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Cradle of Consciousness ii iii Dedicated to Kurt Gödel John Bell William Hamilton with admiration for their contribution to bridge the gap between natural sciences and philosophy iv v Contents Acknowledgements Preface Introduction ix xi xv Part I: Incompleteness 1. Mathematics Hilbert, Gödel, Turing Penrose’s ‘Blatant Reductio ad Absurdum’ Determinism, Procedures, and Algorithms Matter and Mind 3 6 9 13 2. Physics Pure Chance and Correlation The Non-Local Nature of Causality The Non-Temporal Nature of Causality 19 27 35 3. Biology The Clockwork of Descartes Hamilton’s Variation on the Darwinian Theme Software and Genome: an Analogy The Empirical Data Locating Humans in Evolutionary History 39 43 50 55 65 4. Ethology Nothing Wrong With Machines Hume’s Inconsistency The Empirical Data Moral Characteristics of the Human Mind 71 74 77 83 vi Part II: The Model 5. Causality Incompleteness in a Nutshell Physical Causality Quantum-Hylemorphic Causality Idealism and Dualism Aristotle 91 96 100 107 108 6. The Mind Matter and Mind Reading and Writing in the Brain 117 121 7. Consciousness Gradualism on Trial The Quantum-Hylemorphic Model of Consciousness Suffering Free Will Epilogue 125 129 133 140 143 vii Appendices 1: Kurt Gödel on the Incompleteness Theorem 2: Roger Penrose on Non-Algorithmic Procedures 3: The Hylemorphic Foundation of Quantum Mechanics 4: Comments on Niels Bohr 5: Polarisation of Light 6: Faster-Than-Light Communication and Retro-Causation 7: Axelrod and Hamilton on The Triumph of Tit for Tat 8: Frans de Waal on Tender Altruism in Harsh Circumstances 9: Patricia Churchland on Self-Representational Upgrades 10: Daniel Wegner on Conscious Will 11: Daniel Dennett on Descartes 12: Ian Glynn on Consciousness 13: Edward Wilson on Free Will 14: Richard Dawkins on Free Will 15: Roger Penrose on Free Will 149 159 163 175 183 185 189 197 203 207 213 221 225 231 237 References 243 Index of Names 255 Index of Matters 257 viii ix Acknowledgements Among all those who helped me developing and formulating the ideas presented in this book, I wish to thank especially Anton Schins, Marcel Lankhuijzen, Antoine Suárez, Rudi te Velde, and Steve Barr. x xi Preface The present book represents a new tendency in philosophy to value the totality of empirical and scientific data, in contrast to those pertaining to a single discipline only. Evidently valuing the totality of empirical and scientific data is not to be mistaken for treating them. Valuing all empirical data means that, in treating a selection of empirical data, and in searching a philosophical model to explain these data, one always has to keep in mind that the resulting model does not conflict overtly with empirical data of other sciences, or of common sense. Schins’ effort is aimed at explaining a specific set of empirical data, which apparently imply the presence of non-material principles in the evolution of natural processes. The specific set of empirical data is chosen from the disciplines of mathematics, physics, biology, and ethology. The interpretation is done in such a way as to respect the obvious requirements of scientific work. On speaking about non-material elements, one must obviously care for a clear definition of one’s terminology. In my view, the author complies with this requirement by invoking non-material principles when the source of causality is not a phenomenon itself and when it is impossible to describe things completely in quantitative terms, i.e., by means of deterministic mathematical algorithms. In this sense non-material principles appear to be confirmed by the Gödel-Penrose argument in mathematics, by non-local and non-temporal quantum experiments in physics, by the capacity of mastering any finite order of intentionality in biology, and by the personal xii claim of rights in ethology. What makes this book interesting is, in my view, the fact that the author succeeds in arguing that some aspects of natural processes can be understood to be essentially irreducible to deterministic quantitative laws. As a physicist I am particularly interested in the author’s ideas on quantum mechanics and on the quantum experiments I have proposed. The discussion on experiments exhibiting non-local and non-temporal aspects is already appealing to a large scientific audience and I consider that Schins’ analysis about related cultural and philosophical implications is very opportune and valuable. Nevertheless, whereas I share Schins’ criticism of Kant’s notion of causality I disagree with his analysis of Bohr’s attitude. In fact Bohr’s division between ‘quantum system’ and ‘classical apparatus’ seems to me an important condition of both scientific and metaphysical thought. I think Schins’ division between material and formal causality precisely implies Bohr’s division between quantum system and classical world. Everything that can be described in terms of a deterministic mathematical algorithm, is, according to the author’s definition, to be called matter. This definition provides an excellent basis for a sharp distinction of matter and mind. The author argues that there exist specific, wellestablished empirical data, which cannot be accounted for unless one assumes the non-material nature of the human mind. The human mind turns out to be one non-material principle, an entity able to determine natural processes without conflicting with the basic physical laws (quantum mechanics and relativity theory). In this way, the author proves the existence of the human mind as a non-material entity, source