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... kind of nut is put into the mixture? 6. To obtain the height of a tree (see figure), you measure the tree's shadow and find that it is x = 7 meters long. You also measure the shadow of a two-meter lamppost and find that it is 75 centimeters long. How tall in meters is the tree? (Round your answer to ...
... kind of nut is put into the mixture? 6. To obtain the height of a tree (see figure), you measure the tree's shadow and find that it is x = 7 meters long. You also measure the shadow of a two-meter lamppost and find that it is 75 centimeters long. How tall in meters is the tree? (Round your answer to ...
Mean Field Game Theory for Partially Observed Nonlinear Systems
... (MM-MFG) considers the situation where the major player has a significant influence, i.e., asymptotically non-vanishing, on any minor agent. A distinct feature of such games is that the mean field term becomes stochastic and, as a result, the best response control actions of the minor agents depend ...
... (MM-MFG) considers the situation where the major player has a significant influence, i.e., asymptotically non-vanishing, on any minor agent. A distinct feature of such games is that the mean field term becomes stochastic and, as a result, the best response control actions of the minor agents depend ...
Empirical and Molecular Formula Notes
... Determine the empirical formula(either given or you find it) Find the molar mass of the empirical formula Divide the Molecular Formula mass (given in problem) by the EF mass to create a ratio (n). ...
... Determine the empirical formula(either given or you find it) Find the molar mass of the empirical formula Divide the Molecular Formula mass (given in problem) by the EF mass to create a ratio (n). ...
S - Webcourse
... Consider the following modification: the highest bidder wins, but pays half of his bid. The new (strange?) protocol implements the same function (the same allocation and payments for every tuple of agents’ valuations), and truth-revealing is in equilibrium there. ...
... Consider the following modification: the highest bidder wins, but pays half of his bid. The new (strange?) protocol implements the same function (the same allocation and payments for every tuple of agents’ valuations), and truth-revealing is in equilibrium there. ...
Mechanism Design
... Given SCF f : , can we find mechanism for which, regardless of type space associated with preference space , there always exists f-optimal equilibrium? (robust partial implementation) • sufficient condition: f partially implementable in ex post equilibrium, i.e., there exists mechanism that ...
... Given SCF f : , can we find mechanism for which, regardless of type space associated with preference space , there always exists f-optimal equilibrium? (robust partial implementation) • sufficient condition: f partially implementable in ex post equilibrium, i.e., there exists mechanism that ...
Empirical and molecular formula
... 3. Divide the number of moles of each element by the smallest number of moles. If you have whole numbers assign them as subscripts in the formula. If they are not whole numbers go to step 4. 4. Multiply the numbers from step 3 by the smallest integer that will convert them to whole numbers. These wh ...
... 3. Divide the number of moles of each element by the smallest number of moles. If you have whole numbers assign them as subscripts in the formula. If they are not whole numbers go to step 4. 4. Multiply the numbers from step 3 by the smallest integer that will convert them to whole numbers. These wh ...
Modern mechanism des.. - School of Computer Science
... • Combining randomization and manipulation hardness… ...
... • Combining randomization and manipulation hardness… ...
LHS Chem EmpiricalFormula
... 2. A 15.0g sample of a compound is found to contain 8.83g sodium and 6.17g sulfur. Calculate the empirical formula of this compound. 3. Find the empirical formula of a compound that contains 53.70% iron and 46.30% sulfur. 4. Analysis of a 10.150g sample of a compound known to contain only phosphorus ...
... 2. A 15.0g sample of a compound is found to contain 8.83g sodium and 6.17g sulfur. Calculate the empirical formula of this compound. 3. Find the empirical formula of a compound that contains 53.70% iron and 46.30% sulfur. 4. Analysis of a 10.150g sample of a compound known to contain only phosphorus ...
Formulas Powerpoint (level 6)
... cost, n = number of pupils). How much would it cost if there are 120 pupils in year 9? ...
... cost, n = number of pupils). How much would it cost if there are 120 pupils in year 9? ...
Modern mechanism des.. - School of Computer Science
... Criticizing truthful mechanisms • Theorem. There are settings where: – Executing the optimal truthful (in terms of social welfare) mechanism is NP-complete – There exists an insincere mechanism, where • The center only carries out polynomial computation • Finding a beneficial insincere revelation i ...
... Criticizing truthful mechanisms • Theorem. There are settings where: – Executing the optimal truthful (in terms of social welfare) mechanism is NP-complete – There exists an insincere mechanism, where • The center only carries out polynomial computation • Finding a beneficial insincere revelation i ...
Final exam
... potential assistant professors. Candidate i has an outside option of wage θi ∈ [0, 1] with distribution function F . This wage is private information and can be thought of as the candidate’s type. The department gets value v(θi ) from type θi . Consider a direct revelation mechanism consisting of an ...
... potential assistant professors. Candidate i has an outside option of wage θi ∈ [0, 1] with distribution function F . This wage is private information and can be thought of as the candidate’s type. The department gets value v(θi ) from type θi . Consider a direct revelation mechanism consisting of an ...
A Useful New Game Formula
... Then Vi Callaghan volunteered from the audience to conduct an experiential exercise to help people get in touch with what they were doing in a recent fight..."Who started the fight ... what was the satisfaction you got out of it…what happened when you made your point and it didn't work…what was it t ...
