Download 2011 INCSR: Introduction

2011 INCSR: Introduction
BUREAU OF INTERNATIONAL NARCOTICS AND LAW ENFORCEMENT AFFAIRS
2011 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR)
March 3, 2011
Legislative Basis for the INCSR
The Department of State’s International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) has been prepared in accordance with section 489 of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (the "FAA," 22 U.S.C. § 2291). The 2011 INCSR, published in March 2011, covers the year January 1 to December 31,
2010 and is published in two volumes, the second of which covers money laundering and financial crimes. In addition to addressing the reporting requirements
of section 489 of the FAA (as well as sections 481(d)(2) and 484(c) of the FAA and section 804 of the Narcotics Control Trade Act of 1974, as amended), the
INCSR provides the factual basis for the designations contained in the President’s report to Congress on the major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing
countries initially set forth in section 591 of the Kenneth M. Ludden Foreign Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act, 2002 (P.L.
107-115) (the "FOAA"), and now made permanent pursuant to section 706 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (the
"FRAA").
Section 706 of the FRAA requires that the President submit an annual report no later than September 15 identifying each country determined by the President
to be a major drug-transit country or major illicit drug producing country. The President is also required in that report to identify any country on the majors list
that has "failed demonstrably . . . to make substantial efforts" during the previous 12 months to adhere to international counternarcotics agreements and to take
certain counternarcotics measures set forth in U.S. law. U.S. assistance under the current foreign operations appropriations act may not be provided to any
country designated as having "failed demonstrably" unless the President determines that the provision of such assistance is vital to U.S. national interests or
that the country, at any time after the President’s initial report to Congress, has made "substantial efforts" to comply with the counternarcotics conditions in the
legislation. This prohibition does not affect humanitarian, counternarcotics, and certain other types of assistance that are authorized to be provided
notwithstanding any other provision of law.
The FAA requires a report on the extent to which each country or entity that received assistance under chapter 8 of Part I of the Foreign Assistance Act in the
past two fiscal years has "met the goals and objectives of the United Nations Convention Against Illicit Traffic in Narcotic Drugs and Psychotropic Substances"
(the "1988 UN Drug Convention"). FAA § 489(a)(1)(A).
Several years ago, pursuant to The Combat Methamphetamine Enforcement Act (CMEA) (The USA Patriot Improvement and Reauthorization Act 2005, Title
VII, P.L. 109-177), amending sections 489 and 490 of the Foreign Assistance Act (22 USC 2291h and 2291) section 722, the INCSR was expanded to include
reporting on the five countries that export the largest amounts of methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as the five countries importing the largest
amounts of these chemicals and which have the highest rate of diversion of the chemicals for methamphetamine production. This expanded reporting, which
also appears in this year’s INCSR and will appear in each subsequent annual INCSR report, also includes additional information on efforts to control
methamphetamine precursor chemicals, as well as estimates of legitimate demand for these methamphetamine precursors, prepared by most parties to the
1988 UN Drug Convention and submitted to the International Narcotics Control Board. The CMEA also requires a Presidential determination by March 1 of each
year on whether the five countries that legally exported and the five countries that legally imported the largest amount of precursor chemicals (under FAA
section 490) have cooperated with the United States to prevent these substances from being used to produce methamphetamine or have taken adequate steps
on their own to achieve full compliance with the 1988 UN Drug Control Convention. This determination may be exercised by the Secretary of State pursuant to
Executive Order 12163 and by the Deputy Secretary of State pursuant to State Department Delegation of Authority 245.
Although the Convention does not contain a list of goals and objectives, it does set forth a number of obligations that the parties agree to undertake. Generally
speaking, it requires the parties to take legal measures to outlaw and punish all forms of illicit drug production, trafficking, and drug money laundering, to control
chemicals that can be used to process illicit drugs, and to cooperate in international efforts to these ends. The statute lists actions by foreign countries on the
following issues as relevant to evaluating performance under the 1988 UN Drug Convention: illicit cultivation, production, distribution, sale, transport and
financing, and money laundering, asset seizure, extradition, mutual legal assistance, law enforcement and transit cooperation, precursor chemical control, and
demand reduction.
