Download From physics to metaphysics, one way or another.

From physics to metaphysics,
one way or another.
Stephen Ames
History and Philosophy of Science
The University of Melbourne
[email protected]
From physics to metaphysics,
one way:
Prof. Paul Davies, following John Wheeler, takes information to be
ontologically basic and physically fundamental, i.e. “It from Bit”,
and argues:
Information → [forms of the] Laws of Physics → Matter”
This is his aim. The “→” are promissory notes.
I raise two questions about his proposal
or another:
Prof Roy Frieden starts with Fisher information and argues
Information → (forms of the) Laws of Physics
The “→” are actual derivations
I use this to open a different approach to metaphysics.
Paul Davies
• Background
• Davies’ Ontological proposal
• Two questions for Davies
BACKGROUND
Davies asserts that science is empirical and our finest theories
must be grounded, somehow in ‘reality’. But then asks, “where
is reality?” (2010, 65)
Various answers are not acceptable to Davies:
.
No grounding - only an infinite regress of explanations. (2010,66)
The ‘tower of turtles’ or ‘turtles all the way down’ .
• Stopping the regress with a ‘self-levitating’ turtle
> the universe as an ultimate brute fact (Bertrand Russell, Sean Carroll) (2010, 67)
or God (R.Swinburn) (2006, 231)
> God as necessary existent (K.Ward), which for Davies is another
form of ‘self-levitation’, among other problems.(2006,231; 2010,66)
.
On the Laws of Physics
Davies is not happy with what he takes as the common, hidden assumptions about
the laws of physics as immutable, infinitely precise mathematical relationships
that transcend the physical universe, and so are unaffected by what goes on in the
universe. (2010, 71) According to Davies:
. The assumptions reflects the 300year old remnants
of their Platonic/Theological provenance (2010, 72,3.)
. Most physicists reject this older world-view, while many mathematicians
are Platonists. (2010,71,72)
. Both Platonism and theism to be rejected.
For similar views at least about the laws of nature, see Stoeger, W., (1996) and Unger, R., and Smolin, L., (2015)
Alternative views about the laws of physics are represented Cartwright, N. (1983); Mittelstaedt, P., and Weingarter, P., Laws of Nature , (Springer, 2005)
. On the Laws of Physics cont.
Davies says these assumptions may be attacked at their most vulnerable
point: “namely the assumption of infinite precision.” (2010, 73.)
This assumption is alright as a technical convenience, along with the use of
differential equations, real numbers, of infinite and infinitesimal quantities
and continuity. (73)
. On the Laws of Physics cont.
The challenge arises from the fact that observation can only be conducted
to finite accuracy and the assumption of “infinitely precise laws is a leap of
faith”
Davies will later point to circumstances where this assumption “may lead us
astray in a testable manner.” (2010, 73)
Davies’ Own Position
.
Davies has had a long term interest in life and consciousness as somehow
central to rather than being an accidental by-product of the material
processes of the universe.
Davies has long focused on the fact that the universe is knowable,
comprehensible, intelligible (1990a, 1990b, 1992, 2006) and on the fact that the
universe is fine-tuned for carbon based life.
He contends that these two facts are closely connected.
This “cognisability” is due in part to the universe exhibiting a great deal of
linearity and locality, attributed to ‘fine tuning’ – following J. Hartle (1991) – see
Davies (1992).
Why is all this important to Davies?
“Expressed more succinctly, if one insists on attributing the pathway from
mundane chemistry to life as the outcome of fixed dynamical laws, then
(as our analysis suggests) those laws must be selected with extraordinary
care and precision, which is tantamount to intelligent design: it states that
‘life’ is written into the laws of physics ab initio. There is no evidence at all
that the actual known laws of physics possess this almost miraculous property.”
(Walker and Davies 2016)
Why is all this important to Davies?
Davies rejects the thought that “the mighty edifice of scientific rationality is
ultimately rooted in absurdity.” (2006, 248)
How does Davies address this matter?
“Instead of accepting the laws of physics as a levitating super-turtle at the
bottom of the stack – an unexplained brute fact – might we push beyond at
least one step, and try to account for why the laws are as they are, to show
that there are reasons for why they have the form that they do?”
(2010, 73; italics added.)
DAVIES’ ONTOLOGICAL PROPOSAL
Davies proposes a world-view:
“in which information is the primary entity from which physical reality is built.” (75)
Information “occupies the ontological basement” (82).
In a variant of J. Wheeler’s view Davies (2010,75 ) wishes to
“place information at the base of the explanatory scheme, thus:
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter”
Davies is clear that the “→” are promissory notes.
