Download Ideas for Multicultural Citizenship in Europe

Workshop ‘Racism and Xenophobia: Key Issues,
Mechanisms and Policy Opportunities’
European Commission, Brussels 5-6th April, 2001
Ideas for Multicultural Citizenship In Europe
Gerard Delanty
(University of Liverpool)
Discussion Paper For Phase IV ‘Constructing Pluralist, Tolerant, Democratic Societies’. (Please note
this is a draft document for discussion/background to my presentation and is not for quotation or to be
regarded as complete)
Introduction
One of the main challenges facing the European Union today is the question of
cultural identity. The older goal of social equality is being challenged by the
problem of cultural difference. The existing conception of citizenship as codified
by the Maastricht treaty – which presupposes nationality - may be unable to
cope with the challenges facing the EU in the 21st century, as the Union moves
slowing eastwards, gradually incorporating new groups of peoples. The existing
dynamics, former largely in terms of reconciling the south with the north, will
give way to new ones emerging from the encroachment into postcommunist
space and the gradual incorporation of Europe’s borderlands. Three major
kinds of demands will be made on citizenship: polynational rights (for the many
national members and different kinds of membership), polyethnic rights (for
large scale national and transnational minorities) and special representation
rights (for non-ethnic groups).
The discussion paper addresses the question of the prospects and limits of
multiculturalism for Europe. I outline (1) the main problems with
multiculturalism, (2) the principal national models (3) the basic ingredients of an
alternative model for Europe. This is followed by (4) a broader conceptualization
of a differentiated and graduated model of postnational citizenship.
1. The Limits of Multiculturalism for Contemporary European Societies
To begin, it is not evident that multiculturalism is a desirable approach. It has been much criticized and
its relevance for today is questionable. Firstly, then, let us set out the main problems with
multiculturalism.
• Multiculturalism was a model of containment rather rather than of integration. Western
multiculturalism, particularly in western Europe, was always based on the assumption of liberal
tolerance rather than of participation in citizenship.
• It was constructed on the assumption that there was a dominant cultural identity in the society to
which ethnic groups had to adjust but to whom certain concessions could be made.
• Today diversity has penetrated the cultural identity as a whole. Cultural pluralization and the
growing diffusness of all social groups in contemporary society are undermining the presuppositions of
multiculturalism. Integration today is individual, not group specific. This would appear to allow for
more social integration than is often thought.
• On the cultural level, the boundaries between social groups are more diffuse than previously. The
implication for multiculturalism is that it is more and more difficult to demarcate ethnic groups and the
boundary between ethnic groups and the dominatn culture is not always so clearly defined.
Models of Multiculturalism: An Analysis of a Contested Concept
Multiculturalism is an essentially contested term. In the following discussion nine
models of multiculturalism are outlined and discussed. These are (1)
monoculturalism, (2) republican multiculturalism, (3) pillarization (4) liberal
multiculturalism, (5) communitarian multiculturalism, (6) liberal
communitarian multiculturalism, (7) interculturalism, (8) radical
multiculturalism (9) critical multiculturalism. See Diagram 1 for a summary.
The first three are strictly speaking not models of multiculturalism but of
cultural management strategies and generally held to be no longer relevant.
The purpose in outline these models is to provide a basis for thinking about the
assumptions that might shape a model of multiculturalism appropriate to
contemporary European societies.
Diagram 1
Ten Models of Multiculturalism
Models of multiculturalism
1. Monoculturalism
Policy objective
(traditional German, Japanese
models)
2.Republican
Multiculturalism
(The
French
model
multiculturalism is confined
to the private sphere/
marginalization)
–
3. Pillarization
(Classic Dutch model)
4. Liberal Multiculturalism
(The historical American model – the
‘melting pot’)
5. Communitarian
Multiculturalism
(Canada, Belgium)
Preservation of differences
6. Liberal communitarian
multiculturalism
(The British, Australian models)
7. Interculturalism
Postethnic Multiculturalism
(soft cosmopolitanism)
8. Radical ‘Strong’
Multiculturalism
New American multiculturalism
9. Critical
Multiculturalism
(postethnic multiculturalism)
1.