In attempting to evaluate whether countries and certain entities are meeting the goals and objectives of the 1988 UN Drug Convention, the Department has
used the best information it has available. The 2011 INCSR covers countries that range from major drug producing and drug-transit countries, where drug
control is a critical element of national policy, to small countries or entities where drug issues or the capacity to deal with them are minimal. The reports vary in
the extent of their coverage. For key drug-control countries, where considerable information is available, we have provided comprehensive reports. For some
smaller countries or entities where only limited information is available, we have included whatever data the responsible post could provide.
The country chapters report upon actions taken - including plans, programs, and, where applicable, timetables - toward fulfillment of Convention obligations.
Because the 1988 UN Drug Convention’s subject matter is so broad and availability of information on elements related to performance under the Convention
varies widely within and among countries, the Department’s views on the extent to which a given country or entity is meeting the goals and objectives of the
Convention are based on the overall response of the country or entity to those goals and objectives. Reports will often include discussion of foreign legal and
regulatory structures. Although the Department strives to provide accurate information, this report should not be used as the basis for determining legal rights or
obligations under U.S. or foreign law.
Some countries and other entities are not yet parties to the 1988 UN Drug Convention; some do not have status in the United Nations and cannot become
parties. For such countries or entities, we have nonetheless considered actions taken by those countries or entities in areas covered by the Convention as well
as plans (if any) for becoming parties and for bringing their legislation into conformity with the Convention’s requirements. Other countries have taken
reservations, declarations, or understandings to the 1988 UN Drug Convention or other relevant treaties; such reservations, declarations, or understandings are
generally not detailed in this report. For some of the smallest countries or entities that have not been designated by the President as major illicit drug producing
or major drug-transit countries, the Department has insufficient information to make a judgment as to whether the goals and objectives of the Convention are
being met. Unless otherwise noted in the relevant country chapters, the Department’s Bureau for International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs (INL)
considers all countries and other entities with which the United States has bilateral narcotics agreements to be meeting the goals and objectives of those
agreements.
Information concerning counternarcotics assistance is provided, pursuant to section 489(b) of the FAA, in section entitled "U.S. Government Assistance."
Major Illicit Drug Producing, Drug-Transit, Significant Source, Precursor Chemical, and Money Laundering Countries
Section 489(a)(3) of the FAA requires the INCSR to identify:
(A) major illicit drug producing and major drug-transit countries;
(B) major sources of precursor chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics; or
(C) major money laundering countries.
These countries are identified below.
Major Illicit Drug Producing and Major Drug-Transit Countries
A major illicit drug producing country is one in which:
(A) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit opium poppy is cultivated or harvested during a year;
(B) 1,000 hectares or more of illicit coca is cultivated or harvested during a year; or
(C) 5,000 hectares or more of illicit cannabis is cultivated or harvested during a year, unless the President determines that such illicit cannabis
production does not significantly affect the United States. FAA § 481(e)(2).
A major drug-transit country is one:
(A) that is a significant direct source of illicit narcotic or psychotropic drugs or other controlled substances significantly affecting the United States; or
(B) through which are transported such drugs or substances. FAA § 481(e)(5).
The following major illicit drug producing and/or drug-transit countries were identified and notified to Congress by the President on September 15, 2010,
consistent with section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (Public Law 107-228):
Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos,
Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
Of these 20 countries, Burma, Bolivia, and Venezuela were designated by the President as having “failed demonstrably” during the previous 12 months to
adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489(a)(1) of the FAA. The President
determined, however, in accordance with provisions of Section 706(3)(A) of the FRAA, that continued support for bilateral programs in Bolivia and limited
programs in Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.
