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Powers Soc 316 July 5 Lecture Outline A more truly spontaneous order… Axelrod=more ambitious SO theory o o o theory rests on concept of equilibrium Equilibrium in social science Equilibrium = stable, often self-reinforcing outcome o Equilibria can be… Cooperative = Non-cooperative = We often end up w/sub-optimal equilibria, aka “social dilemmas” or the “problem of social order.” Represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD) PD PD 2 players, designated o Row o Column They have 2 choices o Cooperate o Defect Noncooperative equilibrium: no matter what the other does, defection produces a higher payoff than cooperation What’s the dilemma? PD diagram pg. 264 in your book PD, cont’d Pays to defect if you think partner will cooperate (5>3), and if you think partner will defect (1>0) o Best move for you is defect, same for other player o Note: specific numbers don’t matter, except to indicate which strategy is most beneficial So, if players are rational egoists, both defect, getting 1 each. Had they both cooperated, they’d get 3 each. Mutual defection=subopt equilibrium 1 Powers Soc 316 July 5 Lecture Outline Ex’s of sub-optimal equilibria 2 sources of suboptimal outcomes 1. The PD Structure (payoffs) specifies actors are rational egoists o Without this assumption, highest payoff would be for cooperation regardless of what other player chooses, making cooperative equilibrium much easier to attain 2. Coordination o If game ≥2 coordination equilibria, even altruists can fail to cooperate. Solution = conventions: Invisible-hand solutions to PD The iterated PD Axelrod’s tournament An indefinite # of 2-person PD games winning strategy: Tit-for-Tat Requirements of the result Cooperation based on reciprocity o Mechanism = The "shadow of the future" is important enough to make this reciprocity stable o Live & Let Live (trench warfare in WWI) small units & immobility mimics 2-person iterated PD Additions to model: truce made “mutual cooperation” strategy more valuable to both sides, ’d trust & moral consideration for opponents’ welfare (p. 280) Conclusion: cooperation can develop even between those w/ opposing interests Theoretical Critique Axelrod’s spontaneous order solutions assume indefinitely repeating interaction w/ same partners Based on 2-person games, but can it work for groups? 2 Powers Soc 316 July 5 Lecture Outline Empirical critique of spontaneous order theories in general (esp. Smith) Polanyi Summary of Spont Order Critique Theoretical critique Empirical critique Laissez-faire (free-market) capitalism was a disaster, and gov’ts had to step in & regulate firms For tomorrow: I will hand back outlines with feedback, which you should use for your summary of cases, due in class on Monday. For Simmel, make a two-column comparison of concentric vs. juxtaposed group formation. What time/place is each characteristic of? Describe how groups and identity are organized. Describe the type of social order in each. NOTES ON HOW TO PREP FOR NEXT EXAMS: 3