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Is the United States Responsible for the Rise of the Khmer Rouge?
Rebecca Chee
Mr. Cotey
IDP-4U1: Honours Thesis
May 30, 2007
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The Khmer Rouge came into power in 1975 after a five year civil war in
Cambodia, known to the locals as Kampuchea.1 The end of the civil war marked the end
of the Lon Nol regime and the beginning of Pol Pot’s communist reign, remembered for
its infamous killing fields. Upon coming into power, the Khmer Rouge evacuated all of
the major cities, claiming that the Americans were going to bomb the city – a realistic
threat at the time. The Khmer Rouge then tried to return Cambodia to its roots, purging
the country of anything un-Khmer, and the first thing to go was capitalism. Anyone with
a link to capitalism or the foreigners was executed. Forced to work on farms attempting
to meet impossible quotas, many Cambodians died of starvation and exhaustion.
Furthermore, the punishment for not reaching their quota was steep. As a result, many
citizens were killed, which increased the amount of work for those who survived. Should
anyone be found eating more than what was allocated to them, including grass, they
would be severely punished. Others were tortured and subsequently killed, for reasons
ranging from wearing glasses, “confessing” to their “sins,” or living their previous
capitalist life-style. Over the four years that they were in power, the Khmer Rouge
managed to massacre 2 million Cambodians.2
Yet, the Khmer Rouge must have come into power for this to happen; and they
did, through a long and arduous process. It involved overcoming the persecution that
Prince Sihanouk and French colonial rule put into place as well as the social stigma
attached to being a communist. Many of communists were ostracised from society as a
1
Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress,
1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/20.htm
2
Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress,
1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/20.htm
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result of their beliefs. Furthermore, the Khmer Rouge had to go underground, especially
after the Battambang revolts, greatly limiting the effect it could have in Cambodian
politics. . Hindered by persecution and having limited political power, the Khmer Rouge
could have only come into power with the aid of another power, the United States of
America. The rise of the Khmer Rouge was a direct result of the American bombings and
incursions of Cambodia starting in 1969 the unofficial American support for the Khmer
Serei, and American support for the Lon Nol government.
It is often argued that the Khmer Rouge simply exploited the existing tension
between the peasants and the elite, thus enabling them to recruit the masses. Prior to
attaining power, class tensions already existed. In fact, the “economic position of the
Cambodian peasantry and the urban elite had been deteriorating for at least two decades
before the civil war.”3 This was largely due to an increase in the population after the First
World War, and a decrease in arable land. For an agrarian society, this was fatal.4 The
amount of arable land could not keep up with the rising population. By 1955, the amount
of arable land began to decrease, resulting in a shortage of food. This was demonstrated
by a 22% rise in the population from 1958-1966 accompanied by a 16% rise in rice
production. Simple economics dictates that due to supply and demand the price of rice
will rise. It did, by 350% during the same time period. 5 As a result, the peasants were
unhappy due to their economic state.
3
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 12.
4
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 14-16.
5
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 17-18.
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This lethal combination of more people and less land resulted in each Khmer
owning less and less until many were forced off their land altogether. The newly evicted
Khmers were then forced to become vagrants or tenants. Since each family needed more
than one hectare of land to live comfortably, many Khmers were forced to rent land and
take loans. Therefore, there was a greater class division as the rich exploited the poor,6
“[creating] a class of rootless, destitute rural dwellers with very few ties to the
land…such a class would have nothing to lose in a revolution.”7
In addition to creating class tension, this economic crisis created racial tensions.
Since many of the landowners were Vietnamese and the moneylenders were
predominantly Chinese,8 this led to racial tension as many Khmers identified the root of
their problems with the races in power. This resulted in an “underground reservoir of
social tension scarcely visible to some perceptive Cambodian elites, much less foreign
observers.”9 In 1952, 75% of Cambodian farmers were seriously in debt; by 1964 this
number had risen to 80%, of which 60% had not repaid debts from previous years.10 The
reason that so many of these farmers had debts from previous years was because the
Chinese moneylenders charged an exorbitant annual interest of one hundred to two
hundred percent.11
6
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 14-16.
7
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 15.
8
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 16.
9
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 17.
10
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 16.
11
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 16.