Major Precursor Chemical Source Countries
The following countries and jurisdictions have been identified to be major sources of precursor or essential chemicals used in the production of illicit narcotics:
Argentina, Brazil, Canada, Chile, China, Germany, India, Mexico, the Netherlands, Singapore, South Korea, Taiwan, Thailand, the United Kingdom,
and the United States.
Information is provided pursuant to section 489 of the FAA in the section entitled "Chemical Controls."
Major Money Laundering Countries
A major money laundering country is defined by statute as one "whose financial institutions engage in currency transactions involving significant amounts of
proceeds from international narcotics trafficking." FAA § 481(e)(7). However, the complex nature of money laundering transactions today makes it difficult in
many cases to distinguish the proceeds of narcotics trafficking from the proceeds of other serious crime. Moreover, financial institutions engaging in transactions
involving significant amounts of proceeds of other serious crime are vulnerable to narcotics-related money laundering. This year’s list of major money laundering
countries recognizes this relationship by including all countries and other jurisdictions, whose financial institutions engage in transactions involving significant
amounts of proceeds from all serious crime. The following countries/jurisdictions have been identified this year in this category:
Afghanistan, Antigua and Barbuda, Australia, Austria, Bahamas, Belize, Bolivia, Brazil, British Virgin Islands, Burma, Cambodia, Canada, Cayman
Islands, China, Colombia, Costa Rica, Cyprus, Dominican Republic, France, Germany, Greece, Guatemala, Guernsey, Guinea-Bissau, Haiti, Hong
Kong, India, Indonesia, Iran, Iraq, Isle of Man, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jersey, Kenya, Latvia, Lebanon, Liechtenstein, Luxembourg, Macau, Mexico,
Netherlands, Nigeria, Pakistan, Panama, Paraguay, Philippines, Russia, Singapore, Somalia, Spain, Switzerland, Taiwan, Thailand, Turkey, Ukraine,
United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom, United States, Uruguay, Venezuela, and Zimbabwe.
Further information on these countries/jurisdictions and United States money laundering policies, as required by section 489 of the FAA, is set forth in Volume II
of the INCSR in the section entitled "Money Laundering and Financial Crimes."
Presidential Determination
The White House
Washington
September 15, 2010
Presidential Determination No. 2010-16
Pursuant to Section 706(1) of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act, Fiscal Year 2003 (P.L. 107-228) (FRAA), I hereby identify the following countries as
major drug transit or major illicit drug producing countries: Afghanistan, The Bahamas, Bolivia, Burma, Colombia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador,
Guatemala, Haiti, Honduras, India, Jamaica, Laos, Mexico, Nicaragua, Pakistan, Panama, Peru, and Venezuela.
A country’s presence on the Majors List is not necessarily an adverse reflection of its government’s counternarcotics efforts or level of cooperation with the
United States. Consistent with the statutory definition of a major drug transit or drug producing country set forth in section 481(e) (2) and (5) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA), one of the reasons that major drug transit or illicit drug producing countries are placed on the list is the combination
of geographic, commercial, and economic factors that allow drugs to transit or be produced despite the concerned government’s most assiduous enforcement
measures.
Pursuant to Section 706 (2) (A) of the FRAA, I hereby designate Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela as countries that have failed demonstrably during the previous
12 months to adhere to their obligations under international counternarcotics agreements and take the measures set forth in section 489 (a) (1) of the FAA.
Accompanying this report are justifications for the determinations on Bolivia, Burma, and Venezuela, as required by Section 706 (2) (B).
I have also determined, in accordance with provisions of Section 706 (3) (A) of the FRAA, that continued support for bilateral programs in Bolivia and limited
programs in Venezuela are vital to the national interests of the United States.
Afghanistan continues to be the world’s largest producer of opium poppy and a major source of heroin. The United States Government recognized the
Government of Afghanistan’s ongoing commitment to combating narcotics and the range of initiatives undertaken in this regard under the auspices of the
Government of President Karzai. A noteworthy achievement is the reduction of opium poppy cultivation from 157,000 hectares in 2008, to 131,000 hectares in
2009, a 17 percent decline.
