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Framework Contract No. EEA/IEA/09/003
Support for SOER 2010 Part A – Global long-term
environmental trends and ecosystem shifts and their
(potential) impacts on human society
Inventory of evidence in support of the forward-looking component of the
European State of the Environment and Outlook Report
Final Report Note 2: Integration
Submitted by:
The SEI- Milieu Consortium
6 August 2010
_______________________________________________________________________________________
Contents
Executive Summary ............................................................................................................................................... iii
1.
Introduction ............................................................................................................................................. 1
1.1
Context for Megatrend Analysis ........................................................................................................................ 2
1.2
Overview of the structure of the report ............................................................................................................ 2
2.
Conceptual framework and research methodology .................................................................... 5
3.
Overview of Global Megatrends ........................................................................................................ 9
3.1
4.
STEEP-based megatrends .................................................................................................................................. 9
inter-relationships OF the Global Megatrends ............................................................................... 15
4.1
Rationalisation or Consistency check............................................................................................................... 15
4.2
Interlinkages among the megatrends .............................................................................................................. 15
5.
Analysis of effects of the megatrends ............................................................................................. 20
5.1
Scoring approach ............................................................................................................................................. 20
5.2
Discussion of prioritised megatrends .............................................................................................................. 23
6.
Overview of implications for Europe ................................................................................................ 24
6.1
Climate Change ................................................................................................................................................ 24
6.2
Pollution and health......................................................................................................................................... 25
6.3
Biodiversity and nature .................................................................................................................................... 26
6.4
Resources and waste ....................................................................................................................................... 28
7.
Conclusions ........................................................................................................................................... 32
7.1
Ranking the megatrends .................................................................................................................................. 32
7.2
Direct and indirect effects on Europe’s environment ..................................................................................... 32
7.3
Broader consequences: the issue of environmental security .......................................................................... 33
7.4
Technology ....................................................................................................................................................... 34
7.5
Governance ...................................................................................................................................................... 34
7.6
Final reflections................................................................................................................................................ 35
8.
Annex I – Detailed summaries of the megatrends ........................................................................ 36
8.1
S1: Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration ............................................................... 37
i
8.2
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges ........................................................................ 46
S3: Global Urbanisation ................................................................................................................................................ 52
8.3
S4: The Emerging Global Middle-income Consumer Class .............................................................................. 61
8.4
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world ...................................... 68
8.5
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics .............................................. 74
8.6
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles ............................................................ 79
8.7
T2: The rise of the nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies ................................................... 86
8.8
EC1: Continued economic growth ................................................................................................................... 93
8.9
EC2: Intensified competition for resources ................................................................................................... 101
8.10
EC3: Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world ............................................................................ 110
8.11
EnV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources ............................................................................................... 115
8.12
EnV2: INCREASINGLY UNSUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION LOAD .............................................. 127
8.13
Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change ......................................................................... 143
9.
Annex II: Thematic Impact Summaries .......................................................................................... 161
9.1
Climate Change .............................................................................................................................................. 161
9.2
Pollution and Health ...................................................................................................................................... 169
9.3
Biodiversity .................................................................................................................................................... 177
9.4
Natural Resource Use .................................................................................................................................... 185
10.
Annex III: Detailed Driver’s analysis ................................................................................................ 193
10.1
Identifying Common Drivers among Megatrends ......................................................................................... 193
10.2
Worked example ............................................................................................................................................ 195
References .................................................................................................................................................................. 208
ii
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY
The megatrends shaping the world’s future will affect the global environment, and they will ultimately have
both direct and indirect effects for Europe. However, those effects may not necessarily arise directly from the
drivers and megatrends, but also indirectly as the effects of megatrends themselves can act as drivers of
further change. For these reasons, an analysis of these megatrends, their drivers and their effects is a crucial
step in terms of considering future concerns for Europe’s environment and what policy action might be
needed. This is the focus of this report.
The research involved a four-step process which sought to lay out the logic of the way in which the sets of
drivers among the megatrends were analysed and then synthesised to draw together insights into the
interaction between the megatrends in terms of their impacts for Europe’s environment. The starting point
was the bringing together of separate reports undertaken for social, technological, economic and
environmental megatrends, and further more detailed analysis of the likely effects of the following 14
megatrends on Europe’s environment to 2050:
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration

S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges

S3. Global urbanisation

S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class

S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world

S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics

T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles

T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies

EC1. Continued economic growth

EC2. Intensified competition for resources

EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world

Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources

Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load

Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
This sought to answer the first research question - What are the relevant effects?
In examining the effects of these megatrends an important element was also the analysis of the interlinkages among the megatrends in order to identify some of the most significant common drivers shared by
many megatrends. This part of the research sought to answer the second research question- What are the
common drivers and interlinkages? Each of the megatrends was then analysed and qualitative scoring
applied (based on the evidence of the literature and projections) in terms of their direct and indirect effects
for Europe’s environment and in terms of their uncertainty. This sought to answer the third question - What
are the key uncertainties? The scoring allowed a ranking of the megatrends in terms of their combined
extent of effects and uncertainty.
The final step was a more detailed analysis of the main environmental effects for Europe of the global
megatrends under four key themes, in order to answer the fourth and final question – Which are the most
important megatrends in terms of their effects on Europe’s environment? The four themes were


Climate change
Pollution and health
iii


Biodiversity and nature
Resources and waste
This analysis allowed another ranking of the megatrends, but this time based on their relative importance for
each of the major environmental effects individually.
Emerging from this integration analysis of global megatrends are a number of key megatrends that are likely
to be particularly important for Europe’s environment. Three megatrends in particular (T1, T2 and ENV1)
stand out as having a medium or strong influence on Europe’s environment across all four of the
environmental effects. Climate change (ENV3) is also one of the most important megatrends in terms of the
effects on Europe’s environment, though it has slightly lower consequences than the other three in terms of
pollution and health. Growing global pollution levels, on the other hand have only a weak influence on
pollution and health in Europe, and a much stronger influence in other categories. Economic power shifts
(EC3) appears to rank higher than Continued economic growth (EC1), due in part to the opportunity that this
megatrend provides in governance: agreements with a small number of large, emerging economies may
have an important result in terms of the global environment and Europe’s, but also due to the greater
uncertainty about the effects and scale of the power shifts megatrend compared to continued global
economic growth. In terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, Shifts in population structure (S2)
appears to be more important than the Shifts in population size (S1). Here, the effect of Europe’s ageing
population is a key factor, as well as higher degree of uncertainty around the indirect effects of shifts in
pollution structure. Of critical importance is the decreasing stocks of natural resources (ENV1), which
appears to be the most important on the EU environment of all the environmental megatrends.
Overall, the research has highlighted the complexity of undertaking long-term futures analysis of
megatrends, subject as it is to considerable uncertainty in relation to the nature, scale and direction of the
megatrends themselves as well as their likely effects, globally and for Europe. Information and quantitative
data in many areas are sparse, but point to important areas for further research in the future if we are to get
a better understanding of the long-term megatrends and their drivers. However, the research has also
highlighted some key priority megatrends for Europe’s environment (and therefore also identified those that
are less important to Europe, although important globally), and where targeted policy action will be needed if
some of the most damaging environmental megatrends are to be slowed or reversed.
iv
v
1.
INTRODUCTION
The European Environment Agency (EEA) is currently producing the next European State of the
Environment and Outlook Report to be released at the close of 2010 (SOER 2010). Part A of SOER
2010 will present an exploratory assessment of long-term global megatrends (e.g. to 2050), their
driving forces and the uncertainties that will shape Europe's environment and policies over coming
decades.
To support the preparation of Part A of the report, EEA has commissioned separate assessments of
social, technological, economic and environmental megatrends and their associated drivers (in
addition, an assessment of health megatrends was also prepared – these are considered here under
social megatrends).
The different reports thus follow four of the five dimensions of the STEEP framework, which is
commonly used for forward-looking analysis of driving forces:

Social

Technological

Economic

Environmental

Political1
These STEEP categories relate to the different types of drivers (or driving forces) in the DPSIR
analytical framework used by the EEA. This report presents the work to integrate common drivers
and relevant direct and indirect consequences for Europe in order to get to a balanced assessment of
of the relative importance of different megatrends and how they relate to each other. The research
methodology adopted to undertake the initial synthesis is explained in Chapter 2 of this report, but
focuses initially on the fact that all megatrends emerging from the separate reports are descriptive
labels for trends in a set of STEEP drivers. Each of the reports on social, technological, economic
and environmental megatrends has analysed the megatrends on the basis of the STEEP drivers, but
each has focused on one area to generate social megatrends, economic megatrends and so on.
Most of the megatrends identified are not only of a social, economic, environmental, technological or
political nature, they span some or many of those categories.
A total number of 14 global mega-trends have been identified under the STEEP categories. It is
important to note that there is no single correct approach to the analysis. It is by definition exploratory
in nature and an inductive approach to the analysis of the data provided was therefore adopted.
1
The assessments did not cover this last STEEP category.
1
1.1
CONTEXT FOR MEGATREND ANALYSIS
EEA notes that
“Megatrends are those trends visible today that are expected to extend over decades,
changing slowly and exerting considerable force that will influence a wide array of areas,
including social, technological, economic, environmental and political dimensions.”2
A complementary definition notes that megatrends “...indicate a widespread trend of major impact,
composed of subtrends which in themselves are capable of major impacts”.3
The megatrends shaping the world’s future will affect the global environment, and they will ultimately
have both direct and indirect consequences for Europe. However, those consequences may not
necessarily arise directly from the drivers and megatrends, but also indirectly as the effects of
megatrends themselves can act as drivers of further change. For these reasons, an analysis of these
megatrends and their drivers is a crucial step in terms of considering future concerns for Europe’s
environment and what policy action might be needed.
While the STEEP analysis is helpful to understand the range of drivers contributing to megatrends,
most megatrends are not only of a social, economic, environmental, technological or political nature;
they span some or many of those categories. This was recognised in an earlier study for the EEA in
2007 (Sheate et al, 2007) which explored megatrends from a wide range of futures studies. It
concluded:“Some megatrends may appear to arise within a single STEEP category, but in reality they
are made up of multiple component trends among STEEP drivers….. This provides a potential
agenda for future research foresight, since only by focusing research on these megatrends
will a better understanding of the complexity and interaction between trends and drivers be
forthcoming.” (pp 40-41, Sheate et al, 2007)
The synthesis and integration of the separate STEEP megatrend analyses is therefore necessary
before considering which of the megatrends are most important in terms of their environmental impact
to Europe.
1.2
OVERVIEW OF THE STRUCTURE OF THE REPORT
Chapter 2 provides a description of the research methodology adopted. The four-step process
described seeks to lay out the logic of the way in which the sets of drivers among the megatrends
were analysed and then synthesised to draw together insights into the interaction between the
megatrends in terms of their impacts for Europe’s environment.
2
3
EEA Specifications for this contract
infinitefutures, 2003, cited in W. Sheate et al (2007)
2
Chapter 3 provides an overview of the social, technological, economic and environmental
megatrends developed in the separate studies for EEA and an overview of their associated
conseequnces on Europe, drawn from the original separate reports as well as further more detailed
analysis presented in Annex I (this chapter thus equates to Step 1 of the process - What are the
relevant effects?)
Chapter 4 presents an analysis of the inter-linkages among the STEEP-based megatrends and draws
out the most significant common drivers and the potential inter-relationships between the megatrends.
(This chapter equates to Steps 2 of the process - What are the common drivers and interlinkages?)
Chapter 5 examines the megatrends in terms of their direct and indirect effects for Europe’s
environment. The impact of the priority megatrends are examined in terms of their level of
contribution and degree of uncertainties) .(Step 3 - What are the key uncertainties?). A summary
table with relative scores is provided, ranking the megatrends in terms of their combined extent of
effects and uncertainty.
Chapter 6 presents summaries of the main environmental effects for Europe of the global megatrends
under four key themes (Step 4 – Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their
consequences for Europe’s environment?):



Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Resources and waste
The chapter draws together summaries from more detailed analyses provided in Annex II and scores
each megatrend in terms of its combined direct, indirect effects and uncertainty for each theme. This
allows the ranking of the megatrends in terms of the likely influence on the key thematic effects on
Europe’s environment.
Chapter 7 draws the analysis together to present conclusions, in particular which megatrends are the
most important megatrends, , and also what this analysis offers in terms of the policy implications for
Europe and considerations for governance at a global scale.
A series of Annexes is presented containing:I. Megatrend analysis templates
II. Europe’s environment: thematic analysis templates
III. Common drivers’ analysis.
3
4
2.
CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK AND RESEARCH METHODOLOGY
The approach to the integration of the megatrends has taken a systematic approach to the analysis of
the separate STEEP-based reports on megatrends provided by the other EEA consultants, and then
built on those reports with further in-depth analysis of the common drivers and of the consequences of
the individual megatrends and the relationships between the megatrends. This has involved
extensive review of existing literature.
An important first part of the analysis was the need to sieve through the data presented in the
individual STEEP reports and ensure that an internally consistent and coherent set of megatrends
was confirmed. To some extent this process could go on indefinitely so the constraint is one imposed
by the appropriateness of the level of detail required and the time and resources available. There is,
for example, no point in trying to achieve a degree of accuracy that simply isn’t commensurate with
the data concerned. Having done this it was then necessary to further elaborate the analyses of the
consequences of the megatrends in discussion and iteration with EEA staff, not least because some
of the original reports had not elaborated the potential consequences of the megatrends for Europe’s
environment to the level of detail necessary to meet the objectives of this project.
Figure 1 below provides the analytical framework within which this integration analysis was
undertaken. Its starting point is the bringing together of the findings from the separate megatrend
reports and then the focus is on the interlinkages between the drivers of the megatrends as the
means to better understand the possible consequences’ of the global megatrends, particularly as they
relate to Europe. The elaboration of effects and the relationships between the megatrends required
progressive levels of analysis and synthesis through a series of key steps. There were four key
steps in the process and each is described in relation to Figure 1 below.
Steps in the megatrend integration analysis
Step 1
The first step was to bring together the findings from the separate studies – each of the megatrends
reports for social, technological, economic and environmental. This generated a simple overview
table (Table 1 in Chapter 3) of all the megatrends from the three non-environmental studies, plus the
environmental megatrends, which, in particular, provide a cross-check in terms of the environmental
impacts arising from the megatrends. In parallel to this a description and more in-depth analysis of
the contribution of the megatrends to effects on Europe’s environment is provided in Annex I (the
templates in this annex further develop the analysis in the original reports).
5
Global megatrend studies
Social
Economic
Technological
Environmental
Overview of
megatrends and
Annex templates
Step 1
Interactions and
linkages between
drivers and
megatrends
Step 2
Analysis of effects on
Europe – contribution
& uncertainty
Step 3
What are the
relevant
effects?)
What are the
common drivers
and
interlinkages?
What are the
key
uncertainties?
Step 4
Thematic summaries
of environmental
effects for Europe
Figure 1: Integration analysis framework
6
Which are the
most important
megatrends in
terms of their
effects on
Europe’s
environment?
Step 2
Step 2 was focused on answering the question - What are the common drivers and interlinkages? The
approach adopted for exploring the linkages between the megatrends was initially based on an
inductive approach (the process of forming or coming to a general conclusion from particular cases),
including the coding and grouping of common themes – in this case common drivers – emerging from
the data. The assumption underlying this approach was that it would be the common drivers that
would provide the linkages and interactions between the megatrends. The process was done
manually, by physically cutting and pasting each of the drivers associated with each megatrend and
rearranging and clustering on a large piece of paper on the basis of i) those that were the same and ii)
those that were similar. In this way a series of groups, and clusters within groups, emerged
representing drivers common and interlinked across the separate megatrends. These groups of
drivers (and clusters within them) represent common drivers that act through multiple megatrends.
However, following discussion with EEA staff, it was decided that these driver groups would be used
solely as a means to help understand the interactions between the megatrends rather than to
generate outputs in themselves. Consequently only a summary of that work is provided, for
information, in Annex III, along with a worked example to illustrate the method adopted.
This
analysis was useful in being able to identify which megatrends were potentially linked to other
megatrends, since those linkages were through their common drivers and provided a useful learning
process for the project team to tease out the complexities of the numerous issues involved. It
informed also the elaboration of the templates in Annex I. The review of interactions also allows a
preliminary consideration of politics and governance, the STEEP category where prior detailed
assessment was not carried out. The issue of governance is addressed as part of the wider
conclusions.
From the development of the Annex I templates and the common drivers analysis, the key
interlinkages are drawn out in a matrix, Table 2, which highlights which megatrend has the potential to
interact with which other megatrends.
Step 3
Step 3 addresses the question - What are the key uncertainties? In exploring this question it was
necessary to bring together the direct and indirect consequences of the megatrends for Europe’s
environment – using the information in the Annex I megatrend sheets, along with the potential links
between megatrends (from Step 2), their level of contribution and degree of uncertainty, in order to be
able to identify the most important megatrends. A summary table (Table 3) with the relative scores for
each megatrend is provided, along with commentary from the analysis summaries in relation to each
of the megatrends.
Step 4
Step 4 seeks to answer the question – Which are the most important megatrends in terms of their
consequences for Europe’s environment? Chapter 6 presents summaries of the main environmental
consequences for Europe of the global megatrends under four key themes (with more detailed
analysis sheets provided in Annex II):



Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Resources and waste
7
8
3.
OVERVIEW OF GLOBAL MEGATRENDS
This chapter addresses those aspects of the framework covered by Step 1.
3.1
STEEP-BASED MEGATRENDS
This section provides an overview of each STEEP-based megatrend indentified by the separate original
reports. The table below presents an overview of all the global megatrends developed in the reports for EEA.
A total of 11 social, technological and economic megatrends have been identified, together with 3
environmental megatrends.
This overview is based on longer summaries of each megatrend, describing the main driving forces and
uncertainties as well the impacts on Europe: these are found in the megatrend factsheets (see Annex I).
Table 1: Overview of Global STEEP-Megatrends
Megatrend
Summary
Social
S1. Shifts in population size:
increase, decline and rising
migration
S2. Shifts in population
composition: of ageing and youth
bulges
Today the world population is still growing, albeit much slower than in the past. In the
future, the growth is expected to slow down, but the pace is uncertain as development of
the major driver, regional fertility rates, is uncertain in long term. In global terms,
population growth will take long time to slow down and long time to eventually regain
momentum thereafter. This development differs significantly between regions. In large
parts of the developed world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin
declining soon. In contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly
increasing populations. It is estimated that by 2025, approximately 16 percent of
the world population will live in the West, down from 18 percent in 2009 and 24 percent
in 1980. However, in the future the phenomenon of declining populations will no longer
be restricted to the developed world. It is expected that by 2030 many countries may
decrease in size, including South Korea and China. By 2050 countries such as North Korea
and Thailand are also estimated to have reached a stage of declining population.
Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50
years. It leads to populations becoming more diverse and also has an impact on
populations’ growth rates and on the amount of working population. However,
the estimates on the scope and geographical spread are highly uncertain. Migration is a
complex phenomena including voluntary migration for economic reasons as well as
involuntary migration for political, religious, or environmental and climate change
reasons. Migration induced by environment degradation and climate change impacts is
expected to increase in significance in the future. Most of the environment induced
migration is expected to happen within countries and regions. However, for Europe, it can
be of significant relevance the potential migrants from Africa. More analyses is needed in
this context.
Population ageing is a global trend strongly linked to declining population. The world
population is getting older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the world’s
population was aged over 65, and this is expected to increase to 16% by 2050. It
represents demographic shift which will hit both the developed as well as developing
world, but at different time. The difference between the two will remain significant in the
near future, however, slowly trends in developing and developed countries might see
some sort of convergence (more information on convergence to come). Speed
of population ageing in the developing world is expected to be higher than in the
developed world (in 2050 developing countries may reach same level of aging as is
experienced in current developed countries), which will allow less time for adaptation.
Additionally, this trend will hit many developing countries at lower levels of
socio‐economic development, which means that consequences might be worse. This
9
trend has also significant impact on working population. For example, at present,
in Europe, it is experienced a tipping point when 7 out 10 people are in traditional
working age. This tipping point is expected in China around 2015.
S3. Rapid global urbanisation
Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries are expected
to experience until 2025 substantial youth bulges (youth bulges are disproportionate
concentrations of people in the 15‐to‐29 year‐old age group), for example 60% of African
population is expected to be younger than 30 years. Several of the countries with the
largest youth bulges are among the world’s most unstable or potentially unstable
countries. It is estimated that three quarters of the countries with youth bulges will be
located in Sub‐Saharan Africa with the rest located in the Middle East and a few across
Asia and among the Pacific Islands.
For the first time in history more than 50 % of the world’s population, or approximately
3.5 billion, live in urban areas. By 2050, about 70 % of the global population could be
urban, compared with less than 30 % in 1950, according to the UN (medium fertility
global population growth scenario), indicating a significant departure from the spatial
distribution of population growth over the past. The urban areas of the world are
expected to absorb literally all the population growth over the next four decades while at
the same time drawing in some of the rural population. Of particular relevance is Asia,
which is estimated to host more than 50 % of the global urban population by 2050. Urban
populations are expected to generally move away from the largest settlements in the
future, favoring small‐ to medium‐sized cities instead.
S4. The emerging global middle
income consumer class
While growth of urban areas is expected to continue its rate of increase is expected to
slow down in the future. Many developing countries might not have reached the same
level of urban density as the now developed countries by 2050. Yet the speed and scope
of the urban transition in many developing countries is far greater today than it used to
be one century and more ago in the now developed world. Importantly, the proportion of
the urban poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of urban
population growth.
Global economic growth and trade integration have fuelled long‐term shifts in
international competitiveness, characterised by a high growth of productivity and rising
incomes in emerging economies. Global consumer demand had been concentrated in the
OECD countries so far. The number of middle‐income consumers is growing rapidly,
particularly in Asia. According to a World Bank study, there could be 1.2 billion ‘middle
class’ people in the now‐developing world by 2030. Average income is expected to be
much lower in the emerging economies in 2050 than in the G7‐ states now. Yet the total
purchasing power of middle‐income economies and middle‐income people is growing
strikingly and this is likely to continue, fuelled by a steep increase in Asian demand.
S5. Increasing life expectancy:
growing old and seeking youth in an
unequal world
The focus of spending in many of the emerging economies continues to change from
basic to more discretionary goods. Many parts of these populations are approaching "well
to do lifestyles" and disposable income is spent, as in “Western“ societies, on high
nutrient food, cars, household appliances, personal care products and other quality
services. Large‐scale consumer markets are emerging which can fuel future resource
demand. Brazil, Russia, India and China together could match the G7 share of global GDP
by 2040‐2050. Importantly, the benefits of economic growth are not distributed evenly
across populations. Relative poverty will persist and might even become more acute.
The population of the world is getting older. Older persons continue to contribute
productively to society; however, they are more likely to be susceptible to environmental
pollution and hazards, e.g. air pollution, heat waves and floods, and to higher rates of
certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, heart disease, cancers and arthritis. The
trend of an ageing population is first seen in the developed countries. After 2020 these
trends are expected to become increasingly important also in developing countries (e.g.
South Central Asia, South America and the Caribbean). By 2050, it is predicted that about
80% of the elderly could be leaving in developing countries. In addition, population ageing
is occurring in parallel with rapid urbanisation: in 2007 more than half of the world’s
population live cities, by 2030 this figure is expected to rise to more than
60%. Technology and economic development continues enabling substantial
improvements in illness treatments, access to health care and support ability of people to
live longer healthy lives. In the long term, some technology optimists see radical changes
in human enhancement and life extension: increasing medical breakthroughs to counter
10
ageing as well as ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate the use of nanotechnology. Such
breakthroughs, if they do come along, are likely to be very expensive and thus likely to be
affordable mostly in rich countries – and even here, perhaps only for the wealthiest part
of the population. Thus health inequalities are becoming significant, both
between countries and within countries. However, in an optimistic scenario, the gains in
access to health care, drinking water and sanitation will continue, further improving
health in what are now the poorest countries of the world. This in turn depends on the
absence of widespread conflict.
S6. Changing patterns of disease
burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics
It is becoming more and more important to distinguish effects according to rich and poor
and less on the country bases. It is highly uncertain to which degree positive effects
(longer healthier lives) will be counter‐played by negative ones (increased inequalities,
decreasing health for poorest, and spread of diseases from hot spots. Additionally,
development can be seen as a “double edged sword”. Apart from providing benefits, easy
access to high protein / high calorie foods, sedentary lifestyles, and the emergence
of status competition, can lead to physical and mental health problems (obesity, stress
and the erosion of community and traditional values and social support networks) also for
the rich and middle class.
There is a distinct difference in the disease burden between developed and developing
countries. Malnutrition and infectious diseases are dominant in the developing world,
while obesity and many non‐infectious diseases (cardiovascular, neurodegenerative,
diabetes, respiratory, cancer, and mental health) are dominant in the developed world.
As countries develop, infectious diseases generally become a less significant portion of
the disease burden, being replaced by non‐infectious diseases, often associated with
lifestyle, consumption and ageing and they face the increase in the levels of obesity, and
other diseases associated with inactivity.
Changes in working, living and travel practices contribute to changing the global disease
burden, both between and within countries. Migration within and between countries is
increasing as the world becomes more globalised. These migrations increase the
opportunity for diseases to spread rapidly between populations, and may result in the
re‐introduction of infectious diseases to areas where they had been eradicated (or
significantly reduced) from. For example, Tuberculosis (TB) has re‐emerged to become
more common in some developed countries where it had historically been reduced
to extreme lows. This increase in the incidence of TB has been linked to migrants from
areas of high health inequality. Migrations within countries (usually from rural to urban
areas) have, resulted in increased risk from infectious diseases, violence and drug
dependence, particularly when they result in chaotic slum development. Urbanisation, in
the presence of good governance, may increase access to education, employment and
health services, reducing the disease burden of the population. In the absence of good
governance urbanisation is associated with increased burden of infectious
diseases. Globalisation and the increase in global mobility may also change the disease
burden of developed countries. The effectiveness of interventions such as airport
screening, travel restrictions and other community mitigation measures remains
uncertain.
Technological
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in
technology development cycles
Over the last fifty years, the pace of technological change in several economic sectors
and technologies has continuously accelerated, leading to increased pace of mass use of
basic innovations and related societal and economic changes. Competition pressure is
rising as emerging economies start to challenge developed countries in the core areas of
their competitiveness advantages, namely high‐technology development. In spite of
persisting differences, many emerging economies are stepping up their general research
and innovation capacities. Growth rates in patent filings in Asian economies are beyond
the level of many developed economies (figure 2). Acceleration of
technology development cycles is likely to continue and might also concern those
economic sectors that have been slower to change in the past, in particular energy and
transport. Moreover, the very nature and process of creating, owning and sharing
knowledge (in and beyond technologies) is changing in a highly inter‐linked world. In spite
of all progress, a technology divide is likely to remain between developed and many
developing countries. Technology transfer and support is likely to remain a critical issue in
the decades to come, particularly in Europe's neighborhood.
11
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT
and cognitive sciences and
technologies
Large socio‐economic and environmental changes in the 21st century are expected to be
driven by a cluster of rapidly emerging and converging sciences and technologies in
nanosciences and nano– technologies, biotechnologies and life‐sciences, information and
communication technologies, cognitive sciences and neurotechnologies (so called
NBIC‐cluster). The NBIC cluster is likely to move with increasing speed from the
innovation phase, where seeds have been planted over the last two decades, to the
application phase, over the next 20‐30 years. Learning from nature is gaining increasing
relevance as a scientific paradigm. Expectations range from moderate scepticism to
broad enthusiasm, even including far‐reaching assumptions about control of matter and
genes, ubiquitous intelligence and consequently a huge potential to accelerate access to
sustainable energy, abundant food supply or universal health‐care. However, many
observers agree that the NBIC‐cluster is likely to form the backbone of a next long‐term
wave of innovation and growth.
In view of all the uncertainties, in 2040‐2050 nano‐ and biotechnologies are likely to be
pervasive, diverse and incorporated into all aspects of our daily live, particularly in
synthetic reproduction, novel energy sources and health care. Interrelated product and
process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations open up an unusually wide
range of social and environmental benefits, investment and profit opportunities. Yet they
also considerably increase the scale and nature of risk to human‐kind and pose
fundamental challenges to current forms of risk analysis and management.
Economic
EC1. Continued economic growth
EC2. Intensified competition for
resources
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar
to a multi-polar world
Assumptions on global economic growth (in terms of annual changes of Gross Domestic
Product) form a basic megatrend for the economic analyses in Part A. Virtually all major
outlook studies assume that economic growth will be positive on average across the
globe in the coming decades. Growth will be accelerating in BRIC countries and other
newly emerging economies. The rate at which economies will grow is a matter of larger
uncertainty than before. Due to developments like ageing and the need to better control
financial circuits, growth may be smaller than usually assumed in the past, in particular in
the developed world (OECD). For example the DG ECFIN 2009 report on the implications
of ageing in the EU corrects common expectations in a downward direction: roughly 1.8%
instead of 2.4% annually on average in the period to 2060.
Economic growth continues at the global level and is accelerating in BRIC countries and
other newly emerging economies. The demand for sub‐soil and natural resources will
grow in absolute terms despite continuing and partly successful efforts to increase the
resource efficiency of economic activities. Increased demand for subsoil resources will
stimulate exploration and exploitation of new sources. Supply is expected to meet
demand, both for “bulk” resources (fossil fuels, though a different mix than today,
minerals) and for specific metals that are essential to facilitate market penetration
of environmental and other technological innovations. Supply of natural resources
increasingly competes with other land use, and in particular with conservation of
biodiversity and ecosystems services. The increased need for resources stimulates
political monopolization of access (e.g. China/Africa). Europe is dependent on other
regions for much of its fossil fuels and minerals and needs to secure its access to major
world markets.
Economic power concentration tends to diversify from a single (USA) to a multi‐polar
global map when BRIC countries and later on newly emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia,
South‐Africa) grow in economic significance. This development both stimulates the
demand for resources and the countervailing process of attempting to come to blocwise
and global agreements on regulating markets and trade.
Environmental
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural
resources
Human demand for natural resources has more than doubled over the past 45 years as a
result of population growth and increasing individual consumption. This manifests itself in
large‐scale land conversion and ecosystem deterioration. The historical decline in the
area of temperate forest has been reversed, with an annual increase of 30 000 km2
between 1990 and 2005, but deforestation in the tropics, continued at an annual rate of
130,000 km2 over the same period. Within the steadily expanding farmland area, regional
overexploitation has led to serious soil degradation. Since1960, alone, a third of the
12
world’s farmland has been abandoned because it has been degraded beyond use. It has
been estimated that 10 million ha are destroyed per year.
In addition to the effect on terrestrial ecosystems, human resource use has had a
profound effect on the marine environment. Data on fish stocks (in terms of volume)
exploited for at least 50 years highlight an increase in the number of stocks either
overexploited or that have crashed over the last few years.
Demand for natural resources will continue to rise steeply, given that the world’s
population is increasing and diets are shifting from cereal to meat consumption. Demand
for agricultural production may therefore increase until 2050 by as much 250 to 350 %.
This can be achieved by either expanding the agricultural area and/or by intensification of
production, both of which may be expected to lead to further biodiversity loss.
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable
environmental pollution load
The megatrend consists of 5 sub‐trends: increasing nitrogen pollution; increasing ozone
pollution; increasing importance of particulate matter pollution at global scale; increase
of synthetic chemicals in the environment; and increase of waste production.
Increasing nitrogen pollution at global scale is of particular concern, the production and
use of artificial nitrogen fertilizers worldwide has enabled humankind to greatly increase
food production, but it has also led to a host of environmental problems, ranging from
eutrophication of terrestrial and aquatic systems to global acidification and stratospheric
ozone loss. With humans having an increasing impact on the planet, the interactions
between the nitrogen cycle, the carbon cycle and climate are expected to become an
increasingly important determinant of the Earth system.
Ground level (tropospheric) ozone is a global air pollution problem and an important
greenhouse gas. Although not a new issue, ground level ozone remains one of the most
pervasive of the global air pollutants, with impacts on human health, food production and
the environment.
Particulate matter indoor and outdoor pollution from burning of fossil fuels is causing
significant numbers of premature deaths and chronic illnesses around the world,
especially in the rapidly urbanising developing countries.
Consumerism, favouring disposal over re‐use is causing major problems around the world
and there are many uncertainties regarding the toxicity of waste and the ability of
ecosystems to absorb and buffer waste flows.
Env 3. Increasing severity of the
consequences of climate change
The megatrend consists of seven sub‐trends; increasing threat to food security; increasing
threat to water security; negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and
changing prevalence of disease; loss of biodiversity; increasing oceanic acidification;
increased flooding and sea level rise; improved political awareness of issue.
Measurements of the global atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases (GHGs)
show marked increases since pre‐industrial times, with levels of carbon dioxide (CO2) far
exceeding the natural range of the past 650 000 years. The concentration of atmospheric
CO2 has increased from a preindustrial level of about 280 ppm to more than 387 ppm in
2008. Increases in GHG emissions are largely due to the use of fossil fuels, although
deforestation, land‐use change and agriculture also provide significant but smaller
contributions. As a consequence, the average global air temperature by 2009 had risen by
0.7‐0.8 °C since pre‐industrial times. Current projections suggest global mean
temperatures could rise by as much as 1.8‐4.0 °C over the course of this century if global
action to limit GHG emissions proves unsuccessful. Recent observations give reason to
believe that rate of growth of GHG emissions and many climate impacts are approaching
the upper boundary of the IPCC range of projections rather than to the lower ones.
Many key climate indicators are already moving beyond the patterns of natural variability
within which contemporary society and economy have developed. These indicators
include global mean surface temperature, sea‐level rise, global ocean temperature, Arctic
sea ice extent, ocean acidification, and extreme climatic events. With unabated
emissions, many trends in climate will likely accelerate.
13
14
4.
INTER-RELATIONSHIPS OF THE GLOBAL MEGATRENDS
This chapter address Steps 2 and 3 of the analytical framework, which included an analysis and consistency
check of underlying drivers of the megatrends and explored the common drivers and inter-relatinoship
among megatrends in order to synthesise the material from the earlier individual studies.
4.1
RATIONALISATION OR CONSISTENCY CHECK
The STEEP tables contained in the individual megatrend reports were analysed and a consistency check
performed. The aim of this was to ensure that the storyline emerged whether looking at the megatrends or at
the underlying drivers developed by each detailed study. This step also checked that similar terminology was
used across the STEEP analysis so that subsequent analysis would not miss major interlinkages among the
megatrends. The drivers’ analysis is presented in Annex II. Its results were used in identifying interlinkages
among the megatrends, which are described below and presented in detail in Annex I.
4.2
INTERLINKAGES AMONG THE MEGATRENDS
The development of the templates in Annex I provided the basis for the initial exploration of interrelationships as the potential consequences of each megatrend was uncovered. This was also informed by
the common drivers’ analysis of Annex II, which is not described in detail here, but is presented there. The
common drivers’ analysis was essentially a learning process to understand which drivers and groups of
drivers were common to which megatrends. In itself, and following discussions with EEA staff, it was felt that
while a useful process it would not result in a direct output. Rather it was used to inform the understanding
of the inter-relationships between the megatrends explored below.
There are linkages or connections between many of the common drivers and how they relate to the
megatrends, and considering these links, helps to understand and extrapolate impacts from the original
megatrend reports. The identification of common drivers provided useful insights into the potential
interactions which are discussed in Annex I and the potential inter-relationship identified in Table 2 below.
The key relationships among the megatrends are discussed further below.
15
S1
S2
S3
S4
S5
S6
T1
T2
EC1
EC2
EC3
Env1
Env2
Env3
Extent of
links





































































KEY: Extent of links/relationships among megatrends

0-5 links/relationships

6-9 links/relationships

10-13 links relationships
16













































































Total no. of relationships
Increasing severity of the
consequences of climate change
Env3
Increasingly unsustainable
environmental pollution load
Env2
Decreasing stocks of natural
resources
Env1
Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a
multi-polar world
EC3
Intensified competition for
resources
EC2
Continued economic growth
EC1
The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and
cognitive sciences and technologies
T2
Global acceleration and shifts in
technology development cycles
T1
Changing patterns of disease burden
globally, and risk of new pandemics
S6
Increasing life expectancy: growing
old and seeking youth in an unequal
world
S5
The emerging global middle income
consumer class
S4
Rapid global urbanisation
S3
Shifts in population composition: of
ageing and youth bulges
S2
Shifts in population size: increase,
decline and rising migration
S1
Table 2: Matrix of inter-relationships among the megatrends
11
5
11
10
9
9
10
9
13
9
8
9
9
10
This section reviews the megatrends which have the most important interrelationships. A brief summary is
presented here: further detail on these interrelationships can be found in Annex I.
Shifts in population size
Links: this megatrend, shifts in population size (S1), is closely linked with all others, except the technology
megatrends. Population growth will be a key driver for the environmental megatrends. Climate change
(ENV3) and environmental pollution (ENV2) will in influence migration patterns, a key component in the
global shifts in population size.
Population size and economic growth are closely interrelated, as fertility declines with higher income levels.
A major issue in terms of analysing the global future relates to their relative importance in terms of the
consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). While both are central megatrends, global
population growth between 2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This
takes the “constant fertility” scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and
this is not by the UN to be a strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In
contrast, the economies of China and India for example may growth seven-fold over this period, a far faster
rate (Poncet, 2006).
Uncertainties: Small changes in the fertility rate can lead to large changes in future population size. A major
uncertainty relates to migration: its patterns are shaped by economic differences but also by immigration
policies. Moreover, estimates of the number of migrants due to climate change and environmental
degradation to 2050 vary greatly, e.g. from 25 million to 1 billion under IPCC estimates (IOM).
Economic growth
Links: Continued economic growth (EC1) will play a central role in shaping global futures, including the
impacts on the environment. It is closely linked with all the other megatrends. Global economic growth will
change consumption patterns: the growth of global, middle-income consumers (S4) will have a strong impact
on environment, including on increasing environmental degradation (ENV2) and on the increasing global loss
of natural resources (ENV1). This megatrend is also closely linked to shifts in population size (part of S1),
including migration patterns, as people will move to countries and urban areas where growth is strong, and to
urbanisation (S3), as growing cities already account for half of the world’s population and the majority of its
GDP. Growth also influences changing disease patterns (S6), as it will bring access to better health care –
as well as a change from diseases of ‘poverty’, including many communicable diseases, to those of ‘wealth’
related to stress and obesity. Finally, economic growth will fuel the development of technology (T1 and T2)
as well as benefit from it: economists have pointed out that in advanced economies where population,
resources and other factors of production remain constant, technology becomes the main driver of growth. 4
Uncertainties: A key question will be the rate of growth to 2050 for key parts of the world including Europe.
Minor differences in absolute growth rates will make a huge difference for the livelihoods of hundreds of
millions of people. Differences in relative growth rates can yield huge differences after 40 years: for example,
will the Chinese economy become the largest in the world?
4
In particular, this was an insight of Robert Solow, who received the 1987 Nobel Prize in economics. See:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/press.html
17
Urbanisation
Links: With rapid global urbanisation (S3), 70% of the world’s population may live in urban areas in 2050.
urban areas are expected to absorb all of the growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of
the existing rural population (UN 2010). Urban areas are closely linked to economic growth, generating about
80% of the world’s GDP (UN 2010), and they are also centres of technology development (T1 and T2).
Urbanisation is linked to changes in environmental degradation (ENV2): it will exacerbate and concentrate
problems such as air and water pollution and, where financing is available, urbanisation will include
infrastructure to manage these problems, e.g. urban transport and wastewater treatment. Urbanisation brings
better access to health care as well new problems related to stress, and thus is closely related to those for
changing disease patterns (S6).
Uncertainties: small shifts in fertility rates and patterns can have major influence in population size and thus
in urbanisation patterns. Another major uncertainty for global cities relates to climate change and in particular
to sea-level rise, as many of the world’s cities are located in coastal zones.
The emerging middle-income consumer class
Links: This megatrend is closely linked to the two above: economic growth, especially in emerging countries
such as India and China, will lead a major growth of the middle-income class. By 2050, half of the world’s
middle-income population is projected to be in these two countries alone. The link with urbanisation will also
be close: most of these consumers will live in cities. In turn, their consumption patterns will be closely linked
to global environmental megatrends.
Uncertainties: Key uncertainties relate to those for economic growth, in particular in the emerging
economies.
Technology
Links to other drivers: the acceleration and shifts in technology (T1) will have close links with urbanisation
(S3) and with health megatrends (increasing life expectancy S5; changing patterns of disease burden
globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It is very closely linked to economic megatrends: in addition to the
links with continued economic growth (EC1), described above, the world has seen a steady decoupling over
the past 50 years between economic growth and resource demand (EC2), according to the World Bank
(2009), which expects this trend to continue in the coming decades; technology is one of the main factors
behind this decoupling, along with the shift to services. 5 Technology acceleration will also affect the
environmental megatrends, in particular areas such as new technology for energy and agriculture, which will
influence future greenhouse gas emissions as well as demand for natural resources around the world.
Uncertainties: the future of technology is subject to a great range of uncertainties, including the pace and
direction of development of new products: for example, the Rockefeller Foundation (2009) has looked at
different scenarios in which technology can move towards or away from addressing global challenges. A
further uncertainty will arise as technology centres in emerging economies grow in importance in coming
decades due the economic power shift (EC3) to these countries.
5
China’s high consumption of metals in the past 20 years, rising faster even than its rapid GDP growth, has broken this
steady trend. The World Bank (2009) expects China’s economy to return to the overall trend in the near future.
18
Climate change
Links: Climate change is closely linked with many other megatrends, both in terms of those that will influence
future greenhouse gas emissions as well as those that are affected by global climate change impacts. A
number of these links have been identified above.
Uncertainties: the nature and extent of the linkages are subject to a number of uncertainties, for example in
terms of the likely emissions pathways followed globally and regionally, the nature of feedback loops in the
climate system, and the role of technology in mitigation,
The review of common drivers and inter-relationships among the megatrends has provided insights into both
the links among the drivers as well as some of their uncertainties. On the basis of Table 2 and the discussion
above, six megatrends emerge as having the strongest links with others (scoring 10 or more in the number of
inter-relationships among the megatrends in Table 2):

S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration

S3. Global urbanisation

S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class

T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles

EC1. Continued economic growth

Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Here, it should be underlined that these links are not seen as either causes or effects: the links among
drivers – and thus among megatrends – are by their nature complex. Moreover, while the strength of these
links can be an important factor in terms of prioritising the megatrends, it is not the only one. In particular,
this factor is not necessarily related to the direct and indirect environmental effects on Europe, or to other
effects on Europe.
19
5.
ANALYSIS OF EFFECTS OF THE MEGATRENDS
5.1
SCORING APPROACH
Table 3 below presents an initial scoring for all the megatrends in terms of their direct, indirect effects on
Europe’s environment and the uncertainty of those effects.
The analysis used in this table can be found in the megatrend sheets in Annex I. These sheets review likely
effects on Europe’s environment and score these in terms of four categories: climate change; pollution and
health; natural resources; and nature and biodiversity (the categories are based on those used in the EU’s
Sixth Environmental Action Programme). The environmental impacts are presented as total scores for each
megatrend, based on a rounded average for the scores across these categories. The uncertainties, on the
other hand, are only presented in terms of the highest score and thus have a maximum of three.
The other component of the scoring draws on the analysis of the interactions among megatrends, as
presented above in Table 2. The overall scores from Table 2 are included here. While this element is a small
part of the overall scoring, it is included in order to capture the overall influence of each megatrend on others
that may in turn affect Europe’s environment.
Thus, the overall purpose of Table 3 is to identify those megatrends which are likely to have a relatively more
significant contribution to direct and indirect environmental impacts in Europe. Having scored the
megatrends in Table 3, they can then be rearranged in rank order, as in Table 4 which follows immediately
after. Those megatrends with high contribution to effects and high uncertainties emerge as the most
important megatrends. Those of least importance are those that emerge as having a low contribution to
environmental effects and low uncertainty.
These uncertainties in the effects on Europe’s environment are linked first of all to uncertainties in the
underlying megatrends. For many megatrends, such as Continued economic growth (EC1), Shifts in
population size (S1) and Climate change (ENV3), there are ranges in existing projects. For others, such as
the The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (T1), the range of uncertainty is
greater, and is explored by scenarios studies (e.g. carried out in background work for the OECD Bioeconomy
project in Tait and Wield (2009)). There are also uncertainties related to the effects of the megatrends to
Europe’s environment to 2050. While exploring relationships between recent trends and environmental
effects, such as GDP growth and ecological footprint, may provide some insight into possible trends and
effects in the future, any projections of what might happen as a consequence of the megatrends to 2050 are
highly uncertain. This is due to the long timescales involved, and also the impossibility of predicting the
potential interactions which eventually result in environmental effects. For example, the emergence of the
internet and its role in changing how businesses function, (e.g. facilitating the outsourcing of employment to
India from Europe) would have been practically impossible to predict forty years ago, and thus any
environmental effects of this innovation would not have been identified. Thus when considering the potential
environmental effects of the megatrends, there is a danger of assuming that relationships that have existed
in the past will continue in the future, when in reality whatever does emerge in the future is unlikely to be the
same as what happened in the past, as the drivers will (by definition) be different. The individual megatrend
sheets in Annex I explore how these underlying uncertainties then influence the effects that the megatrends
will have on Europe’s environment.
20
Table 3: Summary of the contribution of the megatrends to direct and indirect environmental effects to Europe.
Effects on Europe’s environment
Direct
effects
Uncertainty
Indirect
effects
Uncertainty
Links among
megatrends
Total score:
Impacts +
uncertainty +
links
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration





9
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges















9
8
9
n.a.
n.a.



