On the Initial Allocation of Tradeable Pollution Permits Ian A

... to reduce emissions over time by developing and adopting new abatement technology (see Kerr and Newell 2003, Ja¤e et al. 2003; Requate, 2005 and references therein). Due to the prescriptive standards associated with command-and-control regulation, …rms have very little (monetary) incentive to over-c ...

... to reduce emissions over time by developing and adopting new abatement technology (see Kerr and Newell 2003, Ja¤e et al. 2003; Requate, 2005 and references therein). Due to the prescriptive standards associated with command-and-control regulation, …rms have very little (monetary) incentive to over-c ...

First Price Auctions with General Information Structures

... surplus decreased) while remaining on the efficiency frontier, so that we move to the northwest from point A in Figure 1. Suppose that in the uniform example each bidder learns if they have the high or the low value. In addition, if the low value was relatively close to the high value (in particular ...

... surplus decreased) while remaining on the efficiency frontier, so that we move to the northwest from point A in Figure 1. Suppose that in the uniform example each bidder learns if they have the high or the low value. In addition, if the low value was relatively close to the high value (in particular ...

Maximin Rational Expectations Equilibrium

... In economics, dissatisfaction with the reigning Bayesian paradigm is as old as the paradigm itself. Indeed, important criticisms of Savage (1954)’s expected utility theory go back to Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and others. However, no criticism has substantial impact without an alternative. To th ...

... In economics, dissatisfaction with the reigning Bayesian paradigm is as old as the paradigm itself. Indeed, important criticisms of Savage (1954)’s expected utility theory go back to Allais (1953), Ellsberg (1961) and others. However, no criticism has substantial impact without an alternative. To th ...

Convex Hull Pricing in Electricity Markets

... or not considered in the objective function of a Pricing problem cannot be reflected in market prices. The incorporation of fixed costs in shadow prices is only possible if they are somehow modeled as variable costs. There are obviously consequences to such a modeling change because the Pricing prob ...

... or not considered in the objective function of a Pricing problem cannot be reflected in market prices. The incorporation of fixed costs in shadow prices is only possible if they are somehow modeled as variable costs. There are obviously consequences to such a modeling change because the Pricing prob ...

PDF

... becomes more complex. Non-uniform pricing schemes can be effective only if side deals between members do not take place, since side deals effectively mean that everyone pays the same price. In general, arbitrage by members is difficult to control, although there are ways to circumvent the problem. F ...

... becomes more complex. Non-uniform pricing schemes can be effective only if side deals between members do not take place, since side deals effectively mean that everyone pays the same price. In general, arbitrage by members is difficult to control, although there are ways to circumvent the problem. F ...

Game Changer 2.0

... UCS New Account Breakaway provides different discount categories for individual product families and promotional bundles In order to determine the specific discount level for any given UCS product family or SKU (part number), the partner must generate a formal quote by registering a deal in CCW When ...

... UCS New Account Breakaway provides different discount categories for individual product families and promotional bundles In order to determine the specific discount level for any given UCS product family or SKU (part number), the partner must generate a formal quote by registering a deal in CCW When ...

The Simple Economics of Approximately Optimal Auctions

... new derivation of the optimality for single-dimensinal agents. Our derivation exposes a previously unobserved property of single-dimensional linear preferences which we refer to as revenue linearity. Generally, i.e., beyond single-dimensional linear preferences, the optimality of the marginal revenu ...

... new derivation of the optimality for single-dimensinal agents. Our derivation exposes a previously unobserved property of single-dimensional linear preferences which we refer to as revenue linearity. Generally, i.e., beyond single-dimensional linear preferences, the optimality of the marginal revenu ...

As filed with the Securities and Exchange Commission on October

... services. We believe, based on LP/Gas Magazine dated February 2003, that we were the third largest retail marketer of propane in the United States, measured by retail gallons sold in the year 2002. During the 2002 fiscal year, we sold approximately 456.0 million gallons of propane to retail customer ...

... services. We believe, based on LP/Gas Magazine dated February 2003, that we were the third largest retail marketer of propane in the United States, measured by retail gallons sold in the year 2002. During the 2002 fiscal year, we sold approximately 456.0 million gallons of propane to retail customer ...

... We modify this model by assuming that expending effort generates a set of possible distributions of gross revenues. The agent is then free to (costlessly) choose any element in the set. This structure is meant to capture the idea that effort generates an array of possible strategies for the firm, fr ...

