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Chapter 16 Public Goods and Public Choice © 2006 Thomson/South-Western 1 Introduction Private goods have two important features: They are rival in consumption – the amount consumed by one person is unavailable for others to consume They are exclusive – suppliers can easily exclude those who don’t pay 2 Public Goods Nonrival in consumption One person’s consumption does not diminish the amount available to others Once produced, public goods are available to all in equal amount Marginal cost of providing the good to additional consumers is zero Nonexclusive Once a public good is produced, suppliers cannot easily deny it to those who fail to pay it is nonexclusive Because they are nonrival and nonexclusive, forprofit firms cannot profitably sell public goods 3 Classification of Goods Quasi-Public goods When not congested are non rival Producers can with relative ease exclude non payers Open-access goods Rival but nonexclusive Fish in the ocean are rival in the sense that once caught they are not available for others to catch Nonexclusive in the sense that it would be costly or impossible for a private firm to prevent access to these goods 4 Exhibit 1: Categories of Private and Public Goods 5 Optimal Provision of Public Goods Suppose the public good in question is mosquito control in a neighborhood, which, for simplicity, consists of only two houses One is headed by Alan and the other by Maria Alan spends a lot of time in the yard, thus values a mosquito-free environment more than does Maria 6 Exhibit 2: Market for Public Goods D e Dollars per hour $15 Da Marginal cost 10 Dm 5 D 0 2 Hours of mosquito spraying per week Da and Dm are the demand curves reflecting the marginal benefits that Alan and Maria, respectively, enjoy at each rate of output How much mosquito spraying should the government provide? Suppose the marginal cost of spraying is a constant $15 an hour; the efficient level of output is 2 hours per week, where the marginal benefit to the neighborhood equals the marginal cost 7 Optimal Provision of Public Goods Efficient approach would be to impose a tax on each resident equal to marginal valuation Once people realize their taxes are based on how much the government thinks they value the good, people tend to understate their true valuation Taxpayers are reluctant to offer this information, creating what is called the free-rider problem Even if the government had accurate information about marginal valuations, some households earn much more than others a greater ability to pay taxes Taxing people according to their marginal valuations may be efficient, but it may not be considered fair or equitable 8 Median-Voter Model Voter whose preferences lie in the middle of the set of all voters’ preferences The median-voter model predicts that under certain circumstances, the preference of the median, or middle voter will dominate other choices 9 Special Interest and Rational Ignorance Households have neither the time nor the incentive to understand the effects of public choices on every product They realize that each of them has only a tiny possibility of influencing the outcome of public choices 10 Special Interest and Rational Ignorance Rational ignorance: voters remain largely oblivious to the costs and benefits of the thousands of proposals considered by elected officials The cost to the typical voter of acquiring and acting on such information is usually greater than any expected benefits 11 Distribution of Costs and Benefits Traditional public-goods legislation Widespread benefits and widespread costs Usually has a positive impact on the economy because total benefits exceed total costs Special-interest legislation Benefits are concentrated but costs widespread across nearly all consumers and taxpayers Generally harms the economy, on net, because total costs often exceed total benefits 12 Distribution of Costs and Benefits Populist legislation Widespread benefits but concentrated costs Difficult time getting approved because the widespread group that benefits typically remains rationally ignorant of the proposed legislation voters provide little political support Group adversely affected by costs will object Competing-interest legislation Involves both concentrated benefits and costs 13 Exhibit 3: Categories of Legislation Based on the Distribution of Costs and Benefits 14 Exhibit 4: Effects of Milk Price Supports If Congress establishes a floor price of $2.50 per gallon, then the quantity supplied will increase and the quantity demanded will decrease To maintain the higher price, the government must buy the excess quantity at $2.50 per gallon 15 Rent Seeking Rents: government transfer or subsidy constitutes a payment to the resource owner that exceeds the earnings necessary to call forth that resource – payment exceeding opportunity cost The activity that interest groups undertake to elicit these special favors from government is called rent-seeking 16 Rent Seeking Shifts resources from productive endeavors that create output and income to activities that focus more on transferring income to the special interest Do nothing to increase output Frequently reduce output Special interest groups compete for the same government advantage, so more resources wasted If the advantage conferred by government requires higher income taxes, the net return individuals expect from working and investing will fall and they may work and invest less 17 Underground Economy It is reasonably accurate to say that when government taxes productive activity, less production gets reported The underground economy is a term used for all market activity that goes unreported to the government either to avoid taxes or because the activity itself is illegal 18 Underground Economy A tax on productive activity has two effects: Resource owners may supply less of the taxed resource because the after-tax wage declines To evade taxes, some people will shift from the formal, reported economy to an underground, “off-the-books” economy avoidance is a legal attempt to arrange one’s economic affairs so as to pay the least possible tax Tax evasion is illegal Tax 19 Bureaucracy Elected representatives approve legislation The task of implementing legislation is typically left to bureaus 20 Ownership and Funding of Bureaus Bureaus are typically financed by budget appropriation from the legislature, which comes from taxpayers Becomes of the differences in the forms of ownership and in the sources of revenue, bureaus have different incentives than do for-profit firms so are likely to behave differently 21 Ownership and Behavior Government bureaus receive less consumer feedback and have less incentive to act on any feedback they do receive Government bureaus have less incentive to act on the information available Profits or losses arising in the bureau are spread among all taxpayers, and because there is no transferability of ownership, bureaus have less incentive to satisfy customers or to produce their output using the least-cost combination of resources 22 Bureaucratic Objectives The legislature has only limited ability to dig into the budget and cut particular items If the legislature tries to cut the bureau’s budget, the bureau will threaten to make those cuts as painful to the legislature and constituents as possible Budget maximization results in a larger budget than that desired by the median voter 23 Private versus Public Production Simply because some goods and services are financed by the government does not mean that they must be produced by the government Elected officials may also use some combination of bureaus and firms to produce the desired output The trend is toward increased privatization production by the private sector of government provided goods and services 24 Private versus Public Production Legislators might prefer dealing with bureaus rather than firms for two reasons The internal organization of the bureau may be more responsive to the legislature’s concerns than the manager of a firm would be Bureaus provide legislators with opportunities to reward friends and supporters with government jobs 25