Davies is drawing on Rolf Landauer, e.g. ‘Wanted: A Physically possible theory of physics’, IEEE Spectrum, 1967, 4,105-109, and on
John Wheeler, e.g. ‘It From Bit’ in, Wheeler, J., At Home in the Universe,(AIP Press, 1994).
Five questions by which Davies expounds his proposal
Five questions by which Davies expounds his proposal
• What is Information?
• What is the “information content of the universe and is it finite or
infinite”?
• According to Davies, in what sense could information be “fundamental”
or “basic”?
• How does Davies aim to avoid concluding that “the mighty edifice of
scientific rationality is ultimately rooted in absurdity”?
• How does Davies hope to show the following?
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter
What is Information?
In this context Information is quantified in bits or in binary
digits (0,1), exemplified by a coin toss or by Yes/No answers to
questions including questions directed at the natural world by
conducting experiments. (2010,65,66)
What is the “information content of the universe and
is it finite or infinite”?
.
the information content of any volume of space (any volume not just black holes)
is captured by the information that resides on an enveloping surface (Planck units)
that bounds that volume(2010, 79);
(Davies refers to Jacob Bekenstein, Gerhard ‘t Hooft and Leonard Susskind)
. quantum mechanical calculation giving N= 10122 bits of information
within the horizon of the observable universe (Seth Lloyd 2006) (2010, 77).
Bekenstein, J. D., ‘Black holes and entropy, Physical Revieew D, 8:2333-2346.
Bekenstein, J.D., ‘Universal upper bound on the entropy-to-energy ratio for bounded systems, Physical Review D,23:287-298.
‘t Hooft, G., Dimensional Reduction in quantum gravity. arXiv:gr-pc/930026vl, accessed (http://arxiv.org/as/gr-qc/9310026vl).
Lloyd, S, The Computational Universe, (New York, Random House, 2006)
Susskind, L., ‘The world as a hologram’, Journal of Mathematical Physics, 36, 6377.
Susskind, L., , The Cosmic Landscape: String Theory and the Illusion of Intelligent Design, (NY, Little, Brown, 2005).
• According to Davies, in what sense could
information be “fundamental” or “basic”?
For an n-particle entangled state there are 2n states or components of the
wave function describing the system. The quantum realm is fundamentally
exponential. (2010, 84,5)
“ To be specific, a quantum state with more components than about n=400
particles is described by a wave function with more components than
Lloyd’s 10122 bits of information contained in the entire universe. A generic
wave function of this state of 400-particles could not be expressed in terms
of bits of information, even in principle.” (2010, 85)
According to Davies, in what sense could
information be “fundamental” or “basic”?
“However it could be predicted with a truly god-like transcendent Platonic
demon [or Mother Nature] with infinite resources and patience at its
disposal.” (2010, 85)
“But if information is physical, if it is ontologically real and physically
fundamental, then there are no Platonic demons, no god-like transcendent
Mother Nature, computing with real numbers. Indeed there are no real
numbers. There is only the hard ware of the universe doing its own
calculation itself.. .” (2010, 83)
According to Davies, in what sense could information be
“fundamental” or “basic”?
“The conclusion is stark. If the cosmic information bound is set at 10122 bits and
if information is ontologically real, then the laws of physics have intrinsically
finite accuracy.” (2010, 86)
“For the most part that limitation of the laws will have negligible consequences,
[electric charge measured to one part in 1012] but in cases of exponentiation,
like quantum entanglement, they make a big difference, a difference that could
potentially be observed.” (2010, 86)
“Creating a state of 400 entangled particles is routinely touted by physicists
working on building quantum computers…. I predict a breakdown of the unitary
evolution of the wave function at that point, and possibly the emergence of
new phenomena.” (2010,86; emphasis added)
• How does Davies aim to avoid concluding that “the
mighty edifice of scientific rationality is ultimately
rooted in absurdity”?
Davies appeals to the idea of a self-consistent loop illustrated by the
following kind of story:
“A professor visits the future and reads about a new theorem in a current
mathematical journal. He then returns to his original time, tells a student
the theorem, and the student publishes the theorem in a journal – the very
journal in which the professor found the theorem.” (2006, 284)
• How does Davies aim to avoid concluding that “the
mighty edifice of scientific rationality is ultimately
rooted in absurdity”?