The connections between opium production, the resulting narcotics trade, corruption, and the insurgency continue to be among the most challenging obstacles
to reducing the drug threat in Afghanistan. Poppy cultivation remains largely confined to provinces in the south and west where security problems greatly
impede counternarcotics efforts. Nearly all significant poppy cultivation occurs in insecure areas with active insurgent elements, although progress has been
made in stabilizing these regions. Nevertheless, the country must demonstrate even greater political will and programmatic effort to combat opium trafficking
and production nationwide.
Pakistan is a major transit country for opiates and hashish for markets around the world, especially for narcotics originating in Afghanistan. Pakistan also is a
major transit country for precursor chemicals illegally smuggled to Afghanistan where they are used to process heroin.
Pakistan is still challenged by extremist groups who have power over parts of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas, particularly where most of Pakistan’s
poppy is grown. These extremist groups are also found in settled areas of the Khyber Pakhtoonkhwa Province such as its capital, Peshawar, and the Swat
Valley. The Government of Pakistan is forced to divert law enforcement resources and equipment from poppy eradication efforts to contest these incursions.
The Government of Pakistan remains concerned about opium poppy cultivation in Pakistan and is working to return to poppy-free status soon. A joint U.S.Pakistan survey in 2009 estimated that 1,779 hectares of opium poppies were under cultivation in Pakistan, approximately 130 hectares less than was under
cultivation in the country the previous year.
The range of U.S.-Pakistan initiatives, which include programs to defeat the insurgency on the Pakistan-Afghanistan border and prevent terrorist safe-havens,
have the spin-off effect of helping Pakistan to fortify its land borders and seacoast against drug trafficking and terrorists, support expanded regional cooperation
and encourages Pakistan to return to poppy-free status. United States Government support focuses especially on upgrading the institutional capacity of
Pakistan’s law enforcement agencies.
Although Brazil no longer qualifies as a major transit country to the United States, narcotics control in this country which occupies such a large landmass in the
hemisphere is of serious concern. Dynamic drug trafficking trends from Brazil are directed primarily at other countries, especially to and through Africa, and
onward to Europe. For example, seizures of maritime vessels that departed Brazil in 2009, primarily to European destinations, recorded an unprecedented 2.2
metric tons of cocaine. With its vast terrain and shared borders with so many other countries, Brazil faces unique challenges in terms of patrolling so much
illegal land, air and sea activity. Brazil is seeking to reduce its growing domestic drug use at home, especially the use of cocaine, cocaine base and crack
cocaine, primarily from Bolivia; and marijuana. The United States recognizes Brazil’s emergence as a forward-leaning regional leader for cooperation among
neighboring states to thwart drug production, trafficking, and use. Like all hemispheric countries, it is important for Brazil to place narcotics and crime control at
the top of its national security agenda to thwart these negative influences.
As Mexico and Colombia continue to apply pressure on drug traffickers, the countries of Central America are increasingly targeted for trafficking of cocaine and
other drugs primarily destined for the United States. This growing problem resulted in Costa Rica, Honduras, and Nicaragua meeting the threshold for inclusion
in the Majors List. Panama and Guatemala, already on the Majors List, are especially vulnerable because of their geographic location. Enhanced and effective
counternarcotics measures are needed to thwart smugglers from moving illegal drugs through the seven countries on the isthmus, as well as the waters along
the region’s long Atlantic and Pacific coastlines between the coca producing Andes to the south and determined and flexible criminal trafficking organizations
based in Mexico. United States Government support through the Central American Regional Security Initiative provides Central American countries with the
opportunity to boost their rule of law institutions and promote greater regional law enforcement cooperation to counter drug trafficking and transnational
organized crime.