PROBABILITY Unit 2 Probability of Two or More Events TEXT

... Using the first letter of each drink and topping, it is easy to see that Cola (C)) could be combined with any of the five toppings to give CH, CM, CS, CP, CT. Here 'CH' means 'Cola' drink and 'Ham' topping, etc. Similarly, for Diet Cola (D), you have DH, DM, DS, DP, DT and for Orange (O) OH, OM, OS, ...

... Using the first letter of each drink and topping, it is easy to see that Cola (C)) could be combined with any of the five toppings to give CH, CM, CS, CP, CT. Here 'CH' means 'Cola' drink and 'Ham' topping, etc. Similarly, for Diet Cola (D), you have DH, DM, DS, DP, DT and for Orange (O) OH, OM, OS, ...

Monopoly Regulation under Asymmetric Information: Prices vs

... The design of regulatory mechanisms to control monopoly market power when the firm has better information than the regulator is a problem whose practical relevance is irrefutable. On one hand, the fact that the firm probably has better information about its costs than the regulator was well explaine ...

... The design of regulatory mechanisms to control monopoly market power when the firm has better information than the regulator is a problem whose practical relevance is irrefutable. On one hand, the fact that the firm probably has better information about its costs than the regulator was well explaine ...

Optimal Auctions for Correlated Bidders with Sampling

... In contrast, the auction in Theorem 1.1 needs only one sample for two such distributions. Moreover, even when the auctioneer has some confidence on his guess of the underlying distribution and runs an auction that is interim invidually rational for that distribution, the auction may run into troubl ...

... In contrast, the auction in Theorem 1.1 needs only one sample for two such distributions. Moreover, even when the auctioneer has some confidence on his guess of the underlying distribution and runs an auction that is interim invidually rational for that distribution, the auction may run into troubl ...

NATOMAS PARK CLUBHOUSE MASTER PLAN SCOPE OF WORK

... The site is centrally located in the Natomas Park Community with good access both for personal vehicles and for alternative forms of transportation such as bus, pedestrian, and bicycle. Pedestrian access is provided to the site from the northwest corner of Natomas Boulevard and Clu ...

... The site is centrally located in the Natomas Park Community with good access both for personal vehicles and for alternative forms of transportation such as bus, pedestrian, and bicycle. Pedestrian access is provided to the site from the northwest corner of Natomas Boulevard and Clu ...

A Payment Rules through Discriminant

... There are, however, significant challenges associated with this classical approach. First, it can be analytically cumbersome to derive optimal mechanisms for domains that are multidimensional, in the sense that each agent’s private information is described through more than a single number, and few ...

... There are, however, significant challenges associated with this classical approach. First, it can be analytically cumbersome to derive optimal mechanisms for domains that are multidimensional, in the sense that each agent’s private information is described through more than a single number, and few ...

DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC

... DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS† ...

... DESIGNING STABLE MECHANISMS FOR ECONOMIC ENVIRONMENTS† ...

COS 444 Internet Auctions: Theory and Practice

... Ausubel & Cramton prove, in a simplified model, that this example is not pathological: Proposition: There is no efficient equilibrium strategy in a uniform-price, multi-unit demand auction. The appropriate generalization of the Vickrey auction is the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism… week 12 ...

... Ausubel & Cramton prove, in a simplified model, that this example is not pathological: Proposition: There is no efficient equilibrium strategy in a uniform-price, multi-unit demand auction. The appropriate generalization of the Vickrey auction is the Vickrey-Clark-Groves (VCG) mechanism… week 12 ...

Bayesian incentive compatibility via matchings.

... incentive compatibility; furthermore, it has no clear generalization of its ironing-based approach to more the general (and fundamental) multi-dimensional setting, e.g., where an agent might have distinct values for several services that are available. In contrast we consider multi-dimensional setti ...

... incentive compatibility; furthermore, it has no clear generalization of its ironing-based approach to more the general (and fundamental) multi-dimensional setting, e.g., where an agent might have distinct values for several services that are available. In contrast we consider multi-dimensional setti ...

The Optimal Mechanism for Selling to a Budget

... requirements are often used in real estate transactions, for example. Such requirements are not used in all transactions, however. One possibility is that the requirement may be ineffective because the buyer can borrow and exaggerate his budget. For this reason, we also consider a stronger version o ...