Here is John Wheeler’s own statement of the ‘loop’,
“To endlessness [tower of turtles] no alternative is evident but loop,
such a loop is this: Physics gives rise to observer-participancy; observer
participancy gives rise to information; and information gives rise to
physics.”1
Based on Wheeler’s ‘delayed-choice’ thought experiment.2
1. Wheeler, J.A., At Home in the Universe, (Woodbury, AIP Press,1994), 300.
2. A. G. Manning, et al. Wheeler’s delayed-choice gedanken experiment with a single atom. Nature Physics, DOI: 10.1038/nphys3343 (2015)
Jacques, V. et al. Experimental realization of Wheeler’s delayed-choice gedanken experiment. Science 315, 966–968 (2007).
How does Davies aim to avoid concluding that “the mighty edifice of
scientific rationality is ultimately rooted in absurdity”?
Using Wheeler’s ‘loop’, Davies earlier proposal,
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter ,
becomes,
Information → Laws of Physics
↑
↓
Observers ←
Matter
How does Davies aim to avoid concluding that “the mighty
edifice of scientific rationality is ultimately rooted in
absurdity”?
“The universe clearly cannot be self explanatory without containing
the ability to explain itself! If there is to be a complete explanation
for the universe as a loop, the universe has to know and understand
the laws it is responsible for in order to bring those laws into being.
How could it be otherwise?” (2006,289)
This line of argument is very similar to K. Ward, arguing for God as self explanatory, in, Rational Theology and The Creativity of
God, (Oxford, Blackwell, 1982), 8-10.
• How does Davies hope to show the following?
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter
Again he looks to a self-consistent loop to do with computing, where the universe
is considered to be a quantum computer:
“In other words, the laws determine what can be computed and computability
determines the laws. The open question is whether this requirement of self
consistency is enough to pin down the actual form of the laws?” (2006, 290, italics added)
This still leaves the “→” as promissory notes.
TWO QUESTIONS FOR DAVIES
•
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
•
What informs the choice of which measure of
information is to be used to support Davies’ aim:
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter ?
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Assessment #1
Davies proposed empirical test of his ontology depends on the following claims:
(a) information is real, finite, ontologically basic and physically fundamental and there are
only discrete not continuous magnitudes in space, time, energy/matter
AND
(b) therefore1 there is no Platonic or theological realm in which a transcendent Mother
Nature or Demon has infinite resources for calculations
According to Davies if this is correct then we should expect that new phenomena will be evident
under conditions of large scale quantum entanglement; i.e. information is real if it has effects.
1. Notice the ‘therefore’. Davies obtains the ontological claim in (b) from his ontological proposal in (a).
He does not make an independent argument for (b).
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Consider an alternative proposal:
(a) information is real, finite, physically fundamental and there are
only discrete not continuous magnitudes in space, time, energy/matter
AND
(b) a richer ontology than information represents what there is;
just suppose it is Platonism or theism
According to Davies his prediction would fail if this (b) is correct .
* I have simply deleted ‘ontologically basic’ from (a).
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
On the contrary,
•
I think his proposal about physics still holds – information is real; physics is discrete;
impact of 10122 finite information bound .
•
Traditional mathematics is still just a convenient approximation for most scientific work.
•
These hold even if there was a transcendent Mother Nature or god
After all, what would stop a transcendent Mother Nature or god creating a universe
with a discrete physics?
Davies proposed empirical test of his ontology is in fact an empirical test of discrete physics and
the finite information bound of the universe, not a test of his ontology.
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Assessment #2
I take the following as a general requirement on any ontology.
Any ontology, when combined with appropriate scientific theories, must yield an
explanation of how inquirers have come into existence on this planet. If it could be
shown that logically an ontology prevented this requirement being met, it would
fail as an ontology because it could not account for how inquirers have come into
existence on the planet. It would thereby undermine its own claim to be known.
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Assessment #2
Many will judge the above requirement can be met via the many examples of emergence in
the 13.7 billion year old story of evolutionary cosmology.1 Human inquiry represents a
stunning example of such emergence. Case closed.
1. Morowitz(2002) ; Rolston III, (2011).
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Assessment #2
Many will judge the above requirement can be met via the many examples of emergence in
the 13.7 billion year old story of evolutionary cosmology.1 Human inquiry represents a
stunning example of such emergence. Case closed.
But this judgment is made without any account of the human inquiry. As a matter of principle
an explanandum needs to be well articulated if a proposed explanans is to be tested and do some
useful explanatory work.
1.Morowitz(2002),Rolston III, (2011).
How to assess Davies’ ontological proposal ?
Assessment #2
Many will judge the above requirement can be met via the many examples of emergence in
the 13.7 billion year old story of evolutionary cosmology.1 Human inquiry represents a
stunning example of such emergence. Case closed.
