Download A more truly spontaneous order…

Powers Soc 316
July 5 Lecture Outline
A more truly spontaneous order…
 Axelrod=more ambitious SO theory
o
o
o theory rests on concept of equilibrium
Equilibrium in social science
 Equilibrium = stable, often self-reinforcing outcome
o
Equilibria can be…
 Cooperative =
 Non-cooperative =
 We often end up w/sub-optimal equilibria, aka “social dilemmas” or the “problem of
social order.”
 Represented by the Prisoner’s Dilemma (PD)
PD


PD
2 players, designated
o Row
o Column
They have 2 choices
o Cooperate
o Defect
 Noncooperative equilibrium: no matter what the other does, defection produces a
higher payoff than cooperation
 What’s the dilemma?
PD diagram pg. 264 in your book
PD, cont’d
 Pays to defect if you think partner will cooperate (5>3), and if you think partner
will defect (1>0)
o Best move for you is defect, same for other player
o Note: specific numbers don’t matter, except to indicate which strategy is
most beneficial
 So, if players are rational egoists, both defect, getting 1 each. Had they both
cooperated, they’d get 3 each. Mutual defection=subopt equilibrium
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Powers Soc 316
July 5 Lecture Outline
Ex’s of sub-optimal equilibria
2 sources of suboptimal outcomes
1. The PD
Structure (payoffs) specifies actors are rational egoists
o Without this assumption, highest payoff would be for cooperation
regardless of what other player chooses, making cooperative equilibrium
much easier to attain
2. Coordination
o If game ≥2 coordination equilibria, even altruists can fail to cooperate.
Solution = conventions:
Invisible-hand solutions to PD
 The iterated PD
Axelrod’s tournament
 An indefinite # of 2-person PD games
 winning strategy: Tit-for-Tat
Requirements of the result
 Cooperation based on reciprocity
o Mechanism =
 The "shadow of the future" is important enough to make this reciprocity stable
o
Live & Let Live (trench warfare in WWI)
 small units & immobility mimics 2-person iterated PD
 Additions to model: truce made “mutual cooperation” strategy more valuable to both
sides, ’d trust & moral consideration for opponents’ welfare (p. 280)
 Conclusion: cooperation can develop even between those w/ opposing interests
 Theoretical Critique
 Axelrod’s spontaneous order solutions assume indefinitely repeating interaction w/
same partners
 Based on 2-person games, but can it work for groups?
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Powers Soc 316
July 5 Lecture Outline
Empirical critique of spontaneous order theories in general (esp. Smith)
 Polanyi
Summary of Spont Order Critique
Theoretical critique
Empirical critique
Laissez-faire (free-market) capitalism was a disaster, and gov’ts had to step in &
regulate firms
For tomorrow:
 I will hand back outlines with feedback, which you should use for your summary
of cases, due in class on Monday.
 For Simmel, make a two-column comparison of concentric vs. juxtaposed group
formation. What time/place is each characteristic of? Describe how groups and
identity are organized. Describe the type of social order in each.
NOTES ON HOW TO PREP FOR NEXT EXAMS:
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