Coercive integration
(Official ethnic group/ethic majoritarianism/marginalization of others)
Partial/temporary citizenship
Coercive assimilation
(Shared public culture in the republican national state/no official recognition of
cultural diversity)
Universal/republican citizenship
Aim: the duties of citizenship (loyalty, obedience)
Official/corporate pluralism
Balancing of large scale religious groups.
Aim: autonomy, federalism
Assimilation
(overcoming marginalization/official recognition of cultural/ethnic diversity but
without formal rights) Assimilation through meritocratic individualism
Group differentiated rights for organized groups
(Official Recognition of ethic minorities or large scale culturally defined
groups/ social rights). Also: corporate multiculturalism
(organized groups). Aim: the preservation of identity
Pluralism of groups and tolerance of difference
(co-existence/integration of groups within a majoritarian framework/tolerance
of diversity/precedence of individual rights over group rights) ‘the salad bowl’.
Organized subnationally.
Aim: social citizenship/civic commitment/regionalism
Diversity as a cultural value for all groups
(promotion of cultural programmes, culturalism awareness/the new Japanese
internationalism, educational policy making, new consumerism, peace, cultural)
Aim: understanding
Affirmative action
(group differentiated rights for organized cultural groups/quotas)
Aim: to make institutions representative of their social environment.
Group differentiated rights for smaller socially defined groups
(empowerment, overcoming social disadvantages/injustice)
Aim: enhancement of participation in society
Monoculturalism
Monoculturalism privileges the cultural identity of the majority, making political
identity coeval with a dominant ethnic cultural identity. Japanese citizenship is
still very much based on this equation of ethnicity with nationality as a
qualification for citizenship. A more pertinent European example might be
illustrated by Germany where only one cultural identity has official recognition,
for the national identity is coeval with an ethnic identity based on German
descent. Thus, in Germany citizenship generally rests on German ethnicity,
rather than being born in Germany. In the case of monocultural societies,
cultural diversity can exist only at the margins of society. In such societies the
aim of multiculturalism can only be integration rather than assimilation.
However, it is important to say that few countries that are officially
monocultural do not have ways of promoting other kinds of multiculturalism,
though this is unlikely to extend beyond partial citizenship. In Japan
interculturalism (see below) has official existence and in Germany, despite the
jus sanguinis, communitarian multiculturalism is well established at regional
levels, as is evidence by the work of Daniel Cohen-Bendit in Frankfurt.
2. The Republican Multiculturalism
The paradigmatic model of this is the French republican reduction of multiculturalism to the private
sphere. In this model, as in the American (see point 4 below), there can be no public recognition of
cultural differences in the public domain of civil society which is supposed to be a domain of equality.
The culture-blind model of multiculturalism assumes the absolute separation of cultural and political
identity. Whereas the American model of assimilation discussed below, sees the eventual aim of
multicultural policy to be the creation of a common way of life, this classic republican policy (which
may be called the ‘salad bowl’ model as opposed to the American ‘melting pot’ model) accepts the
reality of diversity at the prepolitical level, seeking only a shared political identity. In France this
comes from the republican ideology that there is only one political identity – the republican values of
the constitution and guaranteed by the absolute neutrality of the state with respect to culture and all
forms of ethnicity, be they those of the dominant groups in society or those of recent immigrants. Thus
the kind of assimilation that it demands is a coercive one, for minority groups must deny their cultural
traditions and effectively become French (Wieviorka, 1998). In France where the Republican ethos is
most apparent, the multicultural society – as we know from the ‘headscarves affair’ - quite literally
ends at the school gates – for once the shared public domain of the state and its institutions is
approached there can be no tolerance of diversity.