4
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.

2





13





12








9
10










Megatrends
S3. Global urbanisation
S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class
S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in
an unequal world
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies
EC1. Continued economic growth
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources



Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load



Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change



Strength of megatrend effect: Not applicable or no effect identified = n.a., Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
21



10
12
10
13
Table 4: Ranking of priority megatrends to Europe’s environment
Effects on Europe’s environment
Megatrends
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles
Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
Direct
effects
Uncertainty
Indirect
effects
Uncertainty
Links among
megatrends
Total score:
Impacts +
uncertainty +
links





13





13





12




















12
10
10
10





9








9
9


4
n.a.

2
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges



S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class



EC1. Continued economic growth



S3. Global urbanisation



S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in
n.a.
n.a.

an unequal world
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
pandemics
Strength of megatrend effect: Not applicable or no effect identified = n.a., Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
22
9
8
5.2
DISCUSSION OF PRIORITISED MEGATRENDS
The megatrends that score highest under this system are those not simply with strong effects on Europe’s
environment, but those with high levels of uncertainties and also strong interrelationships with other
megatrends.
Of the four highest scoring megatrends, two are related to technology and two are related to the global
environment. All have high levels of uncertainty in terms of their effects on Europe’s environment.
The technology megatrends can help address a series of environmental problems. Developments in energy
technologies will be crucial for climate change. Nanotechnology is expected to develop lighter and stronger
materials, reducing resource demands (Biois 2010), and thus perhaps accelerating the decoupling between
GDP growth and resource consumption seen in past decades (World Bank 2009). Biotechnology is expected
to affect agriculture (OECD 2008), influencing the consumption of soil and water around the world as well as
in Europe. A crucial element of future technology development is its great uncertainty in terms of direction
and results. Here, scenarios by the Rockefeller Foundation (Rockefeller Foundation, 2010) as well as in
studies for the OECD Bioeconomy Project (Tait and Wield (2009) highlighted the role of institutions and
policies in shaping research and development – though these studies also underline that discoveries are by
their nature uncertain.
Among the environmental megatrends, ENV3 (climate change) will be crucial for Europe’s environment.
Here, one important element of the analysis is that future greenhouse gas emissions will in coming decades
be largely shaped by trends occurring outside of Europe.
Stocks of natural resources around the world are decreasing, including freshwater, soil, fisheries and other
ecosystem services. The effects on Europe’s environment are not as strong as those for climate change, but
here too uncertainties are great, including in terms of links with other global megatrends.
It should be underlined that the scoring focuses on the effects on Europe’s environment. These megatrends
are likely to have a broad range of other consequences on Europe in social and economic terms. These nonenvironmental consequences are explored in the separate reports for this project, analysing each megatrend
in detail.
The emphasis on uncertainty gives higher weight to megatrends where governance could bring major shifts.
This element helps to understand why major megatrends such as EC1 (continued economic growth) and S1
(shifts in population size) rank lower. Both of these megatrends are crucial in terms of their links to others,
and thus their underlying importance to global futures. The two will affect Europe’s environment – but this is
less strong than the influence of climate change and the declining stocks of natural resources around the
world. And crucially, these megatrends have less uncertainty.
23
6. OVERVIEW OF IMPLICATIONS FOR EUROPE
This chapter reviews the effects of the megatrends on Europe’s environment across four categories:

Climate change

Pollution and health

Nature and biodiversity

Resources and waste
These categories are based on those in the EU’s Sixth Environmental Action Programme. More detailed
analysis is provided in Annex II
6.1 CLIMATE CHANGE
The effects of the megatrends on climate change in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is
provided below:

Global population growth is likely to result in increased emissions of GHGs globally. The aging of
the world’s population could also increase GHS emissions, but this is highly uncertain.

Aging of Europe’s population is likely to increase Europe’s vulnerability to climate change impacts,
and may also reduce the amount of money available to respond to climate change.

Urbanisation, rising incomes and increased economic growth are linked, and are likely to act
together to increase global GHG emissions.

The loss of certain global resources, such as the Amazon forests, may reduce ability of the
ecosphere to regulate GHG emissions, leading to increasingly severe climate change impacts in
Europe.

Increased pollution, such as water and air pollution, in Europe will be exacerbated by climate
change.

Technology may provide a means to reduce GHG emissions, potentially reducing the effects of
climate change in Europe.

The role of fast-growing economies, such as India and China, in mitigating GHG emissions will
becomes increasingly important over the long-term.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on climate change in
Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail).
Table 5 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to climate change in Europe.
24
Table 5: Ranking of priority megatrends to climate change in Europe
Total score:
Climate change
Megatrends
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
11
11
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
10
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
9
Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
9
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges
5
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
5
S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class
4
S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
4
EC1. Continued economic growth
4
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
4
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
3
S3. Rapid global urbanisation
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
2
0
The four megatrends identified as highest priority for climate change in Europe are technological and
environmental (Table 5). Technology may provide the solution to climate change through improving
efficiency or the development of alternative fuel sources, however both are highly uncertain. Decreasing
stocks of natural resources and increasing pollution are will have
Most of the direct effects to climate change in Europe are likely to arise from the environmental megatrends,
with medium uncertainty, although these effects may increase or decrease the pressure of climate change
on Europe.
The direct effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are relatively few. Technology may
actually reduce the direct effects, although it could also increase the indirect effects of climate change on
Europe. However any predictions of what solutions technology can offer are highly uncertain.
The indirect effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are likely to be strong, and S4 (the
emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth) are likely to
particularly significant in increasing the effect of climate change. Predictions of the likely effect of both of
these megatrends have low uncertainty attached to them. S3 (global urbanisation) is closely associated with
S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth), driven by
and driving both megatrends, but considered in isolation is likely to have a weak effect on increasing climate
change in Europe. S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is likely to have a
medium effect on climate change in Europe, with low uncertainty attached. S2 (shifts in population
composition: aging and youth bulges) are also likely to have an medium indirect effect on climate change in
Europe, but the uncertainty of these effects is high.
6.2 POLLUTION AND HEALT H
The effects of the megatrends on pollution and health in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is
provided below:

The trends related to Europe’s population will have a variety of effects in terms of pollution levels.
Ageing and population decline could reduce consumption and related emissions of a broad range of
pollutants, from CO and NOx from motor vehicles to nitrogen runoff from intensive agriculture to
water bodies. Migration to Europe will offset a part of this population decline: and the extent of future
migration is a major area of uncertainty. Migration is expected to lead to an increase in many of the
same pollutants. Overall, the changes in total population size are expected to be relatively small
compared to other trends – far less than the possible 50% increase in global population to 2050.

Increasing global consumption, for example, due to economic growth, increasing incomes and
population increase, may increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products. If this
25
leads to an increase in the scale and intensity of agriculture in Europe to 2050, then it is likely that
pollution may increase as a result; for example, run-off of nitrates and phosphates from agricultural
land could increase, or the release of acidifying substances to the atmosphere could rise. Increased
water demand due to increased agricultural production could also increase water stress in Europe,
increasingly important in the context of climate change.

Increasing global consumption could lead to increases in the exploitation of Europe’s mineral and
fuel resources, which could also increase pollution in Europe to 2020.

Technology is likely to have a positive effect on pollution in Europe, potentially reducing resource
consumption and tackling waste / pollution issues. Technology may also offer improved pollution
monitoring and provide better information to decision makers in Europe.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on pollution and health in
Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail).
Table 6 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to pollution and health in Europe.
Table 6: Ranking of priority megatrends to pollution and health in Europe
Total score:
Pollution and
health
Megatrends
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
9
9
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
EC1. Continued economic growth
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
S3. Rapid global urbanisation
8
8
7
6
6
5
5
4
S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
4
4
0
0
The four priority megatrends to pollution and health in Europe are ENV1 (Decreasing stocks of natural
resources), T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), T2 (the rise of the nano-,
bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) and EC2 (intensified competition for resources).
The global megatrends likely to have the strongest effect on pollution and health in Europe are S3 (global
urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio and
ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), ENV2 (increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load)
and ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change). Most of the effects identified were
direct, with low to medium uncertainty, and are predicted as likely to potentially increase and decrease
pressure on Europe’s environment. The indirect effects identified have higher uncertainty associated with
them, and are also a mix of increasing and decreasing pressures on pollution and heath in Europe.
Increasing concentrations of ozone, particulate matter and POPs from intercontinental transport are
projected to increase in Europe and are likely to have medium strength effects on pollution and health in
Europe, which is identified through ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load).
6.3 BIODIVERSITY AND NAT URE
The effects of the megatrends on biodiversity and nature in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is
provided below:

Increased demand for European agriculture and forestry products due to, for example, increase in
global population, increase in incomes and global urbanisation, could increase pressure on
European biodiversity to 2050. An increase in the scale and intensity of European agriculture could
26
have a negative effect on biodiversity due to the potential threat of eutrophication and acidification
associated with agriculture, as well as a potential increase in water stress in some European
regions.

Increased demand for Europe’s fuel and mineral resources could also increase pressure on
biodiversity, for example by increasing offshore drilling.

Projected population decline in Europe could ease existing pressures on biodiversity, however any
potential reductions could be offset by projected increases in migration to Europe (to maintain
population numbers in the context of population decline). As migration to Europe is generally to
urban areas, it will not prevent population decline in rural areas. This could lead to land
abandonment and potentially have a negative effect on the biodiversity of high-nature value
farmland.

Climate change is identified as likely to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity over the longterm, for example by changing environmental conditions such as average temperature and rainfall
patterns.

Increasing trade between Europe and the rest of the world may increase the spread of invasive
species in Europe, which would have a negative impact on European biodiversity.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on biodiversity and nature
in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail).
Table 7 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe.
Table 7: Ranking of priority megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe
Total score:
Biodiversity and
nature
Megatrends
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
10
10
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class
S3. Rapid global urbanisation
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
8
8
7
7
EC1. Continued economic growth
S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in
an unequal world
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics
3
0
7
5
5
4
4
0
The four priority megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe are Env1 (decreasing stocks of natural
resources), Env 3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change), EC2 (intensified competition
for resources) and Env2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load).
The three environmental megatrends are likely to have the strongest effects to biodiversity in Europe, and
the uncertainty attached to these effects is high. Climate change is likely to have the most significant effect
to biodiversity, changing the functioning of habitats and ecosystems in Europe by altering rainfall patterns
and changing temperatures, for example. As stocks of natural resources decrease around the world,
pressure on Europe’s resources will increase (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) which will increase
stress on Europe’s environment, with negative effect to biodiversity. However these effects are highly
uncertain. This increased competition for resources is also associated with global economic growth,
increased competition for resources and global population growth. This is why EC2 (intensified competition
27
for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment) and S2 (shifts in population composition: aging
and youth bulges) are identified as important in effecting biodiversity in Europe, although the indirect effects
of population growth (associated with increased migration to Europe) are highly uncertain.
The effect of technology on Europe’s biodiversity is highly uncertain; new technologies could reduce
pressure on Europe’s environment by improving agricultural yields around the world or by reducing the use
of agricultural chemicals in Europe. However, technology could also generate new as yet unknown negative
effects to biodiversity, e.g. the potential impact of transgenic crops on European biodiversity over the long
term.
The effects of S3 (global urbanisation) and S4 (emerging middle-income class) are relatively weak, restricted
to indirect effects that are highly uncertain. Both megatrends may act to increase pressure on Europe’s
biodiversity, through increased climate change or demand for agricultural products, but the strength of these
effects is not likely to be high.
6.4 RESOURCES AND WASTE
The effects of the megatrends on resources and waste in Europe are discussed in Annex II, an overview is
provided below:

Population decline in Europe may result in reduced demand for natural resources, however this may
be offset by increased demand associated with increased migration to Europe.

Increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products may lead to an increase in the
intensity and scale of agriculture and forestry in Europe, which could increase pressure on water and
soil resources in Europe.

Increased global demand for energy and sub-soil resources may increase the exploitation of fuel and
mineral reserves in Europe.

Technology may act to reduce pressure on Europe’s natural resources by increasing the efficiency of
resource use and improving agricultural yields.

Climate change may increase pressure on Europe’s natural resources, for example, reducing water
availability. Sea level rise as a consequence of climate change may reduce the amount of
agricultural land available in Europe.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on resources and waste in
Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 and Annex II for more detail).
Table 8 below ranks the megatrends in terms of their priority effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe.
Table 8: Ranking of priority megatrends to resources and waste in Europe
Total score:
Resources and
waste
Megatrends
T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles
T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies
Env1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
Env 3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
EC2. Intensified competition for resources
Env2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
S2. Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges
S1. Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
S4. The emerging global middle income consumer class
EC3. Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
S3. Rapid global urbanisation
9
EC1. Continued economic growth
S5. Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in
an unequal world
S6. Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics
3
0
9
9
9
8
8
7
6
4
4
3
0
28
The four priority megatrends to resources and waste in Europe are T1 (global acceleration and shifts in
technology development cycles), T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies), Env1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources) and Env 3 (increasing severity of the
consequences of climate change)
The global megatrends are likely to increase pressure on natural resource use in Europe, with the majority of
this increase coming from outside Europe (i.e. indirect effects). The uncertainty related to this increase
ranges from low to high, but in general uncertainty around the effects is high. S1 (Shift in population size:
increase, decline and rising migration) and S2 (Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are
predicted to have direct impacts to natural resource in Europe, which may increase or decrease resource
use depending on the final outcome for Europe’s population; an increase or a decrease. Economic growth
and increasing competition for resources may see an increase in the demand for European natural
resources, both for export globally and for use internally in response to price increases on the global market,
however this effect is highly uncertain.
The technology megatrends are notable as they may have the effect of reducing pressure on natural
resources in Europe, as efficiency improvements may offset or reduce demand for resources. However
these effects are highly uncertain as they depend on the development of specific technologies.
The environmental megatrends are likely to have both direct and indirect effects to natural resources in
Europe, although these effects are highly uncertain. ENV3 (climate change) could result in food and water
shortages in other parts of the world, which could trigger migration to Europe. If this were to happen the
effects to resource use in Europe would be significant, but obviously this is a very uncertain effect. Climate
change is more likely to affect resource use in Europe due to direct impacts related to changes to
precipitation patterns, water availability, and increasingly severe and frequent extreme weather events.
Table 9 below summarises the ranking of the megatrends in each of the four thematic areas, with the most
important at the top (it is helpful to refer also to Table 4 (in Chapter 5), which ranks the megatrends in terms
of their direct and indirect effects, uncertainties and linkages). From Table 9 it is apparent that the
technology and environmental megatrends emerge as priority for Europe’s environment. The economic and
social megatrends (as related to changing demographics) are also important. Of lower priority are the
megatrends related to changing patterns of disease burden and increasing inequalities. While these
megatrends are likely to be important to Europe socially, any impacts to Europe’s environment will be
extremely limited and overshadowed by the other megatrends.
29
Table 9: Summary table ranking priority megatrends to Europe by thematic area
Double Click on the Table to see animation of ranking
Ranked score:
Climate change
Ranked score:
Pollution and health
Ranked score:
Biodiversity and nature
Ranked score:
Resources and waste
T1.
Env1.
Env1.
T1.
T2.
T1.
Env 3.
T2.
Env1.
T2.
EC2.
Env1.
Env2.
EC2.
Env2.
Env 3.
Env 3.
S2.
S2.
EC2.
S2.
EC3.
T1.
Env2.
EC3.
Env 3.
T2.
S2.
S4.
EC1.
S1.
S1.
S5.
S1.
S4.
S4.
EC1.
S3.
S3.
EC3.
EC2.
S4.
EC3.
S3.
S1.
Env2.
EC1.
EC1.
S3.
S5.
S5.
S5.
S6.
S6.
S6.
S6.
Three megatrends (T1, T2 and ENV1) stand out as having a medium or strong influence on Europe’s
environment across all four of the areas. Climate change (ENV3) is also one of the most important
megatrends in terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, though it has slightly lower consequences than
the other three in terms of pollution and health (this category considers only health issues related to pollution:
those related to climate change are factored under climate change as a category for Europe’s environment).
One notable result is that growing global pollution levels (ENV2) have only a weak influence on pollution and
health in Europe, and a much stronger influence in other categories. This is seen, for example, in the
interaction between air pollutants (in particular sulphates) and climate change in the northern hemisphere,
described above.
Another interesting element is that Economic power shifts (EC3) has a strong influence than Continued
economic growth (EC1). This relates in large part due to the the opportunity that this megatrend provides in
governance: agreements with a small number of large, emerging economies may have an important result in
terms of the global environment and Europe’s (PBL, 2008), but also due to the greater uncertainty about the
effects and scale of these power shifts compared to continued global economic growth. Economic growth
therefore appears less problematic for Europe’s environment than it might be for the global environment
more generally, borne out by the scores for direct effects which are not high for Europe (see Table 4 in
Chapter 5).
30
In terms of the effects on Europe’s environment, Shifts in population structure (S2) appears to be more
important than the Shifts in population size (S1). Here, the effect of Europe’s ageing population would
appear to be a key factor.
A further issue to underline is the importance of decreasing stocks of natural resources (ENV1), which has
the strongest influence on the EU environment of all the environmental megatrends across all categories..
These rankings should be treated with care, as the table includes the levels of uncertainty, which differ
significantly among megatrends, but it is particularly important to be aware of those uncertain effects that
may also be most significant if they are to arise. The economic megatrends exhibit a lower degree of
uncertainty compared to some of the other megatrends. If uncertainty is removed from the scoring the
economic megatrends move up the rankings a few places. The scoring deliberately has been kept as simple
and transparent as possible, without the use of weightings, since the scores themselves are qualitative and,
while one could apply sensitivity testing, e.g. by applying different weights to direct and indirect effects, it
would be difficult to justify the basis for any such weights. In terms of outcomes, effects are effects whether
they are direct or indirect; both may vary in magnitude, nature, location and sensitivity of the receptors.
31
7.
CONCLUSIONS
The analysis of long-term global megatrends undertaken here – firstly exploring the possible effects of the
megatrends identified, then the potential inter-relationships among those megatrends, and then looking more
closely at cross-cutting key environmental effects in Europe in relation to climate change, pollution and
health, biodiversity and nature, and resources and waste – has identified a range of potential implications for
Europe’s environment along with considerable uncertainty as to the actual pathways that might be followed.
Long-term futures work is inevitably exploratory, however much it may be supported by quantitative
modelling and/or empirical evidence of past trends. We cannot assume, for example, that patterns
established in the past will continue into the future, even in the short term let alone to 2050 or beyond. On
the other hand the concept of megatrends does provide an important framing device for thinking about the
major influences into the future and how policy makers can be more prepared for some of the potentially
most significant but highly uncertain events that may unfold.
7.1
RANKING THE MEGATRENDS
Four of the 14 megatrends appear to be particularly important, when considering their effects on Europe’s
environment, their uncertainties and also their linkages to other megatrends:

T1. Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles

ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change

T2. The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies

ENV1. Decreasing stocks of natural resources
The technology megatrends are notable in terms of their pervasive influence on future global impacts on the
environment. Technology offers a great variety of approaches for addressing environmental problems, from
alternative energy sources to lighter materials that use less energy and raw materials to manufacture. This
megatrend in particular is open to great uncertainty.
The environmental megatrends will also have important effects on Europe’s environment. Their ranking
underlines the importance that global environmental developments will have for Europe.
7.2
DIRECT AND INDIRECT EFFECTS ON EUROPE’S ENVIRONMENT
The analysis shows that global megatrends will have a series of direct and indirect consequences for
Europe’s environment.
The most evident consequences will arise in the area of climate change: here, a series of global megatrends
– including population growth, the growing middle-income consumer class in countries such as China and
India, the accelerated development of technology and continued global economic growth – will be among the
32
main forces shaping future levels of greenhouse gas emissions. As a result, these global megatrends will
play a key role in terms of the severity of climate change that Europe will face in coming decades.6
In terms of resources, the links between global megatrends and Europe’s environment are complex and
uncertain. Growing energy demand and the resulting global competition is likely to stimulate offshore oil
extraction and possibly unconventional gas exploration in Europe, both of which will have a series of
consequences for biodiversity, pollution levels and more. It is also possible that mining in Europe, in recent
decades in decline, will increase again.
The analysis suggests that the megatrends will have other consequences in terms of pollution and health: in
coming decades, for example, hemispheric air pollution is expected to increase as economies across Asia
become stronger in the immediate decades to come (in a longer time frame, policies to address air pollution
in China and elsewhere may reverse this trend). Hemispheric pollution of contaminants such as ozone and
POPs are expected to contribute to the background level of air pollution across Europe; they seem unlikely to
reverse improvements in air quality in urban areas due to lower local emissions. Here too, new technologies
offer opportunities to reduce pollution levels.
For biodiversity and nature as well, the global megatrends are expected to have a relatively weak impact on
Europe itself, though globally the loss of biodiversity will be a major concern.
7.3
BROADER CONSEQUENCES: THE ISSUE OF ENVIRONMENTAL SECURITY
In addition to the direct and indirect consequences on Europe’s environment, the global megatrends and
their broader environmental consequences present a further set of concerns for Europe. Climate change, for
example, will displace millions of people around the world. IPCC estimates of “climate refugees” by 2050
range from 25 million to one billion, indicating that this is one of the areas of great uncertainty the world will
face. These and other impacts from climate change may bring instability in many parts of the world.
Moreover, social and political problems related to climate change may combine with other consequences
arising from the megatrends, such as youth bulges in countries with poor economic growth, to increase
migration pressures as well as social and political instability.
These sorts of consequences may be seen in many parts of the world, including in Europe’s neighbours in
the southern and eastern Mediterranean as well as in sub-Saharan Africa. Climate change together with
social instability could increase the stream of people who seek better futures and refuge in Europe.
In terms of natural resources, while forecasts by the World Bank suggest that mineral and fossil fuel
resources are sufficient to meet growing demand, price levels and uncertainties of supply may mark coming
decades. Moreover, the concentration of many resources – from conventional oil to rare metals used in solar
cells and other applications - may see future actions to establish cartels and oligopolies that drive up prices
and use access to resources for political ends. Europe as a major importer of mineral and fuel resources is
vulnerable to disruptions to supplies.
The analysis in these two areas alone – the impacts of climate change in different parts of the world and the
availability of resources for Europe’s economy – suggest that environmental security should be a major lens
for long-term strategies in Europe. This perspective is based on
6
Europe’s share of greenhouse gas emissions has been steadily diminishing, though an important political issue in
global discussions is how to weigh past compared to current and future emissions
33
... [the] growing understanding that environmental degradation, inequitable access to natural
resources and transboundary movement of hazardous materials increase the probability of conflict
and thereby pose a risk to human and even national security (ENVSEC).
This perspective implies that environment should have a growing role in foreign and defence policies,
including at European level.
7.4
TECHNOLOGY
The high score given to the technology megatrends underlines the fact that coming decades are likely to see
accelerating technological progress, in particular in the new areas of nano, bio and cognitive sciences and
technologies. Here, the implications for the world and for Europe’s environment are hard to predict, as the
paths of discovery and innovation cannot be foreseen. Technology is one of the key uncertainties that will
shape the global future.
This uncertainty implies an opportunity for public policies in Europe to support technological developments
that can solve environmental problems, both in Europe and elsewhere. The opportunities are underlined, for
example, in the recent study by the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, Getting in the Right
Lane for 2050 (PBL 2050).
The results in that study as well as this analysis suggest that in the long-term, a necessary path for the
protection of Europe’s environment involves research and development of new technologies to address
global environmental and resource issues.
7.5
GOVERNANCE
The detailed megatrend assessments prepared for EEA covered four of the five STEEP categories: no
reports, however, focused on the fifth category, politics. As an initial approach to addressing this gap, the
following points briefly extract some of the links to political and governance issues that arise from the
megatrends.
Several of the key interactions among megatrends may affect future global governance in coming decades;
four areas could lead to interactions with the sphere of politics and governance:

A key area is related to the decline of global public goods, seen in the environmental megatrends.

Another area is in terms of managing uncertainties and risks. New technologies in particular can
bring both solutions and new threats. Other uncertainties and risks arise from pandemics. S2 (shifts
in population composition) includes “youth bulges” that may instability to several parts of the world,
including the Middle East and Africa. One key function of governance is to develop structures
(including legal agreements) to manage the uncertainties in social and economic systems. Here as
in the previous areas, the issues that arise are global and need to be addressed at this level.

A third area relates to coping with change. These include the shifts in economic power, which will
change global political relations. Technology is likely to change our perspectives. Governance at all
levels – international, national and sub-national – is needed to cope these with changes..
These interactions all suggest that stronger global governance – and potentially new forms of governance –
will be needed to face the great changes underway.
34
A significant issue for Europe will be the extent to which the European Union will be able to wield the degree
of influence it has been able to on the world stage in terms of global governance, given the rising and shifting
power associated with the economic power houses of SE Asia and Latin America. The ability for the EU and
its member states – collectively and individually – to tackle future challenges will depend on putting in place
appropriate governance structures to understand, regulate and implement measures to prepare for and
resolve such challenges.
7.6
FINAL REFLECTIONS
Overall, the research has highlighted the complexity of undertaking long-term futures analysis of
megatrends, subject as it is to considerable uncertainty in relation to the nature, scale and direction of the
megatrends themselves as well as their likely effects, globally and for Europe. Information and quantitative
data in many areas are sparse, but point to important areas for further research in the future if we are to get
a better understanding of the long-term megatrends and their drivers. However, the research has also
highlighted some key priority megatrends for Europe’s environment (and therefore also identified those that
are less important to Europe, although important globally), and where targeted policy action will be needed if
some of the most damaging environmental megatrends are to be slowed or reversed.
35
8.
ANNEX I – DETAILED SUMMARIES OF THE MEGATRENDS
This annex presents an over of the contribution of each megatrend to environmental impacts in Europe.
Each of the megatrends will ultimately have a set of impacts on Europe. These have been assessed in terms
of two main categories:

Direct changes to Europe’s environment caused by the drivers associated with the megatrend,

Changes caused to the environment in another part of the world that can have an indirect effect on
Europe’s environment.
Under each of these categories are a further set of sub-categories;
o
Increased / decreased impacts of climate change in Europe,
o
Increased / decrease pollution and human health impacts in Europe
o
Increased / decreased changes impacts to nature, biodiversity and land use change in
Europe
o
Increased / decreased levels of natural resource use and waste in Europe.
Table 10 below describes the criteria used to assign scores to the contribution of megatrends to direct and
indirect environmental impacts in Europe, and associated uncertainties.
Table 10: Criteria for assigning scores to contribution to environmental impacts in Europe, including
uncertainty
Contribution
Uncertainty
Score
Score
Weak

Medium

Strong

Megatrend is likely to lead to a slight
contribution in relation to the effect
identified. The megatrend is not likely
to be the primary contributor to the
effect identified.
Low
Megatrend is likely to be one of
several contributors to the effect
identified, but not the principal one,
but its contribution will mean that the
effect will continue to increase.
Medium
Megatrend likely to make a significant
contribution to the effect identified.
High



36
Predictions around the megatrend are reliable
and do not depend on multiple assumptions of
varying certainty.
Number of assumptions megatrend is based
on increases, and the contribution of the
megatrend to the impacts depends on the
evolution of other trends.
Contribution of megatrend is speculative, and
depends on the specific evolution of other
megatrends.
8.1
S1: SHIFTS IN POPULATION SIZE: INCREASE, DECLINE AND RISING MIGRATION
Summary of the global megatrend
Today the world population is still growing albeit much slower than in the past. In the future, the growth is
expected to slow down, but the pace is uncertain as development of the major driver, regional fertility rates,
is uncertain in long term. In global terms, population growth will take long time to slow down and long time to
eventually regain momentum thereafter. This development differs significantly between regions. In large
parts of the developed world populations are already in decline or are expected to begin declining soon. In
contrast, many developing nations are characterised by continuingly increasing populations
Migration is expected to play an important role in demographic change over the next 50 years. It leads to
populations becoming more diverse and also has an impact on populations’ growth rates and on the amount
of working population. However, the estimates on the scope and geographical spread are highly uncertain.
Migration is a complex phenomena including voluntary migration for economic reasons as well as involuntary
migration for political, religious, or environmental and climate change reasons.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend, shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) has
close links with many other megatrends, including most other social megatrends as well as the economic
megatrends and the environmental megatrends.
This megatrend, shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is
very closely linked with that of shifts in population composition (shifts in population composition: aging and
youth bulges): in many ways, the two are sides of a single coin. This megatrend is also closely linked to
urbanisation (global urbanisation) in developing countries: urban areas are expected to absorb all of the
growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of the existing rural population (UN 2010).
There are also key links with health megatrends, notably Changing patterns of disease burden globally
(changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics): child health is a key factor in
population growth in developing countries; so is access to family planning. While improving child health may
increase population growth in the short term, in the long term this factor leads to lower fertility rates (WHO,
2002). In addition, This megatrend is linked to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth
in an unequal world) as the successful demographic transition from high to low fertility depends to a
significant extent on improvements in health (WHO 2002).
37
Figure 2. Links between fertility rates and GDP
Source: Economist (2009).
The social megatrends (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration, shifts in population
composition: aging and youth bulges, global urbanisation, increasing life expectancy; growing old and
seeking youth in an unequal world and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics) are closely linked also to economic ones. This megatrend in particular (shift in population size:
increase, decline and rising migration) and Continued economic growth (EC1) have a series of strong links.
For example, rising populations provide labour for fast-growing emerging economies; in contrast, ageing
reduces the labour base of an economy (Biois).
A further link between population and economic growth relates to fertility rates: these by and large fall with
higher economic incomes (see Figure 2 above).
While social and economic megatrends are closely interrelated, a key issue for the global future relates to
their relative weights in terms of the consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). Global
population growth between 2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This
takes the “constant fertility” scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and
this is not by the UN to be a strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In
contrast, the economies of China and India may growth seven-fold over this period (Poncet, 2006; see also
EC1 (continued economic growth) and EC3). Without diminishing the importance of population growth and
migration in future trends, it appears that economic growth and associated consumption patterns may have
stronger consequences on the world’s environment in coming decade – and thus on Europe’s.
The close links described above between these two megatrends – shifts in population size (shift in
population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and continued economic growth (EC1) also suggest
that a high economic growth future is not likely to intersect with a high population growth future. At the same
time, there is not a simple trade-off here, as key areas of the world where high economic growth is foreseen,
such as China, are already expected to have low population growth.
These two key vital megatrends – shifts in population size and continued economic growth – meet with a
third megatrend, The emerging global middle-income consumer class (S4), whose consumption patterns
(and the related production patterns) will closely influence the environmental megatrends (see emergence of
a global middle-income consumer class).
38
This megatrend (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) is linked to the EC2
intensified competition for resources as population growth is one factor driving resource demand; however,
population growth in coming decades is expected to be slower than in past decades, reducing its influence
(World Bank, 2009).
The growing world population will also increase pressures on resource use (ENV1) as well as those related
to environmental degradation (ENV2) as well as a driver for climate change. As indicated above, slowing
global population growth will reduce the effects of this megatrend: the growing middle-income consumer
class (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class) and continued economic growth (EC1) are
thus likely to have a strong influence on these environmental megatrends than population growth itself.
Migration is also a key element of this megatrend (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration) and it plays an important role in these relationships. Poverty is a key driver of migration, and thus
migration trends will closely interact with continued economic growth (EC1). Many migrants seek better
economic opportunities in urban areas and other countries. In doing so, migrants can increase their incomes
and this can bring benefits to both their host – for example filling a labour gap created by ageing – and their
home countries, through remittances (Biois, 2010).
The figure above (Figure 2) presents key demographic trends around the world, including major migration
patterns.
While this figure shows migration leaving major developing countries such as India and China, in the longer
term the fast-growing emerging economies may become a destination of migrants as their populations slow.
This is expected to be the case for China (whose population will decline after 2030) and Turkey, as well as
for parts of southern India (Biois). Thus, migration is also linked to megatrend EC3, Power shifts.
Figure 3. A snapshot of global demographic trends
Source: CIA (2001)
39
Climate change (ENV3) and other types of environmental degradation (ENV2) are likely to be linked closely
with migration. These megatrends can influence long-term changes – reduced average rainfall patterns –
that will combine with other factors that spur migration, such as conflict and economic conditions. In Africa,
for example, an estimated 10 million people have migrated over the past decade due to desertification (IOM).
Climate change may also increase the frequency of some natural disasters, such as hurricanes and droughts
and will reduce the capacity of people to cope with them, leading to further migration. The total number of
climate and environmental “refugees” is difficult to estimate also because these factors will combine with
other reasons for migration, such as economic conditions and conflict (Biois). Migrant populations will in turn
affect the environment in their new homes – sudden migrations, such as those related to conflict and
disaster, can have very negative impacts.
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 11: Important areas of uncertainty associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population size
Fertility rates in different areas of the world
Infant and child mortality
Government policies for women’s education and health
Migration policy of both emigration and immigration countries
Economic growth in different parts of the world
Future conflicts and their impacts on involuntary emigration
Climate change and its influence on migration
The UN projections for the total global population size in 2050 range from under 8 billion for the low growth
scenario to almost 12 billion for the constant fertility scenario, though the latter is considered unlikely – the
UN’s high scenario projects a global population of about 11.5 billion.
The evolution of fertility rates are one of the major uncertainties influencing population growth and decline,
as small differences in fertility rates can lead to significant differences in population sizes (Biois). Mortality
rates also have an influence – in particular those for infants and children. As these factors are closely related
to other megatrends, the uncertainties related to population growth are closely related to their uncertainties.
Notably, uncertainties in health trends are important, in particular the extent of improvements in child health
in developing countries. (Unexpected health events, such as major global pandemics or major medical
breakthroughs, would also influence population levels.) Reductions and adult mortality will have a slower
impact globally, but can be important in countries with rapid improvements – this has been the case in
Ethiopia in recent years (Biois) and could occur in other low-income countries where healthcare is poor and
life expectancy is low.
Here, political and governance actions at both international level and within developing countries can play a
key role. These include policies for female education and employment, will also have a major influence on
population and migration patterns, and health policies.
Migration is however considered the most uncertain element of population shifts (UN, 2009), due in particular
to the influence of other megatrends. Data on current patterns are incomplete, and the dimensions and
patterns of future migration are very difficult to project. By one estimate, the share of global population living
outside country of birth has risen from about 2.5% in 1960 to 3% in 2005, while absolute levels increased by
about 2.5 times due to the increase in global population (DRC 2008 cited in Biois). UN projections simply
project future migration based on recent levels.
40
Many factors could greatly change future migration. Possible differences and unexpected events in
economic growth and conditions can change migration patterns: for example, megatrends EC1 (continued
economic growth) and EC3 discussion differences in projections for India and China, as well as different
scenarios for economic and political development in South Africa.
Future conflicts have been a major source of migration and could bring uncertainties for future trends. In
Europe in the 1990s, for example, the conflicts in the Western Balkans led to the internal displacement of
about 4 million people, and an estimated 600,000 more went to other European countries (EEA, 2010) – an
event little foreseen a decade before. Conflict in the Congo had left over 1 million people internally displaced
(UNHCR, 2010). The scale of conflicts over the coming 40 years, their geographic distribution and their
impacts on migration are all great sources of uncertainty.
The influence of climate change and other environmental degradation will be important, and is open to great
uncertainty. IPCC estimates cited by IOM range from 25 million to 1 billion people around the world
displaced by 2050: the severity of climate impacts in different scenarios is the key factor in this uncertainty
(IOM, 2009). Urbanisation trends (global urbanisation) will influence these uncertainties, as many growing
cities around the world are in coastal areas and could face flooding risks related to sea-level rise (Biois).
The figure below (Figure 4) provides a picture of potential sources of migration due to climate change and
environmental degradation.
Figure 4. Origin and destinations of international migrants: climate change and environment
induced uncertainty for the future
Source: Warner, 2008
Migration policies will also shape future migration paths. Many OECD countries have changed their migration
policies in recent years, making it easier for highly skilled immigrants from the rest of the world to come and
work but restricting access to low-skilled workers and tightening border controls. In part, these changes have
been due to the recent economic crisis. At the same time, many OECD countries have strengthened efforts
to integrate immigrants – while making citizenship harder to obtain (OECD, 2010). In Europe today,
41
immigration policy is a major source of debate (see e.g. Carrera and Guild, 2008), and some analysts ask
whether social and political difficulties make it impossible for Europe to absorb high levels of immigrants from
the rest of the world on an ongoing basis (Rand, 2004).
Table 12: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population
size
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends
Scale of uncertainties


Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
In terms of scoring, it is clear that population shifts have strong links throughout the megatrends.
The uncertainties associated with population growth (and decline) are seen as relatively low compared to
other megatrends: at global scale its major components, such as fertility and mortality, change slowly over
decades. Indeed, the key uncertainties identified above are related in fact to other megatrends.
In contrast, uncertainties associated with migration are higher – and here, patterns can change quickly.
Moreover, the influence of other megatrends leads to higher uncertainties, as seen in the estimates above of
the future links of climate change on migration.
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s
environment:
Table 13: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S1. Shifts in population size
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Global population growth will influence climate change and its impacts on Europe (the
link is discussed under ENV2)
Indirect
Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and
this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing
demand for its agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution
associated in particular with intensive production (see EC2 for a discussion of
uncertainties)
Indirect
The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from
other megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois).
Direct
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Though not part of a global megatrend per se, Europe’s ongoing migration towards
Direct
Biodiversity/nature
42
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
coastal areas, in particular in the Mediterranean, for retirement and vacation homes,
may continue and this will increase pressures in coastal zones as seen for example in
the Western Balkans (IEA, 2009).
Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related
environmental pressures would remain
Direct
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Immigration is arriving mainly in urban areas in Europe (Biois). This means that other
areas will see ongoing populations decline – e.g. mountain and other remote rural
areas. Here, declining rural labour will contribute to the abandonment of high-nature
value farmland.
Indirect
Biodiversity/nature
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
As shown in Table 13, global population growth will be among the megatrends that will increase pressures
on natural resources and climate change around the world – and the consequences will also fall on Europe.
In Europe, the population will decline slightly to 2050. This – without considering the role of other
megatrends – will lead to a slightly reduction in pressures on the environment. Migration to Europe, which in
recent years has been the most important driver of population growth in Europe, will have the opposite effect
(Biois). In both cases, many of the environmental effects are expected to be relatively minor as governance
of environment, land use and other policy areas in Europe will mediate the consequences.
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the
uncertainties. These uncertainties are related both to those for the megatrend as a whole – described and
scored above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Overall, the direct consequences – which are related to population decline and migration – appear to be
relatively low.
In contrast, indirect consequences on Europe’s environment appear to be stronger: these are related to
population growth around the world. The most important areas are climate change – population growth will
be among the factors fuelling global emissions which will in turn affect climate change in Europe.
A consideration of timing can also be made. The main UN population scenarios see a steady decline in
population growth over coming decades: in the medium scenario, it will fall to 0.34% a year by 2045-2050
(Biois), less than a third of current levels (in the unlikely constant-fertility scenario, the growth rate will fall
much less drastically). This implies that global population growth in itself will decline in terms of its
consequences. It may remain important in some parts of the world. Moreover, other demographic changes
such as migration are not likely to diminish, and their consequences will remain throughout the period.
Table 14: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to global megatrend S1. Shifts in
population size
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a


