the alleviation of suffering. •the recognition of cultural difference does not automatically lead to social equality and frequently can be detrimental to it. •A democratic multiculturalism would be more attentive to social issues. It is easier to build on social ties than on cultural ones. We should be careful not to exaggerate cultural differences. •Recognition of multiple loyalties is an essential dimension. •Pluralization rather than assimilation or integration should be the objective. •Citizenship can no longer be defined by the values of liberty and equality. There is a need for new values, belonging, solidarity and pluralism 2. Towards a Graduated Institutionalization of Citizenship (some incomplete notes) The following diagram (Diagram 2) sketches a differentiated concept of citizenship and Multi-levelled governance. It is based on the assumption that the main dimensions to citizenship are rights, duties, participation and identity and that there are four main levels of governance. This model allows a graduated conception of citizenship by which different degrees of rights are possible and which may be graduated by a principle of subsidiarity on different levels of governance. Diagram 2 Components of Citizenship Rights Duties Participation Identity The entitled citizen The responsible citizen The active citizen The rooted citizen Cultural rights (Immigrant/ ethnic group rights, disadvantaged groups), Residence as criterion Individual responsibility, Ethic of conviction, Family Local communities, Voluntary organizations, Participatory democracy, Social capital Multicultural identities, Substantive identities, Ethnic identities Regional Cultural rights (Indigenous Group rights) Residence as criterion Social well being, Large scale cultural identity, City/regional identities, Territorial identity National Social rights, Labour rights, Civic rights, Political rights, Birth as criterion Global Biorights, Mobility, Human rights, Technology rights Taxation, Education, Voting, Accountability Legal rational, Ethic of responsibility Ecological responsibilities, Future generations, Co-responsibility Associations Municipal/local government Federal structures, Social capital, Civil society, Particatory democracy Political Parties, Representative democracy, Organized interests (TUs, business interests) Discursive democracy INGOs, IGOs lobbyists, specialized experts global civil society Transnational communities/ diasporic identities, virtual community Levels of Governance Local Political identity, national identity as constitutional patriotism/legal identity Note on Author Gerard Delanty is Professor of Sociology in the University of Liverpool, UK. He is the author of several books and papers on social theory. Some relevant publications include: Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Macmillan, 1995), Citizenship in a Global Era (Open University Press, 2000); Challenging Knowledge: The University in the Knowledge Society (Open University Press, 2001). Address Professor Gerard Delanty, Department of Sociology, University of Liverpool, Eleanor Rathbone Building, Bedford Street South, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69 7ZA, UK. Email: [email protected]