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UNITED STATES MILITARY ACADEMY
“LET US CONDUCT A POLICY OF PEACEFUL COEXISTENCE:” 1 RETHINKING
NUCLEAR DISARMAMENT FROM 1953 TO 1964
HI499: HISTORY THESIS
SECTION S6
MAJOR JAMES ISENHOWER
BY
CADET ANDREW S. GLENN ’04, COMPANY B-1
WEST POINT, NEW YORK
10 MARCH 2004
Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev, “Certain Questions of the International Situation,” speech to Soviet
Belorussian Republic Agricultural Personnel, in The Current Digest of the Soviet Press, vol. 10, no. 4
(Columbus, Ohio: American Association for the Advancement of Slavic Studies, 1957), 19.
1.
GLENN 1
After the Soviet Union dissolved, the 1990 Peace of Paris relegated tens of thousands
of nuclear weapons and warheads to the control of its former republics. Russia alone
retained 30,000 nuclear warheads, in addition to biological and chemical mass
destruction weapons. Due to political unrest and a lack of stability in many of these
former republics, unaccounted weapons may have since spread to rogue nations, terrorist
organizations, or may have been used to proliferate more weapons. The dangers posed
by the dissolution of the Soviet Union after the Cold War remain real and chilling.
It has long been argued in America that the U.S. position in the Cold War was
typically a response to Soviet aggression. NSC-68, the Truman Doctrine, the Domino
theory, Korea, Vietnam, and strategic deterrence were all, in American eyes, responses to
the aggressive “red” threat that loomed over the ocean’s horizon. The prevailing theories
hold that the Soviets wanted war with the West, desired expansion, propagated the arms
race, and provoked the Western alliance into a cold war. American policy, from 1949
until 1990, was driven by a fear of Soviet domination in the world. This perceived
conquest was a simple manifestation of the what many people believe today was the
cause of the ultimate end of the Cold War—an inherent “evilness” of the East (and,
conversely, an inherent “rightness” of the West).2
The facts, however, do not support this assumption. Aggressiveness was as much a
part of American policy as it was of Soviet policy. At times, the Soviets actively sought
peaceful settlements to crises while the United States responded with force or threat of
force, while at other times the United States sought peaceful resolutions while the Soviet
Union drove forward with force. The perception that the Soviet Union hawkishly
President Ronald Reagan: “Speech to the House of Commons, June 8, 1982,” in The Public Papers
of Ronald Reagan, June 1982.
2.
GLENN 2
propagated the arms race and the Cold War is less than accurate. How could the Soviets
attempting to reach international agreements on either nuclear or general disarmament, be
reconciled by their continued militarization of their economy and society? The answer to
the question is necessary for a more clear understanding of Cold War relations, as well as
a more complete understanding of contemporary global conditions.
The answer to the question will dispel the popular myth that the Soviet Union sought
to destroy the West, and will challenge the previously held notion that one side was right
and good while the other corrupt and evil. The Soviet Union continued to proliferate
weaponry while it sought peaceful resolutions and disarmament agreements, both actions
a deliberate effort to prepare for the worst-case scenario: war with the West. The Soviet
government perceived Western politics and diplomacy as equally threatening,
consequently seeking measures by which it could achieve security as a constitutional
ideology. During the premiership of Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev from 1953 to 1964,
the Soviet Union shifted diplomatic efforts in an attempt to thaw relations with America
and pragmatically sought disarmament as a viable means to peacefully coexist.
The Cold War dominates the minds of many modern historians, the vast majority of
whom experienced it firsthand. Many documents and other sources are only now
becoming available to historians for research with the consequence being that much of
the writing has been without empirical evidence, confined to social scientists rather than
historians. The lack of historical analysis merits further consideration of a myriad of
questions. Having a clearer understanding of the diplomacy of disarmament will
ultimately help one understand the true nature of the Cold War.
GLENN 3
The first problem an American historian faces when attempting to determine Soviet
sincerity is the lack not just of American sources but also of Soviet sources. An historian
would first have to acquire, and then translate, before he could analyze a Soviet historical
source. This complicates the process of answering historical questions. Thus, much of
the Cold War historical analyses produced to this point have been filtered through
western eyes.
Most writers have either skirted around or completely ignored the question of Soviet
intentions in disarmament diplomacy. The few writers that have paid attention to it have
written inadequate accounts of the Soviet position through the bias of western history.
Consequently, they have forced onto the Soviets an inaccurate account of their own
positions, claiming excessive hawkishness and political gamesmanship.
The leading theory in Soviet disarmament diplomacy is the gamesmanship idea put
forth by John Spanier and Joseph Nogee.3 The gamesmanship model claims that
disarmament was used solely as a vehicle of diplomatic “gamesmanship,” the
improvement of Soviet relative position through rhetoric, vis a vis America. Philip
Towle adapts gamesmanship and applies it to Soviet desires to improve their position
compared to the Federal Republic of Germany (FRG).4 Coit Blacker hints that the Soviet
government never had any intention of disarming but used the rhetoric only as a political
battleground.5
3.
