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Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
Table of Contents
Introduction ..................................................................................................................................... 2
Explanation of primary sources ....................................................................................................... 3
Colombia – a devastating history .................................................................................................... 3
Illegal drugs and their role in Colombia .............................................. Error! Bookmark not defined.9
Samper and Pastrana – diverse approaches ................................... Error! Bookmark not defined.12
The American role in Colombia ..................................................................................................... 18
September 11th and the Colombian future ..................................................................................... 19
An overview of the situation from 1989 to 2001............................................................................. 20
What lies ahead? .......................................................................................................................... 22
Conclusion .................................................................................................................................... 22
Endnotes ...................................................................................................................................... 24
Bibliography .................................................................................................................................. 29
Attachments 1 through 4 ............................................................................................................... 34
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Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
US and Colombia 1989-2001: Colombia, a complicated problem?
Introduction
‘In order to understand the complex nature of Colombia’s internal conflict and the many
actors involved, we must reject out of hand the simplistic argument that today’s left-wing guerrilla
armies are the cause of all of the country’s ills.’1 The history of the Colombian Republic is often
complicated to comprehend; the country has within the last hundred years experienced losing
territory, an illicit and increasing drug trade, violent guerrillas and paramilitary forces, there is
furthermore a civil war that has not yet found its termination. These factors are exceedingly
significant to have in mind when trying to understand the history of a country in despair.
This project will look into the relationship between the United States and Colombia from 1989
to September 11th 2001. The dates have been chosen due to some significant raison d'êtres. In
1989, after the assassination of presidential candidate Luis Carlos Galán, former Colombian
President Virgilio Barco Vargas began an undisputed war against the Colombian drug cartels and
armed rebels. ‘Galán’s death ended any possibility of a dialogue with the cartels, and Barco
immediately launched an unprecedented crusade against them. In the following two weeks the
military arrested 10,000 people, […] confiscated 550 properties, and seized hundreds of small
planes.’2 The terrorist attacks on New York, Washington, and Pennsylvania on September 11th
2001 changed the American Government’s perception of the problems within Colombia. What was
formerly defined as a drug-war had now been converted into an element of George W. Bush’s
newfound ‘war on terrorism.’ ‘In the aftermath of September 11, however, an explicit counter-terror
orientation has developed within US policy. The primary means for the war on terror in Colombia
has been the continued substantial funding of the Colombian military and a shift from the language
of counter-narcotics to that of counter-terrorism.’3
Within the timeframe from 1989 to September 11th 2001 the relationship between the United
States and Colombia will be thoroughly reviewed. The primary focus will be on the anti-drug politics
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and the political and militaristic approaches regarding the Colombian guerrilla groups and the drug
cartels. There will furthermore be a short discussion speculating about the future in Colombia.
Explanation of Primary Sources
This project will make use of news articles for primary sources. The articles are chiefly
extracted from four major sources CNN, BBC, Washington Post and TIME Magazine. CNN and
TIME Magazine cooperate on the internet and combine articles in the archive. These four Medias
are key news sources that are unlikely to be significantly partial in their articles, though it may be
suggested that BBC might figure as a spectator to the conflict, and that the American-based may
be driven by national interests when reporting, this is however not evident in the articles chosen for
this project; all appear seemingly objective and without any political interest.
It is furthermore worth mentioning that the number of combatants within the FARC (Fuerzas
Armadas Revulocionarias de Colombia)4 varies considerably from source to source. Their activities
within various distant areas in the country make it hard for official sources to determine the actual
size of the guerrillas; furthermore there has been a heavy increase in combatants in the army. The
size is estimated to be approximately 18,000 soldiers, according to various newspaper articles.
Colombia - a devastating history
Colombia is the fourth largest country in Southern America, and third-most populous in all of
Latin American.5 Located in the northwestern part of the South American continent, Colombia is
the physical gateway between the northern and southern part of the hemisphere.6 Colombia is a
country with a long and violent history that spans for decades. Official statistics to this day show
that, ‘The national homicide rate (which masks large variations between regions) actually shows
that Colombia is, by a wide margin, world champion in murder among countries not embroiled in a
full-scale civil war.’7
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At the beginning of the 20th century Colombia was an even larger country than it is today. It
also had played a great role in political questions within the Latin American region. The area today
known as Panama used to be a part of Colombia and was at the turn of the 20th century involved in
one of the most important disputes in the history of Central America. The Panamanian isthmus is
one of the narrowest places in all of Central America, and several countries had acknowledged that
a waterway between the Atlantic and Pacific Oceans would save both time and money in a world
that had become increasingly mercantile. European countries had already started working on the
project, but due to political and financial reasons the venture was postponed. The Americans on
the contrary were determined to finish what Spain and France had begun.8 Due to the Colombian
control over the area, it would be the Colombians and not the Americans that would benefit from
the gateway. To avoid this situation, the United States Government passed The Spooner Act,
which allowed them to build a canal across the Panamanian isthmus, though it was technically
Colombian soil. Roosevelt furthermore ‘had a legal opinion from the State Department which
argued that the 1846 (Bidlack’s treaty)9 gave the US the right to compel Colombia to allow the US
to dig a canal.’10 At later stage the Herrán-Hay Treaty was written which was formed with an
intention to make the Colombians accept that the United States could build a waterway across the
isthmus. The Herrán-Hay Treaty was however never accepted in the Colombian capital, Bogotá.