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During this time period, Cambodians were said to be successful if they simply
maintained their standard of living. This was due to the economic crises as most
Cambodians suffered a significant decline in their standard of living. On a positive note
however, it is somewhat comforting that Cambodians suffered as a whole, rich and poor
alike.12 As Cambodians “[became] increasingly disaffected with their economic situation,
particularly in those regions where landlordism and usury were blatantly exploitative…
[they] were increasingly susceptible to the appeal of the forces on the left, who promised
an end to the abuses of the rich”13 The economic crises only sparked other crises, causing
a chain reaction which arguably created several tensions within Cambodia. The Khmer
Rouge promised an end to the exploitation of the peasants, and used this tension to fuel
hatred of the United States, and to start the civil war that would ultimately end with Pol
Pot and his regime.
Although tension existed prior to the illegal American bombings and incursions of
Cambodia, it was not responsible for the outbreak of civil war that occurred. The Nixon
administration clearly did not consider their options when deciding to bomb and invade
Cambodia in order to get rid of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries there. The decision to
bomb Cambodia was made in roughly four and a half days, from April 21to April 26,
1970.14 Nixon did not even consult his Secretaries of State and Defense regarding this
12
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 19-20.
13
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 64.
14
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 89.
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decision. Instead, he informed them on the 28th of April, two days after Americans had
attacked South Vietnamese bases in Cambodia.15
Considering the decision was so rushed, it is probable that Nixon did not fully
think through the consequences of his actions. As well, Nixon did not even consult his
Secretaries of State and Defense, deciding to make the decisions on his own. Nixon also
went to the Pentagon and told them to take out all of the North Vietnamese sanctuaries in
Cambodia, and to “make whatever plans are necessary.”16 These bombings encouraged
Cambodians to join the Khmer Rouge as they “killed innocent civilians and angered the
survivors, leading them to overtly or covertly join the Khmer Rouge, which then came in
power, in April 1975.”17 Undeniably, the U.S.A. did not wish for this to occur as it only
strengthened the communist presence in the Indochina region.
In addition to bombing Cambodia, the U.S.A. illegally invaded them with the help
of the South Vietnamese Army of the Republic of Vietnam (ARVN). This was done in
late April 1970 “without concern for Cambodian sovereignty.”18 The reason that this
attack was launched was in order to “eliminate communist headquarters.”19 This resulted
in the uprooting of nearly half of the Cambodian population, causing many of them to
become refugees. The U.S.A. ground troops stayed until the end of June of that year, with
the ARVN staying for more than one and a half years before being driven out by the
communists.
15
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 99.
16
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 90.
17
Sok Ry, Sum. “A Question of Fairness.” Phnom Penh Post. December 5, 2002. April 20, 2007.
www.phnompenhpost.com.
18
Sok Ry, Sum. “A Question of Fairness.” Phnom Penh Post. December 5, 2002. April 20, 2007.
www.phnompenhpost.com.
19
Sok Ry, Sum. “A Question of Fairness.” Phnom Penh Post. December 5, 2002. April 20, 2007.
www.phnompenhpost.com.
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One of the most important military operations into Cambodia is the Toan Thang
43 Operation which began in May 1970.20 This was a combined U.S.A.-ARVN operation
involving units of the U.S.A. First Calvary Division, Eleventh Armored Calvary and the
ARVN Airborne division. The purpose of this military operation was to find and destroy
the Central Office for South Vietnam (COSVN), or “the city,” as it was commonly
referred to by the Americans. The COSVN was the communist headquarters, located in
Cambodia. When “the city” was found the American troops went in and destroyed all that
they found – eighteen permanent structures, forty tonnes of food, thirty tonnes of
miscellaneous high explosives, three hundred five vehicles, and one hundred eighty two
weapon caches.21 These weapon caches consisted of 1, 282 individual weapons, 202 crew
served weapons and 2.5 million rounds of ammunition. 22 They also found that enemy
resistance was very light, and mainly diversionary. U.S.A. intelligence later reported that
the majority of the vehicles had left before the attack began, along with supplies. 23 The
supplies were “used to expand the small RAK [Revolutionary Army of Kampuchea] into
Cambodia’s new fighting force, the People’s National Liberation Armed Forces of
Kampuchea [PFLANK].”24
In addition to indirectly arming, and shaping Cambodia’s new rebel group, the
U.S.A. – ARVN incursion “gave the enemy ample opportunity [to seek] refuge deeper
20
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 91.