John W. Spanier and Joseph L. Nogee, The Politics of Disarmament: A Study in Soviet-American
Gamesmanship (New York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1962), 6.
4.
5.
Philip Towle, Arms Control and East-West Relations (New York: Saint Martin’s Press, 1983), 97.
Coit D. Blacker, Reluctant Warriors: The United States, The Soviet Union, and Arms Control (New
York: W.H. Freeman and Company, 1987). Blacker claims that the United States desperately tried to reach
an agreement on disarmament with the USSR. He borders on the line of saying that the Soviet Union
resisted all measures to reach any agreement on disarmament.
GLENN 4
P. H. Vigor and Alexander Dallin take a more moderate approach.6 While stating that
diplomacy and rhetoric serve large roles in Soviet self-image, they emphasize the idea
that the Soviet Union could gain major domestic political victories through disarmament.7
Jennifer Sims demonstrates a dangerous tactic, offering the most common response of
social scientists and diplomatic historians to date. She simply skips the question and
moves onward to focus on American objectives.8 At the same time, William C. Potter
represents a radically different school from that of Spanier and Nogee. He recognizes
Soviet sincerity citing their active endorsement of various nonproliferation treaties.9
Most writers have either skirted around or completely ignored the question of Soviet
intentions in disarmament diplomacy. The few writers that have paid attention to it have
written inadequate accounts of the Soviet position through the tainted glass of Western
thought, having filtered the Soviet position through western political theories. Evidenced
by certain documents internal to the Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact states, the Soviet
Union (under Khrushchev’s direction) actively sought disarmament as a realist security to
protect the fledgling German Democratic Republic (GDR) and as a liberal attempt at
thawing relations with the West following the severing of ties that occurred under Stalin.
P. H. Vigor, The Soviet View of Disarmament (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1986). Alexander
Dallin et al., The Soviet Union and Disarmament: An Appraisal of Soviet Attitudes and Intentions (New
York: Frederick A. Praeger, 1964).
6.
7.
For example, they argue that sorely needed economic aid could be diverted from military spending
to bolster the struggling economy (especially the secondary sector).
8.
Jennifer Sims, Icarus Restrained: An Intellectual History of Nuclear Arms Control, 1945-1960
(Boulder, Colorado: Westview Press, 1990). One may compare her criticality and internationalist view of
American actions with Blacker who almost blindly accepts and purports American infallibility as it applies
to disarmament diplomacy.
William C. Potter, “The Soviet Union and Nuclear Proliferation,” in Slavic Review, vol. 44, no. 3
(Autumn, 1985), 468-488. Potter does not blindly accept the Soviet sincerity. He contrasts Soviet nuclear
export initiatives in the late 1970s and early 1980s but claims that these are just small exceptions to the
general path of disarmament and nonproliferation that the Soviets followed for security reasons.
9.
GLENN 5
Disarmament comprised a vast portion of Soviet foreign policy from the founding to
the dissolution of the USSR. In a letter to the governments of Great Britain, France,
Italy, the United States, China, and Japan, the Russian government declared its position
on disarmament, stating that the Government of Russia would only “welcome any
disarmament or reduction of military expenditures, a heavy burden for the working
people in all countries.”10 It is in keeping with this tradition that, following the end of the
Second World War, the Soviet government submitted multiple resolutions and proposed
several treaties that pursued disarmament and the control of weapons development by an
international organization.
Following the proliferation of atomic weaponry in the United States, the USSR
began—with renewed vigor—its push for international controls and disarmament. In
1946, the USSR proposed to the United Nations a draft, the first made by the Soviet
government, on prohibition of atomic weapons. The First Article of this draft declared
that no signatory was to use atomic weapons under any circumstance. It advocated the
prohibition of production and storage of atomic weapons within all signing states, and the
destruction of all stockpiled atomic weapons. The Second Article declared that any
violation of the First shall be considered “a very grave international crime against
humanity.”11 With this strong rhetoric, the Soviet Union entered the second half of the
long war with a policy marked by the paradoxical duality of preaching disarmament but
“Excerpt from the Note by the Government of the RSFSR to the Governments of Great Britain,
France, Italy, the United States, China and Japan,” 19 July 1921, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 30.
10.
“Draft International Convention on the Prohibition of the Production and Use of Weapons Based on
Employing Atomic Energy for Mass Destruction,” 19 June 1946, The USSR Proposes Disarmament
(1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 106.
11.
GLENN 6
practicing proliferation and development. Almost a year later, the Soviet delegation to
the UN Atomic Energy Commission submitted a follow-on proposal. This proposal
outlined the necessity for and means of creating an International Control Commission to
monitor the development of atomic energy programs and ensure that no new weapons
were developed.12 These two documents revealed the crux of the Soviet strategy for
reaching the peaceful solution of disarmament. The government sought prohibition and
destruction of atomic weapons and an international organization to oversee the process.
