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Discourse and Wolves: Science, Society, and Ethics
William S. Lynn
Williams College
[email protected]
Abstract
Wolves have a special resonance in many human cultures. To appreciate fully the wide variety of
views on wolves, we must attend to the scientific, social, and ethical discourses that frame our
understanding of wolves themselves, as well as their relationships with people and the natural
world. These discourses are a configuration of ideas, language, actions, and institutions that
enable or constrain our individual and collective agency with respect to wolves.
Scientific discourse is frequently privileged when it comes to wolves, on the assumption that the
primary knowledge requirements are matters of ecology, cognitive ethology, and allied disciplines. Social discourse about wolves implicitly challenges this privilege and provides a rich array
of social perspectives on human-wolf relations. Ethical discourse has until recently lagged behind
the other two. So too, ethicists are increasingly challenging the adequacy of scientific and social
discourse. They do so by calling attention to the value-laden character of all discourse, and the
unavoidable ethical questions that confront us as we learn to share the landscape with large
predators like wolves.
Keywords
discourse, ethics, hermeneutics, wolves
In early July of 2006, Suzanne Stone and her daughter, Sierra, drove to the
Sawtooth National Forest to search for an orphaned group of eight-week-old
wolf pups. The Stones drove there after hearing that Wildlife Services, an arm
of the U.S. federal government, had killed the parents—a male and female
from the Big Water Pack in the Soldier Mountains—and left the pups to die
from starvation or predation.
I have known Stone a long time, and she is neither a stranger to, nor an
opponent of, lethal “wolf control.” As the Northern Rockies representative of
the nonprofit organization Defenders of Wildlife, she works with citizens,
scientists, the livestock industry, and government officials to manage the growing
wolf populations of the western United States. Part of her work involves
administering one fund that compensates ranchers for livestock or working
dogs lost to confirmed wolf depredation, and another fund that subsidizes
© Koninklijke Brill NV, Leiden, 2010
DOI: 110.1163/106311110X12586086158529
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proactive measures to avoid or mitigate conflicts between wolves and people.
Stone is a sympathetic voice for ranchers and rural communities in wolf country, and she realizes that killing wolves is at times an unfortunate necessity. I
should note that I agree with her. And still, she was disturbed enough to search
throughout the day and into the night for the pups. She never found them.
Neither did Wildlife Services, which, hoping to take the edge off a public relations disaster, also went looking for them.
An interesting contrast to Stone’s attitude was that of Steven Nadeau of the
Idaho Department of Fish and Game. He authorized the killing of these
wolves because they were believed to have preyed on livestock. In comments
to National Public Radio, he said, “The regrettable loss of a few pups does not
have any real biological impact on the recovery or long-term viability of this
population [of wolves]” (Shogren, 2006). Nadeau is almost certainly right
about the biological effect of the loss of these pups. Pups have always been
particularly vulnerable to disease and predation, and the reproductive cycle of
wolves is adapted to high pup mortality. The loss of a few pups will have little,
if any, impact on the population biology of wolves in Idaho. But I do not
think this is why the story made the news. Rather, it was the contrast between
Stone’s concern and Nadeau’s apparent indifference that captured the attention of the public in the United States and Canada. And in this contrast there
is much to be learned about the scientific, social, and ethical discourses that
inform humanity’s troubled history with wolves across the globe.
I want to explore this contrast, not by focusing on Stone and Nadeau per
se, but by probing the discourses that inform our thoughts, actions, and policies toward wolves. I will do this in three steps. First, I will outline the concept
of discourse in terms of its meaning in hermeneutics. I will then explore the
dominant discourses that inform the human relationship with wolves—discourses that are rooted in science, society, and ethics. I will finish by examining the theoretical, methodological, ethical, and interdisciplinary consequences
of taking discourse seriously.
Methodological Caveat
As you read this article, you will note that it does not conform to the usual
conventions of scientific literature. One might expect this, as I do not pretend
to be a scientist in the usual sense of the term. But there is more to it than that.
The standard conventions of scientific articles—a statement of the research
question, justified by a literature review of findings to date, a description of
the methods and measures used to test a hypothesis, and a discussion of the
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results, their significance, and possible avenues for future exploration—are
entirely appropriate to research questions amenable to quantitative methods.