21
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 91.
22
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 91.
23
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 91.
24
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 92.
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inside Cambodia.”25 This was because the incursion did not focus on surrounding the
communists, but instead consisted of only frontal attacks. This meant the communists had
nowhere to go but further into Cambodia. Since the communists were now so far into
Cambodia they decided to transfer their operational centers to the Cambodian town of
Kratie. Cleared of all civilians, Kratie became the new communist headquarters to deal
specifically with American aggressiveness.26 Setting up a headquarters to deal with
American aggressiveness was a smart move on the communists’ part as it brought to light
the tension that the U.S.A. was causing. This tension resulted in “an increase in the
number of communist troops in the sanctuaries, an increase…motivated by the cleaning
up operation of the U.S.A. – Saigon forces.”27 However, Nixon and Kissinger counted
this incursion as a success. Yet American involvement did not end there.
They decided to start another bombing program known as Menu. On March 17
1969, General Creighton Abrams, Commander of U.S.A. forces in South Vietnam
received orders to fly forty-eight sorties, or missions, into Cambodia When the press
questioned these attacks later, Abrams claimed ignorance, and assured them that the
matter would be looked in to. 28 This was the first of the Menu program, known as
Breakfast. That night, Cambodia suffered from sixty strings of bombs.29 During the next
14 months, 3 630 B-52 raids were flown into Cambodia. “Breakfast was followed by
‘Lunch’, Lunch by ‘Snack’, Snack by ‘Dinner’, Dinner by ‘Dessert’, Dessert by ‘Supper’,
25
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 90.
26
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 91.
27
Ben, Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 18.
28
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 22.
29
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 23.
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as the program expanded to cover one sanctuary after another.”30 These bombings were
later exposed to the American public four years later in 1973. 31
In an attempt to defend themselves, Nixon and Kissinger declared that “secrecy
was necessary to protect Sihanouk who was variously described as ‘acquiescing in,
approving, allowing’ or even ‘encouraging’ raids, so long as they were covert.”32 They
also asserted that the bombed areas were unpopulated. Nothing could be farther from the
truth. Cambodia, under the rule of Sihanouk, filed one hundred nine protests with the
United Nations over the U.S.A. violating their territory and airspace. Unfortunately, their
cries fell on deaf ears.33 Clearly, Sihanouk was not in favour of the raids or bombings.
Furthermore “the assertion that no Cambodians lived in these areas not only was untrue,
but was known to be untrue at the time…The White House was to ignore this
reservation.”34 In total, during the menu operation, 4 247 Cambodians were living in the
Sanctuaries bombed, of these 4 247, 3 457 were peasants. In addition, fifteen towns were
located in these sanctuaries. Obviously the sanctuaries the Americans were bombing were
not unpopulated. Evidently, Nixon and Kissinger knowingly infringed on Cambodia’s
sovereignty and killed thousands of innocent civilians, and later denied it.
These bombings were directly responsible for the recruitment of peasants by the
Khmer Rouge who “used the bombing’s devastation and massacre of civilians as
recruitment propaganda and as an excuse for its brutal, radical policies.”35 The ‘aerial
bombardments against the villagers…caused civilian loss on a large scale and the peasant
30
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 28.
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 28.
32
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 28.
33
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 98.
34
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 28.
35
Ben, Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 19.
31
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survivors of the U.S. bombings were turning to the CPK [Communist Party of
Kampuchea] for support.”36 Survivors of the bombings were angry and more than willing
to join with anyone who was against the Americans. Pol Pot and his communists were
more than willing to comfort the peasants and while doing so, fed them a bit of
propaganda, bringing them over to the communist side. In fact, “it was because of the
bombing that [the peasants] kept on cooperating with the Khmer Rouge, joining up with
the Khmer Rouge, sending their children to go with them…”37 If the U.S.A. had not
bombed nor invaded Cambodia, the Khmer Rouge would not have had any propaganda
that could so easily convince the masses of the horrors of capitalism, represented by the
U.S.A.. As with World War II, propaganda was a major proponent for recruiting the
masses of Cambodians for their regime. Without their propaganda, the Khmer Rouge
would not have been able to further the tension caused by the U.S.A. and in turn recruit
the masses, enabling them to win the civil war in 1975. This would mark the beginning of
the Pol Pot regime and the horrors that followed. Therefore, the Americans played a huge
role in aiding the Khmer Rouge recruitment, while ironically trying to suppress them,
through their incursions and bombings.