But this judgment is made without any account of the human inquiry. As a matter of principle
an explanandum needs to be well articulated if a proposed explanans tested.
I argue that human inquiry has, among other things, a normative dimension both
. evaluative (good arguments/ good experiments) and
. regulative (e.g. inquirers ought to take on board the good arguments/experiments
relevant to their inquiries).
Davies’ information ontology can support a scientific view of what is or likely to happen but logically
cannot account for what ought to happen, including in human inquiry.2
A richer ontology is needed.
1.
Morowitz(2002),Rolston III, (2011). This normative dimension is acknowledged by naturalists such as Quine, Ellis, Lycan, Papineau, Smith. For my
discussion of their accounts of normativity see f.n.2.
2. Ames, S., (2013), ‘The Rise, Critiques and Consequences of Scientific Naturalism’, in, Kirchoffer, D.G., Horner, R., and McArdle, eds., in
Being Human, Groundwork for a Theological Anthropology for the 21ST Century, (Preston, Mosaic Press).
What informs the choice of which measure of information is to be used
to support the claim:
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter ?
What informs the choice of information measure ?
Earlier, Davies (1990b, 22) cites John Barrow:
“The world seems to be such that, at least in part, we are able to extract the signal of
the underlying simple mathematical law from the noise of real-life experiments. That
this is so already points to important and unexpected properties of the laws. Barrow
has conjectured that this extractability of the signal from the noise might reflect
something analogous to ‘optimal coding’ in Shannon’s theory of information.”
What informs the choice of information measure ?
Earlier, Davies (1990b, 22) cites John Barrow:
“The world seems to be such that, at least in part, we are able to extract the signal of
the underlying simple mathematical law form the noise of real-life experiments. That
this is so already points to important and unexpected properties of the laws. Barrow
has conjectured that this extractability of the signal from the noise might reflect
something analogous to ‘optimal coding’ in Shannon’s theory of information.”
How do we extract the “signal of the underlying simple mathematical laws”? Presumably, by
experiments, observations, measurements. What might qualify as the ‘something’ that is “analogous
to optimal coding in Shannon information”?
A strong contender for this role is ‘Fisher information’ thanks, independently
to Prof. B.R. Frieden, who for many years wa Professor of Optical Sciences at
The University of Arizona.
A strong contender for this role is ‘Fisher information’
Background The mathematical form of Fisher information ‘I’ was first proposed by R. A. Fisher at Cambridge
in the 1920s; later identified by Cramer1 and Rao2 in their theorizing how to measure a quantity undergoing
fluctuations. Their important result is the Cramer Rao inequality:
I e2 ≥ 1,
e2 is mean square error in measurement;
I ≡ ∫ 4 ( q /(x) ) 2 dx, is ‘Fisher Information’ (one dimension)
q(x) is the probability amplitude function describing
fluctuations x of the parameter around θ its mean value.
Fisher information I in the above equation may then be generalized3 for parameters θn , n = 1, N, in four
space-time dimensions (x, y, z, ict), giving,
N
I = ∑ 4∫ ∇qn(x) .∇ qn (x) dx
n=1
dx ≡ dx dy dz dct
1. Cramer, H. L., (1946), Mathematical Methods of Statistics,(Princeton University Press, Princeton).
2. Rao, C. R., (1945),‘Information and Accuracy Attainable in the Estimation of Statistical Parameters’, Bull. Calcutta Math. Soc. 37, 81-91.
3. Frieden (2004), 58-64.
A strong contender for this role is ‘Fisher information’
Frieden’s international reputation arose from his use of Fisher information to
‘clean up’ fuzzy images of galaxies and stolen car number plates.
During this work he one day noticed that his calculations had yielded
an equation analogous to Schrodinger’s equation. He thought nothing of it.
Later he found an article by A. J. Stam, a Dutch mathematician, showing how to
proceed from the Cramer Rao Inequality to Heisenberg’s Uncertainty Principle.
Stam, A.J., Information and Control, 2, 1959, 101. This moved him to explore the
connections between physics and Fisher information.
1. Cramer, H. L., (1946), Mathematical Methods of Statistics,(Princeton University Press, Princeton).
2. Rao, C. R., (1945),‘Information and Accuracy Attainable in the Estimation of Statistical Parameters’, Bull. Calcutta Math. Soc. 37, 81-91.
3. B.R. Frieden, was for many years Professor of Optical Sciences at The University of Arizona.
A strong contender for this role is ‘Fisher information’
•
Fisher information comes naturally to light in the context of classical measurement theory
concerned with measuring a parameter subject to fluctuation (Cramer, Rao, Van Trees1).
