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Political Culture and Behavior
Tianjian Shi, “Mass Political Behavior in Beijing,” in Paradox, Chapter 7

“Democracy is related to the state of economic development”
- Lipset in the American Political Science Review (1959)

Clusters of social changes drastically affect the class, organizational and social
structure of a nation and this is associated with new forms of political
participation.
Social Mobility Theory
1.
Economic development
a. government is more responsible for regulation and redistribution of wealth
2.
3.
Economic development changes the social structure
a. stratification is altered and socio-economic resources increase ability for
political participation
Individual psychological orientation changes
a. people are now more aware of the impact of government in their lives
Post-Mao Reforms
1.
Per Capita income and median level of education increases
2.
Retreat of government from economic life
a. ability to control society has declined at the grass roots level
b. trade unions and women’s groups, formerly agents of control have come
to represent their members in bargaining with authorities
Key Question: Can leaders cripple the relationship between democratization and
economic growth?
Statistical Data and Analysis
1.
Changes in social context, social structure, psychological orientation (1988 –
1996)
a. yearly salary has increased (1066 to 1638 yuan)
b. per capita living space has increased
c. middle stratum has expanded
d. meat consumption has increased
i. gap between low and high income families has decreased
e. amount of durable goods ownership (television, fridges) has increased
f. perception of local government being more and more important and that
more people are interested in politics
2.
Level and Intensity of Political Participation
a. general participation has increased
i. labour disputes, strikes, boycotts of elections
Conclusions
1.
Chinese in Beijing are more politically sophisticated and more assertive in
articulating their interests due to the regime being less able to apply economic
control mechanisms
2.
The regime feels heavy pressure from below and this will not lead communist
leaders to give up their power, but may lead to party reformers to propose new
ways to govern. (Latent seeds of democracy)
Elizabeth Perry, “Crime, Corruption and Contention,” in Paradox. Chapter 14
Contentious Politics defined: tax riots, industrial strikes and demonstrations
 a prominent feature in Post-Mao China due to the relaxation of political controls
and “unsettling economic development” has led to an increase in collective
resistance. (Traditional pattern found throughout Chinese History)
 Other Historical denunciations of inflation and corruption
 Qing Dynasty and the Opium War
 Decadence of the Manchu rulers led to Sun YatSen’s Nationalists
to take power at the turn of the century
 inflation and blatant graft a factor in the Communist overthrow in
1948
 Tiananmen Square incident over allegations of official
malfeasance and mismanagement of the economy
 participants included those from unions, the propaganda
and security departments
Perceived Corruption and discontent (demands)
 a need to curb inflation
 stop buying expensive cars and houses
 increases allowing grass-root cadres to improve their living standards
 publicizing the investigation of corrupt officials
 The “between plan and market” economy encourages corruption
The notion that bureaucrats steal people’s hard earned money has led to violent
responses by the peasants who frame their calls for reform in cultural revolution
slogans
Minxin Pei, “Rights and Resistance: the Changing Contexts of the Dissident
Movement” in Chinese Society, Chapter 1
o Oppression and resistance are symbiotic political acts and although they may
not succeed in overthrowing oppressive regimes, defiance helps to preserve
individual dignity and set limits to oppression.
Changes in Dissidence Patterns
Oppression and resistance are symbiotic political acts and although resistance may not
succeed in overthrowing oppressive regimes, defiance helps to preserve individual
dignity and serves to create limits on oppression.
Dissent in Post-Mao China
 the early years (1978-1989)
o a direct and confrontational approach was adopted relying heavily on
underground publications and mass demonstrations to challenge the
Communist party’s monopoly on power.
o Democracy Wall movement (78-81): begun in Beijing, it spread to 20
other cities. Cracking down on this movement deprived the dissident
movement of leaders for a while
o hiatus (81-86): dissent carried out under offical covers such as university
newspapers and semi-official publications. This intellectual influence
fueled student-led pro-democracy rallies in major cities in late 1986 and
early 1987
o Tiananmen Square incident with its imprisonment and exile of major
leaders set back the movement until the mid-1990s.
Dissent in the 1990s
o After the conservative attempt to reverse China’s economic reform failed after
Deng’s 1992 visit to South China, a more relaxed political atmosphere was
created
o Ordinary resistance in the form of strikes and street demonstrators are motivated
by social injustice. Dissidents now tend to take a peaceful route usually trying to
register their parties through legal means.
o combining direct challenges to the regime with populist issues (worker’s rights,
anti-corruption and environmental corruption) to gain public sympathy
three issues in particular: anti-corruption, patriotic causes and environmental protection.
Institutional Reform and State-Society Relations
Lianjiang Li and Kevin O’Brien, “The Struggle over Village Elections,” in Paradox,
Chapter 6
Democratic Reform in the Countryside was most evident in the decade leading up to
Deng’s death.
 1987 “Organic Law of Villagers Committees”
o Mass organizations of self-government for self-management of affairs
and education etc.
o composition: 3-7 members on three year terms by popular election
o by 1990, villagers had participated in as many as 4 elections
Conclusions
Grassroots political reforms have made it possible for villagers to hold officials
accountable in exchange for compliance with policies.