‘…the Colombian senate rejected it in August of that year because certain provisions, such as the
stationing of U.S. troops around the canal, infringed on national sovereignty.’ 11
The United States realized that it would be impossible to get an agreement through with
Colombia. As an alternative solution American government officials encouraged revolutionary
forces in Panama to engage in an armed conflict with Colombia. The Americans were so deeply
involved in the Panamanian independence that is has been argued that ‘under the influence of the
military presence of the United States, a revolt occurred in Panama…’12 Eventually the Colombian
government accepted the demands from the revolutionaries in Panama, and in 1903 American
president Theodore Roosevelt declared The Republic of Panama a sovereign state.13 This opened
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the door for the construction of the canal, and ‘”a job that was finished after 10 years, during which
70,000 people worked on the project.” or ”after 10 years, during which 70,000 people worked on
the project, $400 million and 5,600 deaths, the Panama Canal officially opened on August 15,
1914’14 The canal incident sparked a general discontent with the Americans within Colombia, it has
even been suggested that, ‘…the Panamanian question had awakened the rage of all Colombians
and destroyed a friendship of almost a hundred years.’ 15
An infamous period in Colombian history runs from 1948 to roughly 1965. During this time,
La Violencia, a notorious civil war devastated the country. The conflict was rooted in a
disagreement between the two leading parties in Colombian politics. The assassination of liberal
presidential candidate Jorge Eliécer Gaitán in the capital of Bogotá was a decisive moment in the
eruption of ‘La Violencia.’ Gaitán was an exceedingly popular politician and his death resulted in
aggressive uprisings, both in Bogotá and in several other Colombian cities. These aggressive
reactions from the public resulted in a devastating conflict, also known as the ‘Bogotazo.’ It was a
warlike period that would leave thousands of people, primarily civilians, dead. The riots were
present in both the capital, Bogotá, and in a large amount of minor cities around the country.’16
Consequently ‘La Violencia’ was not merely a short term disaster for the Colombian
population. The rebels within the country formed various organizations that co-operated in the
struggles with the Colombian military – especially two which are still significantly involved in the
present quandaries in Colombia. One is the FARC while the other is ‘...The National Liberation
Army (Ejercito de Liberacion Nacional, ELN)…’17 These two guerrilla, or liberation, armies have
strong ties to ‘La Violencia’ since both of them increased heavily in size during the conflict. FARC
can however ‘…trace its roots to the Liberal and Communist self-defense groups formed as early
as the 1930’s…’18
Today the two, together with the paramilitary AUC (Autodefensas Unidas de Colombia)19,
are deeply embedded in the illegitimate cocaine industry within the Western Hemisphere.
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Particularly the FARC has succeeded in an increase of members and illegal activities; today the
guerrillas are a major organization within the Western Hemisphere; ‘The Fuerzas Armadas
Revolucionarios de Colombia-Ejército del Pueblo (Revolutionary Armed Forces of ColombiaPeople’s Army – FARC-EP) is the most powerful and successful guerrilla army in the world
confronting neoliberal regimes and their U.S. backers. It is the dominant political force in over 50%
of the country’s municipalities, fielding a guerrilla army of approximately 18,000 mostly peasant
fighters.’20 It is furthermore worth noticing that throughout time the guerrillas have become deeply
integrated in the rural areas of Colombia. ‘The FARC is a “people’s army” in the sense that it has
long-standing and profound roots in the countryside. Powerful ties link sons and daughters with
parents and grandparents in the prolonged struggle.’21
The Colombian Government, led by Guillermo León Valencia, was aware of the dangers
connected with the peasant uprising during ‘La Violencia.’ Together with representatives from the
United States, the Valencia Administration sought to demolish the peasants’ organizations in the
rural areas of Colombia. These autonomous groups were singled out due to their increasing
dissatisfaction with the Government. The United States’ interest in this conflict might be explained
by a fear that; ‘…these areas to become hotbeds of opposition to the Government.’22 This could
thereby pose a potential problem to the region as a whole.
The Colombian conflict is neither one nor two-sided; it consists of several participants with
different objectives and backgrounds. Some of these partakers are even founded on matters that
have little to do with today’s unstable environment in Colombia. The FARC and the ELN were both
firmly established during ‘La Violencia.’ Furthermore the paramilitary organization AUC plays a
significant role in Colombians domestic politics. It is originally an umbrella organization designed in
1997 by state forces to protect landowners and the upper-class from kidnappers and violent
guerrilla forces. ‘The AUC was a descendant of Muerte a Secuestrados (Deaths to Kidnappers,
MAS), the alliance formed in the 1980’s between the military, the police and Middle Magdalena
businessmen and landowners.’23 The AUC was in the beginning an excellent counterpart to the
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guerrillas since ‘Since [t]he Armed Forces partly organized, trained and even armed the
paramilitaries. They were seen as a force that could counter the fast-growing and abusive left-wing
guerrillas in a way that the military could not.’24 Despite their origins and seemingly good intentions
the AUC are today an illegal organization deeply involved in drug trading and kidnappings. It is
therefore quite difficult to see a difference between AUC and their ideological oppositions, the
FARC and the ELC. These activities have led to a position on the United States list of ‘Specially
Designated Nationals and Blocked Persons.’25 This is a list designed to prevent financial support to
illegal organizations around the world. This is a list that also contains the names of the ELN26 and
the FARC27.
