Download Imperialism in South Africa before 1914

Imperialism in South Africa before 1914
The British controlled the approaches to the Indian Ocean from their foothold in South Africa
and the Cape of Good Hope. British occupation of the Cape Colony in South Africa began in
1806, after it was seized from the Dutch during the Napoleonic Wars. Lord Caledon, a former
governor of Cape Colony, signified its significance when he wrote in 1809 “the true value of this
colony is its being considered an outpost subservient to the protecting and security of our East
Indian possessions”. Lord Caledon’s statement revealed why the British occupied Cape Colony
in the first place as well as why they were bent on its retention. As it were, the strategic value of
the cape remained unaltered for the next hundred years. In 1887, Capetown was chosen as a
principle staging area for reinforcements earmarked for deployment in India in the event of a war
(principally with Russia). The former First Sea Lord, Admiral Lord Fisher, designated
Capetown, Cape Colony one of the “five strategic keys which lock up the world”. A former
Colonial Secretary, Chamberlain, once declared that the cape remained “the cornerstone of the
whole British colonial system”. Niall Ferguson wrote “the cape remained a military base of
immense importance for England,” reasoning was that if, in the event of a major European war,
the Suez Canal, the “lifeline” to India, became vulnerable to closure, Britain’s control of the
Cape of Good Hope in South Africa was vital if it wished to secure its hold on India.
At the close of the nineteenth century, Britain’s Cape Colony was engaged in a competition
with the Transvaal for the paramount position in South Africa. The Republic of Transvaal was
formed in 1852. Along with the Orange Free State, which was formed in 1854, Transvaal was
populated by Afrikaans-speaking, Calvinist farmers, or Boers, who were descendants from the
early Dutch settlers of the Cape. Britain had inherited this dispersed population when it took
over control of the Cape Colony. The Boers were Africa’s only white tribe. They had first
settled the Cape in 1652. The Boers believed it had been willed by God that they should subdue
the land and its black inhabitants. The Boers, certainly, were no partners to the new British
administration. The Boers found the régime’s application of both liberal and humanitarian
principles to the black population of the Cape Colony incomprehensible. Conversely, the
aristocratic British officials perceived the Boers as uncivilized, appearing to be “uncouth”,
“obstructive”, and “extremely touchy”. Furthermore, the British were horrified by the practice of
slavery among the Afrikaners. The rapid deterioration of the relations between the colonial
authorities and the Boers led to a mass exodus of thousands of Boers, who decided to begin a
“Great Trek” into the South African hinterland, beginning in 1834. “The Great Trek” was, in
part, a reaction to the British Parliament’s abolition of slavery in 1833 and pressure on the land
in the Cape resulting from increasing British settlement and development there. The Boer
migration put them on a collision course with the expanding Ndebele and Zulu states. Following
their spectacular victories over the Ndebele and Zulus in the late 1830’s, the Boers formed the
republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State. Britain officially recognized the independence
of the “Boer republics” in 1854, with the condition that they, in turn, concede sovereignty to
Britain, making them, on paper, part of Britain’s informal empire. Beyond its strategic
importance, the economic value of the Cape Colony increased tremendously, beginning in the
late 1860s. Following the discovery of diamonds, Griqualand was swiftly annexed as a crown
colony in 1871. Thereafter, it attracted investments and immigrants on an unprecedented scale.
From 1871 to 1891, British imports into the Cape increased in value by two hundred eighty-five
percent. In 1891, British imports into the Cape were valued at £7.7 million. That same year, the
Cape’s exports totaled £9.5 million, a third of which came from diamonds. From 1871 to 1875,
the Cape’s government inaugurated an ambitious program of railroad construction. The colony’s
railway network extended for over two thousand miles by 1890.
A former British Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, envisioned a South African federation
comprising The Cape Colony, Natal, and the two “Boer Republics”. From 1876 to 1878,
successive native rebellions and conflicts evolved around British efforts to pacify South African
blacks and to confirm white supremacy. One such rebellion involved the Pedi in the Transvaal.
When the Boer campaign against Sekhukhuni’s Pedi bogged down and a unit of Boer mounted
volunteer riflemen were defeated, Carnarvon used such conditions and events as a pretext to reannex the Transvaal in January 1877, arguing that British intervention (i.e. occupation) was
necessary. Sir Theophilus Shepstone, a colonial bureaucrat, viewed the British occupation as a
prelude to the incorporation of the Transvaal into Carnarvon’s proposed South African
federation. Both Shepstone and the new governor of the Cape Colony, Sir Bartle Frere, were
convinced that a federation could not be established until the Zulu state was emasculated, as its
existence as an independent and well-organized nation would unsettle the frontier of any future
federation. Through the collusions and machinations of Shepstone and Bartle Frere, war
between Britain and the Zulu state broke out in January 1879. British forces were led by Lord
Chelmsford. Poor performance led to Shepstone, Bartle Frere, and Chelmsford being sacked.
