De Grauwe , Paul, Ji , Yuemei Steinbach , Armin. 'The EU debt crisis: Testing and revisiting conventional legal doctrine' LEQS Paper No. 108, April 2016
... When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate them for the increased default risk. We also add debt ...
... When the government debt to GDP ratio increases the burden of the debt service increases leading to an increasing probability of default. This then in turn leads to an increase in the spread, which is a risk premium investors demand to compensate them for the increased default risk. We also add debt ...
Pure or Wake-up-call Contagion?
... Euro area was still at about 100 basis points. Strains on the government securities markets became worrisome only towards the end of 2009 (Fig. 1). Concerns mainly focused on Greece. After a series of upward revisions, the last of which equal to nearly 3 percentage points of GDP in October 2009, the ...
... Euro area was still at about 100 basis points. Strains on the government securities markets became worrisome only towards the end of 2009 (Fig. 1). Concerns mainly focused on Greece. After a series of upward revisions, the last of which equal to nearly 3 percentage points of GDP in October 2009, the ...
Adjustment Difficulties and Debt Overhangs in the Eurozone Periphery
... the usual assumption that public debt is risk-free does not hold. The reason is that no individual euro area country has access to the printing press. The latter is what makes government debt risk-free in nominal terms in countries with their own currency. In this sense, in the peripheral euro area ...
... the usual assumption that public debt is risk-free does not hold. The reason is that no individual euro area country has access to the printing press. The latter is what makes government debt risk-free in nominal terms in countries with their own currency. In this sense, in the peripheral euro area ...
risk - Harvard Kennedy School
... Stiglitz: it may even bend backwards, due to rising risk of default. ...
... Stiglitz: it may even bend backwards, due to rising risk of default. ...
What Next? Where Next? Collateral Damage David Rhodes and Daniel Stelter
... private households, nonfinancial corporations, and governments, we estimated the debt overhang to be €6 trillion for the euro zone and $11 trillion for the U.S. We argued that (some) governments might be tempted to fund this through a one-time wealth tax of 20 to 30 percent on all financial assets. ...
... private households, nonfinancial corporations, and governments, we estimated the debt overhang to be €6 trillion for the euro zone and $11 trillion for the U.S. We argued that (some) governments might be tempted to fund this through a one-time wealth tax of 20 to 30 percent on all financial assets. ...
Scenarios on the sovereign debt crisis
... ■ Balance sheet coverage – expanded to cover financial and nonfinancial corporates as well as households and governments ■ Credit ratings – Reflecting the impact of sovereign debt ratings on interest rate spreads for government bonds ■ Feedback effects – from unemployment/insolvencies on credit ...
... ■ Balance sheet coverage – expanded to cover financial and nonfinancial corporates as well as households and governments ■ Credit ratings – Reflecting the impact of sovereign debt ratings on interest rate spreads for government bonds ■ Feedback effects – from unemployment/insolvencies on credit ...
Solving the Financial and Sovereign Debt Crisis in Europe
... shocks through external competiveness and trade. With the inability to adjust exchange rates, these pressures are forced into the labour market and unemployment. This has led some countries over past years to try to alleviate pressures with fiscal slippage. The resulting indebtedness has been exacer ...
... shocks through external competiveness and trade. With the inability to adjust exchange rates, these pressures are forced into the labour market and unemployment. This has led some countries over past years to try to alleviate pressures with fiscal slippage. The resulting indebtedness has been exacer ...
Resilience Preparing for the payback
... policymakers do not fully grasp the consequences of unprecedented debt unwinding. ...
... policymakers do not fully grasp the consequences of unprecedented debt unwinding. ...
How Europe cancelled Germany`s debt
... it had actually earned, rather than having to resort to new borrowing or using up foreign currency reserves. It prevented a return to crisis or long stagnation. If it did have a trade deicit, West Germany was also allowed to restrict imports. ...
... it had actually earned, rather than having to resort to new borrowing or using up foreign currency reserves. It prevented a return to crisis or long stagnation. If it did have a trade deicit, West Germany was also allowed to restrict imports. ...
LIVING (DANGEROUSLY) WITHOUT A FISCAL UNION
... the European Central Bank without clear domestic alternatives to deal with economic distress. When faced with high unemployment risk at home, workers in Europe have traditionally not moved in significant numbers to other European nations with better employment prospects. And for fear of having to pa ...
... the European Central Bank without clear domestic alternatives to deal with economic distress. When faced with high unemployment risk at home, workers in Europe have traditionally not moved in significant numbers to other European nations with better employment prospects. And for fear of having to pa ...
