Download Cradle of Consciousness

Cradle of Consciousness
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Dedicated to
Kurt Gödel
John Bell
William Hamilton
with admiration
for their contribution to bridge the gap
between natural sciences and philosophy
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Contents
Acknowledgements
Preface
Introduction
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Part I: Incompleteness
1. Mathematics
Hilbert, Gödel, Turing
Penrose’s ‘Blatant Reductio ad Absurdum’
Determinism, Procedures, and Algorithms
Matter and Mind
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2. Physics
Pure Chance and Correlation
The Non-Local Nature of Causality
The Non-Temporal Nature of Causality
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3. Biology
The Clockwork of Descartes
Hamilton’s Variation on the Darwinian Theme
Software and Genome: an Analogy
The Empirical Data
Locating Humans in Evolutionary History
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4. Ethology
Nothing Wrong With Machines
Hume’s Inconsistency
The Empirical Data
Moral Characteristics of the Human Mind
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Part II: The Model
5. Causality
Incompleteness in a Nutshell
Physical Causality
Quantum-Hylemorphic Causality
Idealism and Dualism
Aristotle
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6. The Mind
Matter and Mind
Reading and Writing in the Brain
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7. Consciousness
Gradualism on Trial
The Quantum-Hylemorphic Model of Consciousness
Suffering
Free Will
Epilogue
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Appendices
1: Kurt Gödel on the Incompleteness Theorem
2: Roger Penrose on Non-Algorithmic Procedures
3: The Hylemorphic Foundation of Quantum Mechanics
4: Comments on Niels Bohr
5: Polarisation of Light
6: Faster-Than-Light Communication and Retro-Causation
7: Axelrod and Hamilton on The Triumph of Tit for Tat
8: Frans de Waal on Tender Altruism in Harsh Circumstances
9: Patricia Churchland on Self-Representational Upgrades
10: Daniel Wegner on Conscious Will
11: Daniel Dennett on Descartes
12: Ian Glynn on Consciousness
13: Edward Wilson on Free Will
14: Richard Dawkins on Free Will
15: Roger Penrose on Free Will
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References
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Index of Names
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Index of Matters
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Acknowledgements
Among all those who helped me developing and formulating the ideas
presented in this book, I wish to thank especially Anton Schins, Marcel
Lankhuijzen, Antoine Suárez, Rudi te Velde, and Steve Barr.
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Preface
The present book represents a new tendency in philosophy to value the
totality of empirical and scientific data, in contrast to those pertaining to a
single discipline only. Evidently valuing the totality of empirical and
scientific data is not to be mistaken for treating them. Valuing all empirical
data means that, in treating a selection of empirical data, and in searching a
philosophical model to explain these data, one always has to keep in mind
that the resulting model does not conflict overtly with empirical data of
other sciences, or of common sense.
Schins’ effort is aimed at explaining a specific set of empirical data,
which apparently imply the presence of non-material principles in the
evolution of natural processes. The specific set of empirical data is chosen
from the disciplines of mathematics, physics, biology, and ethology. The
interpretation is done in such a way as to respect the obvious requirements
of scientific work.
On speaking about non-material elements, one must obviously care for
a clear definition of one’s terminology. In my view, the author complies
with this requirement by invoking non-material principles when the source
of causality is not a phenomenon itself and when it is impossible to describe
things completely in quantitative terms, i.e., by means of deterministic
mathematical algorithms. In this sense non-material principles appear to be
confirmed by the Gödel-Penrose argument in mathematics, by non-local
and non-temporal quantum experiments in physics, by the capacity of
mastering any finite order of intentionality in biology, and by the personal
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claim of rights in ethology. What makes this book interesting is, in my
view, the fact that the author succeeds in arguing that some aspects of
natural processes can be understood to be essentially irreducible to
deterministic quantitative laws.
As a physicist I am particularly interested in the author’s ideas on
quantum mechanics and on the quantum experiments I have proposed. The
discussion on experiments exhibiting non-local and non-temporal aspects is
already appealing to a large scientific audience and I consider that Schins’
analysis about related cultural and philosophical implications is very
opportune and valuable. Nevertheless, whereas I share Schins’ criticism of
Kant’s notion of causality I disagree with his analysis of Bohr’s attitude. In
fact Bohr’s division between ‘quantum system’ and ‘classical apparatus’
seems to me an important condition of both scientific and metaphysical
thought. I think Schins’ division between material and formal causality
precisely implies Bohr’s division between quantum system and classical
world.