Further Soviet proposals paralleled the two aforementioned drafts for the next decade
and a half. In 1948, the USSR Delegation to the UN General Assembly submitted a
scathing resolution decrying the inactivity of the United Nations regarding previous
resolutions on arms reductions. Again, this proposal sought to destroy atomic weapons.
It also proposed to reduce conventional forces by one-third.13 One would expect that at
least parts of this proposal would meet with a receptive audience in the United States. A
state of disparity existed in the conventional forces of the Soviet Union and the United
States. Following the Second World War, the Soviet Union possessed significantly
stronger ground forces than the United States.14 The Soviet proposal would bring the
troop levels down for both countries with a greater reduction occurring in the Soviet
12.
“Proposals Concerning Atomic Energy Controls,” 11 June 1947, The USSR Proposes Disarmament
(1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 109112.
“Proposal Banning Atomic Weapons and Reducing by One-Third the Armaments and Armed
Forces of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR, France and China, the Permanent
Members of the Security Council,” 25 September 1948, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s),
compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S. Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 113-114.
13.
“NSC 5724. Report to the President by the Security Resources Panel of the ODM Science
Advisory Committee on Deterrence and Survival in the Nuclear Age, Washington, 7 November 1957,”
Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. XIX “National Security Policy,” (Washington,
D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 641.
14.
GLENN 7
Union. Later, following the death of Stalin, Khrushchev unilaterally began reductions in
ground forces.15
In November 1952, the United States tested the prototype hydrogen bomb on the
Pacific island Elugelab. On 12 August 1953, the Soviet government tested its first
thermonuclear device. Honoré M. Catudal explained that the Soviet authorities claimed
that their test was the first real test of a hydrogen bomb, because “the November 1952
U.S. test of a 60-ton thermonuclear device was not a deliverable weapon.”16
Nonetheless, the USSR kept up with the United States as both nations continued the arms
race. Despite their commitment to preserving the existing international structure and
balance of power, the Soviet government maintained its stance on disarmament. On 20
August 1953, the Soviet Union offered a declaration reaffirming their policy of
disarmament and encouraging other countries to accept their proposals on arms
limitations and reductions.17 The Soviet government continued its efforts, publishing
proposals similar to previous ones in 1954, 1957, and 1958.18
15.
These reductions will be discussed in slightly greater detail later in this paper.
16.
Honoré M. Catudal, Soviet Nuclear Strategy from Stalin to Gorbachev: A Revolution in Soviet
Military and Political Thinking (Atlantic Highlands, NJ: Humanities Press International, INC., 1989), 36.
Later, during the 326th meeting of the National Security Council, Governor Stassen claimed that Marshal
Zhukov made statements concerning Soviet possession of a wide variety of nuclear weapons. The notes
continue to tell us that no statement made by Georgiy Konstantinovich Zhukov, Soviet Minister of Defense,
concerning the Soviet Union’s possession of nuclear weapons has been found. John P. Glennon, ed.,
“Document 121. Memorandum of Discussion at the 326 th Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, June 13, 1957,” “National Security Policy,” 525.
“The USSR Government’s Statement on the Testing of a Hydrogen Bomb in the Soviet Union,” 20
August 1953, The USSR Proposes Disarmament (1920s-1980s), compiled by Ye. Potyarkin and S.
Kortunov (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1986), 115-116.
17.
18.
In 1954, the USSR submitted this declaration seeking a very broad consensus among the five
countries comprising the permanent members of the United Nations Security Council renouncing all
weapons of mass destruction. “Draft Declaration by the Governments of the United States, Britain, France,
the People’s Republic of China and the USSR on the Unconditional Renunciation of the Use of Atomic,
Hydrogen, and Other Kinds of Mass Destruction Weapons,” 30 January 1954, The USSR Proposes
Disarmament, 117. The Soviet Union proposed a complete end to testing atomic and hydrogen weapons.
GLENN 8
Perhaps the USSR’s strongest bid for disarmament during this early stage came in
1959 with the “Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete
Disarmament.”19 The declaration used powerful language to promote its strong message:
“General and complete disarmament is the way to save mankind from the scourge of
war.”20 The authors of the declaration reasserted their foreign policy, based on the
assumption that it was possible to prevent similar developments to those that had
previously led to the First and Second World Wars.21 The declaration also proposed
steps to reach general and complete disarmament over a finite period of time.22 Finally,
the distinct characteristic that set this declaration apart from previous, similar drafts was
the partial disarmament clause. This clause, not found in any other document prior to
this, made provisions for a partial disarmament—should the West prove unwilling and
refuse complete disarmament.23
The period following the end of the Second World War until 1964 was filled with
Soviet measures to limit the arms race and reach an agreement on general and complete
disarmament. Nikita Khrushchev, following the horrors of Josef Stalin, championed the
“Draft Resolution on the Cessation of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests,” 17 January 1957, The USSR
Proposes Disarmament, 118. The Soviet government offered several ideas in this document: (1) U.S.