These conventions were developed in and for the natural sciences, work well
within those domains, and overall there is no reason to disparage them (Lynn,
2004; Chalmers, 1999; Lindberg, 1992).
When it comes to explaining human beings and their societies, there was a
time when the human sciences sought to ape the natural sciences in theory,
method, and publishing conventions. This was a dismal failure, and, while the
struggle to shift gears continues, the positivist turn is long dead. The reason is
that human beings do not conform to the models of determinism and/or predictivism that are the hallmarks of the physical sciences. The sentience and
sapience of people—their awareness and self-awareness—make their thoughts
and actions contingent and creative, transcending the boundary conditions
for which the research practices and writing conventions of the natural sciences were devised (Bernstein, 1991; Rorty, 1979). Yes, there are still people
who defend a “naturalistic model” of the human sciences. Yet it is embarrassing to see old-school positivist scholars chopped up by their peers because they
have not kept up with the history and philosophy of science literature over the
last fifty years. E. O. Wilson and his acolytes of consilience best represent this
yearning for the old ways (Westley & Miller, 2003; Wilson, 1998). We can do
much better than this now.
What is needed in such cases is a methodology adapted to the “human
sciences,” something capable of causal explanation (the hallmark of science)
without the pretense of determinism or predictivism.1 Various social theories
and qualitative methodologies have arisen to fill this need (Schwandt, 2007;
Hesse-Biber & Leavy, 2005; Denzin & Lincoln, 2000). So too have new conventions for publications, specifically around the idea of interpretation and
narrative (Yanow, 1999; Fischer & Forester, 1996; Roe, 1994). So for those
with an interest in methodological affairs, what follows is an interpretation of
several discourses that inform how we think about and act toward wolves.
Intentionally broad in scale and scope, it looks for the resonance between our
ideas, behavior, and social institutions, or, to put the matter in social theoretical language, the interplay of human agency and social structure. The point is
not to predict or determinatively explain what people and organizations do.
That is not possible with human and some other beings. Rather, the purpose
is to reveal the discursive dynamic that constitutes, at least in part, our individual and collective stance toward wolves in the world.2
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Discourse
I approach discourse as a hermeneuticist. Hermeneutics is the study of understanding, one of the main perspectives in social theory.3 The basic idea is that
our personal and social lives can only be fully understood when we account for
the meaning embedded in our actions and social relations, such as is found in
our presuppositions and worldviews. To explain the human world, we therefore have to interpret what people mean when they say or do something, and
what significance their words and actions have for the rest of the world.
Engaging in this kind of interpretation might seem trivial to some, as if
picking someone at random on the street and asking them about wolves is
going to tell us the truth about wolf biology or ecology. But that would be
missing the point. Hermeneuticists are interested in our individual and collective interpretations of wolves. These interpretations are highly significant, if,
let us suppose, politically motivated wildlife professionals foster an approach
to environmental policy that emphasizes agricultural production, ranching,
and sport hunting at the expense of predators, ecosystem function, and biodiversity. So one cannot understand (as in, describe, explain, evaluate, or justify)
why someone or some group acts as they do without first interpreting what
they think and how it informs their actions. It is for this reason that hermeneutics is a keystone tradition of scholarship with respect to the theory and
methodology of the human sciences (Wachterhauser, 1994; Gadamer, 1993;
Bruns, 1992; Mueller-Vollmer, 1989).
To the hermeneuticist, discourse refers to the interconnections between
ways of thinking and acting. It is not only a point of view that helps direct our
actions in the world; it is also the meaning(s) embedded in our actions and
social institutions. This approach extends the idea of discourse beyond the
expression of an idea or perspective, whether in speech, writing, or artistic
creation. It focuses on the role of language in the formation of presuppositions, worldviews, and ways of life. In this extended version, discourse traces
the linguistic connections between several components—thought, action,
and social institutions. The argument from a discursive perspective is that
language interweaves these components in such a manner that they are reciprocally constituted and/or mutually informing. That is to say, there is an inextricable linkage between how individual and collective agents think, speak,
act, and interact.
I use the term resonance (or resonances) to refer to the linkages between
the components of discourse, as well as between different discourses themselves. I say resonance because these linkages are not uniform or static, but
plural and shifting. They do not constitute a system of discrete inputs and
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outputs amenable to modeling and prediction. Rather, they are a shifting configuration of meaning and social interaction that must be apprehended for
their causal influences.