•
Fisher information naturally has many properties relevant to physics, for example2
. It is already in the form of an action integral, relevant to extremum principles
. Uses probability amplitude functions independently of Schrodinger
. The I – Theorem dI/dt ≤ 0 , the converse of entropy increasing with time.
•
Fisher information is a kind of ‘mother’ information for a range of information measures.3
•
Independently of Barrow, Frieden compared the channel capacity for Shannon
information, as the maximum amount of information that may be passed by a
communication channel, and the channel capacity for Fisher information as the maximum
amount of information that can be extracted via measurement.4
1.
2.
3.
4.
Van Trees, H. L., (1968),Detection, Estimation, Modulation Theory, Part I, (New York, J.Wiley).
Frieden, B.R., (2004), Science from Fisher Information, A Unification, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press), .
Kulllback, Wootters, Renyi, Shannon, Ibid,35-39.
Ibid, 61-62.
A strong contender for this role is ‘Fisher information’
•
Frieden has derived the mathematical form of many of the laws of physics
including the famous Bekenstein formula for the entropy of a black hole.
•
Frieden also has an explanation for the operation of the laws.
•
He thus offers an account of :
Information → Laws of Physics → Matter .
•
The form of the laws of fundamental physics which Frieden and colleagues have obtained
include:
. Lorentz transformation,
. field equations for General Relativity,
. Maxwell’s equations,
. Klein-Gordon and Dirac equations,
. wave equation for Quantum Chromodynamics,
. Heisenberg uncertainty principle, the EPR-spin entanglement,
. Wheeler-Dewitt equation for the radiant universe,
. Higgs mass effect
. de Broglie wave hypothesis.
•
Also, sixteen new testable predictions have been based on this Fisher information
approach to physics. Of particular interest is the prediction that “a Black Hole transmits
Shannon information at a maximum bit rate.”
•
This reference also includes the derivation of the famous Bekenstein-Hawking area law for
the entropy of a Black Hole. All this work is published in international, physics journals.
Frieden, B.R., (1998), Physics from Fisher Information, A Unification, (Cambridge, Cambridge University Press).
Frieden,B.R., and Soffer,(2002) B., Phys. Lett. A, 304 A, 1-7.
Frieden, B.R., Gatenby, A.G., eds., (2007), Exploratory Data Analysis Using Fisher Information, (London, Springer-Verlag).
Frieden, B.R. and Soffer, B.H.,(2009), ‘de Broglie’s wave hypothesis from Fisher information’, in Physica A – Statistical Mechanics And Its Applications,
Volume 338, Issue 7.
Fisher information approach to physics
Frieden sees himself carrying forward John Wheeler’s programme of recasting all of physics in terms of
information.
Frieden noted the potency and convenience of the standard Lagrangian approach to many domains of
physics. “However an enigma of physics is the question of where its Lagrangians come from. It would be nice
to justify and derive them from a prior principle.”1 Frieden sought a concept sufficient for forming the
Lagrangians for all fields of science. But how?
“There is no science without observation. Therefore a common denominator of all science is measurement.”2
Frieden took this as a possible clue to seeking a concept that is the basis for forming Lagrangians across all
science.
It turns out that Fisher Information as already an action integral naturally offers a way for this clue to be
pursued.
1. Frieden(2004, 25).
2. Ibid, 27.
Fisher information approach to physics.
Frieden’s derivations of the form of the laws of physics L are set within a thought
experiment about precision parameter measurement.1
Frieden assumes:
• probe particles are fired at copies of a system that present at the input of an
experiment conducted by observers under ideal epistemic conditions E;
• the parameters to be measured are subject to intrinsic fluctuations W;
• the measurement interaction takes place and the probe particle registers in the
output screen of the experiment;
• measurements are made.
Each measurement scenario assumes physical knowledge relevant to the derivation.
For example: the derivation of Maxwell’s Equations assumes the existence of magnetic
and electric fields but no relation between them.
1.
Braunstein, S.L., and Caves, C.M., (1994),‘Statistical Distance and the Geometry of Quantum States’, Phys. Rev. Let., 72 ,No.22. , 3439-3443, showed
how state distinguishability can be mapped onto precision parameter measurement, using Fisher information. This built on the work of Wootters,
W.K.(1981),‘Statistical Distance and Hilbert Space’, Physical Review D, 23, No.5, 357. Quite independently of Frieden’s work, both Wootters, and Braunstein and
Caves, provide evidence for there being an interesting relationship between physics and Fisher information.
