Download 43.1 How the Great War Began

How the Great War Began
Well into the second decade of the twentieth century a notion of optimism filled Western
civilization with hope. Before science and technology were applied to modern warfare, they had
helped raise Europe’s standard of living. Educational opportunities were on the rise, and
democracy was dawning. Furthermore, since the end of Napoleon’s violent schemes Europe had
not known a serious conflict among any of the Great Powers except for the border clash between
France and the young German nation in 1870. With both Germany and Italy attaining nation
status, many predicted that Europe would enter a long era of peace among a community of
nations inspired by the notion of the brotherhood of man and maintained by tribunals in an
agency called the International Court located in the Netherlands. What prophets of peace failed
to realize was that rising nationalism led to rising competition among nations, especially nations
with empires, or those who wanted empires.
What most of the men who fought the Great War knew about war was fed to them by
nationalistic newspapers glorifying the exploits of professional armies fighting colonial wars
against non-industrialized opponents. Despite the deadly nature of new weapons of war like the
machine gun, a romantic perception of war held that it was the ultimate test of a nation’s cultural
greatness. Amid strong national impulses, national greatness necessarily meant national
supremacy over others. The historical background of a common European civilization gave way
dangerously to pockets of intensely patriotic citizens who thought their unique cultural attributes
made them better than their neighbors. The question is how could the assassination of one leader
propel all the nations of Europe into a catastrophic, self-destructive war? The answer lies in a
close look at the expansive tendencies of the dual monarchy of Austria-Hungary and the intensity
of German nationalism in its new unity forged by Otto von Bismarck, the prime minister to the
Prussian king.
The dominance of Prussia in the unification of Germany brings up another aspect of
European civilization important to consider. Of all the German states, Prussia was the most
militarized. Certain Prussian rulers had developed impressive military forces that had been used
as mercenaries throughout recent European history. When Bismarck began to organize German
unity, the Prussian military was the stick and the greatness of German kultur was the carrot.
Along with the nationalism and imperialism of European nations now was forged militarism, the
devotion of national ideals to military strength. Many nations saw Prussia’s success and invested
economic resources as well as glory in their new modern armies and navies. Militarism dictates
that the highest expression of a culture is found in military might. In competition with other
nations it also meant that military leaders began to assert more and more control in national
governments. Some nations had aggressive, militarily trained rulers. Others had groups of
military officers that gained enough prestige to be able to dictate policy to civilian rulers. The
astonishing fact is that few individuals in Europe took time away from military parades and the
formation of organizations glorifying their nations to recognize that nationalism, imperialism,
and militarism were like components of gunpowder mixed together in a barrel awaiting only a
small spark to ignite an explosion. The assassination, when it came, provided the spark.
Austria-Hungary’s problem was that it contained Germans, Hungarians, Czechs, Croats,
Slovenes, and Serbs. These last four minorities had one thing in common—they were Slavic.
As the Ottoman Empire began its slow decline, groups in the Balkans like the Serbs broke free
from Ottoman control. The Slavic groups under Serbian influence sought to band together to
attain independence from the Austro-Hungarian Empire as well. Russia even proposed the
notion of Pan-Slavism which called for solidarity among the Slavs in the south along with
Russians, Poles, Bulgarians, and others. The rising nationalism in Europe undermined the ability
of Austria-Hungary to manage its multi-national Empire. A fourth major cause of the Great War
must be mentioned here. When a Serbian nationalist assassinated the heir to the throne of
Austria-Hungary, the result might have been a short war of annexation to enlarge the AustroHungarian Empire. Instead, the machinations of Bismarck had put in place an alliance system
that became the fourth ingredient in the gunpowder making its explosive force more potent.
When the Germans fulfilled their dream of national unity they were immediately propelled to the
front rank of European nations and upset the balance of power that had existed since Napoleon’s
defeat. Germans looked at the map of Europe and concluded that they (and their AustroHungarian neighbors) were contained in an “iron ring” of other nations. In order to survive they
would have to expand, acquire colonies, build a powerful navy, and otherwise act to create world
markets and earn world respect.
Having just humiliated France in the Franco-Prussian War, Bismarck wanted to keep
France isolated. The territory of Alsace-Lorraine was added to the new German nation at the
expense of France, and Bismarck set about to maintain control by forging the Triple Alliance, an
agreement allying Germany, Austria-Hungary, and Italy against a possible assault by France to
regain its lost territory. Meanwhile, Bismarck made a treaty with Russia to further isolate
France. This balance was indeed a delicate one because both Austria-Hungary and Russia eyed
the Balkans with either desirous or protective glances. When a new emperor ascended to the
throne of Germany, however, Bismarck found himself shunted aside. Kaiser Wilhelm II came to
power in 1888 and created a more belligerent foreign policy. Whereas Bismarck considered
German expansion over, the new Kaiser and his military leaders envisioned building a navy that
would eventually challenge the British navy and allow Germany to secure overseas holdings to
catch up with the other imperial powers. Kaiser Wilhelm ended the peace treaty with Russia by
1890.
Events accelerated from there. Russia, humiliated by a loss to Japan in the RussoJapanese War by 1905 saw dissension in the ranks of its soldiers and its workers increase
steadily. Both France and Russia feared the growth of German power and aspirations between
them and formed an alliance in response. After some clashes over territories in North Africa in
which Britain sided with France, the United Kingdom overcame its traditional reluctance to
commit troops to the Continent and joined with France and Russia in the Triple Entente. The
Great Powers of Europe were then broken into two hostile camps of nationalistic, imperialistic,
and militaristic peoples suddenly suspicious and frightened. Germany responded by claiming it
must break the iron ring it had long suspected was closing in around it and resolved to support
the Austro-Hungarian Empire as a weaker neighbor Germany could not afford to lose. The
Triple Entente denied any offensive goals and claimed to exist only for defensive purposes.