Prince Sihanouk, the leader of Cambodia before the Lon Nol regime, is often
blamed for the rise of the Khmer Rouge. After all, if he was a competent leader, he would
have been able to prevent the Khmer Rouge from gaining any influence. Ultimately,
Sihanouk was “vain, a petulant showman who enjoyed boasting of his sexual successes.
He would not tolerate criticism or dissent and he treated his aids as flunkies...[and]
36
37
Ben, Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 20.
Ben, Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 23.
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everyone feared his temper.”38 Clearly, running his country was not Sihanouk’s first
priority. Furthermore, Sihanouk was unable to connect with his people, despite attempts
to tour the countryside, he alienated the masses. The only indication that he gave of being
a competent leader was his practice of extreme neutrality in an attempt to keep his
country out of the hands of communists and the Vietnam War. As a result, Sihanouk was
always suppressing the communists, such as having them stripped, walked through the
streets and photographed, and accepting American aid.39 By doing this, his control over
domestic politics diminished.
When the Americans arrived, they brought with them new demands. This resulted
in the creation of a new servant class including waiters, mechanics, clerks, drivers and
prostitutes. In addition, resorts and American commodities became commonplace as the
Cambodian population began to cater to the American expatriate community. 40 To
Cambodia’s middle class, American power and aid was equivalent with the hope of
economic and social progress. When Sihanouk broke all ties with the United States, the
economic and social results were devastating.
In 1966, Sihanouk forced peasants off their land in the Battambang province of
Cambodia without adequate compensation. This was done in order to build a sugar
refinery to make up for the domestic and international trade Cambodia lost after it
stopped all trade with the U.S.A.. In addition, Sihanouk’s soldiers used aggressive tactics
38
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 46.
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 67.
40
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 58.
39
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in order to collect taxes, further angering the peasants. As a result, in January 1967, the
peasants of Battambang province revolted.41
The peasants managed to take the whole region, and steal various arms near
Samlaut before running to the jungle for cover. Prime Minister Lon Nol was acting as
Head of State as Sihanouk was in Paris. When Sihanouk returned in March, he took
control of the situation, putting himself at the top of the food chain. However, in typical
Sihanouk style, he only made the situation worse, and using Lon Nol as a scapegoat,
forced his resignation. Unfortunately, Sihanouk needed more scapegoats and the
communists were an easy, desirable choice. As Sihanouk blamed the Khmer Rouge, the
leaders went underground, often fleeing to the maquis, guerrilla bands dedicated to
resisting the French. The masses believed they had been assassinated.42
On May 2, 1967, a demonstration of 1500 people protested the assumed
assassinations in Phnom Penh. The following day, Sihanouk was, understandably,
unhappy. He decided to develop a better plan working with loyal peasants. These loyal
peasants would be able to identify the rebellious and disloyal peasants, so that the
soldiers could take care of them. This resulted in 10 000 dead, and Sihanouk declared his
new plan a success. Eager to claim all the credit he could, Sihanouk even went as far to
say that he restored order and peace, pointedly ignoring the fact that the riots had spread
to six other provinces: Pursat, Kompong Chhang, Kompong Cham, Kompong Than,
Kompong Speu and Kampot.43
41
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
42
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
43
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
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The riots had many effects on Cambodia, but the most prominent affects were the
radicalization of peasants and driving the Khmer Rouge underground. The first is that the
riots managed to radicalize peasants. 44 These peasants were now unhappy with
Sihanouk’s government as his policies were now affecting them in a negative way. This
made them more susceptible to communist propaganda. The riots also drove the Khmer
Rouge’s leadership underground, as they realized that there was no hope of political gain
through conventional means.45 Although on the surface this seemed to be a success on
Sihanouk’s part, it was, in reality a curse. Before driving them underground, the
Cambodian government could track the communist leaders and their movements, but
with the ensuing riots, the task became much harder to do. These riots instigated “an
accelerating contest between the left and the right of Cambodian politics, and in this
contest Sihanouk increasingly [appeared] an onlooker rather than a participant.”46
Evidently, Sihanouk was losing control of the government he was supposed to be
heading. Yet, the cause for these riots can be found in the deportation of the Americans
and shut down of their embassy as they were causing civil unrest and aiding the
government in exile.47
Civil unrest came about as a result of the American’s Daniel Boone Operations,
which supported the Khmer Serei, the government in exile. With the launch of the
Daniel Boone Operations, the Khmer Rouge was able to easily recruit the masses. The
Daniel Boone Operation was previously known as Operation Salem House which ran
44
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
45
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
46
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
47
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 18.