David Zweig, “The Externalities of Development: Can New Political Institutions Manage
Rural Conflict?” in Chinese Society, Chapter 6
o Intensified commercialization and commodification of land, labour and
agriculture products, rapid urbanization, enormous capital construction and public
works projects, and rural industrialization are all occurring within the context of
weak market norms, a nascent legal and tax regime, a pliant environmental
monitoring system, and a political system that often ignores or suppresses, rather
than responds to, grievances emerging from society.
o Thus externalities, costs imposed upon society that are not paid for by those
carrying out development projects, are in turn borne by local residents
o environmental degradation and the economic and health costs associated,
excessive and illegal taxes imposed by local cadres, corruption and confiscation
of rural land have motivated rural folk to protest.
o A question asks whether China’s new, yet still weak political institutions deal
with this demand for political and legal action and at the same time build strong
and legitimate legal and political institutions?
o Will economic development lead to political modernization or political decay?
Jun Jing, “Environmental Protests in Rural China,” in Chinese Society, Chapter 7.
o The growing public awareness of a deepening environmental crisis, in effect a
side-effect of the post-Mao reforms has been coupled with the rising
consciousness of legal rights, specifically since the promulgation of
Environmental protection Law in 1979.
o since this law came in effect, the government has been tolerant of protests
as long as they have not been too disruptive.
o 1998 Yanzhi River flood acknowledged to be a result of human and public policy
due to an increase in deforestation.
Three leading forms of protest: petitioning government agencies, filing lawsuits and
staging demonstrations
Civil Society, Corporatism or Hybridization?
Perry and Selden, “Introduction: Reform and Resistance in Contemporary China” in
Chinese Society, chapter 1 (Review)
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, China had attained a stunning record of economic
growth. This was achieved in the face of formidable obstacles including inefficient state
enterprises, ambiguous property rights, irrational prices, primitive transportation, and
outmoded banking and securities facilities. These achievements were not the produce to
some clear blueprint designed at the outset; rather, an improving as they go approach was
adopted, and it was through this flexible strategy that this was attained.
China’s reform effort is a multifaceted process whose key elements include greater
latitude for market, mobility, modernization, and internationalization. Viewed from the
center, these policies are intended to transform Chinese socialism in ways that will
accelerate economic growth, bolster Party authority, and strengthen China’s international
position.
However, these reforms also gave rise to conflicts and resistances. Contention during the
reform era has ranged from tax riots, labor strikes, and inter-ethnic riots, to prodemocracy demonstration, environmental, anticorruption, and gender protests, local
electoral challenges, etc. These direct challenge the power, authority, and reach of the
state.
China’s post-Mao reforms began officially with the Third Plenum of the Eleventh Party
Congress in December of 1978 when the new leadership gave its blessing to the initial
stages of the de-collectivization of agriculture and the expanded scope of the market.
Over time, many of these collectively owned and operated enterprises have converted
into share-holding companies or private firms or joint ventures, including some with
foreign investment.
Some of the effects of reforms:
1
Demand for labor mobility led to pressures to relax the household registration
system that had segregated citizens by rigid categories designed to forestall rural-to-urban
migration.
2
Industrial laborers lost status to rising entrepreneurs and eventually millions lost
lifetime employment and even such welfare benefits as pensions that they had worked a
lifetime to secure.
3
The gap between rich and poor, both between and within regions, had widened.
4
Deng Xiaoping’s reform heavily favored coastal over inland areas with state
investment and privileged access to international capital and markets.
5
To ensure that economic gains are not entirely consumed by an ever growing
population, the state has imposed strict birth-control regulations.
6
Despite far-reaching economic and social reforms, China’s political system
remains frozen. However, there are two most far-reaching political changes: a. since the
1970s, the state has abandoned the mass mobilization political campaigns that were the
hallmark of Chinese politics in the Mao era; b. the state has withdrawn from direct
control of large areas of the economy, thereby sharply reducing its ability to dominate the
lives of ordinary people.
One of the most striking aspects of the reform era is the depth and multiplicity of China’s
engagement with the world. Foreign television programs dominate the air waves in even
remote reaches of the countryside and American fast food franchises dot the urban
landscape. International capital defines leading sectors of economy and finance. Global
fashions in everything from designer jeans to perfume to appliances make their presence
felt in town and countryside alike.
The implications of internationalization are far reaching and contradictory. Access to the
global market has equipped the military and public security agencies with state-of-the-art
electronic and communications technology. At the same time, however, the reforms have
brought fax machines, personal computers, and internet access not only to the state and
businesses but also to intellectuals and activists, thereby facilitating contacts with foreign
scholars, human rights organizations, and the international media. Such ties expand the
information available to outsiders concerning Chinese domestic affairs while facilitating
dissident communications.
Along with rising per capita incomes and remarkable affluence for some, China’s reforms
and their attendant economic growth have brought anxiety and anguish to many. Diverse
forms of everyday resistance and strikes, protests, riots and other types of organized and
unorganized protests. However, there is no evidence that there is significant
organizational focus that might challenge Communist Party leadership. Moreover, the
Communist Party has shown its ability to absorb some of the most powerful complaint
without yielding its grip on state power.
