frege on identity statements
... of a function-expression and an argument-expression, as transparently representing the application of function to object. Where this tight relation comes unstuck, as Frege saw it, was precisely at identity statements. From the outset of his explicitly logical explorations in Begriffsschrift, Frege t ...
... of a function-expression and an argument-expression, as transparently representing the application of function to object. Where this tight relation comes unstuck, as Frege saw it, was precisely at identity statements. From the outset of his explicitly logical explorations in Begriffsschrift, Frege t ...
Most Ordinary Counterfactuals are (Probably) False
... “If the coin were tossed, it MIGHT land Tails, and it WOULD land Heads if it were tossed” (*) There is surely something defective about (*). More generally, there is serious tension between assertions of 'might’ and corresponding ‘would not’ counterfactuals ...
... “If the coin were tossed, it MIGHT land Tails, and it WOULD land Heads if it were tossed” (*) There is surely something defective about (*). More generally, there is serious tension between assertions of 'might’ and corresponding ‘would not’ counterfactuals ...
The Logic of Logical Revision
... expressions of any logical type, including propositions, and includes modal operators and epistemic propositional attitudes verbs [Dowty et. al. 1992]. If we understand the knowability operator in proofs for logical revision as shorthand for the claim that it is possible that there exists someone wh ...
... expressions of any logical type, including propositions, and includes modal operators and epistemic propositional attitudes verbs [Dowty et. al. 1992]. If we understand the knowability operator in proofs for logical revision as shorthand for the claim that it is possible that there exists someone wh ...
Getting Priority Straight
... idea, these explanations thereby confer ontological sparsity. The priority theorist holds that, since the existence and features of raindrops can be explained solely by reference to the existence and features of other things, the world is no more ontologically lush for containing raindrops than it i ...
... idea, these explanations thereby confer ontological sparsity. The priority theorist holds that, since the existence and features of raindrops can be explained solely by reference to the existence and features of other things, the world is no more ontologically lush for containing raindrops than it i ...
Carlo Penco Dipartimento di Filosofia Università di Genova via Balbi
... “he” and goes on, picking out always, with some luck, the same individual I was referring to with the first utterance of “he”. If nobody had any interest in enabling other people to recognize and pick out an individual again, indexicals would be empty and of no use. But indexicals do not only have t ...
... “he” and goes on, picking out always, with some luck, the same individual I was referring to with the first utterance of “he”. If nobody had any interest in enabling other people to recognize and pick out an individual again, indexicals would be empty and of no use. But indexicals do not only have t ...
Friederike Moltmann
... in this paper either). The idea, roughly, is if two products are similar, then they are the same in content. That is, similarity among products is prior to a notion of content. The similarity relation among products allows for the ‘stabilization’ of what appears to be an enduring propositional conte ...
... in this paper either). The idea, roughly, is if two products are similar, then they are the same in content. That is, similarity among products is prior to a notion of content. The similarity relation among products allows for the ‘stabilization’ of what appears to be an enduring propositional conte ...
Metaphysical Dependence and Set Theory
... that they are members of. When it comes to sets and their members, metaphysical dependence is in most cases asymmetric. The claim that sets metaphysically depend on their members may strike you as odd. It is widely accepted that some concrete objects metaphysically depend on others. But why think th ...
... that they are members of. When it comes to sets and their members, metaphysical dependence is in most cases asymmetric. The claim that sets metaphysically depend on their members may strike you as odd. It is widely accepted that some concrete objects metaphysically depend on others. But why think th ...
Relativism, Vagueness and What is Said
... Relativists grant their opponents that it is prima facie difficult to make sense of (not to say that there are) those cases, after all their theory is supposed to be novel and exciting; but this can only be so, I will argue, if the truth whose relativization is posited is the truth of assertions, no ...
... Relativists grant their opponents that it is prima facie difficult to make sense of (not to say that there are) those cases, after all their theory is supposed to be novel and exciting; but this can only be so, I will argue, if the truth whose relativization is posited is the truth of assertions, no ...
AN OBVIOUS-BASED ACCOUNT OF EPISTEMIC POSSIBILITY
... Any view of probability should prevent dutch books from being made against those who have rational credences in propositions. If EPevB is correct, then dutch books can be made against rational agents for whom it is epistemically possible that a tautology is false. This is a bad result. It would be b ...