Fisher information approach to physics.
Frieden’s derivations of the form of the laws of physics L are set within a thought
experiment about precision parameter measurement.
Frieden thinks of a parameter measurement scenario in which probe particles are
fired at copies of the system being measured. The probe particles register in the
output space of the measurement device.
Frieden thinks of Fisher information I as implicated in the data, (via the lower bound
of the CRI).
Fisher information I has the same form for all measurement scenarios. Frieden
assumes that some other information term, “J ”, is needed to characterise each
scenario. Frieden thinks that information J is the level of Fisher information “bound”
to the source. “Any observation is the output of an information-flow process.”
J
→
I
messenger
probe particle.
Frieden postulates that “such information flows are passive so that I can never exceed J.”
Thus, I ≤ J entails 0 = I – κ J, 0 < κ ≤ 1. “zero principle”.
(postulate P1)
The probe particle disturbs J by δJ and Frieden takes the information flow as implying that I is
perturbed by δI.1 Furthermore Frieden postulates, δI = δJ and so δ (I – J) = 0, even when I < J.
Frieden calls this the “extremum principle”.3 (postulate P2)
Defining K = I – J, leads to δK = 0. This leads to Frieden’s principle of ‘Extreme Physical
Information’ (EPI):
EPI
{
K = I- J
δK = 0
0 = I – κ J , 0 < κ ≤ 1,
‘extremum principle’ }
‘zero principle’
On this approach the measurement interaction brings about an infinitesimal symmetry
transformation of K. The probability amplitude functions are constrained and it turns out,
through the solution to the EPI , that the constraints are the laws of physics, which are brought
into operation by the measurement interaction.
1 Ibid, 21.
2 Ibid, 24.
3 Ibid, 28. Frieden uses the EPI in all his derivations of the laws of fundamental physics. Frieden takes these results as a posteriori justification for the two
postulates, P1, P2, of the EPI; Frieden (2004, 89). In my thinking P1 and P2 represent two distinct aspects of the measurement interaction. Relatedly, it
would be interesting to see if the postulates P1 and P2 of the EPI can be derived from the basic assumption of the whole approach, viz. the thought
experiment about a parameter measurement scenario, involving a measurement interaction. This is a work in progress.
Fisher information approach to physics.
Frieden’s derivations of the form of the laws of physics L are set within thought experiments about
precision parameter measurement as just described.
The derivations are the result R .
Gathering the premises of the argument, the result R may be represented as:
R:
E
W
I
AOA
E, W, I AOA
⇒ L
Ideal epistemic conditions for empirical inquiry by human inquirers
Intrinsic fluctuations of space and time
Fisher information
All other assumptions
In a ‘nutshell’ this is my summary of the basics of Frieden’s Physics from Fisher Information
I have no space to highlight Frieden (2004, 2007) using Fisher information in the exploration of the
data from many other fields, especially in cancer research.
The derivations of the form of the laws of physics L may be summarised thus:
R:
E
W
I
AOA
E, W, I, AOA
⇒ L
Ideal epistemic conditions for empirical inquiry by actual inquirers
Intrinsic fluctuations of space and time
Fisher information
All other assumptions
In a nutshell this is Frieden’s Physics from Fisher Information
_________________________________________________________________________
What motivates a move from Physics to Metaphysics and could it be justified?
Something is needed to motivate a change in the kind of explanation sought.
The theme of this paper is ‘From Physics to Metaphysics’ and so a motivation is sought
from within physics.
The derivations of the form of the laws of physics L may be summarised thus:
R:
E, W, I, AOA
⇒ L
___________________________________________________________________________
What motivates a move from Physics to Metaphysics and could it be justified?
There is an apparent ‘oddity’ in R. The form of the L , operating since very soon after the Big
Bang, is explained in terms of E which refers to inquirers that show up billions of years later.
Does this ‘oddity’ call for a change in the kind of explanation sought?
Not if this ‘oddity’ of R is only an apparent oddity, explicable in terms of the resources of the
natural sciences. There would then be NO JUSTIFICATION for further seeking a meta-physical
explanation of R. BLOCKER 1
Also, if it were reasonable to interpret R as a brute fact and therefore without further
explanation there would be NO JUSTIFICATION for further seeking a meta-physical explanation
of R. BLOCKER 2
The derivations of the form of the laws of physics L may be summarised thus:
R:
E, W, I, AOA
⇒ L
___________________________________________________________________________
What motivates a move from Physics the Metaphysics and could it be justified?
