Finite-Degree Predicates and Two-Variable First-Order Logic
... In the context of circuit complexity, logics are considered over finite words with arbitrary numerical predicates. Intuitively, we allow the use of any predicate that only depends on the size of the word. A first result from Immerman [6] provides an equivalence between languages definable by first-o ...
... In the context of circuit complexity, logics are considered over finite words with arbitrary numerical predicates. Intuitively, we allow the use of any predicate that only depends on the size of the word. A first result from Immerman [6] provides an equivalence between languages definable by first-o ...
Continuous Time Contests with Private Information
... do so, we first characterize the candidate equilibrium distribution uniquely up to its endpoints. In a second step, we use a result on Skorokhod embeddings to show that there exists a stopping strategy which leads to the candidate distribution. In the paper, we do not fix the deadline exogenously, b ...
... do so, we first characterize the candidate equilibrium distribution uniquely up to its endpoints. In a second step, we use a result on Skorokhod embeddings to show that there exists a stopping strategy which leads to the candidate distribution. In the paper, we do not fix the deadline exogenously, b ...
Deliberation as Coordination through Cheap Talk ∗ Randall Calvert Washington University, St. Louis
... Deliberation can be important for achieving such coordination. The reasons people enunciate for a decision often carry implications for the criteria by which future decisions will be made. To the extent these reasons are taken seriously, losers in the current decision might see them as an assurance ...
... Deliberation can be important for achieving such coordination. The reasons people enunciate for a decision often carry implications for the criteria by which future decisions will be made. To the extent these reasons are taken seriously, losers in the current decision might see them as an assurance ...
Hard-core measures
... interested in a fixed circuit and measuring how good it is against variable inputs. However, there are also situations where we consider a collection of circuits all of which are supposed to compute the function f , and look at the advantage of the combination of these circuits on each input. 3.4. ...
... interested in a fixed circuit and measuring how good it is against variable inputs. However, there are also situations where we consider a collection of circuits all of which are supposed to compute the function f , and look at the advantage of the combination of these circuits on each input. 3.4. ...
Kanniainen 01 ee08 6538261 en
... customers. The products (or services) are physically identical but the production processes can di¤er. There is, say, a polluting one and a non-polluting one. People di¤er with respect to their morality in respect of pollution and some may …nd it valuable to misrepresent their hidden preferences. Th ...
... customers. The products (or services) are physically identical but the production processes can di¤er. There is, say, a polluting one and a non-polluting one. People di¤er with respect to their morality in respect of pollution and some may …nd it valuable to misrepresent their hidden preferences. Th ...
Postwar game and decision theory: a historical perspective
... The “economic” approach to statistics • The rise of behaviorist statistics: Wald’s works in statistical decision theory (1939-1950). • Wald viewed statistical problems as decision problems: when faced with the data, statisticians have to decide what to do (i.e., how to act), not just what to say (i ...
... The “economic” approach to statistics • The rise of behaviorist statistics: Wald’s works in statistical decision theory (1939-1950). • Wald viewed statistical problems as decision problems: when faced with the data, statisticians have to decide what to do (i.e., how to act), not just what to say (i ...
What Is Oligopoly?
... One possible punishment strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy. A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which one player cooperates this period if the other player cooperated in the previous period but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A more severe punishment str ...
... One possible punishment strategy is a tit-for-tat strategy. A tit-for-tat strategy is one in which one player cooperates this period if the other player cooperated in the previous period but cheats in the current period if the other player cheated in the previous period. A more severe punishment str ...
REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING: TWO PLAYERS
... when monitoring is almost public, i.e., each player can always discern accurately which private signal her opponent has observed by observing her own private signal. The present paper does not assume that monitoring is almost public. Therefore, this paper has many substantial points of departure fro ...
... when monitoring is almost public, i.e., each player can always discern accurately which private signal her opponent has observed by observing her own private signal. The present paper does not assume that monitoring is almost public. Therefore, this paper has many substantial points of departure fro ...
Existence of stationary equilibrium for mixtures of discounted
... with uncountable state space and show the existence of independent stationary equilibrium strategy for both players. Parthasarathy and Sinha21 further show the existence of stationary equilibrium strategies for non-zero sum discounted stochastic games with uncountable state space, finite action spac ...
... with uncountable state space and show the existence of independent stationary equilibrium strategy for both players. Parthasarathy and Sinha21 further show the existence of stationary equilibrium strategies for non-zero sum discounted stochastic games with uncountable state space, finite action spac ...
Game Theory MA 4264 Lecturer: Zhao Gongyun Office: S17 # 08
... iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies: Proposition 1.1 If the strategies (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n) are a Nash equilibrium in an n-player normal-form game G = {S1, . . . , Sn; u1 . . . , un}, then each s∗i cannot be eliminated in iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Proof. ...
... iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies: Proposition 1.1 If the strategies (s∗1 , . . . , s∗n) are a Nash equilibrium in an n-player normal-form game G = {S1, . . . , Sn; u1 . . . , un}, then each s∗i cannot be eliminated in iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. Proof. ...
NOTES ON NASH EQUILIBRIUM 1. 2 × 2 games, pure
... Note that Ruth and Charlie would in fact be better off if they did not testify (they would spend 5 years rather than 10 years in jail). But that is not what Game theory recommends, and that is not what is observed in practice either. . . A way to express that Ruth and Charlie would be better off if ...
... Note that Ruth and Charlie would in fact be better off if they did not testify (they would spend 5 years rather than 10 years in jail). But that is not what Game theory recommends, and that is not what is observed in practice either. . . A way to express that Ruth and Charlie would be better off if ...
An Efficient, Exact Algorithm for Solving Tree
... Let G V denote the subtree of G with root V, and let M~=w denote the subset of the set of local game matrices M corresponding to the vertices in G V , except that the matrix M v is collapsed one index by setting W = w, thus marginalizing W out. On its downstream pass, our algorithm shall maintain t ...
... Let G V denote the subtree of G with root V, and let M~=w denote the subset of the set of local game matrices M corresponding to the vertices in G V , except that the matrix M v is collapsed one index by setting W = w, thus marginalizing W out. On its downstream pass, our algorithm shall maintain t ...
Evolutionary game theory
Evolutionary game theory (EGT) is the application of game theory to evolving populations of lifeforms in biology. EGT is useful in this context by defining a framework of contests, strategies, and analytics into which Darwinian competition can be modelled. EGT originated in 1973 with John Maynard Smith and George R. Price's formalisation of the way in which such contests can be analysed as ""strategies"" and the mathematical criteria that can be used to predict the resulting prevalence of such competing strategies.Evolutionary game theory differs from classical game theory by focusing more on the dynamics of strategy change as influenced not solely by the quality of the various competing strategies, but by the effect of the frequency with which those various competing strategies are found in the population.Evolutionary game theory has proven itself to be invaluable in helping to explain many complex and challenging aspects of biology. It has been particularly helpful in establishing the basis of altruistic behaviours within the context of Darwinian process. Despite its origin and original purpose, evolutionary game theory has become of increasing interest to economists, sociologists, anthropologists, and philosophers.