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from 1967 to 1968, before changing their name in December 1968.48 During this time
period, Operation Salem House ran eight hundred missions into the neutral country
Cambodia, including one where they “blew up a Cambodian civilian bus, causing heavy
casualties.”49 Once the operation changed its name in December 1968 to Daniel Boone,
the number of missions doubled. By March 18, 1970, the number of missions had
reached 1 835 with twenty four prisoners taken and mines laid thirty kilometres in from
the Cambodian border.50 The whole operation was run by Americans, all of them
volunteers.
These Americans would disguise themselves in black pajamas, so as to better
blend in with the night, and carry AK-47s, the standard revolutionary gun at the time.
They would work together with the Vietnamese; however the Americans, being heavier,
fell faster than the Vietnamese. This meant the Americans were easier to track. Once the
Americans soldiers landed, the team spent more time evading the enemy and calling for
helicopters to rescue them than they did fulfilling the objectives. However, illegally
violating Cambodia’s neutrality did not seem to bother the Americans, in fact it only
increased their anger. They could clearly see evidence of communist activity in
Cambodia, yet the Americans were powerless, unable to do anything but watch and await
orders. When they heard about the illegal bombing program Menu, they were elated.51
On March 18, 1970, Major Michael Eiland, the Daniel Boone Operation Officer
informed his troops of the Menu bombing program. The troops were pleased that
something had been done about the communist sanctuaries in Cambodia. When the
48
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 18.
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 18.
50
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 18.
51
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 25.
49
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Daniel Boone men were sent in as a reconnaissance team to “pick up any communists,”52
they were told by Eiland that the “carpet bombing attacks by B-52s [were] totally
devastating...[That] if there was anybody still alive out there, they would be so stunned
that all [we would] have to do [was] walk over and lead him by the arm to the
helicopter.”53 Unfortunately this was not true. The communists were so angry that they
shot and threw grenades at the troops. They managed to inflict enough damage so that not
all of the troops were able to make it back to base. As a result, the Daniel Boone men
refused to complete any more missions involving gathering “stunned” Vietnamese. The
army had three of them arrested, and tried to court-martial them. However, “[they could
not] be court-martialled for refusing to violate the neutrality of Cambodia.”54
The civil unrest that this mission caused was extraordinary. Instead of putting an
end to communism, the Americans were the perpetrators of bombing, killing, and
maiming many Cambodians, communist or not. Although many of their missions were
abandoned, the intent was still there and regardless, one man walking around with an
AK-47 is enough to cause civil unrest. A team of Americans, all fully trained, falling
from the sky with AK-47s, would have been enough to traumatize the peasants. Without
a doubt, the Daniel Boone Operation, formerly known as Operation Salem house caused
civil unrest. The operation added “fuel to the fire” and only aided the Khmer Rouge’s
propaganda campaign to win the support of the peasants.
In addition to causing civil unrest, the Americans also recruited mercenaries
though the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) and Special Forces. Many of these were
mountain tribes found in the Mekong Delta, or members of the Khmer Serei, the
52
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 25.
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 25.
54
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 26.
53
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government in exile. These recruits would be formed into Civilian Irregular Defense
Groups (CIDGs), trained to defend their villages, or in the Khmer Serei’s case, trained by
the Americans. These groups would then be able to defend themselves in case of a
communist attack on their villages. Although the Americans often try to deny their
connections with the Khmer Serei, their excuses fall flat since San Ngoc Thanh, the
leader of the Khmer Serei, was often flown to inspect the CIDG camps in a U.S.A.
chopper.55
In addition, another operation, Operation Cherry, was set up by the CIA to work
exclusively with the Khmer Serei. The CIA would train them and then send them into
Cambodia with the sole purpose of creating civil unrest and making it look like it had
been Sihanouk’s army at work. They had also tried to assassinate Sihanouk three times,
and failed.56 Once Sihanouk found out about how the Americans were supporting the
government in exile and causing civil unrest in his country, all the while pretending to
support him in his battle against the communists, he had no choice but to deport them.