The United States have for several decades been concerned about the guerrillas and the
drug cartels within Colombia. Both were detected as possible dangers to the American sovereignty
within the Western Hemisphere and as harmful to American interests. Previous presidents were
concerned about the significant increase in drug abuse within the United States. The drug question
represented however only half of the American anxiety; the increasing power of a pro-Moscow
faction, the FARC, within the Western Hemisphere worried the American politicians. The fear of a
‘red threat’ within the American Region was not looked upon lightly. The Americans had during the
1980’s been increasingly bothered by both Cuba and the Sandinistas in Nicaragua. Especially the
support from the Soviet Union and similar countries to Nicaragua especially served as a horrific
example of communist presence within the Western Hemisphere. ‘The Soviet Union and other
communist states have discreetly, and steadily, increased their military and intelligence support for
the Sandinistas.’28 Though the FARC and the ELN were inspired from socialist fractions neither of
the two were engaged politically such as for example Fidel Castro’s Democratic Party in Cuba. It
may therefore be argued that never has been either a direct Marxist or Leninist threat to the
American sovereignty within the hemisphere. Though the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1993
removed any risk of a world wide communist influence, the FARC has been neither more nor less
communistic since the breakdown of the bipolar world order. After the breakdown of the USSR
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there has been no American reference to a ‘red threat’ within the Western Hemisphere. In this light
it might on this background be suggested that the United States used the ideological approach as
a reason for a political and financial intervention in Colombia. Charles Wilhelm, a highly decorated
American General deployed in the South American region have nonetheless argued otherwise and
that the Colombia situation is exceedingly important, ‘Cuba is no longer a military threat and
worsening conflict in Colombia is the most serious challenge facing the U.S. military in Latin
American and the Caribbean…’29
It was Ronald Reagan who initiated the first attack on the drug industry within the American
Region. ‘[I]n 1982 President Ronald Reagan dramatically declared “war” on drugs and unveiled his
administration’s plans to launch a “full-scale” attack against drug abuse and dealing at home, and
against production, processing, and trafficking abroad.’30 This approach from Reagan included a
more aggressive angle to the drug question within Colombia. Therefore the American Government
was involved in negotiating the ceasefire that was initiated in 1984. This attempt to secure a
permanent peace within Colombia collapsed approximately 2 years later in 1986, after an obvious
unwillingness from the guerrillas that were severely depended on extortion and drug money. 1986
was also the year President Virgilio Barco Vargas was elected and he immediately changed the
approach towards the guerrillas. The FARC had now manifested its superior control over large
rural areas of Colombia and was obviously a potential threat to the national security. On this behalf
Barco would only accept a 100 % surrendering from the Colombian guerrillas; ‘From his first days
in office, Barco removed the question of reforms from the negotiations’ agenda. This new strategy
allows only discussions on disarmament and re-integrations into civilian life.’31 For this political
approach Virgilio Barco received much praise from his American colleague, George Bush, who felt
the Colombian President had the ability to improve the situation within the country. It was however
the assassination of Presidential Candidate Luis Carlos Galán in 1989 that called for full American
attention towards Colombian politics. President Barco was also highly affected by the execution
and turned his attention to both the FARC and the drug cartels. The two were regarded key
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obstacles when seeking a permanent peace within Colombia. The offensive approach from Virgilio
Barco was not received lightly within the Medellín cartel. ‘We will not respect the families of those
who have not respected our families. We will burn and destroy the oligarchy’s industries and
properties.’32 The Colombian Civil War had reached a new high, and there were no signs of this
changing soon.
Illegal drugs and their role in Colombia
Neither the ELN nor the FARC nor the AUC combine forces in the Colombian conflict; in fact
these three are fierce rivals all competing for an increased influence on the international drug
scene. They have however managed to outlive their largest enemy, the Medellín Cartel. The
governments of the United States and Colombia launched a devastating attack on the cartels in
1989. The two governments had detected one person in particular as the leading figure of the
Medellín Cartel and he was therefore also responsible for much of the illicit export of cocaine. This
was Pablo Escobar. He was known worldwide for his undisputable reign within the city of
Medellín.33 Escobar clearly felt apprehensive after the newfound political interest in removing him
from his powerful position within Colombia. If the Colombian police and military succeeded in
capturing him, he faced a significant risk of extradition to a United States prison. He was highly
wanted in several countries around the world, and most likely facing a lifelong prison sentence in
the United States. In 1991 Pablo Escobar turned himself into the Colombian Government, he had
however one unconditional request; he would under no circumstances accept extradition to
America. President Barco accepted this request, if Pablo Escobar would guarantee not to engage
in illegal activities in the future. Instead of being transferred to a state prison, Pablo Escobar was
allowed to build his own penal complex in the Colombian countryside. He named this ‘La Catedral’
– the cathedral. It has since been suggested that ‘La Catedral’ was very similar to a luxury country
ranch – and that Pablo Escobar attended football matches, night clubs and social gatherings while
‘imprisoned.’ ‘Pablo's containment in La Catedral, a maximum-security prison of his own design -with "stereo equipment, big-screen TV, giant bed," imported furniture and tapestries and wired with
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computers and all switch-board activity monitored by Pablo himself - was the result of elaborate
negotiations with national and local authorities.’34 The notorious drug kingpin could behave in this
manner, and still be successful, due to his undisputable sovereignty within Colombia; he was able
to bribe several prison guards and threaten others if anyone tried to oppose him. ‘In 1989, Forbes
magazine pegged Pablo Escobar as the seventh-richest man in the world, with an estimated
wealth of $3 billion. It was one of the bloodiest fortunes of modern times, a portfolio accumulated
through murder and America's boundless appetite for cocaine.’35 Pablo Escobar furthermore had
‘…emerged as a Robin Hood figure, a donor of largesse – including an entire housing estate – to
the city’s poor, and a model citizen for many.’36 This made the situation exceedingly difficult for the
Colombian President who was in risk of losing a large amount of voters if he succeeded in
capturing the drug kingpin. Newly elected president, Cesar Gaviría Trujillo however, due to political
pressure from the United States, decided to transfer Pablo Escobar to a regular confinement within
Colombia. This change of politics was bad news for Pablo Escobar who together with ‘…his inner
circle staged a violent and spectacular breakout from their luxurious prison near Medellín…which
they had largely administered.’37
Pablo Escobar was, after a month long manhunt, killed on Thursday December 2nd 1993.38
The murder of the cocaine king-pin was regarded as a definite victory for the nation in general, and
the assassination of Pablo Escobar did indeed hamper the Medellín cartel’s power greater than the
politicians had expected at first. Ultimately the cartel collapsed and provided exclusive possibilities
for especially the FARC. The organization was able to expand their territory significantly; ‘from
early 1998 to the end of 1999, the FARC has extended its field of operations and the size and
scope of those operations: military confrontations take place in major cities (Medellin) and on the
outskirts of the capital (Bogotá).’39 This clearly illustrates how advantageous the murder of Pablo
Escobar was for the guerrillas within Colombia. The American and Colombian governments did
collaborate and succeed in removing one threat – however this decision simply produced a new
problem that had the potential to be even more difficult to resolve. In years to come it became
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significant that the murder of Pablo Escobar had done nothing, or at least very little, to decrease
the cocaine production in Colombia.
The illicit drug production in Colombia was regarded from governmental perspective as a
threat to the national security and as dangerous to the general public. For this reason the
Americans and the Colombians were highly determined to alter the situation in Colombia. However
it can be argued that the cocaine industry served a purpose for the large number of people
involved in the trade and production of narcotics. ‘The Increase in consumption of cocaine,
particularly in the United States, encouraged the consolidation of criminal networks of
unprecedented scope of sophistication. The drug use has increased significantly over a long period
in America despite efforts to decrease the drug import.40 The drug trade employed thousands of
people in organized networks: chemists, pilots, communications specialists, and security
personnel, recruited from former police and military officers, former guerrillas, and street thugs.’41
Due to the criminal nature of this enterprise, governments could self-evidently not accept these
circumstances. Nevertheless this did complicate the eradication program, and is a significant factor
when trying to examine the ongoing difficulties in Colombia.