There is an apparent ‘oddity’ . The form of the L , operating since very soon after the Big Bang,
is explained in terms of E which refers to inquirers which show up billions of years later. Does
this call for a change in the kind of explanation sought?
Not is this apparent ‘oddity’ of R is explicable in terms of the resources of the natural sciences
there would be NO JUSTIFICATION for further seeking a meta-physical explanation of R.
It can be shown that the resources of the natural sciences are logically unable to explain R
BLOCKER 1 defeated.
Also, if it were reasonable to interpret R as a brute fact and therefore without further
explanation there would be NO JUSTIFICATION for further seeking a meta-physical explanation
of R.
It can be shown that logically it is unreasonable to treat R as a ‘brute fact’ .
BLOCKER 2 defeated.
A move from physics to metaphysics is in principle justified.
How are Blockers #1 and #2 Defeated?
R:
E, W, I, AOA ⇒ L
•
We want to see whether there is some physical theory Tphys that explains R
•
In brief, a physical theory is:
. a ‘blind’ causal explanation of physical events and processes;
‘blind’ means no final causes, goals, purposes built in;
. the causal explanation is described mathematically and aims to derive
a mathematical description of what is to be explained;
. open to empirical testing.
•
We would like some Tphys ⇒ R
•
Problems:
(a) R is the wrong kind of explanandum for any Tphys
(b) Tphys has to provide E for the derivation of R to succeed
How are Blockers #1 and #2 Defeated?
R:
E, W, I, AOA ⇒ L
•
•
Blocker #1 would like some Tphys ⇒ R .
Problems:
(a) R is the wrong kind of explanandum for any Tphys
.
R is a rational inference. It stands in the logical space of reasons
not in the very different logical space of subsumption under natural laws
(Sellars , 1956, 253-329; McDowell,2004,91-105).
(b) Tphys has to provide E for the derivation of R to succeed.
. If Tphys includes E, then Tphys not ‘blind’ .
. Can Tphys lead to E? No. Physics alone cannot do this;
it took the 13.7 billion year process to lead to inquirers guided by E.
My conclusion is that any physical theory (so construed) logically cannot explain R.
Thus Blocker #1 fails.
Blocker #2 says it is reasonable to treat R as a brute fact about the universe.
Consider the following argument.
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
(e)
R
If no scientific or non-scientific explanation of R1 is possible, R is a ‘brute fact’.
No scientific theory can explain R.
No non-scientific explanation of R is possible.
Therefore R is a brute fact.
The argument is valid. If we reject (e), which premises will we reject?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
OK. R established above.
Says what is meant by a ‘brute fact’.
OK. This is the failure of Blocker#1.
Says that there is nothing outside or beyond what the natural sciences
can tell us, that can explain R.
The argument is valid. If we reject (e), which premises will we reject?
(a)
(b)
(c)
(d)
OK. R established above.
Says what is meant by a ‘brute fact’.
OK. This is the failure of Blocker#1.
Says that there is nothing outside or beyond what the natural sciences
can tell us, that can explain R.
How shall we assess (d)? An initial question is how do we know that no nonscientific theory is capable of explaining R?
Only if we assume scientific naturalism1 with it’s methodological, epistemic
and metaphysical theses. The latter says that all there is, is what physics
says there is or complex configurations of the same.
1. See, Papineau, D., ‘The Rise of Physicalism’, in, Stone, M.W.F., and Wolf, J., eds., The Proper Ambition of Science (London, Routledge, 2000).
But with R we are concerned with something that scientific theories (as construed) logically cannot explain,
something beyond the scope of scientific theories.
E is obtained initially quite independently of knowing the 13.7 billion year scientific evolutionary cosmology.
It is obtained by rational inquirers, with certain aims and some general beliefs about rationality and about
how the world operates deciding what epistemic standards rationally ought to be met by actions directed to
achieve valued epistemic ends. Analogous considerations have their place in practical actions like shooting
an arrow from a bow.
We know about rationality because human beings instantiate rationality, whereby they think and act for
reasons, but this is known independently of how the origins of that instantiation might be explained.
This is one argument for thinking of E as something beyond the theories of natural science, yet E is nontrivially involved in explaining the operation of the laws of fundamental physics L, as shown in R. This
provides rational grounds for wondering if something beyond the natural sciences might explain R. But (d)
would lead us to expect any such explanation to be impossible. Hence (d) should be set aside as
unreasonable. Therefore (e) does not follow and we reasonably set aside the claim that R is a brute fact.
Note, this result is not based on the principle of sufficient reason.