... Then Vi Callaghan volunteered from the audience to conduct an experiential exercise to help people get in touch with what they were doing in a recent fight..."Who started the fight ... what was the satisfaction you got out of it…what happened when you made your point and it didn't work…what was it t ...
Monotonicity in direct revelation mechanisms
... This paper studies a screening problem when the asymmetric information faced by the principal can be described by a one-dimensional variable, but allocation rules may be multi-dimensional. It is well known, since at least Matthews and Moore (1987), that in a multi-dimensional context it is possible ...
... This paper studies a screening problem when the asymmetric information faced by the principal can be described by a one-dimensional variable, but allocation rules may be multi-dimensional. It is well known, since at least Matthews and Moore (1987), that in a multi-dimensional context it is possible ...
Active learning exercise on Stirling numbers of the second kind
... ways to partition {1, 2, . . . , n} into k labelled blocks. Alternatively, Ŝ(n, k) is the number of ways to places balls labelled 1, 2, . . . , n into k boxes labelled box 1, box 2, . . . , box k, in such a way that no box ends up empty. For example, using dashes to separate balls in box i from box ...
... ways to partition {1, 2, . . . , n} into k labelled blocks. Alternatively, Ŝ(n, k) is the number of ways to places balls labelled 1, 2, . . . , n into k boxes labelled box 1, box 2, . . . , box k, in such a way that no box ends up empty. For example, using dashes to separate balls in box i from box ...
Macro II Homework 2- Some Useful Mathematical Tools 1
... (i) Formulate this problem as a dynamic programming problem. (ii) Does Bellman's equation de¯ne a contraction mapping? If so, then prove why this is so. Otherwise explain why not. (iii) Graph the optimal value function against the value of the state variable. Over what region of o®ers does the agent ...
... (i) Formulate this problem as a dynamic programming problem. (ii) Does Bellman's equation de¯ne a contraction mapping? If so, then prove why this is so. Otherwise explain why not. (iii) Graph the optimal value function against the value of the state variable. Over what region of o®ers does the agent ...
Section 11.1
... Ex. You drop a super ball from a height of 12 feet. If the ball rebounds to 80% of its previous height, how high will the ball rebound after its 5th bounce? ...
... Ex. You drop a super ball from a height of 12 feet. If the ball rebounds to 80% of its previous height, how high will the ball rebound after its 5th bounce? ...
Microeconomic Theory II PS 4 1. A firm faces a continuum of
... technology is in place. The owner of restaurant B must now make a binary choice, denoted by x: x is 1 if the new technology is bought (and smoking is allowed) and 0 otherwise. Assume that the cost of the new technology is c and therefore c(x) = cx: Assume also that the owner of restaurant B cares on ...
... technology is in place. The owner of restaurant B must now make a binary choice, denoted by x: x is 1 if the new technology is bought (and smoking is allowed) and 0 otherwise. Assume that the cost of the new technology is c and therefore c(x) = cx: Assume also that the owner of restaurant B cares on ...
Homework 3
... (a) Consider period t = 2. Fix the first period type, θ. Assume in period 2 that the lowtype’s (IR) constraint binds, the high type’s (IC) constraint binds and we can ignore the other constraints. Characterise the second period rents obtained by the agents, UθL and UθH , as a function of {qLL , qLH ...
... (a) Consider period t = 2. Fix the first period type, θ. Assume in period 2 that the lowtype’s (IR) constraint binds, the high type’s (IC) constraint binds and we can ignore the other constraints. Characterise the second period rents obtained by the agents, UθL and UθH , as a function of {qLL , qLH ...
Homework 3
... (a) Consider period t = 2. Fix the first period type, θ. Assume in period 2 that the lowtype’s (IR) constraint binds, the high type’s (IC) constraint binds and we can ignore the other constraints. Characterize the second period rents obtained by the agents, UθL and UθH , as a function of {qLL , qLH ...
... (a) Consider period t = 2. Fix the first period type, θ. Assume in period 2 that the lowtype’s (IR) constraint binds, the high type’s (IC) constraint binds and we can ignore the other constraints. Characterize the second period rents obtained by the agents, UθL and UθH , as a function of {qLL , qLH ...
SCREENING UNDER ADVERSE SELECTION Some Optimal
... • For simplicity, we assume that Uo(θ) = Uo = 0 (reservation utilities do not depend on type) • The timing of the model : t = 0 Agent discovers θ t = 1 Principal offers contract (q, t) t = 2 Agent accepts or refuses t = 3 Contract is executed. ...
... • For simplicity, we assume that Uo(θ) = Uo = 0 (reservation utilities do not depend on type) • The timing of the model : t = 0 Agent discovers θ t = 1 Principal offers contract (q, t) t = 2 Agent accepts or refuses t = 3 Contract is executed. ...
mechanism design
... Social choice function: A social choice function is a function f: 1 … X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (1 … ), assigns a collective choice f(1, …, ) X Implementation: The mechanism implements social choice function f() (in Bayesian Nash equilibrium) if ...
... Social choice function: A social choice function is a function f: 1 … X that, for each possible profile of the agents’ types (1 … ), assigns a collective choice f(1, …, ) X Implementation: The mechanism implements social choice function f() (in Bayesian Nash equilibrium) if ...