 -/+



Biodiversity and nature
 -/+



Natural resource use
 -/+



Climate change
Pollution and health
43
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
The analysis above suggests that the effects of the shifts in population size will have important
consequences for Europe’s environment – though these may be smaller in magnitude than other
megatrends, in particular those related to economic growth. This has important consequences for policy, as
it suggests that the relationship between economic growth – and specifically production and consumption
patterns – is among the most important factors for the future of the global environmental.
Population shifts nonetheless remain quite important.
For example, while migration could provide a solution for Europe’s declining population, some observers
warn that this is not socially or politically feasible: a high number of immigrants over a long period of time is
“not acceptable in the current socio-political climate prevailing in Europe”, according to one analysis (Rand
2004).
The Rand analysis is in terms of accepting migration on voluntary terms. The future impacts of climate
change could, however, generate political and humanitarian crises, even at levels far below the high IPCC
estimate of 1 billion climate change “refugees” by 2050. Moreover, such migration shifts in can lead to social
conflict (IOM). There are risks of that a vicious circle of events may arise in regions where climate change
impacts and other forms of environmental degradation together with poor economic conditions lead to
migrations and then further conflicts and new social problems. While this may represent a worst-case
scenario, even less severe climate events could create instability in countries neighbouring Europe and
beyond, posing risks to Europe’s security.
Thus, the direct and indirect consequences for Europe’s environment may be overshadowed by much larger
concerns related to security – and this suggests that an environmental security perspective needs to be an
important element of future European policy actions, including in external aid as well as international
relations more generally.
Reference
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
Bio Intelligence Service (Biois), General support to the forward-looking assessment component of the
European state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on
Demographics and Migration, Final Draft, April 2010
Other sources include:
Carrera S and Guild E (2008), The French Presidency’s European Pact on Immigration and Asylum:
Intergovernmentalism vs. Europeanisation? Security vs. Rights? CEPS Policy Brief No. 170
CIA (2001) Long‐term Global Demographic Trends: Reshaping the Geopolitical Landscape. Availableat:
https://www.cia.gov/library/reports/general‐reports‐1/Demo_Trends_For_Web.pdf
Development Research Centre on Migration, Globalisation and Poverty (DRC, 2008) Demographics and
Climate Change: Future Trends and their Implications for Migration.
Economist (2009), Fertility and living standards: Go forth and multiply a lot less. October, 29. 2009 – cited in Biois
44
European Environment Agency, Environmental trends and perspectives in the Western Balkans: future
production and consumption patterns, EEA Report No. 1/2010
International Organization on Migration, Migration, Climate Change and the Environment, Policy Brief, May
2009
OECD (2010), International Migration Outlook 2010
Poncet S (2006), The Long Term Growth Prospects of the World Economy: Horizon 2050, CEPII – cited in
Ecorys (2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future environment
Background document for SOER part A Version 22/04/10
RAND Europe (2004) Low Fertility and Population Ageing: Causes, Consequences, and Policy Options.
Available at: www.rand.org/pubs/monographs/2004/RAND_MG206.pdf
UNHCR (2010), 2010 UNHCR country operations profile - Democratic Republic of the Congo,
http://www.unhcr.org/cgi-bin/texis/vtx/page?page=49e45c366 (consulted August 2010)
United Nations (2009), World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision – Highlights, 2009
United Nations (2010), World Urbanization Prospects The 2009 Revision – Highlights
World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects: Commodities at the Crossroads
45
8.2
S2: SHIFTS IN POPULATION COMPOSITION: AGING AND YOUTH BULGES
Summary of the megatrend
Population ageing is a global trend strongly linked to declining population. The world population is getting
older at an unprecedented rate. In 2000, about 7% of the world’s population was aged over 65, and this is
expected to increase to 16% by 2050.
Contrary to the trends in developed economies, many developing countries are expected to experience until
2025 substantial youth bulges (youth bulges are disproportionate concentrations of people in the 15‐to‐29
year‐old age group), for example 60% of African population is expected to be younger than 30 years.
(Taken from fact sheet no. 2 – for further information sheet the fact sheet)
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is closely linked to demographic and other social megatrends. The links with economic
megatrends, in particular continued economic growth (continued economic growth) are also strong.
The closes links are those with Shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration): as noted in the previous sheet, these two megatrends are in many ways two sides of a coin.
Youth bulges are also closely linked to migration, another element of megatrend S1 (shift in population size:
increase, decline and rising migration): in areas that face ongoing economic difficulties, high numbers of
young people are likely to move to wealthier areas and higher-income economies to improve their prospects
(see the previous sheet for further information on links between migration and economic conditions).
The changing population composition will also closely interact with health drivers. Ageing in particular is
closely related to increasing life expectancy (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an
unequal world). As described under that megatrend, the elderly will need more health care and – in particular
persons with disposable income – will seek therapies that can extend lifespans.
Youth bulges are also closely tied to health megatrends. A reduction in child mortality rates can increase the
size of child and youth populations. The HIV/AIDS pandemic in Africa has had a different effect: by striking a
large share of the adults, it has left a larger than normal share of youths in population composition (Biois).
As both examples indicate, Changing patterns of disease burden (megatrend S6: changing patterns of
disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) will influence future youth bulges.
This megatrend, Shifts in population composition, will also be closely tied to EC1 (continued economic
growth).
Ageing will have one set of effects: an ageing economy will see a declining share of the population in normal
working age, reducing the labour force. This will affect in Europe in particular: a 2009 report by the European
Commission report estimates that the ageing population in the EU will cut the Union’s estimated long-term
economic growth from by over half a point, from 2.4% to 1.8% for the period to 2060 (DG ECFIN). Ageing will
also place high burdens on health, pension and other social payments in Europe and other ageing
economies (Biois). Ageing is also likely to change the economic structure: for example, health care will be a
growing sector of the economy in Europe.
The extent of ageing in Europe and its effects on labour markets can be seen in Figure 5 below: under
current projections, about 90 million immigrants would be needed to replace the fall in working age
population to 2050 – more than five times the projected level. It should be noted that other options, in
addition to immigration, may help to address this gap, including raising the retirement age in Europe as well
as increasing the share of working age population that is employed (the latter is a goal of the European
Commission’s Europe 2020 Strategy).
46
Figure 5. Net migration required to hold working age population constant at 1995 levels in 2050
Source: EEA (2007)
In contrast, youth bulges present a different set of issues. High numbers of young people entering an
economy’s workforce can fuel economic growth – if economic conditions and governance can provide the
jobs for them. Where they do not, one result will be migration (see above). Another potential result is social
and political instability: “very young and youthful age structures are most likely to undermine countries’
development and security”, as large numbers of unemployed and disaffected young men are lured by
revolutionary or extremist movements (PAI). A study for the US government refers to an “arc of instability” in
the northern Andes, Sub-Saharan Africa, the Middle East and the Caucasus, and nearby regions of Asia
(NIC 2009).
Ageing populations thus are likely to prompt technology developments for their health care, in particular from
the Rise of nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (shifts in population composition: aging
and youth bulges). A key area for research will be technologies to manage problems such as mobility and
other needs for care (see the sheet for the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies).
In terms of environmental drivers and megatrends, ageing populations as in Europe may be more vulnerable
to suffer health problems arising from climate change (EEA, 2007 – Glimpses): a particular risk can arise
from heat waves, which are expected to be more frequent in coming decades due to climate change (see
ENV3). In 2003, a major heatwave is linked to the deaths of thousands of elderly in northwestern Europe
(BBC 2007).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
47
Table 15: Important areas of uncertainty associated with megatrend S1. Shifts in population
composition
Fertility rates in different areas of the world
Child health and mortality in fast-growing regions of the world
Life expectancy in different parts of the world
Migrations between ageing and youthful parts of the world
Links between ageing and the economy
Technology development to assist ageing
As this megatrend and S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) are so closely
linked, they share many of the same uncertainties. One of the key ones is related to future fertility patterns:
see the previous sheet for a description of these uncertainties.
Ageing will also be influenced by changes in mortality rates. Here too, the uncertainties related to other
megatrends are important – in particular those related to S5 (Increasing life expectancy) and S6 (changing
patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics). Pandemics represent a wild card that could
disrupt demographic trends in coming decades.
Uncertainties related to Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles (T1) and to The rise
of the nano‐, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies) will also influence ageing: an example of these uncertainties is seen in the health
scenarios for the OECD Biotechnology Project. The “rapid change” scenario sees major advances in health
care, including for the elderly, unlike the alternative, “muddling through”, scenario (see the box in the rise of
the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies for further details)
The links between ageing and economic growth have been questioned by some analysts, and thus the costs
may be smaller than predicted in studies such as DG ECFIN (2009). Current retirement ages in Europe, for
example, are based on the shorter life spans several decades ago. While raising these has not been
popular, many people remain active and can contribute to the economy until late in life: in the UK, for
example, only 3% of the population over 65 is currently in care homes. A new vision of ageing – helped
technologies to improve their quality of life– may greatly reduce the costs and increase benefits from this
megatrend (Pearce, 2010).
Youth bulges are a reflection of high fertility rates, and they are also closely influenced by child mortality
levels: uncertainties in these two factors will affect the future pattern of youth bulges. As described above
and for S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), other megatrends will closely
influence these factors – such as the patterns of disease (changing patterns of disease burden) – and thus
many of the uncertainties related to youth bulges arise from these interlinkages.
Table 16: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S2. Shifts in population
composition
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
48
In terms of scoring, this megatrend has many links with others, starting with shift in population size: increase,
decline and rising migration.
The uncertainties are scored as low: here, nearly all of the uncertainties for this megatrend arise from
linkages with other megatrends (this is in contrast with shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration, which includes migration patterns, perhaps the most uncertain element of demographic trends).
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe:
Table 17: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S2. Shifts in population
composition
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population
will increase pressures on the environment.
Indirect
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of
migrants are a possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing
common environment issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea.
Indirect
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available
for the environment
Indirect
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high
demand for passenger vehicle transport and also air travel
Indirect
Climate change
Pollutin/health
Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to longterm issues, and thus also to environmental concerns
Indirect
Climate change
Pollution/health
49
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely impacts; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
One important impact from youth bulges will arise due to the increased pressures on migration to Europe.
This could have a series of direct effects on the environment, as it will increase consumption and related
resource use.
Youth bulges may also lead to greater conflict, which can result in unexpected waves of refugees as well as
less attention to global and regional environmental problems.
Ageing and declining populations in Europe will increase pressures on government budgets for health and
pensions, as noted above: thus, European governments may have fewer resources available for
environmental protection.
At the same time, ageing may have positive a positive influence on Europe’s environment. On the one hand,
this may encourage a reduction in direct environmental effects such as those arising from high motor vehicle
use. Another effect may be growing awareness, demands and needs for a cleaner environment (Pearce
2010). These positive effects may be seen at global scale especially in the longer period (e.g. after 2030, as
population declines and ages in China, a possible global demographic turning point).
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the effects on Europe as well as the
uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as
well as uncertainties with the likely effects themselves.
Table 18: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S2. Shifts in
population composition
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

+

 -/+

Biodiversity and nature
+

 -/+

Natural resource use
+

 -/+

Climate change
Pollution and health
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
In general, this megatrend is seen as having low direct consequences on the environment in Europe: these
would arise mainly from the lower consumption patterns of an elderly population.
The indirect consequences on Europe’s environment also appear to be weak; the exception is climate
change, where the health effects of climate change on an ageing population may be important.
While this megatrend is not seen as relatively less important than others from an environmental perspective,
it should be noted that the other consequences on Europe – in social, economic and political terms, for
example – could be quite significant.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
50
Ageing populations around the world – including in Latin America and East Asia – may have greater
awareness of environmental issues and greater desires and needs for environmental protection; in the longterm this could lead to stronger global action (Pearce, 2010).
In contrast, youth bulges are, as noted above, seen as closely connected with social unrest, instability and
conflict. Major youth bulges are seen in several areas of instability, including Gaza and the West Bank,
Yemen, Pakistan and Afghanistan (NIC 2008). This trend is thus likely to be an important factor in security
issues in coming decades.
Reference
The analysis presented here in particular used the following background document:
Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the European
state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Demographics and
Migration, Final Draft, April 2010
Other references include:
BBC (2007) Europe bakes in summer heatwave. Online, accessed 05 08 10
http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/6915157.stm
European Commission (DG ECFIN), The 2009 Ageing report – Economic and budgetary projections for the
27 Member States, 2009
European Commission (EC 2010), Europe 2020: European strategy for smart, sustainable and inclusive
growth
EEA (2007), The pan-European environment: glimpses into an uncertain future
US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 2008
Pearce F. (2010), Peoplequake: Mass Migration, Ageing Nations and the Coming Population Crash
Population Action International (2007), The Shape of Things to Come
51
S3: GLOBAL URBANISATION
Summary of the megatrend
For the first time in history more than 50 % of the world’s population, or approximately 3.5 billion, live in
urban areas. By 2050, about 70 % of the global population could be urban, compared with less than 30 % in
1950, according to the UN (medium fertility global population growth scenario), indicating a significant
departure from the spatial distribution of population growth over the past. The urban areas of the world are
expected to absorb literally all the population growth over the next four decades while at the same time
drawing in some of the rural population. Of particular relevance is Asia, which is estimated to host more than
50 % of the global urban population by 2050. Urban populations are expected to generally move away from
the largest settlements in the future, favoring small‐ to medium‐sized cities instead. While growth of urban
areas is expected to continue its rate of increase is expected to slow down in the future. Many developing
countries might not have reached the same level of urban density as the now developed countries by 2050.
Yet the speed and scope of the urban transition in many developing countries is far greater today than it
used to be one century and more ago in the now developed world. Importantly, the proportion of the urban
poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of urban population growth.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is linked to ENV2 (Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load) as urbanisation
can exacerbate and concentrate environmental pollutants, e.g. air pollutants. Emissions of air pollutants in
densely populated areas tend to higher than surrounding areas due to the total level of emission-related
activity, even though per capita emissions are reduced by higher efficiency and shorter travel distances
using personal transport (Figure 6). Urban areas concentrate energy demands for transport, heating,
cooking, air conditioning, lighting and housing. In combination with low dispersion conditions (such as tall
buildings blocking the flow of air currents), this results in the exposure of large populations to poor air quality
(UNEP 2007). Although pollutant levels in cities in developing countries have been decreasing due to
controls on emission sources, changing fuel use patterns, and closures of obsolete industrial facilities (UNEP
2007), in many large cities in developing countries air pollution concentrations are high, especially for PM10
(Figure 7). For example, levels of PM10, SO2 and NO2 are above WHO guidelines (WHO 2006) in a number
of cities, and differences are considerable in different regions (UNEP 2007). Megacities 7 are becoming
increasingly important as sources of regional and global air pollution from associated mobile and stationary
sources (Akimoto 2003).
7
A megacity is a metropolitan area with over 10 million inhabitants
52
Figure 6: Activity intensity versus per capita personal car use in 58 higher income metropolitan areas
around the world
Note: Activity intensity is defined as the number of jobs plus the number of people per urban hectare
Source: UNEP (2007)
53
Figure 7: Trends in average annual urban concentrations of pollutants (g/m3) in selected cities
worldwide
Source: UNEP (2007)
Increasing global urbanisation is also linked to ENV1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources). Urban areas,
due to their scale (which will increase significantly to 2050) drive environmental change globally, regionally
and locally (Grimm et al. 2008). The material demands of production and human consumption
(predominately associated with the global consumer class located in urban areas) alter land use and cover,
biodiversity and hydrosystems, and urban waste discharge affects local to global biogeochemical cycles and
climate (Grimm et al. 2008). Urbanisation is also linked to ENV3 (Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change), as cities worldwide consume between 60 and 80% of global energy production, and as
such are primary contributors to CO2 emissions (OECD 2010). In China today the 600 million urban
residents constitute 44% of the country’s population and 17% of the urban population, yet consume 75% of
total national energy demand (OECD 2010). Thus urban areas in China are responsible for generating the
majority of the country’s GHG emissions, which is now the second largest contributor to global warming.
This interlinkage is likely to increase as projections indicate that the urban population will reach 900 million in
2030, and as such the contribution of urban areas in China to global warming is likely to increase over the
54
long-term (OECD 2010). As well as being drivers of environmental change, urban areas are also influenced
by environmental change. Climate change also poses a significant risk to cities’ development and
competiveness, as rising coastal waters, more severe storms and urban heat island effects threaten to
damage infrastructure, reduce efficiency and exacerbate urban poverty (OECD 2010).
Increasing global urbanisation is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) and S4 (emergence of a global
middle-income consumer class). Figure 8 highlights the relationship between increasing GDP and ecological
impact. The global consumer class is already estimated at 2 billion people and growing rapidly; urban areas
are expected to absorb all of the growth in the world’s population, as well as draw away part of the existing
rural population (UN 2010). Increasing incomes lift people out of poverty and enable them to spend on nonessential items. This is fuelled by urbanisation as millions of people move from rural to urban areas and
earn middle-class wages. The result is massive increases in levels of consumption, which are unsustainable
(Worldwatch Institute 2004). This growth in consumption is concentrated in cities as they provide higher
income jobs, as well as great access to goods, services and facilities. Cities generate the majority of wealth
and are places where people expect a better quality of life, often defined in terms of the consumption of
material goods. Urbanisation is driven by the structure of the global economy, as the economies of
developed countries increasing rely on services, with the manufacturing of the goods they consume shifted
to developing countries. The location of production in developing countries triggers significant increases in
urbanisation in developing countries, which in turn stimulates increasing incomes and consumption in these
developing countries. As global economic growth increases, so too does urbanisation, driving and being
driven by consumption of goods and services.
This megatrend is also linked to T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles), as
cities are core areas for GDP growth, and their concentration of production and capital means that they bring
together researchers and entrepreneurs and markets, a combination that spurs technology development (UN
2009). The growing megacities of Asia are thus likely to become new centres of technology development in
coming decades and will contribute to its acceleration. There are also links to between S3 (global
urbanisation) and T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) as
technological developments in these areas could provide methods to address the problems of these huge
urban areas. For example, nanotechnology may weight savings that could potentially reduce emissions of
greenhouse gases could be reduced (Hett, cited in Biois).
Figure 8: Economy and environment, 1961 – 2003
Source: OECD (2008)
55
Global urbanisation is also linked to S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics) as urban populations often have better access to factors important for good health, e.g.
education, but conversely, non-infectious disease associated with rising incomes may become more
significant. There are also links to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an
unequal world). In recent past rural settlements were usually the principle location of poverty and human
suffering, with all measures of poverty (either based on income, consumption or expenditure) demonstrating
that rural poverty was deeper and more widespread than cities (Kessides 2006). Urban centres offered
better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA
2007). However poverty is now increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and hundreds of
millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are
predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). Slum dwellers (in 2006) include one out of every three
city dwellers on the planet, totalling a billion people or a sixth of the world’s population (UN-Habitat 2007).
Over 90% of slum dwellers today are in the developing world; South Asia has the largest share, followed by
Eastern Asia, sub-Saharan Africa and Latin America, China and India together have 37% of the world’s
slums (UNFPA 2007). If no preventative or remedial action is taken, slums may come to characterise cities
in many parts of the developing world, where slum formation has become synonymous with slum formation
(UN-Habitat 2007). Slum and urban growth rates in 2005 are presented by region in Figure 9.
Figure 9: Urban and slum growth rates by region
Note: % slum indicates the proportion of the urban population living in slums; 2005 figures are projections.
Source: UN-HABITAT 2005, Global Urban Observatory, Urban Indicators Programme, Phase III, in UN-Habitat (2007) State of the
World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future.
The urban poor have significantly worse health compared to other city dwellers, with poor women at
particular disadvantage (Montgomery 2005). Income poverty is only one income of urban poverty, as urban
slums are characterised by poor-quality and overcrowded shelter, lack of public services and infrastructure
such as piped water, sanitation facilities, garbage collection, drainage and roads as well as insecure land
tenure (UNFPA 2007). These factors increase health and work burdens of the urban slum dwellers and
increase risks from environmental hazards and crime; poor people in urban areas live in unhealthy
environments (UNFPA 2007). Health risks arise from poor sanitation, lack of clean water, overcrowded and
poorly ventilated living and working environments and from air and industrial pollution (UNFPA 2007).
Inadequate diet reduces slum-dwellers’ resistance to disease, especially because they live in the constant
presence of pathogenic micro-organisms (Bartone 2001).
56
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 19: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S3: Global urbanisation
Fertility rates
Wildcard: climate change
Projections related to global urbanisation are relatively certain, influenced mainly by global population growth
(UN 2010). Projections of global urbanisation growth depend on the continuation of fertility reductions in the
developing world. If fertility were to remain constant at current (2009) levels and the pace of urbanisation
remained as projected by the UN, the world urban population would increase to 7.6 billion by 2050 instead of
the 6.3 billion expected when fertility is assumed to continue declining in all developing regions (UN 2010).
In many countries, natural increase (the difference of births minus deaths) accounts for 60% (or more) or
urban population growth. Thus if policies to facilitate the reduction of fertility (e.g. improving access to
contraception) were successful, it could reduce the rate of urban population growth in many developing
countries (UN 2010).
There is also significant uncertainty related to climate change. There is a plausible risk that low levels of
temperature change (e.g. 1.5ºC above pre-industrial levels) that could raise sea levels by as much as 7
metres over centuries to come (due to melting of ice sheets), which would flood many of the world’s existing
coastal cities (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009). However, there are large uncertainties about the prediction of such
extreme or catastrophic events, which prevents explicit quantification of their probabilities.
Table 20: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S3: Global urbanisation
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends
Scale of uncertainties


Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe:
Table 21: Likely environmental effects on Europe related to megatrend S3: Global urbanisation
Likely effects on Europe’s environment to 2050
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




57
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products
Indirect
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Hemispheric air pollution
Direct
Pollution/health
Emissions of greenhouses gases
Indirect
Climate change
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
Global urbanisation is expected to have few direct effects for Europe’s environment, limited to a potential
increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe (Akimoto 2003, UN 2007). This hemispheric air pollution
could have a negative effect on climate and agriculture in Europe.
The potential indirect consequences to climate change, pollution, biodiversity and resource use are closely
associated with changing consumption patterns and an increase in demand for global resources. Global
urbanisation is associated with rising incomes, which is likely to increase global resource consumption, and
this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural
and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production. The
OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook (2010) predicts that agricultural production will increase in European
countries to 2019. This could have negative consequences for biodiversity in Europe, for example by
increasing the amount of intensively farmed agricultural land in Europe.
Urbanisation is projected to lead to significant increases in GHG emissions, most significantly in China where
increases are expected to be largest (OECD 2010). In India and China, where urban growth is projected to
be greatest, aging is likely to lead to a decrease in projected emissions. However recent projections have
indicated that the net effect of demographic change and urbanisation is to increase projected emissions from
China by 45% by the end of the century, and from India by 25-55% (Dalton et al. 2008).
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole –
described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Figure 10: Net agricultural production for selected countries (index 2004 – 2006=100)
Source: OECD-FAO (2010)
58
Table 22: Scoring the likely effects related to megatrend S3. Global urbanisation
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Natural resource use
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
+

+

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
+

n.a.
n.a.
+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Overall, the strength of the direct effects of this megatrend to Europe’s environment are relatively low, and
are related to hemispheric air pollution. The scale of hemispheric pollution in 2050, due to increasing global
urbanisation, is difficult to predict accurately the uncertainty is predicted as medium.
In contrast, the strength of the indirect effects to Europe’s environment are stronger, but more uncertain. It is
difficult to identify the precise effect of global urbanisation on climate change as it is closely associated with
increasing incomes and consumption. For this reason it is scored as likely to have a weak effect, as it is
working in concert with increasing incomes. The link between urbanisation and increasing GHG emissions
is well established (see above), and thus uncertainty is scored as low.
The strength of the effect to Europe’s biodiversity is scored as low as demand for agricultural and forestry
products due to directly to global urbanisation is likely to be low; rising incomes linked to urbanisation is likely
to be more significant. The FAO projections of increasing agricultural demand in Europe only extend to
2019, so the effect to 2050 is predicted as having high uncertainty.
The scale of predicted global urbanisation is large, but excluding the associated rise in incomes, is likely to
only have a weak effect on natural resource use in Europe. Uncertainty is medium as, although projections
on the scale of the increase in global urbanisation are relatively certain, the knock-on effects on natural
resource use are less certain, but still likely.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
As the proportion of the urban poor is rising faster in many developing countries than the overall rate of
urban population growth (often outstripping the capacity of cities to provide basic services), it is projected
that a significant proportion of the global urban population will reside in urban slums, with insufficient
sanitation systems. This could pose significant risks to health, both in the urban slums, and due to an
increasingly inter-connected and inter-dependent globalised world, to other areas. The re-emergence of
infectious diseases which have been successfully eradicated (or significantly reduced) in Europe due to links
to disease ‘hot-spots’ could pose governance issues related to migration and disease control in Europe.
These issues may be particularly acute due to the potential increase of migration to Europe associated with
an aging and declining population.
References
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
59
Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the european
state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Urbanisation and
Consumption, Final Draft, April 2010
Additional resources used include;
Akimoto, H. (2003) Global Air Quality and Pollution Science 302:1716
Bartone, C. R. 2001. “Urban Environmental Management and the Poor.” Environmental Strategy Background
Paper, Urban Development, Infrastructure Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Corfee-Morlot, Jan, Lamia Kamal-Chaoui, Michael G. Donovan, Ian Cochran, Alexis Robert and PierreJonathan Teasdale (2009), “Cities, Climate Change and Multilevel Governance”, OECD Environmental
Working Papers N° 14, 2009, OECD publishing, © OECD.
Dalton, M., Jiang, L., Pachauri, S., O’Neill, B. (2008) Demographic Change and Future Carbon Emissions in
China and India. May 23, 2008 Draft [Update of March 16, 2007, draft presented at the Population
Association of America Annual Meeting, New York, NY, 2007]
Grimm, N., Faeth, S., Golubiewski, N,. Redman, C,. Wu, J., Bai, X,. and Briggs, J. (2008) Global Change and
the Ecology of Cities. Science 8: Vol. 319. no. 5864, pp. 756 – 760
Kessides, C. 2006. The Urban Transition in Sub-Saharan Africa: Implications for Economic Growth and
Poverty Reduction. Africa Region Working Paper Series. No. 97. Washington, D. C.: Cities Alliance.
Montgomery, M. 2005. “The Place of the Urban Poor in the Cairo Programme of Action and the Millennium
Development Goals,” p. XXIV-5. Ch. 24 in: United Nations Seminar on the Relevance of Population Aspects
for the Achievement of the Millennium Development Goals: New York: 17-19 November 2004
(ESA/P/WP.192), by the United Nations. 2005a. New York: Population Division, Department of Economic
and Social Affairs, United Nations.
OECD-FAO (2010) Agricultural Outlook 2010 – 2019
OECD (2010) Trends in Urbanisation and Urban Policies in OECD Countries: What Lessons for China?
OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030
UN (2007) HEMISPHERIC TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION 2007 AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No. 16
United Nations, Department of Economic and Social Affairs, Population Division (2010) World Urbanization
Prospects, the 2009 Revision,
UNEP (2007) Global Environmental Outlook 4
UN-Habitat. (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006/7: The Millennium Development Goals and Urban
Sustainability, p. 16. London: Earthscan
UN-Habitat State of the World’s (2007) Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future.
UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth
WHO (2006) WHO Air quality guidelines for particulate matter, ozone, nitrogen dioxide and sulfur dioxide.
Global update 2005: Summary of risk assessment
Worldwatch Institute 2004: State of the World 2004: the Consumer Society
60
8.3
S4: THE EMERGING GLOBAL MIDDLE-INCOME CONSUMER CLASS
Summary of the megatrend
Global economic growth and trade integration have fuelled long‐term shifts in international competitiveness,
characterised by a high growth of productivity and rising incomes in emerging economies. Global consumer
demand had been concentrated in the OECD countries so far. The number of middle‐income consumers is
growing rapidly, particularly in Asia. According to a World Bank study, there could be 1.2 billion ‘middle class’
people in the now‐developing world by 2030. Average income is expected to be much lower in the emerging
economies in 2050 than in the G7‐ states now. Yet the total purchasing power of middle‐income economies
and middle‐income people is growing strikingly and this is likely to continue, fuelled by a steep increase in
Asian demand. The focus of spending in many of the emerging economies continues to change from basic to
more discretionary goods. Many parts of these populations are approaching "well to do lifestyles"
and disposable income is spent, as in “Western“ societies, on high nutrient food, cars, household appliances,
personal care products and other quality services. Large‐scale consumer markets are emerging which can
fuel future resource demand. Brazil, Russia, India and China together could match the G7 share of global
GDP by 2040‐2050. Importantly, the benefits of economic growth are not distributed evenly across
populations. Relative poverty will persist and might even become more acute.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
The emergence of a global middle-income consumer class is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth)
and S3 (global urbanisation). The global consumer class is already estimated at almost 2 billion people and
is growing rapidly, potentially increasing to 3.2 billion by 2020 and to 4.9 billion by 2030; 85% of this growth
will come from Asia (Kharas 2010, Figure 11). Thus this megatrend is linked to EC3 (power shifts – from a
uni-polar to multi-polar world) as the growth of the middle-income class and the associated increase in
wealth in China and India will influence these countries global influence.
This increase in the global middle-income class is fuelled by urbanisation as millions of people move from
rural areas and earn higher incomes (OECD 2010). Urbanisation in developing countries is increased by the
relocation of manufacturing from developed countries (Kharas 2010). As global economic growth increases,
so too does urbanisation, driving and being driven by consumption of goods and services. As people’s
income’s increase they have more money available for spending on discretionary items, leading to increases
in consumption (Worldwatch Institute 2004). History has shown that increases in consumption expenditures
per person have been more important in increasing consumption compared to growth in global population;
while consumption spending increased six-fold from $4.9 trillion in 1960 (in 2008 dollars) to $30.5 trillion in
2006, human numbers only grew by a factor of 2.2, and hence consumption expenditures per person almost
tripled (Worldwatch Institute 2010). Thus projected increases in GDP, and incomes, in Asia are likely to
result in a significant increase in the consumption of goods and services. Globally, the demand from the
middle class may grow from USD21 trillion to USD56 trillion by 2030, with over 80% of this growth in demand
coming from Asia (Kharas 2010). China is already emerging as the world’s most important consumer
market, e.g. in 2000 the US accounted for 37% of global car sales, while China accounted for under 1% - in
2010 China is expected to account for 13%, including bus and truck vehicle sales, China is already one of
the most largest vehicle markets in the world (Kharas 2010). This increase in consumption will be focused in
rapidly growing Asian cities, as urban areas are expected to absorb the majority of population increases to
2050 (UN 2010), and incomes are typically higher in urban areas (OECD 2010).
61
Figure 11: Numbers (millions) and Share (percent) of the Global Middle Class
Source: Kharas (2010)
As emerging economies develop and stimulate domestic demand and consumption, subsequent increases in
resource demand will intensify competition for global resources (Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment). It has been argued that it is a “new consumerism” that defines the
middle-class: a constant “upscaling of lifestyle norms; the pervasiveness of conspicuous, status goods and
of competition for acquiring them; and the growing disconnect between consumers desires and incomes”
(Schor 1999 in Kharas 2010). If this is the case, as the numbers of people in the middle-income class
increases, and their demand for goods increase, then increased resources will be required.
There are also links to ENV1 (decreasing stocks of natural resources) and ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable
pollution load). The scale of the increase in the global middle-income class and the consequent rise in
consumption (linked to rising incomes and urbanisation) is likely to increase resource use and pollution. The
material demands of production and human consumption (predominately associated with the global
consumer class located in urban areas) alter land use and cover, biodiversity and hydrosystems, and urban
waste discharge affects local to global biogeochemical cycles and climate (Grimm et al. 2008). For example,
urban areas (where the majority of the global middle-income class will be located) are associated with higher
air pollution than surrounding areas due to the total level of emission-related activity, even though per capita
emissions are reduced by higher efficiency and shorter travel distances using personal transport (UNEP
2007). Figure 12 highlights the relationship between increasing GDP and ecological impact.
Figure 12: Economy and environment, 1961 – 2003
Source: OECD (2008)
62
This megatrend is also linked to ENV3 (Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) as the
rise of the global middle-income class and associated increase in consumption the key drivers of the
projected increase in GHG emissions, especially in emerging economies (e.g. China and are set to overrun
any efficiency gains from technological developments (e.g. Guan et al. 2008)).
The rise of the global middle-income consumer class is linked to S5 (increasing life expectancy; growing old
and seeking youth in an unequal world). Although the numbers of the middle-income class will increase in
urban areas, inequality is likely to persist as the numbers of urban-poor are also expected to increase
(UNFPA 2007). Slum dwellers (in 2006) include one out of every three city dwellers on the planet, totalling a
billion people or a sixth of the world’s population (UN-Habitat 2007). If no preventative or remedial action is
taken, slums may come to characterise cities in many parts of the developing world, where urban growth has
become synonymous with slum formation (UN-Habitat 2007, Figure 13).
Figure 13: Urban and slum growth rates by region
Note: % slum indicates the proportion of the urban population living in slums; 2005 figures are projections.
Source: UN-HABITAT 2005, Global Urban Observatory, Urban Indicators Programme, Phase III, in UN-Habitat (2007) State of the
World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future.
A larger middle-income class is also linked to S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of
new pandemics). As incomes and urbanisation increase, healthcare is likely to become more affordable and
accessible, reducing the burden of infectious disease. Urban centres offered better access to health,
education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007). However rising
incomes of the global middle-income class may result in an increase in the non-infectious disease burden
(e.g. obesity, diabetes, heart disease) (WHO 2009).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
63
Table 23: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S4: the emerging global middle-income consumer
class
Economic growth
Domestic demand in Asia
Transition of power
The levels of economic growth, which are inextricably linked to the emergence of the global middle-income
class, are uncertain. Projections related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on
assumptions of continued economic growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic
failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030 provides an illustration of implications of
different assumptions for growth rates by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from
other time periods. For stronger growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a
longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new
economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for
India’s almost 40%.
To sustain the increase in the numbers of middle-class in China (where the majority of the increase in
middle-class will be), domestic demand will have to increase if exports decrease. However, due to China’s
unequal income distribution and the small current share of its middle class, it is not certain at all that this will
happen (Kharas 2010). Policies required to rebalance growth in China towards domestic demand involve
long-term institutional changes such as the creation of a social safety net, medical insurance schemes, and
better public education services. If these changes are not implemented then the growth of domestic demand
could be suppressed, and the Chinese economy could fail to grow beyond middle-income levels even after
decades of strong performance.
There are uncertainties in how the world will manage shifting relative economic power towards Asia. The
projections discussed above are based on a scenario that assumes any frictions will be managed, but if the
domestic politics of the major economies are not robust enough to adjust to the major structural shifts
envisaged then the increases could be reduced (the extent of this potential reduction is not discussed in the
literature.
Table 24: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S4: the emerging global
middle-income consumer class
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends
Scale of uncertainties


Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe:
64
Table 25: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S4: the emerging global
middle-income consumer class
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products
Indirect
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Indirect
Increased climate change impacts in Europe
Biodiversity/nature
Climate change
Pollution/health
Direct
Increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe
Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe
Indirect
Pollution/health
Pollution/health
Resources/waste
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
Direct consequences to Europe’s environment are relatively limited, and are likely to be related to a
decrease in European air quality due to an increase in hemispheric air pollution (Akimoto 2003).
Indirect consequences are more likely, and are closely related to a rise in demand for global resources. This
may result in an increase in the exploitation of European resources (agriculture, forestry, mineral, fuel) with
potential negative consequences for pollution and health as well as biodiversity.
An increasing global middle-income consumer class will increase resource consumption around the world,
and this in turn can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its
agricultural and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive
production. The OECD-FAO Agriculture Outlook (2010) predicts that agricultural production will increase in
European countries to 2019. This could have negative consequences for biodiversity in Europe, for example
by increasing the amount of intensively farmed agricultural land in Europe.
Increasing demand and resource use as a result of an increasing global middle-income consumer class will
also increase global environmental pressures such as climate change (due to increased emissions of
greenhouse gases). Increasing resource use, particularly fossil fuels, due to the rise of the global-middle
class is likely to lead to increase to climate change across the world, the consequences of which will also be
experienced in Europe, with negative effects to biodiversity and health likely.
Increasing prices of natural resources due to increased competition is likely to encourage the exploitation of
Europe’s mineral and fuel resources, which could lead to increased pollution and health effects.
65
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole –
described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 26: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S4: the emerging
global middle-income consumer class
Direct
Indirect
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Contribution
Uncertainty
Contribution
Uncertainty
Climate change
n.a.
n.a.
+

Pollution and health
+

n.a.
n.a.
Biodiversity and nature
n.a.
n.a.
+

Resource and waste
n.a.
n.a.
+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Increases in energy demand associated with increasing incomes is predicted to contribute significantly to
increases in climate change, and this megatrend is scored as likely to have a strong effect, which is relatively
certain due to the likelihood of the projections around the extent of the increase in the global middle-income
class.
The strength of the direct effects of this megatrend to Europe’s environment are low, and are related to
hemispheric air pollution. The scale of hemispheric pollution in 2050, due to the emerging middle-income
class, is difficult to predict accurately but it is likely that it will increase (UN 2007, Akimoto 2003). For this
reason the strength of the effect and the uncertainty is predicted as medium.
The strength of the effect to Europe’s biodiversity is scored as medium as the emergence of the global
middle-income class is likely to be so large that demand for agricultural and forestry products is likely to
increase. However the available projections from the FAO of increasing agricultural demand in Europe only
extend to 2019, so the effect to 2050 is predicted as having high uncertainty.
The emergence of the global middle-income class, and subsequent increase in consumption, is likely to only
have a medium effect on natural resource use in Europe. Uncertainty is medium as, although projections on
the scale of the increase in are relatively certain, the knock-on effects on natural resource use are less
certain, but still likely.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
National economic policies can play a role in favouring domestic consumption as a stimulus for growth. At
the same time, new middle-class consumers are also likely to demand better “public goods” such as
education and healthcare – as well as better environmental conditions such as air quality. Initially these
concerns of the new middle-income class may be related to improving local environmental issues, but their
concerns could eventually extend to climate change and result in policies to reduce their contribution to it.
Success in reducing the contribution of the gobal middle-income class to climate change would benefit
Europe too. Over decades their concerns could extend to other global issues such as biodiversity.
As globalisation moves towards the growth of consumerism, the middle-classes of Asia, North America and
Europe may find increasingly share common cultural and political ideals. While this idea might sound like a
simplified presentation of Fukuyama’s End of History, now often discredited, it should not be discounted as
global communication brings the “Internet classes” closer together. Conflicts that could also arise from
regions of the world and segments of the population bypassed by growth and middle-class comforts – and
who see in their cities or on TV the lifestyles of the fortunate.
66
References
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
Bio Intelligence Service, general support to the forward-looking assessment component of the european
state of the environment and outlook report (SOER 2010 PART A): Background Paper on Urbanisation and
Consumption, Final Draft, April 2010
Additional resources include:
Akimoto, H. (2003) Global Air Quality and Pollution Science 302:1716
Grimm, N., Faeth, S., Golubiewski, N,. Redman, C,. Wu, J., Bai, X,. and Briggs, J. (2008) Global Change and
the Ecology of Cities. Science 8: Vol. 319. no. 5864, pp. 756 – 760
Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working
paper No. 285
OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030
OECD-FAO (2010) Agricultural Outlook 2010 – 2019
UN (2007) HEMISPHERIC TRANSPORT OF AIR POLLUTION 2007 AIR POLLUTION STUDIES No. 16
UNEP (2007) Global Environmental Outlook 4
UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth
UN-Habitat (2007) State of the World’s Cities 2006-07, background paper; Slums: past, present and future.
WHO (2009) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks
67
8.4
S5: INCREASING LIFE EXPECTANCY: GROWING OLD AND SEEKING YOUTH IN AN
UNEQUAL WORLD
Summary of the megatrend
The population of the world is getting older. Older persons continue to contribute productively to society;
however, they are more likely to be susceptible to environmental pollution and hazards, e.g. air pollution,
heat waves and floods, and to higher rates of certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimer’s, Parkinson’s, heart disease,
cancers and arthritis. The trend of an ageing population is first seen in the developed countries. After 2020
these trends are expected to become increasingly important also in developing countries (e.g. South Central
Asia, South America and the Caribbean). By 2050, it is predicted that about 80% of the elderly could be
leaving in developing countries. In addition, population ageing is occurring in parallel with rapid urbanisation:
in 2007 more than half of the world’s population live cities, by 2030 this figure is expected to rise to more
than 60%. Technology and economic development continues enabling substantial improvements in
illness treatments, access to health care and support ability of people to live longer healthy lives. In the
long term, some technology optimists see radical changes in human enhancement and life
extension: increasing medical breakthroughs to counter ageing as well as ‘bionic’ interventions that
incorporate the use of nanotechnology. Such breakthroughs, if they do come along, are likely to be very
expensive and thus likely to be affordable mostly in rich countries – and even here, perhaps only for
the wealthiest part of the population. Thus health inequalities are becoming significant, both
between countries and within countries. However, in an optimistic scenario, the gains in access to health
care, drinking water and sanitation will continue, further improving health in what are now the
poorest countries of the world. This in turn depends on the absence of widespread conflict.
It is becoming more and more important to distinguish effects according to rich and poor and less on the
country bases. It is highly uncertain to which degree positive effects (longer healthier lives) will be
counter‐played by negative ones (increased inequalities, decreasing health for poorest, and spread of
diseases from hot spots. Additionally, development can be seen as a “double edged sword”. Apart from
providing benefits, easy access to high protein / high calorie foods, sedentary lifestyles, and the emergence
of status competition, can lead to physical and mental health problems (obesity, stress and the erosion of
community and traditional values and social support networks) also for the rich and middle class.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is linked to S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) as the
successful demographic transition from high to low fertility depends to a significant extent on improvements
in health (WHO 2002). A fall in child mortality results in a fall in fertility; with fewer children, parents are likely
to invest more in the education of each child, and rising life expectances mean that there is a longer time in
which to benefit from investments in education (WHO 2002). Thus this megatrend is also linked to EC1
(continued economic growth) as increasing life expectancies act to drive economic growth. Additional links
to EC1 (continued economic growth) arise as ill health may leave persons able to work, but reduce
productivity, shorten their working lives and increase the number of days lost to illness (World Bank 1993).
Healthier workers are less likely to be absent from work due to illness or illness in their family, especially
important in developing countries where a higher proportion of the workforce in engaged in manual labour
(WHO 2002). Economic growth can also lead to negative environmental effects that can have an adverse
effect on health; for example in many Chinese cities air quality is so poor that nationwide the costs of excess
morbidity and mortality for urban residents are estimated at 5% of GDP (OECD 2000).
This megatrend is linked to S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges). An older
population will have higher have higher rates of certain diseases, e.g. Alzheimers, Parkinsopn, heart
68
disease, cancers and arthritis (UN 2002), and are thus likely to require more health care. Persons with more
disposable income will seek therapies that can extent lifespans and good health in old age.
This megatrend is also linked to S3 (global urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer
class) and S6 (changing patterns of disease burden globally and risk of new pandemics) as urbanisation and
rising incomes increases access to healthcare (discussed in global urbanisation and the emerging global
middle-income consumer class). Increasing incomes of the global middle-income class are important in the
context of health inequality, as across the world, within and between countries, ill health disproportionately
afflicts poor people (WHO 2002). In poor countries income protects against poor sanitation, unhealthy
working and living environments, poor nutrition, and a plethora of infectious diseases, on the other hand, in
rich countries income inequality is an indicator of the quality of social arrangements, stress and mortality
(WHO 2002). Thus health is closely correlated with incomes, and as incomes increase (due to rise of
middle-income class) health is likely to improve in developing countries.
ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) is also linked to this megatrend. An older
global population may be more at risk of negative effects of climate change, e.g. increases in the frequency
and severity of heat waves. Some climate change impacts, such as increasingly severe and frequent heat
waves, are projected to be more pronounced in urban areas (IPCC 2007), and thus an increase in the
population of urban areas in terms of elderly people will increase exposure and consequence of climate
change impacts. Urban areas may also be particularly vulnerable to climate change impacts due to high
(and increasing) levels of inequality. Even in developed countries climate change may have an adverse
effect on the poor, which lack the resources to respond quickly and effectively to protect themselves from
extreme weather patterns (Mathew 2007, in OECD 2010). As the urban poor often occupy the least
expensive land, sometimes in illegal slum developments, that may be more exposed to climate change, for
example the un-developed floodplains of the Dharavi slums in Mumbai (Corfee-Morlot et al. 2009).
This megatrend is also linked to T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies),
as these technological advances may increase life expectancy; medical breakthroughs to alleviate the
problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among
the possibilities (Royal Society 2004) which may increase life expectancy. Some observers imagine a “posthuman” future coming – in time frames as early as 2050 – with our bodies are increasingly changed
voluntarily and integrated with machines (Bostrom 2009). New technologies are also important in reducing
health inequality in developing countries, for example in 2008 around 45% of the 1.4 million HIV-positive,
pregnant women in low- and middle-income countries received antiretroviral therapy to prevent the
transmission of HIV to their babies (WHO 2010)8.
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 27: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and
seeking youth in an unequal world
Economic growth projections
Governance of urbanisation
Evolution of health technologies
8
Although more than 4 million people in low- and middle-income countries were receiving ART by the end of 2008, there were more
than 5 million untreated HIV-positive people in these countries (WHO 2010).
69
Economic growth, and the associated rise in incomes and living standards, is a key uncertainty. Projections
related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on assumptions of continued economic
growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s
Environment Outlook to 2030 provides an illustration of implications of different assumptions for growth rates
by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods. For stronger
growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant
looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started. In all, the
resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%. Such variation
would have significantly different outcomes for health inequality and life expectancy in these countries.
As health inequality is linked to urbanisation, how urbanisation manifests itself is a key uncertainty which will
influence this megatrend. If the governance of urbanisation (in developing countries) is poorly managed and
leads to slum development, it is likely that health inequalities will persist and increase. Poverty is now
increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and hundreds of millions live in poverty in the
urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their numbers are predicted to increase in coming
years (UNFPA 2007). However, if urbanisation is well managed it offers the opportunity for improvements to
health by improving access to health services and increasing incomes; urban centres offer better access to
health, education, basic infrastructure, information, knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007).
It is impossible to predict how technological innovation will affect health, health inequality and life expectancy
to 2050. It is likely that the effect will be positive, but there exists the possibility that this positive effect may
not be evenly distributed, potentially increasing inequality. However, significant advances in the treatment of
the most significant global diseases (TB, malaria, mental illness and HIV/AIDS (WHO 2002)) could radically
reduce health inequality and increase life expectancy in developing countries.
Table 28: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S5: Increasing life
expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe:
Table 29: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend S5: Increasing life
expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
Likely effects for Europe’s environment to 2050
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