However, it must be added that this model, like the previous one, is rarely as inflexible as it is often
claimed to be. In reality, as is witnessed by the ruling of the French Constitutional Court on the
headscarves case, the state will recognise the claims of a cultural group, although generally in a highly
qualified way. But there is no denying the reality that the classic republican model has been in practice
diluted by the interest of the state to move closer to a pluralist model of integration (Schain, 2000).
In general, the view is that multiculturalism primarily resides in the private sphere. That is, the
prepolitical sphere of ethnic privatism or, as more recent developments might indicate, in the sphere of
consumption in which the middle classes of the dominant groups participate in the multicultural
society. In this sense, most western European countries are multicultural. But this is a prepolitical
culturalism that was originally seen to reside in tolerance of ethnic groups. In time, with the
incorporation of ethnic groups into society, multiculturalism came to be an expression of a society that
had come to terms with multiple cultural identities and the key marker of multiculturalism resided in
new patterns of consumption. Indeed many societies – ones as different as Ireland and Japan for
instance – became multicultural through consumption rather than through ethnicity (in this case the
kind of multiculturalism that is implied is closer to interculturalism, see below).
3
Pillarization
Like the previous two models this is also a historical model but one that has ceased to exist today. In
The Netherlands it was the official means of accommodating the two religious traditions within the
polity. In the Netherlands the principle of the equality of the religion was accepted since the early
nineteenth century. However, state support for Catholic schools was not granted until 1917, when the
system know as pillarization was formally adopted as a means of organizing education into the
Catholic and Protestant denominations and for much of the twentieth century it was the official means
of dealing with cultural pluralism. Originally this referred to the two main denominations, but from
1983, with the recognition that The Netherlands was a multicultural society, this principle was
extended to the other religious traditions, such as the Jewish and Hindu groups. However, the model
was limited because it was deemed to apply only to religious groups, not ethnic groups as such
(Nederveen Pieterse, 1997, pp. 177-200). Moreover, as the term suggests, it was intended to be a means
of negotiating the main ‘pillars’ of the society – i.e. the main churches - and thus was ineffective in
dealing with groups with lesser influence. Today, as a result of growing numbers of ethnic groups who
are not primarily defined by religion, it is no longer regarded as an appropriate model for
multiculturalism in what is also a predominantly secular society.
It may be noted in passing that the Ottoman ‘millet system’ by which certain
non-Muslim minorities were officially recognised by the state and allowed to
govern themselves (Eisenberg, 1999, pp. 390-1). In the USSR there was also a
similar policy of instituting ethnic citizenship within the federal republics. To an
extent, Switzerland may be cited as a contemporary example of this kind of
multiculturalism. However, in this case the groups in question are not minorities
but subnational groups.
4. Liberal Multiculturalism
This is the constitutional American paradigm, which has also been called the ‘melting pot’ model. The
basis of this is the view that all immigrants will become assimilated into the one society. This model is
not, strictly speaking, a model of ‘multi-culturalism’ since the aim is to have a common way of life –
‘the American way of life’ – and not the preservation of differences. Though often seen as the
paradigmatic expression of multiculturalism, this model of multiculturalism is, in fact, very specific to
the United States and rested on a curious teleology: American multiculturalism is based on the fact of
diversity on the level of cultural identity and an absolute commitment to the neutrality of the shared
public culture of the political domain. Liberalism in political identity and multiculturalism in ethnic
identities was seen to provide the structures for the formation of a uniquely American way of life. For
in time, it was believed, the mix of cultures would create a common way of life.
The neutrality of the political sphere of the state and the fact that, culturally, the United States was a
society of immigrants made such a utopia possible (at least if we ignore the fact that the Anglo-Saxon
immigrants occupied the key positions in the society). While the circumstances peculiar to the United
States – largely that it was a society of immigrants and one that did not have a native ruling elite or the
remnants of a feudal order – made this a reasonable expectation, the dream ultimately rested on the
ability of the social structure to deliver the promise of a new society, and in this it was judged a failure
by many (while being defended by many others) (Glazer and Moynihan, 1963; Hall and Lindholm,
1999; Schlesinger, 1992). In any case the widespread belief was that the mixing of cultures along with
the core ideology of American society – meritocratic individualism – would led to common ground.