Chelmsford was replaced by Sir Garnet Wolseley. Not only would Zululand be defeated, it was
eventually absorbed by Natal. After emerging victorious over the Zulu impis, Wolseley defeated
Sekhukhuni’s Pedi in the Transvaal. Wolseley was unable, however, to fully emasculate the
Basotho in the Transvaal, and the result was a British protectorate being declared over
Basutoland, which, henceforth, would be governed through local native chiefs. The Boers would
not be pacified. When the Boers realized the British occupation of Transvaal was not a stop gap
measure, but, rather, a preliminary measure to its amalgamation into a South African federation,
they rebelled. The British were finally defeated in Transvaal’s War of Independence (18801881) at Majuba Hill in northern Natal. The Calvinist Boers interpreted their victory as the work
of divine Providence, God’s elect triumphing over an impious race.
After the administration (ministry) of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli became embroiled in
the attempted takeover of the Transvaal, the war against the Zulus, and an invasion of
Afghanistan, the Liberal Party seized the reigns of power in 1880 under William Ewart
Gladstone. Gladstone, promising to extricate Britain from what he called “Beaconsfieldism”
(Disraeli was ennobled as the Earl of Beaconsfield) and the Liberal Party was swept into office
on a wave of anti-imperial rhetoric. Whereas Disraeli was a pragmatist, pursuing policies based
upon what Britain could do, Gladstone based his imperial policies on high-minded abstract
principles and what Britain should do. Disraeli realized that Britain had to maintain its global
standing actively and, if necessary, forcefully in pursuit of its own interests. Disraeli was not an
annexationist seeking to enlarge Britain’s power and influence, rather, he preferred policies
which affirmed (maintained) and consolidated (strengthened) Britain’s power and influence
where it already existed. Disraeli perceived Britain’s possessions as valuable assets and a source
of strength. Gladstone, on the other hand, became distressed by the “brashness” and
“belligerence” of “New Imperialism” and believed it had “made militarism fashionable while
undermining national moral values”. In pursuit of these ends, the newly-elected Liberal ministry
dropped any plans for a South African federation and restored Transvaal’s independence, though,
it still clung to pretensions of British sovereignty over the “Boer Republics”.
The period between 1880-1900 witnessed a tentative Boer expansion north and west. In 1886
there was a gold rush in Witwatersrand (a.k.a. the Rand). Apparently, the Transvaal was situated
on one of the world’s largest gold seams. The discovery of huge pockets of gold transformed the
economy of the Transvaal. Once in full operation, the Rand mines extracted twenty-five percent
of the world’s gold supply. Suddenly, the economic center of gravity in South Africa shifted
from the Cape Colony to Transvaal. By 1896, the government of Transvaal was the richest in
Africa, bringing in annual revenue of £8 million from minerals alone. The Transvaal’s economic
revolution was under-written by British business, capital, and engineering. Through its
capitalization of mining in the Transvaal, British investments there amounted to £350 million in
1899. By that year, fully two-thirds of the Rand’s mines were owned by British stockholders.
By 1900, the Rand had absorbed more than £114 million of mostly British capital investments.
A major issue that resulted from the Transvaal’s transformation involved what effect its new
wealth would have on Britain’s position in South Africa, particularly its dominance over a South
African federation. Cecil Rhodes would play a major role in resolving this issue. Rhodes was
the head of the De Beers Consolidated Mining Corporation. In 1889, his British South Africa
Company (B.S.A.C.) was officially chartered, following the hitherto pattern of pursuing
colonization and trade through private enterprise. Rhodes also served as the Prime Minister of
the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896. In 1891 he was able to procure a monopoly over the
Kimberley diamond fields for his De Beers company. The combined territories of B.S.A.C.
became generally known as Rhodesia. Rhodes envisioned a line of unbroken British territory
running from Capetown to Cairo, linking the Suez route to India with the Capetown route to
India, thus making the British Empire in India secure. According to Lawrence James, “the
compass of Rhode’s temerity and [his] ambitions startled [his] contemporaries”. One such
contemporary was the British High Commissioner at the Cape, Viscount Sir Alfred Milner. In a
letter to Lord Selborne, Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, dated June 2nd, 1897, Milner
wrote the following:
[Rhodes] looks to making the territory of the B.S.A.C. into a separate Colony
ultimately self-governed (the Company keeping its mineral and other valuable
rights, but giving up administration). The Colony (which I may remark in passing,
though nominally self-governed, will be virtually an absolute monarchy with
Rhodes as monarch) he means to unite with the Cape Colony and Natal, and then
the three combined will bring peaceful pressure upon the [Boer] Republics to drive
them into a S. African federation. For the execution of this big scheme he wants
the new Northern Colony (the virtual Rhodes Settlement) to be as big as possible.