This contingency of meaning and social interaction arises from the way in
which discourse connects intangible and tangible phenomena.4 There is an
ecology of intangible ideas, intentions, worldviews, and culture informing
more tangible actions, social institutions, and their outcomes (e.g., environmental and social policy). This ecology defies reductionism and is better
understood through a process of interpretation. Discourse is a powerful conceptual tool in the process of social and moral interpretation. It helps us identify and theorize a shifting field of resonances, and thereby understand the
context, content, and consequences of a discourse. With this in mind, we can
better understand why and how an idea, social practice, or institution exists,
operates, and perpetuates itself (Kelly, 1990).5
Discourse may simultaneously exist at several levels. At one level are ideas,
whether expressed in terms of reasons or emotions. At another level are actions.
Here, reason and emotion become the motivating factors for acting in the
world. At still another level are social institutions such as government agencies, economic and politically-based interest groups, or nonprofit advocacy
organization. These institutions are also part of our discourses, patterns of
thinking and acting that, over time, take on concrete and durable form (Wolf,
2003b; Barnes & Duncan, 1992; Ball, 1988). When Stone expressed care for
the well-being of abandoned wolf pups, her expression was at the discursive
level of ideas. When she took to the field to find and save the pups from starvation, her behavior was at the action level of discourse. When she went back to
work at an NGO that is part of our social system, she was involved at the
institutional level of discourse.
If we think of a discourse as a text, such as an essay or a policy statement,
then we can “read” these texts for their meaning(s). Like a written or spoken
narrative, the meaning of a discourse can be interpreted for its good or ill
intentions, content, implications, and consequences (Ricoeur, 1996, 1991,
1977). Thus, when the state of Alaska justifies the aerial gunning of wolves
through policy statements of dubious scientific value, we have a discourse we
can read like a text and from which we can extract its meaning. So too, when
gunners take to the air to kill wolves, we have an equally meaningful action on
which to base our interpretations and from which to discern the values and
worldviews that inform those actions. When the Alaska Board of Game continues to authorize lethal control measures against wolves, we see a social institution whose members, policies, and practices are partaking of a broader
antiwolf discourse.
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Interpretations of discourse are never perfect or unequivocal. There is always
more to be learned, and multiple meanings are the norm. Nor are the intentions
behind, or the consequences of, a statement or act always obvious or explicit.
They can be concealed, poorly understood, or unexpected (Hirschman, 1987;
Hirsch, 1967). Because of this and other contingencies, hermeneuticists are
humble about the power of any one interpretation and encourage dialogue to
generate a broadly shared horizon of understanding. Moreover, they believe that
reason and evidence, along with goodwill and a skeptical eye, can distinguish
better from worse interpretations. In this way, we make progress in finding the
truth. Finally, truth is not relative or absolute. In alignment with the best understanding of science, truth is always proximate. While veracity is the goal, verisimilitude is the reality. For hermeneuticists, understanding is always partial and
fallible, and it is through dialogue with others that we reach a deeper and better
understanding of the presuppositions and worldviews of ourselves and others.6
Three Types of Discourse
We are now in a position to examine how discourse influences our relationship
with wolves. But which discourse should we examine? Because discourse lives
and grows in our thoughts, actions, and social institutions, and because we
know that discourses are not monolithic, there are many possibilities from
which to choose. Nonetheless, when we think about public policy and the
debate over wolves, scientific, social, and ethical discourses are particularly
important. They have a disproportional influence on how we view and relate
to wolves (and other creatures) the world over.
Scientific Discourse. The first discourse is that of the natural sciences, particularly ecology, ethology, and evolutionary biology, as well as their applied
siblings in wildlife management and conservation biology. This is not meant
to be a definitive list. Rather, it illustrates the range of basic and applied sciences with a claim to knowledge about wolves. Overall, scientists are attempting to study nature’s wolf—the Grey wolf (Canis lupus), Mexican wolf (Canis
lupus baileyi), Red wolf (Canis rufus), and Ethiopian wolf (Canis simensis)—all
members of the dog family, Canidae.