The assumption of assimilation in the American tradition differs from the French policy in that it is
less coercive and less based on the constitutional state. It may be observed that while the American
model had its roots in a modern society of immigrants, this republican model arose in a premodern
Enlightenment society when religion, as the principal marker of cultural identity, was relegated to the
private sphere. It is still in the mould of Enlightenment anticlericalism that multiculturalism is still cast
as far as the constitutional national state is concerned.
However, exactly where the divide between multiculturalism as a process of assimilation and
cultural diversity lies is not easy to specify. Ultimately liberal constitutional democracy and
multiculturalism are not compatible, since the former is based on equality and the latter on diversity. In
any case, American multiculturalism today has little in common with the constitutional tradition, which
has become, in the words of Daniel Lazare ‘frozen’: the model of the ‘melting pot’ has been
superceded by radical multiculturalism and various kinds of communitarianism which do have as their
overriding objective universality (Lazare, 1996). This is because the question today is no longer
immigrants but race and the need to make social institutions more representative of their environment
(see point 8 below). Moreover, many indigenous groups have won the right of self-government despite
the culture-blindness of the American constitution, a fact that exemplifies the contemporary relevance
of the constitutional tradition, in the view of James Tully (1995).
5. Communitarian Multiculturalism
Communitarianism is best represented by Canada, whose constitutional tradition is not based on
classical liberal democracy. The accommodation of cultural diversity and democracy are not
antithetical as they are in the republican constitutional traditions, as in France and the United States.
This is a relatively recent conception of multiculturalism, although there have been historical cases of
group differentiated citizenship, as for example rights the Amish community have won in the United
States. In Canada, unlike the United States, immigration has played a more central role in the formation
of the society in the latter half of the twentieth century.
The Canadian federal state grants public recognition to different groups who are encouraged to retain
their differences and will receive state support and recognition. This can take at least three forms:
federal autonomy in the form of self-government (e.g. for French speakers, Aboriginal peoples), polyethnic rights for the various ethnic minorities, and special representation rights for various
disadvantaged groups (Kymlicka, 1996). Thus all that is required is only a minimal commitment to the
shared political culture of the public domain.
There is clearly a delicate balance between maintaining integration and divisiveness, as is strikingly
evident in the case of Belgium, or even secession as in the case of more overt expressions of
nationalism such as in Ireland (O’ Mahony and Delanty, 1998). The communitarian model is quite a
departure from American constitutional liberal model in that groups are encouraged to retain their
cultural identity. It differs from liberal model in that it recognizes that the neutrality of the state must be
comprised in order to maximize inclusion on the social level. It differs furthermore from the American
liberal model in that it does not believe that social integration will be achieved as a result of the mutual
mixing of cultures. In short, the state must take an active role in bringing about social integration.
This model of multiculturalism can be cast in the terms of the communitarian
‘politics of recognition’, to use Charles Taylor’s characterization of what
constitutes a multicultural society (Taylor, 1994). Taylor is opposed to the classic
liberal stance (the model of assimilation) in that for him the state must recognise
cultural identity, for political identity must rest on a particular cultural identity.
What this translates into is a plea for collective rights for culturally defined
group. This stance is what makes communitarian multicultural distinctive, as
well as highly controversial (Bauböck, 2000; Offe, 1998).
While the former models were products of an industrial society that was still
shaped by Enlightenment civil society, the communitarian model is a product of
the postindustrial society; it is an expression of a society in which immigrant
groups can organize themselves in quasi-corporate orders and gain access to a
form of political organization that is more regulatory than liberal in its
fundamental assumptions. It may also be noted that this model is seen as
primarily concerned with access to social and cultural citizenship. It has not been
dominant in cases of political disputes concerning fundamental questions of
group identity. In such cases the radical multicultural model has been more
prevalent.
