Download Contradiction, Reasoning, and Misogyny in Democritus` Ethics

Jonathon Orsi
995675835
PHL301H
Prof. Waterfall
November 29, 2011
Contradiction, Reasoning, and Misogyny in Democritus’ Ethics
The 309 fragments found in Freeman’s translation of Fragmente Der Vorsokratiker on
Democritus give insight to one of philosophy's first ethical theories. From Democritus' ethical
theory we find the soul as master over the body, cheerfulness as a property of the soul, and
wisdom as a way for the soul to achieve cheerfulness. Attempts have been made to link
Democritus’ ethical theory with his own physical theory, though he never explicitly states this is
so and there is little evidence within the fragments to support this connection. For this reason,
Democritus’ ethical theory should be assessed on its own, and when it is, the theory suffers from
contradictions, lack of reasoning, and questionable ethical views.
The most significant aspect of Democritus’ ethics is the authority of the soul over the
body and its responsibility in caring for both it's own and the body's health and wellbeing(Freeman 109). He compares the soul to divinity, though this shouldn't be misunderstood as
the soul being a god(99). More likely, Democritus thinks that health, happiness, and success,
things which were normally associated with the gods of the time, are all things within the soul
already and are completely within the ability of the soul or mind to achieve(107, 111-112). The
lack of these things, or being in a state of anxiety or illness, are the result of an individual either
not caring for his soul or preferring the pleasures of the body instead(108, 112-113).
Cheerfulness, then, is the best state of the soul, as it maximizes the benefits of pleasure
and minimizes the effects of pain(109). But cheerfulness should not be considered as merely
being happy or light-hearted. For Democritus, cheerfulness is more accurately seen as a constant
state of equilibrium in which an individual can easily endure pain and derive the most pleasure
from things without swinging between excesses or deficiencies(109-112). Pleasure and pain are
only indicators to each individual of what is advantageous or disadvantageous to achieving a
constant state of cheerfulness(101, 109), and any pleasure in too great a quantity can quickly
become painful(112). An individual can become better at discerning which pleasures and in what
amounts are beneficial through wisdom(99, 101).
In order to gain wisdom one must learn, understand, and avoid learning anything by
chance or misfortune(100, 108, 110). The best way to achieve this is to study nature and its
causes since nature is inherently self-sufficient and reliable(110-111). On the other hand, a fool
learns through chance and misfortune(100, 108). The meaning of these two statements may not
be apparent at first, but an example may bring out the difference. First, let’s consider what can be
learned by a conceivable random event. An individual who, by chance, is hit by a the car will
likely learn to look both ways before he crosses a street ever again. Most would consider this to
be a great piece of knowledge learned. Yet, if one learned from nature they would know already
to look both ways before crossing, and would have thus avoided the incident in the first place. If
one studies nature, it would be quite apparent that any moving object enacts a force on another
when it comes into contact with it. Thus, the wise person would see a street filled with many
large, fast moving cars and know to avoid them, for fear of being the victim of their force. This
would then lead the wise person to look both ways before crossing the street and thus avoid the
incident in the first place. Through this kind of learning, then, an individual transforms
themselves by gaining wisdom and is less prone to suffering misfortunes like the fool, thus
making them become more cheerful(99).
But what justification does Democritus give for his ethical theory? There are many
criticisms that can be made about the basis for most of his claims, and when properly analyzed,
it’s difficult to find any justification at all. First, there is not enough support to connect
Democritus' ethical theory to his atomic theory. If it cannot be connected to any physical model
then it has no justification to support any claims and there inherent discrepancies between certain
fragments. And finally, the ethical views of Democritus are not even suitable to learn from.
It has been argued that Democritus’ ethical theory can be grounded in his atomic theory,
but this cannot be the case. Gregory Vlastos attempts this through Democritus’ claim that the
soul moves the body, arguing that the ethics changes the movement of the soul's atomic cluster.
Unfortunately, the fragments that can be reasonably argued in favour of this view are rather slim
in comparison to the entire collection of fragments containing Democritus' ethical views. Of the
nearly 300 fragments in Freeman pertaining to Democritus' ethics, only a few dozen can be
argued in relation to the physical theory by Vlastos, a fact which he admits at the beginning of
his essay Ethics and Physics in Democritus. Furthermore, the meaning of Democritus’ words
have to be stretched quite a bit in order to reasonably believe they do have a relationship to the
atomic theory. In the case of fragment 191, Vlastos argues that the statement, “souls which are
stirred by great divergences are neither stable nor cheerful,” can be interpreted as the stirring of
atoms in the soul. Although it is convenient that the verb ‘to stir’ can be used in such a physical
sense of ‘stirring atoms‘, it is more likely that it is used colloquially as a substitute for the soul
being ‘disturbed‘ by great divergences. Democritus never makes it explicit that his ethical theory
is based off his physical system, so we shouldn’t read into the language he uses. Considering
this, and the small portion of fragments that Vlastos can even interpret in favour of this, the
ethical theory is more appropriately viewed on its own.