70
Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Increased contribution of older people to climate change
Indirect
Climate change
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
The effects on Europe’s environment from increasing life expectancy and global inequality are uncertain. An
older global population could potentially lead to increased GHG emissions as older people have been shown
to have slightly higher GHG emissions associated with their lifestyles than the average (SEI 2008, Figure
14). However this study was based on a sample of the population in England so any inference to the global
population to 2050 is highly uncertain.
The effects of this megatrend on the global and European environment are indirect – and moreover cannot
be clearly predicted. For example, ageing populations may be more concerned about the world’s future; they
may seek healthier lifestyles for themselves and support a more ‘sustainable’ global future. An opposing
view could emphasise the increased social and financial burden of care for the elderly could change how
societies and economies in Europe function: one result could be increased resource use and a reduction in
attention to the global environment.
The long-term prospect of human enhancement, such as medical advances to extend life spans, could bring
further uncertainties. Will such an opportunity distract policy makers and the wealthy from attention to the
‘real world’ and its environment?
Health care may improve in many parts of the world. However, a large share of the world’s population will
continue to face poor health care – as well as poor environmental conditions. Many of these people will live
in the growing mega-cities in developing countries. These places may become breeding grounds for social
unrest
Figure 14: Age related carbon-footprint
Source: SEI (2008)
71
Table 30: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend S5: Increasing life
expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
Direct
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
+

n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Natural resource use
Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, n.a. = not applicable
Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The strength of the direct effect to climate change is scored as weak as the potential increase in climate
change emissions from an older population is likely to be small in the context of the emissions associated
with the rise of the global middle-income class. Uncertainty is high the consumption patterns of older people
to 2050 are impossible to determine.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
Increasing global inequality may fuel conflict, particularly terrorism direct at developed countries. This may
increase security risks within Europe if European countries are seen to maintain, or at least not successfully
address, increasing inequality.
If health inequality is significant between and within countries, infectious diseases may become increasingly
common in poorer socio-economic groups. There is a risk that infectious disease could pass from these
groups to the wider population, and thus pose a significant health risk to the entire population. Europe may
be directly at threat of infectious diseases from beyond its borders, posing difficulties in designing an
appropriate response.
References
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
Milieu Consortium, Report on health related megatrends – identifying global health megatrends in support of
SOER 2010 Part A, Final Draft March 2010
Additional resources include:
Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology
and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010
Bostrom, Nick (2009) The Future of Humanity. Published in New Waves in Philosophy and Technology, eds.
Olsen et al, New York: Palgrave McMillan.
72
Corfee-Morlot, J., I. Cochran and P. Teasdale (2009), “Cities and Climate Change: Harnessing the Potential
for Local Action,” Competitive Cities and Climate Change, OECD, Paris, pp. 78.
IPCC (2007b), Climate Change 2007: Climate Change Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of
Working Group II to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, M.L.
Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson (eds.), Cambridge, UK and New
York, USA, Cambridge University Press.
Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working
paper No. 285
Mathew, R. A. (2007), “Climate Change and Human Security,” in: Climate Change: What It Means for Us,
Our Children, and Our Grandchildren, edited by J. F. C. DiMento and P. Doughman. Cambridge, MA: MIT
Press.
OECD (2000) Beyond Economic Growth; meeting the challenges of global development
Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties
SEI (2008) Growing old in a changing climate – meeting the challenges of an aging population and climate
change
UN (2010) World Urbanization Prospects, the 2009 Revision
UN (2002) World Population Aging: 1950 – 2050
UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth
WHO (2010) Millennium Development Goals: progress towards the health-related Millennium Development
Goals. Factsheet No. 290
WHO (2002) Health, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction: The Report of Working Group 1 of the
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
73
8.5
S6: CHANGING PATTERNS OF DISEASE BURDEN GLOBALLY, AND RISK OF NEW
PANDEMICS
Summary of the megatrend
There is a distinct difference in the disease burden between developed and developing
countries. Malnutrition and infectious diseases are dominant in the developing world, while obesity and
many non‐infectious diseases (cardiovascular, neurodegenerative, diabetes, respiratory, cancer, and
mental health) are dominant in the developed world. As countries develop, infectious diseases
generally become a less significant portion of the disease burden, being replaced by non‐infectious
diseases, often associated with lifestyle, consumption and ageing and they face the increase in the levels
of obesity, and other diseases associated with inactivity.
Changes in working, living and travel practices contribute to changing the global disease burden,
both between and within countries. Migration within and between countries is increasing as the
world becomes more globalised. These migrations increase the opportunity for diseases to spread
rapidly between populations, and may result in the re‐introduction of infectious diseases to areas where
they had been eradicated (or significantly reduced) from. For example, Tuberculosis (TB) has re‐emerged to
become more common in some developed countries where it had historically been reduced to extreme lows.
This increase in the incidence of TB has been linked to migrants from areas of high health inequality.
Migrations within countries (usually from rural to urban areas) have, resulted in increased risk from infectious
diseases, violence and drug dependence, particularly when they result in chaotic slum development.
Urbanisation, in the presence of good governance, may increase access to education, employment and
health services, reducing the disease burden of the population. In the absence of good governance
urbanisation is associated with increased burden of infectious diseases. Globalisation and the increase in
global mobility may also change the disease burden of developed countries. The effectiveness of
interventions such as airport screening, travel restrictions and other community mitigation measures remains
uncertain.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is linked to EC1 (continued economic growth) and S3 (global urbanisation), as it has been
shown that there is a distinct correlation between the patterns of disease burden and income levels (which
increase with urbanisation and economic growth). For high- and middle-income countries, the most
important risk factors are those associated with chronic diseases such as heart diseases and cancer, with
tobacco the leading cause for both (WHO 2009). In high-income countries alcohol, overweight and blood
pressure are also leading causes of healthy life years lost; each being responsible for 6 – 7% of the total
(WHO 2009). In middle-income countries, risks for chronic diseases also cause the largest share of deaths,
although risks such as unsafe sex and unsafe water and sanitation also cause a larger share of the disease
burden than high-income countries (WHO 2009).
In low-income countries, relatively few risks are
responsible for a large percentage of the high number of deaths and loss of healthy years, risks which
increase the incidence or severity of infectious disease (WHO 2009). The leading risk factor for low-income
countries is underweight, micronutrient deficiencies, and suboptimal breastfeeding, causing 10%, 7% and
10% respectively of the total disease burden (WHO 2009). Figure 15 ranks selected risk factors for low,
middle and high-income countries. The link between income levels and global pandemics such as AIDS is
complex and poorly understood. Within Africa evidence has shown a disproportionate effect on richer
countries, however within all other continents there is neither a positive nor a negative statistical association
between income levels and AIDS (WHO 2002).
74
Figure 15: Ranking of selected risk factors: 10 leading risk factor causes of death by income group,
2004
Note: Countries grouped by gross national income per capita – low income (US$ 825 or less), high income (US$ 10 066 or more).
Source: WHO (2009)
There are also links between this megatrend to S3 (global urbanisation) and S5 (increasing life expectancy;
growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world) as poverty is increasing rapidly in urban areas and
hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their
numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). People living in urban slums face
significant health risks, not just due to low incomes but also due to poor-quality and overcrowded shelter,
lack of public services and infrastructure such as piped water, sanitation facilities, garbage collection,
drainage and roads; which increase health and work burdens of the urban poor and increase their risks form
environmental hazards and crime (UNFPA 2007). Inadequate diet reduced slum-dwellers’ resistance to
disease, especially because they live in the constant presence of pathogenic micro-organisms (Bartone
2001).
Increasing global migration, as part of S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), is
linked to this megatrend. Increasing volumes of migration and rising population mobility, against a
background of health inequalities, increase the risk of the spread of disease between regions of the world as
the infectious disease threats of a single region can become international phenomena (IOM 2004). Migrants
from areas where diseases are more or less common than they are at their new destination come to
represent populations with higher or lower rates of these disease when compared to the host population
(IOM 2004). Thus global disparities in national capacity to manage some transmissible infectious disease
75
are significant and the prevalence of many serious infectious diseases in areas of the world where migrants
can originate can be hundreds of times greater than that observed in migrant receiving nations (IOM 2004).
This is highlighted by the fact that diseases such as tuberculosis, hepatitis, malaria and HI V are more
common in migrant communities than host populations (Gushalak and MacPherson 2000, PHAC 2003, IOM
2004). Increasing migration and global mobility may change the patterns of disease burden globally by
spreading diseases between global regions, but also potentially increasing the speed at which global
pandemics spread.
This megatrend is also linked to T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies)
as nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and other sectors of
medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers many
opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs (Biois). The integration of
these new technologies is likely to provide further advances. Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems
of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the
possibilities (Royal Society 2004).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 31: Uncertainties associated with megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally,
and risk of new pandemics
Rate of economic growth
Governance of urbanisation
Emergence of global pandemics
Economic growth, and the associated rise in incomes and living standards, is a key uncertainty. Projections
related to increases in the global middle-income consumer class rely on assumptions of continued economic
growth, and would not materialise if the reality was global economic failure (Kharas 2010). The OECD’s
Environment Outlook to 2030 (OECD 2008) provides an illustration of implications of different assumptions
for growth rates by taking average labour productivity and other economic factors from other time periods.
For stronger growth, 2000 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower growth, a longer historical trend; a
final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea that a new economic era has started.
In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%; those for India’s almost 40%; this
variation would have significantly different outcomes for the patterns of disease burden, with higher incomes
associated with a higher burden of non-infectious disease, and lower incomes a higher burden of infectious
diseases.
As the global patterns of disease burden are linked to urbanisation, how urbanisation manifests itself is a key
uncertainty which will influence this megatrend. If the governance of urbanisation (in developing countries) is
poorly managed and leads to slum development, it is likely that disease burden of infectious disease will
persist and increase. Poverty is now increasing more rapidly in urban areas than in rural areas, and
hundreds of millions live in poverty in the urban slums of low- and middle-income countries, and their
numbers are predicted to increase in coming years (UNFPA 2007). However, if urbanisation is well
managed it offers the opportunity for improvements to health by improving access to health services and
increasing incomes; urban centres offer better access to health, education, basic infrastructure, information,
knowledge and opportunity (UNFPA 2007), which may reduce the global burden of infectious disease.
The emergence of virulent global pandemics is highly uncertain to 2050, and the emergence of such
diseases would significantly change the global pattern of disease burden.
76
Table 32 below scores the likely links between this megatrend and others. Although this megatrend is
closely linked to several megatrends, it is influenced by, rather than influencing, them. Thus the
‘contribution’ score is low.
Table 32: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend S6: Changing patterns of
disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is not likely to have any consequences for Europe’s environment. A changing pattern of
disease burden globally and the risk of new pandemics may increase the consumption of novel and existing
pharmaceuticals, which could result in an increase in presence of pharmaceuticals in waste- and drinkingwater. For example steroid estrogens have been shown to be present in waste water, due to consumption of
oral contraceptives (Roswell et. Al 2003). Thus increasing consumption of pharmaceuticals could result in
global contamination of waste- and drinking-water. However the effects of such contamination are highly
uncertain, and it is unlikely that there would be any effects to Europe’s environment.
Table 33: Likely environmental effects related to megatrend S6: Changing patterns of disease burden
globally, and risk of new pandemics
Likely effects on Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
No effects on Europe’s environment likely
Table 34: Scoring the likely consequences on Europe related to megatrend S6: Changing patterns of
disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
Direct
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Climate change
Pollution and health
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
77
Biodiversity and nature
Natural resource use
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
Non-infectious diseases such as obesity, heart disease and cancer are expensive to treat, and increasing
prevalence of these diseases would result in more expensive public health systems. This may pose a
challenge to how healthcare is provided in Europe.
The link between migration and the incidence of infectious diseases in migrant populations may become
increasingly significant as Europe is projected to require increasing numbers of migrants over coming years
due to population decline. If perceptions of migrants change in Europe, and they are less welcome,
population decline may require a different policy response.
References
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
Milieu Consortium, Report on health related megatrends – identifying global health megatrends in support of
SOER 2010 Part A, Final Draft March 2010
Additional resources include:
Bartone, C. R. 2001. “Urban Environmental Management and the Poor.” Environmental Strategy Background
Paper, Urban Development, Infrastructure Group. Washington, D.C.: World Bank.
Gushulak BD, MacPherson DW. Population mobility and infectious diseases: The diminishing impact of
classical infectious diseases and new approaches for the 21st century. Clin Infect Dis 2000; 31: 776-780.
IOM (2004) Population Mobility, Migration Infectious Disease Outcomes. Seminar on Health and Migration,
9-11 June 2004. Session II A – Globalization of communicable diseases
Kharas (2010) The emerging middle-class in developing countries. OECD Development Centre, working
paper No. 285
OECD (2008) Environmental Outlook to 2030
PHAC (2003) Tuberculosis among the Foreign-born in Canada. Accessed online 03 08 10 http://www.phacaspc.gc.ca/publicat/ccdr-rmtc/03vol29/dr2902eb.html
Rowsell VF, Pang DS, Tsafou F, et al, Removal of steroid estrogens from wastewater using granular
activated carbon: comparison between virgin and reactivated carbon., Water Environ Res, 2009, Vol:81,
Pages:394-400, ISSN:1061-4303
UNFPA (2007) State of the World Population 2007: Unleashing the potential of urban growth
WHO (2009) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks
WHO (2002) Health, Economic Growth, and Poverty Reduction: The Report of Working Group 1 of the
Commission on Macroeconomics and Health
78
8.6
T1: GLOBAL ACCELERATION AND SHIFTS IN TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT CYCLES
Summary of the megatrend
Over the last fifty years, the pace of technological change in several economic sectors and technologies has
continuously accelerated, leading to increased pace of mass use of basic innovations and related societal
and economic changes. Competition pressure is rising as emerging economies start to challenge developed
countries in the core areas of their competitiveness advantages, namely high‐technology development. In
spite of persisting differences, many emerging economies are stepping up their general research and
innovation capacities. Growth rates in patent filings in Asian economies are beyond the level of many
developed economies (figure 2). Acceleration of technology development cycles is likely to continue and
might also concern those economic sectors that have been slower to change in the past, in particular energy
and transport. Moreover, the very nature and process of creating, owning and sharing knowledge (in and
beyond technologies) is changing in a highly inter‐linked world. In spite of all progress, a technology divide is
likely to remain between developed and many developing countries. Technology transfer and support is
likely to remain a critical issue in the decades to come, particularly in Europe's neighbourhood.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend will have close links with urbanisation (global urbanisation) and with health megatrends
(increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S5; changing patterns of
disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It is very closely linked to economic megatrends, in
particular continued economic growth (continued economic growth). And it will have important links to
environmental megatrends, in particular those related to climate change and natural resources. Of course,
this megatrend is also tightly linked with the other technology megatrend, Rise of the nano, bio, ict and
cognitive sciences and technologies (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and
technologies).
Technology development will have strong links with megatrends (increasing life expectancy; growing old and
seeking youth in an unequal world) and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new
pandemics. The acceleration and shifts in technology can help to reduce disease mortality and provide ways
of improving nutrition in food, thus improving overall health (CEP and Milieu, WHO 2009). The links with
health are most likely to arise from the rapid development of biotechnology and other parts of the “NBIC”
cluster. For example, nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and
other sectors of medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers
many opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs. (Biois) The integration
of these new technologies is likely to provide further advances. Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the
problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that incorporate nanotechnologies, are among
the possibilities (Royal Society 2004).
Technology is also likely to interact with urbanisation (global urbanisation): cities are the core areas for GDP
growth, and their concentration of production and capital means that they bring together researchers and
entrepreneurs and markets, a combination that spurs technology development (UN, 2009). The growing
megacities of Asia (Bios, 2010) are thus likely to become new centres of technology development in coming
decades and will contribute to its acceleration. Technology may also provide new methods to address the
problems of these huge urban areas. Urban areas can use new IT technologies to monitor pollution levels
and to manage problems such as traffic. For example, the UK study Intelligent Infrastructure 2055 presents a
scenario where IT technology transforms urban traffic to flow with greater efficiency – and this in turns allows
much greater mobility in cities.
79
Links with economic megatrends will also be close. On the one hand, economic growth (continued economic
growth) provides the financial means to pursue scientific and technological research. OECD countries as a
whole spend about 2.2% of GDP on research and development, while the average in the EU27 is slightly
lower, about 1.8% (OECD, 2010). Most developing countries have a much lower level, though research and
development has reached 1.5% of China’s GDP (World Bank data, 2010).
The link is important in the other direction as well, as innovation supports economic growth. In fact, in
advanced economies where the supply of labour and other factors of production remains constant (at least
as a theoretical model), technology becomes the main driver of economic growth (this relationship was
researched by Robert Solow, 1987 Nobel Prize winner in economies: see Nobel Prizes, 2010).
Over the past 50 years, technology has also reduced overall demand for sub-soil resources: the World Bank
estimates that global demand for metals and energy per unit of GDP has fallen by 0.9% and 0.8%,
respectively. Technology is one of the two main factors for this trend (the other being the shift to a service
economy). After 1995, metals intensity increased – due almost solely to China’s economy. The World Bank
(2009) expects the trend to resume in coming years, in particular as China’s economy shifts towards
services. This is a key link between this megatrend and EC2 intensified competition for resources.
The developments in the areas of nanotechnology in particular are expected to provide stronger and lighter
materials that will reduce relative demand for sub-soil resources – it is even possible that breakthroughs will
increase the decoupling seen in the past 50 years (Biois).
One important further consideration is that the power shift underway (power shifts – from a unipolar to a
multi-polar world EC3) has strengthened technology development outside of Europe and other OECD
countries. In coming decades, an increasing number of technology breakthroughs are likely to come from
emerging economies such as India and China. Notably, the developing countries of East Asia and the Pacific
spend about 1.5% of their GDP on research and development (China, the large country in this grouping, has
the same level); this is higher than any other region of the development world (World Bank Data, 2010).
The acceleration in technology will also have a series of close and direct interactions with environmental
megatrends (changing stocks of natural resources EN1; increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution
load ENV2 and increasing severity of the consequences of climate change EN3)
There is a link between this megatrend and ENV1 in that technology may help to preserve biodiversity and
natural resources: in the scenarios developed for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005), for
example, the “Technogarden” scenario foresees environmentally friendly research, and this is an important
component of a path that allows high economic growth with low biodiversity loss.
Further, new technologies are seen as a key step in reducing greenhouse gas emissions. According to an
IEA assessment, a large range of technologies – from energy efficiency to carbon capture to new nuclear
and alternative energy generative capacity – is needed to accommodate economic growth on a low-carbon
path (IEA, 2008) showing the interrelationship between this megatrend and ENV3.
Finally a key issue for the coming decades – either as part of a low-carbon path or an alternative – will be
whether to experiment with large-scale “geo-engineering” methods to reduce the effects of climate change
again linking this technology megatrend with ENV3. The Royal Society in the UK (Royal Society, 2009)
commissioned a report for “a detailed assessment of the various methods and considers the potential
efficiency and unintended consequences they may pose” (see box).
Geo-engineering: Recommendations of the UK Royal Society
The Royal Society’s report on geo-engineering made the following recommendations:

Geoengineering methods should only be considered as part of a wider package of options for
addressing climate change.

Carbon dioxide removal methods should be regarded as preferable to solar radiation management
80

The UK government should fund a 10 year geoengineering research programme

The Royal Society, in collaboration with international science partners, should develop a code of
practice for geoengineering research and provide recommendations to the international scientific
community for a voluntary research governance framework
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
This megatrend is extremely uncertain: future developments in technology, in particular over the period to
2050, are hard to predict.
Table 35: Uncertainties associated with megatrend T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles
The pace of scientific discovery
The time to turn scientific discoveries into products on the market.
The shape of future discoveries and future products: solutions for what problems?
Public reaction to technologies
Unexpected consequences of new technologies, including disasters
A key issue will be the time needed to turn major scientific discoveries into products. While for major
infrastructure – such as existing energy systems – new technologies may move slowly to market, making
foresight easier, in other areas such as consumer products the uptake of a potentially profitable technology
can be far quicker: this is seen today in the way that nanotechnologies are becoming pervasive in products
from food to sun screen.
In the energy field, the service life of large power plants, for example, is between 50 and 70 years. In
contrast, industrial equipment has a much broader range, typically starting at 10 years. This makes the
update of energy efficiency technologies much quicker than that of new power generation methods (IEA,
2008).
A broader uncertainty regards the future of technology change. Here, recent Rockefeller Foundation study
considered technology future to 2030, in particular in terms of technologies that may support the resilience
and equitable growth of communities (Rockefeller Foundation, 2010). The study indicated a very broad
range of outcomes (see box).
Scenarios for the future of technology and international development
81
This study for the Rockefeller Foundation used two axes were used to build four scenarios: the first axis is
the degree of economic integration and political governance; and the second is the adaptive capacity of
society. Where both factors are strong, the “Clever together” scenario emerges: new technologies support
efforts to address global problems. Where both are weak, the “Hack attack” scenario sees weak
governments, growing criminality that uses sophisticated technology and also widespread counterfeiting that
reduces incentives for the development of useful innovations.
In a third scenario, “Lock step”, strong government combined with weak society leads to more authoritarian
leadership around the world, slower innovation – and although some social and environmental problems are
addressed, technology is widely used for social control.
In the fourth scenario, “Smart scramble”, local technological solutions are developed to address local
problems in a world where global growth has stalled.
The risks of unexpected consequences and public reactions may be strongest in particular for the NBIC
technologies: this is seen in a study on nanotechnology futures (Wuppertal et al 2006), discussed under
megatrend T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies).
On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this
megatrend as well as its uncertainty:
Table 36: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend T1: Global acceleration
and shifts in technology development cycles
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Technology is, as described above, closely linked with many megatrends. Moreover, the uncertainty of its
future development and effects is high (and this uncertainty is expected to growth over time).
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Due to the great uncertainty associated with future technology, the range of possible consequences on
Europe’s environment is very wide and equally uncertain. The following table provides a set of examples that
should not be considered exhaustive:
82
Table 37: Likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T1: Global acceleration and
shifts in technology development cycles
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Technology is expected to continue to reduce the amount of energy and raw materials
needed per unit of GDP of the global economy. This will reduce pressures on climate
change in particular.
Indirect
Climate change
New energy technologies promise to reduce GHG emissions, reducing future (longterm) climate change consequences in Europe
Indirect
Climate change
The development of geo-engineering technologies could provide opportunities to
reduce global climate change – with difficult-to-foresee results and effects
Indirect
Climate change
New technologies for alternative energy and energy efficiency developed elsewhere in
the world will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe.
Direct
Climate change
New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial
pollution in Europe
Direct
Pollution/health
Resources/waste
The examples in the table above show that the acceleration of technology is likely to have strong
consequences for Europe’s environment, in particular in terms of indirect consequences. For technology in
particular, it is difficult to separate events around the world from those in Europe, as many aspects of
scientific research and technology development are global activities.
On a broad scale, technology will bring greater efficiency in the use of energy and metals (World Bank
2009), thus reducing greenhouse gas emissions and resulting climate change impacts on Europe in the
decades to 2050. The development and deployment of alternative energy generation and energy efficiency
technologies around the world will also reduce climate change: this is already underway in China, which
reportedly has 22 nuclear reactors under construction, together with new hydroelectric capacity and a
growing industry for solar cells (Fairley). The use of geo-engineering technologies around the world may
have further results in terms of reducing climate change effects on Europe. Deployment is expected to be
decades away, and the effectiveness, broader consequences and overall acceptance of such approaches
are all far from certain. In all these areas and in particular in the last, the possible future effects are highly
uncertain.
In coming decades, continued economic growth (EC1) and the power shift (EC3) towards emerging
economies will mean that a greater share of technologies will be developed outside of Europe. As noted
above, for example, China is becoming a major developer and producer of solar cells. Enterprises,
households and governments in Europe will be able to choose from these new technologies and use the
ones that reduce effects on the environment.
83
These direct consequences of Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles are likely to
be positive: one key reason is that the precautionary principle is part of European policy-making (though the
effectiveness of and approach to its application are open to debate).
The indirect consequences are far more uncertain. The key uncertainty, as suggested by the Rockefeller
Foundation scenarios (see above) as well as scenarios on biotechnology for OECD (see the rise of the
nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), is whether technology paths will support efforts for
global sustainability or rather follow other priorities, such as security.
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties focus on the relationship between the megatrend and
Europe’s environment.
Table 38: Scoring of the likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T1: Global
acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 -

 -/+

 -

 -/+

Biodiversity and nature
 -/+

 -/+

natural resource use
 -

 -

climate change
pollution and health
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High
Overall, the scores are strongest in the areas of climate change, pollution and health and natural resource
use: here, the sources cited in this section (and those for T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies) as well) identify specific technologies that could influence these areas of the
environment. Links to biodiversity and nature are less clearly identified: they are part of the “technogarden”
scenario for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA, 2005): here, the effects appear to be indirect, in
terms of reducing resource demands. Moreover, technology here appears to be especially important in terms
of reducing negative effects on biodiversity in developing countries: the effects on Europe are thus even
more indirect and weaker.
While not scored here, one further consideration is that the scale of effects is likely to increase over time, as
new technologies come to market and influence an ever greater range of economic, social and other sectors.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
The future development of technology will pose challenges for global governance. The application of the
precautionary principle in other major economies and at global scale will be a key challenge. So will the use
of new technologies to tackle global problems: a global debate will be needed on whether to undertake geoengineering methods to tackle global warming.
Technology can also influence conflict. Many technologies, from airplanes to computers, have had military
applications. To some degree, terrorism today relies on the web and other new technologies, and the fight
against terrorism has developed sensors, pilot-less planes and other technologies. Technologies thus will
change conflict around the world – and will also be fuelled by it.
84
There may be some areas of hope: in the long term, for example, cognitive sciences might provide new
insights and methods for reaching political agreements, thus leading to better environmental governance.
Here too, negative applications could be imagined.
Reference
The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document:
Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology
and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010
Other sources include:
Fairley P (2010), China Cleans Up, Technology Review: May/June 2010
IEA (2008), Energy Technology Perspectives 2008
Hett A. from Swiss Re. Nanotechnology Small matter, many unknowns. 2004:
www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0-Publ04_Nano_en.pdf
Millenium Ecosystems Assessment (MEA 2005), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios, Finding of
the scenarios working group
OECD (2010), MAin Science and Technology Indicators: Volume 2010/1
Rockefeller Foundation (2010), Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties
Royal Society (2009) Geoengineering the climate: science, governance and uncertainty
Nobel Prizes (2010), Solow, R, accessed at:
http://nobelprize.org/nobel_prizes/economics/laureates/1987/press.html
UK Government: Office of Science and Technology, Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios –
Towards 2025, 2006
UN (2010), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights, March 2010
WHO (2009a) Global Health Risks: Mortality and burden of disease attributable to selected risks
World Bank (2009) Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads
World Bank Data (2010), Science and Technology web page: http://data.worldbank.org/topic/science-andtechnology (accessed August 2010)
UK Government: Office of Science and Technology, Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The Scenarios –
Towards 2025, 2006
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (Wuppertal 2006), The future of nanotechnology:
We need to talk
85
8.7
T2: THE RISE OF THE NANO‐, BIO, ICT AND COGNITIVE SCIENCES AND TECHNOLOGIES
Summary of the megatrend
Large socio‐economic and environmental changes in the 21st century are expected to be driven by a cluster
of rapidly emerging and converging sciences and technologies in nanosciences and nano– technologies,
biotechnologies and life‐sciences, information and communication technologies, cognitive sciences and
neurotechnologies (so called NBIC‐cluster). The NBIC cluster is likely to move with increasing speed from
the innovation phase, where seeds have been planted over the last two decades, to the application phase,
over the next 20‐30 years. Learning from nature is gaining increasing relevance as a scientific paradigm.
Expectations range from moderate scepticism to broad enthusiasm, even including far‐reaching assumptions
about control of matter and genes, ubiquitous intelligence and consequently a huge potential to accelerate
access to sustainable energy, abundant food supply or universal health‐care. However, many observers
agree that the NBIC‐cluster is likely to form the backbone of a next long‐term wave of innovation and
growth.
In view of all the uncertainties, in 2040‐2050 nano‐ and biotechnologies are likely to be pervasive, diverse
and incorporated into all aspects of our daily live, particularly in synthetic reproduction, novel energy sources
and health care. Interrelated product and process, technical, organisational and managerial innovations open
up an unusually wide range of social and environmental benefits, investment and profit opportunities. Yet
they also considerably increase the scale and nature of risk to human‐kind and pose fundamental challenges
to current forms of risk analysis and management.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is closely linked to social megatrends, in particular those for health (increasing life
expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world S5; changing patterns of disease burden
globally, and risk of new pandemics S6). It will of course be inextricably linked with global acceleration and
shifts in technology development cycles, global acceleration in technology. Moreover, the links with all the
economic megatrends (continued economic growth, Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment and EC3) and one of the environmental megatrends (EN1 changing
stocks of natural resources EN1;) will also be close.
In terms of social megatrends (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration – changing
patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics), the new NBIC technologies are expected to
influence health megatrends (increasing life expectancy; growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
and changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) in particular: medical research
may find solutions for many of the infectious diseases that are still wide-spread, especially in developing
countries. Biotechnology in particular is expected to yield results against major infectious diseases and also
in the fight against possible future pandemics (Biois); wider use of IT could also greatly improve health care
(Hynes 2010).
For example, nanotechnologies are expected to improve drug delivery, sensing and diagnosis and other
sectors of medicine, boosting the fight against many diseases including cancer. Biotechnology offers many
opportunities for health care, including the development of replacement organs (Biois 2010). The integration
of these new technologies is likely to provide further advances.
Medical breakthroughs to alleviate the problems of aging populations, including ‘bionic’ interventions that
incorporate nanotechnologies, are among the possibilities (Royal Society 2004). Longer life expectancy may
be one outcome from nanotechnology (Biois 2010) and biotechnology (Tait and Wield, 2007). Some
86
observers imagine a “post-human” future coming – in time frames as early as 2050 – with our bodies are
increasingly changed voluntarily and integrated with machines (Bostrom, 2009).
Technology is also likely to interaction with urbanisation (global urbanisation). As noted under megatrend T1:
global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles, urban areas are centres of technology
development – and the growing megacities of Asia are likely to become major new technology hubs. Urban
areas can use new IT technologies to monitor pollution levels and to manage problems such as traffic. For
example, the UK study Intelligent Infrastructure 2055 presents a scenario where IT technology transforms
urban traffic to flow with greater efficiency – and this in turns allows much greater mobility in cities (OST,
2006).
Technology has a close relationship with economic megatrends: accelerating technology development will
be a key element of economic growth in coming years (continued economic growth).
For the NBIC technologies, one important consideration is that the ongoing power shift (EC3) has already
strengthened technology development outside of Europe and other OECD countries. In coming decades,
with economic and power shift strengthening emerging economies, in particular India and China, an ever
greater share of research will occur outside Europe.
At the same time, these technologies are an important element in development, including for lower income
countries: the Millennium Development Goals include a target to “make available the benefits of new
technologies, especially information and communications” to developing countries as part of Goal 18, a
global partnership for development. In the developing world, the use of mobile telephone has grown rapidly
and now reaches about half of the population (UN 2010a).
With respect to EC2 intensified competition for resources technologies have steadily reduced the amount of
metals and energy used per unit of GDP, a trend that is expected to continue (World Bank 2009). The NBIC
technologies are expected to play a key role in continuing and perhaps increasing this trend. For example,
developments in nanotechnology and related fields offer the prospect of lighter, stronger materials that use
less raw materials (Biois 2010). New technologies for alternative energy and for energy efficiency could
change the current path of global fuel demand from coal and oil and their greenhouse gas emissions (IEA,
2009).
As this example indicates, the NBIC technologies will interact closely with environmental megatrends,
specifically ENV1 changing stocks of natural resources. For example, China currently a net food importer,
could feed itself in 2025 using less land than it did at the turn of the century by applying existing technology
already in use elsewhere (OECD, 2008).
Moreover, NBIC technologies can contribute solutions to environmental pollution and greenhouse gas
emissions (ENV2). For example, nanotechnology may offer new manufacturing techniques requiring fewer
raw materials and producing less toxic waste. Through reduced weight emissions of greenhouse gases
could be reduced (Hett 2004 cited in Biois, 2010).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
This megatrend, as its partner global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles, is extremely
uncertain: future developments in technology, in particular over the period to 2050, are hard to predict. The
two also share many uncertainties.
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Table 39: Uncertainties associated with megatrend T2: The rise of the nano‐ , bio, ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies
The pace of scientific discovery in each of the NBIC fields.
The time to turn scientific discoveries into products on the market.
The shape of future discoveries and future products.
Approaches towards risk and precaution in different parts of the world.
Public reaction to new NBIC products
Unexpected consequences of new technologies, including disasters
Uncertainties related to the pace of scientific discovery and the time for new products to reach market are
introduced under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). One
important factor, especially for NBIC technologies, is the difficulty in changing well-established systems such
as health care in OECD countries; however, new technologies together with institutional change can bring
period of rapid change (Tait and Wield 2007). Scenarios developed by the OECD Bioeconomy Project
provide a further glimpse of these uncertainties (see box below).
The uncertainties related to the shape of future discoveries are highlighted in the scenarios by the
Rockefeller Foundation, also presented under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles)(Rockefeller Foundation 2010).
Approaches towards risk and precaution will be particularly important for developments related to the NBIC
technologies. These approaches already different between the US, where for example GMO crops cover
about 70% of land planed with corn and over 90% of that planed with soybeans (USDA 2010) and Europe,
where the use such crops remains extremely limited.
In the next four decades, greater differences may be seen as emerging economies become important
centres for research. These differences may be due to a greater priority given to technology as a means for
economic growth, or to differences in the strength of environmental and sustainability policies. Some
observers go further, arguing that different cultural and religious backgrounds in East Asia will lead to easier
acceptance towards research currently shunned in Europe or North America, such as cloning and other
applications of genetic engineering (Silver). Not all may agree with this analysis. Nonetheless, the OECD
bioeconomy scenarios cited in the box below include breakthroughs that occur in India and China in part due
to lower attention to risk.
Scenarios for biotechnology and health (OECD Bioeconomy Project)
In the “muddling through” scenario, health care systems in OECD countries are resistant to change, and
biotechnology in this area focuses on pharmaceuticals, led by large multinationals. After 2015, however,
India and China lead breakthroughs in areas such as new methods of engineering human tissues, where risk
avoidance (as well as the dominance of large multinational drug companies) hinders research and
88
development in OECD countries.
In the “rapid change” scenario, biotechnology makes greatly changes health care systems. Private research
and development occurs across many companies, as today’s large pharmaceutical manufacturers are
eclipsed. Strong links are made between biotechnology and IT developments. This scenario includes the
deployment of technologies to assist the growing number of elderly in OECD countries live more productive
lives.
Source: Tait and Wield 2009
The reactions of people around the world – and policy makers – to new products may also vary. These
reactions will be greatly influenced by events and perceptions. For example, in the study on The future of
nanotechnology: we need to talk (Wuppertal et al 2006), prepared for the European Commission, looks at
three scenarios for the public acceptance and policy regulation of nanotechnology: in one, “Disaster
recovery”, an industrial accident releases large amounts of nanoparticles, raising concerns about their safety
for human health and the environment. In response, the EU and other OECD countries adopt strict
regulations.
On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this
megatrend as well as its uncertainty:
Table 40: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend T2: The rise of the nano‐ ,
bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The NBIC technologies are, as described above, closely linked with many megatrends. Moreover, the
uncertainties related to their future development and effects are high (and these uncertainties are expected
to growth over time).
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
The range of possible consequences on Europe’s environment is very wide – and uncertain. For this reason,
the following table provides a set of examples that should not be considered exhaustive:
Table 41: Potential consequences on Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T2: The rise of
the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:
 Climate change
 Pollution/health
 Biodiversity/nature
89
 Resources/waste
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce greenhouse gas
emissions, thus reducing the climate change impacts on Europe
Indirect
Climate change
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce resource consumption,
with the result of reducing demands on sub-soil (non-renewable) resources in Europe
Indirect
Resources/waste
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields,
reducing demands on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on
resources (soil and water) and pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as
the further effects on biodiversity
Indirect
Resources/waste
NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and
reduce to resource consumption
Direct
New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing
the use of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts
Direct
New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much
less expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe
Direct
Pollution/health
Pollution/health
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
The NBIC technologies offer many opportunities to reduce pollution levels and resource consumption in
industry. One recent example is the use of enzymes replacing chemicals used in textile production could
become common throughout industrial production (Biois 2010). Future opportunities include
nanotechnologies to boost solar cell efficiency (Biois 2010). These technologies could also support a new
path for agricultural research for a sustainable path to increase yields (PBL 2009; see also megatrend EC2,
Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment).
Where these technologies are used outside of
indirect. These effects can be quite important
emissions is expected to decrease in coming
the quality of life in developing countries can
likely to be attenuated.
Europe, their effects on Europe’s environment are likely to be
in the area of climate change, where Europe’s share of total
decades. In other areas, the effects on the environment and
be very important – but those on Europe’s environment are
These effects are also open to great uncertainty: as the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios cited above
suggest, the development of technology to support sustainability is only one of several possible pathways in
future decades.
The NBIC technologies deployed in Europe are likely to have strong consequences for Europe’s
environment, both direct and indirect.
At the same time, unexpected events around the world could influence Europe’s environment, as well as
future technology development: the nanotechnology scenario cited above, involving a major industrial
accident, provides one picture of the consequences of accidents and misuse of new technology. The
90
precautionary principle is closely integrated in European policy-making (though the effectiveness of and
approach to its application are open to debate), and this can be expected to highlight areas of risk with the
introduction of new technologies here. Elsewhere in the world, these risks may be greater. Overall, these
are seen as potential unexpected events – i.e. something beyond the normal uncertainties that are part of
megatrends.
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties focus on the relationship between the megatrend and
Europe’s environment.
Table 42: Scoring of the likely effects for Europe’s environment arising from megatrend T2. The rise
of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
Direct
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 -