While I cannot do justice to the significant contributions made by scientific
discourse, allow me to note the dynamic nature of this knowledge. For example, new methods in genetics are revealing that wolves have a more complex
natural history than we had previously believed. We have long understood
that wolves are related to domestic dogs (Canis lupus familiaris), the dingo of
Australia (Canis lupus dingo), and other canids such as the coyote (Canis
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latrans) of North America or the Golden jackal (Canis aureus) of Africa and
Eurasia. Nevertheless, new information continues to alter our assessment of
the evolution of the dog family and its subsequent speciation. For example,
there is some evidence of a newly discovered species in eastern Canada, Canis
lycaon, the eastern wolf (Kyle et al., 2006).
Many members of the scientific community, advocacy groups, and the
wider public believe natural science is a privileged discourse about wolves.
Thus, to study wolves, one must necessarily be interested in their evolution,
ecology, ethology, management, or conservation. This orientation is understandable. The natural sciences are indispensable to our knowledge of wolves,
and we should not dismiss what such science can teach us.
We should recall, however, that, while necessary, the natural sciences are
neither infallible nor sufficient in and of themselves. For instance, scientists
now recognize wolves as highly skilled carnivores—top predators in their
many habitats—with an overall effect of promoting biodiversity (Smith,
Douglas, Petersen, & Houston, 2003). This was not always the case in scientific circles. It took over a century (from the mid-1800s to the mid-1900s) for
scientists to shed their view of carnivores as parasites on the rest of nature
(Dunlap, 1988; Worster, 1985). Some believe this ideology still guides the
efforts of U.S. federal agencies like the curiously named Wildlife Services
(Robinson, 2005). Indeed, at a time when wolves and other predators were
widely reviled both within and outside the scientific community, it fell to a
few with courage to challenge this ideology, pointing to the valuable ecological
roles of predation. Aldo Leopold’s “Thinking like a Mountain” is the story of
one such scientist and his growing appreciation for the ethical and ecological
value of all nature’s creatures (Flader, 1994; Leopold, 1968).
Moreover, there is an interesting and emergent literature that attempts to
explore the “human dimensions” of wildlife management. This literature is in
part an outgrowth of wildlife management’s self-recognition that the natural
sciences are never enough to understand either human-animal relations, or
environmental policy as it impacts wildlife. Much of this literature invests
itself in the trappings of natural science, however, with an emphasis on quantification, prediction, and control. Human beings become another “variable”
to be managed, using the scientistic theories and methods of what is loosely
called the social sciences, or more accurately the behavioral sciences. Values,
including moral values, become individualist preferences to be managed by
technocratic elites for the highest material or political return. For reasons
noted in the methodological caveat above, this scientistic approach to human
dimensions is problematic at best (see Manfredo, Vaske, Brown, Decker, &
Duke, 2009; Decker, Brown, & Siemer, 2001; Gray, 1993).
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So it implies no disrespect to science or scientists to note that science is
only one discourse among many. We cannot abstract science from the social
context in which it is practiced. Moreover, science is never enough to tell
us everything we need to know about wolves. If we want a fuller appreciation
of what wolves mean, and how this informs our individual and collective
agency toward them, then we will have to step beyond science and explore
other discourses.
Social Discourse. Alongside the natural sciences, there is a wide-ranging set
of social discourses about wolves. These discourses are articulated in the human
sciences, the arts and humanities, as well as in popular culture.7 They emerge
out of the dynamics of human society, and take many complex forms. They
embody divergent interpretations of wolves—who they are, what they do, and
why they do it—and how human beings should respond to them.
A catalogue of these interpretations has never been assembled, but from
diverse sources we know the wolf has been interpreted as a teacher of hunting
skills; an attentive parent; an exemplar of courage; a loyal pack member; a fellow creature; a spirit guide; a competitor for game; a depredator of herd animals; a symbol of strength, cunning, and power; a fool driven by gluttony; a
cowardly opportunist; a villain, varmint, and vermin; an agent of the devil; the
Devil himself; a threat to the safety of other wildlife; a parasite; a stalker of
children and the elderly; a paragon of wildness; and the irrepressible spirit of
women, to name a few. Such passionate interpretations are evident in any wolf
conference one cares to attend. A simple Google search on “wolves” returns an
abundance of Web sites extolling or condemning wolves as a source of inspiration or fear, symbolizing the best and worst of human traits. The human fascination with wolves has produced perhaps the largest wildlife-related literature
in the form of calendars, photographs, coffee table books, and other popular
media (selections from this literature include Coleman, 2004; Dutcher &
Dutcher, 2002; Borchardt, 1998; Evans, 1998; Matteson, 1996; McIntyre,
1996; Busch, 1994; Douglas, 1992; Brandenburg, 1990; Lopez, 1978).