... requirements are often used in real estate transactions, for example. Such requirements are not used in all transactions, however. One possibility is that the requirement may be ineffective because the buyer can borrow and exaggerate his budget. For this reason, we also consider a stronger version o ...

... The second economically substantive assumption is that if the utility of the agent diverges along a sequence of rewards, the cost to the principal of providing that utility diverges even faster. When, for example, the wage is both the agent’s reward and the …rm’s cost, this assumption is satis…ed if ...

AN INTRODUCTION TO RANDOM WALKS Contents 1. Introduction

... Proof. Normally, we want to think of the position Snd as a vector P with d components. However, if we let the vector P have d + 2 components, and note that the (d + 1)-component and (d + 2)-component are always 0, nothing changes in terms of the position on the lattice or the probability of an equal ...

... Proof. Normally, we want to think of the position Snd as a vector P with d components. However, if we let the vector P have d + 2 components, and note that the (d + 1)-component and (d + 2)-component are always 0, nothing changes in terms of the position on the lattice or the probability of an equal ...

CHAPTER 10 FACILITIES LAYOUT AND LOCATION

... material handling costs. • Suppose that some machines 1, 2, 3, 4 are required to be located in A, B, C, D. The cost of locating machines to locations are known and shown below. For example, if Machine 2 is located to location C, the cost is 7 (say, hundred dollars per month). Location Machine ...

... material handling costs. • Suppose that some machines 1, 2, 3, 4 are required to be located in A, B, C, D. The cost of locating machines to locations are known and shown below. For example, if Machine 2 is located to location C, the cost is 7 (say, hundred dollars per month). Location Machine ...

Efficient Dynamic Allocation with Strategic Arrivals

... Gershkov and Moldovanu [2010] analyze efficiency in continuous-time optimal stopping frameworks where the agents are short-lived (thus there is no recall) and where the planner has several heterogenous objects. In a model with discrete time, Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009] and Gershkov and Moldovanu [ ...

... Gershkov and Moldovanu [2010] analyze efficiency in continuous-time optimal stopping frameworks where the agents are short-lived (thus there is no recall) and where the planner has several heterogenous objects. In a model with discrete time, Gershkov and Moldovanu [2009] and Gershkov and Moldovanu [ ...

Lotteries, Sunspots, and Incentive Constraints

... constraints and would yield strictly higher ex ante utility than (x^ 1g , x^ 2g , x^ 1b , x^ 2b ) because utility is strictly concave. Consider the net trade (x 1g , x 2g , x 1b , x 2b )=((1&%) x^ 1g +%x~ 1g , (1&%) x^ 2g +%x~ 2g , (1&%) x^ 1b +%x~ 1b , (1&%) x^ 2b +%x~ 2b ). If % is small enough, t ...

... constraints and would yield strictly higher ex ante utility than (x^ 1g , x^ 2g , x^ 1b , x^ 2b ) because utility is strictly concave. Consider the net trade (x 1g , x 2g , x 1b , x 2b )=((1&%) x^ 1g +%x~ 1g , (1&%) x^ 2g +%x~ 2g , (1&%) x^ 1b +%x~ 1b , (1&%) x^ 2b +%x~ 2b ). If % is small enough, t ...

1 Model with Time-Consistent Agents

... cm , ym , cm , ym θm ∈Θ is truthfully implementable by a direct betting mechanism if the allocation satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and the executability constraints (8). Note that since β̂ = 1, the incentive compatibility constraints (7) are the same for the TC and TI agents. ...

... cm , ym , cm , ym θm ∈Θ is truthfully implementable by a direct betting mechanism if the allocation satisfies the incentive compatibility constraints (7) and the executability constraints (8). Note that since β̂ = 1, the incentive compatibility constraints (7) are the same for the TC and TI agents. ...

Alliance Partner Network Distributor Participation Guidelines

... Brocade offers a number of best-in-class technology courses and certifications. Distributors are required to maintain and report the number of technical personnel on staff and maintain the minimum requirements as outlined by product category. Distributors selling SAN products are required to have tw ...

... Brocade offers a number of best-in-class technology courses and certifications. Distributors are required to maintain and report the number of technical personnel on staff and maintain the minimum requirements as outlined by product category. Distributors selling SAN products are required to have tw ...