‘The massive increase in Colombian coca production in the mid-1990’s provided the guerilla
groups- […] FARC – with substantially higher revenues as they began to tax cocaine production
and demand protection money from coca farmers.’42 The FARC and the AUC have benefited
substantially from the rising cocaine production within Colombia. The guerrillas themselves have
been a major cause for the significant increase in production and harvest of coca leaves due to
their aggressive approach towards farmers in Colombia. The AUC today are very similar to the
FARC. The disputes of today are not over ideology but over control of the cocaine industry.
Attempts to fumigate the coca crops have been unsuccessful and on the contrary the FARC has
continued to force peasants into growing coca instead of other crops. To understand the difficult
struggle against cocaine production in Colombia it is worth noting that the coca plant itself is
capable of producing large amounts of coca leaves. ‘‘The hearty coca tree thrives where other
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crops often cannot survive, growing to maturity in 18 months and remaining productive for 30 to 40
years. With three to four annual harvests, the Andean campesino can produce over 3,000 pounds
of leaf per acre.’43
Samper and Pastrana - diverse approaches
In 1994 the Colombian people elected a new President – Ernesto Samper Pizano – who
was seen as a competent political figure capable of creating peace in Colombia. President Samper
won the election on a radical and confident declaration when he, ‘…unveiled a new peace initiative;
he predicted it would lead to a permanent peace.’44 Samper’s election was expected to stir
newfound optimism within Colombia despite a major diminishing of financial aid from the United
States just one year earlier. ‘In early 1993, the Clinton administration conducted an extensive
classified review of Andean drug eradication and interdiction programs and concluded that efforts
to date had been ineffective.’ 45 The assessment of the Colombian situation resulted in a reduction
of American aid to the anti-drug efforts. The sanguinity Ernesto Samper brought with him called for
a new revision from the American side, and President Clinton was seemingly impressed with
Ernesto Samper’s ideas and hopes. The new political situation in the country convinced Bill Clinton
that raising the American aid would be beneficial for the stability in the region and therefore also for
the United States. Unfortunately for the Colombians the positive situation changed dramatically.
‘Attention picked up again in the mid-1990s when the issue of human rights restriction on U.S. aid
began to make some headlines, at the same time that the Colombian president, Ernesto Samper
Pizano, was being accused of accepting campaign contributions from the Calí cocaine cartel.’46
The new allegations towards Ernesto Samper led to a new political angle from the Clinton
Administration. Instead of attempting to solve the evident problems within Colombia, the American
President chose a strategy based upon isolationism. The American Government decided to reduce
the financial support to the counter-narcotics plan in Colombia and withdraw politically from
Colombia. President Clinton thereby signaled that he did not intend to engage in full-scale support
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of administrations that were unable to remove unlawful actions within their own government. The
disputes between Colombia and the United States resulted in an even worse relationship; it
became impossible for Ernesto Samper to participate in a meeting within the United States since
he failed when trying to obtain a visa. On the contrary the Colombian Government declined
American enquiries about extraditing leaders of Colombian drug cartels to the United States for
trial. ‘‘[…] two issues dominated the bilateral relationship throughout 1996 and most of 1997. One
was the revocation of Samper’s visa to enter the United States; the other was Colombia’s refusal to
send several drug kingpins to the United States for trial.’47 The relationship between the two
countries had extraordinary worsened and had not been this bad since the dispute over the
Panama Canal. The financial situation for the counter-narcotics strategy did however improve
significantly, ironically enough it was the FARC that urged the United States to resume their
economic aid to Colombia. ‘US military analysts had compiled reports on the growing strength of
the FARC and counted 80 instances in which the FARC massed at least 300 men to attack army
contingents and defeated the government troops every time. This led to the resumption of full US
aid in September 1997, and early in 1998 the USA began officially to widen the scope of its aid
[…]’48 When examining the political situation Ernesto Samper was a given little chance for reelection. His alleged intermingling with illegal activities and his worsened relationship with the
American Government resulted in little sympathy from the Colombian voters. ‘…for Samper there
were problems to come – not least the growing suspicion […] that Samper had accepted drug
money and was backed by the traffickers.’49 Samper never conquered the growing mistrust
towards his political abilities and ‘Andres Pastrana was elected president of Colombian in 1999.’50
The newly elected Conservative President ended a 12 year period of Liberal presidents in
the South American country. President Pastrana was determined to begin peace talks with the
FARC and the ELN rebels in the country, believing that this political discourse was necessary to
create a better situation in the country. This approach could be regarded as highly ambitious
because of the tense situation in the country. President Pastrana carried one extraordinary
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advantage that his predecessor was without; full support from the United States and thereby also a
better chance of achieving his political goals. The Washington Post, commenting on these issues,
reported that ‘The Clinton administration's willingness to engage the military is driven in part by
improved relations with President Andres Pastrana, who took office in August.’51
President Andres Pastrana was willing to go very far in achieving his goal of a complete
peace in Colombia. Different from his precedent colleagues Pastrana believed that it was not a
necessity that the guerrillas gave up their firearms. His approach was not as totalitarian as earlier
presidents; ‘…President Virgilio Barco (1986-1990) has announced the continuation of the process,
but with a change in strategy […] The central goal is to convince the FARC to demobilize its forces
as soon as possible.’52 Andres Pastrana on the contrary believed in dialogue and mutual interest in
obtaining a Colombian Peace. The strategy was not received well from a Colombian population
tired after decades of executions, bombs, a worsened economy, and several unreliable presidents.