When assessed on its own though, Democritus’ ethical theory contains statements which
provide little reasoning for their validity. Examples of these kinds of statements are from
fragment 194, "the great pleasures come from the contemplation of noble works,” and "he who
contradicts and chatters much is ill-fitted for learning"(102, 110). In fact, there are a great
number of fragments which share the same fault as these. For what reasons are these statements
supposed to be accepted as true? They can’t simply be stated and accepted as true without proper
justification. Although we could assume that some of these statements are merely shadows of
well-thought out and reasoned arguments that may have been lost, these fragments are the only
evidence we have and thus we should not make that assumption.
There are also fragments which give different accounts of the same topics, which changes
how we should understand the theory. On the topic of wisdom, fragment 59 says, "neither skill
nor wisdom is attainable unless one learns," yet we read in 183 that "it is not time that teaches
wisdom, but early training and natural endowment." Fragment 183 makes wisdom much more
difficult for an individual to achieve, for they must be fortunate enough to have a natural ability
to learn it, and even more fortunate to be given an early education. If 183 is true, then 59 is too
general and does not provide any substantial advice, as it is not the case that wisdom is achieved
through learning, but rather as a result of circumstances that one has little or no control over.
And since wisdom is such an important part in leading a person to cheerfulness, fragment 183
makes cheerfulness almost entirely out of control of an individual to achieve.
Another case is between fragments 80 and 252, which contradict each other on the topic
of conducting affairs. In 80, it is stated that neglecting one's own affairs by being preoccupied
with another's is shameful, yet in 252 it is of the highest importance to put the affairs of the state
first. If 80 is true, then one couldn’t put the affairs of the state as their first priority. The vast size
of the affairs of any state, which would not be their own affairs, and would include warfare,
trade, immigration, budgeting, infrastructure maintenance, and many others, means an individual
would necessarily need to neglect some portion of it in order not to neglect their own affairs.
Thus, if an individual neglects any portion of the state affairs in order to completely take care of
their own, then the affairs of the state would no longer be their first priority and their own affairs
would be. And conversely, if an individual attempts to put the affairs of the state first and
conduct them sufficiently enough not to neglect any aspect of it, it would be hardly imaginable
that one could still conduct their own affairs and satisfy fragment 80.
Lastly, the credibility of Democritus himself is skeptical when there are obvious cases of
misogyny within the fragments. In fragment 111, Democritus says that it is a disgrace "to be
ruled by a woman," which assumes the inferiority of women. Even though it may have been a
common view in the ancient world for women to be inferior to men, it would seem absurd for
one to think so today. In fragments 110 and 273 he also states that women should not learn how
to argue and are far more prone to think about evil things. Is he suggesting that women not be
educated? If we are to take his ethical theory seriously, and with it the proper way to conduct
oneself and achieve cheerfulness, would this mean that men must be misogynistic? And if this is
so, do women have to accept themselves as being inferior in order to achieve cheerfulness, or do
they not even have the ability to do so? It is very hard for a modern thinker to begin to consider
sexism as a proper ethical choice, and so we must question Democritus' authority for giving an
ethical theory.
After considering the criticisms against Democritus’ ethical theory, it seems like one
should not study it to learn how to be a better person. It has no physical or metaphysical
foundation, contradicts itself, and contains an ethical view that suggests that a cheerful man must
think women are inferior. As the first considerable ethical theory produced, it is important not to
understand it as a way to conduct ourselves, but as a learning tool to analyze, criticize, and
compare with our own views about ethics.
Works Cited
Allen & Furley, ed. Studies in Presocratic Philosophy, Vol. II. London, Routledge & Kegan
Paul, 1975.
Freeman, Kathleen, and Hermann Diels. "Democritus Of Abdera." Ancilla to the PreSocratic Philosophers: a Complete Translation of the Fragment in Diels, Fragmente Der
Vorsokratiker. Oxford: Alden, 1948. 91-120. Print.