 -/+

 -

 -/+

Biodiversity and nature
 -/+

 -/+

natural resource use
 -

 -

climate change
pollution and health
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
While both positive and negative effects are foreseen, it should be noted that these are quite different in
nature. Overall, the NBIC technologies are expected to have a broad range of positive effects on the global
environment and in Europe. A key uncertainty, however, is whether future technology paths will provide
solutions for sustainability (this uncertainty is seen in the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios, described under
megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles).
A further issue is that new technologies may yield unexpected events, including accidents, with grave
consequences for the global environment and Europe’s. These “wild cards” or “Black Swans” are hard to
predict, though precautionary approaches to risk assessment may identify them.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
The future development of the NBIC technologies will pose challenges for global governance, as will the
acceleration of technology (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles). As noted
above, different economies and cultures may apply the precautionary principle in diverging ways.
Biotechnology in particular poses ethical dilemmas (Biois 2010; Silver); this may be the case for future
applications of cognitive science as well. For example, cognitive sciences might provide new insights and
methods for reaching political agreements, thus leading to better environmental governance, as well as
negative applications (Biois 2010). Dialogue to seek common approaches among major players – including
OECD countries and the emerging economies – will be needed.
Reference
The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document:
91
Bio Intelligence Service, Support to analysis of mega-trends in the areas of nanotechnology, biotechnology
and information and cognitive science, Final Draft Background paper, April 2010
Other sources include:
Bostrom N (2009) The Future of Humanity. Published in New Waves in Philosophy and Technology, eds.
Olsen et al, New York: Palgrave McMillan.
Hett A. from Swiss Re. Nanotechnology Small matter, many unknowns. 2004:
www.swissre.com/resources/31598080455c7a3fb154bb80a45d76a0-Publ04_Nano_en.pdf
Hynes et al (2010) Use of Health Information Technology to Advance Evidence-Based Care: Lessons from
the VA QUERI Program. Journal of General Internal Medicine. 25(1):1525-1497
Rockefeller Foundation (2010), Scenarios for the Future of Technology and International Development
Royal Society (2004) Nanoscience and nanotechnologies: opportunities and uncertainties
Silver L (2009, Biotech’s Trouble with Religion (http://bigthink.com/ideas/16347)
Tait J and Wield D (2007), OECD International Futures Project on The Bioeconomy to 2030: Designing a
Policy Agenda: Health Biotechnology to 2030
UK Government: Office of Science and Technology (OST 2006), Intelligent Infrastructure Futures: The
Scenarios – Towards 2025,
US Department of Agriculture (USDA 2010), Adoption of Genetically Engineered Crops in the U.S.: available
at: http://www.ers.usda.gov/Data/BiotechCrops/ (consulted in August 2010)
UN (2010a), The Millennium Development Goals Report 2010
UN (2010b), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights, March 2010
World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads
Wuppertal Institute for Climate, Environment and Energy (Wuppertal 2006), The future of nanotechnology:
We need to talk
92
8.8
EC1: CONTINUED ECONOMIC GROWTH
Summary of the megatrend
Assumptions on global economic growth (in terms of annual changes of Gross Domestic Product) form a
basic megatrend for the economic analyses in Part A. Virtually all major outlook studies assume
that economic growth will be positive on average across the globe in the coming decades. Growth will
be accelerating in BRIC countries and other newly emerging economies. The rate at which economies
will grow is a matter of larger uncertainty than before. Due to developments like ageing and the need
to better control financial circuits, growth may be smaller than usually assumed in the past, in particular in the
developed world (OECD). For example the DG ECFIN 2009 report on the implications of ageing in the EU
corrects common expectations in a downward direction: roughly 1.8% instead of 2.4% annually on average
in the period to 2060.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend has a great number of close links with other megatrends. It is closely linked to social
megatrends, in particular the shifts in population size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration), shifts in population structure (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) as well as
urbanisation (global urbanisation) and the growth of middle-income consumers (emergence of a global
middle-income consumer class). It is also closely related to technology megatrends. The two other economic
megatrends are closely linked to – in many ways stem from – this one. And continued economic growth is
also closely linked to the environmental megatrends.
In terms of demographic megatrends, economic growth is an important factor reducing fertility rates in the
long-term (see Shifts in population size, in particular Figure 2).
A key issue for the global future relates to the relative weight of demographic and economic megatrends in
terms of the consequences for the global environment (and Europe’s). Global population growth between
2005 and 2050 will – under the UN’s highest projection – be about 75%. (This takes the “constant fertility”
scenario – however, fertility rates have consistently fallen in recent decades and this is not by the UN to be a
strongly plausible scenario: its “high” scenario is about half a billion less.) In contrast, the economies of
China and India may growth seven-fold over this period (Poncet, 2006; see also EC3). Without diminishing
the importance of population growth and migration in future trends, it appears that economic growth and
associated consumption patterns may have stronger consequences on the world’s environment in coming
decade – and thus on Europe’s.
Economic growth will be also be an important factor in migration, as many people move to escape poverty
and improve their economic opportunities: migration is thus likely to occur between poorer and richer
economies, and in particular arise from lower income economies with low growth rates. The UN,
extrapolating from past migration trends, estimates that from 2005 to 2050 the high income economies will
be the major recipients of migration: the UK, Spain and Italy would each receive more than 150,000
immigrants annually, while populous low-income countries in Asia including India and Pakistan would be
among the largest source of emigration (UN 2009).9 (Climate change is expected to be a major factor and
9
Some countries will both receive immigrants and be a source of emigration: this has been and is projected to remain
the case in particular for Mexico, which takes in immigrants from poorer Central American countries to its south and is a
source of emigration to the US.
93
uncertainty for migration to 2050, and this will combine with economic growth: see S1 (shift in population
size: increase, decline and rising migration) for further information.)
In terms of Shifts in population structure (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges), the
ageing populations seen in most EEA countries and in Eastern Europe will lead to declines in workforce
populations, and this together with the rising burden on pension and health systems is expected to slow
economic growth unless migration fills the gap. For example, a 2009 report by the European Commission
report estimates that the ageing population in the EU will cut the Union’s estimated long-term economic
growth from by over half a point, from 2.4% to 1.8% for the period to 2060 (DG ECFIN).
Migration may fill part of this gap. Where migrants can be absorbed in their host economies, they migrants
can thus support economic growth there and also, through their remittances, in their home countries. (see
shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration for further details on these interrelationships).
Economic growth is also closely linked to urbanisation (global urbanisation). Urban areas, which concentrate
investment and production, generate an estimated 80% of the world’s GDP (UN, 2010). Economic growth is
also driving, and is driven by, the increase in the global middle-class consumer class (emergence of a global
middle-income consumer class): by 2050, about of the world’s middle-income class is projected to live in
India and China (see emergence of a global middle-income consumer class).
Continued economic growth has a close relationship with technology, which is a key driver of economic
growth especially in advanced economies. In turn, economic growth provides the financial resources to
support research and development in new technologies. The link between technology and economy is
discussed under megatrend T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles).
In terms of economic megatrends, continued economic growth will be a key factor in increased competition
for resources: economic growth leads to increased demand, though resource demand grows more slowly
due to technology developments and shifts towards services (World Bank 2009; see megatrends EC2;
Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment for a further description
of this relationship). Moreover, economic growth will also stimulate exploration of new sources and increased
supply.
Continued economic growth is also the motor behind the power shift towards China, India and other
emerging economies: this is described under megatrend EC3.
Continued economic growth is also a key factor linked to the environmental megatrends.
Economic growth and environmental megatrends are linked in a series of ways. Positive economic growth
means that consumption patterns change, mobility increases, replacing becomes dominant over repairing,
and high-caloric food crowds out low-caloric food. It all may lead to increased pressure on the environment
and natural resources by an increased demand for resources and growing emissions of polluting
substances. Although in many areas resources efficiency is increasing and pollution content of lifestyles
tends to get lower relatively, the sheer volume of economic activities pushes resources use and pollution
volumes to higher levels. At the same time, slower growth may generally have a lower environmental effect,
but this is not automatically secured in the longer term. Slow growth and in particular shrinking indicates a
stagnant economy with reduced efficiency, little innovation, continuation of obsolete processes, and the
chance of neglecting the environment.
These links are seen in how economic growth, together with the changing consumption patterns of the
increasing number global middle-income consumers (emergence of a global middle-income consumer
class), will increase demand for natural resources (ENV1). For example, demand for agricultural products
may rise by up to 300% to 2050: this may increase consumption of natural resources including soil and
water. These projections reinforce the discussion above concerning the greater relative importance of
economic growth over population growth in many areas. Global population growth alone is expected to be
about 50% (see S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) for uncertainties in
projections); the largest share in the growth in demand will come from changing consumption patterns,
including growing demand for meat (see ENV1).
94
OECD countries have nonetheless in recent decades seen a decoupling between growth in many areas of
natural resource consumption – for example water – and economic growth (OECD, 2008): a key issue to
2050 is whether fast-growing economies will see similar trends.
Economic growth is also linked to environmental degradation (ENV2). Here there is a debate concerning the
Kuznets curve theory by which pollution levels will increase with income until a turning point and then
decrease. This is seen, according to its proponents, in examples such as improving air quality in European
cities. Among the issues for debate is the fact that no turning point has been seen in areas such as solid
waste generation. Moreover, trade links are an important factor here as pollution related to raw materials
extraction and to goods production may have shifted to other countries (OECD 2008 provides references to
the debate).
Economic growth is closely intertwined with the climate change megatrends. Growth – without changes in
technology or policy – will directly affect future emissions of greenhouse gases (IPCC). The impacts of
climate change can harm economic growth, through effects ranging from decreased agricultural production
in areas of declining precipitation (a climate change impact projected in much of southern Europe) to longterm sea-level rise that could lead to increased flooding in coastal cities around the world.
One measure, the ecological footprint developed by WWF, provides an overall view of human effects on the
global environment, thus encompassing the different themes covered under the three environmental
megatrends. By this measure, the world saw a relative decoupling from the mid-1980s to the middle of the
past decade (see Figure 16). At the same time, this indicator suggests that the footprint of human activities
already exceeded the world’s carrying capacity by the time this relative decoupling start – and it has
continued to rise since then.
Figure 16: Relative decoupling between global GDP and the total ecological footprint
Source: OECD (2008)
95
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 43: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued economic growth
Future growth rates, globally and in major regions of the world
Global trade
Global conflict
Resource availability and cost
The rate of economic growth in coming years is a major source of uncertainty. Studies looking to 2030 or
2050 can focus on a long-term average and ignore fluctuations. Nonetheless, changes in assumptions can
lead to major variations. For example, a 2006 study saw China’s economy growing by less than 5% a year
between 2005 and 2050, and in relative terms reaching about 60% of the size of the EU economy and 40%
of the size of the US economy, while India’s economy would be about one-third of China’s (Poncet, 2006,
cited in Biois). China and India in recent years have achieved much higher growth, and recent studies have
used higher rates in their projections: a 2009 assessment sees China’s economy exceeding that of both the
US and EU in 2050, with India’s close in size to the EU (PBL, 2009).
The influence of different rates of growth can be seen in OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030: for its main
scenario, this study used 1980-2007 as a basis for its economic projections. The study then looked at the
implications of different assumptions for growth rates taking average labour productivity and other economic
factors from other time periods: for stronger growth, 200 to 2007 was used as a time period; for slower
growth, a longer historical trend; a final variant looked at unprecedented growth levels, based on the idea
that a new economic era has started. In all, the resulting variance in China’s GDP for 2030 was over 80%;
those for India’s almost 40%. Variance for OECD economies was generally lower.
A few studies have imagined futures where the assumption of steady economic growth, at least in Europe,
no longer holds: for example, Forum for the Future (2007), Retail Futures 2022 look at different growth
patterns, high vs. low/no growth, as a factor to build its scenarios. A long period without growth, even in
Europe, should however be beyond the normal range of uncertainty for this megatrend. 10
Finally, some uncertainty relates to global trade. The background reports for this study and forecasts by
international organisations such as the World Bank all assume that world trade, which has expanded greatly
in recent years, will continue in coming decades. However, a few studies have considered the possibility of
alternative future paths: for example, UNEP’s GEO4 contains a scenario called “Security First”, where global
trade is restricted due to security concerns (UNEP, 2007). Scenarios where future global trade decreases
are considered in several other studies: for example, for the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment (MEA 2005),
by the Shell Corporation (Shell 2005), and IPCC (IPCC 2000). A breakdown in trade is unlikely and also
beyond the normal range of uncertainties: it is perhaps linked only to dire conflict. Nonetheless, a possible
risk would be a shift towards greater regional trade patterns rather than global ones: regional trade
agreements and international trade are compatible, as long as the regional agreement maintain low external
barriers (World Bank, 2005), and here could arise possible uncertainties for the future.
This GEO scenario touches on a further uncertainty – that of conflict in major areas of the world. A recent
scenario study by the US National Intelligence Study highlights the risks from youth bulges in volatile areas
of the world are one (see megatrend shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges). In addition, it
develops one scenario where conflict arises from resource competition between India and China (see
10
This possibility was also considered unlikely by the corporate partners involved in the study, but has turned out to be
no inaccurate in the short term for the UK, where the studied was drawn. Personal communication, Forum for the Future
(2008).
96
megatrends EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment and
EC3).
Uncertainties arise from links with other megatrends: notably, the close link between technology and
economic growth (see above and megatrend global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles) suggests that an acceleration of technology could lead to faster global growth rates. Another
uncertainty arises from resources: the World Bank (2009) and IEA (2009) estimate that sufficient fossil fuel
reserves exist for the coming four decades and beyond; if assumptions about oil reserves turn out to be
optimistic, however, prices may increase dramatically and global growth could slow (see EC2: Intensified
competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment).
Table 44: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued
economic growth
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
In terms of scoring, this megatrend clearly has very strong links with other megatrends. The uncertainties are
important, though many arise from other megatrends.
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s
environment:
Table 45: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued economic
growth
Likely effects on Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming
decades and thus its effects in Europe
Indirect
Climate change
Economic growth will be a key factor behind global resource demand: for Europe, this
could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports.
Indirect
Biodiversity/nature
97
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased
minerals and fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and in offshore marine areas
Indirect
Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with local air
emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe
Direct
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Pollution/health
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends
identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
Economic growth around the world is likely to have a series of consequences for Europe’s environment.
Economic growth is one of the main factors behind increased greenhouse gas emissions, resulting in climate
change impacts in Europe.
Economic growth also leads to greater global demand for resources, seen notably in the projections for
increased food demand. While most of food demand projected for coming decades should be met by
production outside of Europe (World Bank, 2009), several quantitative scenarios foresee global demand
increasing the land used for intensive agriculture to 2030 in Europe (RIKS 2010; see EC2: Intensified
competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment for further details). Such an
increase would put pressure on other natural resources in to land, notably water resources, and could lead to
an increased use of agricultural chemicals. These effects will in turn affect biodiversity and lead to the runoff
of pollution (notably nitrogen pollution in water bodies).
Global economic growth will also lead to growing demand for minerals and fuels (though demand for these
should growth more slowly than the economy as a whole). Although Europe imports most of its minerals, with
growing economic growth mining may increase, especially in the EU12. Oil and gas exploration may also
increase: oil exploration in particular in marine areas including in the Arctic; and unconventional gas on land
(see EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment).
As has been noted above, global economic growth will also provide the resources to address environmental
problems in fast-growing developing countries. Thus, in the longer term, some effects such as hemispheric
air pollution might decline.
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the
uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as
well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 46: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued
economic growth
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
climate change
pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
 +

 -/+

+

n.a.
n.a.
+

98
natural resource use
n.a.
n.a.
+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Direct consequences for Europe’s environment are expected to be weak: this will mainly be in terms of
hemispheric air pollution, is likely to increase in coming decades (see ENV2).
A direct link to pollution and health in Europe will arise from hemispheric air pollution. Overall, however, this
is expected to be relatively less important and is not expected to outweigh the expected declines in air
pollution from emission in Europe. While hemispheric pollution may increase in the immediate coming
decades, it is possible that towards the end of the period considered (2050), economic growth will provide a
the financial means that lead to a decrease in hemispheric pollution.
The most important indirect consequences are likely to arise from climate change and its effects in Europe.
Economic growth is expected to have a strong effect exacerbating GHG emissions. as well as those in
terms of natural resource use. For climate change, developed countries have been up to now the main
source of emissions: in coming decades, without accounting for the effect of past emissions, this relationship
will shift and developing countries will be the main source of emissions. Moreover, uncertainties are low:
these, as well as any possible change in direction, arise from other megatrends – in particular those tied to
technology – as well as issues related to global governance.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
Future economic growth will be closely linked to governance. National political and social stability is a key
factor for economic growth; and with globalisation, worldwide stability in coming decades will be a key factor
for growth.
Policy decisions will also shape growth patterns – for example towards growth that is lower in terms of
current economic accounting but more sustainable in terms of the environment and thus in terms of a longerterm view. (The GEO4 “Sustainability First” scenario imagines a world that moves in this direction.)
In turn, economic growth can influence governance – and instability. Citing the history of the last century, a
US government warns of “a strong correlation between rapid economic change—both positive and
negative—and political instability” and notes that “today’s globalization... has spurred the movement of
people, disrupting traditional social and geographic boundaries” (NIC, 2008).
Reference
The analysis presented here in particular used the following background document:
Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s
future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10
Other references include:
European Commission (DG ECFIN), The 2009 Ageing report – Economic and budgetary projections for the
27 Member States, 2009
Millennium Ecosystems Assessment (MEA 2005), Ecosystems and Human Well-Being: Scenarios, Finding
of the scenarios working group, 2005
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, 2008),
99
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL, 2009), Getting in the Right Lane for 2050
OECD (2008), Environmental Outlook to 2030
Shell (2005), The Shell Global Scenarios to 2025 – The future business environment: trends, trade-offs and
choices
United Nations (2009), World Population Prospects: The 2008 Revision – Highlights
United Nations (2010), World Urbanization Prospects: The 2009 Revision – Highlights
US National Intelligence Council (NIC), Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, 2008
UNEP (2007) Global Environment Outlook 4 (GEO-4): Environment for Development
World Bank (2005), Global Economic Prospects 2005: Trade, Regionalism, and Development
World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads
100
8.9
EC2: INTENSIFIED COMPETITION FOR RESOURCES
Summary of the megatrend
Economic growth continues at the global level and is accelerating in BRIC countries and other
newly emerging economies. The demand for sub‐soil and natural resources will grow in absolute
terms despite continuing and partly successful efforts to increase the resource efficiency of
economic activities. Increased demand for subsoil resources will stimulate exploration and exploitation of
new sources. Supply is expected to meet demand, both for “bulk” resources (fossil fuels, though a
different mix than today, minerals) and for specific metals that are essential to facilitate market penetration
of environmental and other technological innovations. Supply of natural resources increasingly
competes with other land use, and in particular with conservation of biodiversity and ecosystems services.
The increased need for resources stimulates political monopolisation of access (e.g. China/Africa). Europe is
dependent on other regions for much of its fossil fuels and minerals and needs to secure its access to major
world markets.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend, Intensified competition for resources, is closely linked to demographic megatrends, to
technology megatrends, to economic megatrends, in particular continued economic growth (continued
economic growth) and to environmental megatrends, especially Changing stocks of natural resources
(ENV1). In terms of demographic megatrends, this megatrend is linked in particular with shifts in population
size (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and with the emerging middle-income
consumer class (global urbanisation). On the economic side, continued economic growth (continued
economic growth) is also an important link. The technology megatrends (global acceleration and shifts in
technology development cycles and the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies)
will also play a key role. For environmental megatrends, the closest link is with ENV1, Changing stocks of
natural resources.
Sub-soil and natural resources cover a broad spectrum of materials used for production and consumption.
The analysis here focuses on sub-soil resource, and in particular on two of the most important categories:
minerals, including metals; and fossil fuels. Increased demand for natural or renewable resources – including
water, land, soil and biodiversity – are also an important element. While these are discussed here, greater
detail on natural resources is found under megatrend ENV1, Changing stocks of natural resources.
101
This megatrend is linked to the shifts in population size
(shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration): population growth will increase resource
demand. As under that megatrend, however, population
growth in coming decades is likely to have a smaller
effect in terms of resource demand than economic
growth (continued economic growth).
Among social drivers and megatrends, the consumption
patterns of the emerging global middle class (global
urbanisation) will closely influence resource demand.
This is seen in terms of food consumption: in Asia,
where demand for meat has grown much faster than
population over the past 15 years – a trend that is
expected to continue in coming decades as the middle
class population increases (World Bank, 2009). Greater
food demand is expected to lead to growing pressures
on natural resources, in particular land and water used
in agriculture.
Figure 17: Global Demand for commodities
compared to economic growth in
recent decades
The links with economic drivers are particularly close.
Continued economic growth (continued economic
growth) will play a key role in terms of increasing
resource demand and competition.
Globally, the world economy has seen a relative
decoupling as the demand for many commodities –
from iron ore and petroleum to logs – has risen more
slowly than economic growth (World Bank 2009; see Figure 17). The World Bank expects this decoupling to
continue in coming decades. Nonetheless, the absolute demand is expected to increase for nearly all
resources in the coming decades, assuming continued global economic growth.
It should also be noted that this decoupling has not be an iron rule. Notably, the intensity of metals
consumption per GDP in the global economy has grown since the 1980s: and this is almost entirely due to
demand in China related to that country’s export-oriented manufacturing boom. In coming decades, China’s
economy is expected to reduce its metals-intensity and the world to return to its long-term decoupling trend;
nonetheless, most of the absolute growth in metals demand is still expected to come from the fast-growing
emerging countries (World Bank, 2009).
For some resources used in new products, moreover, demand is expected to grow rapidly. This is discussed
below under technology.
Economic growth is also linked to investment in resource extraction and use: growth will provide the
resources to explore and exploit new mineral and fossil fuel deposits. Nonetheless, in the energy sector, the
financial needs are great: the International Energy Agency estimates that at least US$ 26 trillion (in 2008
dollars) in investments are needed to meet projected global energy demand in 2030, both to tap energy
reserves and for new power plants and other infrastructure. The investment needs rise even higher if a lowcarbon energy path, using fewer fossil fuel resources, is to be taken (IEA, 2009).
New investments are also needed to expand agricultural production to meet growing global food demand, in
particular if global effects on biodiversity are to be limited (PBL, 2009).
Another megatrend will also play a key role: the economic power shifts underway (EC3) are also linked to
resource competition, as India and China increasingly seek to obtain raw materials to fuel their economic
growth. This can be seen in the role of China in metals consumption since the mid-1980s, described above.
At the present day, this country is investing heavily in nuclear and alternative energy, which may reduce its
future fossil fuel consumption, and have a major effect on global trends as well (Fairley; see also below).
102
Technology drivers have a series of strong links with resource demand. Technology contributes to a greater
efficiency in the use of mineral and metal resources – and this in turn is one of the two main factors in the
long-term decoupling between economic growth and resource demand, the other being the long-term shift
towards service-based economies (World Bank, 2009). For example, developments in nanotechnology and
related fields offer the prospect of lighter, stronger materials that use lower amounts of raw materials (see
global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles / the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies). New technologies for alternative energy and for energy efficiency could change
the current path of global fuel demand from coal and oil and their greenhouse gas emissions (IEA, 2009).
Another example of this interaction is seen in an estimate for China: by applying existing agricultural
technology already in use elsewhere, China could feed itself in 2025 using less land than it did at the turn of
the century (OECD, 2008).
While technology will contribute make the use of many resources more efficient, rising demand for products
such as solar cells and vehicle batteries has spurred demand for rare minerals – a trend expected to
continue in coming decades: the table on the following page provides forecasts for growing world demand.
For agriculture, new research can improve yields around the world while reducing biodiversity effects:
IAASTD estimates that US$ 1 trillion are needed over the next 50 years (cited in PBL, 2009).
A growing share of agricultural research is taking place in developing countries, in particular China where
new GMO strains are being developed (World Bank, 2009). This highlights the growing importance of
economic power shifts (megatrend EC3).
In terms of environmental megatrends, close links are seen first of all with ENV1 (Changing stocks of natural
resources). The competition for resources includes natural ones such as land and water and their products,
such as food. Moreover, sub-soil and natural resources can in some cases substitute each other, as seen in
the current efforts to use biofuels instead of crude oil as a basis for transport fuels.
There are also links with ENV2 (environmental degradation): the extraction of many minerals and fuels can
lead to high environmental damage, even when carried out properly.
And the competition for natural resources is also linked to global climate change (ENV3): the competition for
fossil fuels can encourage alternatives, reducing greenhouse gas emissions. At the same time, many
renewable energies depend on scarce metals such as neodymium (used in wind turbine magnets, with over
90% of reserves found in China) or lithium, used for electric vehicle and other batteries (over 80% of the
reserves of this metal are found in Bolivia). The table below provides an overview of several rare metals
whose global demand is expected to increase significantly from 2006 to 2030.
103
Table 47: Projected global demand for rare metals
104
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 48: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC2. Intensified competition for resources
Future growth in energy demand
Extent of recoverable fossil fuels reserves
Extent of mineral reserves, including for rare metals whose demand is rising
Extent of natural resource monopolies and cartels
Growth in agricultural yields, especially in developing countries
Extent of sustainability focus for agricultural research
Continued global trade
Future conflicts
The future growth in global energy demand is not certain: for example, IEA reduced its growth estimates
from its 2007 to its 2008 energy outlook, and again in 2009.
The extent of fossil fuel reserves is a topic of intense debate. The World Bank, for example, argues that oil
and gas reserves are sufficient to meet world demand in coming decades (World Bank, 2009), though
concerns about “peak oil” and other supply constraints are seen as an important issue for EU climate and
energy policy (Piebalgs, 2008).
Another major uncertainty relates to the affect of monopolies and cartels on price and supply of resources.
Many vital sub-soil resources are concentrated geographically in the world. About 60% of global oil reserves
are found in the Middle East (Ecorys). More generally, there is a split between oil producers and oil
consumers: twelve of the world’s countries control more than 80% of the total global proven conventional oil
and gas reserves; while these countries currently produce less than 10% of global GDP; in contrast,
countries that produce more than three-quarters of global GDP hold only about 10% of total proven oil and
gas reserves (Milov).
A similar concentration of resources is seen for some of the rare metals used in new applications, such as
neodymium and lithium, cited above. A key issue for the future is the extent to which countries controlling
these resources will seek to use them to extract monopoly rents or political influences.
In agriculture, the growth in agricultural yields has declined in recent years World Bank, 2009). The pace of
the growth in yields in future decades will influence other key factors, such as the extent of land in the
developing world that will be converted to agriculture (land conversion can have a major effect on
biodiversity in these countries). A closely related uncertainty is the extent to which agricultural research will
address sustainability issues: this is a key uncertainty that arises from the technology megatrends (see for
example the Rockefeller Foundation scenarios described under global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles).
Further uncertainties relate to global trade and to conflict. A few forward-looking studies by organisations
including UNEP, IPCC and Shell have considered the possibility of paths where global trade is restricted, in
particular due to security concerns (these are described in continued economic growth). While this is
considered beyond the normal range of uncertainties for the current analysis, restrictions in global trade
would greatly change commodity supplies and prices.
105
Table 49: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC1. Continued economic
growth
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following consequences, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe’s
environment:
Table 50: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC1. Continued economic
growth
Likely effects on Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Global competition for energy resources can increase attention to alternative energy
(and nuclear power) around the world
Indirect
Climate change
Since the late 1970s, nearly all the increase in oil production around the world has
come from offshore sites (World Bank, 2009): although oil production is declining in
EEA countries, pressures for offshore drilling may increase, including in sensitive
areas such as the Arctic, with risks for the marine environment
Direct
Biodiversity/nature
The boom in unconventional gas extraction seen in the US may move to Europe: this
typically requires high levels of water
Direct
Resources/waste
If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European
exports will increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and
possible loss of biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals.
Indirect
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends
identified some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
Resource competition may have some beneficial consequences, in particular by providing important
economic and energy security motivations for emerging economies to shift away from fossil fuels. China, for
example, reportedly has 22 nuclear reactors under construction, together with new hydroelectric capacity
(notably the Three Gorges Dam) and is rapidly expanding its renewables capacity (Fairley). All of these
106
investments will reduce China’s future greenhouse gas emissions, and thus reducing climate change effects
in Europe. (At the same time, however, China also continued to build new coal-fired power plants.)
While Europe is a major importer of fossil fuels, small shares of its oil and natural gas come from domestic
sources. In future decades, the direct consequences for Europe’s environment are likely to arise from new
fossil fuel extraction in offshore areas (possibly including the Arctic) and also from unconventional gas
development, which has greatly increased US natural gas production (IEA, 2008).
Major consequences are not expected in the area of minerals. Here, the EU imported 175 million tonnes of
metals in 2004, while its domestic production was only 30 million tonnes. European mining is expected to
continue, but not to expand significantly (European Commission, 2009).
Europe is a major importer and exporter of agricultural products. Growing global food demand may lead to
increased agricultural production in Europe – however, the link is far from certain. In a recent review of land
use projections for Europe found that a few studies forecast increases in cropland in the range of 15%
between 2005 and 2050. This included studies that factored in global growth in demand. Other studies,
however, saw a decline in total agricultural land (for many, due to a decline in extensive pasture land rather
than intensively farmed areas). (RIKS, 2010)
The uncertainties related to future European agriculture and resulting land use and other consequences for
Europe’s environment appear to be wide-ranging. They are linked to future demand for agricultural products,
to future production in the rest of the world, and thus to research and investment in this area.
This assessment of likely consequences for Europe has not included a consideration of a future where trade
in commodities is significantly restricted. In this case, Europe would need to fall back on domestic supplies –
which could include returning to coal for energy – the environmental consequences may be far greater.
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences on Europe as well as the
uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole – described above – as
well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 51: Scoring the likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC2. Intensified
competition for resources
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
climate change
pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
natural resource use
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
-

 0/+

 -/+

 0/+

 -/+

 0/+

 -/+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The direct consequences are seen mainly arising from increased fossil fuel extraction in Europe can include
water use for extraction (especially for unconventional gas) and resulting water pollution (IEA, 2008).
Offshore oil production carries the risk of pollution and of biodiversity effects.
107
The indirect consequences are more wide-ranging. Resource demand may lead to a search for alternative
energy sources, reducing climate change consequences in Europe, as seen in China’s development of
nuclear and alternative energy, described above.
The RIKS scenarios show that global food demand may result in increased European exports, in particular
from intensive farming, with consequences that include the runoff of agricultural chemicals as well as
biodiversity loss from greater land use.
In general, the strength of these consequences is seen as weak: for example, resource competition may be
one factor in a global move towards a low-carbon future, but other megatrends (e.g. technology) as well as
governance are expected to be the most important. This consequence is highly uncertain. So are those
stemming from global food demand, where uncertainties arise in particular in terms of agricultural yields and
production in the rest of the world.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
The background paper for this megatrend identified significant risks for Europe’s economy, which is
dependent on imports of many resources and in particular minerals and fossil fuels, as global competition
grows. In other words, this megatrend has major implications in terms of Europe’s economic and energy
security.
This contrasts with the consequences for Europe’s environment, which in this analysis appear not to be
strong. For sub-soil resources, including minerals and fossil fuels, this is because Europe is relatively poor.
In other words, most of the environmental consequences of resource competition are likely to be seen
outside of Europe, especially in developing countries, as well as some fragile areas close to Europe, notably
the Arctic and the Mediterranean.
The situation is slightly different for natural resources, where for example Europe is a major agricultural
producer. Here too, while some effects are expected to arise in Europe, the World Bank (2009) and other
institutions foresee that most of future demand will be met by increases in yields and the conversion of land
in developing countries to meet growing world demand. The consequences could include biodiversity loss as
well as agricultural runoff – again, outside of Europe.
While this megatrend appears not to be so important in terms of the consequences for Europe’s
environment, from the perspective of environmental security, this megatrend is crucial for Europe’s future.
Reference
The analysis presented here used the following background document:
Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s
future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10
Other references include:
European Commission (2009), Public Consultation on Commission Raw Materials Initiative: Background
paper
Fairley P (2010), China Cleans Up, Technology Review: May/June 2010
International Energy Agency (2008), World energy outlook 2008
International Energy Agency, World Energy Outlook 2009, 2009
Milov V (2008), Russia and the West, the Energy factor, Centre for Strategic and international studies,
Institut Francais des Relations Internationales, July 2008
108
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Getting in the right lane for 2050, October 2009, with
the Stockholm Resilience Centre
Piebalgs A. (2008), Die Strategie der EU in der Energieund Klimapolitik – Ist die Energieversorgung
langfristig gesichert?
RIKS, Exploration of land use: trends under SOER 2010 – final report, May 2010
World Bank (2009), Global Economic Prospects 2009: Commodities at the Crossroads
109
8.10
EC3: POWER SHIFTS – FROM A UNI-POLAR TO MULTI-POLAR WORLD
Summary of the megatrend
Economic power concentration tends to diversify from a single (USA) to a multi‐polar global map when BRIC
countries and later on newly emerging economies (e.g. Indonesia, South‐Africa) grow in economic
significance. This development both stimulates the demand for resources and the countervailing process of
attempting to come to blocwise and global agreements on regulating markets and trade.
Interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is closely linked with other economic megatrends, with at least two of the social megatrends
and also with the technology megatrends.
This megatrend very closely tied to EC1 (continued economic growth): global growth is one of the factors
enabling growth in China and India, and the power shift is dependent on the positive growth forecasts in
these and other emerging economies. For example, its faster growth rates may make China the largest
economy in the world in 2050, with total GDP greater than that of the EU or the US (PBL 2008).
This megatrend also plays a key role in the EC2 (increased competition for resources).. For example,
China’s fast-growing consumption of metals has, in the past two decades, reversed the long-standing
decoupling between consumption of these resources and global GDP growth (World Bank, 2009). The World
Bank expects China’s
Cities are centres for economic growth and power (see EC1 (continued economic growth)), and the shift is
also closely linked to urbanisation and the growth of Asian megacities (see S3 (global urbanisation)). While
some analysts expect future growth to shift to smaller cities, the UN’s population projections nonetheless
foresee over 70% of China’s population and about 55% of India’s living in urban areas by 2050 (UN cited by
Biois).
An important part of the growth of India and especially China will be the rise of the middle-income consumer
classes: by one estimate, about half of the middle-class across the world will live in these two countries (see
S4 (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class)). In demographic terms, this megatrend is linked
to migration, as migrants will be drawn to fast-growing economies – and within these, from rural to urban
areas (see (S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration)). With its slowly growing and
ageing population combined with its rapid economic growth, China may also receive economic immigrants
from elsewhere in the world after 2030 (Biois) (see S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration)).
The shift in economic power is being accompanied by a growth in the role of research and development as
China and India take stronger roles in terms of technology development: this is a key factor in its
acceleration (T1 (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles)) and these countries may
also become important players in new technologies such as the “NBIC cluster” (T2 (the rise of the nano-, bio,
ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies)).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
110
Table 52: Uncertainties associated with megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar
world
The economic growth rates of emerging economies in coming decades
Political stability in major economies such as China and India
Availability of raw materials
New emerging economies
Global trade
Global conflict
China, India and other emerging economies have seen unprecedented growth in recent years, and their
future growth rates are open to uncertainty. This can be seen in relative terms: projections several years ago
saw China’s economy in 2050 as smaller than the US or EU economies (e.g. Poncet, 2006 cited in Ecorys);
more recent forecasts see China’s economy as exceeding both by 2050 (PBL, 2009). Similarly, the
variations in growth rates for China tested for OECD’s Environmental Outlook to 2030 led to 80% differences
in the country’s GDP by 2050.
Both China and India have enjoyed relative political stability in recent decades, a key factor in their economy
growth. However, this growth increases has increased the inequalities among people, among regions and
between rural and urban areas, factors that could lead to political instability in future decades.
China’s growth has relied on imports of raw materials from many parts of the world, including Africa. Indeed,
China’s consumption of metals has grown faster than GDP (see EC2 (intensified competition for resources)).
While resource use is expected to grow more efficient, both in China and around the world, the future growth
of emerging economies is tied to the availability of these resources as well as their prices, which are factors
of uncertainty.
Uncertainties regarding the availability of resources might bring the risk of conflict. For example, the US
National Intelligence Council’s 2009 study, Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, includes a scenario
called “BRICS bust-up”, in which competition for natural resources between China and India leads to war
(US NIC 2009).
A key uncertainty relates to the future of economies of today’s low-income countries, such as many in subSaharan Africa. These and other parts of the world are not among those listed as “emerging”. Africa as a
whole is nonetheless expected to see about 5% growth in 2010 and 2011; however, many countries remain
very poor: GDP per capita (at purchasing power parties) is under US$ 1000 (760 Euros) in over a dozen
Sub-Saharan countries (OECD, 2010). An optimistic 2025 scenario prepared in 2008 by the South African
government, “Nkalakatha”, sees policies for economic equity and environmental protection rather than
breakneck growth; none of this study’s scenarios imagine the country or Africa as a whole taking a new role
on the world stage by 2025. Such a role might instead take place in a longer time frame, perhaps building on
this sort of optimistic scenario for the coming decades (PAS, 2008).
Thus, a number of elements of uncertainty will influence this megatrend, in particular in terms of its
dimensions. The overall direction of a shift in power, in particular towards emerging economies in Asia
remains fairly clear. Indeed, while this megatrend represents a huge shift away from the economic powers of
the past two centuries, in a longer-term perspective it is a return of the pendulum. For much of the past two
millennia, in fact, the great majority of the world’s population and economic activity lay in Asia (Diamond).
111
Table 53: Scoring of the links and uncertainties associated with megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from
a uni-polar to multi-polar world
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties

Contribution: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
This megatrend is likely to have the following effects, based on its trends and pressures, on Europe:
Table 54: Likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC3. Power shifts – from a
uni-polar to multi-polar world
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming
decades and thus its effects in Europe
Indirect
Climate change
Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for
Europe, this could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with
resulting effects on natural resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and
agricultural runoff
Indirect
Pollution/health
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased
minerals and fuels extraction
Indirect
Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air
emissions, increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe
Direct
Pollution/health
The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in
terms of global environmental issues as well as policies to address them
Indirect
Climate change
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified some
likely impacts; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
112
This megatrend is very closely linked to continued economic growth: it presents a dominant pattern of the
world’s continued economic growth. For this reason, most of the consequences from the power shift are the
same as those in EC1(continued economic growth) (though slightly less powerful in strength).
One further consequence can be seen in terms of are channelled through changes in global governance,
and thus become quite uncertain. The shift in power will directly affect global decision-making on climate
change. Moreover, it can influence power relations in terms of access to natural resource use.
This is seen in the simulations in the background paper for OECD’s Environment Outlook to 2030: the
results of policy packages were forecast for their application in OECD countries alone, for OECD and the
“BRICs” (Brazil, Russia, India and China) and for the world as a whole. For measures to cut greenhouse gas
emissions, the participation of the BRICs yields almost equals the reductions to 2030 of OECD countries,
and global participation adds a smaller further reduction. To 2050 as well, the participation of BRICs is a key
factor in global emissions reductions. The weight of the BRICs is also significant for other environmental
pressures, such as air emissions of SO2 (PBL, 2008).
Table 55: Scoring the likely effects for Europe’s environment related to megatrend EC3. Power shifts
– from a uni-polar to multi-polar world
Likely effects on Europe’s
environment
Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Natural resource use
Direct
Indirect
Strength
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

 -/+

 -/+

n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The scoring of the effects is in many ways similar to that of EC1 (continued economic growth), as this
megatrend is seen as closely tied to that one.
As with EC1 (continued economic growth), the direct consequences for Europe’s environment are seen in
particular in terms of hemispheric air pollution.
Indirect consequences are strongest in terms of climate change, as emerging economies are expected to
have a growing share in global greenhouse gas emissions. Other indirect consequences are seen as lower.
An important difference is that this megatrend may have both positive and negative consequences for
Europe’s environment. The positive consequences arise from the possibility of reaching environmental
agreement with India, China and other emerging economies. In the immediate decade to come (e.g. to 2030,
as suggested by the PBL study), agreements between OECD countries and these key emissions sources
would address the largest share of global emissions.
The power shift also presents an opportunity to address other environmental issues, such as air emissions of
SO2 – while the BRICs can play a major role in reducing global emissions in coming decades, the
consequences for Europe are attenuated as they arrive through hemispheric transport.
113
The uncertainties, however, are very high – in particular when the interaction between rapid economic
growth of emerging economies and the unclear prospects of reaching environmental agreements with them.
Other consequences (e.g. governance)
It appears that the most important effect of this megatrend – when considered separately from others, such
continued economic growth – will mainly be in terms of global political and governance issues. Notably, as
shown in the PBL study cited above, agreements with the major emerging economies can have significant
results in terms of addressing climate change and other global issues. Thus, the opportunity exists for OECD
countries to seek ambitious agreements on key issues with the “BRICs”. More generally, agreement with
these countries will be a key step in any global agreements.
While beyond the topic of this study, it should be noted that shift in power can also bring risks of conflict. The
study Global Trends 2025: A Transformed World, also includes a scenario called “World without the West”, in
which the rise of new powers vying for influence leads to instability.
References
The analysis presented here used in particular the following background document:
Ecorys Nederland (Ecorys 2010), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s
future environment: Background document for SOER part A, Version 22/04/10
Other references include:
Diamond J. (1997), Guns, Germs, and Steel: The Fates of Human Societies
Ecorys Nederland BV (Ecorys), Analysis of global long-term economic megatrends shaping Europe’s future
environment: Background document for SOER part A – Version 22/04/10
Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (PBL), Background report to the OECD Environmental
Outlook to 2030: Overviews, details, and methodology of model-based analysis, 2008
OECD (2010), African Economic Outlook 2010
Policy Co-ordination and Advisory Services, Presidency of the Republic of South Africa (PCAS, 2008), South
Africa Scenarios 2025: The future we choose?
US National Intelligence C
114
8.11
ENV1: DECREASING STOCKS OF NATURAL RESOURCES
Summary of the megatrend
Natural resources include renewable resources that can be replenished if used sustainably (e.g. land/soil,
forest, water, fisheries and biodiversity) and non-renewable resources that are in finite supply which are not
replenished over foreseeable timescales (e.g. fossil fuels and water, metals, certain nutrients). While this
megatrend covers both, the analysis here focuses on the loss of renewable resources (issues related to nonrenewable resources are covered more closely under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for resources:
likely consequences on Europe’s environment). Increased competition for resources). Loss of biodiversity,
including ecosystems, species and genetic resources, which could be viewed as a key overarching
megatrend in its own right, is included here as it provides the fundamental underpinning of all natural stock;
crucial for the resilience and adaptive capacity of ecosystems.
The growing global populations and wealth associated with industrialised and industrializing countries, in
particular, are driving demand for food, water, energy and manufacturing raw materials, which are then
provided using unsustainable and exploitative practices as the norm.
Humanity’s demand on the planet’s living resources, its ‘Ecological Footprint’, now exceeds the planet’s
regenerative capacity by about 30 per cent (WWF, 2008). The Ecological Footprint measures humanity’s
demand on the biosphere in terms of the area of biologically productive land and sea required to provide the
resources we use and to absorb our waste (Figure 18).
Figure 18: Humanity’s ecological footprint, 1961-2005
Source: WWF (2008)
This manifests itself in large‐scale land conversion and ecosystem deterioration. The historical decline in the
area of temperate forest has been reversed, with an annual increase of 30 000 km2 between 1990 and
115
2005, but deforestation in the tropics, continued at an annual rate of 130,000 km2 over the same period.
Within the steadily expanding farmland area, regional overexploitation has led to serious soil degradation.
Since1960, alone, a third of the world’s farmland has been abandoned because it has been degraded
beyond use. It has been estimated that 10 million ha are destroyed per year (Schade and Pimentel, 2010). In
addition to the effect on terrestrial ecosystems, human resource use has had a profound effect on the marine
environment. Data on fish stocks (in terms of volume) exploited for at least 50 years highlight an increase in
the number of stocks either overexploited or that have crashed over the last few years.
Demand for natural resources will continue to rise steeply, given that the world’s population is increasing and
diets are shifting from cereal to meat consumption. One projection shows that global agricultural production
will need to increase by more than 50% in order to feed a population more than 27% larger and roughly 83%
wealthier than today’s (PBL, 2008). This can be achieved by either expanding the agricultural area and/or by
intensification of production, both of which may be expected to lead to further biodiversity loss.
Changes in other parts of the world which could lead to direct consequences for Europe include increased
likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change through deforestation and loss of GHG regulating
ecosystem services, biodiversity loss via loss of habitat, and impacts relating to exploitation of new and more
polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached.
Indirect environmental consequences could be linked to increasing scarcity of resources in developing
countries resulting in more competition for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (e.g. provision
of food, water, fisheries, timber, mining) and destabilization of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting
livelihoods and leading to migration from developing countries to Europe and increased pressure on
Europe’s environment. Indirect social-economic consequences could be positive e.g. shortage of water and
soil resource could drive food price rises (as long a food is produced in a sustainable way) and European
export potential or negative higher pressure for EU to engage in conflicts caused by resource loss and
degradation; requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc.
Potential interrelationships with other megatrends
Changing patterns of resource use are mainly determined by the growing population (shift in population size:
increase, decline and rising migration) linked with increasing per capita consumption of the emerging global
middle-income consumer class (emergence of a global middle-income consumer class), which is in turn
linked to growing economies (continued economic growth), intensified competition for resources (EC2) and
global urbanization (S3). These links are developed in the text below.
Land/soil
For terrestrial systems increasing demand for livestock products is a principal driver of land use change and
is projected to increase in the future (Figure 19). Expanding urban areas (global urbanisation) will also have
a significant impact on pressure for land, not the least because urban expansion worldwide tends to sprawl
on the best agricultural soils (PBL, 2008). Even if past productivity growth in agriculture can be achieved,
more people and a shifting diet mean more agricultural land use. Worldwide, the bulk of the expansion is
projected before 2030. Later, technology (global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
and the rise of the nano-, bio, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies) is expected to catch up with
increasing demand – first in OECD countries and BRIC (see Figure 19).
For example, up to 2030, one projection shows that global agricultural production will need to increase by
more than 50% in order to feed a population more than 27% larger and roughly 83% wealthier than today’s
(PBL, 2008). Although it is assumed that productivity of land will increase substantially (e.g. Royal Society,
2009), the global agricultural area will have to increase by roughly 10% to sustain this production (Figure 20).
116
Figure 19: Agricultural projection of agricultural area
Source: PBL (2008)
A major constraint on agricultural productivity is soil loss and degradation which has strong links to
population growth (shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration), economic growth
(continued economic growth), technological development (global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles), pollution (Env2) and climate change (Env3). The expansion of agriculture, together
with the development of other pressures, leads to an increase of the global agricultural area with high soil
erosion risk by 30% between 2000 and 2030, from 20 to 27 million km 2 (21% of the world land area) (OECD,
2008). This estimate is based on soil erosion by water will increasingly undermine soils’ capacity to support
food production.
Water scarcity
Water scarcity will worsen due to unsustainable use and management of the resource as well as climate
change (Figure 21). The number of people living in areas affected by severe water stress has been projected
to increase by another 1 billion to over 3.9 billion (47% of the world population) by 2030, mostly in nonOECD countries (OECD, 2008). According to the OECD Outlook Baseline, agricultural production will
increase two times faster in developing countries than in OECD countries, further exacerbating water scarcity
in those regions. Almost all of the projected 34% population increase to 2030 will occur in developing
countries, and growing urbanisation in both OECD and non-OECD countries will also increase demand for
public water supply. Electricity and industrial production will also increase much faster in non-OECD
countries than in OECD countries. Overall, pressures on water use are thus projected to increase at a much
higher pace in developing countries than in OECD countries.
117
Figure 20: Growth of world population, GDP per capita, agricultural production and crop area;
Baseline
Source: PBL (2008)
Figure 21: People living in areas of water stress, by level of stress (millions of people)
Source: OECD (2008)
Biodiversity
The complexity of the interrelationships with other megatrends for biodiversity is illustrated by Figure 22. The
five principal pressures directly driving biodiversity loss, recognised by the Convention on Biological Diversity
118
(CBD), i.e. habitat change, overexploitation, pollution, invasive alien species and climate change, have been
recently reviewed and are either constant or increasing in intensity (GBO3, 2010). Modelling projections
using a range of scenarios show the importance of factors such as infrastructure, crop area and climate
change to global biodiversity loss (e.g. Figure 23).
Figure 22: Links between biodiversity loss and the direct and indirect drivers of change
Source: PBL (2008)
119
Figure 23: Biodiversity loss between 2000 and 2050: baseline, global policy package and 450 ppm
multigas stabilisation. OECD Environmental Outlook modelling suite, final output from
IMAGE cluster (GLOBIO)
Source: PBL (2008)
Forests
Deforestation, mainly conversion of forests to agricultural land, is showing signs of decreasing in several
tropical countries but continues at an alarmingly high rate (GBO3, 2010, FAO, 2010). The net loss of forests
has slowed substantially, from approximately 83,000 square kilometres per year in the 1990s to just over
50,000 square kilometres per year from 2000-2010. This is mainly due to large-scale planting of forests in
temperate regions and to natural expansion of forests. Deforestation is likely to remain high, given the
increasing competition for different land-uses such as food production, biofuel production and urbanization
discussed above.
Fisheries
The FAO estimates that more than a quarter of marine fish stocks are overexploited (19%), depleted (8%) or
recovering from depletion (1%) while more than half are fully exploited. Although there have been some
recent signs that fishing authorities are imposing more realistic expectations on the size of catches that can
safely be taken out of the oceans, some 63% of assessed fish stocks worldwide require rebuilding. Coastal
habitats have come under pressure from many forms of development including tourism and urban
infrastructure, shrimp farming and port facilities including dredging. This is compounded by sea level rise,
creating what might be termed a “coastal squeeze”.
120
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 56: Uncertainties associated with megatrend Env1. Changing stocks of natural resources
Actual status of stocks of some key resources
Future trends in demand for food, water, energy and materials
Conservation efforts and moves to more sustainable practices
Impact on food production of diminishing supply of key nutrients
Resilience of ecosystems and potential for tipping points
Implications of emerging technologies and potential efficiency gains
Future path of energy sector and renewable
The first key uncertainty is over the actual magnitude of resources available. For renewable, it is clear that
land/soil, biodiversity, water, forests and fisheries are under tremendous and growing pressure in the 21 st
Century but most recent studies point towards stocks being sufficient if the resource in managed in a
sustainable way. For example, a comprehensive assessment of water management in agriculture was
conducted by the International Water Management Institute (IWMI) and posed the questions: ‘Is there
enough land, water, and human capacity to produce food for a growing population over the next 50 years—
or will we “run out” of water?’.The answer given was that ‘It is possible to produce the food—but it is
probable that today’s food production and environmental trends, if continued, will lead to crises in many parts
of the world. Only if we act to improve water use in agriculture will we meet the acute freshwater challenges
facing humankind over the coming 50 years’ (IWMI, 2007). Similar arguments have been put forward for
land, forest and fishery management (e.g. GBO3, 2010; FAO, 2008; Worm et al., 2009).
However, overexploitation is still significant in large parts of the world e.g. about 80 percent of the world
marine fish stocks for which assessment information is available are fully exploited or overexploited (GBO3,
2010). Future growth is thus assumed to come from aquaculture (e.g. Figure 24), although aquaculture is in
part dependent on capture fisheries for fishmeal feed. However, as the price of fish products increases, it is
projected that substitutes for fish feed for aquaculture, such as soya-based feed, will become more
economically viable for those species that can be fed a vegetarian diet. There is therefore a great deal of
uncertainty.
121
Figure 24: Projected composition of world fisheries to 2030: capture and aquaculture
Methodologies for estimating the trends also introduce uncertainty e.g. modelling of soil loss and degradation
is based on a water runoff compound index that does not capture cultivation practices, such as tillage (bound
to exacerbate the erosion risk) or contour ploughing and terracing (both enhancing soil conservation) (PBL,
2008).
There is a high risk of dramatic biodiversity loss and accompanying degradation of a broad range of
ecosystem services if ecosystems are pushed beyond certain thresholds or tipping points (GBO3, 2010). For
example, the Amazon forest, due to the interaction of deforestation, fire and climate change, could undergo a
widespread dieback, with parts of the forest moving into a self-perpetuating cycle of more frequent fires and
intense droughts leading to a shift to savanna-like vegetation. While there are large uncertainties associated
with these scenarios, it is known that such dieback becomes much more likely to occur if deforestation
exceeds 20 – 30% (it is currently above 17% in the Brazilian Amazon). It would lead to regional rainfall
reductions, compromising agricultural production. There would also be global impacts through increased
carbon emissions, and massive loss of biodiversity.
Future technology gains may not to be sufficient to slow use of food, water, energy and materials in the near
term for example, the ecological footprint developed by WWF, provides an overall view of human impacts on
the global environment, and shows a relative decoupling of the footprint and world GDP from the mid-1980s
to the middle of the past decade (see Figure 25). However, the indicator also suggests that the footprint of
human activities has already exceeded the world’s carrying capacity and it has continued to rise since then.
Technologies megatrends (T1 and T2) may accelerate this decoupling in coming decades, however, it is far
from clear if they can reverse absolute increases in resource consumption.
122
Figure 25: Relative decoupling between global GDP and the total ecological footprint
Source: OECD (2008)
On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this
megatrend as well as its uncertainty:
Table 57: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with Megatrend
Env3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends
Scale of uncertainties associated
with megatrend


Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Where:
 Megatrend likely to make a significant contribution to the impact identified.
 Number of assumptions megatrend is based on increases, and the contribution of the megatrend to the
impacts depends on the evolution of other trends.
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
123
Table 58 shows the direct and indirect consequences this megatrend is likely to have on Europe’s
environment, based on its trends and pressures, and the environmental issues they will affect. Loss of
habitats around the world will affect migratory species, e.g. birds, and the GHG regulating ecosystem
services of ecosystems such as forests and peatlands will influence global climate change (GBO3, 2010).
Direct impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/
shales as peak oil/coal is reached, is related to non-renewable resources that are covered more closely
under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment).
The likelihood of indirect environmental effects in Europe due to migration and increased completion for
resources is covered in megatrend S1 (Shifts in Population Size: Increase, Decline and Rising Migration)
and Ec2 respectively.
Table 58: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend Env.1 Resource
Likely effects on Europe’s environment
Direct/ Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Effects on biodiversity due to loss of habitat
Direct
Biodiversity/nature
Increased likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change in Europe as GHG
regulation lost in other parts of the world e.g. deforestration
Direct
Climate change
Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels,
such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached
Direct
Pollution/health
Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition
for Europe and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries,
timber, mining)
Indirect (env)
Resources/waste
Climate Change
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Pollution health
Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and
leading to migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s
environment
Indirect (env)
Climate Change
Resources/waste
Biodiversity/nature
Pollution health
124
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole –
described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 59: Scoring of the megatrend Env.1 resource use
Direct
Effects in Europe on:
climate change
Pollution and Health
Biodiversity and nature
natural resource use
Strength
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 +/-

 +/-

+

+

 +

+

+

+/-

Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The influence of deforestation on climate change is well recognised and of international concern but the
future direction and magnitude of GHG emissions is still very uncertain. Full account should be taken of the
greenhouse gas emissions associated with large-scale conversion of forests and other ecosystems into
cropland. This will prevent perverse incentives for the destruction of biodiversity through large-scale
deployment of biofuel crops, in the name of climate change mitigation (GBO3, 2010). When emissions from
land-use change rather than just energy emissions are factored into climate negotiations, plausible
development pathways emerge that tackle climate change without widespread biofuel use. Use of payments
for ecosystem services, such as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation (REDD)
mechanisms may help align the objectives of addressing biodiversity loss and climate change. However,
these systems must be carefully designed, as conserving areas of high carbon value will not necessarily
conserve areas of high conservation importance – this is being recognized in the development of so-called
“REDD-Plus” mechanisms.
The direct impacts on resource use and nature and pollution and health relate to exploitation of new and
more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached. There is a high
level of uncertainty attached to these effects as discussed under megatrend EC2 (Intensified competition for
resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment).
All the indirect effects on Europe of decreasing natural resources are highly uncertain and related to the
development of the economic, social and technological megatrends.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
There are various indirect socio-economic effects that could occur in Europe. Some are positive, such as
potential exploration of reserves in Europe previously considered not economically viable and shortages of
water and soil resource driving food price rises and European export potential, and some are negative, such
loss of genetic resource limiting potential to find new drugs and feed stocks for bio-based materials in
Europe.
125
There may also be higher pressure for the EU to engage in conflicts caused by resource loss and
degradation; requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc
The challenge for international governance is to overcome resistance of countries around the world to accept
the large scale environmental policy changes that may be necessary to protect global resources.
Reference
FAO (2008). The State of Food Insecurity in the World. High food prices and food security – threats and
opportunities.
FAO (2010). Global Forest Resources Assessment 2010. Key Findings:
http://www.fao.org/forestry/fra/en/
GBO3 (2010). Global Biodiversity Outlook 3, Secretariat of the Convention on Biological Diversity, Montréal,
94 pages. http://gbo3.cbd.int/
IWMI (2007). Water for Food, Water for Life, A Comprehensive Assessment of Water Management in
Agriculture. International Water Management Institute (IWMI), Earthscan.
OECD (2008). OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030.
http://www.oecd.org/document/20/0,3343,en_2649_34305_39676628_1_1_1_37465,00.htmls
PBL (2008). Background report to the OECD Environmental Outlook to 2030. Overviews, details, and
methodology of model-based analysis.
PBL (2009). PBL Getting into the Right Lane to 2050 at:
http://www.rivm.nl/bibliotheek/rapporten/500150001.pdf
Royal Society (2009). Reaping the benefits. Science and the sustainable intensification of global agriculture.
http://royalsociety.org/Reapingthebenefits/
Schade, C and Pimentel, D. (2010). Population crash: prospects for famine in the twenty-first century.
Environ. Dev. Sustain., 12: 245-262.
Worm B et al. (2009). Rebuilding global fisheries. Science, 325, 578.
WWF (2008). Living Planet Report 2008. WWF–World Wide Fund For Nature.
http://assets.panda.org/downloads/living_planet_report_2008.pdf
126
8.12
ENV2: INCREASINGLY UNSUSTAINABLE ENVIRONMENTAL POLLUTION LOAD
Summary of the megatrend
Pollution releases around the world are affecting human well-being, interacting with climate change and
harming ecosystems and contributing to biodiversity decline in heavily affected areas around the world.
Although there will be both increases and decreases in different global regions over the next decades,
pollution issues are expected to remain significant and be important for Europe’s environment. Pollutant
emissions around the globe are related to a large number of production and consumption patterns, including
fossil fuel combustion, industrial processes and agricultural production as well as land use changes related
to these. In developing countries, often, poor and under-resourced environmental policies, institutions and
enforcement leads to high pollution rates to water, land and air; a share of this pollution is related to goods
bound for the European market.
The megatrend consists of 5 sub-trends of particular importance:
Anthropogenic nitrogen additions into air, water and marine ecosystems
Increasing nitrogen pollution at global scale is of particular concern, the production and use of artificial
nitrogen fertilizers worldwide has enabled humankind to greatly increase food production , but it has also led
to a host of environmental problems, ranging from eutrophication of terrestrial and marine systems to
acidification and stratospheric ozone loss (Grennfelt, 2009) and antropogenic conversion of nitrogen to
reactive forms now concert around 120 million tonnes of N 2 from the atmosphere, now exceeding all natural
terrestrial ecosystem processes (Rockstrom et al, 2009a,b).
Future additions of reactive nitrogen from agriculture and sewage are expected to increase globally, despite
increasing efficiency of fertiliser use and implementation of sewage treatment in many countries (MNP
OECD 2008).
Anthropogenic disturbance of river nutrient loads and export to coastal marine systems is a major global
problem affecting water quality and biodiversity. The OECD projections indicate an overall increase in the
global quanitity of reactive nitrogen exported by rivers to coastal marine systems of about 4% over the next
three decades, with a decrease in OCED countries of about 5 % being overshadowed by an 11% increase in
BRIC (Brazil, Russia, India, China) countries (MNP OECD 2008).
Tropospheric ozone pollution from increasing hemispheric precursor emissions
Ground level (tropospheric) ozone is a global air pollution problem undergoing hemispheric transport (Royal
Society, 2008) and ozone is an important greenhouse gas, ranked third after carbon dioxide and methane
(Forster et al., 2007) although it was not included in the Kyoto Protocol as its contribution to greenhouse
warming was difficult to quantify (Pleijel et al., 2009). Ground level ozone, formed from emitted precursors,
has been recognised for decades as an important problem and remains one of the most pervasive of the
global air pollutants, with impacts on climate change, human health, food production, the terrestrial carbon
cycle and biodiversity (Royal Society 2008; Pliejel et al., 2009; Sitch et al., 2007).
Importance of atmospheric particulate matter pollution on health in developing countries and its
interaction with climate change at global scale
With humans having an increasing impact on the planet, the interactions between the nitrogen cycle, the
carbon cycle and climate are expected to become an increasingly important determinant of the Earth system.
127
Particulate matter indoor and outdoor pollution from burning of fossil fuels is causing significant numbers of
premature deaths and chronic illnesses around the world, especially in rapidly urbanising developing
countries is one of the major environmental causes of premature death and chronic illness (Cohen et al.,
2004, 2005). The WHO estimated that particulates in urban areas worldwide account for 2 per cent of
mortality from cardiopulmonary disease in adults and 1 per cent of premature deaths in the world each year
(WHO 2002). Some of the substances that make up particulate matter also affect radiative forcing and the
warming of our planet. Some cool (such as sulphate and organic carbon OC) and some warm (black carbon
– BC) (Forster et al., 2007; Ramanthan and Feng 2008; Hansson 2009). The balance of these particles in
the atmosphere will determine the extent of the warming from GHGs that are realised over the next decades.
Some particulate matter also affects cloud formation and rainfall distribution (UNEP 2002), although these
effects are subject to a large uncertainty (Hansson 2009).
Increased number of synthetic chemicals in the environment
Chemicals are used in every aspect of life. More than 50,000 compounds are used commercially and
hundreds are added each year, and the global chemical production is projected to increase by 8.5 per cent
over the next 20 years (OECD 2001; Dent et al., 2007) and the impacts on health are not fully known (MNPOECD 2008) due to insufficient information about amounts released, their toxic properties, effects on health
and safe limites for exposure (Dent et al., 2007). Persistent chemicals give the perspective of very long time
frames for the potential impact. The number of chemicals found in different terrestrial, aquatic and marine
ecosystem compartments, and in different organisms along food chains and in different tissues and organs
in the human body.
Increase of solid waste production.
Our modern consumption-driven society, favouring disposal over re-use, leads to increasing volumes of
waste in the EU (CEC 2005) and rapidly increasing volumes of waste in Asia (see Figure 26), Africa and
Latin America (Barr et al., 2007). The use of unsanitary land fills is becoming a problem in these regions, as
they contaminate land and groundwater. Recycling electronic waste can involve exposure to dangerous
metals including lead, mercury and cadmium if improperly handled and more than 90 per cent of the 20-50
million tonnes of electronic waste generated each year in the world ends up in China, India, Myanmar and
Pakistan (Brigden et al 2005).
128
Figure 26: Per capita municipal waste generation in selected Asian countries ()
Source: UNEP GEO4 in Barr et al 2007
Potential interrelationships with other megatrends
The megatrends of economic growth (continued economic growth), increasing wealth (the emerging global
middle-income consumer class) and an increasing global population (S1) will drive the processes that lead to
emissions of waste and the different pollutants, including reactive nitrogen, particulate matter and ozone
precursors.
Although there will be an increase in the activities that lead to emissions, the implementation of legislation
and new technologies that lead to reductions in emissions (T1. global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles), will contribute to decoupling pollution from economic growth. For example, economic
growth and energy use per unit GDP have decoupled in several key economic regions since 1990. This is
shown in Figure 27: energy use per GDP has declined globally and in Europe, Asia and the Pacific and Latin
America.
129
Figure 27: Energy use per US$1000 GDP (in PPP for 2000) from UNEP GEO 4, Kuylenstierna et al.
2007
These interactions can be seen in detail in terms of one of the pollution sub-trends, nitrogen, and specifically
the issues related to the creation of reactive nitrogen (Nr). Here a key factor is that population shifts (S1),
together with changing consumption patterns to due the rise of the middle-income consumers (S4) will
increase the demand for food and therefore increase the use of nitrogen fertiliser, with associated release
into the environment (Figure 28 – Haber Bosch line). The increasingly affluent population will tend to eat
more meat, again increasing the amount of nitrogen in each person’s diet and thus total nitrogen use and
release (Galloway et al., 2003).
While nitrogen fertiliser is a key element in growing global nitrogen pollution, another arises from air
emissions of NOx. The more affluent global population will lead to rapidly increasing electricity demand,
increasing the emission of nitrogen oxides from fossil fuel-based power stations and transport. However,
counteracting this would be fuel switching for electricity generation (e.g. to renewable or nuclear energy), in
particular related to climate change policies.
130
Figure 28: Global population trends from 1860 to 2000 and reactive N creation
Similarly, for particulate matter (PM) pollution, a growing population in poorer countries, using current
cooking methods will give rise to increased emissions and indoor particulate matter concentrations.
However, a shift to more modern fuels (e.g. LPG) or improved stoves, which is related to the megatrend of
continued economic growth of EC1, will eliminate or reduce PM emissions. An increasing population with
access to more resources will lead to increasing transport demand, potentially using diesel vehicles, causing
further particulate matter pollution. However, fuel switching (e.g. to compressed natural gas) or the
incorporation of particle traps (EURO 5 standard) globally would reduce the PM burden substantially.
Ozone pollution follows a similar trend, as the anthropogenic emissions of precursors is driven by population
(S1) and the emerging global middle-income consumer class (S3) affecting NOX, CH4, CO and nmVOC (nonmethane Volatile Organic Compound) emissions, but tempered by technological development and
application of control measures to key precursor emissions, the resulting emissions over the next few
decades will result in the interplay of these megatrends.
The emissions of air pollutants are of direct relevance to climate change (ENV3 Increasing severity of the
consequences of climate change). Many substances considered traditional air pollutants also have radiative
forcing properties. For example, sulphate formed from sulphur dioxide emissions cool the atmosphere. As
stated above ozone warms the atmosphere and black carbon, making up part of the total PM burden, is
another pollutant that warms the atmosphere and also reduces the albedo of snow, leading to increase rates
of melting of snow and ice, exacerbating the influence of climate change in sensitive glacial regions (Forster
et al, 2007). The effect of changing the concentrations of these substances, together with methane and CO,
both important precursors of tropsopheric ozone that also warm the atmosphere, may be significant to
climate changes over the next few decades, either making the impacts more or less severe in Europe and
other regions, depending on the emission levels of the different substances. Some projections of methane
emissions show an increase over the next decades which will affect background ozone concentrations (see
Figure 29).
Changes in climate (ENV3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change) and land use
(decreasing stocks of natural resources) will influence the production of emissions from natural sources.
Increased demand for energy, transport, food and non-food crops and other resources will influence
emissions arising from human activity, and changes in patterns of consumption and production will affect the
distribution of the pollutants (continued economic growth, Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment, power shifts – from a uni-polar to multi-polar world).
131
Figure 29: Methane emissions from human sources by World region for the new scenario (B2+current
legislation) compared to the original IPCC SRES B2 scenario (Royal Society 2008)
Source: Royal Society 2008
The chemical sector constitutes the third largest European manufacturing industry, providing 1.7 million jobs
and indirect employment for a further three million people (Enterprise Europe, 2001). As such there is a
political interest in keeping the growth of the sector and the demands of chemicals at a high level. This has
the potential for increasing the emissions of new synthetic substances to the environment, but is
counteracted by increasingly stringent regulation and enforcement in Europe (e.g. REACH legislation). This
has an effect on the rest of the world, especially for any products that are to be exported to the EU, that will
tend to reduce pollutant releases. However, the pollution loads in many Asian, African and Latin American
countries remains very high and in many cases largely unregulated, as compliance is underfunded. The
continued development of new synthetic and, in some cases, persistent chemicals leads to an ever
increasingly complex cocktail of chemical residues in the environment and in food (Vallack et al 1998, Dent
et al 2007). As it is virtually impossible to test for the toxicity of very many pollutants acting together on key
receptors (in people or the environment), the impact that this mixture is having remains rather unclear, but it
is potentially significant (Dent et al 2007 in GEO4).
Rapid economic growth (continued economic growth), urbanisation (Shift in population size: increase,
decline and rising migration) and new lifestyles associated with greater affluence (the emerging global
middle-income consumer class), have led to rapid changes in consumption patterns. This has contributed to
the generation of large quantities of solid waste, and changes in waste composition due to for example,
increased use of packaging and the development of cheap disposable technologies (e.g. electronic devices).
There is also an increasing global trade in waste with, for example, electronic waste being shipped in large
quantities from Europe to Asia (Brigden et al 2005), where they are recycled or disposed of in circumstances
that lead to health or environmental impacts in these countries. Improvements in biodegradable materials
arising from new technology may offset this trend (global acceleration and shifts in technology development
cycles).
132
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
Table 60 provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this megatrend:
Table 60: Uncertainties associated with megatrend ENV2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental
pollution load
Areas of uncertainty and indications of their dimension
Environmental governance at global scale, including climate change agreements
Environmental governance in world regions, in particular in Asia
National environmental governance in emerging economies
Technology development and diffusion
Interaction of air pollution (sulphates) with climate change
A key uncertainty for this megatrend is environmental governance. At global level, possible agreements on
climate change can lead to a decline in pollution, notably NOx and other forms of air pollution emissions. At
regional level, the development of agreements in areas such as transboundary air pollution can play an
important role. The success of the Convention on LRTAP (Grennfelt 2009) and the EU programmes has
inspired South Asia to initiate inter-governmental cooperation on transboundary air pollution issues under the
Malé Declaration on Pollution Control and Prevention in South Asia (Hicks et al., 2001; Kuylenstierna et al
2007) which may, in time, be used to set regional standards. One of the functions of the increasingly close
interaction between the LRTAP Convention and these emerging Asian inter-governmental agreements is in
relation the transfer of the considerable experience in Europe about air pollution to these regions.
Environmental governance in emerging economies, and in particular in India and China, will play a key role
in shaping the future pollution trends.
In some areas, pollution control methods are spreading among countries. An example of this is the adoption
of the EURO standard approach in many Asian countries, though their European origins are not always clear
(In India similar emission standards are known as ‘Bharat Standards’). (See Figure 30). This may increase
as other regions of the world use European experience in reducing pollution; the possibility of intergovernmental agreements in this area is also possible.
133
Figure 30: Level of automobile emission limits in Asian countries, compared with the European
Union,
for
new
light-duty
vehicles
(as
of
March
2008)
CAI
Asia,
2008
Source: Royal Society 2008
The uncertainties associated with technology are also major, as described in T1 and T2. For example,
biotechnology may have a transformative effect on economic sectors such agriculture.
One element of the policy uncertainties will be the degree of greenhouse mitigation as some (though not all)
air pollutants are co-emitted with carbon dioxide. The impact of air pollution on the degree of warming and
climate change has a large uncertainty, mainly related to the uncertainty in global emissions of radiatively
active substances or their precursors. Key uncertainties relate to the future use of coal worldwide, quantity
as well as the technology used, and also the degree of implementation of abatement equipment e.g. in China
(MNP OECD 2008).
Future ozone concentrations are dependent on the future emissions of precursors globally, and there is
uncertainty about these. There is also an interaction with climate change and the influence of climate change
on future ozone concentrations is spatially and temporally variable, but there is a general tendency for
climate change to increase ozone over polluted land regions and reduce it over the oceans (Royal Society
134
2008). Over Europe, total ozone is expected to decrease in different scenarios (Royal Society 2008), but
there is another feature of ozone which means that concentrations in European urban areas have increased
as NOX controls have been implemented due to the interaction (titration) between NOX and ozone, and levels
in European cities are expected to occur as more NOX emissions are reduced (Royal Society 2008).
As well as uncertainty in emissions there is also current scientific uncertainty relating to the extent of the
interaction of pollution and climate change. For example the impact of black carbon on warming has a high
uncertainty (Forster et al., 2007), whereas the impact of sulphate, ozone, CO and methane on radiative
forcing are better quantified (Forster et al., 2007) (see Figure 31).
The level of PM pollution in Europe will decrease and the level of uncertainty is rather low. However,
projections see increases in other developing and industrialising regions (MNP OECD 2008) where the
uncertainty is much higher due to the lack of knowledge of the long-term prospects for pollution control in
many countries.
135
Figure 31: Summary of the principal components of the radiative forcing of climate change. All
these radiative forcings result from one or more factors that affect climate and are
associated with human activities or natural processes. The values represent the forcings
in 2005 relative to the start of the industrial era (about 1750). Human activities cause
significant changes in long-lived gases, ozone, water vapour, surface albedo, aerosols
and contrails. The only increase in natural forcing of any significance between 1750 and
2005 occurred in solar irradiance. Positive forcings lead to warming of climate and
negative forcings lead to a cooling. The thin black line attached to each coloured bar
represents the range of uncertainty for the respective value
Source: Forster et al. 2007
On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of this
megatrend as well as its uncertainty:
136
Table 61: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with Megatrend
ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends
Scale of uncertainties associated with
megatrend


Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Low uncertainty: little doubt over magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects
Medium uncertainty: some doubt over magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects
High uncertainty: difficult to determine magnitude and direction of megatrend’s effects
The linkages between drivers of pollutant emission and transformation of the environment are well
established in the scientific literature, especially in Europe. Many of the megatrends interact with pollutant
emissions, including those related to population, technology, affluence, climate change, burden on health
and global regulation. Therefore, the aggregate extent of linkages is categorised as ‘strong’. Pollution covers
a multitude of substances, emitted across the globe, having many different impacts. In some cases the
pathway from emission transport in the environment and impact is well known. In other cases the details are
less well established or the complexity such that it is more difficult to quantify. Therefore, the scale of overall
uncertainties is classified as ‘medium’ as the megatrend contains a mixture of more certain and less certain
relationships.
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
Table 62 shows the direct and indirect consequences this megatrend is likely to have on Europe’s
environment, based on its trends and pressures, and the environmental issues they will affect.
The biggest impact of pollutants on Europe will be related to pollutants emitted in Europe, directly affecting
health and ecosystems. Air pollutants emitted in other regions will also directly affect the European
environment. This includes imports of regional air pollution from neighbouring regions (e.g. PM from N Africa
or parts of Asia close to Europe) and of hemispheric air pollutants, especially tropospheric ozone. Overall,
these imports will be relatively small compared to European emissions: even where ozone is concerned,
European precursor emissions are forecast to have a greater impact on European ozone levels (Royal
Society 2008).
However, with the increasingly successful implementation of protocols and legislation in Europe, the
proportion of remaining ozone caused by other regions will become more significant. In more remote
locations, changes in background ozone concentrations driven by changes in methane and hemispheric
emissions of ozone precurors subject to long range transport will dominate (Royal Society 2008).
While these levels will remain low, it is becoming increasingly understood that the total health impact of
ozone is driven more by baseline ozone concentrations (i.e. made up of background concentrations and
emission in Europe) than the peak ozone (Royal Society 2008), and therefore the currently rising
hemispheric background concentration levels is a concern for Europe. At present, tropospheric ozone
137
concentrations have been estimated to cause 21,400 premature deaths each year (EEA 2007), and has a
direct impact on crop yield and quality and was estimated to cause an annual economic loss in arable crop
production of €6.7 billion in the EU (in 2000 – Royal Society 2008). While imports in coming decades are
likely to be only related to only a small share of total impacts, they will nonetheless play a growing role.
The emissions of persistant organic pollutants (POPs) are also important for Europe as POPs released into
the environment in other regions can concentrate in important European ecosystems, especially the Arctic
and concentrate in food chains (Vallack et al 1998). Here, impacts should decline due to global restrictions
on these chemicals, for example through the Stockholm Convention.
A significant issue for Europe is the interaction between air pollution and climate change. There are
suggestions that recent rapid warming of Europe over the last decades has been significantly related to the
reduction in sulphate over Europe (Hjorth and Raes, 2009). Tropospheric ozone is the third most important
greenhouse gas (after CO2 and methane) and warms the atmosphere and black carbon is another important
warming agent (Forster et al, 2007). The trajectory of temperature changes in Europe could be heavily
dependent on what happens to pollution emissions in Europe and elsewhere (Ramanathan and Feng 2008).
While the precursors of ozone formation have decreased in Europe, background concentrations of ozone
have increased over time (Figure 32). The increasing methane emission over this time period is one likely
contributing factor (see Figure 4). However, global modelling indicates that the overall impact of measures in
Europe will lead to decreased ozone concentration overall, but with projected increases in parts of Asia
(Royal Society 2008).
Figure 32: Trends in monthly mean and 12 month running mean (solid line) baseline oxzone
concentration from April 1987 to April 2007 at Mace Head, Ireland
Source: Derwent et al, 2008 as shown in Royal Society 2008
The impacts on Europe of the growing volume and number of synthetic chemicals released around the world
are not possible to estimate. While information on the health effects of chemicals is incomplete, Europe is
developing a growing understanding of this as well as the impact of chemicals acting together through
138
REACH and other legislation. However, as shown for megatrends T1 and T2, a growing share of
technological development will occur outside of Europe and OECD countries in coming decades.
Table 62 Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend ENV2. Increasingly
unsustainable environmental pollution load
Likely effects on Europe’s environment of pollution from
outside Europe
Direct/ Indirect
Environmental
Area:




Climate change
Pollution
Biodiversity
Resources
Atmospheric pollution (ozone and its precursors including methane, aerosols) and
nitrogen effects on terrestrial ecosystems can influence climate change
Direct
Climate Change
Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background
concentrations of ozone and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and
POPs
Direct
Pollution
Health impacts from pesticide residues in imported food
Indirect (env)
Biodiversity
Pollution
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s environment
as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend as a whole –
described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 63: Scoring of the megatrend ENV2. Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
Direct
Effects in Europe on:
Climate change
Pollution and health
Biodiversity and nature
Natural resource use
Strength
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 +/-

 +/-

 +

N/A

-

+

 +/-

 +/-

Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The effects on Europe are discussed in terms of the following specific areas.
139
Climate Change
Air pollution emissions from the northern hemisphere outside of Europe have a significant direct impact on
climate change in Europe. This is due to the transport of pollutants in the atmosphere that affect radiative
forcing over Europe. For example, precursors of ozone emitted outside Europe (especially methane) affects
ozone concentrations across Europe, and ozone is the third most important GHG according to the IPPC
(Forster et al., 2007). There are limited imports of other radiatively active pollutants such as sulphate and
black carbon, but these are smaller in size as they have shorter residence times in the atmosphere
compared to ozone or methane. Any emissions of air pollution in the northern hemisphere which are
radiatively active will affect temperature change in Europe (Shindell et al, in press). This includes total
sulphate emission, which has a cooling effect on the climate affecting This includes sulphate concentrations
which cool the atmosphere, the emissions of sulphur dioxide will therefore effect the rate of change of global
temperature (Ramanathan and Feng 2008).
N emissions have various indirect impacts on climate change in Europe: N deposition will affect N2O
emissions which is a very important GHG. Nitrogen deposition will also affect carbon sequestration in
terrestrial ecosystems.
Pollution and Health
The impact of PM on human health is very important in Europe, but only a small proportion of European PM
arises from outside Europe. Due to rapid economic growth and increasing fossil fuel combustion, particularly
of coal, sulphur emissions (and therefore sulphate concentrations – an important part of total PM burden in
many regions) in many developing countries have increased substantially in the past few decades and global
levels are expected to remain fairly constant at global scale until 2050 (MNP-OECD, 2008). Ozone
transported from other regions affects human health, but the health impact of ozone is not as large as PM.
Chemical pollution imported in food has the potential to affect health in Europe, although this is tempered by
increasingly stringent food quality standards.
Biodiversity
POPs emitted in the N hemisphere will tend to move and concentrate in the arctic environment. There is
concern about the direct eco-toxicological effects on Europe’s arctic wildlife due to high levels of POPs
(Vallack et al. 1998). Pollution by POPs, or of waterways where migratory birds reside for part of the year,
could affect the populations of migratory birds that visit Europe. The Stockholm Convention for POPs should
mean that this treat reduces in the future. Eutrophication of terrestrial ecosystems by nitrogen will potentially
have a large biodiversity impact, but the timescales for the impact are large and uncertainty high, and the
proportion of N deposited over Europe from outside the region is relatively small. Ozone does effect
biodiversity but the magnitude of the effect in still highly uncertain.
Natural Resources
Pollution, by nitrogen for example, affects marine ecosystems globally and this impacts on fish and shellfish
populations and therefore can have an indirect impact on supply of seafood to European markets.
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
While climate change is a major issue for global governance, air pollution has been addressed mainly on a
regional level. The interactions between air pollutants, notably SOx emissions, and climate change are not
fully understood, but nonetheless underline the importance of addressing these issues together.
More generally, it appears that pollution issues will need to be addressed further at global level. For
example, the waste trade has grown rapidly in recent decades: exports of paper and plastic from the EU15
more than five-fold between 1995 and 2005 (EEA 2009). Legal exports and illegal shipments of hazardous
waste and electronic waste have grown in prominence (Milieu et al, 2009). In future decades, however, the
140
solid waste produced in emerging economies is likely to grow significantly – including economies such as
China that now receive major shipments from the EU. This implies that global agreements in this area may
need to be strengthened. Moreover, Europe may need to whether the balance between environmental
protection and free trade in this area should be adjusted, perhaps towards further domestic waste
management.
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Future. In Global Environment Outlook 4 (GEO4). UNEP, Nairobi.
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8.13
INCREASING SEVERITY OF THE CONSEQUENCES OF CLIMATE CHANGE
Summary of the megatrend
Climate change has arguably become the first truly global environmental mega-trend driven mostly by GHG
emissions from fossil fuel use for energy but also by unsustainable agricultural practices such as forest
clearance for agriculture (IPCC 2007a). It can be viewed as a driver of environmental change in its own right
as it affects the direction and magnitude of other trends and indeed megatrends. It represents an additional
pressure on top of factors such as freshwater extraction, urban sprawl, use of natural capital, and other
forms of socio-economic development and land use changes.
Temperature rises over 2 °C above pre-industrial levels are likely to cause major societal and environmental
disruptions through the rest of the century and beyond, and make it challenging for human and natural
systems to cope and adapt at affordable economic, social and environmental costs. Vulnerabilities differ
across regions, sectors and communities in Europe, with pronounced consequences expected in the
Mediterranean basin, North-Western Europe and the Arctic. Many coastal zones, river-flood prone areas and
mountains are vulnerable to climatic changes, as are cities and urban areas.
In Europe, current and projected climate change encompasses far-reaching impacts including: temperature
increases; sea-level rise; changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and
intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts). This suggests that climate change will affect the
vulnerability of European society as a whole in many of its dimensions, including threats to human health,
damage to economic sectors (e.g. energy, agriculture, and tourism) and to ecosystem goods and functions
as well as loss of biodiversity at all levels.
Europe has a dual role as "victim" of global change impacts and at the same time a major contributor to
global change - both aspects are policy relevant. On the one hand, adaptation can reduce the vulnerability of
human and natural systems and strengthen their resilience to current and expected climate change. On the
other hand, GHG emissions to date have predominantly been from the industrialised countries of the
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) but in the future an increasing proportion
of GHGs will originate from non OECD countries (e.g. Brazil, China and India) (Figure 33 and Figure 34),
including embodied emissions associated with imports to Europe. If Europe were to take its full responsibility
for global environment impacts, it would need to properly internalise the externalities related to its activities
and consumption.
Figure 33: Energy-related CO2 emissions in the World Energy Outlook 2008 Reference Scenario by
fuel and region
Source: OECD-IEA (2009)
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Figure 34: Total Greenhouse gas emissions by region (1970-2050) Simulation runs showing baseline
case with no further action taken to reduce emissions (on left) and to stabilise atmospheric
concentration at 450ppm CO2eq (on right), one of the most ambitious targets being discussed. The
simulation shows that to reach this target, actions by all countries are needed to achieve a 39%
reduction in global greenhouse gas emissions by 2050 relative to 2000 levels. Such action would
reduce GDP by 0.5% and 2.5% below Baseline estimates in 2030 and 2050 respectively, equivalent to
a reduction in annual GDP growth of about 0.1 percentage points per annum on average.
Source: OECD (2008)
Increasing pressure on resources in developing countries will mean more competition for resources for
Europe and this could have serious consequences considering the high level of imports to Europe that rely
on the availability of key resources such as water. Climate change impacts outside of Europe could trigger
migration towards Europe which could potentially increase pressure on Europe resources and political unrest
over competition for resources could require European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc.
Potential interrelationships with other megatrends
This megatrend is the result of several of the other megatrends acting together to produce increasing
emissions of GHGs globally. These include shifts in population size (Shift in population size: increase,
decline and rising migration), the emerging global middle-income consumer class (global urbanisation),
global urbanisation (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), continued economic growth
(continued economic growth), decreasing stocks of natural resources (decreasing stocks of natural
resources) and increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load (Increasingly unsustainable
environmental pollution load) (IPCC, 2007a, Raupach et al. 2007). Economic growth and increasing levels of
consumption are the key drivers especially in emerging economies.
In turn climate change affects other megatrends such as changing patterns of disease burden (changing
patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics) and feeds back on the environmental
megatrends (decreasing stocks of natural resources and Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution
load). For example, ‘tipping points’ may exist in the Amazon for total deforested area (>40%) and for global
warming (DT > 3–48C) where crossing these limits could mean that the regional climate changes induced by
the large-scale deforestation itself could prevent the re-establishment of parts the forest (Nobre et al. 2009).
Key uncertainties associated with the megatrend
144
The following table provides an initial overview of the key uncertainties that have been identified with this
megatrend:
Table 64: Uncertainties associated with megatrend ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change
Areas of uncertainty and indications of their dimension
Scientific:
- climate sensitivity to CO2 concentration;
- rate of climate change
- understanding the dynamics of glaciers and their melting;
- magnitude of feedbacks between biogeochemical cycles and climate change and potential for tipping
points;
- magnitude of effects of climate change and atmospheric CO2 concentration on food production;
- magnitude of effects of climate change on water availability;
- magnitude of long-term health impacts from altered climate;
- response of disease vectors and transmission mechanisms to changed climate;
- 2010 biodiversity targets not met in Europe and elsewhere and adaptive capacity is being lost with
largely unknown consequences;
- how loss of biodiversity will affect resilience of ecosystems and human-dominated systems;
- unknown potential uses for genetic resources that are lost;
- extent of sea level rise/inundation: very hard to anticipate, very location-specific;
- relative importance of sea level rise vs. incidence of severe storms on coastal areas
Other key uncertainties:
- Technological developments
- Regional and sectoral differences in climate change vulnerabilities and socio-economic conditions
make adaptation a context and location-specific challenge;
- Political uncertainty and potential to mitigate future emissions
Table 64 illustrates that there is still some scientific uncertainty over the potential severity of the
consequences of climate change, especially as projections require assumptions to be made about socioeconomic variables such as economic growth, available technology, GDP and population.
145
IPCC scenario projections suggest global mean temperatures could rise by as much as 1.8-4.0 °C over the
course of this century (Figure 35) if global action to limit GHG emissions proves unsuccessful (IPCC, 2007a).
Recent observations give reason to believe that rate of growth of GHG emissions and many climate impacts
are approaching the upper boundary of the IPCC range of projections rather than to the lower ones, as
illustrated by comparing the IPCC projections (Figure 35) with observations of CO2 emissions (Figure 36).
Figure 35: Atmosphere-Ocean Circulation Model Projections of surface warming
Source: IPCC AR4, 2007b, Synthesis report
146
Figure 36: Comparison of IPCC Scenario projections with observed global fossil fuel and industrial
CO2 emissions
Source: Richardson et al. (2009)
147
The Summary for Policy Makers of the Fourth Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007a) of the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) states that “there is high confidence that recent
regional changes in temperature have had discernible impacts on many physical and biological
systems”, where ‘high confidence is defined as ‘about 8 out of 10 chance’. The impacts this statement
is referring to are illustrated in Figure 37 and it can be seen that they are wide-ranging and linked to
the uncertainties detailed in Table 64. As Figure 34 states the impacts will vary by extent of
adaptation, rate of temperature change and socio-economic pathway but will also depend on the
actual increase in global average temperature. Past emissions are estimated to involve some
unavoidable warming (about a further 0.6°C by the end of the century relative to 1980-1999) even if
atmospheric greenhouse gas concentrations remain at 2000 levels (see Figure 35) (see Working
Group I AR4, 2007b) and Figure 37 and Figure 34 show that further warming is inevitable.
148
Figure 37: Key impacts identified by the IPCC AR4 with a high level of confidence associated
with them
Source: IPCC (2007a)
Figure 38 is a new version of the so-called “burning embers diagram”, which shows the increasing risk
of various types of climate impacts with an increase in global average temperature. Using the same
methodology, the reasons for concern have been updated based on the most recent research (Smith
et al. 2009). Several insights relevant to the definition of dangerous climate change are obvious from
a comparison of the 2001 and 2009 diagrams. First, risks of deleterious climate change impacts now
appear at significantly lower levels of global average temperature rise in the more recent analysis.
Second, a 2oC guardrail, which was thought in 2001 to have avoided serious risks for all five reasons
for concern, is now inadequate to avoid serious risks to many unique and threatened ecosystems and
to avoid a large increase in the risks associated with extreme weather events. Third, the risks of large
149
scale discontinuities (see below) were considered to be very low in 2001 for a 2 oC increase but are
now considered to be moderate for the same increase.
Figure 38: Diagram relating the potential impacts of climate change to the rise in global
average temperature. Zero on the temperature scale corresponds approximately to 1990
average temperature, and the bottom of the temperature scale to pre-industrial average
temperature. The level of risk or severity of potential impacts increases with the intensity of
red colour. The 2oC guardrail is shown for reference
Source: Richards et al. (2009) in Smith et al (2009)
In summary, although a 2oC rise in temperature above pre-industrial remains the most commonly
quoted guardrail for avoiding dangerous climate change, it nevertheless carries significant risks of
deleterious impacts for society and the environment. Stabilising atmospheric concentrations at any
level will require emissions to be reduced to near-zero levels in the long term. Some of the projected
pathways that give a reasonable chance of staying within the 2°C guardrail (Figure 12) suggest that
global society may need to develop the capacity to remove carbon from the atmosphere. Although
some promising technologies - for example, Carbon Capture and Storage, CCS – are under
development, they are still some way from being deployed commercially and on a large-scale.
Stochastic models and probabilistic projections have been increasingly developed in recent years to
quantify key uncertainties. For example, IPCC AR4’s projections show that a reduction by 50% of
global GHGs by 2050 would give a 50% chance of staying in the long term below a 2 oC increase in
global temperature compared to pre-industrial levels (IPCC AR4, 2007 quoted in EEA, 2010a).
Although many early impacts of climate change can be effectively addressed through adaptation, the
options for successful adaptation diminish and the associated costs increase with increasing climate
change. At present we do not have a clear picture of the limits to adaptation, or the cost, partly
because effective adaptation measures are highly dependent on specific, geographical and climate
risk factors as well as institutional, political and financial constraints.
150
There are some impacts for which adaptation is the only available and appropriate response. An
indication of these impacts can be seen in Figure 37. A wide array of adaptation options is available,
but more extensive adaptation than is currently occurring is required to reduce vulnerability to future
climate change. There are barriers, limits and costs, but these are not fully understood.
Figure 39: Energy-related emission trajectories from 2000 to 2100 to achieve stabilisation of
greenhouse gases in the atmosphere at three different targets (coloured lines). The black line
is a reference trajectory based on no climate policy. Estimated (median) probabilities of
limiting global warming to maximally 2°C are indicated for the three stabilisation targets
Source: Richardson et al. (2009)
On the basis of the analysis above, the following scores are assigned regarding the extent of links of
this megatrend as well as its uncertainty:
Table 65: Scoring of the extent of the links and scale of the uncertainties associated with
Megatrend ENV3. Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Extent of potential links with other
megatrends

Scale of uncertainties associated
with megatrend

Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
151
Likely effects for Europe’s environment
The direct effects to Europe’s environment listed in Table 3 reflect the key past and projected effects
of climate change on sectors for the main bio-geographical regions of Europe (Figure 40). These are
covered in more detail in the impact summary sheet annex of this report.
Figure 40: Key past and projected effects on sectors for the main bio-geographical regions of
Europe
Note: Please notice that original biogeographical regions of Europe have been regrouped as follows: Arctic:
Arctic; Boreal region: Boreal region; North-western Europe: Atlantic region; Central and eastern Europe:
Continental region minus North/West of Italy + Pannonian region + Steppic region; Mountain areas: Alpine – Alps
152
+ Alpine – Apennines + Alpine – Balkan – Rhodope Mountains + Alpine – Carpathian + Alpine – Fennoscandian
+ Alpine – Pyrenees + Anatolian region + Alpine – Dinaric Alps; Mediterranean region: Mediterranean region +
Black sea region + North/West of Italy. Arctic – Greenland does not belong to a biogeographical region of
Europe.
Source: EEA (2010)
Indirect effects
The indirect impacts hinge upon the socio-economic repercussions in regions outside of Europe. For
example, from Figure 41 it is clear that Europe is heavily reliant on imported goods, and impacts of
climate change in other parts of the world can affect resource availability. This could include food and
water shortages and this could lead to increased migration pressure on Europe which is likely to be
less effected than other regions. In 1990, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC)
expressed that the greatest single impact of climate change might be on human migration by the
displacement of millions of people as a result of agricultural disruption, shoreline erosion and coastal
flooding (Lonergan, 1998).
Climate Change drivers for migration can be slow-onset changes e.g. sea-level rise, growing water
scarcity, desertification and food insecurity or sudden hazards known as climate events e.g. monsoon
floods, hurricanes, earthquakes, glacial lake flood outbursts and typhoons (McLeman and Smit,
2005). Environment-related migration can be both regional and international. In Africa, climate change
is having a major impact in the area of Darfur and the European Commission predicts that both
international and national migration is ‘likely to intensify’ (European Commission, 2008). According to
OECD (2009), while climate change will lead to population movement, the true extent of migration
(international to regional) ‘is far from certain’ (see Figure 42, Figure 43, Figure 44 and Figure 45)
Figure 41: International trade – importers and exporters
Source: FAO (2009)
153
Likely consequences on Europe’s environment
Direct/
Indirect
Environmental Area:
Increasing threat to food production in parts of Europe due to changing
length of growing season and increase in extreme climatic events
Direct
Climate change
Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent
and intense extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts).
Direct
Climate change
Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing
prevalence of tropical diseases in Europe
Direct
Loss of biodiversity in terms of species and habitats, shifts in phenology
Direct
Biodiversity/nature
Sea level rise
Direct
Climate change
Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger
migration from DCs to Europe or have economic repercussions, and
increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
Climate change




Climate change
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Resources/waste
Climate change
Pollution and health
Pollution/health
Biodiversity/nature
Resources/waste
Table 66: Likely effects on Europe’s environment related to megatrend Env.3 Increasing
severity of the consequences of climate change.
154
Figure 42: Countries facing food crises as of August 2008
Source: FAO (2008)
Figure 43: Multiple Stress Zones: Instability is likely to be greatest in areas of Multiple
Environmental Stress
Source: DCC (2007)
155
156
Figure 44: Global impacts of climate change. Source: IAASTD (2008)
157
Figure 45. Origin and destinations of international migrants‐ climate change and environment
induced uncertainty for the future
Source: Warner (2008)
The following table presents estimated scores for the extent of the consequences for Europe’s
environment as well as the uncertainties. These uncertainties are related to those for the megatrend
as a whole – described above – as well as uncertainties with the likely consequences themselves.
Table 67: Scoring of the megatrend Env.3 Increasing severity of the consequences of climate
change for likely effects on Europe’s environment.
Direct
Effects in Europe on:
climate change
Strength
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 +/-

+

+

+

Biodiversity and nature
 +

+

natural resource use
+/-

+

Pollution and health
Strength of megatrend effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=
Direction of contribution: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
158
Other consequences (e.g. for governance)
Food and water shortage, destabilization of ecosystems and health effects might lead to social unrest;
requiring European humanitarian aid efforts/ peace-keeping etc
Reference
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159
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9.
ANNEX II: THEMATIC IMPACT SUMMARIES
9.1
CLIMATE CHANGE
The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely
effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe;

Climate change

Pollution and health

Biodiversity and nature

Natural resource use.
These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment
caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another
part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects
identified for climate change is presented in Table 70 in below. From the likely effects identified in
Table 70 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I
but it is useful to provide an overview here;

Global population growth is likely to result in increased emissions of GHGs globally. The
aging of the world’s population could also increase GHS emissions, but this is highly
uncertain.