Andres Pastrana did believe that his politics would improve the situation in Colombia and he was
therefore willing to go far in order to achieve his political agenda. Andres Pastrana managed to win
many people over with his promises about better times to come. Even more importantly the new
President was so convincing that he managed to arrange negotiations with the FARC. It was
however necessary for the Colombian President to accept a FARC request, one that has since
been regarded as very damaging to the Colombian security; ‘President Andres Pastrana ordered
all government troops Wednesday to start pulling out of a huge area of southeast Colombia -- a
swath of land as big as Switzerland -- in preparation for the start of peace talks with the country's
largest rebel force.’53 The Colombian President accepted this demand from the FARC on the
condition that the rebels engage actively in the peace process.54 Analyst’s who have examined the
Colombian conflict on later occasions have unanimously criticized President Pastrana handling of
the situation. As time progressed it became obvious to political observers that the decision to grant
a temporary safe haven55 to the guerrillas worsened the situation in Colombia. The FARC now had
a recreational area that located in the heart of Colombia, where the military was unable to touch
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them. The original plan from Andres Pastrana was that the FARC would be given control over this
area for a limited time period. This was due to change, however, when the guerrillas refused to
withdrawn from the area when the negotiated period had expired. Giving the most influential
guerrillas in the Western Hemisphere full control over an area illustrated how determined, and
desperate, Andres Pastrana was to fulfil his promises of a permanent peace. From the beginning
the public regarded his willingness to accept such demands as very dangerous. The Colombians
believed, however, at the same time that Pastrana had the necessary determination and political
ability to improve the situation.
Unfortunately for the reconciliation process the FARC appeared uninterested in a full scale
engagement in the preliminary peace talks. This was illustrated when Andres Pastrana as the first
president had expressed his willingness to meet with Manuel Marulanda or ‘Sure Shot,’56 head of
the FARC and a notorious opponent to the Colombian state. Though Marulanda accepted the
proposal from Andres Pastrana the two have never met. Specific dates for a meeting have often
been arranged, but the FARC leader always failed to show up. On more than one occasion the
leader has afterwards stated that he felt he was being used for solely political purposes and that
Pastrana had no real interest in negotiating with the FARC. Furthermore the FARC had requested
that an active role in the peace process would require that the Colombian Government release a
number of important FARC rebels from various prisons around the country, a request Andres
Pastrana was reluctant to accept, and debate over this issue stalled the process even further. The
negotiations had already been slowed down significantly due to the obvious lack of interest from
the FARC. It became evident that the FARC had exploited the situation and secured full control
over the demilitarized zone, while at the same time the guerrillas were without sincere interest in
the peace negotiations. It may be suggested that the FARC and the ELN depended on money from
drug export and other illegal activities that reconciliation would hamper their ability to survive.
The continued postponing of arranged meetings forced Andres Pastrana into a new strategy
if plans for peace were to be successful. The president therefore decided to launch ‘Plan Colombia’
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in an attempt to focus on the problems highly connected with narcotics and crime. ‘Plan Colombia
initially was a development strategy […] Modeled after the post-World War II Marshall Plan that
rebuilt Europe, it addressed the many conditions behind the drug trade and the internal armed
conflict, such as economic inequality, lack of opportunities for progress, especially for Colombian
youth, and an unequal distribution of land.’57 Plan Colombia was proposed as a counter-reaction to
the missing willingness from the FARC and the ELN. It might be regarded as not only a necessity
for Colombia itself, but also for Andres Pastrana’s political career. The American president Bill
Clinton had grown weary due to the slow progress in Colombia and his patience with Andres
Pastrana’s peace summits was running out. Clinton therefore saw ‘Plan Colombia’ as a good
alternative to the peace talks and the American Government was instantly ready to give financial
aid to the new discourse. ‘Under Plan Colombia the US government proposed $68.5 million for
alternative development that took the form of ‘community pacts.’ […] The USA stated that if these
coca farmers would voluntarily eradicate their crops, the pacts would provide monetary and
technical assistance with substitution crops such as maize, mango or coffee.’58 The increased
American engagement in the conflict was regarded as extraordinarily significant for President
Pastrana since it showed that he had full US support for ‘Plan Colombia.’ In the wake of the United
States involvement in the peace process American government officials succeeded in negotiating a
meeting with representatives from the FARC. ‘Toward the end of 1998 Peter Romero of the U.S.
State Department and a delegation from the […] FARC got together for the first time in San José,
Costa Rica, to talk about replacements of illegal crops.’59
The development filled the Colombian public with hopes for a better and safer future. The
Americans were mainly interested in haltering the increasing cocaine use within their own borders,
a project that was primarily achievable through an attractive foreign policy in Colombia since the
problem rooted here. Approximately six months later the constructive progress in Colombia was
forgotten and yet again the country found itself in a violent situation with inconceivable
consequences. ‘‘By mid-1999, moreover, Colombia had become a “crisis” case. Pastrana’s
16
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
negotiations with the FARC eventually stalled. The two major guerilla groups, FARC and the
Éjercito de Liberación Nacional (ELN) staged seemingly daily attacks, and coca cultivation rose
explosively, despite U.S.-led fumigation efforts.’60 The increase in violent aggressions served to
underline what critics of Andres Pastrana had pointed out since the president publicized his peace
plans; that the FARC and the ELN had taken advantage of the situation and increased their
militaristic strength. One might therefore suggest that Andres Pastrana and his attempts to
negotiate a permanent peace never really had a chance of succeeding – the FARC and the ELN
had never shared this interest. According to the FARC this allegation was incorrect, the guerrillas
declared themselves unhappy with the presence of the AUC and would not continue peace talks
since, ‘…the Colombia army and police were not doing enough to combat the rightwing
paramilitary groups.’61 Critics have furthermore suggested that, ‘The fact that the government of
President Andres Pastrana demilitarized five municipalities in southern Colombia controlled by the
FARC in January 1999 in order to jumpstart peace talks was a clear demonstration of military
successes of the guerrillas.’62 They had just followed along in the process since it had given them
opportunities to get firm control over the rural areas, and due to their military resources the
Government was unable to prevent this despite several attempts, the Colombian military had
deployed 11,000 soldiers around the FARC demilitarized zone. The troops were prepared for war if
Andres Pastrana would allow them to enter the FARC controlled area.63 The tense situation was
also noted in the White House where President Clinton, due to missing results, decided to propose
his own political intervention in Colombia.
