Abstracts of the talks in May 2013 GaO: Minicourses: Alain
... the objective functional is the expected value of a cost depending on the trajectory. So it is linear in the probability measure. This type of functional leaves out many current considerations in control theory, namely situations where one wants to take into consideration not just the expected value ...
... the objective functional is the expected value of a cost depending on the trajectory. So it is linear in the probability measure. This type of functional leaves out many current considerations in control theory, namely situations where one wants to take into consideration not just the expected value ...
Chapter 9: Reflective Reason and Equilibrium Refinements
... reasonable or unreasonable. The criterion does not depend on counterfactual or disequilibrium beliefs, trembles, or limits of nearby games. I call this the local best response (LBR) criterion. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous. The traditional refine ...
... reasonable or unreasonable. The criterion does not depend on counterfactual or disequilibrium beliefs, trembles, or limits of nearby games. I call this the local best response (LBR) criterion. The LBR criterion appears to render the traditional refinement criteria superfluous. The traditional refine ...
S - Webcourse
... • In a dynamic game there are several stages, and an agent’s strategy may depend on the history of his/her actions taken so far. • An example: play the battle of the sexes 100 times (e.g. once a day). You may decide to choose boxing on a particular day if and only if concert has been selected by the ...
... • In a dynamic game there are several stages, and an agent’s strategy may depend on the history of his/her actions taken so far. • An example: play the battle of the sexes 100 times (e.g. once a day). You may decide to choose boxing on a particular day if and only if concert has been selected by the ...
Boundedly Rational Nash Equilibrium: A
... convergence as the rationality parameters go to infinity will still hold. Let Ž N, A, u. be a finite game defined as follows. The set of players is N s 1, . . . , n4 . Each player i g N has a set of pure strategies Ai s 1, . . . , m4 with elements a i, the set of pure strategy profiles is A ' =i ...
... convergence as the rationality parameters go to infinity will still hold. Let Ž N, A, u. be a finite game defined as follows. The set of players is N s 1, . . . , n4 . Each player i g N has a set of pure strategies Ai s 1, . . . , m4 with elements a i, the set of pure strategy profiles is A ' =i ...
The Nucleolus of Directed Acyclic Graph Games
... i) We have a network that is represented by a directed acyclic graph G (V , A). This graph has a special node - the so called root of G , denoted by r - such that from each other node of G there leads at least one directed path to the root. This node can be interpreted as a service provider. ii) Pla ...
... i) We have a network that is represented by a directed acyclic graph G (V , A). This graph has a special node - the so called root of G , denoted by r - such that from each other node of G there leads at least one directed path to the root. This node can be interpreted as a service provider. ii) Pla ...
Expected Value
... for each head. • If you play this game many times, you would expect on average to gain $0.80 per game ...
... for each head. • If you play this game many times, you would expect on average to gain $0.80 per game ...
Minimax and Alpha-Beta Pruning
... • Player 1: Wins if result > 0. Can ’play’ (use without replacement) {1,0,-1} • Player 2: Wins if result < 0. Can ’play’ (use without replacement) {+,*} Players play their possible moves and the resulting formula is calculated (iteratively) to obtain the result: Eg. {1} {*} {0} {+} {-1} = -1 – Playe ...
... • Player 1: Wins if result > 0. Can ’play’ (use without replacement) {1,0,-1} • Player 2: Wins if result < 0. Can ’play’ (use without replacement) {+,*} Players play their possible moves and the resulting formula is calculated (iteratively) to obtain the result: Eg. {1} {*} {0} {+} {-1} = -1 – Playe ...
The General Game Playing Description Language is - ijcai-11
... sees(white,M) <= does(black,M). sees(black,M) <= does(white,M). ...
... sees(white,M) <= does(black,M). sees(black,M) <= does(white,M). ...
Slides - The collected game design rants of Marc LeBlanc
... SiSSYFiGHT simulates a playground fight between little girls. ...
... SiSSYFiGHT simulates a playground fight between little girls. ...
intrinsic
... The Need for Robustness Meaning of a POA bound: if the game is at an equilibrium, then outcome is near-optimal. Problem: what if can’t reach equilibrium? • (pure) equilibrium might not exist • might be hard to compute, even centrally – [Fabrikant/Papadimitriou/Talwar], [Daskalakis/ Goldberg/Papadim ...
... The Need for Robustness Meaning of a POA bound: if the game is at an equilibrium, then outcome is near-optimal. Problem: what if can’t reach equilibrium? • (pure) equilibrium might not exist • might be hard to compute, even centrally – [Fabrikant/Papadimitriou/Talwar], [Daskalakis/ Goldberg/Papadim ...
REPEATED GAMES WITH PRIVATE MONITORING: TWO PLAYERS
... price cuts would be the main course of preventing the firms’ cartel agreement from being self-enforcing. Since Stigler did not provide a systematic analysis, we should carefully check to what extent his arguments was correct by making an appropriate model, which would be a discounted repeated game w ...
... price cuts would be the main course of preventing the firms’ cartel agreement from being self-enforcing. Since Stigler did not provide a systematic analysis, we should carefully check to what extent his arguments was correct by making an appropriate model, which would be a discounted repeated game w ...
Informatics 2D: Solutions for Tutorial 2
... how you might fix it, drawing on your answer to item (2) above. Does your modified algorithm give optimal decisions for all games with loops? Answers 1. The game tree, complete with annotations is shown in Figure 2. 2. The “?” nodes can be assigned a value of 0, so choosing the loop state will not b ...
... how you might fix it, drawing on your answer to item (2) above. Does your modified algorithm give optimal decisions for all games with loops? Answers 1. The game tree, complete with annotations is shown in Figure 2. 2. The “?” nodes can be assigned a value of 0, so choosing the loop state will not b ...
