Mechanism Design with Unknown Correlated
... applications is equivalent to a second price auction with a reserve. However, to effectively implement even this common, relatively simple auction, the seller must know, with a high degree of accuracy, the distribution of bidder valuations that she1 is likely to see. If the seller overestimates the ...
... applications is equivalent to a second price auction with a reserve. However, to effectively implement even this common, relatively simple auction, the seller must know, with a high degree of accuracy, the distribution of bidder valuations that she1 is likely to see. If the seller overestimates the ...
Single Buyer, Single Seller Auction
... which satisfy Monhazard Rate Condition and get mechanisms close to the optimal mechanisms. One of the key lemma proved in the paper shows that if ratio of maximum to minimum value in support of any distribution is constant, then items can be partitioned into three parts R, S, T such R contains cons ...
... which satisfy Monhazard Rate Condition and get mechanisms close to the optimal mechanisms. One of the key lemma proved in the paper shows that if ratio of maximum to minimum value in support of any distribution is constant, then items can be partitioned into three parts R, S, T such R contains cons ...
pdf
... eliminated. Rather, they assumed that strategies that are weakly dominated occur with infinitesimal (but nonzero) probability. (Formally, this is captured by using an LPS—lexicographically ordered probability sequence.) They define a notion of belief (which they call assumption) appropriate for thei ...
... eliminated. Rather, they assumed that strategies that are weakly dominated occur with infinitesimal (but nonzero) probability. (Formally, this is captured by using an LPS—lexicographically ordered probability sequence.) They define a notion of belief (which they call assumption) appropriate for thei ...
Public goods with costly access
... Furthermore, we study the allocation that emerges if the good is provided by a profit maximizing monopoly.5 Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources under complete information. When financial constraints are irrelevant, we obtain a generalized version of Sam ...
... Furthermore, we study the allocation that emerges if the good is provided by a profit maximizing monopoly.5 Section 2 presents the model and characterizes the optimal allocation of resources under complete information. When financial constraints are irrelevant, we obtain a generalized version of Sam ...
financialIntermediation_KeisterPaper
... Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. A state-contingent allocation is a mapping c : Ω → A from the set of realized preference types to the set of feasible allocations. Investors who choose to withdraw in period 1 arrive one at a time in a randomly-determined order. As in Wallace (1988, 1990 ...
... Let A denote the set of feasible allocations. A state-contingent allocation is a mapping c : Ω → A from the set of realized preference types to the set of feasible allocations. Investors who choose to withdraw in period 1 arrive one at a time in a randomly-determined order. As in Wallace (1988, 1990 ...
Perfect competition in asymmetric information economies: compatibility of efficiency and incentives 夡
... Section 2, a perfectly competitive differential information economy is considered in Section 3 in the setting of a “common value” model, where agents’ types are purely informational in the sense that they do not enter the utility functions. In particular, this is the case, when uncertainty only stem ...
... Section 2, a perfectly competitive differential information economy is considered in Section 3 in the setting of a “common value” model, where agents’ types are purely informational in the sense that they do not enter the utility functions. In particular, this is the case, when uncertainty only stem ...
The Boolean formula value problem is in ALOGTIME
... Note Σk -LOGT IM E reductions are the same as Πk -LOGT IM E reductions. The next two theorems express the properties we need reductions to satisfy: Theorem 4 helps us establish the upper bound for the complexity of the Boolean formula value problem and Theorem 5 gives the means to demonstrate a lowe ...
... Note Σk -LOGT IM E reductions are the same as Πk -LOGT IM E reductions. The next two theorems express the properties we need reductions to satisfy: Theorem 4 helps us establish the upper bound for the complexity of the Boolean formula value problem and Theorem 5 gives the means to demonstrate a lowe ...
The Extent of the Market and the Optimal Degree of Specialization∗
... The economy described here is essentially the one analyzed by Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998), with the introduction of the specialization choice. There are N (≥ 3) types of goods and agents. A type-n agent produces type-(n + 1) goods, which he can consume or sell in the market. In addition to consu ...
... The economy described here is essentially the one analyzed by Kocherlakota and Wallace (1998), with the introduction of the specialization choice. There are N (≥ 3) types of goods and agents. A type-n agent produces type-(n + 1) goods, which he can consume or sell in the market. In addition to consu ...