Banks` Home sovereign exposures - European Parliament
... On 2 December 2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published the results of its 2016 EUwide transparency exercise that inter alia looked into the banks' holdings of domestic and nondomestic sovereign debt, analysing a sample of 131 banks from 24 countries1 of the European Union and the Europea ...
... On 2 December 2016, the European Banking Authority (EBA) published the results of its 2016 EUwide transparency exercise that inter alia looked into the banks' holdings of domestic and nondomestic sovereign debt, analysing a sample of 131 banks from 24 countries1 of the European Union and the Europea ...
PowerPoint Template
... Non-tradable issuance decline Part of a long term policy • Non-tradable domestic issuance totaled NIS 8.9 billion in 2010. • This issuance was carried out through the following instruments: • NIS 4.8 billion designated non-tradable bonds for pension funds (“Arad”), negative net issuance of NIS 4.1 ...
... Non-tradable issuance decline Part of a long term policy • Non-tradable domestic issuance totaled NIS 8.9 billion in 2010. • This issuance was carried out through the following instruments: • NIS 4.8 billion designated non-tradable bonds for pension funds (“Arad”), negative net issuance of NIS 4.1 ...
The European Redemption Pact (ERP)
... participating countries fulfil the consolidation and reform agreements likewise fixed in advance, as with the EFSF’s structural adjustment programmes. Debt transferring is immediately stopped if a country does not meet its contractual duties under the ERP. During the roll-in phase, the French, Itali ...
... participating countries fulfil the consolidation and reform agreements likewise fixed in advance, as with the EFSF’s structural adjustment programmes. Debt transferring is immediately stopped if a country does not meet its contractual duties under the ERP. During the roll-in phase, the French, Itali ...
Back to Mesopotamia? - Boston Consulting Group
... might not have a substantial stimulatory effect on the economies of the West. ...
... might not have a substantial stimulatory effect on the economies of the West. ...
ECB action and the Spanish economy during the
... Throughout this stage, however, the monetary policy stance was predominantly expansionary. This was a consequence of the difficult digestion of German unification in the very heart of the euro area and the looseness of global financial conditions during the “Great Moderation” which, as subsequent e ...
... Throughout this stage, however, the monetary policy stance was predominantly expansionary. This was a consequence of the difficult digestion of German unification in the very heart of the euro area and the looseness of global financial conditions during the “Great Moderation” which, as subsequent e ...
Slide 1
... appropriate response; Slow and complex EU policy-making process; Domestic political obstacles/ number of protests and fall of many governments ; Political resistance to providing financial support to countries in trouble/ critics opposed to the idea of rescuing countries without adequate budget disc ...
... appropriate response; Slow and complex EU policy-making process; Domestic political obstacles/ number of protests and fall of many governments ; Political resistance to providing financial support to countries in trouble/ critics opposed to the idea of rescuing countries without adequate budget disc ...
JCTR-Presentation-On-The-Debt
... General Report (AGR) for financial year of 2012, reveals US$123 million debt not serviced. (*AG 2012 report “its difficult to ascertain whether there is an effective monitoring and mgt of bonds by MoF”) ...
... General Report (AGR) for financial year of 2012, reveals US$123 million debt not serviced. (*AG 2012 report “its difficult to ascertain whether there is an effective monitoring and mgt of bonds by MoF”) ...
Questioni di Economia e Finanza
... (‘fiscal councils’) were set up at the national level to assess compliance with the rules, and sanctions applicable in both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were strengthened. 8 A common timeline was defined to synchronise key steps in the preparation of ...
... (‘fiscal councils’) were set up at the national level to assess compliance with the rules, and sanctions applicable in both the preventive and the corrective arms of the Stability and Growth Pact (SGP) were strengthened. 8 A common timeline was defined to synchronise key steps in the preparation of ...
ppt presentation
... It has loosened its collateral requirements and agreed to extend its special liquidity programs to stabilize market conditions Under its nuclear option, the SMP, it has bought around €70 bn of bonds, an action different from the US or UK Quantitative Easing, as the injection of liquidity is ster ...
... It has loosened its collateral requirements and agreed to extend its special liquidity programs to stabilize market conditions Under its nuclear option, the SMP, it has bought around €70 bn of bonds, an action different from the US or UK Quantitative Easing, as the injection of liquidity is ster ...
EXPLANATORY MEMORANDUM In response to a request of 8 July
... In response to a request of 8 July 2015 from the Hellenic Republic to the Chairperson of the Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for stability support in the form of a loan with an availability period of three years, the ESM Board of Governors requested the European Commissi ...