Everything that can be described in terms of a deterministic
mathematical algorithm, is, according to the author’s definition, to be called
matter. This definition provides an excellent basis for a sharp distinction of
matter and mind. The author argues that there exist specific, wellestablished empirical data, which cannot be accounted for unless one
assumes the non-material nature of the human mind. The human mind turns
out to be one non-material principle, an entity able to determine natural
processes without conflicting with the basic physical laws (quantum
mechanics and relativity theory). In this way, the author proves the
existence of the human mind as a non-material entity, source of causality in
natural processes.
Using the insights from the four above-mentioned disciplines, the
author works out a philosophical model, which explains some interesting
features of human consciousness: on one hand its dependence on material
states of the brain (e.g., consciousness disappears during sleep), and on the
other its non-material dimension following from its essential character as an
act of knowledge. The author’s model holds the middle way between a
dualistic model of consciousness, in which there is no reason for
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consciousness to sleep, and a materialistic one, in which it is contradictory
to consider the act of consciousness as an act of knowledge of one’s own
existence. The author argues convincingly that acts of knowledge cannot be
identified with their consequences (like libraries or computer programs),
starting from Roger Penrose’s famous defy of artificial intelligence.
Antoine Suárez
Zürich, April 2003
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Introduction
The longer neurologists peer through their microscopes, the more
convinced they are: none of their brain slices shows even the slightest trace
of consciousness. Until now they were able to localise almost anything in
the brain: areas indicative of quantitative estimation and mathematical
calculation; of happiness and anguish; nay even of moral judgements and
religious feelings. Consciousness, however, seems to be particularly
elusive.
Yet all humans claim to be conscious. They are the only species known
to do so. But is their claim truthful? And if so, are humans the only species
endowed with consciousness? It is interesting to consider whether our close
relatives, the chimpanzees, feel conscious. And whether dogs do, and
plants. And even computers! They might all be conscious beings, but
unable to communicate that to humans. Many scientists are inclined to think
that higher animals feel conscious to some extent. Their arguments are not
very convincing, however. In most cases they do not surpass the ‘logic of
emotion’:
 in countless cases animals show the same reactions to external stimuli as
humans do (think of reactions to wounds or danger);
 humans are conscious;
 whence animals are conscious too.
Several renowned scientists have so far failed to formulate a consistent
research programme. Francis Crick, for example, seems to identify
consciousness with perceptive consciousness, as if there existed no
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consciousness without perception. But why bring in perception at all? One
can be perfectly conscious when lying on bed, eyes closed, and
concentrating on anything but sensorial input. True, never has a conscious
organism been found which is unable of perception. Though neither has a
conscious organism been found which is unable of digestion. Is digestion
therefore essential to consciousness?
Daniel Dennett thinks it is all a question of finding the correct
metaphors: kludges, memes, parallel pandemoniums, multiple drafts, innate
design, predesigned gifts of nature, microhabits of thought, and virtual
machines… such abundant terminology gives the impression that the author
hides scientific poverty under a colourful veil.
After Benjamin Libet’s pioneering work on the timing of conscious
experiences, many philosophers conclude that conscious volitions do not
exist in humans. They consider consciousness as the brain’s response to an
unconscious initiative issued previously from that very brain. No conscious
free will in humans, they claim. The rebuttal of conscious free choice on the
basis of Libet’s experiments is a classical example of a petitio principii:
 assume that conscious free choice —if it exists— must necessarily issue
from the brain;
 define consciousness as one’s awareness of bodily motion;
 and conclude from rather subjective timing experiments —involving
human memory, a very complicated and poorly understood neurological
process— that conscious free choice cannot exist.
If conscious free choices issue from the brain, they must do so according to
the natural laws governing the behaviour of the relevant biological cells. If
the behaviour of those cells is determined by natural law and pure chance,
such a ‘conscious free choice’ is by definition not free. Hence, postulating
that free choice must necessarily issue from the brain is identical to
postulating that free choice cannot exist — which was proposed as a
conclusion drawn from the empirical data! Evidently, the empirical data are
superfluous: one is simply begging the question.
Moreover, in this scenario consciousness is degraded to the role of the
brain’s registering bodily motion. Whatever cells are implied in the process
of registering, it is logically impossible to credit them, on the basis of
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natural law and chance, with ‘conscious registering’. Those cells do
nothing but obeying the laws of nature. The standard interpretation of
Libet’s experiments displaces the problem rather than solving it.
Frans de Waal investigates morality rather than consciousness. His
basic syllogism runs as follows:
 chimpanzees fight, learn, show tenderness, gender-specific behaviour;
 conflicts, learning, tenderness, gender are related to morality in humans;
 hence, chimpanzees are moral beings.
From a formal-logical point of view, this is like asserting that everybody
who feels shaky suffers from Parkinson’s disease.