Goldman and Macfarquhar, “Dynamic Economy, Declining Party-State,” in Paradox,
Chapter 1 (Review)
The Paradox of the Post-Mao Reforms – Key Topics
 All previous reform efforts failed until Deng’s “socialism with Chinese
characteristics” sought to combine a market economy with the centralized
Leninist party-state (since December 1978)
 With the prerequisite that the party remain in power, he was prepared to
sanction and means to improve the economic situation.
 “The cat can be of any colour if it can catch mice.”
A success
 GDP grew on an average of 9% for two decades and was the fastest growing
economy in the world
 After the June 4, 1989, crackdown on demonstrators in Tiananmen Square, when
the conservative elders and remnant Maoists reasserted their authority, the
economic reforms virtually stopped. But with the collapse of the Soviet Union in
1991, Deng in early 1991 embarked on a highly publicized tour of South China to
call attention to and reinvigorate the economic reforms in order to stave off a
Soviet-style collapse.
 BUT the pragmatism of the Deng reforms has triggered changes in state and
society much more than previous programs
Economy
 only limited political reforms and a lack of legal and regulatory framework,
bouts of inflation, rampant official corruption, growing social and regional
disparities, and economic and political decentralization has resulted
 economic growth and rising incomes have actually undermined party-state
authority, but China has been able to rise from the stagnancy of the cultural
revolution (1966-1976)
 Abandonment of Mao’s utopian, egalitarian society (Great Leap Forward),
unending class struggle (Cultural Revolution) and a Stalinist centrally-planned
economy, collectivization of agriculture and an emphasis on heavy industry
has only been possible after his death. This model had crippled all of the
communist world.
 Having been sent to the countryside, elders implemented reforms in the
countryside. Having seen first hand regional disparities, they moved away
from the Stalinist model towards the successful East Asian model.
 Leaders consciously replaced central government controls with more indirect
macroeconomic levers and local decision making and this resulted in much
less political control.
Forces unleashed by Economic Reforms
The Household Responsibility System eliminated communes by early 1980
 a return to family farming
 East Asian land reforms and subsequent farmer propriety sparked the
development of a consumer goods industry and involvement in international trade
Development of Village and Town Industries resumed
 this sector was able to respond better to market pressures due to flexibility, lower
labour costs and smaller overheads (housing, health care, pensions and education)
 initially mainly small industry, this sector developed into good production for the
international markets.
 Deng “To get rich is glorious”
o appearance of private entrepreneurship, a dynamic sector (20-30%
growth) composed of those “feeling the stones as one crossed the river”
Externalities
 This encouraged corruption and exploitation etc.
Special Economic Zones
 coastal areas benefited by attracting foreign investment in areas with lower labour
costs as well as lower taxes.
 BUT economic base erosion due to less tax revenue eroded political authority as
well
The Impact of Limited Political Reform
 Chinese Government will still squash any perceived challenge to its authority
o ex. Tiananmen Square incident, Falun Gong, dissidents
o purges of secretary generals
 Hu Yaobang (1987)
 Zhao Ziyang (1988)
However, current campaigns lack the zeal, threat of violence and mass movements of the
Mao era. Example
 the targeting of the dissident’s family, friends, colleagues and profession is no
longer carried out as policy
 Deng himself was critical of the unlimited political power which resulted in the
excesses of the Cultural Revolution
o “Even so great a man as Comrade Mao Zedong was influenced to a
serious degree by certain unsound systems and institutions which resulted
in grave misfortunes for the party, the state and himself.” –1980
Social Fragmentation




Gordon White (Social Scientist)
 The Post-Mao Social Change is “fragmented and fragmenting.”
 Cause: market forces, individual/collective economic initiatives,
political/economics devolution for regions.
alliances between local officials and local enterprises
gap between the rich and the poor
tax riots, industrial strikes, demonstrations


rural economic stagnation
loosening of internal migration controls and tensions created as a result
Cultural Pluralism
 Nationalism as a force to maintain ideological/political unity
 Western economic practices, technology and trade have brought in Western
political ideas and values, porn and pop culture (HK, Taiwan)
o books, internet, fax, media
o Campaigns against spiritual pollution have failed
o Deng and Jiang have sought international acceptance which is a departure
from the isolationism of Mao Zedong
o Post-Deng Leadership pays only lip service to aging conservative’s attempts to
revive old ideology and the notion that Marxism-Leninism is bankrupt prevails
Significance of Reform Paradoxes on China’s future
o Deng could not imagine regional autonomy would result in less power
concentrated in Beijing.
o Wealthy regions are involved in trade
o Guangdong and Hong Kong
o Fujian and Taiwan
o Shandong and South Korea
o Heilongjiang and Russia
Strong ethnic cohesiveness ensures that China’s decentralization does not threaten the
nation, only the state.
China does not have the 100% literacy and Western trained bureaucracy that its
neighbours have.
Elections and other legitimizing institutions are lacking.
Dissidents lack organization and can’t therefore challenge the state.