Therefore, he wishes to incorporate the Protectorate, and not to run the risk of
something like a Crown Colony springing up between the Northern boundary of
the Cape Colony and the territory already in the hands of the Company.
Under Rhodes, British power and influence in South Africa would be extended over the
kingdoms of Mashonaland and Matabeleland as well as Nyasaland and Bechuanaland
(Botswana). Beginning in the early 1880s, parties of Boers had penetrated the region known as
Bechuanaland and miniature republics were established (Goschen and Stellaland).
Simultaneously, German colonists were moving inland from their embryonic settlement of Angra
Pequeña. By this time, German settlements had already appeared in South West Africa
(Namibia). There was great anxiety during this period in both London and Capetown (the capital
of the Cape Colony) over the possibility of a German-Transvaal axis. In April 1884, Paul
Kruger, the President of Transvaal, visited Berlin, where he publicly declared his affinity with
Germany:
Just as a child seeks support from his parents so shall the young Transvaal State
seek, and hopefully find, protection from its strong and mighty motherland,
Germany, and its glorious dynasty [the Hohenzollerns].
In December 1884, when it seemed like German settlers in South-West Africa (Namibia)
might join forces with the Boers in Transvaal and take over Bechuanaland, a small, well-armed
British force marched into Bechuanaland under orders to evict the Boer settlers and declare a
British protectorate over it. Following the Matabele War (1893-1894), King Lobengula’s
Ndebele impis were defeated. Another Ndebele uprising occurred in the spring of 1896 whereby
the last guerilla bands were hunted down by 1897. A secondary pacification campaign was
undertaken in Nyasaland against Arab slave traders operating out of Zanzibar. In 1891, a British
protectorate was declared over Nyasaland to forestall its acquisition by Portugual, who the
British suspected of not pulling its weight in the international effort being undertaken to suppress
Arab slaving. The declaration of a British protectorate over Nyasaland was followed by four
years of small-scale wars subsidized by Rhodes in which the Arab slave traders were defeated.
Rhodes was assisted in his efforts by successive British governments, despite the fact many of
their members did not share his vision. The main reason was that they viewed him as an
effective tool in preserving and extending Britain’s influence in South Africa, especially since it
appeared to be in jeopardy.
It was agreed among the British that a United States of South Africa under the Transvaal
would prove menacing to a strategically vital region for Britain—they reasoned the Transvaal
would be too weak to resist German encroachments and it might easily become a German
satellite. Neither the Liberal Ministry under Archibald Philip Primrose (Lord Roseberry) from
1893 to 1895, nor its Conservative successor under Salisbury from 1895 to 1902 would
acquiesce to this. Much to Britain’s excitement, the Transvaal became a pawn in the dangerous
game of international imperial power politics which was being played by Germany in order to
extract concessions elsewhere. Any German political interest and economic investment would
only serve to strengthen the Transvaal’s independent mindedness. Such encroachments made it
necessary for Britain to pursue measures designed to reassert its authority and prestige in the
region. Between 1894-1895, the Portuguese-controlled Delagoa Railway was completed and the
Transvaal secured a rail link to the sea. Free access to the sea would lessen the Boers’
dependence on Britain in using its rail network to the Cape in transporting their commerce. The
opening celebrations at Lourenco Marques were attended by German warships. Therein
followed a brief period of trade between the Transvaal and Germany in which hindrances were
officially positioned to obstruct the activities and operations of British businessmen in the
Transvaal. Henceforth, the British government was focused on how to bring the Transvaal (i.e.
the Boers) under control. A “coup de main” attempted by Rhodes, using mounted forces of
Rhodesian and Bechuanaland gendarmerie (the Jameson Raid), in 1895-1896, failed in its goal of
inciting and supporting an uprising in Johannesburg, but it did succeed in increasing Anglo-Boer
tensions. Following the failed coup, Kaiser Wilhelm II sent an “ill-timed” telegram to Kruger
congratulating him for suppressing the opposition.