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Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
The American role in Colombia
When Bill Clinton in 2000 decided a more aggressive approach towards the guerrillas it
marked a dramatic change in the United States policy towards Colombia. Not since the Andean
Initiative in 1989 had an American president formed his own politics in the fight against drugs and
crime. In the final part of the 1980’s President George Bush launched an attack on the drug
industry in Colombia and engaged as an active participant in the struggle for a decrease in cocaine
production in Colombia. The Andean Initiative was seen as a new discourse toward a better
situation in the Latin American region. ‘In September 1989, the Bush Administration inaugurated a
broad-based counternarcotics strategy. One component of that strategy, the so-called Andean
Initiative, was intended to stem the flow of cocaine into the United States by reducing production
and trafficking in Colombia, Peru, and Bolivia.’64 It had become evident to the American President
that President Barco’s government was unable to cope with the massive problems affiliated with
the drug industry in Colombia. Not only were the guerrillas a substantial aspect, also the drug
cartels and spread of an anti-governmental philosophy were matters that had to be taken seriously
Though George Bush was worried by the spread of communism within Colombia, he turned his
attention to the drug industry, probably considering this to be the main reason for the bad
conditions in Colombia. ‘President George Bush (1988-1992) recognized this perceived need to do
something about the drug problem and made international drug interdiction and eradication efforts
a fundamental component of his newly declared “war on drugs.” […] Bush declared, “The logic is
simple. The cheapest way to eradicate narcotics is to destroy them at their source […]’65 By stating
this the President showed an extraordinary eagerness to remove a threat that worried the
Colombia people. The Andean Initiative was on a large scale unsuccessful and proved to be
insufficient in the quest for a better Colombia. Bill Clinton’s plans to raise the financial aid in the
fight against narcotics served to continue a long period of increase in monetary help to Colombia, a
policy that would become even more significant in post 9/11 era.66
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Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
The continuation of American interventions in Colombia has not been well received by all
parts of society. When Bill Clinton visited Andres Pastrana in 2000 he was met by thousands of
angry people who were infuriated by the US policy in Colombia. Various Colombian citizens
commented that the ‘Clinton's visit is to give money so that Colombians will keep killing each other
in the name of the Americans…’67 The feeling of American control over Colombian politics has
especially angered many people. They consider the American interventions are a sign of an
imperialistic approach. For decades people around the world have perceived that, ‘’imperialism’ is
effectively a simple synonym for American foreign policy.’68 This has also been the experience in
Colombia who had, and still do regard an American intervention as a blow to their own sovereignty.
Furthermore it is important to have the dispute over the Panama Canal in mind since this incident
has never been completely forgotten by the Colombians. Colombians also felt apprehensive since
it appeared that the Americans were employing politics in Colombia that were solely designed to
improve the situation for the American citizens.
September 11th and the Colombian future
When the hijacked planes hit the World Trade Center and the Pentagon on September 11th
2001 it marked a new political era in the United States. With George W. Bush as commander in
chief the foreign politics changed to a more aggressive discourse, frequently employing terms such
as ‘war on terrorism’ and ‘axis of evil.’ The official American opinion towards the Colombian
guerrillas has also changed from a counter-narcotics approach to a counter-terrorism approach.
‘These discourses have switched from an official justification of anti-communism to anti-narcotics
and, post-September 11, a new ‘war on terror.’69 The terrorist attacks on America served to justify
the United States’ new foreign politics; it changed from military isolationism to a forceful and
frequently violent engagement, such was the case in both Iraq and Afghanistan. The American
President believes in an anti terrorist approach and considers people with an intention to harm
United States property as terrorists. In the wake of September 11th the FARC and the ELN
changed their status from drug producers and kidnappers to basic terrorists. ‘In the weeks and
19
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
months following September 11, it was not uncommon to see images of Osama Bin Laden and
members of the Taliban edited into the news reports about FARC actions in Colombian television
news broadcasts.’70 The new way to define the rebels validated a massive increase in military aid
to the Colombian Government. The monetary help was no longer a part of the drug war; instead
most resources were used to train soldiers who would engage in a more violent war against the
guerrillas. On a latter occasion the American President even introduced a new phrase to the
Colombian conflict. In order to keep focus on both terrorism and drug trafficking George W. Bush
defined the FARC as narco-terrorists ‘Defeating [narco-terrorists] is vital to the safety of our
peoples and the stability of this hemisphere … this war against narco-terrorism can and will be won
and Colombia is well on its way to that victory.’71 Explaining the FARC as part of both the drug war
and the war on terrorism has helped George Bush significantly in his attempt to eradicate threats
on American interests in the hemisphere. Therefore, it has also proved easier for the American
President to increase his support to the Colombian government. ‘‘Since September 11, 2001, the
drug war has been put on the back burner in favor of the more pressing issue of counterterrorism.
This has been the justification for even further U.S. involvement…’72 The 2002 Election of Alvaro
Uribe Velez as new Colombian President did not signal any considerable changes in the
relationship between the United States and Colombia.
An overview of the situation from 1989 to 2001
While attempting to review the national condition in Colombian in the period from 1989 to
September 2001 it is difficult to notice any significant improvement. Though there have been
several different strategies and ideologies all designed to eradicate the evils in Colombia none of
those have succeeded on a large scale basis. Policies in the country have included fumigation of
coca crops, peace talks with the guerrillas, massive economic support from America, a hazardous
safe haven, and intensive training of government soldiers; yet none of these has enhanced the
security in Colombia. Only one of the political promises can to this day be regarded as a success,
however limited; President Virgilio Barco Vargas’ declaration of war on Pablo Escobar and the drug
20
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
cartels. Barco Vargas was furthermore a hardliner in his politics toward the FARC due to their
increased importance in the drug industry after the fall of the Medellín Cartel. This background has
later in time caused observers of Colombian politics to conclude that, ‘Colombian society under
Barco is less democratic and less secure. Abrupt reduction in the scope of negotiations with the
FARC, combined with the increased military activity against their fronts, has led not only to an
increase in combat between the military and the guerrilla movements, but also to a deepening of
the political conflict between the Left and the Right…’73
The situation in Colombia has gradually worsened in the period from 1989 to 2001. There
has been an increase in the number of violent deaths and clashes between guerrillas and
government troops occur more frequently, touching the lives of civilians in especially the rural
areas. In addition the amount of kidnappings has been an everyday incident in Colombia: ‘In
Colombia, the kidnap-capital of the world, an estimated 20,000 people are kidnapped for ransom
every year. It has become Colombia's second-biggest illegal industry, after drug-trafficking.’74 The
cocaine industry has not been hampered by the anti drug efforts and has continued its export to
large parts of the world. Both the FARC and the AUC control large parts of the cocaine industry in
Colombia and make billions of dollars on this industry. The production of the illicit drug has
increase whilst the fumigation efforts have become more intensive over the last years. ‘The
campaign, known as Plan Colombia, has neither reduced the country's coca crop nor the
availability of cocaine in the United States. […]Coca cultivation has increased, despite Plan
Colombia's initial goal of cutting the country's coca crop in half. The most recent data released by
the State Department show that more land was cultivated with coca in 2005 -- 144,000 acres -than when the effort began in 2000.’75
During the time from 1989 to September 11th the United States have played a significant role
in Colombia, but have however not attempted to dictate the internal politics in Colombia. The
United States has no interest in engaging with armed forces in the conflict since difficult ‘jungle
wars’ in both Vietnam and Nicaragua have proved extraordinary difficult for the American military.