This led to the Battambang riots which ultimately led to another Khmer Rouge
propaganda success.57 The Khmer Rouge was able to capitalize on the American support
for the Khmer Serei, the failure of the the Daniel Boone operations, and the growing civil
unrest in the country, all of which were used as propaganda to recruit the masses.
As Cambodia was a French protectorate from 1863 to 1954, the country employed
France’s education system. It was through French Colonial rule that the leaders of the
Khmer Rouge were able to go to France on government scholarships where they were
55
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 65.
“Rouge CIA Operation Cherry.” Golden Coast Publishing. March 25, 2004. April 20, 2007.
http://www.geocities.com/larryjodaniel/17.html.
57
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 70.
56
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exposed to communism. For this reason, France could be blamed for their part in
educating the communists. When the French presence was established in Cambodia in
1863, Cambodia shared an integrated economy with Vietnam and Thailand.58 France
benefited from this immensely as they were able to tax the various exports such as
rubber, silk, tobacco, lumber and cotton. They also generously put into place the France
education system as a means to educate Cambodians, along with government
scholarships.59
Pol Pot, was one of the many bright students who received a government
scholarship to study in France Once there, they were exposed to the ideas behind
communism, the French Revolution, and the writings of Rousseau. Pol Pot particularly
enjoyed Stalin and his work the History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union,
Mao, and political journals such as Humanité and Les Cahiers de Communisme Pol Pot
and his peers had never heard such revolutionary ideas, but once introduced, they actively
began seeking out opportunities to learn more about communism and how they could
help the movement that was sweeping the world.
In 1950, Pol Pot and his friends volunteered to go and work in a “labour
battalion” in Communist Yugoslavia. While there, they had an amazing time and were all
impressed by the national unity expressed, in addition to the strength of the people and
the multiple successes Yugoslavia was experiencing.60 This experience was crucial for
58
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 13.
59
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 17.
60
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 28-29.
Chee 17
Pol Pot as he joined the French Communist Party in 1952.61 Once he was part of the
French Communist Party, Pol Pot met with other Cambodian communists to discuss
important communist works such as Stalin’s The National Question, Lenin’s On
Imperialism and Marx’s Das Kapital.62 These works were essential to the formation of
Pol Pot and his peer’s ideas, leading Pol Pot to want to abolish the monarchy with
revolution like “Robespierre and Danton, Stalin and Lenin and Sun Yat Se.”63 These
educational years were responsible for Pol Pot’s ideas, and once he returned to
Cambodia, he joined the Indochina Communist Party, which was mainly dominated by
the Vietnamese.64 This meant that he was able to continue taking part in the Communist
scene. Pol Pot “never abandoned communism or regretted his decision. Instead, he made
a life-long commitment to the cause.”65 However there was another person who was
notably impacted by the French Education system.
Thiounn Mumm was responsible for bringing Pol Pot to the French Communist
Party, a year after he himself had joined in 1951.66 Mumm was responsible for leading
the majority of the Cambodians to communism as he was the first to join the party and
influenced Pol Pot and his peers. It was also Mumm, who in August 1951, led a group of
more than ten Cambodians to East Berlin for the International Youth Congress. This
event was “sponsored by the Soviet Union and attended by more than 100 000 delegates
61 David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 26.
62
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 33.
63
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 38.
64
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 26.
65
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 27.
66
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 27.
Chee 18
from around the world.”67 Here they discovered the Khmer Communist Resistance and
the Khmer People’s Revolutionary parties. Very excited, the group returned to Paris with
a Cambodian communist flag and propaganda. Upon their return they quickly spread the
literature around, as well as stories of their experiences.68 Seeing 100 000 other
communist delegates representing their own respective parties would undoubtedly have a
profound impact on Mumm and his party. The realization of the worldwide breadth of the
communist movement served to reinforce Mumm and his party’s resolve, and through
their influence, Pol Pot became convinced that Cambodia was in need of a revolution.