of causality in natural processes. Using the insights from the four above-mentioned disciplines, the author works out a philosophical model, which explains some interesting features of human consciousness: on one hand its dependence on material states of the brain (e.g., consciousness disappears during sleep), and on the other its non-material dimension following from its essential character as an act of knowledge. The author’s model holds the middle way between a dualistic model of consciousness, in which there is no reason for xiii consciousness to sleep, and a materialistic one, in which it is contradictory to consider the act of consciousness as an act of knowledge of one’s own existence. The author argues convincingly that acts of knowledge cannot be identified with their consequences (like libraries or computer programs), starting from Roger Penrose’s famous defy of artificial intelligence. Antoine Suárez Zürich, April 2003 xiv xv Introduction The longer neurologists peer through their microscopes, the more convinced they are: none of their brain slices shows even the slightest trace of consciousness. Until now they were able to localise almost anything in the brain: areas indicative of quantitative estimation and mathematical calculation; of happiness and anguish; nay even of moral judgements and religious feelings. Consciousness, however, seems to be particularly elusive. Yet all humans claim to be conscious. They are the only species known to do so. But is their claim truthful? And if so, are humans the only species endowed with consciousness? It is interesting to consider whether our close relatives, the chimpanzees, feel conscious. And whether dogs do, and plants. And even computers! They might all be conscious beings, but unable to communicate that to humans. Many scientists are inclined to think that higher animals feel conscious to some extent. Their arguments are not very convincing, however. In most cases they do not surpass the ‘logic of emotion’: in countless cases animals show the same reactions to external stimuli as humans do (think of reactions to wounds or danger); humans are conscious; whence animals are conscious too. Several renowned scientists have so far failed to formulate a consistent research programme. Francis Crick, for example, seems to identify consciousness with perceptive consciousness, as if there existed no xvi consciousness without perception. But why bring in perception at all? One can be perfectly conscious when lying on bed, eyes closed, and concentrating on anything but sensorial input. True, never has a conscious organism been found which is unable of perception. Though neither has a conscious organism been found which is unable of digestion. Is digestion therefore essential to consciousness? Daniel Dennett thinks it is all a question of finding the correct metaphors: kludges, memes, parallel pandemoniums, multiple drafts, innate design, predesigned gifts of nature, microhabits of thought, and virtual machines… such abundant terminology gives the impression that the author hides scientific poverty under a colourful veil. After Benjamin Libet’s pioneering work on the timing of conscious experiences, many philosophers conclude that conscious volitions do not exist in humans. They consider consciousness as the brain’s response to an unconscious initiative issued previously from that very brain. No conscious free will in humans, they claim. The rebuttal of conscious free choice on the basis of Libet’s experiments is a classical example of a petitio principii: assume that conscious free choice —if it exists— must necessarily issue from the brain; define consciousness as one’s awareness of bodily motion; and conclude from rather subjective timing experiments —involving human memory, a very complicated and poorly understood neurological process— that conscious free choice cannot exist. If conscious free choices issue from the brain, they must do so according to the natural laws governing the behaviour of the relevant biological cells. If the behaviour of those cells is determined by natural law and pure chance, such a ‘conscious free choice’ is by definition not free. Hence, postulating that free choice must necessarily issue from the brain is identical to postulating that free choice cannot exist — which was proposed as a conclusion drawn from the empirical data! Evidently, the empirical data are superfluous: one is simply begging the question. Moreover, in this scenario consciousness is degraded to the role of the brain’s registering bodily motion. Whatever cells are implied in the process of registering, it is logically impossible to credit them, on the basis of xvii natural law and chance, with ‘conscious registering’. Those cells do nothing but obeying the laws of nature. The standard interpretation of Libet’s experiments displaces the problem rather than solving it. Frans de Waal investigates morality rather than consciousness. His basic syllogism runs as follows: chimpanzees fight, learn, show tenderness, gender-specific behaviour; conflicts, learning, tenderness, gender are related to morality in humans; hence, chimpanzees are moral beings. From a formal-logical point of view, this is like asserting that everybody who feels shaky suffers from Parkinson’s disease. I realise that it is quite easy to criticise other people’s research efforts. Let me stress that I do not question their scientific capabilities (all of them are outstanding scientists, with an impressive curriculum), nor do I question the scientific value of their research (I agree with all