6. Liberal Communitarian Multiculturalism
This is often to be found at the sub-national level and can co-exist with other more official finds of
governmental multiculturalism. British multiculturalism takes this form which is one of pluralism, and
derives from colonial history and the Commonwealth. The emphasis is on co-operation and peaceful
co-existence rather than a formal policy of containment. It may be termed ‘liberal communitarian’ in
that there is official recognition of diversity but measures stop short of positive programmes to
empower groups. It is a liberalism that has been modified by communitarianism. Unlike the stronger
Canadian model, ethnic groups are not seen as being on equal footing with the dominant cultural group
in the society (for instance, there is generally the assumption that immigrants will learn the language of
the majority). The liberal component is strong in that there is a tacit recognition of a dominant cultural
group but within an ethos of tolerance. The metaphor of ‘the salad bowl’ rather than the ‘melting pot’
best captures this kind of multiculturalism, which is one of the most prevalent traditions in western
Europe and in much of the rest of the world. Such an understanding of multiculturalism has received a
theoretical formulation in the recent work of Alain Touraine who argues for a reconciliation of
liberalism and communitarianism (Touraine, 2000). It is also the basis of Habermas’s notion of
multiculturalism within the limits of a ‘constitutional patriotism’ (Habermas, 1998).
In this context there is also the question of the different status of immigrants and indigenous
peoples, as Kylimcka argues (1995). Defending the application of group-differentiated rights to
indigeneous, colonized peoples who have suffered a historical grievance, he questions its application to
immigrant ethic groups who have willfully joined the society in order to benefit from it. In many
countries, for instance the US and Australia, liberal communitarianism has been used to justify selfgovernment for indigenous peoples. In the UK, while a form of devolution based on differential rights
has been seen as the solution for Northern Ireland and for Scotland. However, liberal communitarism
does not demand a wider conception group rights.
In sum, this model is largely a strategy to
accommodate within a broadly liberal framework the reality of cultural diversity. It is a supplementary
rather than innovating and frequently it is indistinguishable from intercultural tokenism.
7. Interculturalism
This is a more recent kind of soft kind of multiculturalism that seeks to promote
cultural difference as a positive virtue (see Watson, 2000, p. 51). It is expressed in
programmes of cultural awarness and seeks to encourage tolerance but also
knowledge of other cultures. Most countries today have educational policies
designed to promote cultural understanding. It is a kind of multiculturalism that
has resonances in particular kinds of consumerism and in advertising. Since the
mid-1990s it has an official status as internationalism in Japan, where other
forms of multiculturalism do not exist.
8. Radical Multiculturalism
This is the view that disadvantaged groups must be privileged in order to empower them against the
dominant groups. In this more radical or ‘strong’ conception of multiculturalism, the state must
actively intervene in granting recognition to marginal groups. This is the main form that
multiculturalism takes in the United States today, where the melting pot model has ceased to have any
relevance. This is because the main issues today are framed in the language of race, rather than of
immigrants. It is a question of making institutions more representative of their social environment
rather than the shaping of a common way of life, or even of accommoding cultural identity. The form
that it takes is that of affirmative action, since multiculturalism is now a matter of positive programmes
in particular in education and in jobs.
Unlike in Europe, where multiculturalism is mostly addressed to first and second generation
immigrants and refugees, the American debate today is largely about the diversity of the society’s
native population (Glazer, 2000). It has found controversial expression in debates about the curriculum
and has fueled the culture wars in higher education (Delanty, 2001). In the view of many critics it has
been more divisive than integrative. In the view of many critics, radical multiculturalism is racist in
conception since its key element is the proposition of essential difference (which is exactly in
contradiction with human rights philosophy which posits sameness or equality).