... Any view of probability should prevent dutch books from being made against those who have rational credences in propositions. If EPevB is correct, then dutch books can be made against rational agents for whom it is epistemically possible that a tautology is false. This is a bad result. It would be b ...
NAMING, SAYING, AND STRUCTURE Philosophers
... 2.1. The Worldly Correspondents of Syncategorematic Expressions. Armstrong (1980a,b) and Lewis (1999b) purport to provide the ground to distinguish privileged syncategorematic expressions from ordinary ones, at least in the case of predicates. As Sider understands them, every predicate used to expre ...
... 2.1. The Worldly Correspondents of Syncategorematic Expressions. Armstrong (1980a,b) and Lewis (1999b) purport to provide the ground to distinguish privileged syncategorematic expressions from ordinary ones, at least in the case of predicates. As Sider understands them, every predicate used to expre ...
How Proper Names Refer
... reference-fixing question concerns how this uniform account should go. An exhaustive treatment of the question would defend the suppositions required to set it up.4 But to keep the paper to a reasonable length I shall follow other participants in the debate about referencefixing for proper names in ...
... reference-fixing question concerns how this uniform account should go. An exhaustive treatment of the question would defend the suppositions required to set it up.4 But to keep the paper to a reasonable length I shall follow other participants in the debate about referencefixing for proper names in ...
Not Every Truth Can Be Known (at least, not all
... RK governs K: » Kφ is true at w i: φ is true at all worlds in w’s RK equivalence class. We will call the worlds in w’s RK equivalence class the epistemic alternatives of w. [[Kφ]] is the set containing all epistemic equivalence classes totally included in [[φ]]. Here, [[φ]] is approximated by its ep ...
... RK governs K: » Kφ is true at w i: φ is true at all worlds in w’s RK equivalence class. We will call the worlds in w’s RK equivalence class the epistemic alternatives of w. [[Kφ]] is the set containing all epistemic equivalence classes totally included in [[φ]]. Here, [[φ]] is approximated by its ep ...
Lambda in Sentences with Designations: An Ode to
... Kit Fine, in Semantic Relationism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), at p. 69, evidently misunderstands me as claiming that (AE) and (A) semantically express different propositions while (A) and (B) express the same proposition—the reverse of my actual view. Fine defends and develops a view first proffe ...
... Kit Fine, in Semantic Relationism (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2007), at p. 69, evidently misunderstands me as claiming that (AE) and (A) semantically express different propositions while (A) and (B) express the same proposition—the reverse of my actual view. Fine defends and develops a view first proffe ...
Fiction Paper
... of properties, for example internal properties or external properties. The second approach holds that there is only one kind of property, but an object can have its properties in different ways, for example by either encoding or exemplification. In the end, it doesn’t make a difference whether one a ...
... of properties, for example internal properties or external properties. The second approach holds that there is only one kind of property, but an object can have its properties in different ways, for example by either encoding or exemplification. In the end, it doesn’t make a difference whether one a ...
Chapter 5, Meaning
... correspond to the use of the word. It’s quite possible to say one thing while thinking quite another. One might say to an unexpected visitor ‘How lovely to see you after so long’ while thinking ‘If he doesn’t shut up soon so that I can get back to the kitchen, the potatoes will be overcooked’ Even i ...
... correspond to the use of the word. It’s quite possible to say one thing while thinking quite another. One might say to an unexpected visitor ‘How lovely to see you after so long’ while thinking ‘If he doesn’t shut up soon so that I can get back to the kitchen, the potatoes will be overcooked’ Even i ...
Problem of Non-existence
... represent to be in the world; or which we merely represent in thought. If there is such a thing as thinking about things in these senses, then there are intentional objects. Intentional objects are objects of thought. In his posthumously published book Objects of Thought, A.N. Prior distinguished b ...
... represent to be in the world; or which we merely represent in thought. If there is such a thing as thinking about things in these senses, then there are intentional objects. Intentional objects are objects of thought. In his posthumously published book Objects of Thought, A.N. Prior distinguished b ...