... In response to a request of 8 July 2015 from the Hellenic Republic to the Chairperson of the Board of Governors of the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) for stability support in the form of a loan with an availability period of three years, the ESM Board of Governors requested the European Commissi ...
Debt Audit Program
... Debt obligations are any loan, negotiable notes, time-bearing warrants, bonds or leases. A Short-Term debt obligation has a duration of 12 months or less. A Long-Term debt obligation's duration is considered more than 12 months. School districts usually borrow money on a long-term basis to finance c ...
... Debt obligations are any loan, negotiable notes, time-bearing warrants, bonds or leases. A Short-Term debt obligation has a duration of 12 months or less. A Long-Term debt obligation's duration is considered more than 12 months. School districts usually borrow money on a long-term basis to finance c ...
Document
... euro member countries such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy (“PIIGS”) were also focused on with their weak governmental finances with a fear that these member countries might also fall into crisis just like Greece. Not only PIIGS, but also “big” countries such as Germany and France have also be ...
... euro member countries such as Portugal, Spain, Ireland and Italy (“PIIGS”) were also focused on with their weak governmental finances with a fear that these member countries might also fall into crisis just like Greece. Not only PIIGS, but also “big” countries such as Germany and France have also be ...
THE IMPACT OF THE GLOBAL FINANCIAL CRISIS ON
... Real GDP growth is another measure of real economic activity. As a general rule, a country with a strong economic activity (relative to the rest of the world) will have a strong, appreciating currency, all others conditions being equal. Because the economic environment is more attractive, investors ...
... Real GDP growth is another measure of real economic activity. As a general rule, a country with a strong economic activity (relative to the rest of the world) will have a strong, appreciating currency, all others conditions being equal. Because the economic environment is more attractive, investors ...
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... be possible if the government could raise its liabilities without limit. Obviously, that is not feasible since the government is faced with the possibility that, at some point, the public may refuse to buy more government debt or demand too high an interest rate on it. It also is worth noticing that ...
... be possible if the government could raise its liabilities without limit. Obviously, that is not feasible since the government is faced with the possibility that, at some point, the public may refuse to buy more government debt or demand too high an interest rate on it. It also is worth noticing that ...
European debt crisis
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The European debt crisis (often also referred to as the Eurozone crisis or the European sovereign debt crisis) is a multi-year debt crisis that has been taking place in the European Union since the end of 2009. Several eurozone member states (Greece, Portugal, Ireland, Spain and Cyprus) were unable to repay or refinance their government debt or to bail out over-indebted banks under their national supervision without the assistance of third parties like other Eurozone countries, the European Central Bank (ECB), or the International Monetary Fund (IMF).The detailed causes of the debt crises varied. In several countries, private debts arising from a property bubble were transferred to sovereign debt as a result of banking system bailouts and government responses to slowing economies post-bubble. The structure of the eurozone as a currency union (i.e., one currency) without fiscal union (e.g., different tax and public pension rules) contributed to the crisis and limited the ability of European leaders to respond. European banks own a significant amount of sovereign debt, such that concerns regarding the solvency of banking systems or sovereigns are negatively reinforcing.As concerns intensified in early 2010 and thereafter, leading European nations implemented a series of financial support measures such as the European Financial Stability Facility (EFSF) and European Stability Mechanism (ESM). The ECB also contributed to solve the crisis by lowering interest rates and providing cheap loans of more than one trillion euro in order to maintain money flows between European banks. On 6 September 2012, the ECB calmed financial markets by announcing free unlimited support for all eurozone countries involved in a sovereign state bailout/precautionary programme from EFSF/ESM, through some yield lowering Outright Monetary Transactions (OMT).Return to economic growth and improved structural deficits enabled Ireland and Portugal to exit their bailout programmes in July 2014. Greece and Cyprus both managed to partly regain market access in 2014. Their bailout programme is scheduled to end in March 2016. Spain never officially received a bailout programme. It's rescue package from the ESM was earmarked for a bank recapitalization fund and did not include financial support for the government itself.The crisis had significant adverse economic effects and labour market effects, with unemployment rates in Greece and Spain reaching 27%, and was blamed for subdued economic growth, not only for the entire eurozone, but for the entire European Union. As such, it can be argued to have had a major political impact on the ruling governments in 9 out of 19 eurozone countries, contributing to power shifts in Greece, Ireland, France, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Slovenia, Slovakia, and the Netherlands.