United States and international data shows a continued strengthening of illegal drug trafficking between Latin America and East Africa, especially via Brazil and
Venezuela, with a considerable portion of illegal product destined for Europe. Nigeria, a worldwide drug trafficking focal point, makes counternarcotics a top
national security concern for the country, but Nigeria’s efforts are often thwarted by lack of resources, institutional capability and corruption. A number of U.S.
projects in Nigeria and other West African counties are aimed at building limited capacity to investigate and prosecute organized drug traffickers.
Drug traffickers continue to move significant quantities of cocaine through West Africa. For example, Gambian officials recently discovered over 2 tons of
cocaine being stockpiled in the country. The crash of a Boeing 727 in Mali, which was believed to be carrying cocaine, points to new trafficking methods being
used in the region. Drug trafficking remains a threat to security, good governance, and – increasingly, public health in West Africa. Many countries in the region
have weak criminal justice institutions and are vulnerable to corruption. The facilitation of drug trafficking by government officials continues to be a significant
challenge, especially in Guinea-Bissau. The United States is encouraged that some countries are actively investigating illegal drug traffickers. Liberia, for
example, worked closely with the United States to arrest suspects and deliver them into U.S. custody to stand trial.
The assistance of international donors and organizations to West African governments to improve their counternarcotics capability is increasingly urgent. The
United States fully supports all efforts to promote, preserve, and protect the stability and positive growth of countries in West Africa.
The United States continues to maintain a strong and productive law enforcement relationship with Canada. Both countries are making significant efforts to
disrupt the two-way flow of drugs, bulk currency, and other contraband. Canadian criminal groups continue to produce large quantities of MDMA (ecstasy) and
high-potency marijuana that is trafficked to the United States. The frequent mixing of methamphetamine and other unknown substances into pills marketed as
MDMA by Canada-based criminal groups poses an emerging public health risk to the United States, as well as in Canada.
The stealth with which both natural and synthetic drugs including marijuana, MDMA, and methamphetamine are produced in Canada and trafficked to the
United States, makes it extremely difficult to measure the overall impact of such transshipments from this shared border country, although U.S. law enforcement
agencies record considerable seizures of these substances from Canada.
At the same time, the Drug Enforcement Administration reports that of the amount of MDMA seized in the United States, about half was traced to Canada as its
country of origin in 2009.
You are hereby authorized and directed to submit this determination under Section 706 of the FRAA, transmit it to the Congress, and publish it in the Federal
Register.
Barack Obama
Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination of Major Illicit Drug Transit or Illicit Drug Producing Countries for FY 2011
Burma
Burma has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under Section 489 (a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
While Burmese law enforcement have had some successes, Burma’s drug enforcement authorities have not suppressed drug production and trafficking from
the cease fire enclaves of certain ethnic minorities, primarily the region controlled by the United Wa State Army. The Government of Burma does not control
those areas, and some Burmese Government officials are implicated in the drug trade. In addition, opium cultivation, long on the decline in most regions of
Burma, has been rising in the Shan State, with minimal response from the Burmese regime. Due to these deficiencies in drug law enforcement, Burma has been
unable to meet its international counternarcotics obligations.
From 2006 to 2009, opium cultivation in Burma increased from 21,500 hectares to 31,700 hectares, according to the UN Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC).
There continues to be an increase in production and transshipment of synthetic drugs, such as amphetamine-type stimulants, predominately in the Shan State
and border areas controlled by ethnic minority groups. Unchallenged in their base areas, criminal gangs continue to manufacture dangerous drugs and traffic
those drugs to surrounding countries. Methamphetamine pills and, increasingly, the crystal form of methamphetamine are the most important drugs exported
from Burma. Burma’s illicit methamphetamine exported to Thailand has a devastating impact on drug users, and this substance is having a growing negative
impact on China and the countries of Southeast Asia. Burma’s lawless border regions and endemic corruption help facilitate the diversion and trafficking of
precursor chemicals.
