A Theory of Properties
... the pen can lead not only to puzzlement but to nausea.) But we can go on about the pen for an awfully long time before we come to such a point. If this difference in our abilities to describe the pen and the number cannot be ascribed to ‘‘a better understanding’’ of the pen than of the number, what ...
... the pen can lead not only to puzzlement but to nausea.) But we can go on about the pen for an awfully long time before we come to such a point. If this difference in our abilities to describe the pen and the number cannot be ascribed to ‘‘a better understanding’’ of the pen than of the number, what ...
To be submitted to Vincent Hendricks` Synthese
... vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism – the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and ...
... vacuous treatment of counterpossibles is a consequence of that very elegant theory. Another justification derives from the classical lore than if an impossibility were true, then anything goes. In this paper we defend non-vacuism – the view that counterpossibles are sometimes non-vacuously true and ...
PDF - Jeffrey C. King
... As I said, on this sort of view analyses say what some mind independent complex property or relation really is in the sense of saying what its constituents are and how they combine to form it. I don’t really have a good feel for the idea of conceptual analysis, but I do worry that viewing philosophi ...
... As I said, on this sort of view analyses say what some mind independent complex property or relation really is in the sense of saying what its constituents are and how they combine to form it. I don’t really have a good feel for the idea of conceptual analysis, but I do worry that viewing philosophi ...
Island Universes and the Analysis of Modality
... unified; the maximal such unified regions are the worlds. On this basic strategy, I am in agreement with Lewis. But I disagree with Lewis over two substantial issues having to do with the manner of unification. First, for Lewis, all worlds are globally unified (or almost globally unified): at any wo ...
... unified; the maximal such unified regions are the worlds. On this basic strategy, I am in agreement with Lewis. But I disagree with Lewis over two substantial issues having to do with the manner of unification. First, for Lewis, all worlds are globally unified (or almost globally unified): at any wo ...
Review of Frank Jackson, From Metaphysics to Ethics: A
... If we accept reply (1), then we ground the openness of "is that right?" in the openness (for us today) of "is that mature folk morality?" Jackson occasonally talks as though this latter openness were a matter of ordinary descriptive ignorance about the future; we haven't got there yet, so we don't k ...
... If we accept reply (1), then we ground the openness of "is that right?" in the openness (for us today) of "is that mature folk morality?" Jackson occasonally talks as though this latter openness were a matter of ordinary descriptive ignorance about the future; we haven't got there yet, so we don't k ...
Why Identity is Fundamental1 - University of Miami College of Arts
... that identity is not defined for such an object⎯then it is not obvious what would make the object an individual rather than just an indistinguishable thing (indistinguishable from any other thing of the same kind, whatever it is). In either case, the link between identity and individuality is very ...
... that identity is not defined for such an object⎯then it is not obvious what would make the object an individual rather than just an indistinguishable thing (indistinguishable from any other thing of the same kind, whatever it is). In either case, the link between identity and individuality is very ...
Modality Without Possible Worlds
... utterances and inscription-acts that are bound by the samesaying relation. Samesaying is supposed to capture something like the following: A’s and B’s utterances a and b make A and B samesayers just in case a is a good interpretation of b by A. There are several things to note about saying what anot ...
... utterances and inscription-acts that are bound by the samesaying relation. Samesaying is supposed to capture something like the following: A’s and B’s utterances a and b make A and B samesayers just in case a is a good interpretation of b by A. There are several things to note about saying what anot ...
Logics of essence and accident
... the characterizability of classes of frames. Several interesting problems and directions are left open for exploration. Keywords: philosophy of modal logic, non-normal modalities, formal metaphysics, essence, accident ...
... the characterizability of classes of frames. Several interesting problems and directions are left open for exploration. Keywords: philosophy of modal logic, non-normal modalities, formal metaphysics, essence, accident ...
Essence and Modality
... which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is? It is in answer to this question that appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers. But the con ...
... which makes it bear, in the metaphysically significant sense of the phrase, on what an object is? It is in answer to this question that appeal is naturally made to the concept of essence. For what appears to distinguish the intended properties is that they are essential to their bearers. But the con ...
Direct and representative realism
... perceivers. Examples include size, mass, and shape. We might say that the object has these properties ‘in and of itself’. By contrast, secondary qualities, such as colour and smell, are related to perceivers. Colour, by definition, is something that is experienced in vision. So it is a property that ...
... perceivers. Examples include size, mass, and shape. We might say that the object has these properties ‘in and of itself’. By contrast, secondary qualities, such as colour and smell, are related to perceivers. Colour, by definition, is something that is experienced in vision. So it is a property that ...
1 QUINE`S INTERPRETATION PROBLEM AND THE EARLY
... is true in all possible worlds. Suppose that we are considering a first-order predicate language L with predicate symbols and individual constants, but no function symbols. In addition to Boolean connectives, quantifiers and the identity symbol = (considered as a logical symbol), the language L also ...
... is true in all possible worlds. Suppose that we are considering a first-order predicate language L with predicate symbols and individual constants, but no function symbols. In addition to Boolean connectives, quantifiers and the identity symbol = (considered as a logical symbol), the language L also ...
Island Universe Problems - EngagedScholarship@CSU
... This additional ontological commitment could be justified in terms of the explanatory value gained by postulating the existence of every possible relationship between distinct spacetime regions over substrate s - but to do so, the modal realistS needs to offer some account of what s is, and what kin ...