President Eisenhower’s proposal to end ICBMs was not sufficient, (2) A ban on using space for weapons
testing was needed, (3) A need for the elimination of foreign bases, (4) discuss the need and (5) discuss the
practical implementation of control measures. “Proposal by the Soviet Government on the Question of the
Banning of the Use of Outer Space for Military Purposes, the Elimination of Foreign Bases on the
Territories of Other Countries, and International Co-operation in the Exploration of Outer Space,” 15
March 1958, The USSR Proposes Disarmament, 119-124.
“Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” 18 September
1959, The USSR Proposes Disarmament, 128-144.
19.
20.
Ibid., 128.
21.
Ibid., 131.
22.
Ibid., 139-142.
23.
Ibid., 143.
GLENN 9
idea of a world free from weapons.24 Under his administration, the West was faced with
a great number of proposals, declarations, and treaties attempting to reach an agreement
on complete and general disarmament. During this time, it became a standard in Soviet
foreign policy to seek the end of war through the aforementioned means.
In an international forum, it was relatively easy to claim a desire for disarmament. A
study of communications between U.S. and Soviet diplomats reveals the same desire for
disarmament. During an impromptu discussion between Soviet premier Khrushchev and
Harold Stassen, President Eisenhower’s special assistant on disarmament as well as the
head of both the Mutual Security Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration, the
Soviet leader voiced again his desire for international peace through the reduction of
arms, while expressing concern over U.S. intentions.25 This was just one example of
many simple talks between the heads of state or their representatives during which they
discussed nuclear disarmament in person. Meetings between both heads of state were
rare and relatively nonproductive, as both spouted their gamesmanship. Meetings,
however, that included one head of state and a diplomat were essential to the process of
disarmament. It is interesting to note that Stassen firmly desired disarmament and played
24.
Thomas B. Larson, Disarmament and Soviet Policy, 1964-1968, (Englewood Cliffs, NJ: PrenticeHall, Inc., 1969), 1-5.
25.
John P. Glennon, ed., “Document 136. Telegram From the Embassy in the United Kingdom to the
Department of State: London, 25 April 1956,” Foreign Relations of the United States: 1955-1957, vol. XX
“Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy,” (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing
Office, 1990), 375.
GLENN 10
a critical role in trying to reach agreements with the Soviets, possibly defying directives
from the White House at times.26
To declare international cooperation and peace as a national goal was simple. To
work to attain that goal became much more difficult. American historians have always
been wary to believe that the Soviet Union made sincere efforts to attain that goal.
Further complicating the study of this topic, until just recently, was the inaccessibility of
Russo-Soviet archives. A careful study of this newly available archival material might
reveal insight into the minds of Soviet statesmen.
Further analysis, however, suggests that the Soviet Union did seek to reach
agreements that would work towards the destruction of nuclear weapons and reduce the
size of conventional forces. Under the direction of Khrushchev, the Soviet Union
demonstrated a willingness to cooperate with the West to ease tensions and reach a more
peaceful world. There exist, for the time being, two tools by which this may be viewed:
through the study of the actual language of disarmament used in treaties and through the
study of internal publications within the Soviet government, which discuss the actual
steps taken by the Soviet Union to reach such agreements.
Since the language in the proposals discussed earlier contained plans of action on how
to achieve the goals, including such measures as inspections and the implementation of
advisory and supervisory committees, it suggested a more sincere attitude than the
flamboyant publicity stunts of empty documents. For example, in the “Declaration of the
Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” mentioned previously,
“Document 213. Editorial Note” vol. XX “Regulation of Armaments,” 572-573. Also: “Document
214. Informal Memorandum From the Chairman of the Delegation to the Subcommittee of the United
Nations Disarmament Commission (Stassen) to the Chairman of the Soviet Delegation (Zorin),” 31 May
1957, Ibid., 574-583.
26.
GLENN 11
there are provisions for a slowly phased reduction in arms.27 The coordination and
planning that was required for such a lengthy phased drawdown suggest a more sincere
approach. That is to say, there was a greater investment of Soviet planners’ energies, and
so it seems logical to conclude that there was a greater desire. As such, it may be useful
to examine these documents in greater detail. Researchers, however, wisely remain
cautious of putting full faith in such documents.
Throughout the lifespan of the proposals, evidence suggests that there was a gradual
increase of desire. The initial Soviet proposals sought simply to make illegal the use of
atomic and nuclear weapons.28 While these are modest requests, asking simply that
signatories denounce the use of mass destruction weapons, they certainly represented a
step toward general disarmament. In 1957, the next escalation occurred when the Soviet
government submitted a resolution that called for the end of weapons testing.29
After a long discourse on the necessity for disarmament in the “Declaration of the
Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” the Soviets proposed a
program, by which general and complete disarmament would be reached. In this
proposal, they outlined a three-phased program with force strengths, relative timelines,
and, most importantly, a partial disarmament clause. This clause acknowledged that the
West might not be fully cooperative with the USSR’s aims and stated that the Soviet
government was prepared to agree to partial measures. Furthermore, this resolution
27.
“Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” 141-143.
“Proposal Banning Atomic Weapons and Reducing by One-Third the Armaments and Armed
Forces of the United States of America, Great Britain, the USSR, France and China, the Permanent
Members of the Security Council,” 113-114. See also “Draft Declaration by the Governments of the
United States, Britain, France, the People’s Republic of China and the USSR on the Unconditional
Renunciation of the Use of Atomic, Hydrogen, and Other Kinds of Mass Destruction Weapons,” 117.
28.
29.
“Draft Resolution on the Cessation of Atomic and Hydrogen Weapons Tests,” 118.
GLENN 12
prioritized efforts—stating explicitly what the leadership thought most important to their
cause.30 The declaration demonstrated a sincerity on behalf of the Soviet Union. The
detailed outline showed the planning that would accompany an earnest proposal. As
suggested, the most important element in this document was the partial measures clause,
which showed a deep understanding of the criticism that the Soviet Union would receive
for its proposal and exhibited an earnest desire to pursue disarmament at any level.
Circumstantial evidence suggests that the Soviet Union did not at any time anticipate
complete disarmament, but used the rhetoric of such disarmament as the platform from
which they launched their hopes for partial disarmament.
Khrushchev and his subordinates worked diligently to create an international thaw in
relations, following Stalin’s death. This change in policy and attitude was best revealed
by an official in the Foreign Ministry who stated that “We’re starting a new policy that
will mean serious negotiating on disarmament.”31 It looked as if the USSR was eager to
negotiate and reach agreements. The U.S. government received the policy shift with
cynicism and distaste. Calling it the Soviet “peace offensive,” the National Security
Council denigrated the idea of peaceful coexistence stating that “the Soviet leaders have
almost certainly regarded their ‘peace offensive’ as their most effective present tactic for
dividing the free world.”32 The National Security Council’s statement was in
contradiction to a growing American view that “peaceful coexistence” was both possible
and good.33
30.
“Declaration of the Soviet Government on General and Complete Disarmament,” 141-143.
31.
Quoted by Arkady N. Shevchenko, Breaking with Moscow (New York: Knopf, 1985), pp. 72-84, at
pg. 78.
32.
“NSC 5501. Basic National Security Policy,” 7 January 1955, “National Security Policy,” 29.
GLENN 13
In an effort to demonstrate their own commitment to the ban of nuclear weapons, the
Soviet Union announced in 1958 a unilateral ban on testing.34 The Soviet Union bravely
stopped the testing of nuclear weapons five years prior to the conclusion of a U.S.-Soviet
pact that partially banned testing.35
As discussed earlier, the Soviet proposals were not limited to nuclear weaponry. On
10 May 1955, the Soviet government put forth a proposal, based on an original AngloFrench memorandum that included major reductions in conventional forces as well as
restrictions on nuclear weapons. The United States had previously declared support for
this document. Complete adherence to the plan would result in a Soviet reduction of
conventional ground forces by 20-25% of the force at the time of the publication. This
would have been a disproportionate reduction—certainly not nominal. The Soviet Union
would have, according to this plan, weakened itself militarily, considerably more than
any Western power.36
Some scholars argue that this move was performed as a sleight-of-hand to create a
sense of complacency in the Western Alliance while building a more modern Soviet
military based on the Strategic Rocket Forces (RVSN).37 However, the Soviet high
33.
The results of Gallup Poll on the same day as the publication of NSC 5501 show that nearly half of
Americans interviewed viewed peaceful coexistence possible and one in four viewed it as desirable.
Gallup Poll #540-K, 7 January 1955, 1301.
“Resolution of the Supreme Soviet of the USSR on the Unilateral Discontinuation of Atomic and
Thermonuclear Weapons Tests by the Soviet Union,” 31 March 1958, trans. by David Skvirsky, in
Milestones of Soviet Foreign Policy: 1917-1967 (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1967), 179.
34.
“Limited Test Ban Treaty,” 5 August 1963, in Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements
(Washington, D.C.: Government Printing Office, 1996), 29.
35.
A.A. Roshchin, “Gody obnovleniia, nadezhd i razocharovanii (1953-1959 gg.)” [Years of renewal,
hopes and disappointment (1953-1959)], Novaia i novishaia istoriia [Recent and Modern History], No. 5
(September-October) 1988, pp. 127-147.
36.
GLENN 14
command continued to believe that the greatest threat lay in conventional warfare in
central Europe—not in nuclear war.38 Given that threat, an offer to reduce conventional
forces by up to four million persons was no nominal feat. Soviet reductions of
conventional forces gained greater significance as the Soviet Union had no unified
nuclear strategy. It was not until 1960 that Khrushchev announced a policy based on
nuclear deterrence.39 Thus, in the earlier days of the force reduction, it was a
demonstration of trust, goodwill, and an honest desire to thaw relations with the West.