The leaders of the Khmer Rouge formed their opinions in Paris, where they were
all part of the Khmer Students Association (KSA) which is how they met up. Pol Pot
graduated from l`École Française de Radioélectricité with a degree in Radio electronics.
Ieng Sary, also known as Brother Number Two graduated with a Bachelor of Arts (B.A.)
in Commerce and Politics from l`Institut d'Etudes Politiques. Ieng Sary was sent to
Cambodia by the Cambodian Ministry of Education for, ironically, taking part in a strike
against the French officials. Khieu Samphan, known as Met Hem graduated with a
Philosophiae Doctor (Ph.D) in Economics and Politics, while Son Sen graduated with a
B.A in Letters and Education, both studied and obtained their degrees at the University of
Paris. Hou Yuon graduated with a Ph.D in Economics and Law and Hu Nim, known as
Met Phoas, graduated with his Ph.D in Law, also from the University of Paris. All of
them were given government scholarships.69
67
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 34.
68
David P, Chandler. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United States of
America: Westview Press, 1999) 35.
69
Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress,
1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/20.htm
Chee 19
It was through their scholarships and education in France that all the key leaders
of the Khmer Rouge were able to gain exposure to communism, and actively participate
in conferences, labour camps and discussions. During these crucial years where a person
forms their own opinions, the leaders of the Khmer Rouge became communist. This
would undeniably affect their thoughts and therefore their future polices resulting in the
reign known for their Killing Fields.
On March 17, 1970, Lon Nol, with American support, staged a coup,
overthrowing Prince Sihanouk. He then became an American puppet, allowing the
Khmer Rouge to truthfully declare that the Lon Nol government was nothing but a puppet
government, which then motivated the masses to participate in a civil war that would end
with the Khmer Rouge in power. “The United States wanted to use Cambodia as a base
from which to attack the Vietnamese...So, the CIA conspired with Lon Nol, Cambodian
army chief of staff, to take over.”70 However, this wasn’t the American’s first choice.
They would rather have the Cambodians love them, since it would make life much easier
for them, as they wouldn’t have had to invade. Unfortunately, “the United States could
not woo the society, [but] it could disrupt it and [encouraged] the spread of ‘privatization
(the preoccupation of the individual with his personality rather than his social situation),
discouragement, defeatism and apathy.’”71 Luckily for the Americans, “there were two
groups in Cambodia that [they could count on]: the middle class urban elite and the
officer corps. It was the coalition of these two groups that in 1970 overthrew Sihanouk
and brought Cambodia into the American camp.”72
Deirdre, Griswold. “What U.S. News Reports Don’t Say about Cambodia.” Workers World. July
17, 1997. April 20, 2007. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54/069.htm.
71
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 55.
72
William, Shawcross. Sideshow. (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981) 55.
70
Chee 20
Naturally, Prince Sihanouk was not very pleased with being deposed and so “on
March 20...Sihanouk effectively declared war on the government.”73 This marked the
start of the civil war. By declaring war Sihanouk enabled the Khmer Rouge to stand up
and fight for what they believed in, under the cover of winning back the government for
Sihanouk. With the help from the masses, the Khmer Rouge greatly hindered the Lon Nol
regime from developing as a government, and eventually won the civil war in 1975.74
Nine months after the coup, the Lon Nol regime was totally dependent on the
United States for food, war materials, and tactical and strategic support. Nixon and
Kissinger would have like to have done more for Lon Nol, however Congress would not
allow it. By December 1970, the United States, through their Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, had become the sole supplier of arms, ammunition and aircraft to
Cambodia.75 In addition, the U.S.A. was responsible for 95.1% of the Lon Nol regime’s
economy. Another 2.7% came from foreign aid leaving a paltry 2.2% of the economy
being generated domestically.76 Furthermore, the majority of the bombings and support
strikes were conducted by the United States as well as the South Vietnamese Air forces.
The United States was also responsible for gathering intelligence whether it be military or
73
Henry Kissinger. White House Years. (U.S.A.: Little, Brown and Company, 1979) 467.
74
Russell R. Ross, ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of Congress,
1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/20.htm
75
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 92.
76
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 93.