... This additional ontological commitment could be justified in terms of the explanatory value gained by postulating the existence of every possible relationship between distinct spacetime regions over substrate s - but to do so, the modal realistS needs to offer some account of what s is, and what kin ...
(1) Lidt om bogen `Naming and Necessity` som helhed
... Some general remarks about this theory of proper names: As Kripke emphasizes, the first four theses are the central ones (second column, 277). (5) and (6) in his view, just say that ‘a sufficiently reflective speaker grasps this theory of proper names’. Because (1) – (4) are the core theses, (and be ...
... Some general remarks about this theory of proper names: As Kripke emphasizes, the first four theses are the central ones (second column, 277). (5) and (6) in his view, just say that ‘a sufficiently reflective speaker grasps this theory of proper names’. Because (1) – (4) are the core theses, (and be ...
Philosophy 515 Frege
... Sense and reference for singular terms reference: the object that an expression refers to, picks out, designates sense: what someone who understands the expression grasps; contains the mode of presentation of the reference. Sense and reference for predicates All that Frege has given to us so far is ...
... Sense and reference for singular terms reference: the object that an expression refers to, picks out, designates sense: what someone who understands the expression grasps; contains the mode of presentation of the reference. Sense and reference for predicates All that Frege has given to us so far is ...
1 Names and senses
... person does not exist in a possible world, then the name does not refer to anything at all. A definite description, however, is a non-rigid designator. “The tutor of Alexander the Great” may, in a certain possible world, be someone other than Aristotle. This is exactly the opposite of Russell’s descr ...
... person does not exist in a possible world, then the name does not refer to anything at all. A definite description, however, is a non-rigid designator. “The tutor of Alexander the Great” may, in a certain possible world, be someone other than Aristotle. This is exactly the opposite of Russell’s descr ...
Concrete Possible Worlds
... things, possibly from different worlds, can be patched together in a single world in any arrangement permitted by shape and size. To illustrate: if there could be a unicorn, and there could be a dragon, then there could be a unicorn and a dragon side by side. How should this be interpreted in terms ...
... things, possibly from different worlds, can be patched together in a single world in any arrangement permitted by shape and size. To illustrate: if there could be a unicorn, and there could be a dragon, then there could be a unicorn and a dragon side by side. How should this be interpreted in terms ...
1 - PhilPapers
... need any sophisticated philosophical explanations. We need merely look around, because possible worlds are just more things of that sort. There are like remote planets (cf. Kripke, 1972, p. 44), although most of them are much bigger and are not remote. His argument — called also the argument from wa ...
... need any sophisticated philosophical explanations. We need merely look around, because possible worlds are just more things of that sort. There are like remote planets (cf. Kripke, 1972, p. 44), although most of them are much bigger and are not remote. His argument — called also the argument from wa ...
Haecceitism, Anti-Haecceitism, and Possible Worlds
... of certain sets. (Since in many contexts we do not take possible-worlds talk literally, it can be hard to hear this reading of (7).) That’s what (7) says; and what (7) says is false on this theory of possible worlds. Two sets that contain all the same qualitative sentences may fail to be qualitative ...
... of certain sets. (Since in many contexts we do not take possible-worlds talk literally, it can be hard to hear this reading of (7).) That’s what (7) says; and what (7) says is false on this theory of possible worlds. Two sets that contain all the same qualitative sentences may fail to be qualitative ...
1 This work provides a novel semantic analysis of copy raising verbs
... c. #Haha, Tom seems to be really upset. I argue for a modal analysis of the contrast seen in (3). I model the Pgoal as the individual whose impression/knowledge is relevant for providing the worlds to be quantified over, analogous to the role of the judge in predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2 ...
... c. #Haha, Tom seems to be really upset. I argue for a modal analysis of the contrast seen in (3). I model the Pgoal as the individual whose impression/knowledge is relevant for providing the worlds to be quantified over, analogous to the role of the judge in predicates of personal taste (Lasersohn 2 ...
Kripke, A Priori Knowledge, Necessity and Contingency
... Since Kripke thinks that the two are totally different concepts, he wants to argue that the biconditional is false. Since this is a biconditional, it has two parts: 1. If X is necessary, then X is a priori This conditional seems intuitive; it seems to be the case that if something necessary is the c ...
... Since Kripke thinks that the two are totally different concepts, he wants to argue that the biconditional is false. Since this is a biconditional, it has two parts: 1. If X is necessary, then X is a priori This conditional seems intuitive; it seems to be the case that if something necessary is the c ...
The Semantics of Modal Propositional Logic Philosophy 431 Spring
... Contemporary contributors: C. I. Lewis (e.g., the “strict” conditional), Saul Kripke (Kripke semantics), Ruth Barcan Marcus (axiomatic systems for quantified modal logic [QML]). ...
... Contemporary contributors: C. I. Lewis (e.g., the “strict” conditional), Saul Kripke (Kripke semantics), Ruth Barcan Marcus (axiomatic systems for quantified modal logic [QML]). ...
Pleonastic Possible Worlds References
... The standard semantics for the modal fragment of natural languages can only be correct if there is more than one possible world. The nature and existence of possible worlds is thus of fundamental importance for such a semantics. The paper develops an account of possible worlds in the spirit of the p ...
... The standard semantics for the modal fragment of natural languages can only be correct if there is more than one possible world. The nature and existence of possible worlds is thus of fundamental importance for such a semantics. The paper develops an account of possible worlds in the spirit of the p ...