Thus (d) is unreasonable and should be set aside.
Blocker #1 and Blocker #2 both fail. It is therefore reasonable to seek further beyond the resources of the
natural sciences and physics in particular, for an explanation of R.
A Metaphysical Explanation of R
What must minimally be assumed to hold in order to explain R? Any explanation of
R must include the thought experiment E.
Whatever provides E is something that has language, it has access to the logical
space of reasons, and it knows about intentionality – E concerns embodied rational
agents in some universe yet to be physically produced (whether the only universe is
ours or one of the multiverses) pursuing valued epistemic ends and practical ends.
These are very good grounds for saying that only something capable of rational
thought can provide E.
This ‘something’ should be thought of as some kind of ‘rational agent’, RA,
envisaging embodied rational agents pursuing empirical inquiry for valued epistemic
ends in some universe.
A rational agent must be assumed because thought alone is not enough to explain
the existence of our universe in which R holds.
A Metaphysical Explanation of R
A Kantian point is that, on this argument alone, the RA that orders the universe to this purpose is at most an
Architect not the God of traditional theology who creates the universe ex nihilo. Following this Kantian line,
we must also assume, minimally, some kind of basic ‘stuff’, which this rational agent orders in the light of
envisaging E. This correctly treats this rational agent as envisaging E as a purpose to be enacted.
An alternative to the Kantian note, one which does not require any additional basic ‘stuff’ may be drawn
from the work of Lawrence Krauss. Krauss addresses the question of ‘Why is there Something Not Nothing?’
He gives an account of creation from “nothing” where the “nothing” is “no space, no time - no anything.”1
His account of “nothing” still includes the laws of quantum mechanics and he explains that the laws of
quantum mechanics permit us to envisage how a closed universe with zero total energy could “appear
spontaneously” from this “nothing”.2
On my argument the RA must be understood as thinking these laws of quantum mechanics within a
complete account of quantum gravity (among many other matters) and so enact them to bring something
out of nothing. Could a whole multiverse landscape thus come into existence? Why not? Krauss says that it
is generally assumed “that certain properties like quantum mechanics, permeates all possibilities.”3
On this line of thought RA can be understood as the God who creates the universe ex nihilo structured
according to the laws of physics, with the purpose that at least includes the universe being knowable
through empirical inquiry by embodied rational agents. This engages well with the work of B. Lonergan and
K. Ward on natural theology.
1.Krauss,( 2012, 170).
2. Ibid, 167, 170.
3. Ibid, 177.
A Metaphysical Explanation of R
Here I follow the Kantian point.
For our universe, R, the ‘rational tuning’ of L to E, may be explained as follows. Assume some
powerful rational agent RA with a purpose that at least includes forming a universe that is
knowable by embodied rational inquirers conducting empirical inquiry under ideal epistemic
conditions in that universe.
Assume there is also some basic ‘stuff’ and that in the light of this purpose, this rational agent
orders this basic ‘stuff’ so that it eventually brings about a universe (possibly one among many
others), of which our best physics gives an account, which among other things is characterized
by W , I and AOA. Given this purpose and these characteristics, the universe operates
according to laws, whose operations is explained and mathematical form entailed by E, W, I
and AOA, and these laws are L.
A Metaphysical Explanation of R
R:
E, W, I, AOA
⇒ L
It may be shown that the minimum metaphysical proposal needed to explain R is that the universe is
structured according to the laws of physics by a powerful rational agent in order that the universe may be
knowable through idealised empirical inquiry by embodied rational agents (human or ‘alien’).
This argument linking human inquiry, Fisher information and the laws of physics brings to light this purpose
as immanent in the operation of the universe according to blind natural laws. This argument has nothing to
do with Intelligent Design, Anthropic principles, Fine Tuning, nor the old argument from design and it is not a
‘gaps’ argument, nor does it entail deism. It also opens for discussion the connection between RA and the
many human agents conducting inquiry. It is unaffected by whatever turns out to be the conclusion by
physicists about the multi -verse proposal.
This is an argument from physics to metaphysics. It is metaphysics because it goes beyond physics to what
physics does not inquire into. It is not a physical explanation but an explanation of the physical in terms of
the purpose for which the laws of physics are the way they are.
It is however a metaphysics of inquiry. As such it logically cannot be in conflict with empirical inquiry. This
argument is certainly not a science stopper! It logically cannot inhibit either empirical or theoretical inquiry
in physics or any other science. On the contrary, it strongly encourages the continuing exploration of both
physics and metaphysics as deeply in accord with why the universe is the way it is.
Bibliography
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