Chee 21
civilian, conducting interrogations and performing end use checks.77 In this way, the
“CIA ruled Cambodian through its agent Lon Nol.”78
The civil war continued with the United States pouring hundreds of millions of
dollars into the Lon Nol Regime in hopes of defeating the Khmer Rouge.79 However, the
Khmer Rouge was having their own, much more successful, propaganda campaign. They
would claim that “the government of Lon Nol [had] requested the airstrikes and [was]
responsible for the damage and the ‘suffering of innocent villagers.’...The only way to
stop the ‘massive destruction of the country’ [was] to defeat Lon Nol and stop the
bombing.”80 Their approach to the war was highly successful and resulted in the
recruitment of many young men. By using evidence that the Lon Nol regime was simply
a puppet of the Americans, who had thus far caused unrest in Cambodia through their
bombings and incursions, the masses were enraged. These men would then willingly go
into battle and fight for, what they believed, would be an end to their suffering. In 1975,
the Khmer Rouge won. All of the American attempts to stop the Khmer Rouge had failed
and Cambodia was left in the hands of the communists. Unknown to those who had
signed up to end the suffering through war, the suffering had just begun.
Through their numerous bombings and incursions, enormous sums of money, and
faulty policies, “Nixon and Kissinger...created the Khmer Rouge.”81 It was due to the
American bombings and the combined U.S.A. –ARVN incursions that the Khmer Rouge
77
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 92.
78
Deirdre, Griswold. “What U.S. News Reports Don’t Say about Cambodia.” Workers World. July
17, 1997. April 20, 2007. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54/069.htm
79
Deirdre, Griswold. “What U.S. News Reports Don’t Say about Cambodia.” Workers World. July
17, 1997. April 20, 2007. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54/069.htm
80
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 22.
81
Craig, Etcheson. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. (Colorado: Westview Press,
Inc., 1984.) 95.
Chee 22
was able to scatter propaganda throughout the countryside, quickly recruiting people to
their side. Furthermore the Daniel Boone Operation and the American support for Khmer
Serei were responsible for Sihanouk deporting the Americans, which also resulted in a
loss of revenue and peasant riots. This only brought to light the unhappiness of the
peasants, which the Khmer Rouge was, again, able to capitalize on , winning many new
recuirts. The Lon Nol Regime, the puppet of the United States, unintentionally allowed
the Khmer Rouge to recruit many peasants which were essential during the civil war.
This was effectively achieved and many young men signed up to fight in the Khmer
Rouge’s army.
Due to the U.S.A.’s involvement in Cambodia, through their bombings and
incursions, the Daniel Boone operation, the support of the Khmer Serei and their failed
Lon Nol government, the Khmer Rouge was able to come into power and inflict
irreparable harm and damage to Cambodian society. In fact “Pol Pot’s revolution would
not have won power without U.S. economic and military destabilization of Cambodia.”82
The United States of America should not have involved themselves in the affairs of other
countries, as they only wound up doing more harm than good. The prime example being
the Killing Fields that the Khmer Rouge was able to put into place as a result of the
United States trying to prevent them from coming into power.
82
Ben Kiernan. The Pol Pot Regime.(U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.) 16.
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Works Cited
Chandler, David P. Brother Number One: A Political Biography of Pol Pot.(United
States of America: Westview Press, 1999)
Etcheson, Craig. The Rise and Demise of Democratic Kampuchea. Colorado: Westview
Press, Inc., 1984.
Griswold, Deirdre. “What U.S. News Reports Don’t Say about Cambodia.” Workers
World. July 17, 1997. April 20, 2007. www.hartford-hwp.com/archives/54/069.htm
Kiernan, Ben. The Pol Pot Regime. U.S.A.: Yale University Press, 1996.
Kissinger. Henry. White House Years. USA: Little, Brown and Company, 1979.
Ross, Russell R. ed. Cambodia: A Country Study. Washington: GPO for the Library of
Congress, 1987. http://countrystudies.us/cambodia/20.htm
“Rouge CIA Operation Cherry.” Golden Coast Publishing. March 25, 2004. April 20,
2007. http://www.geocities.com/larryjodaniel/17.html.
Shawcross, William. Sideshow. New York: Simon and Schuster, 1981.
Sum, Sok Ry. “A Question of Fairness.” Phnom Penh Post. December 5, 2002. April 20,
2007. www.phnompenhpost.com.