In October, 1899, the Boer War (a.k.a. “Joe’s War”) broke out under the British Colonial
Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain and Milner. Both men were motivated by their racial prejudices
and the belief the Boers could be defeated easily. The pretext for this war was Kruger’s
enforcement of a long qualifying period of residence before allowing Uitlanders (outsiders) to
vote. The Uitlanders were made up of British migrants to the Transvaal. The reason Uitlanders
were stripped of their political rights was they outnumbered the Boers. The disenfranchisement
of the Uitlanders represented an affront to those democratic principles which formed the
foundation of the British system of government and made the Uitlanders a dangerous dissident
group in Transvaal. “Home Rule for the Rand” was the slogan chanted, which demanded
suffrage for the Uitlanders after five years of residency status in Transvaal. Lawrence James
concluded
in a sense, Britain had been defending the imperial status quo, which from 1895
onwards appeared imperiled by Transvaal’s bid for independence and German
meddling. To have ignored both would have been to admit weakness, which would
have been unthinkable at a time when Britain was under pressure from both France,
Germany, and Russia, who were challenging her position elsewhere in Africa and
the Far East….The [Boer] war was, in international terms, a demonstration of
Britain’s imperial will and determination to retain global power whatever the
cost.
The discovery of gold in the Transvaal in 1887 also provided an economic impetus for Britain to
declare war. In October, 1899, Britain went to war against the Transvaal and the Orange Free
State to prevent the dilution of British power in South Africa, which would have imperiled the
Cape and, with it, British naval supremacy in the South Atlantic and Indian Oceans. Similar to its
response to French designs in the Sudan, the calculated measures Britain pursued in South Africa
were designed to ensure its absolute security in India.
The Boer War would become Britain’s largest war. It became a protracted war and by war’s
end, between two hundred ninety-five thousand and five hundred thousand British regular,
reservist, and volunteer soldiers would be mobilized or committed to serve in it. About fortyfive thousand British soldiers died in the conflict. In addition to the social cost, Britain
appropriated approximately £200 million for the hostilities. Under the Treaty of Vereeniging,
which was concluded on May 31, 1902, the two Boer Republics lost their independence and
were absorbed into the British Empire. Strategically, the Boer War exposed Britain’s
vulnerability and contributed to a deepening fear in Britain that it was no longer invincible. Hew
Strachan wrote “the commitment to it had left Britain’s other possessions vulnerable and
exposed”. Peter Clarke concluded “the Boer War brought home the reality that, fully extended
in their imperial role, the British needed to avoid conflict with the other great powers”.
Revulsion in Britain regarding its wartime use of scorched earth and concentration camps
resulted in a shift in British politics to the left. Entering the conflict, politics in Britain was
dominated by a coalition of Tories and “Chamberlainites” for nearly twenty years. The antigovernment backlash that was triggered by the discovery of Britain’s use of concentration camps
and a personal campaign led by antiwar activist, Emily Hobhouse, to stop Britain’s internment
policy, provided the Liberal party with a political opportunity to win back power. As early as
June, 1901, the leader of the Liberal Party, Sir Henry Campbell Bannerman, denounced the
“methods of Barbarism” being used against the Boers. The leader of the radical wing of the
Liberal Party, David Lloyd George, charged the wagers of the war with “exterminating” the
Boers by “burning homesteads and turning women and children out of their homes”. Lloyd
George described such measures as acts of savagery.
Anti-imperialists opposed the Boer War on the grounds that it was an imperialistic war
funded publicly, yet waged for the personal private benefit of a small elite group of wealthy
individuals such as Rhodes and the Rothschild’s, who stood to profit off the sacrifice of others.
Among the leading vocalists of this group were J.A. Hobson and Henry Noel Brailsford. In
1902, Hobson published an essay entitled “Imperialism: A Study” with the premise that such
financiers and speculators sanctioned, financed, and influenced virtually every political act and
were the prime determinants of economic policies. By virtue of their profitable businesses, such
financiers were imperialists by nature, according to Hobson. “They have the largest definite
stake in the business of Imperialism, and the amplest means of forcing their will upon the policy
of nations….[F]inance is…the governor of the imperial engine, directing the energy and
determining the work.” Brailsford’s “The War of Steel and Gold: A Study of the Armed Peace”
was published in 1914. He wrote: “in the heroic age, Helen’s was the face that launched a
thousand ships. In our golden age the face wears more often the shrewd features of some
Hebrew financier” (note the hint of anti-semitism). Brailsford accused his government of
occupying and practically annexing Egypt in order to “defend the interests of Lord Rothschild
and his fellow bondholders” and of waging war on the Boer Republics in order to “ensure that
the gold mines of the Transvaal, remained securely in the hands of their capitalist owners”.