In terms of its enforcement efforts, Burma has eradicated narcotics operations of smaller groups such as the Kokang Chinese, but other more potent groups,
such as the Wa, continue to operate. Burmese law enforcement seized larger quantities of methamphetamine, precursors and heroin in 2009. Burma’s seizures
included the largest heroin seizure (762 kg) ever made in Southeast Asia, the seizure of 13.1 million methamphetamine tablets, and more than 20 metric tons of
chemical precursors. However, methamphetamine and heroin continued to flow out of Burma’s ethnic minority regions to the major surrounding countries.
It has been six years since the last U.S.-Burma joint opium yield survey, previously an annual exercise. In the absence of that survey, an annual survey
conducted by the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime (UNODC) is used to track opium cultivation and production. Opium yield surveys are clearly in the
interest of both sides to track the implications of policy steps taken and to gauge future action based on concrete facts rather than estimates.
The number of injecting drug users and regular consumers of methamphetamine-type stimulants in Burma is increasing, and intravenous drug users contribute
to the expansion of Burma's HIV/AIDS epidemic. Burma has one of the most serious problems of illegal drug use in Asia. However, Burma’s prevention and
drug treatment programs suffer from inadequate resources and a lack of high-level government support.
Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination of Major Illicit Drug Transit or Illicit Drug Producing Countries for FY 2011
Bolivia
The United States remains committed to the bilateral dialogue designed to establish the basis for a cooperative and productive relationship going forward, and
especially to agree on joint actions to be taken regarding issues of mutual interest, including counternarcotics.
We recognize that the government of Bolivia has taken some steps to combat the production and trafficking of illegal narcotics. However, during the past year
Bolivia failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements or to take the counternarcotics
measures set forth in Section 489(a)(1) of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended (FAA).
Over the past 12 months, the United States maintained its counternarcotics support for Government of Bolivia counternarcotics efforts. While the Government of
Bolivia’s efforts, particularly those benefitting from U.S. support, continued to achieve some goals in interdiction and eradication, the Bolivian Government failed
to diminish the production of coca leaf and cocaine products.
The United States Government estimated that, in 2009, net coca cultivation in Bolivia was approximately 35,000 hectares, nearly 9.4 percent higher than 2008
and the highest estimated level in a decade. In 2009, Bolivia eradicated 6,341 hectares of coca, about 1,100 more hectares than the previous year. These
results, while significant, have not resulted in a net reduction in the cultivation of coca in Bolivia.
The United States Government estimated that Bolivia’s potential cocaine hydrochloride production remained at 195 metric tons in 2009. Bolivian police seized
approximately 27 metric tons of finished cocaine and coca paste in 2009, a figure slightly lower than 2008. Law enforcement in Bolivia also reported the
destruction of 4,865 cocaine base labs, roughly the same number as in 2008. In 2009, the number of cocaine hydrochloride labs destroyed increased to 16, as
compared to seven in the previous year. In large part because of the Bolivian Government’s January 2009 decision to expel U.S. Drug Enforcement
Administration (DEA) officials from Bolivia, the United States Government is unable to verify this data. The trends track the rising prevalence of Colombian-style
manufacturing methods and the increasing presence of Columbian and Mexican drug traffickers in Bolivia.
The Government of Bolivia continued its efforts to obtain counternarcotics assistance from other countries, especially Brazil. These efforts have not addressed
the gap in operational support and enhanced investigative capabilities to target and dismantle drug trafficking organizations created by the government’s
expulsion of the DEA.
In addition, Bolivia has not implemented some of the controls outlined by the international counterdrug conventions. Strict licensing for coca growers is not
enforced, illicit coca crops are not seized at the time of harvest, and illicit coca markets are not closed. The Government of Bolivia also failed to develop and
execute a national drug strategy consistent with its international obligations.
The Bolivian government promotes a policy of “social control” of illicit and excess coca cultivation. The policy has diminished violence, but it has not yielded
reductions in excess production. The Government of Bolivia maintained its intent to increase the amount of coca it deems licit to 20,000 hectares, in violation of
its own laws and international obligations.