Wolves are particularly symbolic animals: they stand in for something else
happening in human society. Thus, wolves may symbolize the endangered species or wild landscapes that people believe should be protected or exterminated. They may become flashpoints of political tension between branches or
levels of government, regulatory agencies, or corporate and nonprofit pressure
groups. Wolves may be seen as exemplifying the threats to rural economies, or
the prospect of economic growth and diversification in the form of ecotourism. They may represent the loss of political control by established communities of “insiders” and the garnering of political power by new communities of
“outsiders.” They may be associated with an oppressed social group, like the
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First Nations. Conversely, oppressed people may see wolves as fellow travelers
and stand in solidarity with their well-being. This symbolic, values-laden,
politically charged aspect of human-wolf relations has been eclipsed over the
years. There is, however, a burgeoning literature on wolves and public policy
that is not only excellent, but is beginning to redress this imbalance (Robinson, 2005; Nie, 2003; Lynn, 2002; Rawson, 2001; Sharpe, Donnelley, &
Norton, 2001; McIntyre, 1993).
Ethical Discourse. Of all the discourses over wolves, ethics is the least
acknowledged. When wolves are the subject of explicit ethical thought, they
tend to be used as portals to other arguments and issues, such as ecological
restoration, ecological integrity, or value conflicts in environmental politics
(see Katz, 2000). Comparatively little consideration is given to their wellbeing in and of themselves, either among philosophers or policy-makers. Yet
implicit moral sensibilities influence scientific and social discourses and make
wolves the object of much normative speculation. Resolving this tension
between explicit ethical thought and implicit moral presuppositions requires
more attention to the ethical discourses of human-wolf relations.
Ethics is one of the most pervasive discourses in human history. We are, in
the words of Mary Midgley (1995), the “moral primate,” a species with a propensity to understand our world in moral terms. Questions about what is
right, good, just, or of value are ubiquitous in all human societies. This is not
because individuals or groups agree on a single ethical worldview. The range of
ethical perspectives is quite broad, and scholars disagree on whether moral
norms are entirely relative to personality or culture (i.e., subjective and cultural relativism, respectively), objective truths based on analytic reason (e.g.,
Kant and the traditions of analytic philosophy), the by-product of divine
commands (e.g., Christian or Islamic ethics), or situated judgments based on
reason, evidence, and context (e.g., casuistry, hermeneutics, practical ethics).
In spite of these differences, there is no denying that we humans give extraordinary power to moral norms in our personal and social affairs (Midgley,
1995, 1993b; Rachels, 1986).8
In terms of ethics and wolves, there are several sources that should be highlighted. Arne Naess uses deep ecology to examine the ethical conundrums
involved in conflicts between predators like wolves and bears, and the herding
communities of Norway (Naess, 1974). Midgley discusses how wolves (and
other predators) are the symbolic substitutes onto whom we transfer the guilt,
fear, and loathing of our own destructive propensities (Midgley, 2001). Ashby
Sharpe does a fine job of teasing out and making explicit the ethical content
in a series of articles and presentations on ecological restoration in the Adirondack region of New York, (Sharpe et al., 2001). Robert Jickling and Paul Paquet
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(2005) explore the assumptions about science and management involved
when wolves are considered from an ethics-based epistemology, in contrast to
the dominant science-based epistemologies. Jody Emel (1995) has explored
our moral relationship to wolves through the lens of ecofeminism and geography. My own work has focused on the need for both sound science and sound
ethics, the role of discourses about wolves in pulling nature and culture into a
common orbit of ethical meanings (termed “cosmopolitanism”), and the way
in which the well-being of wolves in the landscape is a dual sign of environmental and moral health (Lynn, 2007b, 2005, 2002, 1998a, 1998b).
We may be in the midst of a “moral turn” regarding discourses about wolves.