9. Critical Multiculturalism
This idea of multiculturalism is close to the communitarian model discussed above
but is more radical in that it is ultimately a theory of cultural plurality that goes
beyond all traditional understandings of multiculturalism (see Goldberg, 1994). It
differs from radical multiculturalism in one respect: the groups in question are largely
‘postethnic’ – they can be found as much in the dominant cultural groups as in ethnic
groups – and the state is expected to be proactive, as opposed to reactive, in
promoting citizenship (Hollinger, 1995). For critical multiculturalism differences
within ethic groups is emphasized and ultimately it is a conception of multiculturalism
that recognises the pluralization of all group identities.
Iris Young’s conception of a strong communitarianism fits into this model group
differentiated rights around issues of bilingual education, women’s rights, rights for
disadvantaged groups such as disabled people (Young, 1989; 1990. See also Guttman,
1993; O’ Neill, 1994, 1997). Feminists and cultural pluralists who advocate group
differentiated citizenship (Benhabib, 1996; Parekh, 1994, 1995, 1997), see identity as
contested and therefore always open to definition.
Critical multiculturalism model highlights the conflict of collective rights for
groups and individual rights, i.e. the right of the individual to dissent from the ethic
group. Thus the emphasis here is less on multiculturalism in the sense of cultures in
the plural than of the pluralization of culture. It must be mentioned that this model is
largely philosophical, with resonances in debates about postmodernization, and
cannot be so easily related to particular kinds of policies (Delanty, 2000a).
At this point we have reached the limits of multiculturalism. In communitarian
theories as well as the older liberal conceptions, group identity was taken for granted
as something fixed and belonging either to the private domain or reducible to a public
notion of the common good. The four models of multiculturalism discussed until now
are commonly regarded as unacceptable and are in fact contrary to international law
(and can even entail severe violations of human rights if they were implemented). The
latter models of multiculturalism suggest a move beyond some of the assumptions of
these older models, which presuppose the national democratic state as the operative
framework. Whether it is the constitution or the curriculum, multiculturalism has
irreversibly politicized citizenship, albeit to the point of bringing into question the
very possibility of social integration. The question that remains to be answered is
whether there is any value left in the term for democratic and cosmopolitan politics. Is
a cosmopolitan multiculturalism possible for Europe?
2. An Alternative Conception of Multiculturalism For Europe
Given the reality of cultural diversity as a result of immigrant, ethnic, various subcultural, and
postmodernized identities, how much common ground is there in European societies? Can the
emergent reality of a European society give expression to a different kind of multiculturalism? What
criteria do we use to define a group? Does multiculturalism sustain social integration or is it divisive?
Lessons from the North American Experience
There is no doubt that the liberal or republican multiculturalism no longer caries any weight. The
American model is now widely believed to be a failure, or at least politically exhausted, at least if we
follow communitarian and liberal critiques (Lazare, 1996; Schlesinger, 1992). Many critics argue
assimilation has been possible only at the cost of ghettozization and new forms of social exclusion have
emerged (Byrne, 1999; Wacquant, 1993, 1996, Wacquant and Wilson, 1989). However, this is not to
deny the relative success of American multiculturalism, since there has been considerable assimilation
and the term has been normalized (Glazer, 1997. See also Smelser and Alexander, 1999; Patterson,
1997). What is apparent however is that this model may have reached its limits. A new radical
multiculturalism has emerged – though whether this is as a result of the failure of assimilation or not is
an open question – seeking to empower positively groups through collective rights and the repoliticization of cultural identity.
Radical multiculuralism is possibly relevant as a temporary kind of policy, but not as a long term
solution. Strong commuitarianism is pertinent on the transnational level of the European Union as a
means of guaranteeing the survival of national cultures. Communitarian and radical multiculturalism
has generally been a response to either the problem of indigeneous populations or to race. In Europe,
which does not have indigeneous populations of substantial significance, polyethnicity is the major
issue and the problems its poses are less divisive for the population as a whole.
There is however one lesson for Europe to draw from the Canadian debate. The Canadian model has
much to offer European transnationalism, namely the need to separate three domains of group rights:
national determination, rights for national minorities and special representations rights. Only by
divising a multi-tiered citizenship that is capable of responding to these three realities, will a genuinely
democratic multiculturalism be possible. But beyond this the US and Canadian experience is limited.
