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Sophie Pineau (002937 048)
Theory of Knowledge Essay
Mr. Fred Wolno
Citadel High School, Halifax, Nova Scotia, Canada
Word Count: 1305
“What separates science from all other human activities is its belief in the
provisional nature of all conclusions” (Michael Shermer, www.edge.org). Critically
evaluate this way of distinguishing the sciences from other areas of knowledge.
The pursuit of knowledge and the understanding of our world is vital to the
existence and evolution of the human species. The hunger for knowledge has lead
humans to seek concrete conclusions in all areas of knowledge for thousands of years.
We accumulate knowledge, with each new conclusion in a field contributing to the
expansion of human knowledge. We may seek this knowledge in psychology, physics, or
even the visual arts. Embedded in Shermer’s remark is the well established knowledge
issue concerning the justification for a knowledge claim in the different areas of
knowledge. Researchers in all areas of knowledge use different kinds of justifications for
their conclusions and claims, gained through methods appropriate to their fields.
However, Shermer’s statement implies a marked distinction between conclusions in
“science” and other areas of knowledge. While the provisional nature of knowledge in the
natural sciences may differentiate it from certain areas of knowledge, it is simultaneously
paralleled in others.
Although Shermer’s remark clearly attempts to contrast “science” from other
“human activities,” it is ambiguous about the nature of either term, and it is for this
reason that we must define them in the context of this argument. In this essay “science”
shall be defined as the natural sciences, and “human activities” as all other areas of
knowledge.
We are sometimes led to believe that natural science is a body of knowledge that
is true beyond a doubt. However, the grounds of validity of scientific reasoning are a
pivotal concern in the area of the natural sciences, and they are the root of the provisional
nature of scientific conclusions. Based on the scientific method, scientific assertions must
undergo rigorous testing before they will be accepted as laws or scientific theories and
ought to be falsifiable, that is capable of being proven false by observation or a physical
experiment. The assertion is not necessarily false, but if it is then this can be shown by
observation or experimentation. Essentially, scientific assertions are tentatively accepted
until proven false. It is not possible for scientists to have tested every incidence of an
action, and found a reaction. How is it then that they can assert that any scientific theory
is universally true? We observe this situation in Europe, where the miasma theory of
disease originated in the Middle Ages and persisted, remaining very popular, until the
mid19th century,1 when through experimentation Robert Koch established a link between
1
Halliday, S. “Death and miasma in Victorian London: an obstinate belief.” British
Medical Journal 323.7327 (2001): 1469-71. Print.
microbe and disease, and revolutionized bacteriology.2 Granted at this time the scientific
method was not as well developed, but it was nonetheless a shocking paradigm when
Robert Koch created his Postulates. What is to say that tomorrow Newtonian mechanics
will still be found to hold true? With this, Einstein’s expansions and refinements of
Newton’s theories would too deteriorate, along with other theories that accumulated,
relying on the validity of Newton’s Principia. It is for this reason we must accept certain
assumptions without empirical proof, like axioms. By the very nature of scientific
generalization and inductive reasoning it is not ever possible to verify; only falsify. This
is what Einstein intended to convey in his statement, “No amount of experimentation can
prove me right; a single experiment can prove me wrong.”3
Shermer’s use of the wording “its belief” in his remark seems to suggest that
natural science is one single entity, personifying a system of knowledge. This is not
2
“Robert Koch – The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1905.” Nobelprize.org. N.d.
Web. 19 Dec. 2009. <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1905/kochbio.html>.
3
As noted by Alice Calaprice in Calaprice, Alice. The New Quotable Einstein. Princeton:
Princeton University press, 2005. 291. Print. Calaprice denotes this not an exact
quotation, but a paraphrase of a translation of A. Einstein's "Induction and Deduction".
Collected Papers of Albert Einstein. 7 Document 28. Volume 7 is The Berlin Years:
Writings, 1918-1921. A. Einstein; M. Janssen, R. Schulmann, et al., eds.
altogether incorrect: science is sometimes described as a “social construct.”4 The total
body of scientists is often referred to as the scientific community, and discussion and
debate or peer review attempt to assist in maintaining the objectivity sought by the
scientific method. However, the implication that this entire community shares one belief
is dubious. One example of this is the debate regarding evolution and intelligent design.
While many notable scientists strongly reject intelligent design,5 there are other scientists
who support intelligent design and reject Darwinism.6 They are all members of the
scientific community and yet they do not necessarily agree; as this is possible so may it
be possible that there is disagreement concerning the provisional nature of science,
despite the general acceptance of the scientific method.
Over time many philosophical perspectives have attempted to extend the scientific
method to all areas of investigation, including the human sciences. However, the patterns
and generalizations of the natural sciences are not so well mirrored in this field. It could
4
Wyllys, R. E. “Science as a Social Construct.” The University of Texas at Austin:
School of Information.28 Feb. 2003. Web. 16 Dec. 2009.