Germany’s disbelieving this claim as well as linking itself to an unstable nation on the border of
the most volatile place in Europe (the Balkans) were the two reasons why Europe eventually
blamed Germany for all the devastation that was to follow.
Meanwhile in that volatile region, Austria-Hungary annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina,
two other Slavic provinces of the Ottoman Empire that Serbs viewed as a model for what was
about to happen to them. German strategists responded by coordinating military plans with
Austria-Hungary in the event of war with Serbia that might involve France and Russia.
Bismarck had tried to hold the Austro-Hungarians back; Kaiser Wilhelm coolly offered German
support if Russia ever began to mobilize. The volatility increased in the 1912 Balkan War where
Montenegro, Serbia, Bulgaria, and Greece attacked the Ottoman Empire. Together these nations
took all European territory away from the Ottomans except for Constantinople (Istanbul) itself.
As a reward, Serbia was offered the Albanian coast which would have granted them long-desired
access to the sea. Austria-Hungary resolved not to let Serbia expand. Germany backed its ally.
Russia did not back Serbia, and the nation of Albania was created as a result to the deep
consternation of the Serbs. Both the Serbs and the Russians vowed to never suffer such
humiliation again.
And now for the assassination. The Austro-Hungarian Archduke, Franz Ferdinand, was
the heir to the throne and a man with a plan. He had traveled on June 28, 1914, to the newly
acquired city of Sarajevo in Bosnia to spread his idea that once he sat on the throne (and his
uncle, Franz Josef, was old and ill) the Slavs within his empire would be set on an equal footing
with Germans and Hungarians. He was accompanied by a military display to communicate
resolve to Serbia, but his mission was one of good will—he even brought his wife, Sophie.
Waiting for him was a team of Bosnian and Serbian terrorists armed with hand grenades and
pistols. While the Archduke’s caravan passed through the city streets a conspirator hurled a
grenade. The driver of the Archduke’s car saw the object flying toward them and accelerated,
and the grenade went off beneath the next car in line. The Archduke was whisked away in his
car but later asked about those injured. He insisted on seeing them in the hospital, and on the
way his driver took a wrong turn landing the Archduke and his wife right in the path of Gavrilo
Princip, a young Serbian conspirator who had given up and was on his way home. Princip fired
as the car went by at a distance of about five feet and hit the Archduke in the neck and Sophie in
the abdomen. Both soon died of their wounds.
Certain Austrian leaders resolved to use the assassination as a pretext to crush Serbia.
They checked with their German allies and were encouraged to take up arms against the
troublesome Serbs. On July 23rd Austria-Hungary presented an ultimatum to Serbia and
demanded a response within 48 hours. The terms of the ultimatum were designed to be so harsh
and insulting as to elicit a refusal to comply which could be used as a reason to invade. Russia
did move, this time, and said such an attack would mean that Austria-Hungary determined to
dominate the entire Balkans region. With German militarism backing up Austro-Hungarian
imperialism and Russian wounded pride and Slavic nationalism at stake, the terrorist attack
brought about its design but on a much larger scale than the Black Hand (the terrorist
organization) had bargained for. Within six weeks all of the Great Powers were mobilizing their
troops in the Great War. With Russian assurances, Serbia rejected the provision of the
ultimatum that said Austro-Hungarian officials could enter Serbia to investigate the
assassination. A rejection of one provision of the ultimatum was considered a rejection of all,
and on July 28th, exactly one month after the assassination, Austria-Hungary declared war on
Serbia.
What happened next was later considered to be pathetically absurd, but at the time the
nations involved in the crisis operated under long-held plans of military mobilization for the war
that most had predicted and to which some looked forward. Russia had no plans to mobilize
against Austria-Hungary alone, so they went ahead and mobilized against Germany as well.
Germany’s military plans called for a two-front war against both Russia and France, and since
the Russians were expected to take longer to mobilize, the German plan called for all trains to
take troops to France first. Germany declared war on Russia and then two days later on France.
Germany asked Belgium for permission to travel through that country to avoid having to attack
France’s fortifications on their mutual border. When Belgium refused, Germany advanced there
anyway, and the Great War is said to have begun in earnest when Great Britain declared war on
Germany for this violation of a neutral country’s territory.
All of the forces of patriotic fervor enflamed each nationalistic, imperialistic, and
militaristic nation to fight. Internal conflicts dissipated in combatant nations who faced enemy
invasions that threatened the destruction of their version of civilization. Crusading volunteers
flocked to recruiting stations in what some historians remarked was a collective desire for the
more primal urges of human nature for adventure over against the more humdrum life of
bourgeois, industrialized society. Bold claims were made for a short war. The Germans planned
to be in Paris by Christmas once the hastily mustered Belgian defenses collapsed. They hardly
believed the British would fight and assumed their troops that crushed the French would be able
to swing back east to fight the Russians before the Czar could put an army in the field. The
French believed their national fighting spirit would easily overcome any technological or
industrial advantages the Germans possessed. The Russians trusted in their superior numbers.
When diplomatic failures and unrestricted submarine warfare drew the United States into the
war, then President Woodrow Wilson told Americans they were fighting to make the world safe
for democracy. All of these assumptions were wrong.