Brailsford described Rhodes as an “Empire jerry-builder who has always been a mere vulgar
promoter masquerading as a patriot, and the figure-head of a gang of astute Hebrew financiers
with whom he divides the profits”. In their critique of imperialism, radicals attributed sinister
powers to certain financial institutions and private adventurers who stood to profit privately and
who used the flag to veil their true intentions to promote their ends. The emergence of the
Liberal Government in 1906 was partly the result of moral indignation over the government’s
methods of fighting the Boer War, mounting anxiety about the war’s cost, and growing
suspicions about who the war’s beneficiaries might be. The supporters of the Prime Minister,
Arthur Balfour, were divided over how best to finance the war’s costs. The fatal blow came
when Joseph Chamberlain used the opportunity to argue for a restoration of protectionist tariffs
as a source of revenue. The tariffs would be levied on all items coming from outside British
territories. Many opponents of this proposal viewed it as an attempt to increase the price of
imported food stuffs.
The Boer War revealed the limits of British military strength and raised doubts about
Britain’s war preparedness in the possible scenario that colonial competition for raw materials,
markets, or trade routes led to the outbreak of war. The Boer War had a significant impact on
British attitudes and policies. According to Bourne, “the impact of the Boer War on British
strategy and diplomacy was little short of revolutionary.” Bourn further illustrated that “the war
had demonstrated the bankruptcy of the Empire’s military arrangements.” The Boer War also
contributed to the realization or perhaps the recognition that Britain’s limited military resources
left large parts of the empire either undefended or indefensible. Fear and anxiety over the
implications of this led to military reforms under Balfour, Esher, and Haldane in areas of
recruitment, education and training, equipment, conditions of service, tactical doctrine, and
management. The realities of this precarious military situation also factored into the creation of
an Imperial General Staff in 1907. The historic significance of the Boer War in terms of
diplomacy was “that it put a term to the [hitherto] policy of splendid isolation”. “Britain had
thus come perforce to the parting of the ways. In the first years of the new century she had to
make her choice between a close relationship with the Triple or the Dual Alliance.”
Reading Comprehension Questions
Define
Boers
“Great Trek”
“Jameson Raid”
Uitlander
1. When/how did British occupation of the Cape Colony begin?
2. What was the strategic importance of the Cape Colony? Be specific.
3. What were the causes/consequences of the rapidly deteriorating relations between the
British-colonial authorities and the Boers?
4a. When/how did the Boers form the republics of Transvaal and the Orange Free State?
4b. On what condition(s) did the British officially recognize the independence of Transvaal
and the Orange Free State?
5. What discovery resulted in a massive increase in British investments and settlement in the
Cape Colony beginning in the late 1860s?
6a. What did the British Colonial Secretary, Lord Carnarvon, envision in South Africa?
6b. Upon what pretext did Lord Carnarvon “re-annex” the Transvaal in January 1877?
6c. What did the colonial bureaucrat, Sir Theophilus Shepstone, and the new governor of the
Cape Colony, Sir Bartle Frere, view British occupation of the Transvaal as a prelude to?
7. List the local African tribes that had to be pacified before a British-controlled South
African federation could be formed.
8a. What were the causes/consequences of Transvaal War of Independence (1880-1881)?
8b. Why did the British Government later deem it necessary to “reassert its authority and
prestige” in the Transvaal despite its independent status?
9a. What discovery transformed the economy of the Transvaal?
9b. What challenges and/or opportunities did this pose or present to the British in South
Africa?
10a. Who was Cecil Rhodes?
10b. What did Rhodes’ ambitions in Africa entail? Be specific.
11. What possibility during the late 19th century created “great anxiety” in both London and
Capetown?
12. On what pretext(s) did Great Britain declare a protectorate over both Bechuanaland and
Nyasaland?
13. What pretext led to the Boer War in October 1899?
14. What were considered the origins/causes of the Boer War? Be specific.
15. What was the specific military, political, and diplomatic outcome of the Boer War?
16. How/why did the Boer War expose the vulnerability of Britain’s international presence/
position?
17. In what way(s) did the Boer War contribute to a shift in British politics?
18. What revolutionary impact did the Boer War have on British strategic/diplomatic
thinking?