5
Meyer, Stephen C. “The Demarcation of Science and Religion.” Center for Science &
Culture. Discovery Institute, 1 Jan. 2000. Web. 21 Dec. 2009.
<http://www.discovery.org/a/3524>.
6
“A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism.” A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism.
Discovery Institute. Jan. 2010. We. 6 Jan. 2010.
<http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDBdownload.php?command=download&id=660>.
be argued that conclusions reached in this field are not truly provisional, but there may in
fact be no conclusions at all. There are no “laws” in the social sciences; only co-existing
theories based on observations with their own areas of applicability. Social scientists
have now come to realize that laws cannot be identified that would hold true in all cases
when human behaviour is concerned. While behaviour may be predicted in terms of
probability, it is much harder to explain the behaviour of each individual. Many
sociologists take an intermediate position and argue that human behaviour is more
complex than the cycles of planets or animal behaviours. Even when attempting to make
observations of social phenomena, it is impossible to not affect the subjects in observing,
or for the observer to remain completely separate and impartial. In economics there are
basic regularities that have been designated as the laws of economics, but they generally
only apply under very specific circumstances, and are often easily falsified. An example
of this is the law of supply and demand, and Sraffa’s critique of this “law” based on the
rationale for the upward slope of the supply curve in a market for a produced
consumption good and the inconsistency of partial equilibrium analysis.7 The human
sciences are most definitely separated from the natural sciences in that no concrete
conclusions are reached at all, let alone provisional conclusions. The field of study is too
chaotic and random to be encompassed by any law thus far, making the human sciences a
unique field of study.
7
Cohen, Avi J. “The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions’: Progress in
Microeconomics Since Sraffa.” Eastern Economic Journal 9.3 (1983). Print.
While the examination of the human sciences serves to further support Shermer’s
claim, mathematics is an area of knowledge that appears to most closely resemble the
natural sciences in its methods. Natural science is like mathematics in that models in both
science and mathematics need to be internally consistent and also ought to be falsifiable,
and researchers in both disciplines can clearly distinguish what is know from what is
unknown at each stage of discovery. The mathematical method is very similar to the
scientific method, and when a statement has attained mathematical proof the statement
gains a kind of immortality similar to that of a law of natural science. Mathematics is
also similar to natural sciences in that it is built upon a foundation, usually assumptions
known as axioms. The provisional nature of such foundations is demonstrated in
Euclidian geometry, which was assumed valid and true for over 2,100 years until the 19th
century, when doubt was cast upon Euclid’s fifth postulate, and it became apparent that
axioms were true only within a system and this came to define mathematical truth.8
Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorem essentially stated that no axiomatic system can ever
prove its own consistency, and this again draws parallel to the natural sciences: axiomatic
systems can never be validated, only falsified.
Shermer’s statement is valid in its drawing light to the unique facets of the natural
sciences and the aspects which differentiate this field from other areas of knowledge. It
is, however, too narrow and unjustified. While knowledge within the natural sciences is
undoubtedly provisional, mathematics is also an example of this phenomena. The insight
8
Dombrowski, Eileen, Lena Rotenberg, and Mimi Bick. Theory of Knowledge Course
Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. 140. Print.
into the nature of knowledge provided in his assertion is instrumental to a deeper
understanding of how and what we know. If knowers foster an appreciation of the fluidity
of knowledge and understand that it is not in fact rigid and static, we may continue with
confidence on our quest for knowledge.
Works Cited
Calaprice, Alice. The New Quotable Einstein. Princeton: Princeton University press,
2005. Print.
Cohen, Avi J. “The Laws of Returns Under Competitive Conditions’: Progress in
Microeconomics Since Sraffa.” Eastern Economic Journal 9.3 (1983). Print.
Dombrowski, Eileen, Lena Rotenberg, and Mimi Bick. Theory of Knowledge Course
Companion. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007. Print.
Halliday, S. “Death and miasma in Victorian London: an obstinate belief.” British
Medical Journal 323.7327 (2001). Print.
Meyer, Stephen C. “The Demarcation of Science and Religion.” Center for Science &
Culture. Discovery Institute, 1 Jan. 2000. Web. 21 Dec. 2009.
<http://www.discovery.org/a/3524>.
Wyllys, R. E. “Science as a Social Construct.” The University of Texas at Austin: School
of Information.28 Feb. 2003. Web. 16 Dec. 2009.
“A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism.” A Scientific Dissent from Darwinism. Discovery
Institute. Jan. 2010. We. 6 Jan. 2010.
<http://www.discovery.org/scripts/viewDB/filesDBdownload.php?command=download&id=660>.
“Robert Koch – The Nobel Prize in Physiology or Medicine 1905.” Nobelprize.org. N.d.
Web. 19 Dec. 2009. <http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/medicine/laureates/1905/kochbio.html>.