Since 1998, both Defenders of Wildlife and the National Wildlife Federation
have held a series of conferences in which the ethics of wolf recovery played a
significant role. Building on the momentum of these conferences, the World
Wolf Congress of 2003 (held in Banff, Canada) was something of a watershed.
Alongside a substantial session that featured the ethics of wolf recovery, ethics
was a subject of concern in many of the plenaries, paper sessions, and dinner
conversations. The importance of this moral turn was driven home by the
concluding address, delivered by David Lavigne, senior science advisor to
the International Fund for Animal Welfare. In his talk, Lavigne emphasized
the ethical and value-laden dimensions of wolf recovery and management. His
overall point was not that science is unimportant. To the contrary, science is
indispensable in describing and explaining what is occurring with wolves in
nature or in specifying the factual basis of human-wolf conflict. Yet in spite of
its descriptive and explanatory power, science cannot make moral decisions
for us about how we ought to live with wolves. Such policy questions can only
be answered with explicit reference to ethical norms. (For elaborations on this
speech, see Lavigne, 2006.)
Subsequent meetings on ecological sustainability (held in Limerick, Ireland
in 2004) and, shortly thereafter, Carnivores 2004 (held in Santa Fe, New
Mexico), featured well-attended sessions on the role of ethics in wolf recovery,
wildlife conservation more broadly, and sustainability in general. Time will
tell if this moral turn represents something of sustained interest to the
wolf community.
Discursive Consequences
Discourses are consequential. They help shape how we see and act in the
world, at both individual and collective levels. The idea of discourse, as
opposed to a discourse itself, is equally significant, for it makes possible the
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disclosure of the meaning, power, and interaction of one or more discourses.
If we did not have the idea of discourse, we would not be able to identify the
nexus of beliefs and behaviors that constitute distinct discourses. With this
observation in mind, I want to conclude by noting four consequences of discourse as it affects the world of wolves.
The first consequence is that discourse has a substantial impact on our theoretical approaches to human-wolf relations. An attention to discourse helps
us identify which theoretical perspectives are (and are not) being advanced
when the discussion turns to wolves. This is crucial when various positions
argue that theirs is the “truly” objective, reasoned, evidenced, and scientific
point of view. We should be skeptical of such claims by now, but many are still
bamboozled by such rhetoric. The promotion of the International Wolf Center as an institution providing “unbiased” information about wolves serves as
one example. Sailing under the flag of value-neutral information, its rhetoric
obscures a science-based discourse that is the subtext to its education and
outreach initiatives (Anonymous, 2006).
Aside from sharpening our theoretical vision, a discursive approach also
implies that we are always theorizing our relationship to wolves. I say “theorizing” to emphasize that, whether our theories are hunches, testable propositions, or expansive worldviews, they are always fallible, contestable, and in the
making. Theorizing wolves is an ongoing activity, an endeavor of heart and
mind and practice that will never be fully settled. As we deepen our knowledge
of wolves, as our social and moral norms shift and conflict, as the plight of
wildlife and wild landscapes becomes increasingly acute, our theories will
evolve as well. If the history of ideas is any guide, such an evolution will not
be gradual and unilinear, but punctuated by conflict and increasing diversity
(Livingstone, 1992; Kuhn, 1970; Glacken, 1967).
The impact on methodology is the second consequence, and equal in scope
to that of theory. Sit in on a wolf conference, and one quickly discovers the
importance of numbers. Quantification is a touchstone of most presentations,
whether they are from advocates, managers, politicians, and/or scientists. What
distinguishes them is their skill and the purpose of using these numbers, not
the emphasis on quantification itself. For the reasons outlined above, discourses
cannot be studied using the techniques of the natural and resource sciences so
familiar to wolf biologists—radio and global-positioning collars, mathematical
modeling, genetic testing, etc. To plumb the depth and power of a discourse
requires qualitative, not quantitative, methods—interviews, participant observation, documentary analysis, etc. This may be a hard pill for some to swallow,
as these methods employ a set of ideas and practices that are very different, and
in some cases highly critical of, the natural science model of research.
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A third consequence is the role of ethics as a form of discursive power. Ethics can focus our attention on the moral values at stake in a social or political
issue and provide guidance for our thought and action in addressing moral
problems. As important, ethics is indispensable for holding people and societies accountable for their (un)ethical actions, something that should not be
confused with legal culpability. Ethics is the foundation for all movements of
social change, whether these are for animal, environmental, or social causes.