Rationality authority for provable rational behavior
... correlated equilibria [1] or as moderators that are used in multi-party computation [15]. However, the rationality authority is not trusted, where as synchronization mechanisms are. Vis., the inventors must demonstrate their trustworthiness and have only the (trusted) verifiers at their disposal. Thi ...
... correlated equilibria [1] or as moderators that are used in multi-party computation [15]. However, the rationality authority is not trusted, where as synchronization mechanisms are. Vis., the inventors must demonstrate their trustworthiness and have only the (trusted) verifiers at their disposal. Thi ...
The Nash Equilibrium in Multy
... Inventory management of physical goods and other products or elements is an integral part of logistic systems common to all sectors of the economy including industry, agriculture, and defense. Since the logistic costs account for up to 20% of the costs of Russian companies under the modern condition ...
... Inventory management of physical goods and other products or elements is an integral part of logistic systems common to all sectors of the economy including industry, agriculture, and defense. Since the logistic costs account for up to 20% of the costs of Russian companies under the modern condition ...
Alpha-Beta Example
... player’s perceive the intelligence • Game is not focused on winning – it enhances play and enjoyment ...
... player’s perceive the intelligence • Game is not focused on winning – it enhances play and enjoyment ...
match day nutrition - Port Weller Soccer League
... Eating Before The Match It has been well documented for several decades that a soccer player will gain the greatest benefits from a meal eaten two to four hours prior to kickoff. Dr. Laurie Whitsel, Regional Director of Advocacy for the American Heart Association explains the benefits of this practi ...
... Eating Before The Match It has been well documented for several decades that a soccer player will gain the greatest benefits from a meal eaten two to four hours prior to kickoff. Dr. Laurie Whitsel, Regional Director of Advocacy for the American Heart Association explains the benefits of this practi ...
Distributed Computing Meets Game Theory: Robust Mechanisms for Rational Secret Sharing and Multiparty Computation
... does not work. Then results are proved showing that if no more than a certain fraction of the agents are “bad”, the protocol will succeed. Halpern and Teague [10] studied secret sharing under the assumption that agents were rational : they would only do what was in their self-interest. For three or ...
... does not work. Then results are proved showing that if no more than a certain fraction of the agents are “bad”, the protocol will succeed. Halpern and Teague [10] studied secret sharing under the assumption that agents were rational : they would only do what was in their self-interest. For three or ...
Playing Games in Many Possible Worlds
... be applied to Socratic games with constant-sum (or strategically zero-sum) worlds. We face two major obstacles in extending these classical results to Socratic games. First, a Socratic game with constant-sum worlds is not itself a constant-sum classical game—rather, the resulting classical game is o ...
... be applied to Socratic games with constant-sum (or strategically zero-sum) worlds. We face two major obstacles in extending these classical results to Socratic games. First, a Socratic game with constant-sum worlds is not itself a constant-sum classical game—rather, the resulting classical game is o ...
Strategic Behavior in Non-Atomic Games
... then, imagines that the actual players in this game reside on one of those islands, players on the same island have identical payoffs and are equally likely to be chosen to play the game. Therefore, starting from the case where there is only one player on each island, we formulate associated replica ...
... then, imagines that the actual players in this game reside on one of those islands, players on the same island have identical payoffs and are equally likely to be chosen to play the game. Therefore, starting from the case where there is only one player on each island, we formulate associated replica ...
7 repeated games.pptx
... u1(x) = ∑ y∈{C,D} u1(x,y) × P(y | π, previous moves) where x = my move, y = other agent’s move Choose the move with the highest expected utility ...
... u1(x) = ∑ y∈{C,D} u1(x,y) × P(y | π, previous moves) where x = my move, y = other agent’s move Choose the move with the highest expected utility ...
Answers to Practice Questions 10
... 8) Roberto and Ruben are the only two guys that sell Brats to the crowd during Badgers’ games. The market demand is given by the equation Q = 22 – 2P and Budgers’ fans buy Brats from the guy with the lowest price. If Roberto and Ruben charge the same price, half the crowd go to each shop. In additio ...
... 8) Roberto and Ruben are the only two guys that sell Brats to the crowd during Badgers’ games. The market demand is given by the equation Q = 22 – 2P and Budgers’ fans buy Brats from the guy with the lowest price. If Roberto and Ruben charge the same price, half the crowd go to each shop. In additio ...
Software Instrumentation of Computer and Video Games
... Faculty of Information and Media Studies The University of Western Ontario ...
... Faculty of Information and Media Studies The University of Western Ontario ...
VIII. Monopolistic Competition and Oligopoly.
... The police separate the partners & say to each individually: “We are willing to make a deal with you. Confess to the crime, implicating your partner and we will let you go free and you get the loot for yourself and your partner will be locked up for a long time. If you both confess, you both go to j ...
... The police separate the partners & say to each individually: “We are willing to make a deal with you. Confess to the crime, implicating your partner and we will let you go free and you get the loot for yourself and your partner will be locked up for a long time. If you both confess, you both go to j ...
Simple Search Methods for Finding a Nash Equilibrium
... the average runtime conditional on solving the instance (Figure 1(c)). Here, we see that Algorithm 1 completes far more instances on several distributions, and solves fewer on just a single distribution (6 fewer, on D23). Additionally, even on distributions for which we solve far more games, our con ...
... the average runtime conditional on solving the instance (Figure 1(c)). Here, we see that Algorithm 1 completes far more instances on several distributions, and solves fewer on just a single distribution (6 fewer, on D23). Additionally, even on distributions for which we solve far more games, our con ...