I realise that it is quite easy to criticise other people’s research efforts.
Let me stress that I do not question their scientific capabilities (all of them
are outstanding scientists, with an impressive curriculum), nor do I question
the scientific value of their research (I agree with all their immediate
conclusions); I only question the very last jump in their logic, when
consciousness, free choice, or morality make their miraculous appearance.
Just like scientists of consciousness do not succeed in defining
consciousness scientifically, without loosing the intuitive meaning of the
word, ethologists do not succeed in defining morality.
My definition of consciousness is simply the knowledge of one’s own
existence. This definition is in line with the intuitive concept of
consciousness. It is the description given literally in the dictionaries.
One either does, or does not, know one’s own existence. It is not
possible to know one’s existence twice or three times better than one’s
neighbour knows his or her own existence. This is the ‘digital property’
(i.e., a property allowing only two mutually exclusive realisations) of
consciousness. It is hardly possible to explain a digital property on the basis
of matter distributions in the brain. If the act of consciousness really issued
from a group of brain cells, then adding some cells to that group, or
enhancing the performance of those cells, should enhance one’s act of
consciousness. With such a modified centre of consciousness a human
should be able to know his or her existence better than a wild-type human.
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Which makes no sense: one either knows, or does not know, one’s own
existence.
At this point one may ask what ‘knowing’ is exactly. If ‘knowing’ can
be reduced to brain activity, then all criticism mentioned above applies to
my own position, too. It really seems as if one keeps circling around
fruitlessly unless one assumes the existence of a non-material mind for
every human. This assumption is at the heart of this book. I can see no a
priori reason why the assumption of a non-material entity would be nonscientific, or, as most of my opponents love to call it: ‘metaphysical’. Does
the assumption —which every physicist has to admit— that all matter obeys
some non-material entity, convert physics into metaphysics?1 Branding the
assumption of non-material entities as ‘metaphysical’, without testing the
theory on its merits, is a profoundly anti-scientific stance; a stance which
has been able to survive so long only because of its façade of political
correctness.
The main goal of this book is to discuss empirical data pleading for the
non-material nature of the human mind, and to develop a philosophical
model in which these empirical data can be understood properly. When
exactly does a set of phenomena point at the existence of a non-material
entity? In this book I will show that every phenomenon that can be proved
to be irreducible to quantitative laws (those formulated in terms of
mathematics) is a pointer towards the existence of a non-material entity.
This does not mean that all phenomena which scientists have not yet been
able to describe by quantitative models are to be considered as such
pointers. Not at all. I consider to be pointers only those phenomena which
are known today to be never explained by quantitative laws.
The obvious question arises how one can know that some phenomenon
will never be understood in terms of quantitative lawfulness. Strange
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Nobody doubts that in some way the laws of nature have their own existence.
Moreover, the physical laws of nature are not matter themselves, since they
describe the behaviour of all matter, and they do not describe their own
behaviour. Apparently, something exists which is not matter. Hence this ‘thing’
—the law of nature— is by definition non-material.
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enough, such a state of affairs is not only possible theoretically, but it has
already been verified in four different sciences: mathematics, physics,
biology and ethology. In some peculiar way, these sciences have clashed
with inherent limits. This I call the incompleteness of sciences: the
existence of a proper problem (i.e., a problem pertaining to that science)
which can be proven not to be soluble within that science.
The four examples of incompleteness are the subject of the first four
chapters, making up the first part of this book. In order to be understandable
also for neurologists and philosophers, I wrote these chapters in a handwaving way, and relegated less accessible ingredients to the appendices.
Three of the four chapters describe human behaviour that is irreducible to
quantitative lawfulness: the mathematical judgement, the intentional
judgement, and the claim for rights. The chapter on physics provides a basic
ingredient of the philosophical model of the human mind: a view on
causality, consistent with both quantum mechanics and common sense.
Part II of the book describes a model of the human mind, based on the
new view on causality developed in part I.
It will be clear by now that I will not present nor criticise any
neurological experiments. As long as neurologists do not claim that brain
physics conflicts with well-established natural laws (like quantum
mechanics or relativity theory) I have no problems in accepting whatever
neuro-empirical fact. My problem with many neuro-inspired mind-brain
studies is on the meta-neurological level, the level of philosophical
interpretation of the empirical data in terms of common-sense concepts like
free will, morality, or consciousness. Other empirical data, quite foreign to
neurology, already point to the existence of a non-material human mind. If
the neurological data are ever to be understood and interpreted in terms of
free will, morality, or consciousness, such will be impossible without
acknowledging the existence and causal agency of a non-material mind.
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