Generally, these movements involve a twofold process of critique and vision.
They criticize habits of thought as well as individual and social practices that
negatively impact our own well-being, as well as that of others. At the same
time, they envision a way of life that promotes our own well-being, as well as
that of others (Moyer, Macalister, Finley, & Soifer, 2001; Sibley, 1970).
Of course, our moral concern for others is not restricted to Homo sapiens.
Our moral community is a mixed one, comprising humans and nonhuman
animals. We all share an intrinsic value and moral standing alongside the rest
of nature, albeit at different individual and collective scales, something that
requires contextual nuance in our ethical reasoning. Nonetheless, people, animals, and nature all possess a potential well-being that ethics helps us appreciate and protect (Fox, 2001; Midgley, 1998; Rolston, 1988).
The fourth consequence is the recognition that bias haunts our research
into, policy regarding, and management of, wolves. This bias is not one of
invidious distortion, but of an imbalance of discourse. To begin with, the
natural sciences are overrepresented in the conversation. Over the years, other
fields of learning have weighed in, but these are still underrepresented when it
comes to setting policy and management goals. Note that this is not a failure
on the part of the individuals, per se. It is rooted in the dominant discourses
of the social community that concerns itself with wolves. Redressing this
imbalance will require expanding the kinds of discourses we routinely take
into consideration.
We can take steps to redress this situation by developing a truly interdisciplinary learning community around the subject of wolves. This is easier said
than done, but there are some excellent models where this has worked. One is
the Ethical, Legal and Social Implications of Research (ELSI) program associated with the Human Genome Project. Lasting from 1990 to 2003, the project sought to sequence the genome of humanity. This was “big science,” very
expensive and highly technical, and in the domain of the life sciences. Even so,
the need to look at ethical, legal, and other social issues was recognized early
and ELSI-based research was integrated with genomic science throughout the
project.9 Such an approach might work for wolves. This would require a shift
from depending on individuals to self-organize presentations, papers, articles,
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etc. on ethical and other issues regarding wolves, to advocacy and scholarly
organizations proactively integrating ELSI-like content into conferences, journals, and other organs of research and outreach.
Final Thoughts
I think it is clear that we need to take a broad range of discourses into account
if we are going to better understand and manage humanity’s relationship with
wolves. Welcoming these discourses to a common table will require an interdisciplinary spirit, as noted above. So I want to conclude by emphasizing the
need for interdisciplinarity. A landscape analogy may help make this point.
Imagine that a valley surrounded by three mountain ranges represents the
study of wolves. The mountains to the north are the Ethics Range, to the
southeast, the Social Range, and to the southwest, the Science Range. Members of the wolf community sit atop each range and have a view of the wolves
in the valley below. They can also see each other and might wonder what the
others can see that may be invisible to them.
With this metaphor in mind, we can say that each group has a different
point of view on the world before them and a distinct outlook from which to
derive insights on wolves. When the community gets together to talk about
their observations, they converse in ways that reflect the insights developed
from their particular viewpoints. This might include what they think can,
should, or ought to be done to manage humanity’s relationship with wolves.
They are in effect speaking in terms of distinct discourses. By proactively considering each point of view, they share insights that may not have been clear or
even visible to the others. They cross-check, contest, confirm, and create a
deeper and broader understanding of wolves.
In practical ethics, hermeneutics, and qualitative research, this approach to
interdisciplinarity is called triangulation (see Lynn, 2007a; Schwandt, 2007;
Flick, 2006). Much like using multiple compass points to find one’s geographic position in a landscape, triangulation is the use of multiple perspectives and methods to achieve the best account of a moral, scientific, and/or
social issue. This approach may substantially improve the rigor and communicative competence of the scientific, social, and ethical discourses about wolves.
It should fully respect what scientific discourse brings to the table, but at the
same time honor what social and ethical discourse brings as well. We might
hope that it also serves as a model for interdisciplinarity in other arenas and
has a positive impact on how we understand human-animal and naturesociety relations more generally.
