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NS4540 Winter Term 2017 Nicaragua: Economy Nicaragua: Overview • Country has had a period of gradual economic recovery from the mid-1980s despite devastation caused by Hurricane Mitch in 1998 • Recovery since latter half of 1990s followed period of major economic crisis • Between late 1970s and early 1990s Nicaraguan economy battered by • Prolonged civil war, • Major international recession of the early 1980s • Imposition of economic sanctions by U.S. and • Government mismanagement • By 1994, economic output more than 60% below what it had been in 1977 • These factors accentuated the traditional dependence on imports and external financing 2 Agriculture I • Agricultural sector along with rest of economy deeply depressed in the 1980s and early 1990s • Immediately after revolution of 1979 the state took over more than 1m. ha of land • 70% converted into state farms • Remainder transferred to peasant cooperatives • Large areas of underutilized and idle land expropriated during second stage of Government’s land reform program in 1981 • From 1986 emphasis was increasingly placed upon • Production from cooperatives or individual smallholders • With government exercising considerable control over sector through monopoly purchase of export crops. 3 Agriculture II • Government of President Barrios de Chamorro (1990-97) adopted a more pragmatic approach • Privatized a number of large state farms but • Declined to reverse the Sandinista land reforms • Administration of Aleman Lacayo (1997-2002) continued this flexibility • Reached agreement with Sandinista opposition which sanctioned the land and property distribution to legitimize beneficiaries of the Sandinista reforms • Government also reinforced arbitration mechanism to adjudicate claims of many larger property owners who claimed to be victims of asset seizures by senior Sandinista's • Rather than return land generous compensation made • Claims not completely settled – has created uncertainty over access to U.S. markets 4 Agriculture III • Payments totaled US $900m between 1990 and 2003 • Massive impact on country’s external debt representing more than half the total in 2003 • Property question continued to be major political and economic issue in Nicaragua • No doubt a major disincentive to significant private sector investment in agriculture • Although Sandinistas returned to power in 2006 elections President Ortega distanced himself from more extreme policies of 1980s and pledged to • Respect free enterprise • Protect private property, and • Encourage investment 5 Agriculture IV • Agriculture production has had steady improvement since 1999 • Production levels 81.7% higher in 2012 than in 1999 • Remained mainstay of economy in 2014 accounting for 20.5% of GDP 6 Recent Developments: 2015 I • President Ortega and the FSLN government weathered considerable adversity in 2015 • Slow-down in economic growth • Upsurge in social conflict • Reduced assistance from Venezuela and • Stalling of a inter-oceanic canal project • Despite difficulties, Ortega popularity firm above 50% • Can count on a fairly easy election win in 2016 • Opposition splintered • Ortega has tacit support of business community through negotiating some important policies with its leaders • Business still thinks energy prices too high 7 Recent Developments: 2015 II • Conflict on the rise • Despite government’s commanding positon, social and political conflict increased led by opposition party, PLI • PLI has organized small scale-scale protests demanding conditions for a free and fair ballot in 2016 • Government has responded with repression • fear that election related protests would combine with rural and industrial conflicts leading to destabilization • October 2015 church supported environmental movement forced cancellation of a mining concession • Rural demonstrations against canal project increased in strength – despite lack of any property expropriations 8 Recent Developments: 2015 III • Developments suggest certain fraying of FSLN’s capacity to head off political conflict • Recently approved Law on Sovereign Security probably designed to dissuade multiple opposition groups from combining forces against government • Economically • GDP growth down to 3.8% in 2015 from 4.7% in 2014 • Fall in exports • Impact of drought on agriculture • Uncertainty about charges for electricity held up investment in renewable energy projects and • Little done to improvement the investment climate 9 Recent Developments: 2015 IV • Financing Worries • Government came under pressure in 2015 to start diversifying its external financing sources • Assistance form multilateral banks will be offered on an increasingly less concessionary basis in the future • Crashing world oil price has hastened the decline of off-budget assistance from Venezuela • Starting in June 2015 monthly shipments of crude oil and derivatives from Venezuela fell by nearly half. • Foreseeing and eventual end to assistance Ortega government began laying groundwork for Nicaragua to issue sovereign bonds on world financial markets • Invited both Standard and Poor’s and Fitch, to rate the country’s credit worthiness 10 Recent Developments: 2015 V • The US$50bn canal project did not advance as scheduled • Startup has been postponed to end of 2016 • Doubts about the scheme’s viability and the absence of visible financial banking make it difficult to determine project’s status 11 IMF: Outlook and Risks I 12 IMF: Outlook and Risks II 13 IMF: Outlook and Risks III 14 IMF: Outlook and Risks IV 15