The total effort by the Government of Bolivia over the past 12 months falls short of its obligations to the international community as outlined in the United
Nations and bilateral agreements. In accordance with Section 481(e)(4) of the FAA, the determination of having failed demonstrably does not result in the
withholding of humanitarian and counternarcotics assistance. It is in the vital national interest of the United States to grant a waiver so that funding for other
assistance programs may also be allowed to continue.
Memorandum of Justification for Presidential Determination of Major Illicit Drug Transit or Illicit Drug Producing Countries for FY 2010
Venezuela
Venezuela has failed demonstrably to make sufficient efforts to meet its obligations under international counternarcotics measures set forth in Section 489(a)(1)
of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended.
This determination takes into account actions taken by the Government of Venezuela during the past 12 months. Despite the opportunity for improved
collaboration which could have been provided by the return of Ambassadors to Caracas and Washington, Venezuela has not responded to U.S. Government
offers to work in a consistent, rigorous, and effective way towards greater cooperation on counternarcotics. Venezuela’s President and Minister of Justice
continue to refer to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) as a drug trafficking organization. Venezuela never replied to an invitation by the Office of
National Drug Control Policy extended in September 19, 2009, to send experts to the Marijuana Potency Monitoring Program in Oxford, Mississippi. In 2009, the
U.S. Ambassador extended an invitation to Venezuela’s National Anti-Drug Office (ONA) Director to discuss developing a mechanism for exchanging
information on drug smuggling flights for Venezuelan interdiction. To date there has been no response.
Venezuela remains an important transshipment point for drugs bound for the United States and Europe and increasingly to West Africa. Corruption within the
Venezuelan government and a weak and politicized judicial system contribute to the ease with which illicit drugs transit Venezuela. Trafficking through
Venezuela increased from an estimated 50 metric tons of cocaine in 2004 to an estimated 143 metric tons in 2009.
While the ONA publicly reports seizures of illicit drugs, the Venezuelan government does not share the necessary data or evidence needed to verify seizures or
the destruction of illicit drugs. The U.S. Coast Guard (USCG) has received permission from the Government of Venezuela to board suspect Venezuelan-flagged
vessels operating in the Caribbean. Venezuelan authorities require the return of confiscated vessels, people and any contraband located during these
operations. There is no exchange of information regarding drug trafficking organizations, the prosecution of the suspects or the destruction of the drugs seized.
The Venezuelan Government took some positive steps regarding counternarcotics issues during the past year, including: the July 13, 2010, deportation of three
significant fugitives to the United States to stand trial for drug trafficking offenses; the purchase of aircraft, radars and patrol vessels purportedly intended for
combating drug trafficking; the destruction of numerous clandestine airstrips; and the transfer of several drug traffickers to Colombia, the United States, and
Europe. However, Venezuela remains a pre-eminent transit country for cocaine shipments. The Venezuelan Navy and Coast Guard did not report making any
at-sea drug seizures on their own in the last 12 months. The number of illicit flights that depart Venezuela to supply drug trafficking organizations remains
unchanged, indicating that the new aircraft and radars are not effectively employed.
In addition, there continue to be credible reports that the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) and the National Liberation Army (ELN) have
established camps in Venezuela along its border with Colombia. The ability to operate freely in western Venezuela would facilitate the FARC’s well-established
involvement in narcotics trafficking. The Venezuelan Government merely denies the reports and has refused to investigate them further or to permit international
bodies to investigate them. In light of this lack of action, questions are legitimately raised as to whether the Venezuelan Government and armed forces are
tolerating this presence. Individual members of Venezuela’s National Guard and Police are credibly reported to both facilitate and be directly involved in
narcotics trafficking.
Venezuela’s efforts fall short of its obligations to the international community as outlined in the relevant United Nations Conventions and bilateral agreements. A
determination of having failed demonstrably does not affect funding for humanitarian and counternarcotics programs. A limited U.S. vital national interest waiver
to Venezuela will permit funding for other programs critical to U.S. foreign policy interests.
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