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Reputation and Sudden Collapse
in Secondary Markets
Discussion by
Andy Neumeyer
Universidad Torcuato Di Tella
SEC probes second Goldman security
From the Financial Times. June 9 2010 23:42
“The US Securities and Exchange Commission has
stepped up its inquiries into a complex mortgagebacked deal by Goldman Sachs that was not part
of the civil fraud charges filed against the bank in
April, according to people close to the matter.
SEC interest in Hudson Mezzanine Funding, a
$2bn collaterised debt obligation, comes amid
settlement talks with Goldman over accusations
that the bank defrauded investors in Abacus, a
similar CDO.”
Main Conclusions of the paper
• Adverse selection => multiple equilibria in
secondary markets for loans
– Equilibrium refinement selects among these
equilibria with signals on colateral values
• Policies implemented in 2008 are either bad
or irrelevant
– Asset purchases
– Low interest rates
Main points of discussion
• Interpretation of secondary market
– Highlight some modelling choices: assume that
new issues of ABS have the same distributions of
returns over time.
• Show some data
– Collateral values
– Interest rates
Interpretation of Secondary Market
Mortgages
Car Loans
Student Loans
Credit Cards
Buys assets
with a cost q
ABS
Originator
Sells ABS
(with
possibly
complex
payoff)
Buyer
Interpretation of Secondary Market
Mortgages
Car Loans
Student Loans
Credit Cards
Buys assets
with at cost q
ABS
Originator
perfect
information
Sells ABS
(with
possibly
complex
payoff)
Buyer
imperfect
information
Interpretation of Secondary Market
Mortgages
Car Loans
Student Loans
Credit Cards
Buys assets
with at cost q
ABS
Originator
perfect
information
Sells ABS
(with
possibly
complex
payoff)
Buyer
imperfect
information
FRAGILE
MARKET
Interpretation of Secondary Market
Mortgages
Car Loans
Student Loans
Credit Cards
Sells ABS
(with
possibly
complex
payoff)
Buys assets
with at cost q
Buyer
imperfect
information
perfect
information
Goldman
Chari
FRAGILE
MARKET
Setup of the Model
Sells ABS
ABS
Originator
sell 
a 1:
Buyer
p q
p E buyer 
v|a
p|

, c1
hold 
a 0: E seller 
vq
1 rc
Sell iff E seller 
v
qr cE buyer 
v|p
Static Model
• Secondary market exists iff ABS originator sells
(is active)
E seller 
v
qr cE buyer 
v|p
• Perfect information: only costs matter
• Assumption on returns
v
v
with prob 
v 0 with prob 1 
Static Model
• Imperfect information (lemmons): there is
trade iff
E seller 
v
qr cp E buyer 
v|

v

qr c
 
v

1 

v
p


qr c
 1 



v




Dynamic Model
In t = 2
• New buyer
observes payoff of
ABS in t = 1
• ABS originator
issues ABS with
same (π, c) of t = 1
• Beliefs μ2 depend
on actions and v
realizations in t =1
Dynamic Model
Dynamic Model: crucial assumptions
• ABS assembled by originator has always the
same (π, c)
– Otherwise no Bayesian learning → all results
collapse
• Other interpretation: update about whether
the ABS originator truthfully disclosed the
distribution
– What if the incentives to lie change over time ?
IF I TAKE THE MODEL SERIOUSLY . . .
Illustration of abrupt collapses
• All ABS collapse in 2007
• Auto ABS, credit cards
and student loans
revive in first half of
2008
• Collapse in september
2008
Used Cars and Trucks (CPI - BLS)
US Home Price Values- SP Case Shiller 10
Jan-10
Sep-09
May-09
Jan-09
Sep-08
May-08
Jan-08
Sep-07
May-07
Jan-07
Sep-06
May-06
Jan-06
Sep-05
May-05
Jan-05
Sep-04
May-04
Jan-04
Sep-03
May-03
Jan-03
50.0
Sep-02
100.0
May-02
Jan-02
Sep-01
May-01
Jan-01
Sep-00
May-00
Jan-00
Colateral Values: Used Cars and US Homes
250.0
200.0
150.0
Why did auto ABS
market collapse in
2007?
0.0
Interest Rates
Sells ABS
ABS
Originator
sell 
a 1:
Buyer
p q
p E buyer 
v|a
p|

, c1
hold 
a 0: E seller 
vq
1 rc
Sell iff E seller 
v
qr cE buyer 
v|p
Interest Rates (static model)
Payoff
sell
hold
r*
Market collapse
Interest Rate
Interest Rates (Dynamic Model)
μ
Multiple
Equilibrium
μ0


μ
r*
μ*
Interest Rate
Interest Rates in the Paper
• Why collapse in 2007 and not in 2001?
– More discipline on μ?
Conclusions
• Do we think that distributions of returns on
ABS are constant over time across new
issuances?
• Do more work in terms of matching model
and data