What is more, following the rejection of this proposal for a conventional force reduction
treaty, Khrushchev continued to unilaterally decrease his forces, claiming reductions as
high as two million persons.40
One of the major objectives of Khrushchev’s policy shift was to see a nuclear
nonproliferation treaty signed by NATO and the Warsaw Pact states. Viewing his actions
through the international theory of realism may help to better understand his actions.
Although he was motivated by a sense of liberalism and a desire for peace, he also
wanted to ensure the security of his state and those states in Eastern Europe, namely the
37.
W.W. Rostow, Open Skies: Eisenhower’s Proposal of July 21, 1955 (Austin, TX: University of
Texas Press, 1982), p. 20.
38.
Vasilii Danilovich Sokolovsky, Soviet Military Strategy, trans. Harriet Fast Scott (New York:
Crane, Russak, 1975), 198.
39.
Pravda, 15 January 1960.
40.
For further reading on Khrushchev’s troop reductions, see: Matthew Evangelista, “‘Why Keep Such
an Army?’ Khrushchev’s Troop Reductions,” Working Paper Series (Washington, D.C.: Cold War
International History Project, 1997), pp. 1-8. It is also interesting to note the short duration of these
reductions as Brezhnev quickly began a force buildup when he became general secretary.
GLENN 15
GDR. 41 His search for security demanded that the FRG not acquire control of nuclear
weapons, which might directly threaten the sovereignty of its socialist counterpart.
In spring of 1961, Washington and Moscow began serious talks on a Test Ban Treaty.
According to the U.S. State Department, the Soviet government was reluctant to agree to
the Test Ban Treaty, rejecting it repeatedly because of their objections to methods of
verification.42 The Soviet government rejected the treaty because it did not provide a
way to renounce the treaty in the event that one side breached it—which the Soviets
feared the Americans would. This same fear would again emerge during the talks in
1963 over the signing of a nuclear nonproliferation treaty.43 During Kuznetsov’s
remarks, the true desire to see nuclear weapons control became more clear. “When one
weighs all the pluses and minuses of the USA’s second proposal,” said Kuznetsov, “the
positive outweighs the negative… [and] an agreement on this basis is at any rate better
than the current situation, in which no such treaty exists.”44 Indeed, the Soviet
government sought more stringent restrictions at the time, but met with opposition from
the United States, who desired a multinational nuclear force within NATO to include the
41.
Perhaps the best example of this concern arose during the Berlin Crisis from 1958-1961. See
“Khrushchev’s Opening Speech to the 3-5 August 1961 Moscow Conference of Secretaries of the Central
Committees of Communist and Workers’ Parties of Socialist Countries for the Exchange of Opinions on
Questions Concerning the Preparation and Conclusion of a German Peace Treaty,” trans. by Hope
Harrison, “Ulbricht and the Concrete Rose: New Archival Evidence on the Dynamics of Soviet-East
German Relations and the Berlin Crisis, 1958-1961,” in Cold War International History Project Working
Paper Series, (Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, May 1993), 64.
42.
Department of State, Presidential Correspondence: Lot 66 D 204. Secret; Priority; Verbatim Text;
Eyes Only. Drafted by Davis; cleared by Kohler, Beam (ACDA), and Bromley Smith at the White House;
and approved by Ball. Repeated to Tokyo, London, Geneva, and Paris for USRO. Printed in Documents
on Disarmament, 1962, vol. I, 292-293.
43.
The TBT was signed on October 8, 1963 in the midst of discussions on the nonproliferation treaty.
See “Excerpts from discussion between Soviet Deputy Foreign Minister Vasilii Kuznetsov and the SED
Politburo,” October 14, 1963, reproduced in Douglas Selvage, “The Warsaw Pact and Nuclear
Nonproliferation: 1963-1965,” in Cold War International History Project Working Paper Series,
(Washington, D.C.: Woodrow Wilson International Center for Scholars, April 2001), 30-35.
44.
Ibid.
GLENN 16
FRG. These closed discussions within the Soviet Union revealed the true nature of
Soviet disarmament diplomacy.
It was during this time that Khrushchev sent a personal memorandum to Wladyslaw
Gomulka, the leader of the communist party in Poland, discussing his desire to conclude
a nuclear nonproliferation treaty with the United States, despite concerns over the lack of
restrictions on multi-national forces. In addition to his concern over a multi-national
nuclear force, which in reality was a concern about a nuclear West Germany, Khrushchev
clearly indicated his desire for peace when he said:
The Soviet Government is proceeding from the idea that this tactical line on the
question of the nonproliferation of nuclear weapons is in keeping with the
interests of preserving peace and the security interests of all the socialist states
and that it derives from the commonly agreed-upon line of the states of the
socialist commonwealth in the international arena.45
Since this was an internal memorandum, not intended for release to the West (indeed, it
was only recently released), it seems reasonable to take Khrushchev at his word. Had the
Soviet premier simply sent this memorandum to President Kennedy, the diplomatic
stakes might have made the message appear less sincere.