What Kind if Values Should European Multiculturalism be Based On?
•Residence rather than birth or descent
•Flexible citizenship (with multiple paths to citizenship) is important. Concretely, in this respect
what is important is mobility for migrants. The over-riding priority is no longer political rights (ie.
voting rights).
•Multicultural citizenship must be transnational. This is important in the case of de-territorial groups,
such as the gypsy population. The way forward for Europe is to build on common ties rather than to
create policies that can be divisive.
•Multiculturalism can no longer be posed exclusively in terms of migrants but must address all
minority groups, including nonethnic groups such as religious groups, linguistic groups and groups
defined by social disadvnatages (such as the elderly, the disabled).
•common ground is to be found less on the level of culture – or even on the level of the political than on the level of the social. Examples of this might be found in the wide acceptance of the value of
education, support for ecological causes and the alleviation of suffering.
•the recognition of cultural difference does not automatically lead to social equality and frequently
can be detrimental to it.
•A democratic multiculturalism would be more attentive to social issues. It is easier to build on
social ties than on cultural ones. We should be careful not to exaggerate cultural differences.
•Recognition of multiple loyalties is an essential dimension.
•Pluralization rather than assimilation or integration should be the objective.
•Citizenship can no longer be defined by the values of liberty and equality. There is a need for new
values, belonging, solidarity and pluralism
2. Towards a Graduated Institutionalization of Citizenship (some incomplete
notes)
The following diagram (Diagram 2) sketches a differentiated concept of
citizenship and Multi-levelled governance. It is based on the assumption that the
main dimensions to citizenship are rights, duties, participation and identity and
that there are four main levels of governance. This model allows a graduated
conception of citizenship by which different degrees of rights are possible and
which may be graduated by a principle of subsidiarity on different levels of
governance.
Diagram 2
Components
of
Citizenship
Rights
Duties
Participation
Identity
The entitled citizen
The responsible
citizen
The active citizen
The rooted citizen
Cultural rights
(Immigrant/
ethnic group
rights,
disadvantaged
groups),
Residence as
criterion
Individual
responsibility,
Ethic of
conviction,
Family
Local
communities,
Voluntary
organizations,
Participatory
democracy,
Social capital
Multicultural
identities,
Substantive
identities,
Ethnic identities
Regional
Cultural rights
(Indigenous Group
rights)
Residence as
criterion
Social well being,
Large scale
cultural identity,
City/regional
identities,
Territorial identity
National
Social rights,
Labour rights,
Civic rights,
Political rights,
Birth as criterion
Global
Biorights,
Mobility,
Human rights,
Technology rights
Taxation,
Education,
Voting,
Accountability
Legal rational,
Ethic of
responsibility
Ecological
responsibilities,
Future generations,
Co-responsibility
Associations
Municipal/local
government
Federal structures,
Social capital,
Civil society,
Particatory
democracy
Political Parties,
Representative
democracy,
Organized interests
(TUs, business
interests)
Discursive
democracy INGOs,
IGOs
lobbyists,
specialized experts
global civil society
Transnational
communities/
diasporic
identities,
virtual community
Levels
of
Governance
Local
Political identity,
national identity as
constitutional
patriotism/legal
identity
Note on Author
Gerard Delanty is Professor of Sociology in the University of Liverpool, UK. He is
the author of several books and papers on social theory. Some relevant publications
include: Inventing Europe: Idea, Identity, Reality (Macmillan, 1995), Citizenship in a
Global Era (Open University Press, 2000); Challenging Knowledge: The University
in the Knowledge Society (Open University Press, 2001).
Address
Professor Gerard Delanty, Department of Sociology, University of Liverpool, Eleanor
Rathbone Building, Bedford Street South, University of Liverpool, Liverpool L69
7ZA, UK.
Email: [email protected]