Aging of Europe’s population is likely to increase Europe’s vulnerability to climate change
impacts, and may also reduce the amount of money available to respond to climate change.

Urbanisation, rising incomes and increased economic growth are linked, and are likely to act
together to increase global GHG emissions.

The loss of certain global resources, such as the Amazon forests, may reduce ability of the
ecosphere to regulate GHG emissions, leading to increasingly severe climate change impacts
in Europe.

Increased pollution, such as water and air pollution, in Europe will be exacerbated by climate
change.

Technology may provide a means to reduce GHG emissions, potentially reducing the effects
of climate change in Europe.

The role of fast-growing economies, such as India and China, in mitigating GHG emissions
will becomes increasingly important over the long-term.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on climate change in
Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex 1 for more detail). Table
68 below provides a summary of the strength and uncertainty of likely effects to climate change in
Europe, by megatrend.
Table 68: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to climate change in Europe
Direct
Megatrend
Strength
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration
161
n.a.
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
n.a


S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth
bulges
n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

S3: Global urbanisation
n.a.
n.a.
+

S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
n.a.
n.a.
+

S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking
youth in an unequal world
n.a.
n.a.
+

S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and
risk of new pandemics
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles
 -

 -/+

T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies
 -

 -/+

EC1: Continued economic growth
n.a.
n.a.
 +

EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment
n.a.
n.a.
-

EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
 +/-

 +/-

ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution
load
 +/-

 +/-

ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change
 +/-

+

Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
Most of the direct effects to climate change in Europe are likely to arise from the environmental
megatrends, with medium uncertainty, although these effects may increase or decrease the pressure
of climate change on Europe.
The direct effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are relatively few.
Technology may actually reduce the direct effects, although it could also increase the indirect effects
of climate change on Europe. However any predictions of what solutions technology can offer are
highly uncertain.
The indirect effects of the global megatrends to climate change in Europe are likely to be strong, and
S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued economic growth) are
likely to particularly significant in increasing the effect of climate change. Predictions of the likely
162
effect of both of these megatrends have low uncertainty attached to them. S3 (global urbanisation) is
closely associated with S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class) and EC1 (continued
economic growth), driven by and driving both megatrends, but considered in isolation is likely to have
a weak effect on increasing climate change in Europe. S1 (shift in population size: increase, decline
and rising migration) is likely to have a medium effect on climate change in Europe, with low
uncertainty attached. S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are also likely to
have an medium indirect effect on climate change in Europe, but the uncertainty of these effects is
high.
Outlooks for Europe’s environment
A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the
scale of potential climate change effects. There is extensive amount of data and information available
describing the potential impacts of climate change in Europe (for example see EEA 2008), a
summarised selection of which is presented below. This summary is followed by a description of the
spatial and temporal distributions of these impacts.
Table 69: Impacts of climate change on Europe from EEA (2008) Impacts of Europe’s changing
climate – 2008 indicator-based assessment
Temperature change

The annual average temperature for Europe is projected to increase by 1.0–5.5 °C
(comparing 2080–2100 with the 1961–1990 average) (Figure 46).

Extreme high temperature events across Europe, along with the overall warming, are projected
to become more frequent, intense and longer this century.

Night temperatures are projected to increase considerably (Figure 47) (possibly leading to
additional health problems and even mortality, at least partly compensated by reduced mortality
in winter).
Figure 46: Modelled change in mean temperature over Europe between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099
Source: EEA (2008)
Figure 47: Modelled number of tropical nights over Europe during summer (June–August) 1961–
1990 and 2071–2100
163
Source: EEA (2008)
Changing rainfall patterns

Climate models project changes in precipitation that vary considerably from season to season
and across regions. Geographically, projections indicate a general precipitation increase in
northern Europe and a decrease in southern Europe (Figure 48). Many parts of Europe are
projected to experience dryer summers Relatively small precipitation changes are projected for
spring and autumn.
Figure 48: Modelled precipitation change between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099
Source: EEA (2008)
River floods

Although there is as yet no proof that the extreme flood events of recent years are a
direct consequence of climate change, they may give an indication of what can be expected: the
frequency and intensity of floods in large parts of Europe is projected to increase.

In particular, flash and urban floods, triggered by local intense precipitation events, are likely to be
more frequent throughout Europe.

Flood hazard will also probably increase during wetter and warmer winters, with more frequent
rain and less frequent snow.

Even in regions where mean river flows will drop significantly, as in the Iberian Peninsula, the
164
projected increase in precipitation intensity and variability may cause more floods (Figure 49)
Figure 49: Projected change in 100-year return level of river discharge between 2071–2100 and the
reference period 1961–1990
Source: EEA (2008)
River droughts

In most of Europe, the projected decrease in summer precipitation, accompanied by rising
temperatures which enhances evaporative demand, may lead to more frequent and intense
summer droughts.

As a result of both climate change and increasing water withdrawals, more river basins will be
affected by severe water stress, resulting in increased competition for water resources (Figure
50).
Figure 50: Projected change in mean annual and summer minimum 7-day river flow between 2071–
2100 and the reference period 1961–1990
Note: Red indicates more severe droughts, blue less severe droughts
Source: EEA (2008)
165
Spatial distribution
Spatial distribution
Temperature increase
Warming is projected to be greatest over eastern Europe, Scandinavia and the Arctic in winter (December to
February), and over south-western and Mediterranean Europe in summer (June to August). The temperature
rise in parts of France and the Iberian Peninsula may exceed 6 °C, while the Arctic could become on average
6 °C and possibly 8 °C warmer than the 1961–1990 average.
The maximum temperature during summer is projected to increase far more in southern and central Europe
than in northern Europe, whereas the largest reduction in the occurrence of cold extremes is projected for
northern Europe.
Changing rainfall patterns
The change in annual mean between 1980–1999 and 2080–2099 for projections varies from 5 to 20 % in
northern Europe and from – 5 to – 30 % in southern Europe and the Mediterranean
River floods
In snow-dominated regions such as the Alps, the Carpathian Mountains and northern parts of Europe,
spring snowmelt floods are projected to decrease due to a shorter snow season and less snow
accumulation in warmer winters.
River droughts
The regions most prone to an increase in drought risk are the Mediterranean and south-eastern parts
of Europe, which already suffer most from water stress. River flow droughts are projected to increase
in frequency and severity in southern and south-eastern Europe, the United Kingdom, France, Benelux,
and western parts of Germany over the coming decades. In snow-dominated regions, where droughts
typically occur in winter, river flow droughts are projected to become less severe because a lower fraction
of precipitation will fall as snow in warmer winters.
Temporal distribution
Temporal distribution
Temperature increase
Temperature increases projected for Europe are to the end of the century.
Changing rainfall patterns
Projections of changing rainfall patterns are to the end of the century.
River floods
Projections of river floods are to the end of the century.
River droughts
166
Projections of changing river droughts are to the end of the century.
Table 70: Likely effects of global megatrends to climate change use in Europe
Direct/
Indirect
Likely effects
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
Global population growth will influence climate change and its impacts on Europe (the link is
discussed under ENV2)
Indirect
The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other
megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois).
Direct
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges
Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a
possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment
issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea.
Indirect
The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the
environment
Indirect
Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high demand for
passenger vehicle transport and also air travel
Indirect
Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues,
and thus also to environmental concerns
Indirect
S3: Global urbanisation
Emissions of greenhouses gases
Indirect
S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
Increased climate change impacts in Europe
Indirect
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
Increased contribution of older people to climate change
Indirect
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
No effects to climate change in Europe’s identified
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
Technology is expected to continue to reduce the amount of energy and raw materials needed per
unit of GDP of the global economy. This will reduce pressures on climate change in particular.
Indirect
New energy technologies promise to reduce GHG emissions, reducing future (long-term) climate
change consequences in Europe
Indirect
The development of geo-engineering technologies could provide opportunities to reduce global
climate change – with difficult-to-foresee results and effects
Indirect
New technologies for alternative energy and energy efficiency developed elsewhere in the world
will reduce greenhouse gas emissions in Europe.
Direct
167
T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce greenhouse gas emissions, thus
reducing the climate change impacts on Europe
Indirect
EC1: Continued economic growth
Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and
thus its effects in Europe
Indirect
EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment
Global competition for energy resources can increase attention to alternative energy (and nuclear
power) around the world
Indirect
EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
Global economic growth will be directly related to global climate change in coming decades and
thus its effects in Europe
Indirect
The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of
global environmental issues as well as policies to address them
Indirect
ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
Increased likelihood of more severe impacts of climate change in Europe as GHG regulation lost
in other parts of the world e.g. deforestration
Direct
Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and
more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining)
Indirect
Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration
from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load
Atmospheric pollution (ozone and its precursors including methane, aerosols) and nitrogen effects
on terrestrial ecosystems can influence climate change
Direct
ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Increasing threat to food production in parts of Europe due to changing length of growing season
and increase in extreme climatic events
Direct
Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense extreme
weather events (e.g. floods and droughts).
Direct
Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of tropical
diseases in Europe
Direct
Sea level rise
Direct
Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to
Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified
some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
References
EEA (2008) Impacts of Europe’s changing climate – 2008 indicator-based assessment
168
9.2
POLLUTION AND HEALTH
The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely
effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe;

Climate change

Pollution and health

Biodiversity and nature

Natural resource use.
These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment
caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another
part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects
identified for pollution and health is presented in Table 70 in below.
From the likely effects identified in Table 70 there are several key issues which emerge. These are
discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here;

The trends related to Europe’s population will have a variety of effects in terms of pollution
levels. Ageing and population decline could reduce consumption and related emissions of a
broad range of pollutants, from CO and NOx from motor vehicles to nitrogen runoff from
intensive agriculture to water bodies. Migration to Europe will offset a part of this population
decline: and the extent of future migration is a major area of uncertainty. Migration is
expected to lead to an increase in many of the same pollutants. Overall, the changes in total
population size are expected to be relatively small compared to other trends – far less than
the possible 50% increase in global population to 2050.

Increasing global consumption, for example, due to economic growth, increasing incomes and
population increase, may increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products.
If this leads to an increase in the scale and intensity of agriculture in Europe to 2050, then it is
likely that pollution may increase as a result; for example, run-off of nitrates and phosphates
from agricultural land could increase, or the release of acidifying substances to the
atmosphere could rise. Increased water demand due to increased agricultural production
could also increase water stress in Europe, increasingly important in the context of climate
change.

Increasing global consumption could lead to increases in the exploitation of Europe’s mineral
and fuel resources, which could also increase pollution in Europe to 2020.

Technology is likely to have a positive effect on pollution in Europe, potentially reducing
resource consumption and tackling waste / pollution issues. Technology may also offer
improved pollution monitoring and provide better information to decision makers in Europe.
Table 71: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to pollution and health in Europe
Direct
Megatrend
Strength
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and
rising migration
 -/+



S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and
+

 -/+

169
youth bulges
S3: Global urbanisation
+

n.a.
n.a.
S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer
class
+

n.a.
n.a.
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and
seeking youth in an unequal world
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally,
and risk of new pandemics
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles
 -

 -/+

T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies
 -

 -/+

EC1: Continued economic growth
 -/+

+

EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment
 0/+

 -/+

EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar
world
 -/+

 -/+

ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
+

+

ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental
pollution load
 +

n.a.
n.a.
+

+

ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The global megatrends likely to have the strongest effect on pollution and health in Europe are S3
(global urbanisation), S4 (the emerging global middle-income consumer class), T2 (the rise of the
nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies), ENV2 (increasing unsustainable
environmental pollution load) and ENV3 (increasing severity of the consequences of climate change).
Most of the effects identified were direct, with low to medium uncertainty, and are predicted as likely
to potentially increase and decrease pressure on Europe’s environment. The indirect effects
170
identified have higher uncertainty associated with them, and are also a mix of increasing and
decreasing pressures on pollution and heath in Europe.
Increasing concentrations of ozone, particulate matter and POPs from intercontinental transport are
projected to increase in Europe and are likely to have medium strength effects on pollution and health
in Europe, which is identified through ENV2 (increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load).
Outlooks for Europe’s environment
A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the
scale of potential pollution and health impacts. Data was not available for every effect identified, but
where data was identified it is present below.
Pollution and agriculture
The use of mineral and organic fertilizers in agriculture to increase cropping power increases
environmental hazards, such as water and soil pollution, and has negative effects on other
environmental components, interfering with the natural balance of soil microflora. High levels of nitrate
and nitrite in drinking water are a hazard to human health (EEA 2010). The actual environmental
effects will depend on pollution abatement methods, soil and plant types, and meteorological
conditions (EEA 2010). Figure 51 demonstrates projections of fertilizer consumption in Europe
between 2001 and 2020, for EU15 (Austria, Belgium, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece,
Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, Netherlands, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, United Kingdom) and EU 8 (new
EU states (Czech republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia).
Figure 51: Projections of fertilizer consumption
171
Source: European environment outlook, EEA Report No 4/2005, in EEA (2010)
European air pollution
Figure 52 shows the general trend of emissions of primary particulate precursors and ozone-forming
substances in EECCA, WCE and SEE for 2000-2004, and projections to 2020 (EEA 2007). The bars
show the quantities emitted, scaled to take into account their contribution to the formation of
particulate matter, ground-level ozone and acidifying and eutrophying gases.
It is apparent from
Figure 52 that between 2005 and 2020 emissions in Europe overall are projected to decline further,
with the largest reduction (35%) projected for WCE. In SEE, emissions are also projected to fall
(27%) over the period, as a result of harmonisation of air quality and emission reduction targets with
the EU. Emissions in EECCA are projected to have increased slightly above 20015 levels by 2020.
Figure 52: Emission trends and projects by region
Source: EEA (2007) Figure 2.2.1
Modelling studies of inter-continental transport of fine aerosols into Europe (Liu et al. 2009) estimate
that 10, 000 premature mortalities annually can be attributed to emissions from outside Europe
(Figure 53b) and that 20,000 deaths annually in other regions as a result of inter-continental transport
of Europe’s emissions. Due to rapid economic growth and increasing fossil fuel combustion,
particularly of coal, sulfur emissions in many developing countries have increased substantially in the
past few decades and are expected to grow further in the future. Key uncertainties include the future
use of coal worldwide, quantity as well as technology; use or non-use of existing abatement
equipment in power plants in China; and industrial emissions for example from metallurgy in Russia
(PBL, 2008).
172
Figure 53: compares the impact on premature mortalities of intercontinental import and export
of fine aerosols. ‘Import’ indicates the total number of premature mortalities in a
region caused by aerosol emissions that arrive from the 9 other regions. ‘Export’
indicates the total number of premature mortalities outside the region resulting from
inter-continental transport of the region’s emissions.
Impacts of ozone on human mortality have also been estimated (Anenberg et al., 2009) and show
that currently for EU, the largest influence of intercontinental impact is due to the influence of North
American ozone precursor emissions (Table 72)
Table 72: Annual Avoided Cardiopulmonary Mortalities (Hundreds) Following 20% NOx,
NMVOC, and CO Emission Reductions in. Each Region, Assuming No Concentration
Threshold (bold) and Assuming a Concentration Threshold of 35 ppb (normal font)
Source: PBL 2008 background for OECD outlook
173
Spatial distribution
Spatial distribution
Pollution and agriculture
Global megatrends may play a small role in influencing fertilizer use and related runoff. It is projected
that in EU15 the overall level of fertilizer consumption will be largely stable to 2020. However in EU8,
where average levels are much lower, the projections are for an increase over this period.
Air pollution
In Europe, emissions of key air pollutants such as PM and ozone precursors are expected to decline to
2020, with the largest reductions in Western and Central Europe, and smaller reductions in South East
Europe. Emissions of these pollutants are projected to increase in Eastern Europe, the Caucasus and
Central Asia.
Temporal distribution
Temporal distribution
Pollution and agriculture
Fertilizer consumption projections are to 2020. After 2020 the direction of fertilizer consumption is
uncertain. It could potentially increase, as discussed in the global megatrends, for example due to
increased global demand for European agriculture and forestry products.
European air pollution
European air pollution is expected to improve in most of Europe to 2020. The effect of the global
megatrends on European air pollution is uncertain, but hemispheric air pollution could become
increasingly important.
Table 73: Likely effects of global megatrends to pollution and health
Likely effects
Direct/
Indirect
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn can
increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural and
forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive production
(see EC2 for a discussion of uncertainties)
Indirect
The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other
megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois).
Direct
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges
Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase
174
Indirect
pressures on the environment.
Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a
possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment
issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea.
Indirect
The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the
environment
Indirect
Ageing populations may reduce their high-impact consumption, such as the high demand for
passenger vehicle transport and also air travel
Indirect
Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues,
and thus also to environmental concerns
Indirect
S3: Global urbanisation
Hemispheric air pollution
Direct
S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
Increased climate change impacts in Europe
Indirect
Increase in hemispheric air pollution in Europe
Direct
Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe
Indirect
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
Increased contribution of older people to climate change
Indirect
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
No likely effects to Europe’s environment identified
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial pollution in
Europe
Direct
T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields, reducing demands
on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on resources (soil and water) and
pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as the further effects on biodiversity
Indirect
NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and reduce to
resource consumption
Direct
New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less
expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe
Direct
EC1: Continued economic growth
Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air emissions,
increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe
Direct
EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment
If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European exports will
increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and possible loss of
biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals.
EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
175
Indirect
Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could
mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with resulting effects on natural
resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and agricultural runoff
Indirect
Economic growth, at least in coming decades, is likely to be associated with air emissions,
increasing hemispheric air pollution that will reach Europe
Direct
ENV1: Intensified competition for resources
Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar sands/ shales as
peak oil/coal is reached
Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress
on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining)
Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs to
Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load
Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background concentrations of
ozone and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and POPs
Direct
Health impacts from pesticide residues in imported food
Indirect
ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Negative health effects due to increasing temperatures and changing prevalence of tropical diseases in
Europe
Direct
Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or
have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified
some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
References
EEA (2010) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/fertilizer-consumption-outlook-from-eea/fertilizerconsumption-outlook-from-eea
EEA (2007) Europe’s Environment – the Fourth Assessment
Liu, JF; Mauzerall, DL; Horowitz, LW (2009). Evaluating inter-continental transport of fine aerosols:(2)
Global health impact. Atmospheric Environment 43 (2009) 4339–4347
176
9.3
BIODIVERSITY
The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely
effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe;

Climate change

Pollution and health

Biodiversity and nature

Natural resource use.
These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment
caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another
part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects
identified for biodiversity is presented in Table 76 in below.
From the likely effects identified in Table 76 there are several key issues which emerge. These are
discussed in more detail in Annex I but it is useful to provide an overview here;

Increased demand for European agriculture and forestry products due to, for example,
increase in global population, increase in incomes and global urbanisation, could increase
pressure on European biodiversity to 2050. An increase in the scale and intensity of
European agriculture could have a negative effect on biodiversity due to the potential threat of
eutrophication and acidification associated with agriculture, as well as a potential increase in
water stress in some European regions.

Increased demand for Europe’s fuel and mineral resources could also increase pressure on
biodiversity, for example by increasing offshore drilling.

Projected population decline in Europe could ease existing pressures on biodiversity, however
any potential reductions could be offset by projected increases in migration to Europe (to
maintain population numbers in the context of population decline). As migration to Europe is
generally to urban areas, it will not prevent population decline in rural areas. This could lead
to land abandonment and potentially have a negative effect on the biodiversity of high-nature
value farmland.

Climate change is identified as likely to increase pressure on Europe’s biodiversity over the
long-term, for example by changing environmental conditions such as average temperature
and rainfall patterns.

Increasing trade between Europe and the rest of the world may increase the spread of
invasive species in Europe, which would have a negative impact on European biodiversity.
Table 74: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to biodiversity in Europe
Direct
Megatrend
Strength
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and
rising migration
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth
177
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
 -/+



+

 -/+

bulges
S3: Global urbanisation
n.a.
n.a.
+

S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer
class
n.a.
n.a.
+

S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and
seeking youth in an unequal world
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and
risk of new pandemics
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles
 -/+

 -/+

T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies
 -/+

 -/+

n.a.
n.a.
+

 0/+

 -/+

n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
 +

+

ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental
pollution load
-

+

 +

+

EC1: Continued economic growth
EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment
EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The three environmental megatrends are likely to have the strongest effects to biodiversity in Europe,
and the uncertainty attached to these effects is high. Climate change is likely to have the most
significant effect to biodiversity, changing the functioning of habitats and ecosystems in Europe by
altering rainfall patterns and changing temperatures, for example. As stocks of natural resources
decrease around the world, pressure on Europe’s resources will increase (food, water, fisheries,
timber, mining) which will increase stress on Europe’s environment, with negative effect to
biodiversity. However these effects are highly uncertain. This increased competition for resources is
also associated with global economic growth, increased competition for resources and global
population growth. This is why EC2 (intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on
Europe’s environment) and S2 (shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges) are
178
identified as important in effecting biodiversity in Europe, although the indirect effects of population
growth (associated with increased migration to Europe) are highly uncertain.
The effect of technology on Europe’s biodiversity is highly uncertain; new technologies could reduce
pressure on Europe’s environment by improving agricultural yields around the world or by reducing
the use of agricultural chemicals in Europe. However, technology could also generate new as yet
unknown negative effects to biodiversity, e.g. the potential impact of transgenic crops on European
biodiversity over the long term.
The effects of S3 (global urbanisation) and S4 (emerging middle-income class) are relatively weak,
restricted to indirect effects that are highly uncertain. Both megatrends may act to increase pressure
on Europe’s biodiversity, through increased climate change or demand for agricultural products, but
the strength of these effects is not likely to be high.
Outlooks for Europe’s environment
A review of existing environmental outlooks for Europe’s environment provides an indication of the
scale of potential biodiversity effects. Most projections for biodiversity in Europe are related to climate
change, and some of these are presented below in Table 75. In addition to this information, a recent
review of land use projections for Europe found that a few studies forecast increases in cropland in
the range of 15% between 2005 and 2050. This included studies that factored in global growth in
demand. Other studies, however, saw a decline in total agricultural land (for many, due to a decline in
extensive pasture land rather than intensively farmed areas) (RIKS, 2010)). While this does not
related directly to biodiversity, it may indicate that biodiversity could decrease due to a loss of highnature value farmland.
The EEA’s Indicators and factsheets on Europe’s environment (EEA 2010) provide an excellent
description of the projected effect of climate change on biodiversity in Europe to 2050. This
description is provided in Table 75 below.
Table 75: EEA (2010) description of the projected effect of climate change on Europe to 2050

By the late 21st century, distributions of European plant species are projected to have
shifted several hundred kilometres to the north, forests are likely to have contracted in the
south and expanded in the north, and 60 % of mountain plant species may face extinction.
The rate of change will exceed the ability of many species to adapt, especially as landscape
fragmentation may restrict movement.

A combination of the rate of climate change, habitat fragmentation and other obstacles will
impede the movement of many animal species, possibly leading to a progressive decline in
European biodiversity. Distribution changes are projected to continue. Suitable climatic
conditions for Europe's breeding birds are projected to shift nearly 550 km northeast by the
end of the century, with the average range size shrinking by 20 %. Projections for 120 native
European mammals suggest that up to 9 % (assuming no migration) risk extinction during
the 21st century.
Distribution of plant species

Projections indicate that, by the late 21st century, the potential range of many European
plant species may shift several hundred kilometres in a northerly direction. The greatest
changes are projected for endemic plant species in Mediterranean, Euro-Siberian and many
mountain regions. Mountain communities may face up to a 60 % loss of plant species under
179
high emission scenarios. This will be higher if migration is restricted due to continuing
fragmentation or if there is competition with invasive species.

Figure 54 provides a geographical description of the projected change in the number of plant
species to 2050.
Figure 54: Projected changes in number of plant species in 2050
Source: EEA (2010)
Distribution of animal species

Projections suggest that the northward and uphill movement of many animal species will
continue this century. Widespread species may be less vulnerable, while threatened
endemics -- already under pressure -- will be at greatest risk, although there will be spatial
variation. An important constraint will be the ability of species to move.

Species richness is likely to reduce dramatically this century in the Mediterranean region, but
increase towards the northeast and in mountainous areas such as the Alps and Pyrenees,
assuming that movement through fragmented landscapes is possible.

Figure 55 highlights the projected effect of climate change on the distribution of reptile and
amphibian species in Europe to 2050.
Figure 55: Projected impact of climate change on the potential distribution of reptiles and
amphibians in 2050
180
Source: EEA (2010)
Spatial distribution
The most important effects from global megatrends on Europe’s nature and biodiversity in coming
decades are expected to be those resulting from climate change. Global megatrends are going to be
the main force shaping greenhouse gas emission to 2050, and thus will have a strong effect in terms
of climate change impacts in Europe.
Global megatrends will also play an important role in the increasing pressure on global fisheries will
affect marine biodiversity around the world, including in Europe. Another link is the increased
competition for resources, which can lead to new offshore oil exploration and exploitation in Europe’s
marine areas: this too can harm marine biodiversity. Here, the main effects are expected to be weak –
except in the event of major accidents.
Spatial distribution
plant species
Due to climate change, many plant species currently found in the south of Europe are expected to be
become increasingly common in northern regions, and with this change in the range of plant species forests
are expected to expand in the north and contract in the south, with broadleaved species replacing native
coniferous species in western and central Europe. Several European plant species are also predicted to
change their altitudinal range.
The greatest changes are projected for endemic plant species in Mediterranean, Euro-Siberian and many
mountain regions.
animal species
Climate change is projected to dramatically reduce the species of native terrestrial mammal species in the
181
Mediterranean region, but increase it in northeast Europe and also in mountainous areas such as the Alps
and Pyrenees. This change is the distribution of species richness depends on the assumption that
movement through fragmented landscapes is possible
The ranges of European breeding birds are projected to shift about 550 km to the northeast by the end of the
21st century, but the average range size is expected to be 20% smaller. Arctic, sub Arctic and some Iberian
species are projected to suffer the greatest range losses.
Other categories
Loss of marine biodiversity due to overfishing, both in European waters and around the world. Potential loss
due to new oil exploration, in particular in the event of accidents.
Temporal distribution
Effects to biodiversity are likely to be gradual, but significant to 2050.
Temporal distribution
Plant species
The impacts of climate change on plant species are expected to become increasingly significant to 2050, and
will happen gradually until then.
Impact of climate change on animal species
The impacts of climate change on animal species are expected to become increasingly significant to 2050,
and will happen gradually until then.
Other categories
The impacts of overfishing are also expected to increase steadily to 2050. There are risks of tipping points
due where the population of a species may decline rapidly.
Impacts from oil exploitation are likely to arise mainly in the event of accidents, and thus do not follow a
pattern.
Table 76: Likely effects of global megatrends to biodiversity and nature in Europe
Likely effects
Direct/
Indirect
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
Global population growth will increase resource consumption around the world, and this in turn
can increase resource consumption in Europe – e.g. through growing demand for its agricultural
and forestry products, with biodiversity and pollution associated in particular with intensive
production (see EC2 for a discussion of uncertainties)
Indirect
The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other
megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois).
Direct
182
Though not part of a global megatrend per se, Europe’s ongoing migration towards coastal areas,
in particular in the Mediterranean, for retirement and vacation homes, may continue and this will
increase pressures in coastal zones as seen for example in the Western Balkans (IEA, 2009).
Direct
Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related environmental
pressures would remain
Direct
Immigration is arriving mainly in urban areas in Europe (Biois). This means that other areas will
see ongoing populations decline – e.g. mountain and other remote rural areas. Here, declining
rural labour will contribute to the abandonment of high-nature value farmland.
Indirect
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges
Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will increase pressures
on the environment.
Indirect
Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a possible
consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment issues, such as
protection of the Mediterranean Sea.
Indirect
The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the environment
Indirect
Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term issues, and thus
also to environmental concerns
Indirect
S3: Global urbanisation
Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products
Indirect
S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products
Indirect
Increased climate change impacts in Europe
Indirect
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
No effects to biodiversity and nature in Europe’s identified
T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing the use of
agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts
Direct
New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less
expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe
Direct
EC1: Continued economic growth
Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could
mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports.
Indirect
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels
extraction, especially in the EU12 and outside EEA countries (W. Balkans, EECCA) as well as in
offshore marine areas
Indirect
183
EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s environment
Since the late 1970s, nearly all the increase in oil production around the world has come from
offshore sites (World Bank, 2009): although oil production is declining in EEA countries, pressures
for offshore drilling may increase, including in sensitive areas such as the Arctic, with risks for the
marine environment
Direct
If food production does not grow in developing countries, demand for European exports will
increase: this would support intensive agriculture and result in runoff and possible loss of
biodiversity from land use changes and agricultural chemicals.
Indirect
EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this could
mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports.
Indirect
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and fuels
extraction, especially in the EU12 and outside EEA countries (W. Balkans, EECCA) as well as in
offshore marine areas
Indirect
The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of
global environmental issues as well as policies to address them
Indirect
ENV1: Intensified competition for resources
Effects on biodiversity due to loss of habitat
Direct
Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe and more stress
on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining)
Indirect
(env)
Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to migration from DCs
to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
(env)
ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load
Health and crop impacts from emissions outside of Europe increasing background concentrations of ozone
and intercontinental transport of particulate matter and POPs
Direct
ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Loss of biodiversity in terms of species and habitats, shifts in phenology
Direct
Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs to Europe or
have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified
some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
References
EEA (2010) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/change-in-species-diversity-as/change-inspecies-diversity-as-1
184
9.4
NATURAL RESOURCE USE
The 14 global megatrends were reviewed in terms of their interlinkages and uncertainties, and likely
effects to four environmental areas were identified for Europe;

Climate change

Pollution and health

Biodiversity and nature

Natural resource use.
These effects are classed as direct or indirect. Direct effects are changes to Europe’s environment
caused by the drivers associated with a megatrend. Changes caused to the environment in another
part of the world which impact on Europe’s environment are indirect effects. The likely effects
identified for climate change is presented in Table 70 in below. From the likely effects identified in
Table 78 there are several key issues which emerge. These are discussed in more detail in Annex I
but it is useful to provide an overview here;

Population decline in Europe may result in reduced demand for natural resources, however
this may be offset by increased demand associated with increased migration to Europe.

Increased demand for European agricultural and forestry products may lead to an increase in
the intensity and scale of agriculture and forestry in Europe, which could increase pressure on
water and soil resources in Europe.

Increased global demand for energy and sub-soil resources may increase the exploitation of
fuel and mineral reserves in Europe.

Technology may act to reduce pressure on Europe’s natural resources by increasing the
efficiency of resource use and improving agricultural yields.

Climate change may increase pressure on Europe’s natural resources, for example, reducing
water availability. Sea level rise as a consequence of climate change may reduce the amount
of agricultural land available in Europe.
The global megatrends were scored in terms of the strength of their likely effects on natural resource
use in Europe, including the uncertainty related to these likely effects (see Annex I for more detail).
Table 77 below provides a summary of the strength and uncertainty of likely effects to natural
resource in Europe, by megatrend.
Table 77: Strength and uncertainty of likely effects to natural resource use in Europe
Direct
Megatrend
Strength
Indirect
Uncertainty
Strength
Uncertainty
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising
migration
 -/+



S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth
bulges
+

 -/+

S3: Global urbanisation
n.a.
n.a.
+

S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
n.a.
n.a.
+

185
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking
youth in an unequal world
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
n.a.
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and
risk of new pandemics
n.a
n.a
n.a
n.a
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology
development cycles
 -

 -

T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive
sciences and technologies
 -

 -

EC1: Continued economic growth
n.a.
n.a.
+

 0/+

 -/+

EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
n.a.
n.a.
 -/+

ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
+

+/-

ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution
load
 +/-

 +/-

ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of
climate change
+/-

+

EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely
consequences on Europe’s environment
Strength of the effect: Weak=, Medium=, Strong=, Not applicable = n.a.
Direction of effect: + indicates that pressures on Europe are likely to increase; - indicates a likely decrease
Uncertainty: Low=, Medium=, High=
The global megatrends are likely to increase pressure on natural resource use in Europe, with the
majority of this increase coming from outside Europe (i.e. indirect effects). The uncertainty related to
this increase ranges from low to high, but in general uncertainty around the effects is high. S1 (Shift
in population size: increase, decline and rising migration) and S2 (Shifts in population composition:
aging and youth bulges) are predicted to have direct impacts to natural resource in Europe, which
may increase or decrease resource use depending on the final outcome for Europe’s population; an
increase or a decrease. Economic growth and increasing competition for resources may see an
increase in the demand for European natural resources, both for export globally and for use internally
in response to price increases on the global market, however this effect is highly uncertain.
The technology megatrends are notable as they may have the effect of reducing pressure on natural
resources in Europe, as efficiency improvements may offset or reduce demand for resources.
However these effects are highly uncertain as they depend on the development of specific
technologies.
The environmental megatrends are likely to have both direct and indirect effects to natural resources
in Europe, although these effects are highly uncertain. ENV3 (climate change) could result in food
and water shortages in other parts of the world, which could trigger migration to Europe. If this were
to happen the effects to resource use in Europe would be significant, but obviously this is a very
186
uncertain effect. Climate change is more likely to affect resource use in Europe due to direct impacts
related to changes to precipitation patterns, water availability, and increasingly severe and frequent
extreme weather events.
Outlooks for Europe’s environment
Land/soil

Increased demand for agricultural products could increase pressure on Europe’s soil
resources. In the European region it is projected that the area of agricultural land use may
increase slightly (under the baseline scenario), however under a scenario where global
agricultural markets are liberalised the area of agricultural land in Europe will fall (Figure 56).
Thus effects to land / soil are highly uncertain.
Figure 56: Land cover distribution in 2000 and 2050 under different scenarios
Source: EEA (2008)
Water

Increased demand for agricultural products could increase pressure on Europe’s water
resources; however this could be offset by reductions due to decreased abstractions
associated with new power stations. In southern Europe climate change is projected to
increase pressure on Europe’s water resources (Figure 57).
187
Figure 57: Changes in water availability, 2000 - 2030
Source: EEA (2010a)
Waste

A recent assessment prepared for the EEA projected that municipal waste generation in the
EU-12 would increase by roughly 33% between 2005 and 2020 if economic growth is strong.
If economic growth is weak, a 22% increase is still projected (Figure 58).