According to Gomulka’s response, Khrushchev apparently was more idealistic and
desired a thaw in international relations more than his Polish counterpart. Gomulka
stated explicitly that the conclusion of a nonproliferation treaty between the Western
Alliance and the Warsaw Pact was intolerable unless the Soviet Union demanded a clause
forbidding the creation of multinational nuclear forces. He also stated that his opinion
was that no nonproliferation treaty should be signed even if the United States and NATO
45.
Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev, memorandum to Wladyslaw Gomulka, trans Douglas Selvage
(Archiwum Akt Nowych: Komitet Centralny Polskiej Zjednoczonej Partii Robotniczej) sygn. 2639, pg. 21.
GLENN 17
renounced such forces.46 The forcefulness of Gomulka’s response indicated his concern
that Khrushchev would shortly thereafter conclude such a treaty, which suggests
Khrushchev’s willingness and desire to seek a peace with the West to relax tensions. 47
Across the polar ice cap from the Soviet Union stood the other global nuclear power—
the United States. While the Soviet Union, under Khrushchev’s leadership, worked
towards finding peaceful settlements, the United States under the influence of Secretary
of State John Foster Dulles, considered disarmament much less seriously.
Though the United States made several overtures similar to Soviet proposals on
disarmament, they seemed motivated more by competition than did the Soviets.48
Criticism of the Soviet disarmament proposals came primarily from non-Soviet states like
Poland, while criticism for disarmament proposals in the United States came from the
nation’s leadership, most frequently from John Foster Dulles.
Even before Dulles and the Eisenhower administration, elements of American
criticism existed for attempts to peacefully resolve differences with the Soviet Union.
George Kennan, well-known for his advisory correspondence from Moscow at the
outbreak of the Cold War under the pseudonym “Mr. X,” served as a diplomatic envoy
to Moscow in 1945 and 1946. During this time, he provided the State Department with
his analysis of the Soviet government. Kennan declared that the combination of Stalinist
46.
The original memorandum from Khrushchev stated that he was prepared and willing to sign the
treaty without this clause.
47.
Wladyslaw Gomulka, letter to Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev, 8 October 1963, trans. Doug
Selvage.
48.
Under the Eisenhower administration, these proposals focused most heavily upon what is now
known as the “Open Skies” program, aerial verification. See John P. Glennon. Ed., “Document 48.
Editorial Note,” Foreign Relations of the United States, 1955-1957, vol. XX, “Regulation of Armaments;
Atomic Energy,” (Washington, D.C.: United States Government Printing Office, 1990), 163-164.
GLENN 18
politics and Marxist ideology created a dangerous state that could not be trusted. Kennan
proposed the implementation of containment, significantly shaping American foreign
policy during this time.49 Truman, influenced by Kennan, issued the Truman Doctrine in
a style reflecting the ideas of his mentor. Truman announced that it would be the policy
of the United States government to assist revolutionary movements that supported
parliamentarianism. In essence, he declared war on Communism sans a war
declaration.50
Another very powerful and important voice opposing Soviet attempts at disarmament
was that of Bernard Baruch, the United States representative to the United Nations
Atomic Energy Commission. Baruch shattered the Soviet’s efforts when he declared:
“Don’t let us be the first to disarm!… We must be strong.”51 The Baruch Plan envisaged
an international commission that would put the development and production of nuclear
energy programs as well as nuclear weapons under U.S. control.52 Baruch called for a
world under the domination of U.S. military power.
Dulles, perhaps better than anyone else during the Cold War, understood the
implications of disarmament and competitively participated in gamesmanship. In a draft
memorandum, he discussed the need for national armament to defend a nation. He
proceeded to analyze the recent “good” Soviet behavior as a virtue of necessity and
49.
George Kennan, “The Sources of Soviet Conduct,” in Foreign Affairs, Vol. XXV, July 1947, pp.
566-582, reprinted in Walter Lafeber, America in the Cold War: Twenty Years of Revolutions and
Response, 1947-1967, (New York and London: John Wiley and Sons, INC., 1969), 35-48.
Public Papers of the Presidents… Harry S. Truman… 1947, (Washington, D.C.: Government
Printing Office, 1963), 176-180. Reprinted in Lafeber, 49-55.
50.
51.
Bernard M. Baruch, The Public Years, (New York: Pocket Books, INC., 1962), 363. Reprinted in
The USSR Proposes Disarmament, 100.
52.
Ibid., 100; see also Morris V. Rosenbloom, Peace through Strength: Bernard Baruch and a
Blueprint for Security, (Washington, D.C. and New York: American Surveys in association with Farrar,
Straus and Young, 1953), 257-291.