21
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
Neither the American Government nor the American public have any interest in a risky war against
armed rebels who are accustomed to surviving in the jungle.
What lies ahead?
From 2001 and to 2007 there has been no significant change in the criminal activities in Colombia.
The FARC, the ELN, and the AUC have continued their role as world leaders in both kidnappings
and cocaine export. Thousands of peasants are still fleeing their homes in fear of the rebels and
the consequences of ‘Plan Colombia’ are yet to become evident. Since the terrorist attacks in 2001
the US military has turned its attention towards Afghanistan and Iraq in a pursuit for terrorists. This
has put the Colombian question in the background, though it is still regarded as the biggest threat
to America within the Latin American region. The United States is still monitoring the Colombian
situation very closely and is ready to act should it prove necessary.
Conclusion
The continued instability within Colombia makes it unproblematic to criticize the strategies
used toward the criminals. Colombia is a country in despair and there are no sign of a decrease in
kidnappings, drug trades and murders. That the guerrillas have increased significantly in size is
evident from newspaper articles that estimate the size of the FARC to an overwhelming 30,000
fighters.76 One will however have to acknowledge that the Colombia and the United States have
attempted to change the situation – without this hard discourse it is exceedingly likely that the
guerrillas and the drug cartels would have been even more powerful than they are today. Colombia
seems to suffer from grave political mistakes such as Pastrana decision to grant FARC a safe
haven and the insecure period during the Samper administration caused by the allegations of
bribery. One could additionally have asked for a changed approach from the United States. A
political perspective that would focus more upon helping the Colombian people would definitely
have proved beneficial for the stability in Colombia. This would lead to an increased stability in the
whole region as a whole and in the end also the Americans themselves. While examining the
22
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
reigns of former Presidents in Colombia it is noteworthy that no president since the founding of the
Colombian Republic in 1886 has managed to be re-elected. It is likely that the situation in today’s
Colombia would have been different if the Colombian people had re-elected some of their
presidents in newer time. It is though fair to argue that neither of the presidents in the 1990’s has
proved that they were capable of recuperating the situation in the country. One can argue that the
instability in the country is rooted in the discontinuation of specific political ideas. Criminal fractions
within Colombia have shown that they are good at turning the political confusion into something
useful for their criminal activities.
The Colombian government is obviously not interested in engaging in a full scale war with
the rebels since the lives of too many civilians will be affected by this. Due to the complicated
problems in Colombia it will be difficult to create a permanent peace. It could prove beneficial to
use neutral personal to protect civilians in regions where the FARC and the AUC are dominant.
Both guerrilla fractions will not be interested in attacking neutral international forces since this will
urge most countries around the world to focus on the guerrilla problem in Colombia. This will make
the rebel’s activities more difficult due to an increased international interest in supporting and
aiding the Colombian government. One thing does however remain obvious – if the politicians,
within a few years, prove unable to change the situation dramatically the FARC and the AUC will
have succeeded in dividing the country into one of Colombian control and one controlled by the
criminal rebels. This will result in devastation for millions of people living in the rural parts of
Colombia. One will also have to expect an increased instability within the Western Hemisphere and
a potential risk of large scale war in the region.
23
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
ENDNOTES
1
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, P. 44
2
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, P. 212
3
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia, p. 105
4
Bagley, Bruce Michael. Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990’s. P. 10
5
US Department of State. ‘Colombia (03/07).’ [online] Last revised: March, 2007.
<http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/35754.htm#people>
6
Showcaves.com ‘Clickable maps: South America’ [online] Last revised: February 21, 2001.
<http://www.showcaves.com/english/explain/Maps/SouthAmerica.html> ‘Attachment 1’
7
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, p. 243
8
Avery, Ralph E. ‘The French failure – the Panama Canal.’ [online] Last revised: May 29, 2001.
<http://www.czbrats.com/Builders/FRCanal/failure.htm>
9
Ninkovich, Frank. The United States and Imperialism, p. 105
10
Ibid. P. 111
11
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, p. 42
12
The Proposed New Treaties for the Panama Canal. Tate, Mercer D. & Allen, Edward H. International
Affairs (Royal institute of International Affairs 1944-), 1969. P. 270.
13
Halsall, Paul. ‘Modern History Sourcebook: Convention between the US and Panama (Panama Canal),
1903.’ [online] Last revised: July 1998. <http://www.fordham.edu/halsall/mod/1903panama.html>
14
Unknown. ‘CNN In-Depth Specials – Panama Canal Handover – Troubled passageway.’ [online] Last
revised: 2001. <http://www.cnn.com/SPECIALS/1999/panama.canal/stories/history/>
15
Drekonja-Kornat, Gerhard. Colombia: Learning the foreign Policy Process. P. 231
16 16
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, P. 142
17
Simons, Geoff. Colombia, a Brutal History. P. 43
18
Boudon, Lawrence. Guerillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process. P.
280
24
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
19
Bagley, Bruce Michael. Drug Trafficking, Political Violence and U.S. Policy in Colombia in the 1990’s, p. 12
20
Petras. James & Brescia, Michael M. The FARC Faces the Empire. P. 134
21
Ibid p. 135.