Municipal waste is expected to increase by 25% over the period (Figure 59). This could lead
to an increase in environmental pressures and also strain the waste management capabilities
of countries will less developed infrastructure.
Figure 58: Generation of municipal waste in the EU-12, 2005, 2010, 2015 and 2020
Source: EEA (2010b)
188
Figure 59: Growth in waste quantities and GDP (2020/2000)
Source: EEA (2010c)
Spatial distribution
Spatial distribution
Land / soil
Disaggregated information on projections of land-use in Europe was not identified. It is possible that there
could be regional variation in land-use patterns. For example the small farms of eastern Europe may increase
in size and agricultural intensity, but the pastoral high-nature value farmland of western Europe may be
abandoned as farming there becomes increasingly uncompetitive.
Water
In northern Europe water stress is likely to decrease, due to changing rainfall patterns and reduced
abstraction. In contrast, climate change is expected to reduce water availability and increase irrigation
withdrawals in the Mediterranean river basins to 2030, reducing water availability by as much as 10% (or
more) by 2030. In the longer term, changes in water availability are likely to develop more noticeably in
southern and south-eastern Europe.
Waste
In the EU-15 the municipal waste stream is expected to decouple relatively from GDP by 2020, however
none of the countries are expected to decouple absolutely (EEA 2010c)
Another set of projections has shown that in the EU-15, the municipal waste stream is expected to decouple
relatively from GDP by 2020, however, none of the countries are expected to decouple absolutely. In the
New-10, and Bulgaria and Romania, relative decoupling of municipal waste from GDP is expected to 2020
(EEA 2010c).
Temporal distribution
189
Temporal distribution
Land / soil
The modelled data presented in Figure 56 extends to 2050, which does not indicate large differences in the
baseline of 2000. Thus changes to land / soil due to land use change are likely to be gradual to 2050.
Water
Reductions in water stress are predicted for northern Europe to 2030, however in southern Europe, there is
likely to be a significant increase in water stress to 2030.
Waste generation is projected to increase to 2020, but projections after 2020 are not available.
Table 78: Likely effects of global megatrends to natural resource use in Europe
Direct/
Indirect
Likely effects
S1: Shift in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
The decline in Europe’s population – considered separately from migration or from other
megatrends – will reduce pressures on the environment (Biois).
Direct
Migration from outside Europe would maintain Europe’s population, and related environmental
pressures would remain
Direct
S2: Shifts in population composition: aging and youth bulges
Youth bulges are likely to influence migration to Europe – this increase in population will
increase pressures on the environment.
Indirect
Youth bulges can lead to conflicts in countries near Europe. Sudden influxes of migrants are a
possible consequence. Another is an increased difficulty in addressing common environment
issues, such as protection of the Mediterranean Sea.
Indirect
The pressure on government budgets due to ageing may reduce resources available for the
environment
Indirect
Ageing populations in Europe and around the world may pay greater attention to long-term
issues, and thus also to environmental concerns
Indirect
S3: Global urbanisation
Increased demand for Europe’s agriculture and forestry products
Indirect
S4: The emerging global middle-income consumer class
Growing demand for European agricultural and forestry products
190
Indirect
Increased exploitation of mineral and fuel resources in Europe
Indirect
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
New process technologies developed elsewhere in the world can reduce industrial pollution in
Europe
Direct
T2: The rise of the nano-, bio and ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can reduce resource consumption, with the
result of reducing demands on sub-soil (non-renewable) resources in Europe
Indirect
NBIC technologies introduced around the world can improve agricultural yields, reducing
demands on agricultural products from Europe and related impacts on resources (soil and
water) and pollution (chemical runoff to water bodies) as well as the further effects on
biodiversity
Indirect
NBIC technologies introduced in Europe can tackle pollution and waste problems and reduce
to resource consumption
Direct
New technologies for agriculture could increase yields around the world and reducing the use
of agricultural chemicals as well as biodiversity impacts
Direct
New sensors and information technology could make environmental monitoring much less
expensive and provide better information for decision-makers in Europe
Direct
EC1: Continued economic growth
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and
fuels extraction, especially in the EU12 and in offshore marine areas
Indirect
EC2: Intensified competition for resources: likely consequences on Europe’s
environment
The boom in unconventional gas extraction seen in the US may move to Europe: this typically
requires high levels of water
Direct
EC3: Power shifts – from uni-polar to multi-polar world
Economic growth will be a key megatrend fuelling global resource demand: for Europe, this
could mean growing demand for its agricultural and forestry exports, with resulting effects on
natural resources (land, water) as well as biodiversity and agricultural runoff
Indirect
Resource demand associated with economic growth could also bring increased minerals and
fuels extraction
Indirect
The fast-growing economies – including China and India – will have a growing role in terms of
global environmental issues as well as policies to address them
Indirect
ENV1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
191
Impacts relating to exploitation of new and more polluting sources of fossil fuels, such as tar
sands/ shales as peak oil/coal is reached
Direct
Increasing pressure on resources in DCs will potentially mean more competition for Europe
and more stress on Europe’s environment (food, water, fisheries, timber, mining)
Indirect
(env)
Destabilisation of ecosystems outside of Europe, disrupting livelihoods and leading to
migration from DCs to Europe and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
(env)
ENV2: Increasing unsustainable environmental pollution load
No effects to natural resource use in Europe’s identified
ENV3: Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
Changes in precipitation patterns and water availability; and more frequent and intense
extreme weather events (e.g. floods and droughts).
Direct
Food and water shortage and destabilization of ecosystems could trigger migration from DCs
to Europe or have economic repercussions, and increased pressure on Europe’s environment
Indirect
Note: For the most part, these have been identified through expert analysis. The detailed reports on megatrends identified
some likely consequences; work for the integration analysis expanded and explored these further.
References
EEA (2010a) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/use-of-freshwater-resources-outlook/use-offreshwater-resources-outlook
EEA (2010b) Environmental trends and perspectives in the Western Balkans: future production and
consumption patterns. EEA report No. 1/2010
EEA (2010c) Indicators and fact sheets about Europe’s environment. Accessed online 04 08 10
http://www.eea.europa.eu/data-and-maps/indicators/municipal-waste-generation-outlook-eea/municipalwaste-generation-outlook-eea
EEA (2008) Catalogue of forward-looking indicators from selected sources; A contribution to the
forward-looking component of a shared environmental information system (SEIS/Forward). Technical
report No. 8/2008
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10.
ANNEX III: DETAILED DRIVER’S ANALYSIS
10.1
IDENTIFYING COMMON DRIVERS AMONG MEGATRENDS
The approach taken was premised on the fact that numerous drivers lie behind each megatrend. Look
across these drivers can identify deeper patterns and also provide a basis for identifying the linkages among
the megatrends.
The first stage in the process was to collate all of the STEEP drivers for each megatrend, and label each one
according to the megatrend with which it was originally associated (Table 79).
Table 79: Megatrend code assigned to each driver
Code and related megatrend
S1: Shifts in population size: increase, decline and rising migration
S2: Shifts in population composition: of ageing and youth bulges
S3: Global urbanisation
S4: The emerging global middle income consumer class
S5: Increasing life expectancy: growing old and seeking youth in an unequal world
S6: Changing patterns of disease burden globally, and risk of new pandemics
T1: Global acceleration and shifts in technology development cycles
T2: The rise of the nano-, bio-, ICT and cognitive sciences and technologies
EC1: Continued economic growth
EC2: Intensified competition for resources
EC3: Power shifts: from a uni-polar to a multi-polar world
Env 1: Decreasing stocks of natural resources
Env2: Increasingly unsustainable environmental pollution load
Env 3:Increasing severity of the consequences of climate change
In addition to the megatrend labels assigned to each driver, the drivers were also colour coded according to
the STEEP category they belonged to (Table 80). This was done to ensure that the STEEP analysis was not
lost and was available to be carried through to the later stages – the design of successful interventions to
ameliorate negative, or enhance positive, impacts to Europe’s environment may depend on targeting drivers
by STEEP category. This first stage is represented in Figure 60 below, marked 1.
Table 80: Colour assigned to each STEEP category
STEEP Category Colour
Social
Technological
Economic
Environment
Policy

The next step was to examine the drivers and to identify those that were i) the same (because the
wording and phrasing were almost identical) and ii) similar (because the wording and phrasing
implied they were closely related or were drivers acting in a similar direction) across the megatrends.
A systematic approach was taken, placing the same and then similar drivers together until the
majority of drivers had been placed in a set of broad driver groups (see 2 in Figure 60). The initial
193
groupings were initially relatively loose, but an iterative approach showed that multiple common
drivers influenced several broad categories such as resource use, growth of consumer economy,
and environmental degradation: these emerged as initial major groupings. With further review, other
distinct groupings also then emerged.
At this stage it was clear that patterns were emerging, but further refinement within each of the driver-groups
was required. Within each driver-group, the drivers were clustered together more closely based on their
similarities (see 3 in Figure 60). This step was also used to ensure that the drivers in each larger drivergroup had been categorised correctly. ‘Non-drivers’ were separated out from the clustering process as false
data.
The end result was a series of driver-clusters within each driver-group (see 4 in Figure 60). A further
iteration of the process was undertaken to ensure consistency, and to identify links between the drivergroups and driver-clusters. The driver groups and clusters represent those drivers that are most commonly
shared across the megatrends. A worked example is provided below to illustrate the process of grouping
and how the groupings of common drivers emerged.
194
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
1
All drivers
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
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Driver
Driver
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Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
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Driver
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Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
2
Increasing global
loss of natural
resources
Increased
Increased
scarcity of
demand
4
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Increasing population
growth / aging
resources
Changing
values
Population
growth
Increasing migration
& urbanisation
Increasing
economic
disparity
Reduced
Driver
Population
aging
Increased permeation of
technology
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
3
Sub-groups
Technology
permeation
employment
opportunity
Changing
health patterns
Changing
disease
burden
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver groups
Increasingly globalised
economic growth
Increasing
Increasing
international
market
allocation of
liberalisation
capital
Growth of the global
market economy
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Emerging groups
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Driver
Improving
healthcare
Increasing environmental
degradation
Changing
Increasing
patterns of land
environmental
management
pollution
Increased impact
of production on
the environment
Figure 60: Common drivers analysis showing grouping and sub-grouping of drivers to deliver
‘integrated’ megatrends. Drivers are colourer dark blue, red, light blue, green and yellow
per each respective STEEP category. Grouped by smaller clusters (white bubble) and then
clusters organised by group (green bubble).
10.2
WORKED EXAMPLE
Figure 60 above provides a clear diagrammatic representation of how the megatrends were analysed
according to the analytical approach outlined in section 2. From the bubble marked 4 in Figure 60 it is
apparent that each driver group contains one or more sub-groups. Each of these clusters contains drivers
identified in the original megatrends.
The group Increasing migration and urbanisation provides a useful example to demonstrate the basis for the
grouping of the drivers. Figure 61 below provides a diagrammatic representation of where these tables fit in
the analysis.
195
Increasing global
loss of natural
resources
Increased
Increased
scarcity of
demand
Increasing population
growth / aging
resources
Changing
values
Increasingly globalised
economic growth
Increasing
Increasing
international
market
allocation of
liberalisation
capital
Growth of the global
market economy
Increasing migration
& urbanisation
Increasing
economic
disparity
Reduced
Population
aging
Increased permeation of
technology
Technology
permeation
employment
opportunity
Changing
health patterns
Changing
disease
burden
Population
growth
Improving
healthcare
Increasing environmental
degradation
Changing
Increasing
patterns of land
environmental
management
pollution
Increased impact
of production on
the environment
Migration & urbanisation
Increasing
economic
disparity
Reduced
employment
opportunity
Driver-cluster: Employment opportunity
S3: Mechanisation of agriculture
S3: Changes in agricultural productivity
S6: AEnv3ess to employment
ENV1(R): Increased land use of productive land for urban development
S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment
S3: Innovation
S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas
EC3: access to employment
S1: Access to employment
S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries
S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country
S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration
S3: Land use policy
S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing
countries
ENV1: Global population growth
ENV2: Global population growth
ENV3: Global population growth
S1: High fertility
S2: High fertility
S3: Global population growth
S4: Global population growth
S6: Global population growth
EC2: Global population growth
S3: Foreign Direct Investment
EC3: industrial relocation
S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries
S1: Climate change
S3: Climate change
S6: Climate change
ENV1: Climate change
ENV3: Climate change
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
Driver-cluster: Economic disparity
S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration
ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport
S2: Low living standards for youth bulges
S3: Absence of well developed state pension system
S1: Environmental degradation
S1: Better information about migration possibilities
S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions
S1: Family links
S6: Improvement of commuting technology
S1: Religious factors
S1: Increased mobility
S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions
T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces
ENV1: Global population growth
ENV2: Global population growth
ENV3: Global population growth
S1: High fertility
S2: High fertility
S3: Global population growth
S4: Global population growth
S6: Global population growth
EC2: Global population growth
S1: Climate change
S3: Climate change
S6: Climate change
ENV1: Climate change
Climate change
The growth of populations in rural areas and theENV3:
increasing
mechanisation of agriculture are likely toEC1:increase
Climate change
unemployment in rural areas, driving people to T1
migrate
to
& T2: Climate
change
There are several additional drivers important in migration /
urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily
similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected
increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable
political systems, or the political system which do not provide
the social supports necessary to allow people to live
unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between
regions and countries will increase migration as people seek
opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men,
could lead to increased instability and trigEc1 migration.
Climate change could exacerbate political instability and
migration by reducing employment opportunities associated
with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea
level rise.
urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment
in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural –
urban migration.
Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely
to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and
low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in
countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce
capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population.
Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both
between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the
productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment
opportunities.
Figure 61: Increasing migration and urbanisation ‘group of common drivers showing smaller clusters
of drivers in white circles and corresponding tabulated drivers
Following the process of grouping and sub-grouping of drivers, the drivers in each group were tabulated by
cluster, which included a colour code for the driver’s STEEP classification category, and also the code of the
megatrend from which the driver was originally associated (see Table 81 and Table 82 below). From these
tables it is apparent that the drivers of Increasing migration and urbanisation come from a wide range of the
STEEP megatrends, and from a wide range of STEEP categories. In addition, some of the drivers present
in the Increasing migration and urbanisation group may also appear in other megatrends, e.g. climate
change may cause migration, and may also cause biodiversity loss.
The cluster Reduced employment opportunity is described in Table 81 below. Each of the drivers contained
in this table influence employment opportunities, either acting to limit or increase employment opportunity.
Reduced employment opportunity is an important factor influencing rural-urban migration and urbanisation,
causing people to leave areas of low opportunity to move to areas of high opportunity. For example, S3:
Mechanisation of agriculture and S3: Changes in agricultural productivity in Table 81 could reduce
employment available in rural areas. This is likely to increase urbanisation as people move from rural to
urban areas in search of work. S3: Innovation and S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased
unemployment could reduce employment opportunities, which could in turn drive migration. These drivers
are not presented in a geographically specific context, and their impacts would be very different in Europe
compared to China, for example. Nonetheless, in either of these global regions, both drivers are likely to
drive migration. Further down the table, some of the drivers associated with the environmental megatrends,
such as ENV1: Low access to fertilizer and poor incentives for soil conserving technology with smallholders
and ENV3: Severe droughts and flooding affecting food production, are both different from the drivers
described above, but are both likely to drive migration. Poor soil quality may reduce productivity of
agricultural land, and thus cause people to leave rural areas, migrating to cities or further afield. Droughts
reducing food production are likely to have a similar affect.
196
Table 81: Increasing Migration and Urbanisation – reduced employment opportunity.
Driver-cluster: Reduced employment opportunity
S3: Mechanisation of agriculture
S3: Changes in agricultural productivity
S6: Access to employment
ENV 2: Growth of industrial and transport sector
S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment
S3: Innovation
S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas
EC3: access to employment
S1: Access to employment
S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries
S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country
S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration
S3: Land use policy
ENV3: Insufficient response to challenge of adaptation and mitigation
S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing
countries
ENV 3: Global markets comprising local food availability
ENV1(R): Low access to fertiliser and poor incentives for soil conserving
technologies with smallholders
ENV 3: Prohibitive costs of required defences
ENV 1(R): La of investment in agriculture in poor countries
The growth of populations in rural areas and the increasing
mechanisation of agriculture are likely to increase
unemployment in rural areas, driving people to migrate to
urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment
in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural –
urban migration.
Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely
to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and
low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in
countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce
capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population.
Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both
between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the
productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment
opportunities.
S3: Foreign Direct Investment
EC3: industrial relocation
S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries
ENV 3: Severe droughts and floods affecting food production
ENV 3: Increasing frequency of severe droughts and floods
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
Note: Colours correspond to STEEP category (Social is dark blue, Technology is red, Economic is light blue,
Environment is green and Social is yellow). Codes to the left correspond to megatrend with which the driver was
associated.
The cluster Increasing economic disparity is similar to Reduced employment opportunity, but the drivers are
related to poverty rather than employment. For example, S1: Low living standards for youth bulges and S3:
Absence of a well-developed state pension system are both likely to drive migration as people seek
economic well-being elsewhere. Other drivers, such as S1: Family links, S1: Religious factors and S1:
Increased mobility are also likely to drive migration and urbanisation as people seek better economic
conditions in which to live.
Table 82: Increasing Migration and Urbanisation – increasing economic disparity.
Driver-cluster: Increasing economic disparity
S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration
ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport or lack of urban
planning
S2: Low living standards for youth bulges
S3: Absence of well developed state pension system
S1: Environmental degradation
S1: Better information about migration possibilities
S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions
S1: Family links
S6: Improvement of commuting technology
S1: Religious factors
S1: Increased mobility
197
There are several additional drivers important in migration /
urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily
similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected
increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable
political systems, or the political system which do not provide
the social supports necessary to allow people to live
unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between
regions and countries will increase migration as people seek
opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men,
could lead to increased instability and trigger migration.
Climate change could exacerbate political instability and
migration by reducing employment opportunities associated
S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions
T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces
ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies
ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies
ENV 1(R): Poverty and insecure land tenure
ENV 1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development
ENV 3: National strategies prioritising development over environment
ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel
ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel
with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea
level rise.
Note: Colours correspond to STEEP category (Social is dark blue, Technology is red, Economic is light blue,
Environment is green and Social is yellow). Codes to the left correspond to megatrend with which the driver was
associated.
Following the process described above in the worked example, the clustering and grouping of drivers went
through a number of iterations, including internal discussions and interrogation of the groupings within the
research team. Figure 62 summarises the final groups and clusters of common drivers.
Increasing global
loss of natural
resources
Increased
Increased
scarcity of
demand
Increasing population
growth / aging
resources
Changing
values
Increasingly globalised
economic growth
Increasing
Increasing
international
market
allocation of
liberalisation
capital
Growth of the global
market economy
Population
growth
Increasing migration
& urbanisation
Increasing
economic
disparity
Reduced
Increased permeation of
technology
Technology
permeation
employment
opportunity
Increasing environmental
degradation
Changing
health patterns
Changing
disease
burden
Population
aging
Changing
Increasing
patterns of land
environmental
management
pollution
Increased impact
of production on
the environment
Improving
healthcare
Figure 62: The final common driver groups and clusters (groups in green bubbles, clusters in white
bubbles)
These groupings were then used to inform the research team’s analysis of the inter-relationships among the
megatrends during the compilation of the templates in Annex I and in the development of the interactions
matrix in Chapter 4.
198
The tables below present each driver cluster, together with the specific drivers for each and an overview
description to give an indication of how it links to other driver-clusters and driver-groups.
Driver-cluster: Changing values
S4: Spread of radios, televisions and the internet in rural areas (exposure to
media stimulating consumerism)
S4: Changing consumption preferences
ENV2: Consumerism, favouring disposal over reuse
ENV1: Value shift: preference for individual transport Vs public transport
S6: Emphasis of economy on output and productivity (rather than wellbeing)
S4 / S6: Rebalancing of values
S4: Marketing and advertising
Consumption of goods and services will increase, as countries
get richer and fulfil basic needs, and as status and success is
expressed in terms of material goods. This trend is already
firmly entrenched in developed countries, and the amount
consumed is growing per person, but consumption is also
increasing due to the significant growth in consumer markets
as Asian economies develop and their populations expand.
The development of Asian economies is facilitated by
economic liberalisation.
Marketing and advertising seek to increase consumption.
The lifetime of consumer goods is relatively short, with a
significant proportion disposed of within months of
purchase. This contributes to the environmental impacts of
consumption.
Driver-cluster: Increased demand
ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand, especially by emerging economies and
biofuel demands by developed countries
ENV1: Global population growth
ENV1: Global population growth [driving demand for food and agricultural
production]
ENV1: Improved methods of extracting fossil water
T1 & T2: Thirst for new products and access to free information
T1 & T2: Consumer demand for new innovative products
T1 & T2: Consumer demand
T1 & T2: Human appetite for innovation and information
T1 & T2: Consumer’s choice
ENV1: Growth of economies e.g. China and India and demand for key high-tech
metals
ENV1(R): Upstream extraction of water resource
ENV1: Fossil water cheaper than alternatives
ENV1: Growth of resource demand, especially by emerging economies
ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand (timber and paper etc) especially by
emerging economies and biofule demands by developed countries
ENV1(R): Growth of resource demand, especially be emerging, more affluent,
economies and biofuel demands by developed countries – more international
trade and water use for export agriculture
ENV1: Water not priced to capture externality of dwindling supply
EC2: Change in diet (meat requires much more land than vegetable food
products)
ENV1: Agricultural subsidies
ENV3: Rising incomes increase demand for food, including meat
ENV1: Increasing incomes driving demand for energy services
EC2: Growth of resources demand by emerging economies
EC2: Increased demand
ENV1(R): Increasing demand for food / fuel linked to increasing affluence
S6: Demand for cheap food
T1 & T2: Changing demands and growing competition in a globalised economy
199
The global population rise will increase the demand for
natural resources. In addition, as the global middle class
expands more people will consume more goods and services,
which in turn will increase the exploitation of natural
resources.
As consumer preferences change, for example the increased
consumption of meat and dairy, the rate of resource use /
demand will increase per capita, and in net terms. Increased
resource use will also have negative impacts on the
environment, which will rise as more resources are
consumed. For example, increased consumption of fossil
fuels will increase the amount of greenhouse gases, which
could have a negative impact on the availability of water
resources due to climate change. Technological innovation is
driven by this resource demand, e.g. improving efficiency,
but also drives resource demand as new products and
technological applications require more resources.
Technological innovation and new applications of technology
is closely related to consumerism and the consumer market.
Driver-cluster: Increased scarcity of resources
ENV2: Slow uptake of new technology developments
ENV1: Climate change creating demand for alternative technologies requiring
high-tech metals
EC2: Loss of productive capacity of environment due to over exploitation and
pollution
ENV2: Development of zero emission vehicles
S6: Application of technology to farming
EC2: Growth of energy intensive consumer goods (e.g. air-conditioning)
ENV1: Concerns about impact on sensitive ecosystems of exploiting nonconventional fossil fuel sources
ENV3: Increase agricultural production in Canada, northern Europe and Asia
ENV1: Increasing options and efficiency of renewables
ENV1(R): Chemical and mechanical ‘abuse’ of soils
ENV1: Rising population in water-scarce area
ENV1(R): Increased use of productive land of urban development
ENV1(R): Urbanisation
ENV1: Growing demand for meat and dairy products (requiring more
phosphorus)
ENV1(R): Increasing demand for livestock products
ENV1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development
ENV1(R): Global population growth
ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand
ENV1(R): More water-intensive lifestyles, including increasing demand for
livestock products
ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand for water
ENV1: Demand for inexpensive water
ENV1(R): Irrigation schemes
ENV1(R): Biofules targets / directives
ENV1(R): Demand for building materials
EC1: Water shortages
EC1: Climate change may change productivity of agricultural land
EC2: Shifting mineral demand due to technological change
ENV1(R): Increasing demand for shrimp etc
ENV1: Improvements in extractive technology (e.g. non-conventional oil
reserves) extending effective life of fossil resources
EC3: Scarcity of natural resources
ENV1(R): Continued strong increase in paper, pulp and cardboard demand
ENV2: Waste treatment and disposal costs not sufficiently internalised
S4: Loss of arable land to fossil fuel extraction
ENV1(R): Coastal pollution
ENV1R): Pollution e.g. tropospeheric ozone
EC1: Scarcity of resources
EC2: Climate change leading to a reduction of arable land, shortage of water,
increased flooding and prolonged droughts
EC3: Scarcity of natural resources
S3: Scarcity of agricultural land
ENV3: Global population growth and increased demand for food
ENV2: Development of cheap disposable technologies
ENV1(R): Poor land management
T1 & T2: Rising concerns about food and energy security
T1 & T2: Growing concern over the stability of food supply, climate change,
water scarcity and resource depletion
T1 & T2: Increasing production costs/ price of oil and other resources (biofuels
et al. As substitute)
ENV1(R): Irrigated crop production
ENV1(R): Increasing demand for livestock products (and feed e.g. soy)
ENV1(R): Electricity demand (hydro, cooling water)
ENV1(R): increasing demand for and exploitation of wild fish
T1 & T2: Dematerialisation
200
The increasing consumption of natural resources, driven by
population increase, the emergence of a global middle class
and existing / growing consumerism, will lead to shortages
and scarcity of some natural resources. Economic
liberalisation and the growth of market economies are key
factors increasing the scarcity of resources, facilitating their
exploitation and in turn being supported by this exploitation.
In the future there will be less to go around per person, and
at the same time, each person will be consuming (or seeking
to consume) more. This will increase resource exploitation as
resources which have previously been economically unviable
become profitable (e.g. tar sand exploitation in Canada).
New technologies will also drive the exploitation of new
natural resources, or increase the exploitation of resources
for which there might not currently be a significant demand.
However novel technological applications could also reduce
resource demand by offering substitutes in place of scarce
resources, or by improving the efficiency of processes which
require input of natural resources.
Resource exploitation often has negative impacts on the
environment, and thus negative environmental impacts
would be likely to increase over time. Climate change could
exacerbate resource scarcity, e.g. water shortages, reducing
the agricultural productivity of agricultural land.
ENV1: Low rainfall and natural recharge
ENV1(R): Lack of resources for fisheries protection in developing countries
ENV1(R): Expansion of EU fishing activities in other parts of the world, such as
along West African coast
ENV1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Need for increased food production
T1 & T2: Energy efficiency
T1 & T2: Renewable energy
ENV1(R): Climate change is leading to a reduction or arable land, shortage of
water, increased droughts, desertification
ENV1(R): Climate change (increased fire frequency) and collapse of forest
ecosystems e.g. Amazonia
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
Driver-cluster: Employment opportunity
S3: Mechanisation of agriculture
S3: Changes in agricultural productivity
S6: Access to employment
ENV 2: Growth of industrial and transport sector
S6: Efficiency improvements leading to increased unemployment
S3: Innovation
S3: Lack of employment opportunities in urban areas
EC3: access to employment
S1: Access to employment
S6: Increase in (male)working age population in poorer, fast-growing countries
S1: Insufficient economic opportunities in home country
S3: Poverty induced rural-urban migration
S3: Land use policy
ENV3: Insufficient response to challenge of adaptation and mitigation
S3: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing
countries
ENV 3: Global markets comprising local food availability
ENV1(R): Low access to fertiliser and poor incentives for soil conserving
technologies with smallholders
ENV 3: Prohibitive costs of required defences
ENV 1(R): Lack of investment in agriculture in poor countries
The growth of populations in rural areas and the increasing
mechanisation of agriculture are likely to increase
unemployment in rural areas, driving people to migrate to
urban areas. Economic liberalisation, facilitating industrial relocation and foreign direct investment, provides employment
in urban areas, and acts as an added incentive for rural –
urban migration.
Increasing population decline in developed countries is likely
to drive migration from areas with increasing populations and
low employment opportunities. This is due to the need in
countries with declining populations to maintain a workforce
capable of supporting an elderly (non-working) population.
Climate change could increase the rate of migration, both
between countries and rural-urban, by reducing the
productivity of agricultural areas and reducing employment
opportunities.
S3: Foreign Direct Investment
EC3: industrial relocation
S6: Fall in working age population in advanced and emerging countries
ENV 3: Severe droughts and floods affecting food production
ENV 3: Increasing frequency of severe droughts and floods
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
Driver-cluster: Economic disparity
S1: Instability of the political system of home country is a factor of migration
ENV1: Urban planning that favours motorised transport or lack of urban
planning
S2: Low living standards for youth bulges
S3: Absence of well developed state pension system
S1: Environmental degradation
S1: Better information about migration possibilities
S1: Disproportionate growth in vulnerable regions
S1: Family links
201
There are several additional drivers important in migration /
urbanisation, although these drivers are not necessarily
similar. Some of the populations with the highest projected
increases in fertility levels are in countries with unstable
political systems, or the political system which do not provide
the social supports necessary to allow people to live
unsupported in rural areas. Increased inequality between
regions and countries will increase migration as people seek
opportunities. Population growth, particularly of young men,
S6: Improvement of commuting technology
S1: Religious factors
S1: Increased mobility
S3: Population displacements due to dam constructions
T1 & T2: Need for better living spaces
ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies
ENV 1(R): Increasing automation and scale of harvesting technologies
ENV 1(R): Poverty and insecure land tenure
ENV 1(R): Increased use of productive land for urban development
ENV 3: National strategies prioritising development over environment
ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel
ENV 3: Land competition for food / fuel
could lead to increased instability and trigEc1 migration.
Climate change could exacerbate political instability and
migration by reducing employment opportunities associated
with agriculture, or by triggering migration, e.g. due to sea
level rise.
Driver-cluster: Market liberalisation
S6: Economic growth and restructuring
Countries around the world are opening their economies to
global trade, most significantly in China and India. This
liberalisation process is supported by deliberate governance
policies designed to spur investment, develop export capacity
and internal markets. Increasing supranational cooperation
results in free trade agreements, but also in the rise of global
cartels and the formation of state backed monopolies based
on natural resources.
As economies open to trade, comparative wage difference
between developing and developing economies encourages
industrial re-location to take advantage of a more competitive
producer base. As more industries relocate, economies of
scale and producer specialisation increase price competition,
in turn increasing the incentive for industrial re-location.
Lower manufacturing costs result in cheaper consumer goods,
facilitating increased consumption and thus increased
resource exploitation. As industrial employment increases in
liberalised economies rural – urban migration increases as
people seek employment. A developing market economy,
increased industrialisation and urbanisation give rise to
environmental impacts. Developed countries shift to a service
based economy as their industry re-locates and their imports
increase. This shift to a service based economy is facititated
by technological innovation, particularly in information
services, and also drives further innovation in information
services.
S4: Economic policy choices
S6: Subsidies / taxation
S3: Industrial policy
S3: Market liberalisation and free trade
EC2: Market liberalisation
EC3: Market liberalisation
S4: Multinational companies entering Chinese and Indian market
S6: International trade
EC1: WTO
EC1: Rise of multi-nationals and anti-trust laws
Ec1: (more) supranational cooperation / coordination
EC2: Global cartel formations
S6: Producer specialisation
S6: Price competition
EC1: Shifts in international competiveness
EC1: Increasing productivity levels in BRICs
T1 & T2: Globalisation in societal activities (education)
T1 & T2: Switch to service-oriented economy continues
T1 & T2: Competitiveness concerns and opportunities
Driver-cluster: Growth of the global market economy
S6: Rapid economic growth
EC2: Growth of Asian consumer market
S4: Increasing incomes
S6: Economic development
Economic progress in BRICs
S4: Development of a state pension / health care system and the resulting
changes in household savings rates
S4: State policy to develop the consumer market
EC2: Policies which encourage development of market economy
EC3: Foreign Direct Investment
EC3: Industrial relocation
EC1: Increased diffusion of technology
T1 & T2: Potential for job creation increases social demand (biotechnology)
T1 & T2: Job creation prospects (information sciences)
202
As economies develop their consumer market develops,
incomes increase and consumption increases. Policies which
develop the state pension and health systems allow people to
save less and spend more, contributing to the growth of the
market economy.
Foreign Direct Investment and industrial re-location in China
and India provide the employment necessary to simulate
demand for goods and services in these developing
economies, and the associated rise in incomes in turn
encourages more investment and more manufacturing /
industry. Combined with population growth and economic
reforms in China and India, the size of the global market
economy is likely to increase significantly. This is likely to
increase global consumption and increase pressure on natural
T1 & T2: Commercial expectations and growth of potential NBIC markets
(household products, pharmaceuticals, industrial goods, agrifood sector,etc.)
T1 & T2: Increased diffusion of technology
T1 & T2: Globalisation in economic activities
T1 & T2: Decreased cost of computing components
resources, e.g. water and agricultural land.
In developed countries, technological innovation in NBICs may
potentially drive the next wave of growth as recent discoveries
are exploited on a wide scale.
Driver-cluster: International allocation of capital
S4: Availability of new financing options
EC1: Integration of capital markets
EC3: Inter-connectivity of markets
S6: Globalisation of industry
EC2: Globalised markets
EC1: Increased trade levels
EC1: Developments in ICT
T1 & T2: Increased diffusion of technology
Developments in ICT have facilitated the development of new
financing options which have encouraged the integration of
financial and capital markets. Combined with economic
liberalisation and the globalisation of industry, this
internationalisation of financial capital has spurred investment
in developing economies, enabling the growth of regional and
the global economy.
Driver-cluster: Land management
ENV 1: Expanding irrigation-based agriculture
ENV 2: Population and agricultural growth
ENV 3: Climate change putting pressure on habitats
ENV 1(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment
EC2: Technological solutions to increase crop yield
ENV 1(R): Genertic engineering behind monoculture of crops and cultivars
ENV 1: Intensive farming techniques require more phosphorus
ENV 1(R): Poor economic incentives for bio-diverse agro-ecological production
systems
ENV 1(R): Monoculture with reduced diversity and resilience
ENV 3: Prevalence of unsustainable agricultural practice
ENV 3: Global population growth and increased demand
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
As the population and wealth of the world increases, and
particularly the size and wealth of the global middle-class,
pressure on the worlds limited resources increases,
particularly in relation to agricultural land. To obtain
increased harvests from productive land technological
solutions are applied which increase the intensity of land
management. These technological applications may be
positive, such as facilitating a reduction in the amount of
fertilizer used, or may be harmful, such as increasing
mechanisation which increases erosion of soil. In addition,
agricultural land is likely to face increased pressure between
growing biofuels or food.
Climate change may compound the pressure on agricultural
land by changing the productive capacity of the land,
increasing the demand for biofuels or changing rainfall
patterns. Economic liberalisation coupled with increasing
demand may result in more countries farming the agricultural
land of other countries for their own purposes.
Driver-cluster: Production and the environment
ENV 1(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment
S4: Shift of industrial production from developed countries to developing
countries
LEI: Pollution due to production transfer and waste trade to developing
countries
ENV 1(R): Poor governance and enforcement of national legislation
ENV 2: Lack of inter-country co-ordination
ENV 2: National strategies prioritising development but not keeping up with
waste management strategies and regulations
ENV 2: Transfer of waste from high-income to low-income countries
ENV 2: Commercial viability of ‘dirty’ technologies e.g. brick kilns in
developing countries
T1 & T2: Prospects for innovative tools for soil protection, waste reduction,
treatment and reduction of use of agrochemicals
ENV 2: Technologies for lower pollution levels not widely applied
ENV 2: Shift in chemical production to countries with lower environmental
203
In addition to increased employment, industrial relocation
associated with economic liberalisation can, depending on the
environmental policies of the recipient country, increase
environmental pollution.
It can also lead to reduced
environmental pollution in the donor country as the pollution
relocates along with the industry. The cost of environmental
pollution, or environmental impacts, associated with industrial
processes is often not reflected in the price of the final
product. This can result in the over exploitation of resources,
e.g. water, and lead to increased pollution.
The capacity of the environment to absorb pollutants and
provide ecosystem services is likely to be diminished by
climate change. Combined with projected increases in
population stimulating increased demand, the net result in
likely to be damaged ecosystems and reduced provision of
ecosystem services. There is, however, the possibility that
advances related to NBIC technologies may offer viable means
standards
ENV 2: Technology for reduced particulate emissions not widely applied
ENV 3: Target delivery systems not well-developed
ENV 1(R): Increaseing automation and scale of harvesting technologuy (sea
and sea floor)
EC1: Climate change
T1 & T2: Climate change
of reducing the environmental impact of industrial process.
Due to the relative immaturity of these technologies it is
difficult to predict what exactly they might offer, but the
possibility is there.
Driver-cluster: Pollution
ENV2: Limited capacity of ecosystems to absorb waste
ENV1: Contamination of aquifer by salt water in coastal areas
ENV1: Increase in invasive alien species
ENVR: Climate change (coral) and ocean acidification
T1 & T2: Prospects for environmental remediation, such as wastewater
treatment, energy storage, decrease of volume of discarded devises
(nanotechnology)
ENV1(R) Climate change and pollution
ENV2: Population and increased demand
ENV2: Limited treatment options available
ENV2: Difficulty of quantifying and capturing external costs
ENV3: Poor governance and enforcement of national legislation
ENV2: Lack of awareness
ENV2: Lack of inter-country co-ordination
ENV2: Scope of international agreements too limited
ENV1(R): Lack of governance / political will and enforcement of legislation
ENV(R): National strategies prioritising development over environment
ENV2: Inertia in dealing with non-crisis problems
ENV2: Lack in inter-country co-ordination
ENV1(R): Lack of governance and enforcement of legislation
ENV2: Viability of dirty fuels in households
ENV 2: Low awareness of risks associated with spread of chemicals in the
environment and the subsequent exposure to humans and ecosystems
ENV2: Insufficient public awareness and education
ENV 2: Growth of transport sector
ENV 2: Awareness of waste as a problem growing, but not always understood
ENV 3: Increased settlement in coastal areas e.g. urbanisation /
industrialisation along in developed countries
ENV 2: Low understanding of alternatives
ENV 1(R): Water pollution externalities not captures by markets where
pressures currently on increase
ENV 2: Excess fertiliser application
ENV 3: Water pricing not realistic – water still often seen as a free good
ENV (R): Economic benefits of biodiversity (e.g. as source of new medicines)
not captured in countries where genetic resource is found
ENV 2: Increased consumption and innovation in the chemical industry
ENV 3: Lack of innovation
T1 & T2: Climate change
Pollution increases as the through-put of resources in the
global economy increases. Thus the projected increase in
population and the rise of a global middle class may increase
pollution globally; however marked regional disparity is likely.
The increase in the demand for consumer electronics, which
often use small quantities of heavy metals in forms difficult to
recycle, is likely to significantly increase pollution in the longterm. Coastal water pollution, driven by industrial processes
and urbanisation, and linked to the pollution of river systems,
is likely to increase over the long-term.
Climate change is likely to compound coastal water pollution,
reducing river flows and concentrating pollutants and
potentially increasing migration towards urban areas.
Driver-cluster: Improving healthcare
T1 & T2: Improved gene sequencing technologies
T1 & T2: Health care improvements
T1 & T2: Ageing population strives for higher quality of life
S5: Increasing concern with wellness
The application of technological innovation to
healthcare is leading to advances in the standard of care
available, increasing the range of treatable diseases and
allowing people to live longer and healthier lives. This
204
S2: Improvements in health technology
S5: Emerging economies have resources to improve access to
healthcare
S6: Improved access to sanitation and clean drinking water
S6: Increased vaccination against existing and persistent diseases
S6: Improvements in, and increased access to, healthcare/ health
systems
S5: Existing inequalities in wealth and access to healthcare
S1: Longevity
S6: Reduced cost of drugs
S5: Reduced disease burden of infactious diease
S5: Application of novel technologies, e.g. nanotechnologies
ENV1(R): Improvements in sanitation (reducing pressure)
S2: Increasing living standards and healthcare for population aging
S5: Increasing range of treatable diseases
S6: Increased divide in levels of exposure to environmental hazards
between rich and poor
S5: Improved environmental standards (developed countries)
S6: Increased government spend on basic healthcare
S1: Reduced disease burden of infectious disease
S5: Improvements in health technology
S6: Risk of bacterial resistance to medicines
S6: Wider range of treatable diseases
S2: Longevity
S1: Improved healthcare
health-related technological innovation is driven by
ageing populations, wealthier populations and success
in treating infectious diseases in developing countries.
These technological improvements in healthcare are not
available on an equal basis as they are often expensive,
and this expense may become increasingly important as
the population of Europe ages towards 2050.
Populations in developing countries are also
experiencing improved health, due to the increase in
government spend on basic healthcare, combined with
improvements related to basic sanitation, vaccination
programmes,
and
increased
availability
of
contraceptives.
Driver-cluster: Changing disease burden
S6: Less need for physical activity during work or leisure time
ENV3: Vaccination programmes lack universality
T1 & T2: Aging of population (increase mental illness)
ENV3: Governments insufficiently committed disease prevention
(public health) programmes
ENV3: Insufficient resources for vaccines and medicines in developing
countries
ENV3: Climate change leading to spread of disease vectors
T1 & T2: Increasing healthcare costs
S6: Changing attitudes to food and eating habits
S6: Increased availability of food
S6: Hierarchical class structure
S6: Changing income distribution (increased social inequality)
S6: Reduced cost of food (often weighted towards high calorie / low
nutrient foods)
ENV3: Insufficient resources for vaccines and medicines in developing
countries
S6: Climate change
S3: Absence of well developed health care system
S5: Lack of research into neglected / orphan diseases
S6: Technological innovation reducing physical activbity
ENV3: Governments insufficiently committed disease prevention
(public health) programmes
S6: Physical effort engineered out of the built environment in cities
and towns
205
Health improvements associated with new technologies
are limited when the resources are not available to
implement them. This is principally an issue in the
poorest developing countries which do not have the
resources to provide basic sanitation or vaccination
programmes. In the poorest developing countries,
population growth is compounding access to healthcare,
reducing the resources available per person and
overwhelming underfunded healthcare systems.
In developed countries, decreasing health is associated
with non-infectious disease, often associated with
obesity and ageing. Obesity is an increasing trend in
developed countries and is also emerging as a trend in
other less developed countries (China, India, Brazil). As
a population ages, the proportion of certain
degenerative diseases increases, such as Alzheimer’s,
Parkinson’s disease etc. These diseases have significant
cost implications for national health systems.
S6: Failure to implement vaccination programmes
S6: Direct marketing of food
ENV3: Vaccination programmes lack universality
S5: Healthcare policies that put the cost of healthcare onto individuals
(increasing the cost of healthcare and increasing health inequalities)
Population growth
S2: Little access and / or information about contraception
S4: Shifts in demographic composition
S2: Better medical supply decreases infant mortality
S2: Fertility levels
S5: Lack of education
S2: Declining infant mortality influence youth bulges
The global population is increasing, and this is likely to
continue to 2050. Global population growth is driven by
high fertility levels, which is closely linked to poverty
and poor access to contraceptives.
In addition,
improved medical supply decreases infant mortality,
contributing to population growth.
Population growth is likely to have significant impacts
on global resource consumption, and thus on
environmental pollution and climate change. It may
also contribute to migration and urbanisation.
Population decline
S4: Longevity
EC3: Aging population in developed countries
S2: High HIV / AIDS prevalence is a major cause of premature adult
deaths
S1: Education (esp. Women)
S2: Better medical supply increases longevity
S6: Changing patterns of sexual behaviour
S4: Improvements in health technology
S1: Improvements n health technology increasing longevity
S1: Increasing living standards and healthcare
S5: Low fertility
S1: Diffusion of information on contraceptives
EC3: Low fertility rates in developed countries
S1: Availability of effective contraceptives
S2: Improved healthcare
S5: Increased gender equality and education of women
S5: Reduction in proportion of working age population in aging
societies
S1: Fertility levels
Low fertility rates in developed countries change the
demographic composition of populations, leading to a
higher proportion of older people. Low fertility levels
are associated with the education of women and an
increased role of women in the working population, and
increased use of contraceptives. The effects of low
fertility levels on population aging are complimented by
advances in medical technology which help people to
live longer and healthier.
Older populations are more susceptible to certain
degenerative diseases, which are expensive to treat and
could pose a significant cost to national health services,
especially if combined with a fall in the proportion of
working people. Elderly populations are also more
susceptible to the extreme weather effects predicted as
a consequence of climate change.
In certain developing countries where the HIV / AIDS
epidemic is particularly prevalent, the proportion of
elderly (and young) people in the population is
increasing as the virus increases mortality amongst the
those people in the middle-aged bracket. The people in
this age bracket are typically the working-age of the
population, and thus this change to demographics has
significant social implications for the affected
developing countries.
Increased permeation of technology
T1 & T2: New military devices, monitoring systems and surveillance
systems
ENV1: Changing behaviour e.g. increased demand for electronic
devices containing high-tech (rare earth) metals
206
The rate of technological innovation is increasing, as is
the range of issues for which technological applications
are being developed for. This is likely to continue and
accelerate to 2050. Recent developments in nano, bio
T1 & T2: ubiquitous broadband
T1 & T2: Increased device complexity / multifunctional devices
T1 & T2: Development of knowledge society
T1 & T2: Advances in molecular biology
EC3: Increased diffusion of technology
T1 & T2: Better knowledge of the decision making processes toward
environmental friendly actions
T1 & T2: Developments of ICT mimicking human brain
T1 & T2: Need for flexibility
T1 & T2: Competition for new resources
T1 & T2: Wireless networks
T1 & T2: Decreased device size
T1 & T2: Development of innovative devices
T1 & T2: Improved processing power
T1 & T2: Need for new molecular tools for bio-medical research
S5: Long-term (post 2020/2030) human ‘enhancement’ with
technology (bio/nano/IT)
EC2: Technological solutions to water management
ENV1(R): Development of desalinisation technology
EC2: Developing alternative resources
T1 & T2: Global pandemics requiring new therapeutic tools
T1 & T2: Development of transportation devices
ENV1: Rare earth metals in new technology
T1 & T2: Development of robotics
T1 & T2: New social movements facilitate by ICT
T1 & T2: Need for GM models for medical and biological research
T1 & T2: Demand for decreasing size of technological applications
T1 & T2: Changes in educational approaches
T1 & T2: Quality of life – information sharing (video-conferences,
blogs, social networks etc.)
ENV1: Climate change concerns leading to improve energy efficiency
and switch to renewable forms of energy
T1 & T2: Need for better prostheses and ortheses
T1 & T2: Need for new active molecules in pharmaceutics
ENV1: Resources to promote new technologies
207
and information technologies have the potential for
significant impacts on society and the environment.
However the potential impacts of technology are not
limited to these specific technological innovations, but
could be related to the increasing degree to which
technology permeates people’s lives.
Technology
facilitates
globalisation
and
the
development of the global consumer market, increases
resource exploitation, improves the efficiency of
resource use and improves healthcare. Thus the
permeation of technology, as well as being a megatrend
in its own right, also serves to modulate the range and
degree of other megatrends.
The drivers for the
increased permeation of technology are many, but can
be summarised as a need to respond the many of the
challenges posed by the other megatrends identified.
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