Many-Valued Logic
... logic. But it is opened by larger environment of possible worlds or situations and therewith by the global environment introduced via many-valued logic. Many-valued logic has the possibility to assign several additional values to the cases in question and so it is appropriate for leading the inquiry ...
... logic. But it is opened by larger environment of possible worlds or situations and therewith by the global environment introduced via many-valued logic. Many-valued logic has the possibility to assign several additional values to the cases in question and so it is appropriate for leading the inquiry ...
Review of The Meaning of `Ought` by Matthew Chrisman Billy
... semantics as he claims that it needs non-trivial modification. His central motivation stems from the distinction between the so-called “agential” and “non-agential” readings of sentences containing ‘ought’. To use Chrisman’s example, we might truly say “Larry ought to win the lottery”, in a context ...
... semantics as he claims that it needs non-trivial modification. His central motivation stems from the distinction between the so-called “agential” and “non-agential” readings of sentences containing ‘ought’. To use Chrisman’s example, we might truly say “Larry ought to win the lottery”, in a context ...
http://pine.kuee.kyoto-u.ac.jp/member/kaufmann/ Draft
... also settled at evaluation time, that is, true at all historical alternatives. Nothing that has not yet materialized is physically inevitable. There is always a slight chance that things might not turn out the way we are now sure they will. We can assume that there always are historical alternatives ...
... also settled at evaluation time, that is, true at all historical alternatives. Nothing that has not yet materialized is physically inevitable. There is always a slight chance that things might not turn out the way we are now sure they will. We can assume that there always are historical alternatives ...
Neo-Fregeanism and Quantifier Variance
... seem unobjectionable: we could understand Hume’s Principle as a bold hypothesis about numbers. The power and the mystery of neo-Fregeanism derives from combining these two claims: Hume’s Principle may be stipulated true, and its apparent logical form is genuine, so that if there are any concepts in ...
... seem unobjectionable: we could understand Hume’s Principle as a bold hypothesis about numbers. The power and the mystery of neo-Fregeanism derives from combining these two claims: Hume’s Principle may be stipulated true, and its apparent logical form is genuine, so that if there are any concepts in ...
COMPOSITION, IDENTITY, AND EMERGENCE
... As it was said already CP (7) says that something is among a given plurality iff it is part of the mereological fusion of that very plurality. We already saw that CP is crucial in order to prove that CAI (3) entails PDP (4). On the other hand it is also important in undermining the argument in §2 in ...
... As it was said already CP (7) says that something is among a given plurality iff it is part of the mereological fusion of that very plurality. We already saw that CP is crucial in order to prove that CAI (3) entails PDP (4). On the other hand it is also important in undermining the argument in §2 in ...
A Philosophical Conception of Propositional Modal Logic
... having the denotation of the object term ‘j’ plugged into the first (and only) place of the property denoted by the predicate ‘H’. There are three important features of this analysis worth noting. First, the property H denoted by the predicate ‘H’ is not to be conceived as a set-theoretic entity of a ...
... having the denotation of the object term ‘j’ plugged into the first (and only) place of the property denoted by the predicate ‘H’. There are three important features of this analysis worth noting. First, the property H denoted by the predicate ‘H’ is not to be conceived as a set-theoretic entity of a ...
THE UNTRUTH AND THE TRUTH OF SKEPTICISM
... is the element of truth in Mill's view, and freed from his sensationalist phenomenalism it can be stated simply as follows: For a thing to exist is for it to be indefinitely identifiable. Or, shifting terminology, we may say that for a thing to exist is for there to be an indefinite number of persp ...
... is the element of truth in Mill's view, and freed from his sensationalist phenomenalism it can be stated simply as follows: For a thing to exist is for it to be indefinitely identifiable. Or, shifting terminology, we may say that for a thing to exist is for there to be an indefinite number of persp ...
Review of Peter Loptson, Reality: Fundamental Topics in Metaphysics
... reality, freely employed in singular existential statements. But what is the content of that concept? On the surface, there is no particular mystery about this either. It is the element of truth in Mill's view, and freed from his sensationalist phenomenalism it can be stated simply as follows: For ...
... reality, freely employed in singular existential statements. But what is the content of that concept? On the surface, there is no particular mystery about this either. It is the element of truth in Mill's view, and freed from his sensationalist phenomenalism it can be stated simply as follows: For ...