22
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia. P. 72
23
Simons, Geoff. Colombia, a Brutal History. P. 140
24
Garcia, Victoria. ’Terrorism – in the spotlight: United Self-defense Forces in Colombia (AUC).’ [online] Last
revised: September 23, 2002. <http://www.cdi.org/terrorism/auc.cfm>
25
Office of Foreign Assests Control. ’Office of foreign Assets Control – Specially designated nationals and
blocked persons.’ P. 56
26
Ibid P. 92
27
Ibid P. 94
28
Valenta, Jiri. Nicaragua: Soviet-Cuban Pawn or Non-aligned Country. P. 169
29
MacSwan, Angus. ’Cuba no threat, Colombia war worsening-U.S. general/ Reuters – Cuba news/ Noticias
– Cubanet.’ [online] Last revised: April 27, 1998. <http://www.cubanet.org/CNews/y98/apr98/28e7.htm>
30
Bagley, Bruce Michael. After San Antonio. P. 2
31
Chernick, Marc W. Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process.
P. 81
32
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002, P. 212
33
The Emerald Empire. ‘Bogotá, Colombia and neighboring cities maps…’ [online] Last revised: Unknown.
<http://www.theemeraldempire.com/maps2.html> ’Attachment 2’
34
Goodman, Robin Truth. ‘Politics and Culture.’ [online] Last revised: Unknown.
<http://aspen.conncoll.edu/politicsandculture/page.cfm?key=247>
35
Prendergast, Alan. ‘Denver – News – The hit man nobody knows – westword.com.’ [online] Last revised:
May 17, 2001. <http://news.westword.com/2001-05-17/news/the-hit-man-nobody-knows/full>
36
Simons, Geoff. Colombia, a Brutal History. P. 69
37
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Epilogue, p. 255
25
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
38
Fedarko, Kevin. ‘Escobar’s Dead End – Time.’ [online] Last Revised: December 13, 1993.
<http://www.time.com/time/magazine/article/0,9171,979803,00.html>
39
Petras. James & Brescia, Michael M. The FARC Faces the Empire. P. 134-135
40
SAMHSA. ‘Samhsa News – Volume X, No. 3, Summer 2002.’ [online] Last revised: Summer 2002.
<http://www.samhsa.gov/SAMHSA_news/summer2002/article11_1.htm> ‘Attachment 3’
41
Palacios, Marco. Between Legitimacy and Violence – A History of Colombia, 1875-2002. Epilogue, p. 242
42
Crandall, Russell. Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration.
P. 111
43
Craig, Richard B. Colombian Narcotics and United States-Colombian relations. P. 244
44
Boudon, Lawrence. Guerillas and the State: The Role of the State in the Colombian Peace Process. P.
284
45
Crandall, Russell. Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration.
P. 101
46
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, P. 156
47
Crandall, Russell. Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration.
P. 108
48
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia. P. 91
49
Simons, Geoff. Colombia, a Brutal History. P. 94
50
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia. P. 92
51
Farah, Douglas. ’Washingtonpost.com: U.S. to Aid Colombian Military.’ [online] Last revised: December
27, 1998. <http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-srv/inatl/daily/dec98/colombia1227.htm>
52
Heinz, Wolfgang S. Guerrillas, Political Violence, and the Peace Process in Colombia. P. 258
53
Unknown. ‘CNN - Colombia troop pullout ordered in preparation for peace talks.’ [online] Last revised:
October 15, 1998. http://edition.cnn.com/WORLD/americas/9810/15/colombia.01/
54
Unknown. ‘BBC News, Americas, Colombian rebels raid police base.’ [online] Last revised: November 3,
1998. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/206746.stm>
26
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
55
Unknown. ‘Colombia Guerrilla maps’ [online] Last revised: Unknown.
<http://www.latinamericanstudies.org/colombia-guerrilla-maps.htm> ‘Attachment 4’
56
Unknown. ‘BBC News, Americas, FARC ‘to resume peace talks.’’ [online] Last revised: February 2, 2001.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1150392.stm>
57
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, P. 127
58
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia. P. 94
59
Gamboa, Miguel & Zackrison, James W. Democratic discourse and the conflict in Colombia, p. 100
60
Crandall, Russell. Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration, p.
113
61
Simons, Geoff. Colombia, a Brutal History, p. 193
62
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, p. 71
63
Unknown. ‘BBC News, Americas, FARC ‘to resume peace talks.’’ [online] Last revised: February 2, 2001.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/1150392.stm>
64
Reischauer, Robert D. ‘The Andean Initiative: Objectives and Support.’ [online] Last revised: March 1994.
<http://www.cbo.gov/showdoc.cfm?index=4885&sequence=0>
65
Crandall, Russell. Explicit Narcotization: U.S. Policy toward Colombia during the Samper Administration, p.
100
66
Haugaard, Lisa et. al. Erasing the Lines – Trends in U.S. military programs with Latin America, p. 18.
67
Unknown. ‘BBC News, Americas, Clinton defends the drug war.’ [online] Last revised: August 31, 2000.
<http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/americas/902179.stm>
68
Howe, Stephen. Empire – a very short introduction, p. 25
69
Stokes, Doug. America’s Other War – Terrorizing Colombia, p. 79
70
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, p. 22
71
Unknown. ‘Foxnews.com – Bush promises more help for Colombia – politics.’ [online] Last revised:
November 23, 2004. <http://www.foxnews.com/story/0,2933,139264,00.html>
72
Murillo, Mario A. Colombia and the United States – War, unrest and destabilization, p. 123
27
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
73
Chernick, Marc W. Negotiated Settlement to Armed Conflict: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process,
p. 82
74
Goldberg, Kate. ‘BBC News, World, Kidnapping becomes growth industry.’ [online] Last revised:
September 7, 2000. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/914448.stm>
75
Gould, Jens Erik. ‘U.S. effort to kill coca failing in Colombia.’ [online] Last revised: March 11, 2007.
<http://www.sfgate.com/cgi-bin/article.cgi?file=/c/a/2007/03/11/MNGGVOJC151.DTL>
Associated Press. ’Former resort houses Colombia’s far-right warlords as they await trail.’ [online] Last
revised: November 15, 2006.
<http://www.iht.com/articles/ap/2006/11/15/america/LA_GEN_Colombia_Warlords_Prison.php>
76
28
Oscar Svendsen, Exam nr. 158413, Imperialism by Deborah Simonton, Bachelor project, Spring 2007
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