NBER WORKING PAPER SERIES INTERTEMPORAL DISTORTIONS IN THE SECOND BEST Stefania Albanesi
... competitive equilibrium conditions for households and firms. Since consumption and labor decisions in the future affect the present value of tax revenues, the implementability constraint is forwardlooking. In stochastic economies, admissible allocations can be characterized also in terms of a single ...
... competitive equilibrium conditions for households and firms. Since consumption and labor decisions in the future affect the present value of tax revenues, the implementability constraint is forwardlooking. In stochastic economies, admissible allocations can be characterized also in terms of a single ...
Coordination Mechanisms∗
... allocation can be easily enforced by a centralized authority and all game-theoretic issues vanish). This framework is very similar to competitive analysis, especially if we consider the worst-case price of anarchy: We, the designers, select the scheduling policies for each machine. Then an adversar ...
... allocation can be easily enforced by a centralized authority and all game-theoretic issues vanish). This framework is very similar to competitive analysis, especially if we consider the worst-case price of anarchy: We, the designers, select the scheduling policies for each machine. Then an adversar ...
On extensive form implementation of contracts in differential
... without free disposal. To our surprise, as it was not intuitively obvious, we found that solution concepts which are Bayesian incentive compatible without free disposal, do not retain this property under free disposal. In particular, not only free disposal destroys incentive compatibility but a prob ...
... without free disposal. To our surprise, as it was not intuitively obvious, we found that solution concepts which are Bayesian incentive compatible without free disposal, do not retain this property under free disposal. In particular, not only free disposal destroys incentive compatibility but a prob ...
Internet Auction
... Then gradually decreases his asking until the buyers emerge with bids to purchase at the price. ...
... Then gradually decreases his asking until the buyers emerge with bids to purchase at the price. ...
Optimality in an Adverse Selection Insurance Economy with Private
... agents have an incentive to unbundle the contingent claims in an insurance contract to eliminate arbitrage profits and to improve risk-sharing. As Bisin and Gottardi [5]-[6] and Rustichini and Siconolfi [17] have shown, the problems of existence of competitive equilibria are not mitigated by allowin ...
... agents have an incentive to unbundle the contingent claims in an insurance contract to eliminate arbitrage profits and to improve risk-sharing. As Bisin and Gottardi [5]-[6] and Rustichini and Siconolfi [17] have shown, the problems of existence of competitive equilibria are not mitigated by allowin ...
impossibility of efficiency trade with bilateral private information
... • Also note that under truthful revelation, it’s efficient – the object is always allocated to someone, and a low type never gets it if a high type is available • So the seller is achieving both efficiency and full surplus extraction – his best-case scenario Now, where the hell did this auction come ...
... • Also note that under truthful revelation, it’s efficient – the object is always allocated to someone, and a low type never gets it if a high type is available • So the seller is achieving both efficiency and full surplus extraction – his best-case scenario Now, where the hell did this auction come ...
Introduction to Sunspots and Lotteries
... information economy. He shows that absent lotteries the private informaton economy of Prescott and Townsend [31] is convex, yet lotteries are needed for Pareto efficiency. In addition, the LE concept has also been applied to real nonconvexities arising in labor markets because a given person can onl ...
... information economy. He shows that absent lotteries the private informaton economy of Prescott and Townsend [31] is convex, yet lotteries are needed for Pareto efficiency. In addition, the LE concept has also been applied to real nonconvexities arising in labor markets because a given person can onl ...
Kernel Estimation and Model Combination in A Bandit Problem with
... where I(·) is the indicator function and v is a small positive constant (to ensure that v̂i,n+1,r is nonzero). In practice, we set v = 10−16 . STEP 7. Repeat steps 3 - 6 for n = n0 l + 2, n0 l + 3, · · · , and so on. In the allocation strategy above, step 1 and step 2 initialize the game and pull ea ...
... where I(·) is the indicator function and v is a small positive constant (to ensure that v̂i,n+1,r is nonzero). In practice, we set v = 10−16 . STEP 7. Repeat steps 3 - 6 for n = n0 l + 2, n0 l + 3, · · · , and so on. In the allocation strategy above, step 1 and step 2 initialize the game and pull ea ...