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Notes
1. The terms human science and natural science are commonly used in social theory, qualitative
inquiry, and the philosophy of science. The former refers to what others call the behavioral and
social sciences, while the latter refers to the physical, biological, and life sciences. In addition to
serving as a way to categorize different forms of scientific knowledge, it also implies a more historically and philosophically reflective posture over the theory, methods, and role of science itself
(see Ricoeur, 1981).
2. Astute readers may recognize that a similar shift is occurring in the field of cognitive ethology. There is a recognition that many kinds of nonhuman animals think, feel, plan, play, act
altruistically and selfishly, have a sense of guilt and wild justice, and transmit cultural traditions.
The growth of this theoretical perspective has methodological implications, and represents a
turning away from positivist models that frequently misunderstand animals. While using a different language, cognitive ethology is developing its own interpretive theory and qualitative
methods. In this sense it is kin to hermeneutic traditions in the human sciences (for examples of
such work, see Allen & Bekoff, 2007; Bekoff, 2005; Bekoff et al., 2002).
3. Hermeneutics is named after Hermes, the Greek god who handled communication
between Olympus and the Ecumene—the habitable world of humanity, which for the Greeks
was centered on the Mediterranean. Like the coyote, however, Hermes is a trickster, taking pleasure in parsing meaning in ways that lead to misunderstanding. The background idea here is that
language is not something we simply use subjectively to describe our feelings or objectively to
describe the world. Rather, language is constitutive of how we experience and conceptualize the
world around us.
4. For more on the “qualities” and “phenomena” that distinguish the human and natural sciences, as well as the implications this has for causal explanation, qualitative inquiry, and moral
reasoning, see Lynn, 2004.
5. When I speak of discourse, I often shift between the singular and plural. This is to denote
the scale and specificity of my comments. Thus, I may speak of discourse in general, discourses
in particular, or a particular discourse in the singular.
6. There are other theories about discourse that emphasize the ideological nature of “totalizing” discourse (e.g., structuralism), the partiality of all discourse (e.g., poststructuralism) and the
distorting tendencies of all discourse (e.g., critical theory). The structuralists and poststructuralists tend to see people as subjects of discourse—i.e., subservient to the discourse(s) that constitute their worldview. Hermeneuticists and critical theorists think otherwise, believing that
people have agency—that is, they can be self-determining and are not the pawns of larger social
forces. Exercising this agency may not be easy (or possible) for everyone, but it is in the nature
of human beings to be agents and interpreters of their own individual and collective lives
(for examples of this literature, see Wolf, 2003a, Darier, 1999; Habermas, 1998; Gare, 1995;
Habermas, 1993).
7. Words like culture, society, and polity have deep roots in intellectual history and carry overlapping meanings. I have intentionally chosen the term social for its broad resonance across the
entire range of the human sciences, arts, and humanities. If people choose to use other words—
e.g., culture, politics, community—there is nothing preventing us from translating between these
terms and their associated fields of learning and mapping insights from one tradition of scholarship into another. To my mind, it is silly to argue over which disciplinary language is best. Each
has empirical and theoretical knowledge to share, and these insights should be appreciated in an
interdisciplinary spirit.
8. I approach ethics and its various discourses from the tradition of practical ethics, perhaps
best exemplified by Socrates, Mary Midgley, and Steven Toulmin (Toulmin, 2001, 1986; Midgley, 1993a; Plato, 1987). To paraphrase Socrates, ethics is an exploration of how we ought to live
W. S. Lynn / Society and Animals 18 (2010) 75-92
89
(Plato, 1987). It is an inquiry into moral values that inform—or should inform—our lives, an
evaluation of the moral norms embodied in our thought and practice, and a concern for what is
good, right, just, or of value in our individual and collective lives. Practical ethicists use moral
concepts as rules of thumb to help us grasp the ends and means of life, providing guidelines and
guideposts as we strive for what the ancient Greeks termed eudaimonia, a word we translate
variously as happiness, well-being, and flourishing (Boss, 1998, 388-389; MacIntyre, 1966,
Chapter 7). From the practical ethics perspective, when we engage in ethics, we are not only
exploring principles of moral reason; we are also articulating maxims of conduct. Yet we do all
this in a manner that takes a diversity of moral insights and contexts into account (see Lynn,
2007a, 2006).
9. Information on the project can be found at www.ornl.gov/sci/techresources/human_
genome/research/elsi.shtml.
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