their immediate conclusions); I only question the very last jump in their logic, when consciousness, free choice, or morality make their miraculous appearance. Just like scientists of consciousness do not succeed in defining consciousness scientifically, without loosing the intuitive meaning of the word, ethologists do not succeed in defining morality. My definition of consciousness is simply the knowledge of one’s own existence. This definition is in line with the intuitive concept of consciousness. It is the description given literally in the dictionaries. One either does, or does not, know one’s own existence. It is not possible to know one’s existence twice or three times better than one’s neighbour knows his or her own existence. This is the ‘digital property’ (i.e., a property allowing only two mutually exclusive realisations) of consciousness. It is hardly possible to explain a digital property on the basis of matter distributions in the brain. If the act of consciousness really issued from a group of brain cells, then adding some cells to that group, or enhancing the performance of those cells, should enhance one’s act of consciousness. With such a modified centre of consciousness a human should be able to know his or her existence better than a wild-type human. xviii Which makes no sense: one either knows, or does not know, one’s own existence. At this point one may ask what ‘knowing’ is exactly. If ‘knowing’ can be reduced to brain activity, then all criticism mentioned above applies to my own position, too. It really seems as if one keeps circling around fruitlessly unless one assumes the existence of a non-material mind for every human. This assumption is at the heart of this book. I can see no a priori reason why the assumption of a non-material entity would be nonscientific, or, as most of my opponents love to call it: ‘metaphysical’. Does the assumption —which every physicist has to admit— that all matter obeys some non-material entity, convert physics into metaphysics?1 Branding the assumption of non-material entities as ‘metaphysical’, without testing the theory on its merits, is a profoundly anti-scientific stance; a stance which has been able to survive so long only because of its façade of political correctness. The main goal of this book is to discuss empirical data pleading for the non-material nature of the human mind, and to develop a philosophical model in which these empirical data can be understood properly. When exactly does a set of phenomena point at the existence of a non-material entity? In this book I will show that every phenomenon that can be proved to be irreducible to quantitative laws (those formulated in terms of mathematics) is a pointer towards the existence of a non-material entity. This does not mean that all phenomena which scientists have not yet been able to describe by quantitative models are to be considered as such pointers. Not at all. I consider to be pointers only those phenomena which are known today to be never explained by quantitative laws. The obvious question arises how one can know that some phenomenon will never be understood in terms of quantitative lawfulness. Strange 1 Nobody doubts that in some way the laws of nature have their own existence. Moreover, the physical laws of nature are not matter themselves, since they describe the behaviour of all matter, and they do not describe their own behaviour. Apparently, something exists which is not matter. Hence this ‘thing’ —the law of nature— is by definition non-material. xix enough, such a state of affairs is not only possible theoretically, but it has already been verified in four different sciences: mathematics, physics, biology and ethology. In some peculiar way, these sciences have clashed with inherent limits. This I call the incompleteness of sciences: the existence of a proper problem (i.e., a problem pertaining to that science) which can be proven not to be soluble within that science. The four examples of incompleteness are the subject of the first four chapters, making up the first part of this book. In order to be understandable also for neurologists and philosophers, I wrote these chapters in a handwaving way, and relegated less accessible ingredients to the appendices. Three of the four chapters describe human behaviour that is irreducible to quantitative lawfulness: the mathematical judgement, the intentional judgement, and the claim for rights. The chapter on physics provides a basic ingredient of the philosophical model of the human mind: a view on causality, consistent with both quantum mechanics and common sense. Part II of the book describes a model of the human mind, based on the new view on causality developed in part I. It will be clear by now that I will not present nor criticise any neurological experiments. As long as neurologists do not claim that brain physics conflicts with well-established natural laws (like quantum mechanics or relativity theory) I have no problems in accepting whatever neuro-empirical fact. My problem with many neuro-inspired mind-brain studies is on the meta-neurological level, the level of philosophical interpretation of the empirical data in terms of common-sense concepts like free will, morality, or consciousness. Other empirical data, quite foreign to neurology, already point to the existence of a non-material human mind. If the neurological data are ever to be understood and interpreted in terms of free will, morality, or consciousness, such will be impossible without acknowledging the existence and causal agency of a non-material mind. xx