Toward the fair sharing of profit in a supply network formation
... ‘non-cooperative’ are composed of players with different preference relations or utility functions. Their actions obey a strategy that takes into account information (generally imperfect) on the other players’ actions and preferences. As noted in Cachon and Netessine (2004), most supply chain models ...
... ‘non-cooperative’ are composed of players with different preference relations or utility functions. Their actions obey a strategy that takes into account information (generally imperfect) on the other players’ actions and preferences. As noted in Cachon and Netessine (2004), most supply chain models ...
pass-by-reference - Emory`s Math Department
... The Pass-by-reference mechanism - the agreement (cont.) For the called method: • First, the called method uses the reference (= address) stored in the parameter variables to locate the actual parameter • Once the actual parameter have been located, the called method can subsequently obtain the info ...
... The Pass-by-reference mechanism - the agreement (cont.) For the called method: • First, the called method uses the reference (= address) stored in the parameter variables to locate the actual parameter • Once the actual parameter have been located, the called method can subsequently obtain the info ...
Axiomatizing first order consequences in dependence logic
... Let A be a set and {x1 , . . . , xk } a finite (possibly empty) set of variables. A team X of A with domain Dom(X) = {x1 , . . . , xk } is any set of assignments from the variables {x1 , . . . , xk } into the set A. We denote by rel(X) the k-ary relation of A corresponding to X rel(X) = {(s(x1 ), . ...
... Let A be a set and {x1 , . . . , xk } a finite (possibly empty) set of variables. A team X of A with domain Dom(X) = {x1 , . . . , xk } is any set of assignments from the variables {x1 , . . . , xk } into the set A. We denote by rel(X) the k-ary relation of A corresponding to X rel(X) = {(s(x1 ), . ...
An all-pay auction with a pure-strategy equilibrium
... ] That is, if [ b (S] 1 e ) 2 bS] ] 1 [(1 / 2) S] 2 e ] . 0. It is easy to see, that any e [ (0, 0.5S], ] is a sufficient but not necessary condition for A’s payoff to be higher when he bids (S 1 e ) than when he bids S. However, since ...
... ] That is, if [ b (S] 1 e ) 2 bS] ] 1 [(1 / 2) S] 2 e ] . 0. It is easy to see, that any e [ (0, 0.5S], ] is a sufficient but not necessary condition for A’s payoff to be higher when he bids (S 1 e ) than when he bids S. However, since ...
Statistics 512 Notes ID
... Suppose a person’s prior distribution about is ( and the model is that X | has probability density function (or probability mass function) p( x | ) . Then the joint (subjective) pdf (or pmf) of ( X , ) is ( p ( x | ) . The Bayes risk of a decision procedure for a prior distribu ...
... Suppose a person’s prior distribution about is ( and the model is that X | has probability density function (or probability mass function) p( x | ) . Then the joint (subjective) pdf (or pmf) of ( X , ) is ( p ( x | ) . The Bayes risk of a decision procedure for a prior distribu ...
GENERAL COMPETITIVE ANALYSIS IN AN ECONOMY WITH
... a standard construct might be modified with the introduction of private information in such a way as to create a construct which combines the explanatory power cf the standard construct with the explanatory power of private information. Such a construct might also have important normative implicatio ...
... a standard construct might be modified with the introduction of private information in such a way as to create a construct which combines the explanatory power cf the standard construct with the explanatory power of private information. Such a construct might also have important normative implicatio ...
PDF
... allocation as well as the income distribution. According to Coase (1960), an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved in spite of existing externality, whenever property rights are well defined and transaction costs are relatively low. However, the conditions of low transaction costs are vi ...
... allocation as well as the income distribution. According to Coase (1960), an efficient allocation of resources can be achieved in spite of existing externality, whenever property rights are well defined and transaction costs are relatively low. However, the conditions of low transaction costs are vi ...
P - brassmath
... EXAMPLE Suppose that, at the beginning of a regular CFL season, the Saskatchewan Roughriders are given a 25% chance of winning the Grey Cup. a) What is the probability that the event will occur as a fraction? b) Describe the complement of this event? c) Express the probability of the complement of ...
... EXAMPLE Suppose that, at the beginning of a regular CFL season, the Saskatchewan Roughriders are given a 25% chance of winning the Grey Cup. a) What is the probability that the event will occur as a fraction? b) Describe the complement of this event? c) Express the probability of the complement of ...