GLENN 19
claimed that as such, care should be taken to not proceed too hastily or completely with
disarmament.53 He argued that out of necessity, from a security paradigm, the United
States must support or propose a plan.54 Secretary Dulles wanted to see the United States
support or propose a treaty on disarmament that would appease American allies and the
American populace while not going so far as to remove the “necessity” of the Soviet
Union to be on its best behavior.
While Dulles was penning these thoughts, Governor Howard Stassen, the director of
both the Mutual Security Agency and the Foreign Operations Administration, met with
the Joint Chiefs of Staff and recounted the meeting, saying that “it was [the Joint Chiefs]
view… that it was better to continue with the present situation and the arms race than to
enter an agreement with the Soviets.”55 The memorandum continues to state that the
Joint Chiefs held this view because they believed it to be a more effective deterrent to
war.
Viewing American responses to Soviet actions is an important tool that has been
overlooked by many who write about the Cold War. Samples of the general American
reaction across the duration might hint at the success of the Soviet Union to convince
people of their sincerity. In July 1955, nearly half of the American population surveyed
in a Gallup Poll stated that they thought that Russia and foreign policy were the primary
Secretary Dulles references Molotov’s portrayal of the Soviet Union as “good” in his
memorandum: “Document 43. Draft Memorandum by the Secretary of State,” “Regulation of
Armaments,” 141.
53.
54.
Ibid., 140-142.
“Document 45. Memorandum of Discussion at the 253 rd Meeting of the National Security Council,
Washington, June 30, 1955,” “Regulation of Armaments; Atomic Energy,” 145.
55.
GLENN 20
concerns that faced America.56 Nine years later, in Oct 1964, “international problems”
were still listed as the chief concern but the primary focus shifted from Russia to
“specifically Vietnam.”57 Admittedly, this is a large jump. Trends, however, seem to
support this. When asked about the possibility for peaceful coexistence, 41% of those
surveyed in January 1955 said it was possible while 53% of those surveyed in February
and March 1962 said it was possible.58 Throughout this period viewed, questions about
the Soviet Union appear less and less—suggesting that people were less concerned about
the threat it posed. Indeed, by May 1964, the Soviet Union dropped to the second
greatest threat to peace with only 27% of those surveyed claiming it.59 Khrushchev had
been successful, it would seem, with his desire to thaw relations with America and the
West.
Another medium for studying American opinion is newspaper editorials. On 31
October 1955, C. L. Sulzberger wrote in the New York Times about Soviet-American
relations over the future of Germany. His words were scathing: “Moscow still regards
itself politically as a dynamic power in Europe.”60 The implication is that neither
Sulzberger, nor anyone else in the West, considered this to be true. Later, on 14
September 1958, an editorial discussed Soviet and Western attempts to disarm. Although
still critical, this editorial portrayed the Soviet Union as more willing to work, stating that
56.
Gallup Poll #548-K, 3 July 1955, 1345.
57.
Gallup Poll #698-K, 11 October 1964, 1905.
58.
Gallup Poll #540-K, 7 January 1955, 1301. See also: Gallup Poll #654-KA, 2 February 1962,
1754. It is interesting to know that in January 1955 only 26% of those surveyed thought peaceful
coexistence was a good thing.
59.
Gallup Poll #689-K, 22 May 1964, 1881.
60.
New York Times, 31 October 1955, 32.
GLENN 21
“if successful, [an East-West conference scheduled to begin on 31 October 1958 in
Geneva] would mark a real break in the long-standing disarmament deadlock.”61
Reviewing editorials in other newspapers would undoubtedly render similar results.
Analyses of Cold War disarmament often share a common shortcoming, one
characterized by a lack of Soviet internal sources (i.e., primary sources). Frequently,
researchers have not studied the question of Soviet involvement in disarmament
altogether. This truly is a grave oversight and one that must be reconciled. A close study
of both Soviet and American documents, however, shows that under Khrushchev, the
Soviet government began an honest effort to pursue disarmament as part of a general
diplomatic shift in pursuit of “peaceful coexistence.” Khrushchev characterized this
pursuit when he said in a 1957 speech:
So let us not frighten one another but manifest some sound thought and pledge on
a mutually acceptable basis to put an end to the 'cold war,' stop the arms race and
establish conditions for the peaceful coexistence of states and for consolidating
peace throughout the world.62
This effort for peaceful coexistence was frustrated by mutual distrust between the Soviet
Union and the United States, which took a harder stance on disarmament. The two
nations were unable to coexist until one forsook their ideology. The foreign policy shift
in the Soviet Union and the issue of disarmament reveal more completely the diplomatic
history of the Cold War and have implications for contemporary and future diplomacy.
61.
New York Times, 14 September 1958, 24.
62.
Nikita Sergeivich Khrushchev, “Certain Questions of the International Situation,” 20.
GLENN 22
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